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このページ(論文)をリンクする場合は次のURLを使用してください: http://hdl.handle.net/2261/55827

タイトル: Commitment, Deficit Ceiling, and Fiscal Privilege
著者: Ihori, Toshihiro
キーワード: deficit ceiling
fiscal privilege
soft budget
hard budget
JEL classification numbers: H42, H60, H62
発行日: 2014年2月
出版者: 日本経済国際共同センター
抄録: This study analyzes how commitment to a deficit ceiling can affect private agents’ political efforts, as well as overall welfare, in a hard and a soft budget regime, using a two-period model simulating a present and a future generation and a government. In the hard budget regime, the government imposes the deficit ceiling before the present-generation’s interest group decides the quantity of personal fiscal privileges. Since in the soft budget regime the government cannot commit itself to the deficit ceiling ex ante, the present generation exerts intense political efforts for personal fiscal privileges. We explore the interesting possibility that the soft budget regime leads to an overall welfare reduction for both generations, and hence, the commitment to a deficit ceiling benefits even rent-seeking private agents.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2261/55827
その他の識別子: CIRJE-F-920
出現カテゴリ:061 ディスカッションペーパー
Discussion Paper F series (in English)


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