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Exclusive Dealing and the Market Power of Buyers
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/37289
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/37289eb679340-6ebc-447f-94d4-7e91ff1abc82
Item type | テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1) | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
公開日 | 2013-05-31 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | Exclusive Dealing and the Market Power of Buyers | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Exclusive Dealing | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Large Distributor | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Antitrust Policy | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | JEL Classi cation: L11, L13, L14, L42, K21 | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
タイプ | technical report | |||||
アクセス権 | ||||||
アクセス権 | metadata only access | |||||
アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb | |||||
著者 |
Oki, Ryoko
× Oki, Ryoko× Yanagawa, Noriyuki |
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著者別名 | ||||||
識別子 | 97050 | |||||
識別子Scheme | WEKO | |||||
姓名 | 柳川, 範之 | |||||
著者所属 | ||||||
著者所属 | Graduate school of Economics, University of Tokyo | |||||
抄録 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
内容記述 | This paper examines the effects of exclusive dealing contracts offered by an incumbent distributor. The effectiveness of exclusive dealing contracts offered by distributors is quite different from those offered by incumbent manufacturers. The traditional literature has focused solely on exclusive dealing contracts made by incumbent manufacturers and has derived multiple equilibria within homogeneous price competition models. In contrast, this paper asserts that exclusive dealing contracts made by a distributor generate a unique equilibrium and that an efficient entrant must be excluded under the equilibrium as long as distributors have sufficient bargaining power. | |||||
内容記述 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | 本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと | |||||
書誌情報 |
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F 巻 CIRJE-F-748, 発行日 2010-07 |
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書誌レコードID | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
収録物識別子 | AA11450569 | |||||
フォーマット | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||
日本十進分類法 | ||||||
主題 | 335 | |||||
主題Scheme | NDC | |||||
出版者 | ||||||
出版者 | 日本経済国際共同センター | |||||
出版者別名 | ||||||
Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy | ||||||
関係URI | ||||||
識別子タイプ | URI | |||||
関連識別子 | http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2010/2010cf748ab.html |