

**Aid Coordination, Competition and Cooperation
among UN Organizations for Better Development Results**

A Dissertation

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Abstract

The objective of this research is twofold: to examine the impact of aid coordination on development results within the programs and activities carried out by the United Nations (UN) system, and to analyze the mechanisms of aid coordination that contribute to improved development results. On the basis of three case studies on UN efforts in coordinated programs, this dissertation aims to draw practical lessons and policy recommendations for strengthening the aid coordination structure and tools within the UN system and beyond. Worldwide, 1.4 billion people are living in extreme poverty—more than one-quarter of the population of developing countries, by the below US\$1.25 a day poverty line measurement in 2005. Poverty reduction remains as a persisting challenge for the humankind. In 1990s, in the context of increasing regional and internal conflicts, aid fatigue, and the New Public Management practices applied in industrialized countries, a pressing need for more effective and efficient aid was felt the world over. Transaction costs for receiving and implementing aid were, and continue to be too high for the recipient governments.

For this dissertation, the case studies are selected from two regions and from different development phases: post-conflict Rwanda and an emerging country China. The first case focuses on a development phase in Rwanda after the post-conflict recovery period. Specifically, a joint project between the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), “Poverty and Environment Initiative”, will be examined as one of the best practices of UN joint

projects. This was a critical building block by the UN system in Rwanda in supporting the Rwandan government to formulate its sector plan for the Environment and Land Use Management Sector as part of the second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). The second case scrutinizes the series of UN joint activities to assist the Government of China in combating HIV/AIDS in the early 2000s. The third case study looks into aid coordination between the UN system with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in post-conflict Rwanda after 1994. This section will examine the examples of aid coordination in natural resource management, in particular, the protection of the habitat of endangered mountain gorillas.

In order to gain some general insights into the inter-organizational relationships formed and exercised in these cases, the framework of “the 3Cs” is developed by the author. The 3C framework is composed of the notions: Competition, Coordination, and Cooperation. According to different project phases, effective inter-organizational relationships vary. As a conclusion, this research argues that Competition, Coordination, and Cooperation should be emphasized respectively depending on different stages of project cycle. Competition should be emphasized for project formulation and resource mobilization phase. Coordination should be emphasized for project implementation phase, and Cooperation is essential in the monitoring and evaluation phase. The functions of Competition, Coordination and Cooperation influence each other and produce both positive and negative impact on development results. UN aid coordination structures are in most cases, an add-on to the existing UN bureaucracy, and not contributing to efficiency gains for the UN. Advocacy and negotiation with the program country governments require Cooperation, and as a

result of Cooperation, the advocacy itself carries more weight by the joint efforts. The China's case proved this assumption. Incentives for aid coordination are not well built in within the UN system. Financial allocation and performance appraisal should be used more effectively to facilitate coordination, which contribute to generating better development results. Based on the analysis of 3Cs diagrams, overall policy recommendations will be provided.

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OECD GLOSSARY

(OECD 2002)

Effectiveness	The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time etc.) are converted to results.
Evaluation	The systematic and objective assessment of an on-going or completed project, programme or policy, its design, implementation and results. The aim is to determine the relevance and fulfilment of objectives, development efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. An evaluation should provide information that is credible and useful, enabling the incorporation of lessons learned into the decision-making process of both recipients and donors. Evaluation also refers to the process of determining the worth or significance of an activity, policy or program. An assessment, as systematic and objective as possible, of a planned, on-going, or completed development intervention.
Impacts	Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.
Indicator	Quantitative or qualitative factor or variable that provides a simple and reliable means to measure achievement, to reflect the changes connected to an intervention, or to help assess the performance of a development actor.
Inputs	The financial, human, and material resources used for the development intervention.
Joint evaluation	An evaluation to which different donor agencies and/or partners participate.

Monitoring	A continuing function that uses systematic collection of data on specified indicators to provide management and the main stakeholders of an ongoing development intervention with indications of the extent of progress and achievement of objectives and progress in the use of allocated funds.
Outcome	The likely or achieved short-term and medium-term effects of an intervention's outputs.
Outputs	The products, capital goods and services, which result from a development intervention; may also include changes resulting from the intervention, which are relevant to the achievement of outcomes.
Performance	The degree to which a development intervention or a development partner operates according to specific criteria/standards/ guidelines or achieves results in accordance with stated goals or plans.
Performance indicator	A variable that allows the verification of changes in the development intervention or shows results relative to what was planned.
Programme	A development programme is a time bound intervention involving multiple activities that may cut across sectors, themes and/or geographic areas.
Relevance	The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners' and donors' policies.
Result-Based Management	A management strategy focusing on performance and achievement of outputs, outcomes and impacts.
Sector programme evaluation	Evaluation of a cluster of development interventions in a sector within one country or across countries, all of which contribute to the achievement of a specific development goal.

Chapter 1

Introduction

Can aid be coordinated? Aid coordination is an old and new issue to be tackled in the efforts of poverty reduction and promoting development globally. This dissertation aims to analyze the effectiveness of aid coordination, in particular the United Nations (UN) coordination. This will be examined through case studies.

How can organizations (/ actors) construct relationships with other organizations (/ actors) to generate better net results in implementing or providing aid? How does the aid coordination contribute to improved results of aid programs? What are the mechanisms of aid coordination adding value to programming? What are the costs of aid coordination and the costs of not coordinating aid? In this dissertation, inter-organizational relationships will be analyzed by examining the factors contributing or deterring the optimal or expected results of the aid programmes. When expected results are achieved through coordination, what are the possible modes of how organizations interact with one another? Through case studies, this dissertation aims to respond to some aspects of these issues mentioned above. The cases will provide examples of types of inter-organizational relationships. The relationships were productive, or counter-productive either as a result of design or by chance.

1.1 Background of the Dissertation

Worldwide, 1.4 billion people are living in extreme poverty—more than one-quarter of the population of developing countries, by the below US\$1.25 a day poverty line measurement in 2005 (World Bank 2008). Poverty reduction remains as a persisting challenge for the humankind. Funding for official development assistance (ODA) has been growing steadily over the last decade. Aid flows from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member countries totalled US\$129 billion in 2010, the highest level ever. The members of OECD, currently 34 of them, span the globe, from North and South America to Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. They include many of the world’s most advanced countries, with high-income, but also emerging countries like Mexico, Chile and Turkey.




FIGURE 1: Private and ODA flow from 1990 to 1996 (OECD 2011)

However, the ratio of ODA is declining over the years in relation to private financing as indicated in Figure 1. Although, the aid flows from the OECD member countries

mounted to the highest level ever, the weight of ODA in the entire global financial flow is dwindling. These trends enforce the demand for more effective and efficient aid with limited aid resources. The quality of aid is scrutinized with more critical eyes of the donors and their respective taxpayers.

However, on the receiving end of aid, it is observed that multiple donors bring in aid resources and modalities in an uncoordinated manner. This causes proliferation and fragmentation of aid, and often times, conflicting donors' agendas in the recipient countries. Recipient governments tend to have limited capacity to absorb and implement aid programs. Under proliferation and fragmentation of aid, it has been pointed out that the transaction costs for implementing aid programs become high. Therefore, the delivery of aid and corresponding governments activities suffer in terms of effective implementation.

The concept of aid coordination stemmed from the technical discussions to reduce the transaction costs between the recipient governments of official development assistance (ODA) and ODA providers, the donors. Aid coordination is an essential part of the debate on how to improve aid effectiveness facilitated by OECD, Development Assistance Committee (DAC).

This dissertation particularly focuses on the aspect of United Nations coordination within the aid coordination efforts. This research topic emanated from the author's professional question if aid can be coordinated well, and if so what are the tangible benefits brought by the sometimes cumbersome aid coordination processes? When

the author was serving as Assistant Resident Representative of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Rwanda Office, in 2007, the United Nations launched the “Delivering as One” pilot to test how the UN system can deliver in a more coordinated and coherent way at the country level. Eight countries volunteered to become “Delivering as One” pilots: Albania, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Pakistan, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uruguay, and Viet Nam. The objective was to ensure faster and more effective development operations to achieve the Millennium Development Goals by establishing a consolidated UN presence - with one program and one budgetary framework and an enhanced role of the UN Resident Coordinator - while building on the strengths and comparative advantages of each UN organization.

The author was eagerly looking forward to the implementation of and the results of this Pilot. The author hopes that this dissertation will provide some useful guidance and lessons to the UN coordination endeavours including the “Delivering as One” pilots. The findings of this dissertation could also provide useful input to the aid coordination efforts beyond the UN system, which embrace non-UN donors such as other multilateral organizations, bilateral partners, civil society organizations and the private sector.

1.2 Objective and Main Research Questions

The objective of this research is twofold: to examine the impact of aid coordination on development results within the programs and activities carried out by the United Nations (UN) system, and to analyze the mechanisms of aid coordination contributing

to improved development results. The following questions will be tackled.

1. What is the impact (degree of change) of aid coordination on development results?

In the aid coordination discussions, the assumption is that aid coordination affects the development results positively. Generally, UN agencies' headquarters instruct their respective regional offices and country offices that aid coordination should be part of their routine aid activities. For instance, according to UNDP guidelines, UN coordination is one of their three main business practices in addition to Program and Operation. How much is the contribution by aid coordination to improved development results? Are the net results of coordination positive as desired? Or negative, if so, how are those negative results generated? The impacts brought about by coordination efforts could also be insignificant after the extra work of coordination.

Coordination can be approached from two perspectives: 1. to avoid the negatives: by minimizing overlaps, reduce transaction costs, and reconcile conflicting targets and messages from donors, and 2. to promote the positives: by efficient allocation of resources based on outcome approach, reaching the economy of scale, access to larger pool of resources, knowledge and professional networks, access to lessons and best practice from around the world, promote mutual (organizational) learning and enhancing knowledge generation. Having common messages by development partners (donors) could carry more weight in negotiating with the counterpart governments. On the other hand, this could also pose threats to aid recipient countries. When coordination is pursued, the costs of coordination (vs. benefits) also have to be taken

into consideration.

2. *What are the mechanisms of aid coordination contributing to better / worse development results?*

This question has not been exploited much thus far. Does the reduction in transaction actions, in practical terms, contribute to betterment of development outcomes? As nobody up to date has measured transaction costs of aid, this question has not systematically been addressed so far (Acharya, de Lima & Moore 2006). This dissertation does not provide systematic measurement of transaction costs and associated aid activities either. However, what this research will present are the pathways of when aid coordination, more specifically, UN coordination functioned, and where coordination significantly influenced the outcomes of development results either positively / negatively.

3. *What are the lessons and policy recommendations to improve the aid coordination structure and tools within the UN system and beyond?*

Lessons and policy recommendations will be presented, with regard to how to improve the aid coordination structure and tools within the UN system and beyond. Specifically, UN reform initiatives relating to UN coordination will be examined such as “Delivering as One” pilot tested by UN, current guidelines on UN coordination tools such as the United Nations Development Framework (UNDAF) and Common Country Assessment (CCA), and Cluster approach. These lessons should also have implications on overall aid

coordination beyond UN system and inter-organizational activities in the public arena.

1.3 Structure of the Thesis

The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 1 serves as an introduction indicating the background and objective and main research questions. Chapter 2 describes the scope of the study and outlined relevant literature and previous work. Gaps of research and areas for further analysis will be mapped out. Previous research and political debate on aid effectiveness will be reviewed. Chapter 3 explains the research methodology. Chapters 4 to 6 are devoted to case studies. Chapter 7 discusses “3Cs” analysis and UN coordination mechanisms, and highlights lessons and policy recommendations. Finally, Chapter 8 presents the conclusion.

Chapter 2

Literature Survey of Aid Coordination

2.1 Research and discourse on Aid Coordination

The question of “how effective is aid” has been repeatedly raised over the last 50 years. When the Marshall Plan assistance from the United State to Western Europe after the World War II started as the first form of contemporary development aid, there were few aid providers around the world (Acharya, de Lima & Moore 2006). As the number of aid providing donors had increased, in 1967, already a report by the Commission on International Development pointed out the need to strengthen aid coordination by the donor community. Many of the Paris Declaration principles and commitments, including among others partnership and harmonization were then highlighted in this document (Eriksson 2001). In 1980s, as Morss pointed out, the proliferation of donors and projects reached a point where they were having a negative impact on the major government institutions of developing countries (Morss 1984). Government officials at the receiving end of aid were spending too much time and efforts on implementing donor-driven projects, with donors’ own respective agenda and reporting requirements. The need for project consolidation was pointed out with the acknowledgement of its constraint due to the competitive nature of donor interactions (Morss 1984).

This was characterized by “the aid-bombardment syndrome”, in which the sheer

volume of resources and numbers of donors, activities, and complex and inconsistent procedural requirements overwhelmed the government's capacity to plan, budget, manage, monitor, and evaluate (Eriksson 2001). World Bank reported that, similarly, in Tanzania in the early 1990s, had more than 2,000 projects supported by some 40 donors. Developing country borrowers must produce 8,000 audit reports every year for multilateral development banks, with the World Bank accounting for 5,500 such reports. Tanzanian government officials have to prepare about 2,000 reports of different kinds and receive more than 1,000 donor delegations each year (Acharya, de Lima & Moore 2006).

As previously mentioned, worldwide, 1.4 billion people are living in extreme poverty—more than one-quarter of the population of developing countries, by the below US\$1.25 a day poverty line measurement in 2005 (World Bank 2008). Various new players have joined in the fight against global poverty. Since 1975, donor proliferation, on a global scale, has continued almost constantly (Acharya, de Lima & Moore 2006). In the phenomena of *proliferation*, not only the number of donors has risen, but also the number of sources and channels of aid have increased faster than the actual volume of aid (Acharya, de Lima & Moore 2006, Knack & Rahman 2004).

There are primarily four reasons for the phenomena of *proliferation*. First, is due to the increase of United Nations and related multilateral organizations with their own sets of organizational mandates and aid programs. Second, OECD countries have developed increasing number of bilateral aid programs. There are 27 bilateral donors, including the new OECD members from Eastern Europe such as the Czech Republic and Greece

(OECD 2010). Twenty-two operated during 1999-2001, each donor benefiting on average 107 recipient countries (Acharya, de Lima & Moore 2006). Third, there is growing number of non-governmental organizations, operating with relatively small volume of financial input. Forth is explained by the expanding influence of Non-DAC and “emerging” donors in the aid landscape. This poses new challenges for donor harmonization and alignment as non-DAC countries do not necessary incorporate the OECD principle of aid effectiveness or aid coordination. Insufficient data on non-DAC ODA makes it even more difficult to accurately assess aid volumes and predictions for the overall ODA (IDA 2007).

In 1990s, in the context of increasing regional and internal conflicts globally, aid fatigue, and the trend of New Public Management applied in industrialized countries, there was a push for more effective and efficient aid. Transaction costs for receiving and implementing aid were often too high for the recipient governments. There were basically two strong arguments for the need for aid coordination. The first argument was that the complexity of the aid architecture increases transaction costs for donors and recipients alike, and thus, aid should be more coordinated to reduce the imposed transaction costs (IDA 2007). The second discourse was founded in the New Public Management doctrine in industrialized countries, which is explained further in the following sections (Sasaki 2003).

Transaction costs

Transaction costs are defined as “the costs of resources utilized for the creation, maintenance, use, and change of institutions and organizations. They include the costs

of defining and measuring resources or claims, the costs of utilizing and enforcing the rights specified, and the costs of information, negotiation, and enforcement” (Ronald Coase Institute 2011). The World Bank points out; there is evidence that donor proliferation and aid fragmentation represent a tax on recipient countries’ implementation capacity (IDA 2007). However, the transaction costs of aid have never been systematically quantified or measured (Acharya, de Lima & Moore 2006). Acharya, de Lima and Moore go on to say that the concept remains very useful, all the more so since it can be used flexibly to suit different contexts and problems, and describes sets of transaction costs detected in the real development settings: (a) direct transactions costs, that essentially take the form of the absorption of the scarce energies and attentions of relatively senior government staff; and (b) indirect transactions costs, that take the form of the dysfunctional bureaucratic and political behaviour that is stimulated by aid proliferation.

New Public Management (NPM)

The New Public Management (NPM) has become to play a dominant role in public sector reform, mainly in industrialized countries. Decline in governments’ budgets, taxpayers demanding strong accountability and pressures of globalization, all these have contributed to the drive to make Governments more efficient and productive. “Getting More For Less” (Ohsumi 1999) or “Value for Money” has been the slogans for such public sector reforms. Polidano summarizes that key components of NPM include deregulation of line management; conversion of civil service departments into free-standing agencies or enterprises; performance-based accountability, particularly

through contracts; and competitive mechanisms such as contracting-out and internal markets (Polidano 1999). Various authors also include privatization and downsizing as part of the NPM package. In the field of official development assistance, the principle of NPM were introduced, and served as a basis for improving the quality and efficiency of development assistance.

Development of various coordination tools

Over decades, multiple sets of instruments for development aid were developed. (See Figure 2.) This section briefly describes the major instruments for development aid based on the Technical Note prepared by the UN (WHO 2008).

Project support

Projects focus actions and resources on the delivery of a limited number of outputs to contribute to the resolution of a specific problem in a determined timeframe. Output is defined as “the products, capital goods and services, which result from a development intervention” (OECD 2002). Projects are expected to deliver their results in the short-term. Development partners and donors are usually strongly involved in identifying, negotiating and designing projects and in implementing them. Therefore, projects are often seen to be donor-driven, with activities that cannot be sustained after development partners cease their funding.

General Budget support (GBS)

General Budget Support (GBS) is aid funding to government that is not earmarked to specific projects or items. It is disbursed through the government's own financial management system. The finance is accompanied by other "inputs": conditions and procedures for dialogue; donor efforts to harmonize their aid and align it with national policies and procedures; and technical assistance and capacity building. (OECD 2011b)

Budget support targets results delivery in a longer-term horizon than projects. In the last 1990s, the concept of new General Budget Support or Partnership General Budget Support was developed in response to the perceived failures of earlier aid instruments, and to distinct itself from the imposed conditionality of the structural adjustment. In the 2000s, it has been accompanied by a focus on the importance of good governance to create capacities for sustainable development.

General Budget Support concentrates on outcomes rather than outputs, and emphasizes the importance of ownership of policies and programs by recipient countries. Outcome is defined as "the likely or achieved short-term and medium-term effects of an intervention's outputs" (OECD 2002). There are two main categories of Budget Support: General Budget Support (GBS) and Sector Budget Support (SBS).




FIGURE 2: Representation of the individual characteristics of the major instruments for development (WHO 2008)

Sector budget support (SBS)

In contrast to GBS, SBS channels funds to specific sectors. The degree of targeting can range from an overall allocation to a sector, in which the relevant ministry decides on how the funds are used, down to financing of specific budget items such as capital equipment. In principle, the earmarking of funds in SBS ensures that they are spent rather than retained in the central banks as currency reserves or used for debt repayments. Its design is based on three key components: 1.) a general sector policy document, 2.) a Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), and 3.) a sector coordination mechanism for policy-dialogue, joint planning, monitoring and evaluation. Accordingly, its results are expected in the mid- and long-term.

Sector-Wide Approaches

Sector-Wide Approaches (SWAs) are coordination mechanisms where support to a particular sector is improved through better policy-dialogue and coordination of aid directed to national sector plans. Development partners and recipient countries coordinate their efforts to support the particular sector in a structured manner using various development aid instruments, such as projects, budget support, common trust funds or technical assistance. Programs, as opposed to projects, are usually developed to address development issues according sector-wide perspectives. Once in place, SWAs are expected to deliver their results in the short to long-term.

2.2 Global events and processes on Aid Coordination

Aid effectiveness high-level forums

In the 2000s, a number of high-level international conferences were held to discuss the aid effectiveness agenda: the Millennium Summit (in 2000), Monterrey (in 2002), the International Roundtables on Results at Marrakech (in 2004) and Hanoi (in 2007), and the High Level Forums (HLF) on Aid Effectiveness in Rome (in 2003), Paris (in 2005), and Accra (in 2008). The Paris Declaration (in 2005) was agreed by over one hundred Ministers, Heads of Agencies and Senior Representatives in order to increase their efforts in strengthening ownership of developing countries, aid harmonisation, alignment and managing aid for results. The Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) in 2008, builds on the Paris Declaration, and calls for more predictability in aid, use of partner (developing) country systems as the first option, and further Untying of aid. Busan, in Korea will host another HLF on Aid Effectiveness in November, 2011. The international

debate on Aid Effectiveness and its implementation is driven and monitored by the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness under the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2010).

TABLE 1: Initiatives to promote aid coordination (main messages in *Italic*)

	Global Initiatives	UN Initiatives
1969	The Pearson Report by the Commissions on International Development (<i>Need to strengthen aid coordination</i>)	The Jackson Report, “A Study of the capacity of the United Nations Development System.
1997	Sector Wide Approaches (SWAPs), Poverty Reduction Strategies (<i>Ownership and Alignment to country program</i>)	Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform (<i>Resident Coordinator, CCA and UNDAF</i>)
2000	The Millennium Summit and MDGs	
2002	The Monterrey Consensus, World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD)	Strengthening the United Nation: an agenda for further change
2003	Rome declaration on Harmonisation	
2004		UNAIDS 3 Ones Principles
2005	Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, (<i>Aid Effectiveness principles to be monitored.</i>)	In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security an Human Rights for ALL
2006		One-UN- ‘Delivering as One’, Cluster Approach (<i>in crisis</i>)
2008	Accra Agenda for Action (AAA)	

(Developed by the author.)

