2020-08-04T11:22:34Zhttps://repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/?action=repository_oaipmhoai:repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp:000419732020-04-17T06:40:58Z00062:07433:0743400009:07435:07436
The Folk Theorem with Private MonitoringengRepeated Prisoner-Dilemma GamesPrivate Monitoring Conditional IndependenceFolk TheoremLimited Knowledgehttp://hdl.handle.net/2261/2399Technical ReportMatsushima, HitoshiThis paper investigates infinitely repeated prisoner-dilemma games, where the discount factor is less than but close to 1. We assume that monitoring is imperfect and private, and players'private signal structures satisfy the conditional independence. We require almost no conditions concerning the accuracy of private signals. We assume that there exist no public signals and no public randomization devices, and players cannot communicate and use only pure strategies. It is shown that the Folk Theorem holds in that every individually rational feasible payoff vector can be approximated by a sequential equilibrium payoff vector. Moreover, the Folk Theorem holds even if each player has no knowledge of her opponent's private signal structure.This paper was accepted in Econometrica as a note. This paper was combined with Discussion Paper 2002-CF-154 and revised as Discussion Paper 2003-CF-242.本文フィルはリンク先を参照のことDiscussion paper series. CIRJE-FCF-1232001-07AA11450569application/pdf330日本経済国際共同センターhttp://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2001/2001cf123.pdf2017-06-16