

Śāntideva's Critique of 'I' or Self in the Early and Later Recensions of the *Bodhi(sattva)caryāvatāra*

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I

Śāntideva's *Bodhi(sattva)caryāvatāra* provides an analytical criticism of 'I' or Self with twenty or twenty-one stanzas in its early and later recensions.¹ These stanzas are included in Chapter 8 entitled "Instruction of Wisdom" (Shes rab bstand pa) of the early recension and in Chapter 9 entitled "Perfection of Wisdom" (*Prajñāpāramitā*) of the later.² Śāntideva's criticism is centered on the reality of 'I' (*aham*) or Self (*ātman*). The purpose of this article is to offer a comparative analysis of Śāntideva's critique on 'I' or Self as found in the two recensions of the *Bodhi(sattva)caryāvatāra*.

The following diagram shows an outline of the difference between the two versions in regard to the above topic: (In this diagram, dash (—) means "wanting", and sign "±" indicates that the stanza is mostly identical with its corresponding stanza in the left column but still appears to contain partial difference.)

Early	Later	Early	Later	Later	Early	Later	Early
37	58	47	—	58	37	69ab	±44cd
38	59	48	—	59	38	69cd	—
39	60	49	—	60	—	70	—
40	—	50	—	61	—	71	—
41	—	51	—	62	—	72	—
42	—	52	—	63	—	73	—
43	—	53	±76	64	—	74	—
44ab	—	54	—	65	—	75	55
44cd	±69ab	55	75	66	—	76	±53
45	—	56	—	67	—	77	—
46	—	68	—	78	—		

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¹ See A. Saito, "Tonkō Shutsudo *Akṣayamati Saku Nyūbosatsugyōron to sono Shūhen" ("*Bodhisattva-caryāvatāra* as Found in the Tibetan Manuscripts from Dūn-huáng", *Chibetto no Bukkyō to Shakai (Buddhism and Society in Tibet)*, Tokyo, 1986, pp.79–109; *do.*, *A Study of Akṣayamati (=Śāntideva)'s Bodhisattva-caryāvatāra as Found in the Tibetan Manuscripts from Tun-huang*, Research Report of the Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C), Mie University, 1993.

² *Ibid.*, p.(33). For a discussion of Śāntideva's criticism of Self (*ātman*) as given in the later recension of BCA, see also Y. Ejima, "Śāntideva no Ātman Hihan (Śāntideva's Critique of *Ātman*)", *Ga no Shisō (Philosophy of Self)*, Volume in Honour of Prof. S. Mayeda on his Sixtieth Birthday, 1991, pp.213–223.

As is shown in the above diagram, only five and half stanzas are common to both recensions, of which only four are exactly identical. The two versions also differ in the order and nature of the discussion topics, the synopses of which are as follows:

Early Version (hereafter BSA-I):

- 1 Critique of 'I' (*aham*)
 - 1.1 kk.37–39: Parts of the body such as teeth, hair or nails etc. and internal organs are not 'I'.
 - 1.2 kk.40–41: Mind or heart is not 'I'.
 - 1.3 k.42: Eighteen elements (*aṣṭādaśadhātavaḥ*) such as eyes and nose etc. are not 'I'.
 - 1.4 k.43: Mental functions such as pleasure, suffering, desire and anger etc. are not 'I'.
 - 1.5 k.44ab: What has consciousness is not 'I'.
 - 1.6 k.44cd: What lacks consciousness is not 'I'.
- 2 Impermanence of the Body, and the Possibility of Action and its Consequence etc.
 - 2.1 kk.45–47: Possibility of Action and its Consequence
 - 2.2 kk.48–52: Impermanence of the Body
 - 2.3 kk.53–54: Possibility of Sympathy
- 3 Conclusion: kk.55–56

Later Version (BCA):

- 1 Critique of 'I' (*aham*): kk.58–60
- 2 Discussions on the Negation of Self
 - 2.1 Critique of Non-Buddhists' Concepts of Self
 - 2.1.1 kk.61–68: Negation of the Self defined as having consciousness by the Sāṃkhya etc.
 - 2.1.2 kk.69–70: Negation of the Self defined as lacking consciousness by the Vaiśeṣika etc.
 - 2.2 On Buddhist theory of Not-Self
 - kk.71–73: Possibility of Action and its Consequence
 - k.74: Heart is not 'I'.
 - kk.76–78ab: Possibility of Sympathy
- 3 Conclusion: kk.75, 78cd

