UTokyo Repository 東京大学

UTokyo Repository >
117 経済学研究科・経済学部 >
70 日本経済国際共同センター >
Discussion Paper F series (in English) >

このページ(論文)をリンクする場合は次のURLを使用してください: http://hdl.handle.net/2261/54926

タイトル: Incentive Pay that Causes Inefficient Managerial Replacement
著者: Sato, Meg
キーワード: Journal of Economic Literature Classi cations: D86, G32, G34, M12, M52.
Moral Hazard
Managerial Replacement
Stock-based Compensation
Long-term Vested Options
Short-term Vested Options
発行日: 2013年6月
出版者: 日本経済国際共同センター
抄録: It is well known that granting incentive pay, such as stock-based compensation, to an agent mitigates the agency problem created by the unobservability of the agent 's effort level. Using contract theory, this paper shows that stock options mitigate the moral hazard problem. However, they create another problem, namely, a misalignment of the interest between the principal and the firm. Speci cally, I consider an environment in which the principal can save her payments to the incumbent agent where the rational choice of the principal on whether to replace or retain the incumbent agent becomes an inefficient decision from the perspective of total fi rm value. The paper further examines both long- and short-term vested options may exhibit over-replacement of the incumbent agent, but only the short-term vested options may exhibit under-replacement, along the parametric range of control benefit.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2261/54926
その他の識別子: CIRJE-F-890
出現カテゴリ:061 ディスカッションペーパー
Discussion Paper F series (in English)


ファイル 記述 サイズフォーマット
2013cf890.html605 BHTML見る/開く



Valid XHTML 1.0! DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2010  Duraspace - ご意見をお寄せください