Aid Effectiveness debate

In early 1990s, technical debate on how to improve aid harmonization and alignment, started to take form in multiple international arenas. The demand for aid harmonization and alignment was especially high in Africa. In 2000s, political commitment to Aid Effectiveness was expressed at series of international events as previously mentioned. According to OECD definition, aid effectiveness concepts are composed of: ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results and mutual accountability. Among these concepts, “ownership” is the most prominent and new concept introduced and, at the same time, subject to a multitude of interpretations according to different stakeholders. Aid effectiveness concepts are described as following, suggested by OECD. The Paris Declaration pyramid illustrates the logical flow of how these concepts relate to one another.

Aid effectiveness concepts:

- 1.) Ownership:** *Developing countries set their own strategies for poverty reduction, improve their institutions and tackle corruption.*
- 2.) Alignment:** *Donor countries align behind these objectives and use local systems.*
- 3.) Harmonisation:** *Donor countries coordinate, simplify procedures and share information to avoid duplication.*
- 4.) Results:** *Developing countries and donors shift focus to development results and results get measured.*
- 5.) Mutual accountability:** *Donors and partners are accountable for development results.*

(OECD 2010)



FIGURE 3: The Paris Declaration pyramid, Five shared principles with actions to make aid more effective (OECD 2011c p18)

This section briefly outlines the current debates taking place around the concept of “ownership” in the context of development. A definition of “Ownership” proposed by Ohno and Ohno, based on Johnson and Wasty (1993) and Morrissey (1999), is “Political *commitment* to and *capacity* for designing and implementing policies and development actions” (Ohno & Ohno 2008). Some see the elements of Ownership as: Will, Capacity and Legitimacy (Jerve 2008). Currently, the issue of ensuring “democratic ownership” is actively debated by both OECD and non-OECD countries. The key is often argued how to set up accountability mechanisms (OECD 2010). In the ownership debate, the often quoted phrase is “Who is in the driver’s seat?” Jerve (2008) illustrates what are the specifics, which should be asked within this question: 1.) Who owns the car?, 2.) Who is driving?, 3.) Who made the road map?, and 4.) Who decides where to go?

OECD has developed a set of indicators to measure the degree of Paris Declaration

implementation on Aid Effectiveness. The indicator to gauge countries' "ownership" is assessed by whether "Countries have operational development strategy?" More in detail, Indicator 1: Partners have operational development strategies that have clear strategic priorities linked to a medium-term expenditure framework and reflected in annual budgets. In monitoring this progress, the baseline is based on World Bank analysis of national development strategies undertaken in 55 countries and to be published in the 2005 Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) Progress Report. The framework includes 20 assessment criteria, 5 of which are relevant to assess the operational value of national development strategies. These are: Coherent long-term vision; Medium-term strategy derived from vision; Country-specific development targets; Holistic, balanced, well-sequenced strategy; and Capacity and resources for implementation.

The measurement of ownership proposed by OECD only captures one aspect of ownership. For instance, researchers like Whitfield, through her series of interviews with aid stakeholders in Africa, reveals the multiple meanings attached to the term 'ownership', and how donors use this rhetoric of imposing their policy priorities without being seen as too pushy (Whitfield 2009). Martens, writes also that there can only be full ownership if the preferences of recipient countries are aligned with donor preferences (Martens 2005). Often times, donors want the program countries to "own" the kind of policies that donors prefer. If there is a strong ownership by the program country government, which donors do not adhere to, this could be seen in the eyes of the donors as "lack of ownership" of most prominent issues by the program country governments.

Initiatives by the World Bank

The World Bank initiated the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF), a management tool “designed to provide a framework which is more country-focused, created with components of the recipient country’s development strategy across the top and the development actors, including the country itself, along the side”. Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) were introduced in 1999 by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a new framework to enhance domestic accountability for poverty reduction reform efforts; a means to enhance the coordination of development assistance between governments and development partners, and a precondition or access to debt relief and concessional financing from both institutions' the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) Initiative.

2.3 UN reform

The United Nations (UN) was founded in 1945 after the Second World War by 51 countries committed to maintaining international peace and security, developing friendly relations among nations and promoting social progress, better living standards and human rights. The Organization takes action on a wide range of issues, and provides a forum for its 193 Member States to express their views, through the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and other bodies and committees. The budget amounts to approximately US\$20 billion annually with a secretariat staff of 70,000 in 2010 (Müller 2010). The UN in its 66th year since its birth, now has a very complex structure. The expansion of the UN system has added

layers of bureaucracies and created overlapping mandates and duplications of operational activities within the system.

Phase I: 1945 – 1966

In order to overcome such structural obstacles and to meet the global challenges at times, the UN system in development has gone through three major phases of reform. The phases are: Phase I: 1945 – 1966; Phase II: 1966 – 1997; and Phase III: UN reform 1997 (Bertrand 2005). During Phase I: 1945 – 1966, after the creation of UN, its activities were expanded to the spheres of technical assistance, authorized in the General Assembly resolution 200 (III) in 1948. The Expanded Programme for Technical Assistance (EPTA) was established in 1949. It was merged with the United Nations Special Fund, established in 1958, and the two organizations evolved into the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1965 (Stokke 2009). In 1961, the World Food Programme (WFP) and, in 1964, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) joined the web of UN family. Constant increase in the number of UN organizations as well as the bilateral aid organizations in 1960s, have added the diversity and complexity to the ODA landscape. The balance of power and control between the central funding mechanism such as UNDP and the autonomous UN specialized agencies became the subject of ever-lasting debate.

Phase II: 1966 – 1997

There were scores of attempts to reform UN to improve its roles and functions in development in the Phase II: 1966 – 1997. These earlier reform initiatives already highlighted the issues that are still pertinent in the current development assistance after 40 years. The first major report, “Partners in development” (so called the Pearson Report), prepared by the Commission on International Development led by Lester B. Pearson, former Prime Minister of Canada, argued for the need to achieve greater coherence within the aid machinery, including both the UN and the Bretton Woods Institutions, and stressed the need for a country-level coordination (Bertrand 2005). The second report, commonly known as the Capacity Study or Jackson Report, “A Study of the capacity of the United Nations Development System”, issued in 1969, provided a critical analysis of the role of the United Nations development system. The Study had two purposes, to assess 1.) “the capacity of the United Nations system to make effective use of the present resources of the United Nations Development Programme” and 2.) “its capacity to handle a programme approximately double that of the present operation within the next five years”. Jackson pointed out the absence of an effective governance mechanism to control UNDP, and described UNDP as “prehistoric monster”. Major problems highlighted were a lack of an integrated approach in responding to the needs of developing countries, proliferation of projects by UN Specialized Agencies, delays in project delivery, and suffering quality of UNDP projects due to weak capacity of its personnel (Kaufmann 1971). The challenges identified in these two reports are still quite relevant, and they remain to be tackled in the current context.

Phase III: UN reform 1997

The reform package launched by the Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan in 1997 had a great impact on operational activities of UN system at the field. The report titled “Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform” highlighted the Secretary-General’s vision to transform UN to meet the challenges more effectively and efficiently in the new century. The Secretary-General referred to the reform package as the most extensive and far-reaching in the fifty-two year history of UN. A set of comprehensive and detailed recommendations were made accompanied by concrete action points in order to enhance UN’s strategic deployment of resources, unity of purpose, coherence of effort, agility and flexibility (UN 1997). In the realm of development cooperation, new measures were put in place to avoid fragmentation and overlaps of UN assistance in program countries. The UN Development Group was constituted at the headquarters level, whose membership was initially held by UNDP, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), to supersede the sectoral group on development operations. UN Development Assistance Framework was devised as a common planning tool for UN representative offices in the field, and it was confirmed that UNDP would continue as the manager and funder of the Resident Coordinator system.

Indicated in a previous section, the Table 1 summarises a series of initiatives to promote aid coordination. Recent UN reform packages are listed below pertaining to development in UN system and aid coordination, launched during former Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan’s term.

UN reform initiatives launched during former Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan's term:

1997 *Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform*

2002 *Strengthening the United Nations: An Agenda for Further Change*

2005 *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for ALL*

2006 *Investing in the United Nations for a Stronger Organization Worldwide*

2006 Introduction of *the Cluster Approach to Strengthen Humanitarian Response* by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)¹

2006 *Delivering as One: Report of the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel*

In 2007, "Delivering as One" Pilots were initiated by the recommendations presented by the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel¹ on UN System-wide Coherence in the Areas of Development, Humanitarian Assistance, and the Environment, a group of heads of state and policy makers tasked to examine ways to strengthen the UN's ability to respond to the challenges of the 21st Century. The Report identified series of recommendations with an aim to overcome the fragmentation of the United Nations so that the system can deliver as one entity to assist countries in need to achieve the Millennium Development Goals and other internationally agreed development goals. In particular, it was recommended to establish One UN at country level, with one leader, one program, one budget and, where appropriate, one office. It was argued that the UN Resident Coordinator should be empowered further, and s/he should focus and strengthen its operational work on policy coherence and positioning of the UN country team. The report proposed to have 5 One UN country pilots by 2007, and

¹ The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) is an inter-agency forum for coordination, policy development and decision-making involving the key UN and non-UN humanitarian partners. The IASC was established in June 1992 in response to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/182 on the strengthening of humanitarian assistance. General Assembly Resolution 48/57 affirmed its role as the primary mechanism for inter-agency coordination of humanitarian assistance.

subject to satisfactory review, 20 One UN Country Programs by 2009, 40 by 2010 and all other appropriate programs by 2012.

In 2007, the UN Delivering as One pilots started in the following countries, which volunteered to take on these new arrangements: Albania, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Pakistan, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uruguay, and Viet Nam. The results are currently under review by the UN secretariat, in addition to the stock taking reports prepared by the respective UN country offices in the pilot countries.

2.4 Remaining issues for further research

Although, the commitment to aid coordination is politically expressed and there is some useful research carried out in quantifying the extent of aid proliferation and fragmentation, the empirical evidence is few to show how aid coordination contributes to improving aid effectiveness and how to do this well. There is very little research conducted to examine the quality of coordination itself and the mechanisms of how better aid coordination could influence the better results of ODA programmes or projects delivered. Shortcomings of the UN reports and analysis are that they tend to focus too much on the project level outputs and do not systematically analyze the added-value of “coordination” to project outputs and ultimately to broader development outcomes. UN working level reports tend to attach attentions to the details of operational and administrative issues, and lack in delving into the structural bottlenecks of why coordination is often hampered. Therefore, this research attempts make a humble contribution in filling the missing links between the various technical internal reports and the high-level political declarations. This research focuses on the

practical lessons on aid coordination specifically analyzing the UN coordination, aiming to draw practical policy recommendations.

Lack of research with regard to aid coordination:

- 1.) Lack of research on systematically quantifying the transaction costs of aid;
- 2.) Lack of evidence on how reduced transaction costs result in improved service delivery;
- 3.) Lack of analysis, which gives practical guidance on how to improve aid coordination for better development results.

Chapter 3

Research Methodology

This chapter describes the research methodology of this dissertation. In order to tackle the primary research questions of *“the impact (degree of change) of aid coordination on development results and their mechanisms”*, analysis was carried out through case studies. Means of collecting data and information were through: literature survey, participant observation and interviews. Relevant research was investigated, various UN reports, internal communications, and meeting minutes were reviewed, and face-to-face individual interviews were carried out. As the author of this dissertation is a former staff member of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the initial hypothesis and explanations were shaped based on participant observation from her own working experience as UN official. A number of face-to-face individual interviews were carried out with stakeholders involved in the activities within the case studies. Interviews, in some cases, were conducted via Skype where meeting in person was not feasible due to geographical distance, for instance, between Europe and Japan.

3. 1 Rationale for the selection of case studies

Three case studies were selected for this research from two countries: the Republic of Rwanda (hereafter, Rwanda) and the People's Republic of China (hereafter, China). These are the two countries, in which the author served as a UN official, and had opportunities of directly or remotely dealt with in my professional capacity. The first

case study examines the experience of a joint project between the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), called the Poverty and Environment Initiative (PEI), implemented from 2005-2011. The second case is focusing on UN joint response in assisting the Government of China in fighting HIV/AIDS, especially around 2003. The third case analyzes the aid coordination practice to conserve the forest areas in Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda, after the civil war and genocide in 1994. The forest area, the Virungas provide critical means of livelihoods for the local population living in this region by offering resources and livelihood functions (water sources, firewood, etc). The Virungas are also the habitat of endangered mountain gorillas.

These case studies were selected for the following reasons. By analyzing these three cases, specific experiences from two regions can be covered. Africa and Asia holds largest numbers of world population people living under poverty, and thus, still remain as the main target regions of official development assistance (ODA). According to Human Development Index (HDI), Rwanda is categorized as Low Human Development country and China as Medium Human Development country and emerging country. The Government of Rwanda recognizes that Rwanda is no longer a post-conflict country, and has successfully lifted itself out from a post-conflict phase to a development phase. These cases represent different levels of socio-economic status. In particular, the post-conflict Rwanda case is a very important example in understanding how donors and, in particular UN system, attempted to organize its work and to coordinate stakeholders in Rwanda during the post-conflict chaos.

The underlining motivation to choose Cases 1 and 2 were aiming at distilling lessons from relatively successful cases of UN coordination. Both the joint project between the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Poverty and Environment Initiative (PEI) in Rwanda the UN joint response in assisting the Government of China in fighting HIV/AIDS around 2003 and were evaluated positively internally and externally by funding donors and counterpart governments. These two initiatives were often quoted as “best practice” of UN coordination in relevant evaluation reports and internal communications by senior management in the UN organizations involved. Within the UN system, there is a lack of UN system-wide criteria for assessing how well UN coordination functioned and contributed to improving development results. Each UN agency has its own mandate and specialized areas, and generally, there is a reluctance to coordinate with other UN sister agencies. It is the case especially when the costs are high for coordinating their activities with others in terms of spending staff time and efforts and changes in business processes and procedures are imposed. It is not usually easy to be able to identify “best practice” of UN coordination, and therefore, there are imperatives for analyzing the factors contributing to those perceived positive results with these particular cases for further learning and analysis. Through these cases, the impact of UN coordination on development results will be looked into whether, with UN coordination, development programmes yielded better or worse results against intended goals.

The cases from Rwanda and China offers examples from different development phases, and could shed light on how coordination could be better pursued and implemented in

countries and regions at different levels of socio-economic status and national capacity. The analysis of post-conflict Rwanda after 1994 holds a particular importance. The failure for the international community to assist Rwanda in avoiding the horrific genocide in 1994 was a hard lesson for the UN system, and raised the question of UN's role and function in intervening to mediate and prevent such kind of human atrocities to take place. UN system reflects on the experience from Rwanda, not being able to react to the demands from the field to dispatch additional peacekeepers to suppress the genocide, and describes that UN's own activities being hampered by poor coordination (UN 1996). The lessons from Rwanda stood as a basis for the series of UN reform launched by former Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan, who was the Head of Peacekeeping Operation at UN headquarters at the time of the genocide in Rwanda in 1994.

3.2 Selection of informants and methods of interviews

In addition to literature survey and desk review, several field studies were carried out. Relevant research was studied, various UN reports, internal communications, and meeting minutes were reviewed, and face-to-face individual interviews were carried out. Interviews were conducted in Rwanda, China, Japan, and New York in the United States of America. In some cases, the interviews were done through Skype or by email sending a list of questions and receiving answers to them. Several group interviews were organized where it seemed to be the most suitable mode of communication.

The purpose of research is to answer "How" UN coordination affected the development results and "Why" the results were generated the way they did. In order

to find out the process and motivations, semi-structured interviews were arranged. The author took the approach of indentifying informants progressively, making use of findings from earlier interviews and modifying questions in response to understanding or information gained in earlier interviews (Thomas & Mohan 2007). Findings were validated by triangulation to the extent possible by drawing upon different sources of information. Triangulation is defined as “the use of three or more theories, sources or types of information, or types of analysis to verify and substantiate an assessment” (OECD 2002).

In total 115 people participated in the interviews and kindly offered their important inputs and observations. The informants were former or present UN officials at both junior and senior level, staff members from bilateral partners, civil society organizations and government counterparts. By interviewing experts and policy-makers, the intention is to capture the general understanding and perceptions shared by particular professional communities at that time (Symon & Cassell 1998). Both internal and external evaluation reports of these cases reflect little about the underlining motivations and politics of “Why” the events happened the way they did. People in this situation were the essential sources of information. Experts were also consulted at UN headquarters to test the content of research findings and policy implications in order to develop policy recommendations, which are supposed to be relevant and feasible in practical terms.

3.3 Author's position and avoiding bias

As the author of the thesis is a former UNDP staff member, and the cases analyzed are the projects, in which the author was involved in one way or another, this gives a unique condition for how the case studies were conducted. The author has served for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for seven years. She has worked in the UNDP China office as Programme Officer (2000-2003), Bureau of Management of UNDP HQ as Planning Specialist (2003-2005), and UNDP Rwanda office as Assistant Resident Representative (ARR) heading the Sustainable Livelihoods Unit (2005-2007). During her assignment in Rwanda, she served as the Co-chair of the Environment and Land Use Management Sub-sector Working Group supporting the Government Chair to formulate Rwanda's Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS). In China, the author worked as UN Coordination Analyst, and then in Rwanda, worked on joint programme initiatives as UNDP ARR, and faced the challenges of UN coordination. These frustrations and observations prompted her to focus on aid coordination as the central theme of this research.

First, there was an advantage of the author having the first-hand access to project information and background knowledge, had opportunities of collecting factual information and forming views through participant observations, and had the understanding of corporate culture, organizational logics and business practices of UN system within my own work area. Being part of the workforce, the author had the privilege of hearing, reading and debating the common understanding and interpretations of events in her work domain in the UN system. However, the downside of this situation was that there might have been an inclination to evaluate

the work that her colleagues and she were engaged in, with an overly positive light. In the same vein, the government counterparts could also be biased towards praising their past work, and do not feel the need to be pointing out any mistakes in their work achievements. The beneficiaries of UN aid programmes, including government counterparts might also exercise judgment to be polite to the author (interviewer), and might have even foreseen a funding potential in the future although the author do not hold any official position in the UN system anymore. The fact that the author have worked for UNDP for 7 years present an advantage of having wealthier information on UNDP than other UN organizations. During the research process, in order to alleviate these types of biases, intentional efforts were made to approach informants from multiple parties, and they were explained the fact that an independent research was carried out for the purpose of a doctoral degree, which had no links to any potential new UN funding as such. The author also made cautious efforts not to fall into short-sightedness when discussing the technical details of UN or UNDP day-to-day business.

3.4 Applying “the 3Cs framework”

In order to draw some general insights into inter-organizational relationships formed and exercised in these cases, the author will use the framework of “the 3Cs”. The 3C framework is composed of the following notions: Competition, Coordination, and Cooperation. As a conclusion, this research argues that Competition, Coordination, and Cooperation should be emphasized respectively depending on different stages of project cycle. Based on the analysis of 3Cs diagram, policy recommendations will be provided how incentive mechanisms could be improved within UN system to ensure

that aid coordination efforts contribute to yielding better development results. The 3Cs diagram will represent the elements extracted from the case studies in a logical manner. The functions of Competition, Coordination and Cooperation will be examined, and how these inter-organizational relationships influence each will also be discussed. The incentive mechanisms within the UN system will be examined with a 3Cs lens in the areas of strategic planning, financing, personnel management, in order to draw practical policy recommendations.

Why 3Cs, in this case: Competition, Coordination and Cooperation? “The fact is that forces of competition, coordination and cooperation are constantly at play, and any particular inter-organizational relationship or organizational arena may be more or less shaped by some combination of the principles and practices of these forces” (Kyriakidou & Özbilgin 2006). 3Cs encompass broad range of social life activities. There are other inter-organizational relationships, such as conflict, collaboration, collusion, complacency, compassion, confusion, etc. However, the author believes that 3Cs embrace wide range of human activities and some of the inter-organizational relationships mentioned above can even be part of the 3Cs perspective or be one of the variables in analyzing the 3Cs. The characteristics of each “C” will be depicted below.

Competition

The literal meaning of “Compete” is “to strive for something together with another”. The functions of competition are: “efficient allocation of resources, increase in productivity, and quality depending on conditions. Economists argue that, as a process,

competition generates new knowledge and information. However, if it is managed unruly, causes conflict. Competition also is referred to as the state of “conflict over scarce resources”, therefore, in those cases, “goals are negatively related, so that one’s success interferes with the others: one’s successful goal attainment makes others less likely to reach their goals” (Robinson, Hewitt & Harriss 2000).

Coordination

The literal meaning of “Coordinate” is to “place in the same order, rank, or division; to place things in proper position relatively to each other and to the system of which they form part; to act in combined order for the production of a particular result”. The functions of coordination is through hierarchical control, minimize duplication and wastage and tackle fragmentation (Gittell 2006). Coordination can also provide opportunities for reaping harvests from the economy of scale and complementarities. Shared norm and rules play important roles in coordination along with authority. Through authority, control mechanisms can be established, and by either imposed or agreed incentives and sanctions.

Gittell outlines how organizational theorists have tackled the notion of “Coordination” in the past. Thompson, in 1967, explained that effective coordination in highly interdependent work settings is characterized by ‘mutual adjustment’ among participants. Results from one task generate new information for participants undertaking related tasks. However, Thomas admitted the limitation to ‘mutual adjustment’ due to the exorbitant costs associated with it. Therefore, he argued that coordination is more commonly carried out through supervision, routines, scheduling,

pre-planning or standardization. Organizational researchers such as Thompson, Argote, and Van de Ven have acknowledged that these mechanisms are typically effective in circumstances with low levels of task interdependence and low levels of uncertainty (Gittell 2006).

