In 2005, Japanese firms were allowed to introduce the anti-takeover amendments. By using of the data of 2005, this paper examined the incentives and effects of anti-takeover amendments in Japan. It has shown that the performances of the ATA introduced firms dropped in 2005 fiscal year. These performances changes occurred just after the introduction of ATA. Hence we can conclude that ATAs have been introduced by the firm whose managers recognized that their performances would be decreased. By checking the stock prices of those firms by using of an event study technique, this paper found that the movements of stock prices were consistent with the changes of performances. In other words, the introduction of ATA has revealed the negative signal to the market. Moreover, this paper shows that explicit ATAs were more negatively judged than implicit ATAs from the market. The average abnormal returns of ATA introduced firms whose simple Q is lower than 1 were negative even when the estimation window is extended to 35 days.
内容記述
本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと
雑誌名
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-J
巻
CIRJE-J-182
発行年
2007-08
書誌レコードID
AA11451834
フォーマット
application/pdf
日本十進分類法
330
出版者
日本経済国際共同センター
出版者別名
Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy
買収防衛策導入の業績情報効果 : 2005 年日本のケース
