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Incentive for gatekeepers and their demand inducement: An empirical analysis of care managers in the Japanese Long-Term Care Insurance
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/55831
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/5583193a9162e-9f97-47eb-8b6f-f3da66e6506a
| Item type | テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 公開日 | 2014-05-01 | |||||
| タイトル | ||||||
| タイトル | Incentive for gatekeepers and their demand inducement: An empirical analysis of care managers in the Japanese Long-Term Care Insurance | |||||
| 言語 | ||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Elderly care | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Gatekeepers | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Incentive | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Supplier-induced demand | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Japanese Long-Term Care Insurance program | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Care managers | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | JEL classi cation codes: I18; I11; J13 | |||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||
| 資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
| タイプ | technical report | |||||
| アクセス権 | ||||||
| アクセス権 | metadata only access | |||||
| アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb | |||||
| 著者 |
Sugawara, Shinya
× Sugawara, Shinya× Nakamura, Jiro |
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| 著者所属 | ||||||
| 著者所属 | University of Tokyo | |||||
| 著者所属 | ||||||
| 著者所属 | Nihon University | |||||
| 抄録 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
| 内容記述 | This study analyzes incentives and supplier-induced demand of care managers, middlemen between consumers and service providers in the Japanese social insurance program for long-term care. Care managers can be considered as pure gatekeepers in that their function is limited to referral to specialists and they themselves do not provide care. Rewards for care managers are rendered by capitation, which is considered as a cost-effective payment mechanism for insurers. However, many care managers actually work for firms that also operate service provision sectors. The service providers are rewarded by the fee-for-service payment and have motivation to induce excess consumer demand. Thus, the violation of neutrality of care managers might yield an financial burden on social insurance. In this study, we empirically analyze the behavior of care managers by checking whether they cause supplier-induced demand. Our estimation results detect the existence of care manager-induced demand for care managers who work for firms that jointly operate in service provision sectors; however, those who operate only care management do not induce demand. Based on the estimation results, we conduct a quantitative analysis and show that the care manager-induced produces a considerable financial burden on social insurance. | |||||
| 内容記述 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | 本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと | |||||
| 書誌情報 |
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F 巻 CIRJE-F-916, 発行日 2014-01 |
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| 書誌レコードID | ||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
| 収録物識別子 | AA11450569 | |||||
| フォーマット | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||
| 出版者 | ||||||
| 出版者 | 日本経済国際共同センター | |||||
| 出版者別名 | ||||||
| Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy | ||||||
| 関係URI | ||||||
| 識別子タイプ | URI | |||||
| 関連識別子 | http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2014/2014cf916ab.html | |||||