The mechanism of coordination of activities of multiple people are categorized by mainly three methods indicated below by Noda Depending on the complexity within or among organizations, the best mix of means of coordination will be selected (Noda 2005 p.236). Makihara argues that “Coordination” has been one of the central concepts in public administration. In the public administration literature, there have been sets of “doctrines” developed as a result of analyzing the issue of coordination (Makihara 2009).

Three methods of coordination:

- 1) Adjustment through mutual interactions (a. Coordination through direct conversation, b. Possible within small groups, c. No need to establish hierarchy, d. Costly for participating members)
- 2) Direct management and supervision (a. Assigning people who manage and people whom to be managed, b. The issue of span of control arise, c. At least two layers of hierarchy necessary)
- 3) Standardization (a. Standardization of processes, b. Standardization of outputs, c. Standardization of capacity, skill and knowledge of members of the organization)

(Noda 2005 pp.236)

Cooperation

The literal meaning of “Cooperate” is “to work together; act in conjunction with another person or thing, to an end, or in a work”. A function of cooperation is effective allocation of resources. Cooperation promotes exchange of commodities whose values

are not easily measured. Institutional framework commonly associated with cooperation is the civil society, and cooperation is usually forged based on trust and self-organization (Robinson, Hewitt & Harriss 2000). Cooperation does not require changes in standard operating procedures (SOPs) or business procedures, thus, administrative costs are relatively lower than coordination (Takahashi 2003). (See Table 2 for Common associations of competition, coordination and cooperation.)

TABLE 2: Common associations of competition, coordination and cooperation (Based on Robinson, Hewitt & Harriss 2000)

Inter-organizational relationships (3Cs)	Definitions	Functions	Common institutional framework	Results
<u>COMPETITION</u>	Compete: to strive for something together with another.	Efficient allocation of resources. Increase productivity, and quality.	Market	If unruly, causes conflict.
<u>COORDINATION</u>	Coordinate: to place in the same order, rank, or division; to place things in proper position relatively to each other and to the system of which they form part.	Through hierarchical control, minimize duplication and wastage. Tackle fragmentation. To reach the economy of scale and complementarities.	State	Shared norm and rules rather than by authority. Control through authority: imposed or agreed.
<u>COOPERATION</u>	Cooperate: to work together; act in conjunction with another person or thing, to an end, or in a work.	Effective allocation of resources. Promotes exchange of commodities whose values are not easily measured.	Civil society	Based on trust and self-organization.

3.5 Project Cycle Management (PCM) and 3Cs

In this dissertation, the case studies will be analyzed by applying the 3Cs perspective. In conjunction, the activities brought about by official development assistance will be examined by looking at different phases of the project cycle. Project Cycle Management framework, with variances in its names and definitions by various aid providing organizations (the Project Design and Management (PDM) by USAID, Objectives-Oriented Project Planning (ZOPP) by German Technical Cooperation (GTZ)², Project Cycle Management (PCM) by the European Commission (EC) and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), etc.), represents a circular stream of activities with learning and feedback processes built in, for delivering an aid project.

The core concept of Project Cycle Management is to depart from traditional public administration practices, in which “Plan – Do” sequences were the norm. The basis for this was to assume that as long as the governments “Do” what was “Planned” and instructed by the Parliament / Congress, the targeted objectives will be met automatically. A new paradigm of public administration, “Plan – Do – See” was introduced in the context of New Public Management (NPM), pursued by a number of industrialized countries in the mid-1990s. Countries such as the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Canada, Australia, the Netherlands, Germany and France, applied the principles of NPM, in order to overcome challenges like stagnation of macro-economy, fiscal deficit, accumulated national debts and increasing demand for service delivery caused by aging populations (Ohsumi 1999). New Public Management (NPM) is generally “characterized by an emphasis on output controls, the disaggregation of

² As a result of the merger with DED (German Development Service) and InWEnt (Capacity Building International), GTZ was renamed as GIZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit) in January, 2011.

traditional bureaucratic organizations and decentralization of management authority, the introduction of market and quasi-market mechanisms, and customer-oriented services” (Yamamoto 2003).

In the cycle of “Plan – Do – See”, the results and lessons are fed into the process of new planning exercises (Ohsumi 1999 p.4). In the domain of official development assistance, not being free from the public administration reforms of their home governments, the demand for more effective and efficient aid became increasingly high. The wave of New Public Management-ism swept over both bilateral and multilateral aid agencies. As part of this effort, in late 1960s, Logical Framework was introduced by USAID, and international organizations started to use the Logframe. In early 1980s, Objectives-Oriented Project Planning (ZOPP) by German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), and European countries adopted the ZOPP in early 1990s. Also, in early 1990s, JICA started to fully apply PCM developed by the Foundation for Advanced Studies on International Development (FASID) in their operation. Generally, the basic sequence of “planning, implementation, learning and feedback, which inform the next planning process” is embraced in the majority of prominent aid organizations, and this cycle is typically called the Project Management Cycle.

For instance, European Commission (EC) notes that the cycle of operations for managing the EC’s external assistance projects has five phases: Programming, Identification, Formulation, Implementation, Evaluation and Audit. EC’s Project Cycle highlights three main principles:

- 1.) Decision making criteria and procedures are defined at each phase (including key information requirements and quality assessment criteria);
- 2.) The phases in the cycle are progressive – each phase should be completed for the next to be tackled with success; and
- 3.) New programming and project identification draws on the results of monitoring and evaluation as part of a structured process of feedback and institutional learning.

(European Commission 2004)

The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) identifies the components of its Project Cycle Management as: Identification and Formulation, Planning, Implementation, Evaluation and Lessons and Feedback. The JICA version of PCM is a “tool to manage an aid project through planning, implementation and evaluation using Project Design Matrix (PDM)” (FASID 2011), which was developed based on ZOPP by GTZ. JICA, in particular places an emphasis on 1.) participatory method, 2.) the logical flow of how components relate to each other, and 3.) the consistency ensured by using PDM through the project cycle (FASID 2011).

According to UNDP project management guidelines, projects are integral components of a UNDP country regional or global programme. At the country level they are also imbedded in the Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) or United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) Action Plan. The project cycle begins by justifying a project’s business case based on the initial articulation in the country programme, and ends with achievement of outputs to be assessed in the programme

review. The rounded-corner rectangles in the centre of the diagram in the figure below represent the processes of a project, essentially the high-level activity areas starting and ending at decision points that must be complied with to manage a project (UNDP 2011). According to OECD, “development programme” is a time bound intervention involving multiple activities that may cut across sectors, themes and / or geographic areas (OECD 2002).




FIGURE 4: UNDP Project Cycle (UNDP 2011)

Based on the Project Cycle models of various aid organizations, in this dissertation,

the Project Cycle will be simplified in the form of the Cycle indicated as the Figure 5. The Cycle starts with “Planning & Initiation (Resource Mobilization)”, then moves on to “Implementation”. “Monitoring” will be carried on along with “Implementation” which will finally inform the “Evaluation”. The learning from the “Evaluation” will feed into the new planning exercise.



FIGURE 5: Project Cycle Management for this dissertation

By combining the Project Cycle Management for this dissertation indicated above and the 3Cs framework (Competition, Coordination and Cooperation) in analyzing the case studies, the author would like to introduce the “3Cs Diagram” shown as the Figure 6. The “3Cs Diagram” is developed by the author, and it is used to analyze the case studies, and the findings of the case studies will feed into the development of

the 3Cs Diagram, and verify the validity of the model proposed. The following chapters will provide the details of how these analytical processes take shape.



FIGURE 6: 3Cs Diagram

Chapter 4

Case study 1:

UN partnership in achieving poverty and environment targets in Rwanda

4.1 Background

Cross-sectoral coordination for poverty and environment nexus

“The environment is our life-blood; indeed the real surprise is not that ministries of finance are now talking to ministries of the environment but that it has actually taken this long”, expressed by the Rwandan President Paul Kagame in his speech to delegates at the 3rd African Ministerial Conference on Financing for Development in Kigali (UNDP and UNEP 2010). Integration of environmental management into economic planning and decision-making has been discussed as one of the ways to achieve sustainable development, first in the 1987 Brundtland Report more than two decades ago. The thinking is that better environmental management can improve health, well-being and livelihood opportunities, especially for the poor (UNDP & UNEP 2009). The notion of “poverty and environment” approach emanated, and formed into actual initiatives as one of the results from the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg in 2002.

The new “poverty and environment” argument suggested a paradigm shift from understanding “poverty and environment” link as a vicious circle to a win-win

interaction. When the natural resource assets are properly managed and accessed by the poor, the poor are more likely to be capable of improving their livelihoods. The thinking matured to be put into practice as concrete internationally-funded initiatives, one of them being, the United Nations Poverty and Environment Initiative (PEI). The current global PEI is a marriage of what used to be two separate programmes of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). The global PEI went through three major stages of development: 1.) from 1987 (Brundtland Report) to 1992 (the Rio Summit), “the incubation and concept development period”, 2.) from 2002 (WSSD) to 2007 (Scale-up of PEI) “start-up and implementation period”, and 3.) 2007 (Signing of UNEP and UNDP MoU) to 2011, “global scale-up period”.

The case subject to analysis of this paper, is a joint-project managed by UNDP and UNEP in support of the Government of Rwanda. Rwanda was one of the 7 countries implementing PEI with the funding from Norway and Belgium between 2004 and 2008. The joint effort of PEI in Rwanda is often quoted as a “best practice” of UN coordination and partnership by the programme country government, donors and senior managers of the UN system. The case study will examine the contributing factors to the positive and fruitful partnership between these two UN organizations in supporting the Government of Rwanda. At the country level, UNEP and UNDP often end up fighting over their turfs of who will manage field level environmental programmes in what areas. The fact that these two UN sister organizations coming to terms, collaborating and demonstrating results is a unique example, which deserves a thorough analysis.

Method of Case study

For this case study, the primary source of data collection was carried out through review of reports issued by UN Development Group (UNDG), PEI reports, UN Theme Group meeting minutes, various journal papers and publications, participant observations, semi-structured interviews with around 10 officials from the UN system in Rwanda and Government of Rwanda. For the interviews, around 5 senior officials responded to around 1-hour long interviews. Around 2 mid-level and junior staff members of the UN system in Rwanda and Government of Rwanda participated in 30-60 minutes individual interview sessions. A field trip took once in Rwanda in June, 2009 for 10 days. Based on the notes taken by the author during those interviews, and written material collected, attributional coding was carried out to extract attributes. The findings were constructed based on these attributes and perceptions by the informants.

Where Rwanda is coming from – her recent history

Clashes between Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups in Rwanda during the late 1950s led many Tutsi to flee to Uganda and other neighbouring countries. In April 1994, President Habyarimana of Rwanda was killed, which triggered a genocide that killed up to a million people, mainly Tutsi, in 100 days. Since 1994, Rwanda has succeeded in reestablishing public security and made remarkable progress in socio-economic recovery. In 2003, Presidential and Legislative elections were held and the new Constitution was issued. The Human Development Index (HDI), which is a composite measure of health, education and income, for Rwanda rose by 1.5% annually from 0.249 to 0.385 between 1980 and 2010, which gives the country a rank of 152 out of

169 countries. Rwanda demonstrated a steady improvement of HDI, and in 2010, Rwanda is almost catching up with the regional average of Sub-Saharan Africa whose HDI value is 0.389.




FIGURE 7: HDI trend in Rwanda (UNDP 2010)

Integration of poverty and environment in Rwanda

Rwanda's economy and the livelihoods of her people are dependent on the environment and natural resources such as water, land, air, minerals, plants and animals. These natural resources are increasingly under pressure from unsustainable use resulting in environmental degradation as well as decline in ecosystem goods and services (REMA 2009). The population density of Rwanda is the highest on the African continent, 380 persons per km² (Singapore: 7,148 persons per km², Belgium: 355 persons per km², and Japan: 337 persons per km²) by the 2005 UN statistics. The fact that Rwanda has maintained a high level of population density past and present is also an indication of Rwanda's prosperity (Prunier 1995). However, the challenge lies ahead in how to support the existing and growing population at the rate of 2.8%. The overwhelming majority of the population, 90%, depend their livelihoods on agriculture. Developed in 1999, Rwanda's "Vision 2020" states that Rwanda will endeavour to "mainstream the environmental aspect in all policies and programmes of education, sensitisation and development and in all the processes of decision-making" (UNDP & UNEP 2009).

National planning process in Rwanda

Rwanda embarked on developing its first Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), and finalised it in November 2001, which was later endorsed by the World Bank and IMF in July 2002. Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) "describe a country's macroeconomic, structural and social policies and programs to promote growth and reduce poverty, as well as associated external financing needs". In the development of the first generation of PRSP, the environment issue was considered as a cross cutting

issue, but not recognized as an independent sector. Rwanda's first PRSP did not adequately integrate environmental issues into other environmentally sensitive sectors. There was a lack of articulation as the environment as an independent sector, which also resulted in a weak standing for budget negotiation and allocation.

Building national capacity to for environmental management

In 2004, Rwanda Environmental management Authority (REMA) was established to facilitate coordination and oversight of the implementation of national environmental policy and the subsequent legislation, which operates under the Ministry of Natural resources (MINIRENA) (REMA 2009). Under the supervision of REMA, the country level "Poverty and Environment Initiative" (PEI) in Rwanda was initiated, jointly by UNDP and UNEP, aimed to integrate poverty-environment linkages into development planning for poverty reduction and pro-poor growth at national, sector and local level. PEI Phase I was implemented from 2005 to 2007 and Phase II from 2007 to 2011. The overall goal was: to contribute to poverty reduction and improved well-being of poor and vulnerable groups through mainstreaming of poverty-environment linkages into national development processes and to build capacity for sound environmental management at the local, district, and national level (UNDP & UNEP 2010). More specifically, the country level objectives were the following.

Objectives at country level:

- 1) Inclusion of environmental sustainability as a central objective in national development strategies, such as poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs), MDG implementation plans or equivalent;
- 2) Increasing national budget allocations in support of pro-poor environmental outcomes;

- 3) Building the long-term capacity of the government to integrate poverty-environment concerns into the design and implementation of development plans.

(UNDP & UNEP 2010)

4.2 Aid Coordination problems

Who is in the drivers' seat?

Rwanda had an estimated gross domestic product (GDP) of US\$371 per capita in 2007. Still, 37% of the population lived below the extreme poverty line; 57% fall below the upper poverty line. Net official development assistance (ODA) to Rwanda in 2006 was US\$585 million; this accounted for 24% of gross national income (GNI), and approximately one half of the government budget (OECD 2008 p.45-1). In Rwanda, the External Finance Unit in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN) provides a focal point for government efforts to ensure that aid is aligned with its policies and systems.




FIGURE 8: Aid coordination architecture in Rwanda in 2004 (Hayman 2006 p.66)

As the Government of Rwanda articulates, it continues to suffer from capacity problems. This is partly due to the legacy of the genocide of 1994, and the fact that Rwanda has moved from a period of emergency assistance through a period of transition, to a new period of long-term development. The Government of Rwanda's ability to attract and retain highly qualified and skilled staff remains limited. The limited administrative capacity of the Rwandan Government presents challenges for negotiation processes with the donors. The Government's absorptive capacity of aid is relatively low, and thus, provides a strong case for the need to reduce the transaction costs of external aid.

In Rwanda, the External Finance Unit in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN) provides a focal point for government efforts to ensure that aid is aligned with its policies and systems. The External Finance Unit is supported by an Aid Co-ordination Unit within the Office of the United Nations Resident Coordinator and financed by a basket fund of six donors (OECD 2008). In 2005, Rwanda signed the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness along with its bilateral and multilateral development partners, with the aim of stimulating increased efficiency and efficacy in the provision and management of external aid.

Proliferation and fragmentation of UN programmes

In Rwanda, there are 26 UN organizations represented². The Resident Coordinator (RC)

² Out of 26 UN organizations represented, there are 10 resident agencies: FAO, UNAIDS, UNDP, UNECA, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIFEM, WFP and WHO. UNCDF, UN-HABITAT, UNIDO and UNV are represented by UNDP. There are 8 non-resident agencies, IFAD, ILO, UNEP, UNESCO, UNCTAD, ITC, OHCHR and ITU. IMF, World Bank, ICTR, and MONUC are not part of One UN, but part of the UN Country Team. The abbreviations of the organizations are spelled out as following, in an alphabetical order: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), International Labour Organization (ILO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Trade Centre (ITC), International Telecommunication Union (ITU), United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), Office of the United

is responsible for coordination of the UN system in strategy, planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation of development programmes at the country level. In 2007, Rwanda volunteered to be one of the first eight countries to participate in the UN “Delivering as One” pilot. This pilot was initiated by the recommendations presented by the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on UN System-wide Coherence on UN, a group of heads of state and policy makers tasked to examine ways to strengthen the UN’s ability to respond to the emerging global challenges.

According to Rwanda UNDAF 2002-2006, UN system works on five themes, and aim to achieve 48 key objectives, covering issues such as support to the state institutions, the environment, gender-based violence, just to name a few. The UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) is “the strategic programme framework that describes the collective response of the UN system to national development priorities”. Some areas are covered by multiple UN agencies. Except five UN agencies, each UN agency in Rwanda disburses less than US\$3 million each year (UN Rwanda 2008a). (See Table 3 and Figure 9.) Table 3: Disbursement per UN agency in Rwanda, indicates that the size of each UN agency’s programme is rather small working in multiple sectors. The Figure 9 shows the disbursements per UN agency in Rwanda with an indication of US\$3 million threshold inserted by the author. Agencies such as UNIDO, UNIFEM and UN Habitat are staffed with only one professional staff with their respective administrative assistants depending on the funding. UN spreads itself rather thinly in multiple areas.

Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), United Nations Volunteers (UNV), World Bank (WB), World Food Programme (WFP) and World Health Organization (WHO).

In total, the UN system has over 400 staff members in Rwanda, for a total budget of US\$30 million in 2005. This contrasts with bilateral and multilateral donors (and even government) who typically have only a fraction of the staff (e.g. the largest bilateral donor, the UK Department for International Development (DFID), has less than 50 staff members) for programmes that are many times the size of the UN system (the World Bank's annual budget in Rwanda is over US\$120 million) (UN Rwanda 2007). It can also be noted that a large portion of DFID and the World Bank's assistance is in the form of general budget support. UN's project or programme-based technical assistance is rather labour-intensive in its implementation.

What "Delivering as One" has delivered - UN reform on the ground

There are problems of overlaps of programmes, inconsistencies among them, proliferation and fragmentation. On the other hand, in some cases, coordination is pushed for the sake of coordination itself. Coordination office itself is a growing bureaucracy, and adding another layer for already cumbersome administrative processes. Rwanda is among the UN Delivering as One pilot countries. In Rwanda, the new funding for the One UN pilot was primarily funded by Spain. With the aim of having One leader, One programme, and One budget, the UN agencies come together to formulate activities under the One UN umbrella. As pointed out by the RC office in Rwanda, the new funding played a role as "glue" to bind UN organizations together. As a result, what happened was to reinvent a new parallel programme to the existing country programmes. Therefore, instead of integrating the entire UN programme into one whole of coordinated activities, there are two parallel programmes running at the same time. This is beating the purpose of having an integrated "Delivering as One"

country programme. It indicates the challenge of altering existing scheme of activities and bringing in strong incentives for UN organizations to work together apart from new financial input.

Integration of poverty and environment – can agencies work together?

The national capacity to manage the environment is increasing in Rwanda. However, the staff capacity of REMA for instance is still quite limited, having only 7 staff members. The number of staff is, in fact, much less than the total number of staff members from donors agencies engaged in environmental affairs. In 2006, prominent development partners (a term more preferred to be used rather than “donors”), managing on-going environmental portfolio in the country were FAO, UNEP, UNDP, UN Habitat, UNIDO, FAO and the World Bank. These projects were implemented without systematic overall coordination.

For instance, in 2006, there were multiple UN projects aiming at national capacity development for environmental management: GEF National Capacity Self-Assessment (NSCA), UNEP&UNDP Poverty and Environment Initiative, UNDP Decentralized Environmental Management Project (DEMP), UNEP Bali Strategic Plan, and UNIDO Energy for rural communities project through mini-hydropower. Basically, GEF NCSA and the UNEP Bali Strategic Plan are identical in its goal and approaches. However, they were to be implemented in Rwanda around the same period. In 2006, several national consultants ended up spending the whole Christmas holiday writing up multiple reports for different development partners in different formats with basically the same idea. It is hard for the national governments to deny projects even with small

budget amounts, due to apprehensions of loosing out on future opportunities.

4.3 Results of Aid Coordination

As previously mentioned, PEI is often quoted as “a successful example of how UNDP and UNEP can work together”. This statement was made by the senior management of UNEP and UNDP in 2007. In 2011, UNEP Government Council encouraged UNEP to use the PEI as a model for its collaboration with UNDP and other UN agencies. Bilateral donors such as Norway and DFID also echoed such positive assessments. According the Norwegian Evaluation in 2009, UNDP & UNEP joint project, “Poverty and Environment Initiative (PEI)” in Rwanda was considered to be a “One UN” pioneer.

