Department of Economics, University of Tokyo
Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University
The Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, Graduate School of Economics, University of Tokyo
抄録
We investigate the adverse selection problem where a principal delegates multiple tasks to an agent. We characterize the virtually implementable social choice functions by using the linking mechanism proposed by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) that restricts the message spaces. The principal does not require any incentive wage schemes and can therefore avoid any information rent and welfare loss. We show the resemblance between the functioning of this message space restriction and that of incentive wage schemes. We also extend the results of the single-agent model to the multi-agent model
内容記述
Revised version of CIRJE-F-401 (2006); accepted in Journal of Economic Theory.
本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと
雑誌名
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F
巻
CIRJE-F-721
発行年
2010-03
書誌レコードID
AA11450569
フォーマット
application/pdf
日本十進分類法
335
出版者
日本経済国際共同センター
出版者別名
Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy
Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information