II

It requires only a glance to reveal the fact that the two versions significantly differ in discussing the topic of 'I' or Self. The early recension, now available only in the Tibetan manuscripts from Dūn-huáng³, focuses on the criticism of 'I'. On the other hand, the later version has shifted, especially after the first three stanzas, the main object of critique from 'I'

³ Stein Nos.628, 629, 630-I; Pelliot No.794.

in the sense of a subject or a subjective entity to the Self as defined by some philosophical schools such as Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika. The above discrepancy between the two versions should be noted since it also reflects a subtle but significant difference in the motifs of the two recensions. The early recension emphatically shows, with a repeated expression of the 1st singular form of pronoun or verb, how a bodhisattva should maintain his/her everyday practice.⁴ On the other hand, the later version has attached greater importance to doctrinal explanation and at times some critiques of other Buddhist or non-Buddhist doctrines. Of those significant differences in motif found between the two recensions, this part in Chapter 9, in which 'I' or Self is critically discussed, may provide one of the best examples.

Prior to the part in question are commonly found the following two stanzas:

“Granted that something which causes suffering causes fear, but emptiness relieves suffering(/fear, according to the early recension). So why does it cause fear?”

sdug bsngal skyed dngos gang yin pa// de las 'jigs pa skye grang na//
stong nyid 'jigs pa zhi byed na// de yis 'jigs skyer ci zhig yod// (BSA-I, VIII.35)⁵
*yad duḥkḥajananaṃ vastu trāsas tasmāt prajāyatām/
śūnyatā duḥkḥaśamanī tataḥ kiṃ jāyate bhayaṃ//* (BCA IX.56)

“If there is something called 'I', fear may come from any quarter whatsoever; but if 'I' am nothing whatsoever, whose fear will it be?”

bdag ces bya ba 'ga' yod na// ci yang rung las 'jigs grang na//
bdag nyid cung zad yod myin na// su zhig la ni 'jigs par 'gyur// (BSA-I, VIII.36)⁶
*yatas tato vāstu bhayaṃ yady ahaṃ nāma kiṃcana/
ahaṃ eva na kiṃcic ced bhayaṃ kasya bhaviṣyati//* (BCA IX.57)

In this way, denying equally the existence of 'I', both recensions claim that meditation on emptiness should be encouraged and should not be feared.⁷

Then, the two recensions start on an analytical criticism of 'I' as was shown under the

⁴ See M. Kajihara, “*Bodhicaryāvatāra* no Kihon-Seikaku—Ichinshō no Imi-surumono—” (The *Bodhicaryāvatāra* for Ritual Recitation), *Machikaneyama Ronsō*, Philosophy, 1991, pp.25–38.

⁵ Hereafter the texts of BSA-I and BCA are cited respectively from A. Saito, *A Study of the Dūn-huáng Recension of the Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra*, Research Report of the Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C), Mie University, 2000, pp.53–56, and I. P. Minayev, “*Bodhicaryāvatāra*” (see BCA in the ABBREVIATIONS AND TEXTS), pp.212–214.

⁶ BSA-I, Saito, *op.cit.* (*A Study of the Dūn-huáng Recension ...*), p.53.29–32 (Stein No.628, Ka 20a8); BCA, p.212.11–12.

⁷ Cf. BSAV, Saito, *op.cit.* (*A Study of Akṣyamati (=Śāntideva)'s Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra ...*), p.76.4–6 (D No.3873, La 345a4–5): da ni las dang po pa dag stong pa nyid kyi rnal 'byor bsgom pa la mi skrag par bya'o zhes bstan pa'i phyt/ sdug bsngal bskyed dngos [k.35a] zhes bya ba la sogs pa smos so//; BCA IX. 54cd–55: *tasmān nirvicikitsena bhāvanīyaiva śūnyatā/* (54cd), *kleśajñeyāvṛtitamaḥ pratipakṣo hi śūnyatā/ śīghraṃ sarvajñatākāmo na bhāvayati tāṃ katham//* (55)