4.3.1 Unfolding the success elements

What was achieved and done well? The Rwanda PEI succeeded in three aspects on poverty and environment nexus: first to change the mind-set of policy makers, secondly to change the policies, and thirdly to assist those policies to be implemented. In order to showcase evidence of improving the environmental assets contributing to poverty reduction and economic growth, several economic studies were carried out by PEI. A solid Sector Plan on the Environment and Land use Management was incorporated in Rwanda’s second generation PRSP, called the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) 2008-2012, with budgets mobilized. The development of the Sector Plan was led by the Sector Working Group on the Environment and Land Use Management for the formulation of EDPRS for 18 months leading up to early 2007. The Group was chaired by REMA and co-chaired by UNDP, which facilitated the inclusion of PEI findings into the process of the development of

the Sector Plan. To mention one example, a case studied in the PEI economic analysis, the Rugezi wetland was restored, and recovered its capacity for hydro electricity generation for the country in 2009 after the launch of EDPRS in 2007. This was achieved through the contributions by PEI, a partnership among the Government of Rwanda, UNEP and UNDP.

Despite the fact that there was no clear description of division of labour between UNEP and UNDP in the memorandums of understanding nor terms of references, the complementarities between these two agencies were quite obvious. UNEP essentially provided technical competence and knowledge on PE issues and financial resources. UNDP offered the local office capacity, country knowledge and links to national counterparts. UNEP is based in Nairobi, Kenya and it was a non-resident UN agency when PEI started. The coordination between UNEP and UNDP was not pursued for the sake of coordination, but there were strong incentives to work together to accomplish results, which would not have been possible without each agency's contributions to one another. There was also organizational survival impetus to launch PEI in Africa. Since early 1997, UNEP has been close to bankruptcy and institutional extinction. It had been required to strengthen its management systems and meet the tall order of satisfying two constituencies: industrialized countries seeking UNEP's international normative roles and developing countries demanding operational programmes to be tailored at the field level.

Structure:

As the bulk of PEI budget in Rwanda was funded by UNEP, UNEP functioned as a donor to UNDP in a practical term. During the implementation of PEI, a UNDP senior official stated that, “UNEP is like our donor in PEI”. When there were decisions to be made or disagreements, UNEP had a final say. Therefore, there was a hierarchy built in within the programme from the outset. This arrangement contributed to effective coordination. This particular structure was set up, because, there was a prior phase when UNEP and UNDP competed globally for resource mobilization. Around the period of WSSD, both UNEP and UNDP attempted to operationalize the poverty and environment concept at the country level, and approached different donors. UNDP managed to receive funding from the European Commission and DFID, the British aid provider. On the other hand, UNEP mobilized a large sum of grant from Norway (US\$7 million), as well as Belgium and Sweden. This allowed UNEP to develop their country-level poverty and environment projects in Africa, which also funded PEI in Rwanda. PEI in Rwanda was turned into a UNEP&UNDP joint project, but the major source of funding was that of UNEP’s.

Timing:

Another key element was the timing of PEI in Rwanda (Bass & Renard 2009, personal communication with a UNEP senior manager 2009). The PEI was launched in 2005, just in time for the development of the EDPRS. Rwanda PEI was initiated after PEIs in Kenya and Tanzania, which allowed replication of good practices and learning from the past lessons. A UNDP senior official noted that, “Rwanda was the first country in which we

started working together from the very beginning and provided a model for future collaboration". An early consultation proved effective in initiating a joint programme.

People:

People elements played important roles as well. Strong commitments from the Environmental Minister and the REMA Director-General were a key. There were forth-coming boundary persons at both sides of UNEP and UNDP for PEI. A competent national team including both national and international consultants ensured results to be delivered, not to miss critical political opportunities. The UN RC had an environmental background and supported PEI at the leadership level. The fact that project was able to hire one full time international consultant and a senior national consultant and top-notch experts on various specialized assignments, was of a critical importance. Transaction costs, in fact, increased due to double processes and two agencies working together. There was a certain level of threshold of budget, which could accommodate hiring enough competent personnel to shoulder those increased tasks, and yet reap the net benefit. In the case of PEI Rwanda Phase I, the budget was US\$600,000 for one year.

Content:

The content of PEI policy messages were evidence-based and country specific. They were communicated to policy-makers in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN), and contributed to bringing changes to government policies including EDPRS. Regional learning took place among PEI countries in Africa during the

monitoring and evaluation phase. This type of corporation was less costly than more rigid coordination activities, and proved effective in improving project results.

4.4 Findings from applying 3Cs framework

Observations on Competition

Coordination of PEI worked well, because, there was a competition between UNDP and UNEP for resource mobilization phase for PEI programme. As a result, UNEP was entrusted to manage the PEI funding in Rwanda.

Observations on Coordination

UNEP functioned as a donor to UNDP in PEI in a practical term. As UNEP had a final say for decision-making, there was a hierarchy built in within the PEI from the outset. This arrangement made effective coordination possible.

Observations on Cooperation

Knowledge sharing and mutual learning took place in the process of monitoring and evaluation through cooperation. Lessons were disseminated to other PEI pilot countries, PEI Africa team gave good support.

(2). Case study with project cycle results

The Table 4 indicates the overall results of this case breaking them into each project cycle, and relating them to how inter-organization relationships played roles in facilitating those results. The first column shows actual results observed, and the second column summarizes the policy implications observed. Each row of the case

study represents one phase of the project cycle. Inter-organizational relationships, represented by Competition (RED), Coordination (GREEN) and Cooperation (PURPLE), are marked in different colours, where each “C” played an essential function in generating either positive or negative development results.

TABLE 4: Case study with project cycle results (Effective inter-organizational relationship according to Programme Cycle: RED: Competition, GREEN: Coordination and Purple: Cooperation)

Project cycle	Rwanda PEI	
	Results	Implications
Planning	Poverty and environment concepts to be operationalized by WSSD.	Question of who leads a global PEI initiative? Period of PEI content development.
Initiation (Resource mobilization)	UNEP and UNDP competed for funds. UNEP provided Rwanda PEI funding as a major donor.	A hierarchical decision-making built in within the project.
Implementation	UNEP & UNDP, good division of labour. Strong demands on both sides. Strong government ownership and leadership.	Division of labour should be decided in planning. Double processes for implementation a burden.
Monitoring and Evaluation	M&E results shared among global PEI projects.	PEI indicators established and served as a common framework for EDPRS.
Advocacy	Effectively advocated for reflecting environmental considerations in EDPRS. Evident-based approach.	Initially, limited access to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN) and the Parliament.

(3). The findings and the 3Cs diagram

The following conclusion is derived from this research. According to different project phases, effective inter-organizational relationships vary. This provides a new perspective on inter-organizational relationships within the UN system, when one form of inter-organizational relationship “Coordination” is overly emphasized to generate development results from working as a large whole of UN system. Internal UN guidelines usually instruct Competition to be avoided. The FIGURE 10 describes the case findings graphically. This research argues that Competition should be emphasized for project formulation and resource mobilization phase. Coordination plays a key role in project implementation phase, and Cooperation is essential in the monitoring and evaluation phase.




FIGURE 10: 3Cs Diagram

Conclusion

Competition, Coordination and Cooperation, each has its functions effectively contributing to improving development results as a consequence of multiple organizations working in relation to others. These effects manifest themselves differently according to different phases of project cycle. The FIGURE 10: 3Cs Diagram, represents that in Planning and Initiation / Resource Mobilization phase, competitive processes have contributed to selecting UN organization with technical competencies to deliver the end results. During the competitions among agencies, the quality of project proposals for applying for project funding has improved in order to emulate other agencies. As a result of a Competition among agencies, there was a case in which a hierarchical structure was already in place for project implementation. In the case of UNEP in Rwanda being a funding agency to UNDP Rwanda, from the initial competition between these two organizations, provided a built-in hierarchical decision-making structure within a UN joint project. This has contributed to effective Coordination taking place for a joint project implementation. For the second phase in the 3Cs Diagram, Project Implementation, Coordination should be emphasized. For the third phase in the 3Cs Diagram, Project Monitoring & Evaluation and Advocacy, there is generally a lack Cooperation among UN agencies, and it is essential to improve the cooperative nature of Project Monitoring & Evaluation and Advocacy among agencies.

Chapter 5

Case study 2: Aid to AIDS epidemic – Coordination towards solutions

The second case of this dissertation examines the UN concerted response to HIV/AIDS in China in early 2000s and subsequent policy measures and actions. The Government of China's standpoint on HIV/AIDS changed significantly from "Silence to Action" after the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003 (Yip 2006). The purpose of this chapter is to analyze what worked well in the HIV/AIDS sector in terms of UN joint efforts in supporting the Government of China to fight HIV/AIDS.

China, as a newly emerging economy, is achieving a rapid economic growth since its opening up of the economy in 1978, and now has the second largest gross national product (GNP) in the world, exceeding Japan. China certainly is becoming a significant player in the international arena and enhancing its influences globally. China is also increasingly being recognized as capable of "graduating" from aid. With this context in mind, there are important lessons to be learned in terms of the role played by ODA and how UN placed itself to accelerate the transformation processes of China. The findings from this case study could also provide some insights for China itself, as a prominent donor in the South-South cooperation, especially in Africa.

5.1 Background

China and United Nations

The United Nations system launched its development corporation in China in 1978, after China has taken its seat in the UN Security Council in 1971. Since 1979, with the introduction of reforms, China's Gross Domestic Product Gross (GDP) has grown at an average of 9.8 percent per annum, per capita income has increased fifty-fold, and some 500 million people have been lifted out of poverty in the last three decades (UN in China 2010). The Human Development Index (HDI), which is a composite measure of health, education and income, for China was 0.567 in 2000. After the turn of the century, China surpassed the HDI values of the East Asia and the Pacific region and the world in 2002. In 2010, China's HDI reached 0.663, and ranked 89th out of 169 countries with comparable data (UNDP 2010). (See FIGURE 11.) In 2000, out of US\$300 billion annual public investment in China, the total ODA was at US\$6 billion, representing a portion of 2%. The total of UN assistance was about US\$120 million in 2000, which was 0.004% of China's total public investment, "a small drop in a vast ocean" described by the UN (UN Country Team in China and the Government "Mirror Team" 2000).




FIGURE 11: HDI trend in China (UNDP 2010)

Method of Case study

For this case study, the primary source of data collection was conducted through review of reports issued by UN Development Group (UNDG) and UN in China, relevant programme reports, UN Theme Group meeting minutes, various journal papers and other publications, participant observations, and semi-structured interviews with 45 officials from the UN system in China and the Government of China. For the interviews, around 10 senior officials (a former Resident Coordinator, Heads of UN Agencies, the Directors of the State Council AIDS Working Committee Office (SCAWCO) and the National Center for AIDS/STD Prevention and Control (NCAIDS)) responded to around 1-hour long interviews. 25 mid-level and junior staff members of the UN system in China and the Government of China participated in 30-60 minutes individual interview sessions, and 10 people took part in a group session for about 1 hour. Field trips took

twice in Beijing China in June, 2010 for 10 days and in April 2011 for 5 days. Based on the notes taken during those interviews, and written material collected, attributional coding was carried out to extract key concepts. The findings were constructed based on these attributes and perceptions by the informants.

China is among the 135 countries and territories adhering to the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA). However, the OECD report reporting on the implementation of the Paris Declaration and AAA by the Government of China is not available. As China is not among the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) countries, thus, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) exercise is not obligatory for receiving concessional loans or other forms of aid resources for China. In this context, donor-driven coordination tools such as the Sector-wide approaches (SWAs), PRSP, general budget support (GBS) are not installed in the aid architecture in China as in other aid receiving countries around the world.

A set of new UN coordination policy and tools were launched as part of the 1997 UN reform package initiated by former UN Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan. UN coordination structure launched in the field was composed of: UN Country Team (a team of all the UN country office representatives in the programme country), Common Country Assessment (UN joint assessment of the status of a programme country), and UN Theme Groups (inter-UN sector groups). There were also set-ups developed by UN country team's own innovation and leadership, for instance the mirror team of the UN Country Team, inter-ministerial forum in the Government of China.

In 2000s, there were 24 UN agencies when the author was serving as a UN Coordination Analyst in China. UN Resident Coordinator (RC) was appointed, and the RC office was established for the first time in China in 2002. The RC Office was composed of RC, RC assistant, UN Coordination Analysis (Professional level-2 (P2), Junior Professional Officer) and an international part-time Senior Advisor. The capacity of the RC office is of a critical importance. In this sense, the capacity of the RC Office in 2010 when this research was conducted, has been improved by far due to the funding from DFID and the Spanish Government's contribution.

HIV/ AIDS Overall situation

HIV was first reported in China in 1985, and by 1998 the virus had spread to all 31 provinces of the mainland. By the end of 2008, 87% of China's 2868 counties had reported HIV/AIDS cases, including 43 which reported more than 1,000 cases and five which reported more than 5,000 cases (Wu et al. 2011). By the end of 2009, around 740,000 adults and children were estimated to be living with HIV, with around 48,000 new infections taking place in 2009. Among them, around 105,000 were estimated to be AIDS cases and around 26,000 to have died of HIV-related causes in 2009. Although the national HIV prevalence remains at 0.057%, the epidemic is serious in some areas and among some most-at-risk populations (UNAIDS 2011).

According to UNAIDS, the rate of increase in the growth of the epidemic has slowed further. However, more has to be done to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) target on HIV/AIDS: to halt the incidence by 2015 and reverse the spread. Sexual transmission continues to be the primary mode of HIV transmission. The

number of people affected by HIV/AIDS is increasing and modes of transmission are diversifying (UNAIDS 2011).

HIV/ AIDS in China: dramatic shift in policies and top leaders' commitment

Until 2003, there was limited response by the Government of China (GOC) in addressing the HIV/AIDS, and “China’s HIV/AIDS programmes were mainly supported by international donors” (Wu et al. 2011). When former United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan visited the former President Jiang Zemin in 2001, as part of his annual visits to the permanent member countries of UN Security Council, Kofi A. Annan raised the issue of AIDS challenge at the meeting. The former President Jiang Zemin at the time understood this to be a challenge relating to Africa. The UN Resident Coordinator from this period, recalls that only one year later, in October 2002, and a few months after the publication of the *Titanic report* did President Jiang Zemin raised the issue in his next meeting with Kofi A. Annan, and expressed the concern of the Chinese authorities (Leitner 2009).

It is widely recognized that an early response to HIV/AIDS is a key to prevent a nationwide epidemic (Munakata et al. 1993). If the response and appropriate measures are not taken early enough after the incidence of HIV/AIDS infections or deaths in the country, the tendency is that the epidemic becomes rampant in the society. Studies show that when the policy response to HIV/AIDS takes place within around 1 year after the first discovery of HIV/AIDS cases, the disease is likely to be contained within a Modest-level Prevalence Scenario like in the United Kingdom and Australia. When comprehensive policy measures for HIV/AIDS are put in place within

2-3 years after the first discovery of HIV/AIDS cases, the disease is likely to be contained within a Medium-level Prevalence Scenario. However, when the HIV/AIDS policies are implemented after 5 years or more after the first discovery of HIV/AIDS cases, the disease is likely to follow the Large-level Prevalence Scenario, meaning the prevalence rate reaching over 1% of overall population, which was the case with United States of America and Thailand (Munakata et al. 1993 pp.2-4). In the case of China, it took about 18 years, almost two decades after the first reported incidence of HIV for a comprehensive national policy response to HIV/AIDS to be in place.

5.2 Aid coordination problems

Problems with lack of coordination on the ground

The problems with lack of coordination cause overlaps, inconsistencies among different aid programmes and even with the policies of the programme countries. Wu et al. (2007) generalize the problems caused by lack of coordination in tackling HIV/AIDS in China as follows. Absence of agreed standards can be quite detrimental in providing public services with certain level of quality and safety assurance. An uncoordinated approach by donors could impose burdens on the aid beneficiaries. Respective guidelines and reporting duties are imposed on beneficiaries, which all result in the increase of transaction costs of receiving aid. Lack of overall strategy or integration affects how on-the-ground projects will be implemented also without coherence towards agreed goals. It is also pointed out that donors tend to flock in hotspots of development problems, and therefore, causes other sectors / geographical areas not receiving enough basic services. Missed opportunities for complementarities, achieving the economy of scale and mutual learning could also be added to the cost of

not coordinating aid.

Lack of coordination in the HIV/AIDS sector in China

The analysis by Wu et al. (2007) outlines the difficulties caused by lack of coordination on the ground. Overlaps of projects were observed in severe epidemic areas. For instance, there were 5 parallel HIV/AIDS projects in Tianshan District alone in Urumqi City, which resulted in heavy reporting responsibilities for the local officials and leading to weak implementation. On the contrary, there were insufficient funds for low-incidence areas to carry out basic HIV/AIDS activities (establishing HIV testing facilities & laboratory support), which may have caused shifts from low to med-high-prevalence (Wu et al. 2007). Inconsistency in data collection and measurement was also a huge obstacle. Similar information was collected from patients such as the patients on ART. Even though multiple groups gathered similar information and data, some of them were not reliable enough to be useful for national planning.

5.3 Results of Aid Coordination

Turning point in HIV/AIDS policy-making

Firstly, before zeroing in on the issue of coordination, it will be discussed how the shift in policy towards HIV/AIDS and strong political commitment to fight HIV/AIDS came about. The following section highlights the achievements in the field of HIV/AIDS prevention and care in China. Several reasons explain the rapid change of Government of China's AIDS policy in 2003. Firstly, because of the concentrated AIDS deaths in

Henan Province (so called the AIDS village), there were pressures from both domestic and international constituencies to quickly take appropriate measures. Secondly, the SARS epidemic during the spring of 2003 prompted the top leaders to embrace public health issues as a social and economic agenda, which required nationwide attentions and measures (Wu et al. 2007). Thirdly, there were imperatives for the new leadership by the Premier Wen Jiabao and the President Hu Jintao and the Government to demonstrate that they were capable to deal with crisis and to look after their people. Fourthly, the international policy environment towards HIV/AIDS has also changed and related advocacy has influenced the Chinese policy-makers. As a manifest to express the political commitment to tackle HIV/AIDS and to address stigma and discrimination associated with HIV/AIDS, the new leaders made public appearances in 2003, on the World AIDS Day (1 December). On that day, the Premier Wen Jiabao and Vice Premier Wu Yi visited a Beijing hospital to greet AIDS patients and shook hands. During the Spring Festival in 2005, the Premier Wen Jiabao paid a visit to the AIDS village in Henan Province. Since then, it has become an annual event for the top leaders to visit people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA).

Achievements in the field of HIV/AIDS prevention and care in China

In 2001, the media coverage related to HIV/AIDS was allowed legally and the first China AIDS Conference was convened in Beijing. Among a number of important achievements in 2004, the State Council AIDS Working Committee Office (SCAWCO) was established in February, 2004, followed by the State Council Document No.7 (March 2004), which articulated a comprehensive policy framework for HIV/AIDS prevention and control in China (SCAWCO & UN Theme Group on HIV/AIDS in China

2004). A national mid-term evaluation of China's Medium-and Long-Term Programme for the Prevention and Control of AIDS (1998-2010) was conducted, which informed the formulation process of the 5-Year Action Plan to Control HIV/AIDS (2001-2005). The CARES programme was expanded to the "Four Frees One Care" Policy (*simian yiguanhuai*) in 2003, which has increased the number of people living with AIDS on anti-retroviral treatment from some 100 patients in 2003 to over 80,000 in 2009. These were accompanied by firm demonstrations of commitment by key Chinese Government leaders to the HIV/AIDS crisis through actions such as public handshakes with people living with HIV/AIDS. The number of drug users provided with methadone maintenance treatment substantially increased from 8116 in 2005 to 241,975 in 2009, almost (a 30-fold increase). The Regulation on AIDS Prevention and Treatment (Decree No. 457) was issued by the State Council in early 2006. The Regulation was the first legal framework formulated in China for a specific disease or epidemic (SCAWCO and UN Theme Group on HIV/AIDS in China 2007). The State Council issued the new Five Year Action Plan for Reducing the Preventing the Spread of AIDS (2006-2010). The Budgets for HIV/AIDS prevention and care were increased sharply both at the central and local level, including the funds disbursed by the Global Fund. Since 2003, the Global Fund has approved US\$ 482.5 million in funding for China and has disbursed US\$ 313.1 million to date.

UN coordination structure in China

In China, there were 24 UN agencies represented in the country, in 2003. The basic UN coordination structure, instructed by the UN Development Group, is composed of the UN Country Team and the UN Theme Groups. The UN Country Team is the forum of all the UN Heads of Agencies in the country. The UN Theme Groups are the sectoral

coordination bodies participated by, in principle, 24 UN agencies represented in the country. The Resident Coordinator (RC) is responsible for coordination of the UNCT in strategy, planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation of development programmes at the country level. According to the UN guidelines, the RC “on behalf of the UN System (UNS), and in consultation with country representatives of the UNS, assumes overall responsibility for, and coordination of, the operational activities for development of the UNS carried out at the country level.”

The Resident Coordinator (RC) and the UN Country Team, supported by the UN Theme Groups, develop the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for the country, in which they are serving. UNDAF is “the strategic programme framework that describes the collective response of the UN system to national development priorities”. Common Country Assessment (CCA), UN joint diagnosis of country’s overall socio and economic status and development challenges on the ground, stands as a basis of analysis for developing each country’s UNDAF. In China, in 2003, there were 8 UN Theme Groups as listed in the Table 5: UN Theme Groups in China.

