Heidegger on the Ontological A Priori

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It might be a surprising and questionable suggestion to talk about ontology in connection with the concept of “a priori.” It seems all the more so because we have learned that we should distinguish this concept from ontological concepts such as necessity. However, this suggestion makes sense in Heidegger’s early ontology: he is committed to the concept of a priori more deeply than one might suspect, and through this commitment he approaches ontological problems in an unprecedented way. In this paper, I would like to make his approach explicit through three steps. The first step is to consider briefly the historical context of ontology that eminently characterizes Heidegger’s early thought. The second step is, by going back to Kant’s philosophy from which Heidegger’s concept of a priori originated, to distinguish two basic meanings of Kant’s concept of a priori; the distinction is also significant for Heidegger. The third and most important step is to show how the concept of a priori helps the analysis of Dasein in Being and Time to give a new picture of ontology.

1. Ontology as a complex of different questions.

Ontology poses no unitary question about being as being; rather, it consists of several important questions originating from our understanding of being. It is because of this complexity that ontology matters a lot to us. There are at least three distinctive ontological questions:

1. How do we distinguish between what really is, and what is really not but only appears in dependence on what really is?
2. What is the cause of an entity? (Among entities we count an event at time t, a material thing, the human mind, and other things.)
3. What are the meanings of the verb “to be?”

Aristotle’s ontology is a systematic project to integrate these three questions. (1) Arguing that the study of being as such reduces to the study of
being in the primary sense, Aristotle takes substances such as individual living things and species as what really is. (2) For him, substance means not only what really is, but also the cause of the being of what really is; insofar as the cause of being explains why a substance is such and such, the cause is also substance in an essential sense. Aristotle's ontology contains investigations into the cause of being as its intrinsic part. (3) Aristotle partly draws the primacy of substance from logical considerations of the verb "to be"; because all the other forms of "to be" are predicated of the primary form of "to be" expressing the primary substance, nothing else would exist if there were no primary substance.

Modern philosophers no longer seem concerned with this ontological integrity. But this does not mean that ontology has disappeared in the history of philosophy, nor that ontology has made way for epistemology, but rather that the ontological questions mentioned above only have been asked separately. The question of "what really is" has been transformed into the question of the relationship between the human mind or mental representations as modes of the human mind and material things; the question of the cause of being has been narrowed down to the problem of discovering the initial conditions and general laws of the occurrence of an event, the solution of which has been left to the modern natural sciences; the semantical question of the verb "to be" has only been asked in the context of the theory of judgment, and has nothing to do with the concept of substance.

In the face of this modern separation of once integrated ontology, Heidegger's ontology in Being and Time is an attempt to answer the three questions above systematically and so resurrect that integrity. I find that, in Heidegger's early work, the first two questions are answered in an organized and innovative way, but that the third question is not well developed.

(1) Heidegger answers the first question in a way that utterly invalidates the modern ontological apparatus. The ontological procedure underlying the debate over the mind/body problem roughly goes as follows: first, one establishes the most general categorical framework, such as substance-property or event-relationship, and then one decides what kind of status mental and physical phenomena have within that framework, for which decision one refers to the certainty of consciousness, mental causation, and other criteria.

In introducing three ontological categories in Being and Time—Dasein, availableness (Zuhandenheit), and occurrentness (Vorhandenheit)
Heidegger does not follow this procedure. His categorical division is derived from the role of *contextuality* in each category: Dasein is context-forming Being,2) availableness is context-conforming Being, and occurrentness is context-annihilating Being. So the contrast between Dasein and occurrentness does not coincide with the contrast between mental states and physical states; if we take the human mind as a Cartesian conscious subject in a detached way, it necessarily appears as an occurrent entity. To be sure, questions remain unanswered: What is contextuality? In what way does contextuality function in Heidegger's division? To answer these questions we need to address the question of the cause of being in Heidegger's philosophy.

(2) In answering the second question, Heidegger follows Kant's idea of the "conditions of possibilities": the fact that an object of our experience appears as it does cannot be explained only through natural causation, whether it be event causation or Aristotelian generation; to encounter an object of our experiences as it appears, we need some prior conditions of possibilities for the appearance of that object. For example, what are the conditions of the appearance of the objects of our perceptual experiences? External causal conditions such as some sensory stimuli, particular states of the brain, and certain conditions of external surroundings do not suffice to let object appear. With these conditions, we could only get a bundle of meaningless mental images. Some concepts and the abilities to apply these concepts provide necessary conditions for the appearance of the perceptual object, and further for the integration of this object into our logical space of judgments and inferences.

