WEKO3
アイテム
{"_buckets": {"deposit": "a62d4b90-dcff-44e8-894b-f67f4e6937ef"}, "_deposit": {"id": "42149", "owners": [], "pid": {"revision_id": 0, "type": "depid", "value": "42149"}, "status": "published"}, "_oai": {"id": "oai:repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp:00042149", "sets": ["7436", "7434"]}, "item_8_biblio_info_7": {"attribute_name": "書誌情報", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"bibliographicIssueDates": {"bibliographicIssueDate": "2010-02", "bibliographicIssueDateType": "Issued"}, "bibliographicVolumeNumber": "CIRJE-F-715", "bibliographic_titles": [{"bibliographic_title": "Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F"}]}]}, "item_8_description_13": {"attribute_name": "フォーマット", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_description": "application/pdf", "subitem_description_type": "Other"}]}, "item_8_description_5": {"attribute_name": "抄録", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_description": "We extend the voluntarily separable repeated Prisoner\u0027s Dilemma (Fujiwara-Greve and Okuno-Fujiwara, 2009) to continuous actions. We show that there is a (constrained) efficient bimorphic equilibrium which is robust under evolutionary pressure. It consists of a cooperative strategy and a myopic defection strategy so that our model provides a foundation to incomplete information models as well.", "subitem_description_type": "Abstract"}]}, "item_8_description_6": {"attribute_name": "内容記述", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_description": "本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと", "subitem_description_type": "Other"}]}, "item_8_publisher_20": {"attribute_name": "出版者", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_publisher": "日本経済国際共同センター"}]}, "item_8_relation_25": {"attribute_name": "関係URI", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_relation_type_id": {"subitem_relation_type_id_text": "http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2010/2010cf715ab.html", "subitem_relation_type_select": "URI"}}]}, "item_8_source_id_10": {"attribute_name": "書誌レコードID", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_source_identifier": "AA11450569", "subitem_source_identifier_type": "NCID"}]}, "item_8_subject_15": {"attribute_name": "日本十進分類法", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_subject": "335", "subitem_subject_scheme": "NDC"}]}, "item_8_text_21": {"attribute_name": "出版者別名", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_text_value": "Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy"}]}, "item_8_text_34": {"attribute_name": "資源タイプ", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_text_value": "Discussion Paper"}]}, "item_8_text_4": {"attribute_name": "著者所属", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_text_value": "Keio University Dept. of Economics"}, {"subitem_text_value": "University of Tokyo Graduate School of Economics"}, {"subitem_text_value": "Komazawa University Faculty of Economics"}]}, "item_access_right": {"attribute_name": "アクセス権", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_access_right": "metadata only access", "subitem_access_right_uri": "http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb"}]}, "item_creator": {"attribute_name": "著者", "attribute_type": "creator", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"creatorNames": [{"creatorName": "Fujiwara-Greve, Takako"}], "nameIdentifiers": [{"nameIdentifier": "97010", "nameIdentifierScheme": "WEKO"}]}, {"creatorNames": [{"creatorName": "Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro"}], "nameIdentifiers": [{"nameIdentifier": "97011", "nameIdentifierScheme": "WEKO"}]}, {"creatorNames": [{"creatorName": "Suzuki, Nobue"}], "nameIdentifiers": [{"nameIdentifier": "97012", "nameIdentifierScheme": "WEKO"}]}]}, "item_keyword": {"attribute_name": "キーワード", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_subject": "social norm", "subitem_subject_scheme": "Other"}, {"subitem_subject": "evolution", "subitem_subject_scheme": "Other"}, {"subitem_subject": "voluntary separation", "subitem_subject_scheme": "Other"}, {"subitem_subject": "repeated game", "subitem_subject_scheme": "Other"}, {"subitem_subject": "JLE classification: C 73.", "subitem_subject_scheme": "Other"}]}, "item_language": {"attribute_name": "言語", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_language": "eng"}]}, "item_resource_type": {"attribute_name": "資源タイプ", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"resourcetype": "technical report", "resourceuri": "http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh"}]}, "item_title": "Voluntarily Separable Repeated Games with Social Norms", "item_titles": {"attribute_name": "タイトル", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_title": "Voluntarily Separable Repeated Games with Social Norms"}]}, "item_type_id": "8", "owner": "1", "path": ["7436", "7434"], "permalink_uri": "http://hdl.handle.net/2261/33403", "pubdate": {"attribute_name": "公開日", "attribute_value": "2013-05-31"}, "publish_date": "2013-05-31", "publish_status": "0", "recid": "42149", "relation": {}, "relation_version_is_last": true, "title": ["Voluntarily Separable Repeated Games with Social Norms"], "weko_shared_id": null}
Voluntarily Separable Repeated Games with Social Norms
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/33403
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/334038d3f2aa6-d2a0-4949-8be9-c5a700b15a70
Item type | テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1) | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
公開日 | 2013-05-31 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | Voluntarily Separable Repeated Games with Social Norms | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | social norm | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | evolution | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | voluntary separation | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | repeated game | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | JLE classification: C 73. | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
タイプ | technical report | |||||
アクセス権 | ||||||
アクセス権 | metadata only access | |||||
アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb | |||||
著者 |
Fujiwara-Greve, Takako
× Fujiwara-Greve, Takako× Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro× Suzuki, Nobue |
|||||
著者所属 | ||||||
著者所属 | Keio University Dept. of Economics | |||||
著者所属 | ||||||
著者所属 | University of Tokyo Graduate School of Economics | |||||
著者所属 | ||||||
著者所属 | Komazawa University Faculty of Economics | |||||
抄録 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
内容記述 | We extend the voluntarily separable repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (Fujiwara-Greve and Okuno-Fujiwara, 2009) to continuous actions. We show that there is a (constrained) efficient bimorphic equilibrium which is robust under evolutionary pressure. It consists of a cooperative strategy and a myopic defection strategy so that our model provides a foundation to incomplete information models as well. | |||||
内容記述 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | 本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと | |||||
書誌情報 |
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F 巻 CIRJE-F-715, 発行日 2010-02 |
|||||
書誌レコードID | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
収録物識別子 | AA11450569 | |||||
フォーマット | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||
日本十進分類法 | ||||||
主題 | 335 | |||||
主題Scheme | NDC | |||||
出版者 | ||||||
出版者 | 日本経済国際共同センター | |||||
出版者別名 | ||||||
Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy | ||||||
関係URI | ||||||
識別子タイプ | URI | |||||
関連識別子 | http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2010/2010cf715ab.html |