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Small Verifiability in Long-Term Relationships
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/2374
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/237477e5a5f1-5d96-4173-917d-fd065be9ab5e
| Item type | テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 公開日 | 2012-01-13 | |||||
| タイトル | ||||||
| タイトル | Small Verifiability in Long-Term Relationships | |||||
| 言語 | ||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Finitely Repeated Games with Side Payments | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Small Verifiability | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Limited Liability | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Unique Implementation | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Efficiency | |||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||
| 資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
| タイプ | technical report | |||||
| アクセス権 | ||||||
| アクセス権 | metadata only access | |||||
| アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb | |||||
| 著者 |
Matsushima, Hitoshi
× Matsushima, Hitoshi |
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| 著者所属 | ||||||
| 著者所属 | University of Tokyo | |||||
| 抄録 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
| 内容記述 | This paper investigates a finitely repeated game at the beginning of which players agree to write an explicit contract with full commitment. This contract conditions the budget-balancing vector of side payments on the complete history of their action choices. However, this history is not always verifiable to the court, and each player's liability is severely limited. We show, in the general case, that even if the probability of the complete history being verifiable is small and the amount of possible fines is negligible compared with the differences in long-run payoffs, every efficient payoff vector induced by an action profile, which Pareto-dominates a Nash equilibrium action profile, is uniquely and exactly implementable either in terms of perfect equilibrium or in terms of perfect iterative undominance. Moreover, we show, in a wide class of component games, that even if this probability is close to zero and the amount of fines is negligible compared with the differences not only in long-run payoffs but also in instantaneous payoffs, every efficient payoff vector induced by an action profile, which Pareto-dominates a Nash equilibrium action profile, is uniquely and virtually implementable either in terms of perfect equilibrium or in terms of perfect iterative undominance. | |||||
| 内容記述 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | 本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと | |||||
| 書誌情報 |
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F 巻 CF-98, 発行日 2000-12 |
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| 書誌レコードID | ||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
| 収録物識別子 | AA11450569 | |||||
| フォーマット | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||
| 日本十進分類法 | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | NDC | |||||
| 主題 | 330 | |||||
| 出版者 | ||||||
| 出版者 | 日本経済国際共同センター | |||||
| 出版者別名 | ||||||
| Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy | ||||||
| 関係URI | ||||||
| 識別子タイプ | URI | |||||
| 関連識別子 | http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2000/2000cf98.pdf | |||||