heading “1 Critique of ‘I’ (*aham*)” in the above synopses. The first three verses point out that I am neither any parts of the body nor the six consciousnesses such as eye-consciousness etc., expressed commonly, “The teeth, hair, or nails are not I, nor is the bone, nor am I the blood. . . . I am neither the orifices [of the body] nor at all the six consciousnesses.” (BSA-I, VIII.37–39; BCA IX.58–60).⁸ The reason for the above discussion explained by the BSAV, the only commentary extant on the BSA-I, is that these teeth etc. are impermanent and many, but on the other hand ‘I’ am permanent and one⁹; and the six consciousnesses perceive the objects such as form etc. separately, but ‘I’ perceive all [the objects of the six sense organs].¹⁰

From here, both versions differ considerably in their criticism of ‘I’ or Self. In the subsequent stanzas from 40 to 43, the early recension discusses that ‘I’ am neither mental organ (*manas*) [k.40ab], nor mind (*citta*) in the future, present or past [kk.40cd–41], nor eyes or ears [k.42], nor pleasure (*sukha*) or suffering, nor am ‘I’ lust (*rāga*) or hatred (*dveṣa*) etc. [k.43ab]. It means in brief that ‘I’ am neither mind nor mental faculties (*caitta*). From this discussion, the early recension draws the conclusion that there is nothing that can be ‘I’.¹¹ Thus, it stresses the importance of bodhisattva’s meticulous observations of the fact that not only parts of the body but also mind and mental faculties are not ‘I’, which, while reciting these stanzas, the bodhisattva or the Mahāyāna practitioner is expected to recognize by him/her-self. On the other hand, the later recension has deleted all these four stanzas.¹²

III

Hereafter, the biggest difference occurs between the two recensions. The early recension states as follows:

“That which is conscious (**cetana*) and different from this very mind is not [‘I’], like a pot. That which is unconscious (**acetana*) is also not ‘I’ since it lacks consciousness, like a pot.” (BSA-I, VIII.44)

sems ’di nyid ni ma gtogs pa’// sems pa yod myin bum pa bzhin//

sems pa myed pa’ang bdag myind te// sems pa myed phyir bum ba bzhin//

It may safely be said that the author of this stanza has at least two premises regarding ‘I’ or Self. In the first place it must be conscious, and secondly it cannot be different from

⁸ BSA-I, Saito, *op.cit.*, p.54.1–13 (Stein No.628, Ka 20a8–b2); BCA, p.212.13–18.

⁹ BSAV, Saito, *op.cit.*, p.76.15–17 (D No.3873, La 345a6–7): so la sogs pa de dag ni mi rtag pa du ma yin pa’i phyir dang/ bdag ni rtag pa gcig pu yin pa’i phyir ro//

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p.76.22–24 (D No.3873, La 345b1): de dag ni yul gzugs la sogs pa rnam la so sor ’dzin pa yin la/ bdag ni thams cad la ’dzin pa’i phyir/

¹¹ BSA-I, Saito, *op.cit.*, p.54.28–29 (Stein No.628, Ka 20b4): de ltar bdag tu rung ba gang// de ni ’ga’ yang yod ma yin//

¹² Like BSA-I, kk.40cd–41, the later recension has indeed a similar stanza k.74 which argues that ‘I’ am neither past or future mind, nor am ‘I’ present mind; however, this stanza seems to be placed rather out of context.

our ordinary mind. Upon these premises, the author appears to criticize two types of Self (*ātman*) as defined differently by some non-Buddhist schools in terms of consciousness or non-consciousness. The Sāṃkhya's Spirit (*puruṣa*) and the Vaiśeṣika's Self (*ātman*) constitute those typical examples. Therefore, the BSAV adds an introductory remark to this stanza as follows:

“Now, in order to explain that neither Self regarded by the Sāṃkhya, [one of the schools of] heretics, as being conscious, nor Self regarded by the Vaiśeṣika as being unconscious can be a Self since the two are recognized [by them] as being different from mind, [Ācārya Akṣayamati]¹³, the author of the BSA-I] said, ‘[That which is conscious and different from] this very mind’, and so on.”¹⁴

