Keio University
Norwegian School of Management BI
University of Tokyo
抄録
We develop a general framework to analyze endogenous relationships. To consider relationships in the modern society, neither one-shot games nor repeated games are appropriatemodelsbecausethe formationand dissolutionofa relationship is not an option. We formulate voluntarily separable repeated games, in which playersarerandomlymatchedtoplay acomponentgameaswellastochoose whether to play the game again with the same partner. There is no information ?ow across matches, and players areboundedly rational. We extend the notion of Neutrally Stable Distribution (NSD) to ?t for our model. When the component game is a prisoner's dilemma, NSD requires some trust-building periods to defect at the beginning of a partnership. We ?nd that polymorphic NSDs with voluntary breakups include strategies with shorter trust-building periods than any monomorphic NSD with no voluntary separation, and hence the average payo? ofpolymorphic NSD is higher.
内容記述
本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと
雑誌名
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F
巻
CIRJE-F-415
発行年
2006-04
書誌レコードID
AA11450569
フォーマット
application/pdf
日本十進分類法
330
出版者
日本経済国際共同センター
出版者別名
Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy
Voluntarily Separable Prisoner's Dilemma