In China, the UN Theme Group on HIV/AIDS (UNTG) was established in early 1996. The UNTG evolved into an Expanded Theme Group, where all key international players, including international non-governmental organizations and national non-governmental organizations, and the Government were represented. Among the 8 UNTGs, the UN Theme Group on HIV/AIDS was considered one of the most successful UNTGs in China (Wattez & Wang 2003). It was one of the few UNTG, which enjoyed “expanded” participation, which went beyond the UN system. The monthly meetings

convened by the UN Theme Group on HIV/AIDS (UNTG) was one of the rare coordination meetings, which gained a strong popularity among donors, Government counterparts and civil society organizations. At times, the turnout was so high that there were not enough seats for all the participants. The purpose of this chapter is to examine what worked well in the HIV/AIDS sector in terms of UN concerted efforts in supporting the Government of China and serving their people.

TABLE 5: UN Theme Groups in China (UNCT in China and the Government “Mirror Team” 2000)

Theme Groups	Lead UN Agency	Frequency of Meetings	Key Members
Poverty Alleviation and Food Security	UNDP, FAO, WFP	Monthly	UNDP, FAO, WB, UNIDO, WFP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNICEF, WHO, Ford Foundation, Embassies of Australia, Canada, Germany, Netherlands
Gender	UNIFEM	Monthly	UNIFEM, UNFPA, WFP, UNICEF, UNDP, UNIDO, WB, FAO, UNESCO, WHO, ILO, Ford Foundation, Embassies of Canada and Australia
Basic Education	UNESCO, UNICEF	Monthly, every third Wednesday	UNESCO, UNICEF, UNDP, UNFPA, WB, WFP
Environment and Energy	UNDP	Monthly/Quarterly	FAO, WFP, UNIDO, UNDP, UNESCO, UNICEF, WHO
Rule of Law	UNDP	Quarterly	UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIFEM
Disaster Management (UNDMT)	UNDP	Quarterly	UNDP, WFP, UNIDO, UNESCO, UNICEF, WHO, UNHCR, ILO, UNFPA, WB, FAO, Red Cross
HIV/AIDS	UNICEF (for 2000, as the Lead Agency changes on an annual basis)	Monthly, every last Thursday	UNICEF, UNAIDS, WHO, UNDP, UNFPA, UNESCO, WB, UNIFEM, EU, DFID (UK), AusAID, Ford Foundation, Ministry of Health
Health (Task Force)	WHO		WHO, FAO, UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNIFEM, WFP, UNAIDS, WB, Ford Foundation, AusAID, DFID (UK), Ministry of Health

As a result, the author's following hypothesis of "UN's concerted efforts contributed to the positive changes in the Chinese Government's policies and actions in the fight against HIV/AIDS in 2000s" was confirmed by most of the informants interviewed from the UN system in China, the Government of China, bilateral donors, and the civil society organizations. Under the extracted themes: 1. Leadership among "equals"; 2. Doing things together; and 3. Policy change, different viewpoints were presented and analysis was made based on these observations and comments by informants

Response to HIV/AIDS in China: Evolution of ownership

For 20 years, China has participated in 267 international cooperation projects against the HIV/AIDS epidemic and accepted 526 million USD from over 40 international organizations (Sun 2010). Until 2003, China's HIV/AIDS programmes were mainly supported by international donors. In 1990s, the World Health Organization (WHO), UNICEF and USAID provided technical assistance to the Ministry of Health. In the early 2000s, international donors were the primary funders of HIV/AIDS programme in China, and the ownership of the issue by the Chinese counterpart was not very strong. Sun et al. summarizes that funding from international projects has accounted for one-third of the resources provided for the HIV/AIDS response in China, these programs have introduced best practices, accelerated the introduction of AIDS policies, strengthened capacity (Sun 2010).

After 2003, learning from the SARS epidemic and responding to both domestic and international voices, there was a positive drastic change in the way the Government of China was handling HIV/AIDS. The ownership shifted to the Government of China, and

gradually, the local governments and the civil society organizations demonstrating stronger commitment and will, and they were gaining capacity to deal with the problems with improved technical skills and increased financial resources. The access to the Global Fund boosted the budgets of the Chinese Government. Now, the national budgets for HIV/AIDS total at 1.6 billion Chinese yuan, which represent the major bulk of all the HIV/AIDS related public budgets in China.

Joint advocacy and policy dialogue - Titanic saved? China's HIV/AIDS peril

The initial international technical assistance by UN on HIV/AIDS to the Government of China was carried out by the World Health Organization (WHO) and UNICEF. Study tours were conducted to countries with severe HIV/AIDS reported cases such as Thailand. Pilot projects were implemented to test the effectiveness of condom use in preventing HIV infection, which later provided basis for choosing condoms as one of the major means of prevention in the nationwide HIV/AIDS campaign. These earlier technical assistance projects contributed to having evidence-based policy options for the leaders in China. However, in the 1990s and early 2000, HIV/AIDS was not recognized a major threat to the country and its people. The prevalence rate was increasing rapidly, and the situation was very alarming. In 2002, the UN issued a report titled: HIV/AIDS: China's Titanic Peril report (See Figure 12). By quoting statistics put together by the Ministry of Health, the UN gave a strong warning on the HIV/AIDS situations in China and prompted the Chinese Government to take immediate actions to tackle the epidemic. The prediction at that time was that China would have more than 10 million people living with HIV/AIDS by 2010. Chinese counterparts became quite upset with this Report, claiming that the Report was not shared with the

Government for their comments and approval. Especially, the international media jumped on to the stories. One of the high-ranking government officials from the Ministry of Health commented at that time that “Chinese people only know that Titanic is a big ship, which sank”, and revealed obvious discontent. Another official, a medical doctor, much later commented and quoted a Chinese proverb that as the report was making some legitimate points, “it was painful in the ears to hear truths.”

The writing of the Titanic report and the joint advocacy were carried out almost by the whole UN and donors beyond. As the centre of joint Cooperation, the UNTG on HIV/AIDS urged the participating donors to convey the same messages to their respective counterparts, to express “one voice”. The dialogue continued between the UN and GOC. At the highest level, the Chinese President and the UN Secretary-General (SG) met annually during the SG’s annual visit to the members of the UN Security Council. The bottom up approach was mainly led by the UNCT and UNTG on UNAIDS. Despite the initial denial of the Titanic report, after the response to SARS, the Government of China’s take on HIV/AIDS changed substantially. However, this change was not automatic.

A former Chair of UNTG on HIV/AIDS accounts that “the next step was that I thought SARS would bring official recognition of AIDS, but it did not. So in August 2003 I called a meeting of WHO, UNICEF, UNAIDS, and we agreed on a strategy, which was that we would work toward 4 goals: (a) that the joint report should be finalized (b) that a high level coordination body of the government be activated (c) that some coming to terms with the Henan blood scandal take place (d) that stigma be addressed, and we

suggested that a high level official go on TV and shake hands with an AIDS patient. We mentioned these 4 goals in the Theme group so it was transparent, and we told all of our visiting dignitaries that they should mention it to the government. Of course they did so - visiting dignitaries like to have a message for their meetings. And within 6 months we reached all 4 goals.” (22 March, 2010 Email correspondence followed by a Skype interview on 28 March, 2010)




FIGURE 12: HIV/AIDS: China’s Titanic Peril report (left)




FIGURE 13: A Joint Assessment of HIV/AIDS Prevention, Treatment and Care in China (2007) (right)

Coordination through Joint Assessment Reports (JARs)

As mentioned in the account of the Chair of UNTG on HIV/AIDS, the Government of China and the UN system agreed to develop “a Joint Assessment of HIV/AIDS Prevention, Treatment and Care in China” (JAR). This served as a forum for policy dialogue and coordination. Then, JAR was issued every year until 2007 (See Figure 13).

During the SARS outbreak, the UN supported emergency response and there was a strong sense of teamwork within the forum. The working level officials from the Ministry of Health and China CDC used JAR to gain authority to communicate upwards to advise their top political leaders and also to communicate downwards to the public by obtaining credibility from UN. There is usually scepticism by the people in the official lines of what the Government releases – especially in crisis. As Government typically controls what information to be provided to the public, not always to give comprehensive sets of facts. In this context, external entity such as UN provided sources of confidence in believing what the Government is communicating to their people. Through this report-writing process, issues such as the methods of surveillance and methadone treatments were debated in great detail. These discussions fed into the development of 5-year plans of HIV/AIDS by the Government. The 2007 JAR was the last joint assessment by the Government and the UN system. The assessment work was then fully owned by the Government in the form of UNGASS regular reporting. Countries report on the progress made against the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS adopted by United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on HIV/AIDS in 2001. A senior Chinese official mentioned during one of the interviews, that “in early years, I felt that we have to implement projects for foreigners, but now foreigners help us do our work, and we implement.” Another senior Chinese official spoke about the UNAIDS’s “Three Ones” Principle (One coordinating entity, one programme and one monitoring and evaluation framework for tackling HIV/AIDS), and felt that if there should be One coordinating entity, then that should certainly be the national government of China.

This joint advocacy and policy dialogue by UN was effective in expressing “one voice” and to carry more weight had it not been for the joint efforts and the buy-in of other donors. Some of difficult issues in dealing with HIV/AIDS were discussed at UNTG and possible actions towards solutions were facilitated, and the process was accelerated by the joint work. What was best about the interventions, were the change of mind-set, subsequent changes in policies and the long-term impact. This also tells the importance of joint needs assessment work, which cultivates common understanding and grounding for policy actions. CCA type of situational analysis should be done in a cooperative manner.

HIV/AIDS Joint Programme

There are different types of UN joint projects. Some are just a bundle of projects of different agencies called under a common joint project title. Some have more integrated goals and approaches. According to the interviews carried out with officials engaged in joint programmes, the costs for coordination are quite high for sharing information and to implement joint programmes. A large amount of time and efforts go into joint programmes. Often times, the front-loaded efforts do not pay off in terms of benefits to be reaped later.

Reasons for a coordination success by the UN Theme Group on HIV/AIDS

- In comparison to the UN Theme Group on Environment and Energy

Why the UN Theme Group on HIV/AIDS succeeded as a coordination mechanism? This section will compare the two UN Theme Groups, namely the UN Theme Group on

HIV/AIDS and the UN Theme Group on Environment and Energy to analyze the reasons how the UN Theme Group on HIV/AIDS were able to function as a convening forum for donors, and influence the policy-making on HIV/AIDS by the Chinese government.

Among the eight UN Theme Groups (UNTG), the UNTG on HIV/AIDS was often mentioned as the best example of concerted UN effort in assisting the Government of China around 2003. The UNDAF Mid-term review prepared by the UN Resident Coordinator's office highlights this in its report. In order to distil the lessons and the reasons for successful joint efforts among UN organizations in the HIV/AIDS sector, various contributing factors will be explained anchored in the categories of Organizational Theories classified by Noda (2005).

The UN Theme Group on Environment and Energy was chaired by the UNDP Resident Representative and co-chaired by the Representative of UNIDO. The Assistant Resident Representative of UNDP, heading the Environment and Energy Cluster, was often delegated the task of chairing the meeting. The Group met on a monthly or quarterly basis, and the members were FAO, WFP, UNIDO, UNDP, UNESCO, UNICEF and WHO. Although the issue of Environment and Energy was of critical importance to China's sustainable development, the Group was not so active.

On the other hand, the UN Theme Group on HIV/AIDS was very active and was even expanded to invite partners beyond the UN system including the Government of China, multilateral and bilateral partners, civil society organizations, research institutes and the private sector. In fact, it was the only forum in Beijing at that time, open to

anybody who was interested in the subject. The Group was chaired the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) Representative. The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) had the mandate of being the secretariat UNTG HIV/AIDS. Thus, UNAIDS Country Coordinator and Head of Office, also played a significant role in the group. This group was considered as the most active and successful among the UNTGs, and enjoyed very high participation of various donors and servicing as a forum for donor coordination in a practical sense. This group has also managed to invite the Ministry of Health (MOH) as a regular key participant, which was considered to be a remarkable achievement in fostering Government's ownership on the issue.

The Chair of UNTG UNAIDS and the UNAIDS Country Coordinator and Head of Office met with the representative from the Ministry of Health one or two weeks ahead of every meeting to discuss and agree on the meeting agenda. All the participants were also invited to suggest meeting agenda in prior to the meetings. The UNTG published a situational analysis report on HIV/AIDS called the Titanic report in 2002. It triggered huge amount of discussions internationally and domestically on HIV/AIDS in China. It drew attention of the Chinese government to the severity and the depth of the issue. The group worked on joint situational analysis in 2003 with the government in order to develop strong partnerships with the government to tackle this extremely important and pressing issue.

The comparison between the two distinctive UN Theme Groups (UNTG on the Environment and Energy and UNTG on HIV/AIDS) will be made through examining the aspects of Organizational Theories. Noda classifies aspects of Organizational Theories:

1.) Organization network, 2.) Organization functions, and 3.) Organization structure (Design) under the Macro Organizational Theories. The following aspects of Organizational Theories: 4.) Leadership, 5.) Group behaviour (Decision-making, Communication, etc.), and 6.) Individual behaviour, are categorized as subject of study under Micro Organizational Theories. The tables below summarize the findings of these comparisons.

TABLE 6a: Comparison between UN Theme Group on HIV/AIDS and the Environment and Energy

	Aspects of Organizational Theories	In UNTG context	UNTG HIV/AIDS	UNTG ENVIRONMENT & ENERGY
Macro Organizational Theories	1. Organization network	Alternative forums for the similar functions	Global Fund Country Coordination Mechanism was not yet established. No forum to host a meeting participated by NGOs especially represented by People Living With HIV/AIDS. No government meetings were held during the SARS epidemic.	Other forums were already well established, such as the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED), Global Environment Facility (GEF), Renewable Energy information sharing meetings, etc.
	2. Organization functions	The function of the secretariat	Competent secretariat. The Secretariat was managed by UNAIDS and by a medical doctor with strong technical knowledge.	There was no secretariat as such.
	3. Organization structure (Design)	The size of the sector	Small enough to involve most of the relevant stakeholders. UNAIDS's One Strategy, One Coordination mechanism, and One M&E was effective. UNAIDS had a clear mandate for coordination.	The sector is too large to discuss specific technical issues under the Environment and Energy classification.

TABLE 6b: Comparison between UN Theme Group on HIV/AIDS and the Environment and Energy

	Aspects of Organizational Theories	In UNTG context	UNTG HIV/AIDS	UNTG ENVIRONMENT & ENERGY
Micro Organizational Theories	4. Leadership	Leadership by UN system and the GOC	Head of the UNTG, UNFPA Representative, joint chair by UNICEF and WHO Representatives	Relatively junior level officers as Heads of the UNTG.
	5. Group behaviour (Decision-making, Communication, etc.)	Agenda-setting, follow-up and communication. Incentives for resource exchange.	Always a joint process among the chairs of UN system and the Ministry of Health. Clear rules of when and where to hold the UNTG meetings. Application for the Global Fund and formulation of new joint projects, such as the Human Security Fund.	Irregular meetings and no specific mandates for resource mobilization.
	6. Individual behaviour	Incentives for resource exchange. (Financial resources, information, professional network, etc.)	Rewards as a professional for learning, and networking. However, no incentives for UN coordination within the UN personnel appraisal.	No incentives for UN coordination within the UN personnel appraisal. Other incentives were learning and networking, etc.

The following sections explain the different aspects of organizational theories pertaining to the UNTG context, which are summarized in the Table 6a and 6b.

Macro Organizational Theories

Organization network

Whether alternative forums for the similar functions existed in town was a critical factor. For UNTG on HIV/AIDS, as admitted by UN and the Government of China, there was no other competing forum around 2003. This group even laid a foundation for SCAWCO and Global Fund Country Coordination Mechanism, currently the main bodies of coordinating HIV/AIDS related work. At that time, there was no forum open to all the stakeholders, importantly, the civil society partners, especially civil society organizations represented by People Living With HIV/AIDS (PLWHA). On the other hand, for the environment and energy sector, alternative coordination forums were already well established and active. Examples are the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED), Renewable Energy information sharing meetings, secretariats for respective multilateral environmental agreements, such as Conventions, etc.

Organization functions

The function of the secretariat was essential. For the case of UNTG on HIV/AIDS, there was a high need for a forum for collaboration and information exchange among nationals and internationals. The mandate of the secretariat was clear. There was a useful guidance on how the forum should function based on the “3 Ones” principle: One coordinating body, One programme and One monitoring and evaluation system.

UNTG on HIV/AIDS was also blessed with a competent full-time secretariat, run by UNAIDS, and managed by a medical doctor with specialized knowledge. For the UNTG on Environment and Energy, there was no secretariat as such and relatively junior staff members were assigned to manage the theme group meetings.

Organization structure (Design)

The size of the sector matters also. For UNTG on HIV/AIDS, the sector was small enough to involve major stakeholders and hold specific technical discussions. For UNTG on Environment and Energy, the designated sector was too large to involve major stakeholders and carry out specific technical discussions. The size of the sector and the capacity and the resources (financial as well as human) of the coordinating unit have to match to be able to perform the coordinating role. The coordinating unit has to be given such an authority to manage the coordination of a particular sector with the given stretch of sectoral coverage and responsibilities. The size of the sector should be appropriate in dealing with actionable sets of issues within its reach.

Micro Organizational Theories

Leadership

The type and level of leadership demonstrated by UN system and the Government had essential role in the functions of the UNTGs. UNTG on HIV/AIDS was chaired by the UNFPA Representative (UN Director level in UN career hierarchy, which represent the highest level on the UN career staffing structure requiring work experience of 15 years or more), and sub-chaired by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Health Organization (WHO) Representatives. The Government representative

was the Head of the International Department of the Ministry of Health (MOH). The Group was led by senior officials with high-ranking positions in their respective organizations. The UNTG on Environment and Energy was also represented by the Heads of UN organizations at the country office level. However, in practice relatively junior staff members were delegated to manage the theme group meetings, for instance, staff members at mid-level in the UN professional ranking.

Group behaviour

This section discusses group behaviours in relation to decision-making and communication. Specifics of agenda-setting, follow-up and communication will be looked into. Incentives for resource exchange are also of critical importance in determining the patterns of group behaviours. For UNTG on HIV/AIDS, there was a common vision “Break the silence” in the fight against HIV/AIDS. Based on the interviews conducted with both the UN participants and the Government representatives, there were “respect, openness and trust among partners” felt by the members of the group. As previously mentioned, joint agenda-setting between the UN and the Ministry of Health was the norm, and all the participants, who were on the members’ mailing list had the chance to comment on the agenda in advance. Inclusive and open approach was developed out of previous experiences and lessons. Clear rules were set up when and where to hold the meetings: every last Thursday for two hours at the UN premise. This made it easy for the participants to schedule the meeting regularly in their agenda.

The UNTG on Environment and Energy was a group composed of UN organizations

only, and depending on the themes, the meeting were open to external partners. The UNTG did not have a common vision agreed by the participants or any specific mandate given apart from common UN exercises of formulating the Common Country Assessment or UNDAF related activities. The Group was not so much driven by issues but UN specific tasks. The UNTG meetings were held on an irregular basis.

Individual behaviour

In this section, the relation with individual behaviour and incentives for resource exchange will be examined. For UNTG on HIV/AIDS, from participants' testimonies through interviews and also by reviewing the past meeting minutes, UNTG members enjoyed exchange of resources by attending this forum. Participants had opportunities to access reliable first-hand information from Chinese health experts and government institutions, UN experts, civil society organizations and various other professional organizations. People thus had access to such a professional network by coming to this forum. New initiatives and programme sprung out of the discussions taken place at the UNTG HIV/AIDS meeting. In some cases, resource mobilization opportunities were available too. Part of the UNAIDS Programme Acceleration Funds (PAF) was particularly meant to support the activities of UNTG on HIV/AIDS. The UN application to Japanese Human Security fund for a project to fight HIV/AIDS was tabled to the meeting, and continued to be discussed in the forum. The writing up of the proposal to apply for the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria was in fact driven by the leadership of UNTG HIV/AIDS.

However, UN staff members were not particularly rewarded for actively participating

in coordination activities in their respective personnel appraisal systems. UN coordination tended to be seen as an add-on to the core business of respective UN field offices, and not reflected in the personnel appraisal schemes. Therefore, from a human resources perspective, the incentives for UN coordination built in within the personnel appraisal schemes were rather weak.

The resource exchange in the UNTG on Environment and Energy, compared to UNTG on HIV/AIDS was rather inactive. The Group did not have the privilege of particular financial resources attached to the Group or the Group did not facilitate any resource mobilization activities for its members. The funding sources such as the Global Environment Facility (GEF) operated irrespective of UNTG activities and so did the other funding sources for environment and energy issues. As touched up on in the previous section, UN staff members were not particularly rewarded for actively participating in coordination activities in their respective personnel appraisal systems, and thus, this element was exactly the same for the staff members taking part in UNTG on Environment and Energy.

5.4 Findings from applying 3Cs framework

5.4.1 Issues related to Competition

Leadership among “Equals - trust rather than authority by the Resident Coordinator

Among the Heads of UN Agencies in a programme country, the UN Resident Coordinator has to exercise leadership within a group of “equals”. The proposition of

“One leader” is, in a way, intruding the organizational authorities of UN organizations and could be quite threatening. Because, there are Competitions among UN Heads of Agencies, Coordination through hierarchy and authority do not seem to work too well. Rather, relationships of Cooperation based on trust worked better within the UN Country Team in China especially in response to HIV/AIDS.