In the Sāṃkhya system, in fact, only the Spirit (*puruṣa*), which is also later called “Self” (*ātman*), is defined as being conscious. In contrast, our ordinary mind corresponding to intellect (*buddhi*) or more widely to the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) composed of intellect, ‘I’-consciousness (*ahaṃkāra*) and mental organ (*manas*) is regarded in this system as being unconscious, just like their ultimate cause, i.e. the Original-matter (*prakṛti*).¹⁵

On the other hand, in the Vaiśeṣika system, Self is defined as one of the 9 substances (*dravya*) and placed originally in a different category from that of 17 — later 24 — attributes (*guṇa*) such as pleasure, suffering, and intellect (*buddhi*) etc., though it is — before liberation — accidentally connected with some of the attributes including intellect.¹⁶ The Vaiśeṣika system also refers to mental organ (*manas*) as one of the 9 substances. In this system, the Self is thus a different substance from mental organ and also belongs to a different category from that of intellect. The Self as defined by the Vaiśeṣika has the nature of unconsciousness (*acidrūpa*) and can indeed be conscious, but not by itself and only through its connection with consciousness (*cetanā*).¹⁷ According to both the BSA-I, VIII.44 and the above-cited commentary on it from the BSAV, the Sāṃkhya's Spirit cannot be ‘I’ since, even if defined

¹³ For the author's name *Akṣayamati, see A. Saito, “Akṣayamati to Śāntideva” (Akṣayamati and Śāntideva), *Higashi-Ajia Bukkyō — sono Seiritsu to Tenkai (Eastern Buddhism — Its Formation and Development, Volume in Honour of Prof. K. Kimura on his Sixtieth Birthday)*, 2002, pp.533–551.

¹⁴ BSAV, Saito, *op.cit.*, p.79.1–5 (D No.3873, La 346b1–2): da ni mu stegs Grangs can pas bdag sems pa yod pa'i bdag nyid du 'dod pa dang/ Bye brag pa'i sems pa med pa bdag nyid du 'dod pa de dag gnyis ka yang sems las ma gtogs pa nyid du khas blangs pa'i phyr/ bdag nyid yin par mi 'thad do zhes bstan pa'i don du sems 'di nyid ni [44a] zhes bya ba la sog spa smos so//. For different characterizations of the Self in terms of consciousness (*cetana*) and unconsciousness (*acetana*) given by the Indian philosophical schools, see Sh. Murakami, “Seishinsei (*caitanya*) wo meguru Shoriron” (Theories on the Spirituality (*caitanya*), *Tōhokudaijaku-bungakubu-kiyō* 45, 1995, pp.1–38.

¹⁵ Cf. SK.11; BCAP p.456.5: *citsvabhāvātmavādināḥ Sāṃkhyādayaḥ*.

¹⁶ Cf. NM II, p.80: *ātmanas ca sukhaduḥkhabuddhyādaya āgantukā guṇā...*

¹⁷ Cf. NM II, p.6.26: *sa cetanaś citā yogāt tadyogena vinā jaḍaḥ!*

as being conscious, it is regarded in their system as being different from mind; on the other hand, the Vaiśeṣika's Self also cannot be 'I' since it lacks consciousness. Therefore, the former Spirit or Self is comparable to a pot in the sense that it is, like a pot, different from mind, while the latter Self is also compared to a pot since it lacks consciousness, like a pot.

IV

The early recension has only one stanza, i.e. BSA-I, VIII.44, in which the author apparently refers to Self. The purpose for this reference is, as mentioned above, to encourage a bodhisattva to make sure that not only physical or mental elements but also the Self defined differently in terms of consciousness or non-consciousness is not 'I'. Confirming this fact, the bodhisattva is expected to free him/her-self from fear since he/she then understands that fear belongs to none.¹⁸ Therefore, the intension of the early version is not to directly criticize the Self, but rather to make sure that the Self, being conscious or unconscious, also cannot be 'I'.

