Reseach Institute of Economy, Trade, and Industry
University of Tokyo
抄録
In this paper, we propose a theoretical model in which a banking crisis (or bank distress) causes declines in the aggregate productivity. When borrowing firms need additional bank loans to continue their businesses, a high probability of bank failure discourages ex ante investments (i.e., “specialization”) by the firms that enhance their productivity. In a general equilibrium setting, we also show that there may be multiple equilibria, in one of which bank distress continues and the borrowers’ productivity is low, and in the other equilibrium, banks are healthy and the borrowers’ productivity is high. We show that the bank capital requirement may be effective to eliminate the bad equilibrium and may lead the economy to the good equilibrium in which the productivity of borrowing firms and the aggregate output are both high and the probability of bank failure is low.
内容記述
本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと
雑誌名
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F
巻
CIRJE-F-521
発行年
2007-10
書誌レコードID
AA11450569
フォーマット
application/pdf
日本十進分類法
330
出版者
日本経済国際共同センター
出版者別名
Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy
Bank Distress and the Borrowers'Productivity