Especially, the Heads of Agencies assigned to China are usually some of the most qualified and competent professionals from respective agencies, and thus naturally they possess high pride. Heads of Agencies are usually at similar director level in the UN professional classification. Due to this competitive nature, depending on the required expertise, the leader representing the UN system should be treated in a flexible manner. More flexible leadership should be tested – a type of leadership, which the author calls “Rotational leadership”. For example, during the time the Avian Flu was spreading, the UN Resident Coordinator and the Representative of WHO were invited to discuss with Mme Wu Yi, the Vice Premier and the Health Minister. At this meeting, the Representative of WHO took the first seat to brief Mme Wu Yi in a detailed manner and to advise a course of action. The Resident Coordinator took the second seat. The former WHO Head pointed out that this resulted in communicating focused technical advice to the Government of China, and subsequent pragmatic approach taken by the Government.

The more the merrier?

When UN coordination is discussed, the underlining assumption is that the more UN organizations work together, the better the development results are. However, in

reality, according to the interviews conducted, this assumption not always worked in practice. For instance, the HIV/AIDS Joint Programme by the UN system has 9 participating UN agencies. According to the analysis by UN Joint Programme (UNJP) for Culture, there seems to be a threshold of 2-4 agencies maximum for the implementation a successful joint programme. The Representative of UNAIDS also gave a testimony that “fewer the organizations working together, the better the results are.” Due to the large sum of funding allocated to China by the Global Fund, a number of UN agencies became involved in HIV/AIDS, without necessarily having expertise to work on the theme. In the resource mobilization and project initiation stage, there was a lack of competitive process to eliminate agencies, which did not have the expertise or capacity to contribute to the joint initiatives.

5.4.1 Issues related to Coordination

Incentives for coordination

Coordination mechanisms functioned well when there were exchanges of resource among partners. Stronger incentives were in place when there were resource mobilization opportunities and demand for coordination from the Government. The timing was right coinciding with SARS and the change of the leaderships, which led to stronger national ownership.

Current UN coordination mechanisms do not build in the incentive mechanisms for staff to be actively taking on the UN. The performance appraisals are not reflective of

these elements. (Ex. UNDP Balanced Scorecard³ and Results Competency Assessment, a personnel appraisal system.) There is a need for a qualitative indicator to explain plausibility.

Joint thinking rather than joint implementation

One of the important findings is that “Joint thinking pays off more than joint implementation”. Too much focus on joint implementation was costly. What mattered most was the strategic division of labour, and the common administrative processes were not essential in achieving targeted goals. The integration of strategy and targets are crucial, and once the roles of agencies are defined, the projects can run in parallel. In one case, one national partner had to sign 8 contracts with 8 different UN agencies within one Joint Programme. Instead of streamlining administrative processes, they were being multiplied within the UN Joint Programmes. This example shows that, in fact, part of transaction costs increased when joint programme was implemented. The short-term costs are not yet outweighing the long-term benefit expected in the design of the joint programme.

When considering three levels of coordination: 1.) Information sharing, 2.) Coordination at strategic level and division of labour and 3.) Implementing joint activities and programmes. Coordination was added value in planning and division of labour. However, the joint implementation per se was very costly, and had less impact

³ According to the Balanced Scorecard Institute, the balanced scorecard is “a strategic planning and management system that is used extensively in business and industry, government, and nonprofit organizations worldwide to align business activities to the vision and strategy of the organization, improve internal and external communications, and monitor organization performance against strategic goals. It was originated by Drs. Robert Kaplan (Harvard Business School) and David Norton as a performance measurement framework that added strategic non-financial performance measures to traditional financial metrics to give managers and executives a more 'balanced' view of organizational performance” (Balanced Scorecard 2011).

on the results. As Coordination requires changes in business practices, thus, costly initially.

Coordination forum (Joint Assessment Reports) and evolution of Ownership

The working level public health officers used UN and JAR as a coordination forum to agree on critical epidemiological data and possible courses of action. They used JAR to gain authority to communicate upwards to advise their top political leaders and also to communicate downwards to the public by obtaining credibility from UN. There are scepticisms by the people in the official lines of what the Government releases – especially in crisis. In this context, external entity such as UN provided sources of confidence in believing what the Government is communicating to their people.

5.4.1 Issues related to Cooperation

UN's convening role

With the case of the UN Theme Group on HIV/AIDS, the group served as a unique forum to engage all the partners working on the epidemic: the Chinese government institutions, multilateral organization, bilateral organizations, the civil society organizations and the private sector. It was the single forum, which was open to all the stakeholders, and where People Living With HIV/AIDS had the opportunities to voice their concerns, viewpoints and proposals. The Group effectively used UN's convening role, and the network of cooperation was formed beyond the UN system.

Joint advocacy yielded positive results as part of UN concerted efforts in the form of

cooperation. Cooperation does not require change in the standard operation procedures or business processes, thus, administrative costs are relatively lower than coordination. One voice, a common message by the members of the UN Theme Group on HIV/AIDS. Advocacy with multi-sectoral approach and at multiple levels of bureaucracy contributed to the change in policy-making. UN provided chances for inter-Ministry and intra-Ministry (working level and top management) negotiation and influencing.

Where joint work was effective was when joint advocacy or intellectual work, such as publishing reports with clear policy messages, were pursued. For instance, when joint reports were produced, the UN in-house capacity was utilized across organizations. If this type of expertise were to be purchased externally, the costs of selection, contracting, training and monitoring would have been quite high. By using internal capacity within UN system, the transaction costs for accessing and using such qualified professionals had been reduced. Knowledge sharing and mutual learning took place in the process of monitoring and evaluation through cooperation.

Chapter 6

Case study 3:

Aid coordination in post-conflict Rwanda – forests, gorillas and people

This chapter discusses the aid coordination by UN system with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in post-conflict Rwanda after 1994. This section will specifically examine the examples of aid coordination in natural resource management; in particular, the protection of the habitat of endangered mountain gorillas. Other forms of joint efforts will also be looked into such as the regional partnership among Protected Areas Authorities in the Great Lakes Region.

This chapter specifically looks into the joint efforts between UNHCR and International Gorilla Organization (IGCP) coordination - joint activities in conserving the Virunga forest (mountain gorilla habitat) during and after the emergency. Gorilla-based ecotourism, then re-developed steadily, and now grew to be the largest foreign exchange earner followed by coffee and tea.

Method of Case study

For this case study, the primary source of data collection was through review of reports issued by UN, various journal papers and publications, participant observations, semi-structured interviews with around 50 informants from UN system in Rwanda, Government of Rwanda, non-governmental organizations and community members in

the Virungas. A field trip took place once in Rwanda in June, 2009 for 10 days. Based on the notes taken by the author during those interviews, and written material collected, attributional coding was carried out to extract attributes. The findings by the author were constructed based on these attributes and perceptions by the informants.

6.1 Background

Today only around 720 Mountain gorillas (*Gorilla beringei beringei*) inhabit the afro-montane forests, shared between Rwanda, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Gray et al. 2003, McNeilage et al. 2006). In this region, mountain gorillas serve as flagship species, attracting public support and international tourists as well as drawing attention to their habitat. The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the role of mountain gorilla ecotourism in Rwanda in the post-conflict years and beyond. This research focuses on the Virunga Volcanoes Region of Rwanda, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, which is one of the two habitat blocks of mountain gorillas along with the Bwindi Impenetrable National Park of Uganda. Despite the high level of regional insecurity and conflicts, the mountain gorilla population has managed to increase in the past years. The gorilla census in 2003 estimated the current gorilla population in the Virunga Volcanoes Region to be 380 individuals. This represents a 17 % increase in the total population from 324 since 1989, or a 1.15% annual growth rate (Gray et al. 2003).




FIGURE 14: Map of mountain gorilla habitat (IGCP 2011)

The Role Mountain Gorilla Ecotourism in Post-Conflict Recovery

The ecotourism has evolved in Rwanda since 1979. More recent concept of ecotourism, expressed in the Quebec Declaration in the framework of the UN International Year of Ecotourism, 2002 embraces the following principles: 1.) Contributes actively to the conservation of natural and cultural heritage, 2.) Includes local and indigenous communities in its planning, development and operation, contributing to their well-being, 3.) Interprets the natural and cultural heritage of the destination to visitor, 4.) Lends itself better to independent travellers, as well as to organized tours for small size groups (UNEP 2002). In Rwanda, tourism was used as a tool for conservation. Since 1979, tourism rose to become the third foreign exchange earner in Rwanda subsequent to tea and coffee (Weber 1987). Now, led by the gorilla-based tourism, the tourism sector in Rwanda, has risen to the largest foreign exchange earner followed by coffee and tea, generating around US\$200 million (Nielsen & Spenceley 2010).

National capacity for biodiversity conservation in Rwanda

In 1995, Rwanda has ratified the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), and its National Strategy and Action Plan for Conservation of Biodiversity was adopted in 2003. The restructuring of Office Rwandais de Tourisme et des Parcs Nationaux (ORTPN) took place in 2003, the Rwanda Environment Management Authority (REMA) was established in 2005 under the Organic Law on Environment Protection and Management, and National Forestry Authority (NAFA) was founded in 2008. Environment management aspects in Rwanda are vested in a diversity of different stakeholder institutions including ministries, the private sector, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) different sectors with activities contributing to natural resources management. The umbrella organization for overall environmental management is the Ministry of Lands, Environment, Forestry, Water and Mines (MINITERE). The MINITERE includes lands, water, forestry mines and environment. Three key units have been established in the ministry, namely; the planning unit dealing with policy, the ICT unit and the financial and administration unit. The government has established REMA to coordinate all technical aspects of environment management. It is noted that other environmental activities are scattered in other ministries like the Ministry of Infrastructure (MININFRA) (energy and population settlement), land and soil management in Ministry of Agriculture and Animal resources (MINAGRI), the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN) responsible for general policy and resource allocation for environment, and the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MINICOM) for industries. At the district level, MINITERE is to establish and work through committees but linking through the local government. These committees are

to work on a voluntary basis, and will be responsible for all environment management aspects including preparation of district environment profiles and state of environment reports (GEF and Government of Rwanda 2007).

The research conducted by the Government of Japan, United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Tourism Organization shows that, in comparison with the industrial and high-technology sectors, tourism presents unique opportunities for African countries to compete in the global economy and to promote their own economic growth and job creation. The following reasons are given: 1.) Africa's unique and varied natural and cultural resources bode well for the growing global travel trends towards nature and culture exploration. 2.) Tourism is a job intensive industry that generates jobs from semi-skilled to managerial levels. 3.) Tourism generates valuable foreign exchange. 4.) Tourism can have significant pro-poor benefits as it provides a wide range of income-generating opportunities along the value-chain. 5.) Tourism turnover trickles down to the poor from supply chains as it enhances the development of and access to a range of basic infrastructure such as electricity, water and roads. 6. Well-managed tourism can assist in conserving important natural and cultural assets and traditions. 7. Barriers to entry in tourism are less prohibitive than for technology-driven industries such as manufacturing and mining (GOJ, UNDP & UNWTO / OMT 2009).

The growth of ecotourism has created new employment opportunities and contributed to the increase in local income, stimulating local and regional economy, infrastructure development (roads), provision of education and medical services through activities

supported by non-governmental organizations and the revenue-sharing programme. The mountain gorilla conservation has also played a role in projecting a positive national image internationally using gorillas as Rwanda's friendly ambassador against the backdrop of the genocide.

In 2008, about 17,000 people visited the Volcanoes National Park to participate in the gorillas tracking. There was a steady increase in the number of tourists compared to 417 in 1999 after the reopening of the park (Nielsen & Spenceley 2010). Tourism sector marked increasing number of tourists in 1980s, Akagera National Park accounting for the majority of visitors. After the launch of gorilla tourism initiated by the Mountain Gorilla Project in 1979 (Weber & Vedder 2001), the Volcanoes National Park / le Parc National des Volcans (PNV) started to attract international tourists, and marked 6,900 tourists in 1989. During the year of the genocide in 1994, the visitors to PNV dropped, however, still recorded 61 visitors. This included the members from the United Nations Peacekeeping Operation, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), who started to visit PNV, as early as three months after the halt of the genocide in July, 1994 (Rutagarama 2009).

Following the international release of the film "Gorillas in the Mist", the price of gorilla permits was increased from US\$120 to US\$170 and up to US\$250 (Plumptre & Williamson 2001). The Park permit kept rising to US\$375, and to US\$500 at present for non-nationals (RDB 2011). The park employs at least 180 people, working as guides, gorilla groups' trackers (both tourism and research groups) and anti-poaching teams deployed in 5 protection sectors of the park. In addition, an estimated 800 community

members around PNV are involved in day-to-day PNV management activities and temporary employment and revenue sharing support (Nielsen & Spenceley 2010). The park authority, in collaboration with a private sector tour operator, Rwanda Ecotours, supported to form an association of former poachers to work as tourism guides and providing cultural experiences to tourist in the *Iby'Iwacu* cultural village. *Iby'Iwacu* means, "treasures of our home, our heritage" (Iby'Iwacu Cultural Village 2011). The cultural village has increased tourism arrivals and has generated an income base for the village. A Rwandan conservationist Edwin Sabuhoro notes that poaching of gorillas has been reduced by 60%.



Ex-poachers performing traditional dance at the Iby'Iwacu Cultural Village.

[2009, 6,23]



An ex-poacher displaying his hunting skills.

[2009, 6,23]



[2009, 6,23]



Herbal medicine man explaining the effects of his herbs.

[2009, 6,23]

As early as late 1980s, the Rwanda Office of Tourisme and National Parks / Office

Rwandais du Tourisme et des Parcs Nationaux (ORTPN)⁴, become self financing and was even able to subsidise salaries, patrols and operating costs in the other protected areas of Rwanda, Akagera National Park and the Nyungwe Forest Reserve (Plumptre & Williamson 2001). This contrasts with protected area management in other African countries. For instance, in the Congo Basin, less than 30 per cent of recurrent costs required to manage the protected-area network are covered by the Government and donor investment within the central African countries (Wilkie & Carpenter 1999). For the gorilla revenue to cover the recurrent costs of the three national parks (the Nyungwe Forest Reserve was upgraded as a National Park in 2004) in Rwanda as well as paying for the regional revenue-sharing scheme including Rwanda, DRC and Uganda is a notable achievement. In Rwanda, the mountain gorillas are “paying their own way” for their existence and also paying for other wildlife and contributing to the livelihoods of human beings.

Since 2005, revenue-sharing has been implemented in Rwanda. 5% of the tourism revenue (park fees) is injected into communities by ORTPN (now Rwanda Development Board (RDB)). Up to date, 10 schools have been constructed accommodating approximately 3,640 pupils; 32 water tanks built providing water to around 40,000 people; 10 community associations were supported for income generating activities. Sabyinyo Community Lodge was also supported, which is owned by the Kinigi communities association (SACOLA), and managed by a specialized eco-lodges company. Since 2005, around US\$428,248 has been disbursed for community projects, however,

⁴ The Office Rwandais du Tourisme et des Parcs Nationaux (ORTPN) was created in 1973 as the national authority managing Rwanda's parks and tourism sector. In 2008, the mandate and functions of ORTPN were transferred to the Rwanda Development Board (RDB).

when averaged by the number of population, it only accounts for US\$1.45 per person since its launch and US\$0.36 per person per year (Nielsen & Spenceley 2010). First, when the revenue-sharing was launched, the fund was disbursed from the Ministry of Local Government People instead of ORTPN / RDB. As a result, local people did not see the link between the building of infrastructure in their neighbourhood and the revenue shared by the PNV. RDB quickly rectified this situation and started to handle the disbursement of funds and relevant infrastructure management by themselves (RDB 2009). Some research points out that the revenue-sharing scheme is too much infrastructure oriented, and not genuinely responding to the needs of the poor in the local community (Martin et al. 2008). It should also be noted that no study has been carried out to assess the impact of these schemes on the livelihoods of people living near PNV up to date.



Nyabitsinde Primary School built by revenue-sharing programme.

[2009, 6,23]



School teachers at Nyabitsinde Primary School. They talked about the difficulty of some pupils having to walk 10-12km to come to school.

[2009, 6,23]



The total number of students is 756.
[2009, 6,23]

Regeneration of Ecotourism in Rwanda: Lessons learned

How was the regeneration of Rwanda's tourism sector possible? The factors contributing to the recovery and further development of Rwanda's tourism sector will be examined from institutional, economic and political viewpoints. The significant aspect of security will be touched upon. The status of natural resource base during the conflict will be the foundation for post conflict recovery and onwards. Natural resource management during the conflict is critical to avoid irreversible impact on the natural resource base. During the turbulent years of conflicts, there were tireless efforts by the national park authority and various non-governmental organizations to assist the national authority and to protect the wildlife, their habitat and contribute to the livelihoods of local communities. The series of these efforts will be outlined.

Firstly, on the institutional perspective, during the height of the conflict years, culminating in 1994, NGOs, such as International Gorilla Conservation Programme (IGCP)⁵ provided politically impartial support for the protected area conservation and

⁵ IGCP is a coalition of African Wildlife Foundation (AWF), Fauna & Flora International (FFI) and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), which works to ensure the conservation of mountain gorillas and their regional afro-montane forest habitat in Rwanda, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

the park authorities. International Gorilla Conservation Programme (IGCP) continued its financial and technical support to the park staff and rangers who remained in the Park and carried on their work. The junior staff remained in the Park and kept the operations. Technical, moral and financial support is important, and especially the fact that the salaries reached the field-level staff was essential in keeping the park operations to function. Bilateral and multilateral donors such as USAID, German Co-operation (GTZ), European Union (EU) and World Wildlife Fund (WWF) also provided support to the protected areas around the time of genocide in the Region.

In particular, the support provided to the Office Rwandais du Tourisme et des Parcs Nationaux (ORTPN) by IGCP immediately after the genocide (October 1994) to assist the organizations regain staff and resume operations, was essential in preventing the rapid destruction of the forest. The National Volcanoes Park in Rwanda and Southern Sector of the National Virunga Park in DRC were extremely vulnerable due to the presence of up to 750,000 refugees on the borders of the park, and the regular movement of people through the forest. Only with coordinated defective action from the park authorities on both sides of the border could poaching and habitat destruction be contained.

After the Rwandan Patriotic Front took power in Rwanda in August 1994, approximately 50% of the Rwandan population was displaced or settled temporarily. Rwanda's Volcano National Park (PNV) has a significant ecological function in the region, especially in terms of protecting water catchment and soil stability. In early February 2000, the International Gorilla Conservation Programme (IGCP) became

aware of a plan to resettle war refugees within Volcano National Park. Approximately 627 ha of PNV (approximately 5% of the park) were to be degazetted. After investigations and numerous missions by the Minister of Lands, Resettlement, and Environment Protection (MINITERE) and park staff, the problem was brought to the attention of the President and Vice President of Rwanda. The government was presented with concerns regarding the long-term impacts of the planned resettlement on the livelihood of the local population. Having considered the concerns for the potential environmental and socioeconomic consequences, the Rwandan government clearly indicated that the park should remain intact, and that resettlement should take place elsewhere (Lanjouw 2003).

On the economic viewpoint, the government was well aware of the potential of tourism growth based on the business model already well established by 1980s. These factors all contributed to the decision made by the Government to maintain the park borders. In the Park areas, led by IGCP, labour-intensive quick impact projects were implemented, such as constructing buffalo walls from 1993, cleaning up of forests, building joint-community buffer zones, which provided much needed employment opportunities in the local community.

There was also a deliberate decision made by the political leaders to develop tourism as a priority sector in Rwanda. The Government designed a Strategic Plan with the support of USAID, and launched marketing and branding strategy to promote gorillas as their iconic symbol. Donor support also followed. The Government organized occasions such as annual gorilla naming ceremony "*Kwita Izina*" as a major

international tourism event, and as a week-long public education forum to inform local people of the benefit of the park and the biodiversity conservation to the local community.



Kwita Izina, the Gorilla naming ceremony. The Prime Minister being the Guest of honour.

[2009, 6,19]



Kwita Izina, the guests will announce the newly given gorilla names to the audience. People wearing gorilla suits to perform the roles of gorilla babies.

[2009, 6,19]

Previously mentioned study by GOJ, UNDP and UNWTO/OMT points out that while tourism obviously has significant growth potential for Africa countries, it is a highly competitive industry, and, among other factors, safety and security are prerequisites for the success of tourism. With regard to safety and security, in resuming the gorilla tourism, there was a strong commitment by the military in ensuring security around

the Volcano National Park. Military escort was provided for mountain gorilla research and tourism until 2004, which was entirely funded by the national military budget. Para-military training was provided to conservation practitioners, and training on natural resource management was provided to the military personnel by the conservation community.

Despite the remarkable success of mountain gorilla tourism, there are remaining and intensifying challenges such as competitions over gorilla revenue by local, national and international entities, increasing stress on gorilla population due to constant exposure to human beings and higher demand for habituating more gorilla groups, the equity issue in the local communities in terms of loss and benefits felt by the local communities due to the national park activities, with a special reference to the Btwa community, who feel that they benefit less from the Park compared to other groups in the community (Martin et al. 2008). The Btwa population is recently more often referred to as people 'left behind by history'.



A community association of Btwa members, AIMPO, responding to the author's group interview. AIMPO has 21 members.

[2009, 6,22]



A Btwa family living on the land owned by a farmer.

[2009, 6,22]



A lady in front of her house provided by a Btwa community association.

[2009, 6,22]



A plot of land provided by a community association to the owner of the house above.

[2009, 6,22]

6.2 Aid Coordination problems

In Rwanda, United Nations activities were hampered by poor coordination (UN 1996).

International community failed in responding / avoiding the humanitarian crisis in

Rwanda in 1994 genocide. Kofi A. Annan, the Director of Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) at that time, later on as the Secretary-General of the UN embarked a comprehensive UN reform package, especially focusing on peacebuilding and UN coordination.