On the other hand, the later recension, gives a more detailed critique of the Self, expanding one verse into ten stanzas. Although they may probably be a later interpolation, these new stanzas interestingly deepened the quality of the discussion. It is clear that in comparison with the early recension, the later has expanded the first half of the BSA-I, VIII.44 into 8 stanzas (BCA IX.61–68) and the latter half into 2 verses (IX.69–70).

Let us now turn to those 10 stanzas in detail. Śāntideva's critique of Sāṃkhya's Spirit starts with the following two verses:

“If it were consciousness of sound, then sound would be perceived at all times. But without the object of consciousness, what does it perceive on account of which there is said to be consciousness?” (IX.61)

*śabdajñānaṃ yadi tadā śabdo gṛhyate sarvadā/
jñeyaṃ vinā tu kiṃ vetti yena jñānaṃ nirucyate//*

“If what is not conscious [of anything] is consciousness, it follows that a stick is consciousness. Therefore, it is certain that there is no consciousness in the non-proximity of the object of consciousness.” (IX.62)

*ajānānaṃ yadi jñānaṃ kāṣṭhaṃ jñānaṃ prasajyate/
tenāsamnihitajñeyaṃ jñānaṃ nāstīti niścayaḥ//*

These two stanzas point out the first fault to be found with the Sāṃkhya's Spirit or Self defined as being conscious. The criticism is here given on the premise that the Spirit or Self is permanent. In the Sāṃkhya doctrine, the Spirit or Self is in fact regarded both as one who sees (*draṣṭṛ*, SK.19), enjoys (*bhokṭṛ*, SK.17) and is conscious [of something] (*jñā*, SK.2), and

¹⁸ See BSA-I, kk.35–36, cited in the section II.

as permanent (*nitya*, G ad SK.11).

Moreover, in the following four stanzas from 63 to 66, Śāntideva indicates the second fault to be found with the same doctrine. The critique is directed to a possible understanding of the essential nature of the Spirit or Self as being conscious [of something] (*jñā* or *cit/cetana*). The fault is found, according to Śāntideva, when it is postulated that the consciousness of sound is identical with that of form. The criticism is in this case given on the premise that the Spirit or Self is identical regardless of the objects of consciousness.¹⁹

“[If] the same [consciousness of sound] is conscious of form, why does it not also hear at the same time? If [you say] because of non-proximity of sound, then the consciousness of that [sound] is also non-existent.” (IX.63)

*tad eva rūpaṃ jānāti tadā kiṃ na śṛṇoty api/
śabdasyāsaṃnidhānāc cet tatas tajjñānam apy asat//*

“How does that whose nature is to perceive sound perceive form? One person is imagined both as father and as son but not in reality.” (IX.64)

*śabdagrahaṇarūpaṃ yat tad rūpagrahaṇaṃ katham/
ekah pitā ca putras ca kalpyate na tu tattvataḥ//*

“Because [according to your doctrine] ‘goodness’ (*sattva*), ‘passion’ (*rajas*), and also ‘darkness’ (*tamas*) are neither father nor son. But the essential nature endowed with the perception of sound is not observed in that [consciousness of form].” (IX.65)

*sattvaṃ rajas tamo vāpi na putro na pitā yataḥ/
śabdagrahaṇayuktas tu svabhāvas tasya nekṣyate//*

“[If you argue:] The same [consciousness] is [observed] in another nature, like an actor. [We respond:] He too is transient (*aśāśvata*). If the same has a different nature, it has an unprecedented kind of unity.” (IX.66)

*tad evānyena rupeṇa naṭavat so 'py aśāśvataḥ/
sa evānyasvabhāvas ced apūrveyaṃ tadekatā//*

The last fault related to the second one above that Śāntideva points out to be found with the

