UTokyo Repository 東京大学

UTokyo Repository >
117 経済学研究科・経済学部 >
20 現代経済専攻 >
1172025 修士論文(現代経済専攻) >

このページ(論文)をリンクする場合は次のURLを使用してください: http://hdl.handle.net/2261/72286

タイトル: Legislative Bargaining and Parties' Patience
著者: Kawamori, Tomohiko
キーワード: Parties' patience
Continuation values
Legislative bargaining
Majority rule
発行日: 2004年3月
出版者: 東京大学
抄録: We investigate the relationship between parties' patience and continuation values in legislative bargaining. We consider the legislative bargaining game without assuming common discount factor. In the game, it is observed a seemingly paradoxical phenomenon that more patient party obtains less continuation value than less patient party. Also, we show that in some cases, a party's continuation value decreases as she marginally becomes more patient. These seemingly paradoxical results come from the role of patience different from ordinary bargaining games. The role is unique to the majority rule in the legislative bargaining.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2261/72286
出現カテゴリ:025 修士論文
1172025 修士論文(現代経済専攻)


ファイル 記述 サイズフォーマット
Master_Thesis_Kawamori.pdf458.55 kBAdobe PDF見る/開く



Valid XHTML 1.0! DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2010  Duraspace - ご意見をお寄せください