This paper explores how the Bank of Japan (BOJ) dealt with the trade-off between stability of the financial system and the moral hazard of banks in pre-war Japan. The BOJ concentrated Lender of Last Resort (LLR) loans with those banks that had an established transaction relationship with the BOJ. At the same time, the BOJ carefully selected its transaction counterparts, and did not hesitate to end the relationship if the performance of a counterpart declined. Further, the BOJ was selective in providing LLR loans. Through this policy, the BOJ could avoid the moral hazard that the LLR policy might otherwise have incurred.
内容記述
forthcoming in Explorations in Economic History
本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと
雑誌名
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F
巻
CIRJE-F-447
発行年
2006-11
書誌レコードID
AA11450569
フォーマット
application/pdf
日本十進分類法
330
出版者
日本経済国際共同センター
出版者別名
Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy
Micro-aspects of Monetary Policy : Lender of Last Resort and Selection of Banks in Pre-war Japan