¹⁹ Cf. TS 287, 288: *tatrāpi rūpaśabdādicetasāṃ vedyate katham/ suvyaktaṃ bhedavad rūpaṃ ekā cec cetaneṣyate//* (277), *ekarūpe ca caitanye sarvakālam avasthite/ nānāvīdhārthabhoktrvaṃ katham nāmopadyate//* (278) (pp.111–112) “Also in this [Sāṃkhya’s doctrine], if what is conscious is regarded as one, how is it that the cognitions of form, sound etc. have clearly differentiated nature?” “And if what is conscious and of one nature continues to exist at all times, how is it possible that it is the enjoyer of objects of many kinds?” For Śāntarakṣita’s critique of the Sāṃkhya’s theory of Self, see M. Hattori, “Shinrikōyō ni okeru Garon-hihan — Mīmāṃsā, Sāṃkhya no Sōtei suru Ga no Kōsatsu” (On the Critique of the Sāṃkhya’s theory of Self in the *Tattvasaṃgraha* — Examination of Self as Postulated by the Mīmāṃsā and Sāṃkhya), *Jiga to Muga (Self and No-self)*, Kyoto: Heirakuji-shoten, 1963, pp.515–546 (esp. 541–546).

Sāṃkhya's definition of the Spirit or Self is as follows:

“If the other nature is untrue, let its innate nature be explained. If it is the nature of consciousness, it follows that all people are identical.” (IX.67)

*anyad rūpam asatyam cen nijam tadrūpam ucyatām/
jñānatā cet tataḥ sarvapuṃsām aikyaṃ prasajyate//*

“What is conscious and what is unconscious would be identical because their [nature of] existence is the same. And when difference is false, what then is the basis of similarity?” (IX.68)

*cetanācetane caikyam tayor yenāstitā samā/
viśeṣas ca yadā mithyā kaḥ sādṛśyāśrayas tadā//*

The above is the fault found with the possible postulation that the Spirit or Self has only one innate nature, whether consciousness in itself or more specifically the consciousness of sound etc. and the other so-called natures are false.

After thus criticizing the Sāṃkhya's Spirit or Self, Śāntideva proceeds to critique the Vaiśeṣika's definition of Self as follows:

“That which is unconscious is not also ‘I’ since it lacks consciousness, like cloth. Or if it is conscious because of union with consciousness, it follows that when unconscious it perishes.” (IX.69)

*acenatanaś ca naivāham acaitanyāt paṭādivat/
atha jñāś cetanāyogād ajño naṣṭaḥ prasajyate//*

“Or if the Self is in fact unchanged, what is done to it by consciousness? Unconscious and without activity thus, space is considered as the Self.” (IX.70)

*athāvikṛta evātmā caitanyenāśya kiṃ kṛtam/
ajñāśya niṣkriyasyaivam ākāśasyātmātā kṛtā//*

The first half of k.69 is the same as the last half of the above-cited BSA-I, VIII.44, except for the example of “cloth” in the place of “pot”. The other one and half verses, kk.69cd and 70, point out two possible faults to be found respectively with the postulation that it becomes conscious only because of union with consciousness or that the Self is unchanged before and after its union with consciousness.

V

From the above discussion we may draw the following conclusions: First, the early recension, which seems to better fit the context than the later, rather consistently focuses on a criticism of ‘I’. It thus stresses the importance of Bodhisattva's meticulous observations of the fact that neither any parts of the body, nor mind and mental faculties, nor those [Spirit and Self]

regarded by non-Buddhist thinkers as permanent, whether conscious or unconscious, are not 'I'.

Secondly, on the other hand, the later recension considerably changed the contents and expanded the only stanza (BSA-I, VIII.44) into ten verses, i.e. BCA, IX.61–70 in which the author, Śāntideva, interestingly provides a more detailed discussion than the early text.

Thirdly, the only stanza in the early recension argues that those [Spirit and Self] defined as conscious or unconscious are not 'I', since in brief they are regarded as different from our ordinary mind endowed with consciousness.

Lastly, on the other hand, the later recension first criticizes the Sāṃkhya's Spirit or Self by pointing out a contradiction between the premise of its eternity and identity and the real nature of its transience and plurality. It then directs a criticism at the Vaiśeṣika's Self by showing the two possible faults to be found respectively with the postulation that it becomes conscious only because of union with consciousness or that the Self is unchanged before and after its union with consciousness.

