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  1. 123 情報学環・学際情報学府
  2. 10 情報学環
  3. 東京大学大学院情報学環紀要 情報学研究
  4. 96
  1. 0 資料タイプ別
  2. 30 紀要・部局刊行物
  3. 東京大学大学院情報学環紀要 情報学研究
  4. 96

Is My Car Evil? A Review of Non-Anthropocentric Theories of Moral Agency

https://doi.org/10.15083/00076849
https://doi.org/10.15083/00076849
64bd692a-c9e7-4c89-9b7a-a69bc45b84dd
名前 / ファイル ライセンス アクション
96_8.pdf 96_8.pdf (526.8 kB)
Item type 紀要論文 / Departmental Bulletin Paper(1)
公開日 2019-03-29
タイトル
タイトル Is My Car Evil? A Review of Non-Anthropocentric Theories of Moral Agency
言語
言語 eng
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 Actor-network theory
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 Information ethics
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 posthumanism
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 moral agency
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 responsibility
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 morality of technology
資源タイプ
資源 http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
タイプ departmental bulletin paper
ID登録
ID登録 10.15083/00076849
ID登録タイプ JaLC
著者 Barbetta, Tommaso

× Barbetta, Tommaso

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Barbetta, Tommaso

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著者所属
著者所属 University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Interdisciplinary Information Studies, ITASIA
抄録
内容記述タイプ Abstract
内容記述 Smart-technologies substituting us and acting for us have become increasingly ubiquitous over the last decade. We are quickly getting used to delegating everyday tasks to a multitude of artefacts. Artefacts that constantly mediate our experience of reality and help us in the process of making decisions. However, from a moral point of view, we do not yet know how to consider all these entities.
In the social sciences, Actor-network Theory (ANT) has provided a consistent framework for the analysis of non-human agency. This has been theoretically possible thanks to the detachment of the notion of agency from that of human intentionality. However, it is not clear if and how a notion of agency detached from intentionality could also be embraced by the field of ethics. What is the usefulness of ascribing moral agency to non-human entities? Would such a new notion of moral agency be a characteristic of one specific category of entities, or could it be ascribed to anything? Furthermore, how could the question of responsibility be reframed in order to fit a nonanthropocentric ethical approach?
The paper focuses on the crash of a self-driving car, an example which is used to review advantages and limits of an ethical framework informed by ANT. Moreover, the article illustrates the alternative non-anthropocentric approach of Information Ethics (IE), highlighting the potentials of its narrower definition of moral agency. Ultimately, the paper shows that, despite their different ontological foundations, ANT and IE reach comparable conclusions in the moral analysis of the car crash: both these theories leave in fact the door open for the assessment of the moral agency of a self-driving system. This is possible due to a conceptual shift from the idea of moral responsibility to that of moral accountability, terms which, however, still lack a fully consistent definition.
内容記述
内容記述タイプ Other
内容記述 査読研究論文
内容記述
内容記述タイプ Other
内容記述 Refereed Papers
書誌情報 情報学研究 : 学環 : 東京大学大学院情報学環紀要

巻 96, p. 107-121, 発行日 2019-03-29
ISSN
収録物識別子タイプ ISSN
収録物識別子 1880697X
ISSN
収録物識別子タイプ ISSN
収録物識別子 21878056
書誌レコードID
収録物識別子タイプ NCID
収録物識別子 AA12032633
著者版フラグ
値 publisher
出版者
出版者 東京大学大学院情報学環
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