Dynamics of Realignment: Hanoi, Beijing, Moscow, 1964–1980

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This article attempts to shed new light on the dynamics of realignment among powers, using the Hanoi-Beijing-Moscow triangle during the period of 1964-1980. These three powers witnessed the dramatic changes in alignment patterns among themselves during the period. First, they were on the same side vis-a-vis a fourth power, the United States, at least for the 1965-1973 period. Second, China and the Soviet Union experienced border clashes in March 1969 on the Zhenbao-Damanskii island. Third, Vietnam and China fought a bloody war in February-March 1979. This rapidly unfolded realignment among them is worthy of special analysis since it clearly points to the last of the following three consequences of alliance. Alliance has in principle one of the following three consequences:

1. Alliance between A and B works to deter a common enemy, C, from attacking the allied actors, A and B.

2. B, a junior ally, is drawn into conflict because a common enemy, C, is determined to beat A, a senior ally.

3. Allies, A and B, start fighting each other, after having “lost” a common enemy, C.

In this article realignment is formulated to consist of the two elements, force and perception. The regression equations are formulated and tested using empirical data of force and perception, drawn from the aggregate and content analysis data. Some tentative conclusions are drawn.