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Merger, Corporate Financing, Managerial Incentives and R & D Effort Duplication
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/15397
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/1539786427df3-ebf5-4044-986c-e47512b54c4b
名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
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KJ00004192016.pdf (1.0 MB)
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Item type | 紀要論文 / Departmental Bulletin Paper(1) | |||||
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公開日 | 2008-09-19 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | Merger, Corporate Financing, Managerial Incentives and R & D Effort Duplication | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||
タイプ | departmental bulletin paper | |||||
著者 |
Cardon, James H.
× Cardon, James H.× Sasaki, Dan |
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著者別名 | ||||||
識別子 | 107904 | |||||
識別子Scheme | WEKO | |||||
姓名 | 佐々木, 弾 | |||||
著者所属 | ||||||
著者所属 | 東京大学社会学研究所 | |||||
著者所属 | ||||||
著者所属 | Brigham Young University | |||||
抄録 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
内容記述 | We characterize the interplay between oligopolistic firms'strategic decisions in product development, and their incentives for (or against) merger. In an R & D intensive industry where newly developed products can be awarded exclusive patent protection, individual firms'profit maximization can result in effort duplication, which is socially suboptimal. Such strategic incentives can be curtailed by [1] tightening corporate financing, [2] corporate profit taxation, [3] reduction in R & D subsidies, or [4] delegating product development decisions to short-lived managers. The former two ([1] and [2]) also discourage merger. On the other hand, the latter two ([3] and [4]) indirectly encourage merger, as the managerial incentives discouraged away from effort duplication are a consequence of oligopolistic competition, so that the owners of these firms have extra incentives toward merger to eliminate competition altogether. | |||||
書誌情報 |
社會科學研究 巻 55, 号 3-4, p. 37-54, 発行日 2004-03-18 |
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ISSN | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | ISSN | |||||
収録物識別子 | 03873307 | |||||
書誌レコードID | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
収録物識別子 | AN00108966 | |||||
フォーマット | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||
日本十進分類法 | ||||||
主題 | 300 | |||||
主題Scheme | NDC | |||||
出版者 | ||||||
出版者 | 東京大学社会科学研究所 | |||||
出版者別名 | ||||||
Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo |