Bertola/Caballero (1994) and Abel/Eberly (1996) extended Jor-genson s classical model of rms optimal investment. By introducing investment frictions, they were able to capture the role of future antic-ipations in investment decisions as well as the lumpy and intermittent nature of investment dynamics. We extend Jorgenson s model to the other direction of nancing frictions. We construct a model of an equity-only rm, who must pay a linear nancing cost for issuing new shares. We show that the rm s optimal investment- nancing is a two-trigger policy in which the rm nances investment by issuing new shares (supplementing internal funds) when the shadow price of capital hits the upper trigger value. When the shadow price hits the lower trigger value, she sells a portion of her capital stock and buys back shares (or pays dividends). Values of the shadow price of capital between the two trigger values de ne a range of "inaction", in which the rm does neither issue nor buy back shares and invests all of her internal funds for expansion.
内容記述
本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと
雑誌名
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F
巻
CIRJE-F-627
発行年
2009-07
書誌レコードID
AA11450569
フォーマット
application/pdf
日本十進分類法
335
出版者
日本経済国際共同センター
出版者別名
Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy
Investment Frictions versus Financing Frictions