There was poor coordination amongst the UN actors: Regional Emergency Coordinator, Resident Coordinator, and the General of PKO. There was no hierarchy or mandate of leading the whole UN system. In Aid coordination by UN system with NGOs in natural resource management, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and International Gorilla Organization (IGCP) formed a strong partnership in alleviating the impact of deforestation and settlements by refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). This section examines the joint activities in conserving the Virunga forest (mountain gorilla habitat) during and after the emergency between UNHCR and IGCP. UNHCR was the leading agency in coordinating humanitarian relief. In Rwanda, there were three levels of coordination: Information sharing, Coordinating existing activities and strategies, Coordinating joint activities and programmes. Coordination, compared to Cooperation requires changes in business practices, thus, costly initially.

6.3 Results of Aid Coordination

Partnership between NGOs and UN

In Rwanda, during 1994, at least eight UN agencies, one intergovernmental agency, approximately 250 NGOs, including those involved in Tanzania and Zaire that did not have programme inside Rwanda, at least eight third-party military contingents were

involved in either a humanitarian delivery or support role (Borton, 1996). Thus, the issue of coordination was critical, and overall experience of coordination especially among UN agencies were not very effective as admitted by the UN itself (UN 1996).

However, in some cases, at the field-level, coordination has worked well, such as the activities led by UNHCR in the National Virunga Park (PNVi) in DRC. Between 1996-1998, IGCP worked with the UNHCR to rehabilitate the Southern Sector of the PNVi and to provide training in Management Information Systems to the Congolese parks management authorities Institut Congolais pour la Conservation de la Nature (ICCN).

In DRC, the powerful voice of the international conservation NGOs in the region was able to put pressure on the UN, the multitudes of humanitarian NGOs providing support to the refugees and victims of the crisis, to ensure that the park and the forest was protected. The pressure on the forest to provide fuel wood for the refugee camps, raw materials for construction and even supplement the food provisions for the refugees and displaced people was enormous. At certain moments during the refugee crisis, refugees were provided with not more than 50% of their daily caloric requirements, thus making the wildlife in the park extremely vulnerable to poaching.

Through the partnership project between UNHCR and IGCP, the following results were observed. From the inception of the programme, the degradation of PNVi-south was significantly slowed down. One estimates that the quantity of wood cut in the park dropped from 350,000 kg per day to 4,500 kg per day. In Kibumba, which was the most

sensitive zone because the camp used to be next to the park, deforestation was scaled down by 98.5%. Near the end of the presence of refugee camps, 70% of the needs in fuel wood were covered by this programme in the Goma region. Thanks to energy-saving methods, the wood consumption was decreased from 2 kg of wood per person per day, down to 1 kg of wood per person per day (Henquin & Blondel 1996). Effective partnership between the humanitarian organization (UNHCR) and environmental organization (IGCP) has contributed to the mitigation of environmental destruction in the protection while responding to the humanitarian relief needs.

Some of the elements key to successful coordination observed were : a.) the technical capacity of the coordinating entity, UNHCR, was critical and the calibre of its personnel, b.) the financial and human resource base of the coordinating entity matters, c.) a hierarchical decision-making structure rather than flat consensus based decision-making process especially in the humanitarian relief sector led by UNHCR, d.) donor funding was channelled through one organization, UNHCR, instead of numerous entities when coordination functioned well. (UNHCR supervised over 20 relief projects implemented by various partners.)

Security dimension

With regard to security pertaining to conservation, it is acknowledged that there was a strong commitment by the military in ensuring security around the national park, which borders with neighbouring countries. Military escort was provided for mountain gorilla research and tourism until 2004, which was totally funded by the national military budget itself. Security was a necessary condition for tourism to pick up again.

Para-military training was provided to people working in the conservation community, and training on natural resource management was provided to the military personnel by the conservation community. The presence of the military provided “sense of security” appreciated highly by the local people, which could have been one of the major positive results brought about by the national park to the local communities (Gasigwa 2009). The return of international tourists also gave assurance to the local communities that certain level of security has been restored.

Transboundary (TB) collaboration

Facilitated by IGCP, there have been active transboundary collaboration efforts among the protected area authorities and field-based park staff in this region. This on-the-ground initiatives were formalized by the following Agreements and Plans: Memorandum of Understanding amongst protected area authorities of DRC, Rwanda and Uganda in 2004; two Ministerial Declarations in 2005 and 2008; Transboundary Strategic Plan; and Memorandum of Understanding on “Collaborative Monitoring of and Sharing Revenues from Transfrontier Tourism Gorilla Groups”. Within this framework, Transboundary secretariat was established to maintain regular contacts among these three countries and to coordinate activities. This could be seen as a remarkable case of Track Two diplomacy (non-official mediation between civil society actors) promoting more active dialogue for Track One diplomacy (official negotiations between political and military elites, in other words, top-down efforts) for regional collaboration (Goodhand 2006). Based on this working relationship developed from the joint mountain gorilla conservation efforts, there are emerging new initiatives to scale up the transboundary collaboration activities to also deal with energy issues and

other natural resource concerns in the Region.

6.4 Findings from applying 3Cs framework

Overall lessons from the case are indicated below.

- 1) In emergency situations, Coordination between the organizations for humanitarian and emergency relief, long-term development, and natural resource management is of critical importance.
- 2) The technical capacity of the coordinating entity, UNHCR, was critical and the calibre of its personnel. The financial and human resource base of the coordinating entity matters.
- 3) Hierarchical decision-making structure worked well, rather than flat consensus based decision-making process especially in the humanitarian relief sector led by UNHCR.
- 4) Donor funding was channelled through one organization, UNHCR, instead of numerous entities when coordination functioned well. (UNHCR supervised over 20 relief projects implemented by various partners.)
- 5) In resuming conservation and tourism activities, the support from the military was indispensable. Tourism and security go hand in hand.

- 6) Transboundary cooperation worked well from bottom-up rather than top-down. The top-down approach could create a vacuum at the local level.
- 7) Peace-keeping missions, fact-finding missions by UN/donors should have natural resource experts involved from the outset.
- 8) Institutional capacity of park authorities is essential. Even during the height of insecurity, continuous internal / external support is vital (technical, moral and financial support).
- 9) During the conflict, in the absence of legitimate government, natural resource NGOs could be effective partners for external donors.

In terms of 3Cs, there is no smooth project cycle in emergency situations, thus, the 3Cs model should be applied differently from the non-emergency situation.

Competition: When emergencies occur, there is no time for competition among donors and subsequent selection process. Thus, ready-made structure to respond to emergencies is necessary within the UN system. The competition should be rather against time than with other development partners. The scheme of Humanitarian Coordinator and Cluster Approach is attempting to address this aspect.

Coordination: is critical in emergency situations. However, under armed conflict and its aftermath, political coordination among donors is limited. UN system should provide

an effective forum for information-sharing, strategic division of labour, and formulation of necessary common guidelines for those donors who seek this type of service, especially NGOs. Political coordination usually takes place in larger international forums such as UN Security Council, African Union, and so forth.

Cooperation: as situations change rapidly and frequently, knowledge sharing and mutual learning should take place on a frequent basis (daily or weekly) compared to usual 3-6 months monitoring and 1-3 year evaluation cycle.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

This chapter provides a summary account of the research process and the key findings of the study. The key findings are presented in relation to the main research questions. Remaining work is identified for future study.

7.1 Summary of the research process

Background of the research

The question of “how effective is aid” has been repeatedly raised since the start of contemporary form of development assistance. As the number of aid providing donors increased, in 1967, already a report by the Commission on International Development pointed out the need to strengthen aid coordination by the donor community. Government officials at the receiving end of aid were spending too much time and efforts on implementing donor-driven projects, with donors’ own respective agenda and reporting requirements. The need for project consolidation was pointed out with the acknowledgement of its constraint due to the competitive nature of donor interactions (Morss, 1984). This was characterized as the Aid-Bombardment Syndrome, in which the sheer volume of resources and numbers of donors, activities, and complex and inconsistent procedural requirements overwhelmed the government’s capacity to

plan, budget, manage, monitor, and evaluate (Eriksson, 2001). In 1990s, in the context of increasing regional and internal conflicts globally, aid fatigue, and the trend of New Public Management applied in industrialized countries, a pressing need for more effective and efficient aid was felt the world over. Transaction costs for receiving and implementing aid were, and continue to be too high for the recipient governments.

Research objectives

The objective of this research was twofold: to examine the impact of aid coordination on development results within the programmes and activities carried out by the United Nations (UN) system, and to analyze the mechanisms of aid coordination contributing to improved development results. This dissertation aims to draw practical lessons and policy recommendations to strengthen the aid coordination structure and tools within the UN system and beyond.

Research methodology

The previous chapters analyze the three case studies: 1.) the joint project between the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), “Poverty and Environment Initiative” implemented from 2005 to 2011, 2.) UN joint activities in assisting the Government of China in response to HIV/AIDS in early 2000s, and 3.) aid coordination by UN system with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in post-conflict Rwanda after 1994.

Through interviews and extensive literature review, attributional coding is carried out to distil key concepts pertaining to coordinated activities positively affecting the

development results. The interviews results were first noted down as were delivered by the informants. The results of literature review and interviews were examined in the framework of 3Cs with the breakdown of project cycle phases. The 3Cs model was developed to understand the mechanisms of how inter-organizational relationships affected the project results.

7.2 Key findings on inter-organizational relations and aid coordination

Summary of findings:

The following conclusions are derived from this research. According to different project phases, effective inter-organizational relationships vary. This provides a new perspective on inter-organizational relationships within the UN system, when one form of inter-organizational relationship “Coordination” is overly emphasized to generate development results from working as a large whole of UN system composed of multitude of organizations and activities.

Competition, Coordination and Cooperation, each has its functions effectively contributing to improving development results as a consequence of multiple organizations working in relation to others. These effects manifest themselves differently according to different phases of project cycle. The FIGURE 15: 3Cs Diagram, represents that in Planning and Initiation / Resource Mobilization phase, competitive processes have contributed to selecting UN organizations with technical competencies to deliver the end results. During the competitions among agencies, the quality of project proposals for applying for project funding has improved in order to emulate

other agencies. As a result of a Competition among agencies, there was a case in which a hierarchical structure was already in place for project implementation. In the case of UNEP in Rwanda being a funding agency to UNDP Rwanda, from the initial competition between these two organizations, provided a built-in hierarchical decision-making structure within a UN joint project. This has contributed to effective Coordination taking place for a joint project implementation. For the second phase in the 3Cs Diagram, Project Implementation, Coordination should be emphasized and the lessons for Coordination are elaborated in the following sections. For the third phase in the 3Cs Diagram, Project Monitoring & Evaluation and Advocacy, there is generally a lack of Cooperation among UN agencies, and it is essential to improve the cooperative nature of Project Monitoring & Evaluation and Advocacy among agencies. The lessons from the respective projects then should feed into the initiation of a new project to be formulated. Competition, Coordination and Cooperation influence each other and produce both positive and negative impact on development results. In the post-conflict societies, the 3Cs model applies only partially as the usual project cycle is not in place in those emergency situations.

Current UN coordination policies tend to promote a blanket approach of coordination for all the phases of project cycle, and for example, do not factor in the positive functions of Competition during the course of project cycle. More comprehensive yet detailed examinations of the connections between inter-organizational relationships and development results should be pursued, to be reflected in the policies and guidelines of UN system.




FIGURE 15: 3Cs Diagram

The above “3Cs Diagram”, developed by the author, describes the findings of the case studies graphically. Based on the analysis described in the Table 7 and 8, summarizing results according to project cycle per case study, this research argues that Competition, Coordination, and Cooperation should be emphasized respectively depending on different stages of the project cycle. According to different project phases, effective inter-organizational relationships vary. Competition should be emphasized for project formulation and resource mobilization phase. Coordination should be emphasized for project implementation phase, and Cooperation is essential in the monitoring and evaluation phase.

Summary of the overall key findings:

7.2.1 Project phase and inter-organizational relations

According to different project phases, effective inter-organizational relationships vary. Competition should be emphasized for project formulation and resource mobilization phase. Coordination should be emphasized for project implementation phase, and Cooperation is essential in the monitoring and evaluation phase.

7.2.2 3Cs interactions

The functions of Competition, Coordination and Cooperation influence each other and produce both positive and negative impact on development results.

7.2.3 UN aid coordination: Growing bureaucracy

Coordination mechanisms are an add-on to the existing UN bureaucracy, and not contributing to efficiency gains for UN. Joint projects per se could in some cases bring about large costs compared to benefits

7.2.4 Incentives for aid coordination

Current UN coordination mechanisms do not build in the incentive mechanisms for staff to be actively taking on the UN coordination roles and activities. The performance appraisals are not reflective of these elements. (Ex. Balanced Scorecard and personnel appraisal systems.)

7.2.5 One Voice

Advocacy and negotiation with the Government requires Cooperation and gains weight by joint efforts. China's case proved this in policy dialogue and policy recommendation by UN with the Government in responding to HIV/AIDS.

The Table 7 and 8: “Case studies with project cycle results” indicate the overall results of these cases breaking them into each project cycle, and related them to how inter-organization relationships played roles in facilitating those results. The first column shows actual results observed, and the second column summarizes the policy implications based on the observations described in the first column. Each row of the case study represents one phase of the project cycle. Inter-organizational relationships, represented by Competition, Coordination and Cooperation are marked in three different colours (RED, GREEN and PURPLE) as background where they played essential functions. The cells coloured in RED describe incidents when Competition had a major role to play either generating positive or negative development results. The cells with GREEN colour indicate project activities, when Coordination had significant impacts on development results in relation to Competition and Cooperation. The cells marked in PURPLE included project activities, when Cooperation had critical functions in generating either positive or negative development results.

TABLE 7: Case studies with project cycle results (Effective inter-organizational relationship according to Project Cycle: **RED: Competition**, **GREEN: Coordination** and **PURPLE: Cooperation**)

Project cycle	Rwanda PEI (2005-2011)		HIV/AIDS Joint Programme (2007-2009)	
	<i>Results</i>	<i>Implications</i>	<i>Results</i>	<i>Implications</i>
Planning	Competition for bilateral funding by UNDP & UNEP.	Who will lead the global PEI initiative?	Driven by funding	Lack of integration of programme
Initiation (Resource mobilization)	UNEP and UNDP competed for funds. UNEP provided Rwanda PEI funding as a major donor.	A hierarchical decision-making built in within the project.	Too many UN agencies seeking DFID, Spanish and Global Fund funding.	Elimination of organizations based on competition necessary. (2-4 agencies per activity.)
Implementation	UNEP & UNDP, good division of labour.	Division of labour to be defined in the planning phase. Double processes for implementation.	9 UN agencies for HIV/AIDS joint implementation. Increased transaction costs.	Focus on division of labour than joint implementation. Reduce overlapping processes.
Monitoring and Evaluation	M&E results shared among global PEI projects.	PEI indicators established and served as a common framework for EDPRS.	Multiple missions by agencies. Learning not shared systematically.	Three sets of M&E frameworks. Enhance inter-organizational learning.
Advocacy	Effectively advocated for reflecting environmental considerations in EDPRS.	Limited access to MINECOFIN and the Parliament.	Evidence-based advocacy and policy dialogue effective.	UN should utilize its convening role. Ensure exchange of resources takes place.

TABLE 8: Case study with project cycle results (Effective inter-organizational relationship according to Project Cycle: **RED: Competition**, **GREEN: Coordination** and **PURPLE: Cooperation**)

Project cycle	Post-conflict Rwanda (From 1994 to 2003)	
	<i>RESULTS</i>	<i>IMPLICATIONS</i>
Planning	No joint planning.	Without joint planning, joint implementation is not feasible.
Initiation (Resource mobilization)	Multiple sources of funds and lack of a UN Resolution for increased capacity of PKO.	Internal conflicts reflect the challenges of who should be beneficiaries.
Implementation	Several UN heads to coordinate with limited office capacity.	Need for a strong coordinator to facilitate with a capable office.
Monitoring and Evaluation	Different timings of M& E exercises by donors. How to bridge to development phase?	Different targeted results among aid agencies.
Advocacy	Conflict between national security and human security.	Lack of UN mandates.

The following Key findings on inter-organizational relations and aid coordination are derived from this research.

Findings from the Case Study: Rwanda PEI (2005-2011):

Under the joint programme between United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), “Poverty and Environment Initiative” (PEI), the coordination between UNEP and UNDP worked relatively well.

Competition as a basis for Coordination:

One of the critical factors contributing to this result was because, there was a Competition between UNDP and UNEP during the resource mobilization phase for the PEI programme. As a result, UNEP was entrusted to manage the PEI funding in Rwanda. UNEP functioned as a donor to UNDP in PEI in a practical term. As UNEP had a final say for decision-making, there was a hierarchy built in within the PEI from the outset. This arrangement made effective coordination possible.

Issues related to Coordination:

Coordination: UNEP functioned as a donor to UNDP in PEI in a practical term. As UNEP had a final say for decision-making, there was a hierarchy built in within the PEI from the outset. This arrangement made effective coordination possible. UNEP provided expertise on PEI issues as a normative organization and UNDP offered project implementation administrative base and national knowledge and network.

Issues related to Cooperation:

Knowledge sharing and mutual learning took place in the process of monitoring and evaluation through cooperation. Lessons were disseminated to other PEI pilot countries and the PEI learning was fed into UNDAF Environmental Guidelines developed by UNEP.

Findings from the Individual Case Study: HIV/AIDS Joint Programme (2007-2009):

Lack of Competitive processes during the resource mobilization phase:

When UN coordination is discussed, the underlining assumption is that the more UN organizations work together, the better the development results are. However, in reality, according to the interviews conducted, this assumption not always worked in practice. For instance, the HIV/AIDS Joint Programme by the UN system has 9 participating UN agencies. The UN Joint Programme was implemented from 2007 to 2010 with a total budget of \$26.8 million. According to the analysis by the UN Joint Programme for Culture, there seems to be a threshold of 2-4 agencies maximum for the implementation a successful joint programme. The Representative of UNAIDS also gave a testimony that “fewer the organizations working together, the better the results are.” Due to the large sum of funding allocated to China by the Global Fund to fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, a number of UN agencies became involved in HIV/AIDS, without necessarily having expertise to work on the theme. In the resource mobilization and project initiation stage, there was a lack of competitive process to eliminate agencies, which did not have the expertise or capacity to contribute to the joint initiatives.

Coordination for the sake of Coordination?

Joint thinking rather than joint implementation

One of the important findings was that “joint thinking paid off more than joint implementation”. Too much focus on joint implementation was costly. What mattered most was the strategic division of labour, and the common administrative processes per se were not essential in achieving targeted goals. The integration of strategy and targets are crucial, and once the roles of agencies were defined, the projects could run in parallel generating aimed results. One example of the downside of a joint project, in which multiple UN organizations implement a project from a common pool of resources, is that the transaction costs increase for UN organizations overall, and in some cases for the recipient government as well. This defeats the purpose of a joint project, which originally was supposed to reduce the transaction costs for the recipient government. In one particular case of a joint project for Culture and Development, one national partner had to sign 8 contracts with 8 different UN agencies within one joint project. Instead of streamlining administrative processes, administrative processes were multiplied as a result of having multiple UN organizations participating in the joint projects. The short-term costs of joint projects are not yet outweighing the long-term benefit expected in the design of the joint projects.

When considering three levels of coordination: 1. Information sharing, 2. Coordination at strategic level and division of labour and 3. Implementing joint activities and programmes. Coordination added value in planning and division of labour. However, the joint implementation per se was very costly, and had less impact on the results. As Coordination requires changes in business practices, thus, costly initially.

Incentives for coordination

Coordination mechanisms functioned well when there were exchanges of resource among partners. Stronger incentives were in place when there were resource mobilization opportunities and demand for coordination from the Government.

Current UN coordination mechanisms do not build in the incentive mechanisms for staff to be actively engaged in UN coordination. The performance appraisals are not reflective of these elements. (Ex. UNDP Balanced Scorecard and Results Competency Assessment, a personnel appraisal system.)

Coordination forum (Joint Assessment Reports) and evolution of Ownership

The working level public health officers used the working group of the Government of China and the UN system to develop “Joint Assessment of HIV/AIDS Prevention, Treatment and Care in China” (JAR) issued from 2004 to 2007. The forum served as a coordination forum to agree on critical epidemiological data, possible courses of action and policy implications. The working level officers from the Ministry of Health from the Government of China used JAR to gain authority to communicate upwards to advise their top political leaders and also to communicate downwards to the public by obtaining credibility from UN. There was some scepticism by the people in the official lines of what the Government releases – especially in crisis. In this context, external entity such as UN provided sources of confidence in believing what the Government was communicating to their people.

Issues related to Cooperation:

UN's convening role

With the case of the UN Theme Group on HIV/AIDS, the group served as a unique forum to engage all the partners working on the epidemic: the Chinese government institutions, multilateral organization, bilateral organizations, the civil society organizations and the private sector. It was the single forum, which was open to all the stakeholders, and where People Living With HIV/AIDS had the opportunities to voice their concerns, viewpoints and proposals. The Group effectively used UN's convening role, and the network of cooperation was formed beyond the UN system.

Joint advocacy yielded positive results as part of UN concerted efforts in the form of cooperation. Cooperation does not require changes in the standard operation procedures (SOPs) or business processes, thus, administrative costs were relatively lower than coordination (Takahashi 2003). One voice, a common message, by the members of the UN Theme Group on HIV/AIDS was communicated to the Chinese government. Advocacy with multi-sectoral approach and at multiple levels of bureaucracy contributed to the changes in policy-making within the Chinese government. UN provided chances for inter-Ministry and intra-Ministry negotiation and influencing.

