This paper explores the implications of the interaction between interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition for the optimal provision of public goods. In contrast to Hoyt's (1991) finding that the extent to which public goods are undersupplied is monotonically increasing in the number of competing regions, we show that the relationship between the level of public good supply and the number of competing regions is nonmonotonic if political as well as tax competition is considered. Interestingly, some certain interaction between interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition can result in the optimal provision of public goods.
内容記述
本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと
雑誌名
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F
巻
CIRJE-F-553
発行年
2008-04
書誌レコードID
AA11450569
フォーマット
application/pdf
日本十進分類法
335
出版者
日本経済国際共同センター
出版者別名
Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy
Interregional Tax Competition and Intraregional Political Competition: The Optimal Provision of Public Goods