ABBREVIATIONS AND TEXTS

- BCA *Bodhicaryāvatāra*; I. P. Minayev ed., "Bodhicaryāvatāra", *Zapiski Vostochnago Otdeleniya Imperatorskago Russkago Arkheologicheskago Obshchestva* 4, 1890, pp.153–228.
- BSA-I *Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra*, the early recension, translated by dPal brtsegs in the early 9th century and discovered in the Tibetan manuscripts from Dūn-huáng.
- BCAP *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* by Prajñākaramati; *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā, Prajñākaramati's Commentary to the Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva*, Bibliotheca Indica 983, 1031, 1091, 1126, 1139, 1305, 1399, Calcutta.
- BSAV **Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra-vyākhyāna[-pañjikā]*, P Nos.5274, 5279, D Nos.3873, 3877.
- G *Gauḍapāda-bhāṣya*; Har Dutt Sharma ed., *The Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, with the Commentary of Gauḍapādācārya*, Poona: The Oriental Book Agency, 1933.
- NM *Nyāyamañjarī*; S. N. Śukla ed., *Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa*, Kashi Sanskrit Series 106, 1969/1971.
- SK *Sāṃkhyakārikā*; see G.
- TS *Tattvasaṃgraha*; E. Krishnamacharya ed., *Tattvasaṃgraha of Śāntarakṣita with the Commentary of Kamalaśīla*, Gaekwad's Oriental Series 30 & 31, 1926, repr. 1984.

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『入菩薩（菩提）行論』新旧両本における シャーンティデーヴァの自我批判

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シャーンティデーヴァ作の『入菩薩行論』第8章（『入菩提行論』第9章）は、それぞれ、およそ20偈を用いて、私（*aham*）ないしアートマン（*ātman*）批判を展開する。両者を比較すると、まず、以下のような特徴が注目される。

(1) 新旧両本において、内容的に一致する、あるいはごく一部の用語の相違を除いて一致すると推定される偈頌は5偈半ほどであり、その他は、配列順序のみならず、内容的にも大きく相違する。

(2) 総じて、読誦を通してみずから菩薩行を学ぶことに力点を置く旧本（8世紀前半頃成立、9章立て・702.5偈、書名『入菩薩行論』、著者名*アクシャヤマティ）は、身体部位や、精神的な諸要素が「私」でないことを詳論する。これに対して、他学派のアートマン批判を詳説する新本（9世紀以降の成立、10章立て・913偈、書名『入菩提行論』（Tib. 訳は『入菩薩行論』）、著者名シャーンティデーヴァ）は、アートマン批判に重点を移している。

(3) 新本がアートマン批判を展開する kk.61-70 は、「この心とは別な精神的なもの（**cetana*）は [私] ではない。瓶のように。非精神的なもの（**acetana*）もまた私ではない。精神を欠いているのであるから。瓶のように。」と出る旧本の1偈（k.44）に対応する。

本稿は、とくに上記（3）の分析を通して、新旧両本の性格上の相違とともに、新本に見られるアートマン批判の詳細を考察することを目的とする。それぞれの文脈を踏まえたうえで、当該箇所を比較考察した結果、以下の諸点が結論づけられた。

(1) 旧本の k.44 は、身体部位および精神的な諸要素が「私」ではないという自己省察をもとに、読み手（菩薩）に「私」批判を促すという文脈下に配置される。この*アクシャヤマティによる「私」批判には、2つの前提がある。すなわち、「私」は精神的なものではないはず、しかも、それは日常的な心と別であってはならないという前提である。旧本に対する、唯一現存する著者不明の注釈によれば、この偈頌は、精神的なものという意味づけられたサーンキヤ流のアートマン説と、非精神的なものとしたヴァイシェーシカ流のアートマン説とを、両者いずれにおいても日常的な心とは別なものとしてアートマンが規定される点に難があるとして批判を展開するという。

(2) これに対して、新本は、同様の認識を前提にしたうえで、この1偈頌を総計で10の偈頌に拡大し、kk.61-68によって、サーンキヤ派のアートマン（プルシャ）説批判を詳論し、kk.69-70により、ヴァイシェーシカ派のアートマン説批判を展開する。

(3) 両本に見られるこれらの相違は、1人称表現を多用しながら菩薩行の体得に力点を置く旧本と、他学派の教理批判を積極的に展開する新本との性格上の相違を、かなり典型的な形で示している。その意味でも、当該箇所は、新旧両本の著者問題にも関わる重要な論点を提供するものといえる。