Where joint work was effective was when joint advocacy or intellectual work, such as publishing reports with clear policy messages, were pursued. For instance, when joint reports were produced, the UN in-house capacity was utilized across organizations. If this type of expertise were to be purchased externally, the costs of selection,

contracting, training and monitoring would have been quite high. By using internal capacity within UN system, the transaction costs for accessing and using such qualified professionals had been reduced. Knowledge sharing and mutual learning took place in the process of monitoring and evaluation through cooperation.

Findings from the Case Study: Post-conflict Rwanda (From 1994):

In terms of 3Cs, there is no smooth project cycle in an emergency situation; thus, the 3Cs model should be applied differently from the non-emergency situation.

Competition: When emergencies occur, there is no time for competition among donors and subsequent selection process. Thus, ready-made structure to respond to emergencies is necessary within the UN system. The competition should be rather against time than with other development partners. The scheme of Humanitarian Coordinator and Cluster Approach is attempting to address this aspect.

Coordination: is critical in emergency situations. However, under armed conflict and its aftermath, political coordination among donors is limited. UN system should provide an effective forum for information-sharing, strategic division of labour, and formulation of necessary common guidelines for those donors who seek this type of service, especially non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The convening role of UN should be prominent in fleshing out the different perspectives and positions and seeking to find out the areas where stakeholder could work jointly. Political coordination usually takes place in international forums such as UN Security Council,

African Union, etc.

Cooperation: as situations change rapidly and frequently, knowledge sharing and mutual learning should take place on a frequent basis (daily or weekly) compared to usual 3-6 months monitoring and 1-3 year evaluation cycle.

7.3 UN reform and “3Cs” implications

This section compares the findings of the case studies and the current UN reform initiatives pertaining to UN coordination. As outlined in Chapter 2, the UN system has been engaged in series of UN reforms to bring about coherence to programmes delivered by the UN system.

In particular, in Rwanda one of the pilot countries of Delivering as One, it was observed that the One UN programme is in fact setting up another parallel funding mechanism to the existing UN country programme. This is beating the purpose of whole One UN initiative in terms of developing an integrated one UN programme in a country. Donors who were supportive of One UN approach, such as the British government and the Government of Spain. One UN, is in most cases adding another bureaucracy to the already complex UN programmes, and not actually resolving the fundamental problems of overlaps, inconsistency and proliferation.

When considering performance measurement tools within UN organization, UNDP uses the Balanced Scorecard to evaluate the performances. Within the Balanced

Scorecard, Theme 2 deals with “Support to UN Reform and Coherence, Strategic Result, Effective CO support provided to programmatic activities of the UN system”. The success indicator is “Number of Active Joint Programmes”. If the country office implements 3 or more joint programmes, their mark goes green, and if under, yellow or even red marks are given. This is rather an overly simplified method of judging if the country office is doing well on “UN Reform and Coherence”.

Has One UN pilot addressed the issues raised through these case studies? The preliminary findings indicate that the definition of transaction costs is not fully developed or shared among the One UN pilot countries. There were no agreed Logic model or success indicators for UN coordination achieved by One UN pilots. Therefore, in order to gauge the results in a systematic manner, there needs to be a common definition of transaction costs to start with and a Logic model outlining what exactly are the goals that UN system is aiming to achieve through a coordinated approach. The findings from the self-evaluation and stocktaking reports by respective countries participating in One UN pilot show that the transaction costs have increased for the UN system due to the additional workload as a result of coordination. Some staff members say in perception surveys, “the level of workload is not sustainable”.

The Figure 16: One-ness Triangle provides a snapshot of which UN coordination initiatives are relatively more effective than others and associated costs incurred to implement those initiatives. These costs were not measured through rigorous calculation process, and this is rather an indication of people’s observations. Based on the findings from the cases, and within the limits of the case studies, One voice (cost:

Low), One Programme (cost: Medium) seem to be quite effective in yielding positive programme outcomes through coordinated approach. One Leader is also effective (cost: High), however, could cause conflicts and unhealthy competitions among UN organizations and UN representatives in country offices in the field. Therefore, the cost for it is in fact quite high. One Database (cost: Medium), such as DEVINFO proves to be quite useful. One Budget (cost: High) is a useful tool, however, very costly in terms of procedural re-arrangements and redefining the territorial and authority boundaries among multiple UN organizations. One HR system (cost: High) also has similar characteristics with implementing One Budget. One UN premise (cost High) is not creating opportunities of UN coherence and coordination unless active efforts are being made. Where good efforts are in place, the physical locations of the offices are not of a great importance. UN system to be in one location also has a downside of becoming an easy target for oppositions to attack the premise, especially in fragile states.

How effective is One-ness?




FIGURE 16: One-ness Triangle

7.4 Lessons and policy implications

Based on the findings from the case studies, the following overall lessons and policy implications are derived.

- 1) The incentive mechanisms should be re-examined to promote coordination leading to better development results. The incentive mechanisms should combine the schemes of financing, personnel and human resources (HR) management, and results-based management.
- 2) To put in place appraisal system more conducive to coordination, especially to revisit the UNDP Balanced Scorecard indicators. Relevant indicators and monitoring and evaluation framework should be put in place to gauge the

contribution of coordination to development results. The transaction costs need to be assessed, and should be one of the measurements in the evaluation framework.

- 3) There is a strong need for consolidation of procedures, as in general, coordination structures and mechanisms are an add-on to the existing procedures within UN system.
- 4) Coordination should be pursued in the areas where the benefits are large. There should be “coordination diagnosis” per country to examine what are the coordination needs on the ground. To cure the problems, there should be careful diagnosis prior to the blanket approach of remedies. There should be focused efforts to be made on areas where the added-value of coordination is high.
- 5) In post-conflict societies, the needs and requirements for aid coordination are different from the medium and long-term development settings. Absence of legitimate government and weak administrative capacity of the government makes the coordination severely difficult. In the case of Rwanda, partnership with military was effective. There should be flexibility in partnering with counterparts especially in post-conflict recovery process.

7.5 Future research

Through the research presented in this dissertation, the following areas are identified for future examination, exploration, and research.

Through the research of this dissertation, on the basis of analyzing case studies from China and Rwanda, the 3Cs framework was developed. The 3Cs framework whose

components are: Competition, Coordination and Cooperation, together with the project cycle, proposed the effective forms of inter-organizational relationships according to the timing of project phases. In addition to the temporal aspect, the spatial aspect of project dynamics should be looked into. That is to say, to analyze the relationships among different sectors, and how particular interventions, project activities, and policies impact the development results across sectors. The issue of inter-relationships among sectors is a complex subject. Cross-sectoral approach requires the evaluation of trade-offs among sectors and pursuing the social optimum status, as a result of political competition and judgment and corresponding administrative coordination. Two issues arise here for further investigation, 1. the cross-sectoral coordination and 2. the interplays between political competition and administrative coordination.

The 3rd area is the method of how to evaluate the results of coordination. One of the most common understandings of how to measure the costs and benefits of coordination is through transaction cost concept. The notions of transaction costs need be researched further, and feasible definitions should be developed for a practical use. However, transaction cost concept only captures the efficiency aspects, and will not adequately encompass other important dimensions of development results such as relevance, effectiveness and sustainability. There is a need for both quantitative and qualitative evaluation of aid coordination, and practical tools for both approaches. There is generally a lack of understanding on how aid coordination contributes to improving development results among development stakeholders. Therefore, at the country level, there should be outlines of logical flow developed how

coordinated activities lead to the targeted development outcome by respective stakeholder groups. The development of a logframe or a logic model sketching the links between coordination and development results is rare, and so is relevant research basis for that type of efforts. The UNDAFs are mostly process oriented, and present weak logics of linking coordination and development results at the country levels. Related to the issue of evaluation, there is a lack of common assessment framework or tools to gauge the performances of various development organizations, including the United Nations organizations.

Lastly the 4th area is explained. As a consequence of the trends of New Public Management (NPM), international public organizations, such as UN also started applying the concepts of NPM in administering their own organizations. In the UN context, one of the key concepts of NPM to introduce the function of competition is usually limited to the non-core or external entities working for UN. For instance, more open bidding systems are starting to be in place for sub-contractors applying for contacts with UN. A number of non-core functions of UN are being outsourced to the private sector entities through competitive processes. However, there is a lack of competitive processes for core functions of UN and among UN agencies. The fact that there is no common performance assessment tool within the UN system among UN agencies makes it difficult for the donors and taxpayers to judge which UN agencies are performing relatively better or worse than others. With the development of common assessment tools, there will be common denominators and rules for competition for results among UN agencies, and relevant research should be pursued to form such a basis.

APPENDIX 1: Paris Declaration Indicators of Progress

Indicators of Progress To be measured nationally and monitored internationally

OWNERSHIP		TARGET FOR 2010
1	<i>Partners have operational development strategies</i> — Number of countries with national development strategies (including PRSs) that have clear strategic priorities linked to a medium-term expenditure framework and reflected in annual budgets.	At least 75% of partner countries have operational development strategies.
ALIGNMENT		TARGETS FOR 2010
2	<i>Reliable country systems</i> — Number of partner countries that have procurement and public financial management systems that either (a) adhere to broadly accepted good practices or (b) have a reform programme in place to achieve these.	(a) Public financial management — Half of partner countries move up at least one measure (i.e., 0.5 points) on the PFM/ CPIA (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment) scale of performance. (b) Procurement — One-third of partner countries move up at least one measure (i.e., from D to C, C to B or B to A) on the four-point scale used to assess performance for this indicator.
3	<i>Aid flows are aligned on national priorities</i> — Percent of aid flows to the government sector that is reported on partners' national budgets.	Halve the gap — halve the proportion of aid flows to government sector not reported on government's budget(s) (with at least 85% reported on budget).
4	<i>Strengthen capacity by co-ordinated support</i> — Percent of donor capacity-development support provided through co-ordinated programmes consistent with partners' national development strategies.	50% of technical co-operation flows are implemented through co-ordinated programmes consistent with national development strategies.
5a	<i>Use of country public financial management systems</i> — Percent of donors and of aid flows that use public financial management systems in partner countries, which either (a) adhere to broadly accepted good practices or (b) have a reform programme in place to achieve these.	PERCENT OF DONORS
		Score* Target
		5+ All donors use partner countries' PFM systems.
		3.5 to 4.5 90% of donors use partner countries' PFM systems.
		PERCENT OF AID FLOWS
		Score* Target
5+ A two-thirds reduction in the % of aid to the public sector not using partner countries' PFM systems.		
3.5 to 4.5 A one-third reduction in the % of aid to the public sector not using partner countries' PFM systems.		
5b	<i>Use of country procurement systems</i> — Percent of donors and of aid flows that use partner country procurement systems which either (a) adhere to broadly accepted good practices or (b) have a reform programme in place to achieve these.	PERCENT OF DONORS
		Score* Target
		A All donors use partner countries' procurement systems.
		B 90% of donors use partner countries' procurement systems.
		PERCENT OF AID FLOWS
		Score* Target
A A two-thirds reduction in the % of aid to the public sector not using partner countries' procurement systems.		
B A one-third reduction in the % of aid to the public sector not using partner countries' procurement systems.		
6	<i>Strengthen capacity by avoiding parallel implementation structures</i> — Number of parallel project implementation units (PIUs) per country.	Reduce by two-thirds the stock of parallel project implementation units (PIUs).
7	<i>Aid is more predictable</i> — Percent of aid disbursements released according to agreed schedules in annual or multi-year frameworks.	Halve the gap — halve the proportion of aid not disbursed within the fiscal year for which it was scheduled.
8	<i>Aid is untied</i> — Percent of bilateral aid that is untied.	Continued progress over time.

HARMONISATION		TARGETS FOR 2010
9	<i>Use of common arrangements or procedures</i> — Percent of aid provided as programme-based approaches.	66% of aid flows are provided in the context of programme-based approaches.
10	<i>Encourage shared analysis</i> — Percent of (a) field missions and/or (b) country analytic work, including diagnostic reviews that are joint.	(a) 40% of donor missions to the field are joint. (b) 66% of country analytic work is joint.
MANAGING FOR RESULTS		TARGET FOR 2010
11	<i>Results-oriented frameworks</i> — Number of countries with transparent and monitorable performance assessment frameworks to assess progress against (a) the national development strategies and (b) sector programmes.	Reduce the gap by one-third — Reduce the proportion of countries without transparent and monitorable performance assessment frameworks by one-third.
MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY		TARGET FOR 2010
12	<i>Mutual accountability</i> — Number of partner countries that undertake mutual assessments of progress in implementing agreed commitments on aid effectiveness including those in this Declaration.	All partner countries have mutual assessment reviews in place.

Important Note: In accordance with paragraph 9 of the Declaration, the partnership of donors and partner countries hosted by the DAC (Working Party on Aid Effectiveness) comprising OECD/DAC members, partner countries and multilateral institutions, met twice, on 30-31 May 2005 and on 7-8 July 2005 to adopt, and review where appropriate, the targets for the twelve Indicators of Progress. At these meetings an agreement was reached on the targets presented under Section III of the present Declaration. This agreement is subject to reservations by one donor on (a) the methodology for assessing the quality of locally-managed procurement systems (relating to targets 2b and 5b) and (b) the acceptable quality of public financial management reform programmes (relating to target 5a.ii). Further discussions are underway to address these issues. The targets, including the reservation, have been notified to the Chairs of the High-level Plenary Meeting of the 59th General Assembly of the United Nations in a letter of 9 September 2005 by Mr. Richard Manning, Chair of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC).

***Note on Indicator 5:** Scores for Indicator 5 are determined by the methodology used to measure quality of procurement and public financial management systems under Indicator 2 above.

(OECD 2011d)

APPENDIX 2: Questions and responses during interviews on UN's assistance in the fight against HIV/AIDS in China.

What was asked during the interviews?

The interview questions were developed to test the author's overall hypothesis of "UN's concerted efforts contributed to the positive changes in the Chinese Government's policies and actions in the fight against HIV/AIDS in 2000s". The questions were broken into mainly four parts: 1.) if there were perceived positive changes in the Chinese Government's policies and actions in the fight against HIV/AIDS in 2000s? 2.) what were the major contributing factors in prompting those policy and attitude changes, 3.) what were the role of UN in these processes, and 4.) what was the value-added of UN coordination in this context? Centred around these four questions, the 7-8 questions were developed indicated in the Box 1 and the Box 2.

BOX 1: The main questions asked in the semi-structured interviews, conducted with UN officials in China or who have previously worked in China.

1. *During your time in China, what were the examples of best practice of UN joint / coordinated efforts?*
2. *In the same vein, what were the not so successful experiences of UN joint / coordinated efforts?*
3. *What do you see as the added-value of UN joint / coordinated efforts?*
4. *In your view, how does the Government of China assess the added-value or added burden of UN coordination?*
5. *If you are a member of UN Country Team, how do you assess the usefulness of Resident Coordinator and Heads of Agencies providing inputs to each other's performance appraisal? Does it create any incentives? Does it cultivate a sense of teamwork?*
6. *What do you see as a result of competition among UN agencies? Positive / negative / not much impact?*
7. *Do you see that the opportunities of inter-organizational learning among UN agencies are pursued effectively?*
8. *Any other comments.*

BOX 2: The main questions asked in the semi-structured interviews, conducted with Chinese Government counterparts, civil society organization members and bilateral aid organizations.

1. *What do you see as major contributing factors in developing more responsive policies and actions in the fight against HIV/AIDS?*
2. *How did the UN play a role in this process?*
3. *Among UN's contributions to address HIV/AIDS in China, what was most useful?*
4. *How do you see UN's relevance and effectiveness in supporting the Government of China and its people compared to other development partners?*
5. *How do you see the value of UN joint / coordinated efforts?*
6. *In your view, how did the ownership of the HIV/AIDS issue evolved by the Chinese stakeholders?*
7. *How do you see the role of coordination within the Chinese stakeholders in HIV/AIDS field?*
8. *What are the remaining challenges in the fight against HIV/AIDS in China?*
9. *Any other comments.*

The interview notes were reviewed multiple times by the author, and key words and concepts, which appeared in the conversations with the informants, were marked. These key words and concepts were coded and grouped into the following three themes: 1. Leadership among "equals"; 2. Doing things together; and 3. Policy change. The tables 9 to 11 are the essence of results summarized through attributional coding, indicating: Themes, Explanations, Data and Analysis.

TABLE 9: Data and analysis on the theme, "Leadership among equals"

Theme	LEADERSHIP AMONG "EQUALS"
Explanations	Leadership within the UN Country Team is an issue. UN Heads of agencies are at the same level of authority, and has no supervisory relationships.
Data (Comments by informants.)	<p>Resident Coordinator (RC): It is difficult to convince UNCT members without an authority.</p> <p>UNFPA Head: RC supported UNTG HIV/AIDS when in need, but did not take the credit.</p> <p>WHO Head: I am in support for one programme, but not for "One Leader"</p> <p>WHO Head: At the meeting with Vice Premier at the time of Avian flu, I sat at the first seat, and RC took the second seat. This resulted in communicating focused technical advice to the Government of China, and subsequent pragmatic approach taken by the Government.</p> <p>UNESCO Head: RC supported UN-wide efforts, and helped raising the UN profile.</p> <p>UNESCO Head: For the Joint Programme, led by UNESCO, I interacted with all the UN staff as their supervisor, in order to cultivate UN teamwork.</p>
Analysis	<p>Because, there are "competitions" among UN Heads of Agencies, "coordination" through hierarchy and authority do not seem to work very well. Rather, relationships of "cooperation" based on trust worked better within the UN Country Team in China, especially in response to HIV/AIDS.</p>

(The titles of the informants are from the year 2003.)

TABLE 10: Data and analysis on the theme, “Doing things together”

Theme	DOING THINGS TOGETHER
Explanations	Doing things together in UN creates more processes. UNDAF, CCA and Joint programmes, often times, increase transaction costs for UN.
Data (Comments by informants.)	<p>RC: The formulation of the CCA and UNDAF jointly elaborated by the UN and Government joint team, and signed by Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) on behalf of the Government was a success.</p> <p>RC: UN's multisectoral approach also prompted the Government to work across different sectors.</p> <p>Current UNAIDS Head: “Fewer the organizations working together, the better the results are.”</p> <p>According to the analysis by UN Joint Programme for Culture, there seems to be a threshold of 2-4 agencies maximum for the implementation a successful joint programme.</p> <p>Under UN Joint Programme for Culture, there was a case when a Government Ministry had to sign 8 contracts with respective UN agencies.</p> <p>GOC senior officials: What the Government appreciates about UN support in HIV/AIDS are: 1. scientific expertise, 2. credibility based on international practices, and 3. enjoyable processes to work together as an international team.</p> <p>WHO Head: Joint analytical work and advocacy by UN were instrumental. Joint analytical reports were of high quality and influenced Chinese policy-making.</p> <p>WHO Head: Joint monitoring and evaluations, and joint missions by UN were not carried out as much as they should have been.</p> <p>GOC senior official: When a UN team interacts with the Government as one entity, it is much more efficient and better for us.</p>
Analysis	<p>Joint thinking pays off more than joint implementation. Too much focus on joint implementation was costly. What mattered most was the strategic division of labour, and the common administrative processes were not essential in achieving targeted goals. The integration of strategy and targets are crucial, and once the roles of agencies are defined, the projects could run in parallel.</p>

(The titles of the informants are from the year 2003.)

TABLE 11: Data and analysis on the theme, “Policy change”

Theme	POLICY CHANGE
Explanations	GOC's response to HIV/AIDS changed "From Silence to Action". UN concerted efforts have made significant contribution to this process.
Data (Comments by informants.)	<p>RC: These elements contributed to positive changes in Chinese AIDS policies: advocacy with all Chinese counterpart organizations and partners, integration into all ongoing programs. Significant steps were a) the UN SG speaking about the HIV/AIDS threat to President Jiang Zemin, and b) UNFPA succeeding in convincing the State Family Planning System to integrate AIDS related educational material in their programs.</p> <p>UNFPA Head: UNTG HIV/AIDS proposed GOC the following 4 goals: (a) that the joint report should be finalized (b) that a high level coordination body of the government be activated (c) that some coming to terms with the Henan blood scandal take place (d) that stigma be addressed, and we suggested that a high level official go on TV and shake hands with an AIDS patient. And within 6 months we reached all 4 goals.</p> <p>GOC senior official: HIV/AIDS related projects supported by UN in 1990s were very useful in learning about effective ways of prevention (condom use) and care.</p> <p>GOC senior official: GOC reflected evidence-based learning from HIV/AIDS projects supported by UN in HIV/AIDS related legislations and 5-year plans.</p> <p>UNFPA: UNTG HIV/AIDS assisted GOC succeed in the Global Fund application, which brought a large sum of budget for HIV/AIDS measures.</p> <p>CSO member: UN and GOC are not doing well enough to protect the rights of AIDS victims.</p> <p>DFID official: UNTG HIV/AIDS served as a useful forum for policy coordination and dialogue.</p> <p>GOC senior official: In 2010, the national budgets for HIV/AIDS exceeded those of international inputs.</p>
Analysis	<p>In this context, external entity such as UN provided sources of confidence in believing what the Government is communicating to their people. Through this report-writing process, issues such as the methods of surveillance and methadone treatments were debated in great detail. These discussions fed into the development of 5-year plans of HIV/AIDS by the Government. This joint advocacy and policy dialogue by UN was effective in expressing “one voice” and to carry more weight had it not been for the joint efforts and the buy-in of other donors.</p>

(The titles of the informants are from the year 2003.)

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