We investigate the adverse selection problem where a principal delegates multiple tasks to individuals. The individuals form a group as a single agent and share their private signals in order to maximize their average payoff. We characterize the virtually implementable social choice functions by using the linking mechanism proposed by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2005) that restricts the message spaces. The principal does not require any incentive wage schemes and can therefore avoid any information rent and welfare loss due to risk aversion. We show the resemblance between the functioning of this message space restriction and that of incentive wage schemes.
内容記述
本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと
雑誌名
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F
巻
CIRJE-F-401
発行年
2006-02
書誌レコードID
AA11450569
フォーマット
application/pdf
日本十進分類法
330
その他のキーワード
No Side Payments
出版者
日本経済国際共同センター
出版者別名
Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy
Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information