Kant introduces this idea of the conditions of possibilities as an utterly new candidate for the cause of being (and here, I understand "cause" in the broad sense of *aitia* in Plato and Aristotle), insofar as these conditions are supposed to apply not only to possible knowledge but also to every object we can encounter. The idea of the "Being of entities" (das Sein des Seienden), a focal point of the inquiry into being in *Being and Time*, shows a structural similarity to the idea of the conditions of possibilities. Kant develops his new idea through his concept of "a priori," and Heidegger owes so much to this concept. What distinguishes Kant from Heidegger regarding this point is that for Heidegger, roughly, the way Being makes an entity possible is exactly the way that entity finds its niche within a certain local context, whereas conceptual unity is the pivotal point for Kantian conditioning.
Accordingly, Heidegger's categorical division centers around how it occurs that an entity is contextualized and so made possible.

In the following two sections, we shall go into the details of this similarity and difference. Before that, I will examine the way Heidegger comes to grips with the last question.

(3) Heidegger takes it as one of the most fundamental ontological problems to explicate the unitary foundation of the various meanings of the verb "to be" (Sein), which includes at least three meanings: copula, existence, and identity. Against Mill's caution that those who confuse the several meanings of the verb "to be" will push philosophy into mysticism, Heidegger tries to solve the problem by assigning the unitary foundation of the polysemy of the verb "to be" to Dasein's revealing (enthüllend) function. However, this attempt, which relies on the truth of Dasein, will be unsuccessful. For, as Ernst Tugendhat justifiably stresses, the meaning of the verb "to be" concerns exclusively the structures of propositional content, and is to be distinguished from the concept of truth that lies in assertive force.  

2. Two meanings of "a priori" in Kant's philosophy.

It is fair to say that the question of "how are a priori synthetic judgments possible?" is the most fundamental one in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, and that at least the first half of the book is chiefly devoted to answering this question. This type of "a priori" is obviously a characteristic attributed to judgments, and designates the status of knowledge; it means that the truth or falsity of the relevant a priori judgments do not depend on experience of senses. Still, any serious reader of this book would not overlook that the concept "a priori" therein cannot be interpreted only in this context of epistemological justification. Kant evidently uses the concept "a priori" in a non epistemological meaning when he writes, "objects of sensible intuition must conform to the formal conditions of sensibility which lie a priori in the mind" or "a priori concepts must be recognized as a priori conditions of the possibility of experience."

What is noteworthy here is that Kant answers his question "how are a priori synthetic judgments possible?" by using this double meaning in a positive way. Why are the judgments of geometry, arithmetic, and the principles of natural sciences a priori, that is, independent of sense experience in the context of epistemological justification? Kant's answer to this question is that the apriority in the context of epistemological justification is
grounded on the non-epistemological a priori. For example, the reason the judgments of geometry are true a priori is, Kant seems to assume, that geometry is the science of space, and that space is neither a quality characteristic of Things-in-themselves nor a relation between things but a “form of intuition” that makes experiences possible a priori; since geometry deals with something that makes experiences possible, its epistemological value cannot depend on experiences.

We should call the non-epistemological a priori that makes experiences possible “the ontological a priori,” because “to make experiences possible” is nothing but “to make the objects of experiences possible” from a Kantian point of view. Kant’s arguments about sensibility (Sinnlichkeit) and understanding (Verstand) seem to aim at, above all, making it clear that the “a priori” in the context of epistemological justification is founded on the “a priori” that makes experiences and the objects of experiences possible. The fundamental characteristic of Kant’s transcendental philosophy lies in explaining the epistemological a priori by referring back to the ontological a priori. Let us argue this point based on Kant’s texts.

To demonstrate this point from the “Transcendental Aesthetic” is no laborious task. The foundation of the epistemological a priori on the ontological a priori appears clearly and directly in the course of Kant’s exposition of space and time. Let us look at the “Exposition of Space” in the first edition. Kant begins by declaring that space is not an empirical concept derived from outer experiences but a representation which “must be presupposed” in order that sensible appearances may have space-order; space is a representation that makes outer appearances possible. What is more, space is a “necessary a priori” representation, since we can never imagine the absence of space. From these two determinations of space—order giving character and necessity—Kant derives the ontological apriority of space:

It [=space] must therefore be regarded as the condition of the possibility of appearances, and not as a determination dependent upon them. It is an a priori representation, which necessarily underlies outer appearances.⁶

Space should be named “the ontological a priori” in the sense that it constitutes the precedent condition for the “Appearances” that are the only objects that finite human reason can experience. After establishing this point, he
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goes on to found the “epistemological a priori” on the ontological a priori:

The apodeictic certainty of all geometrical propositions, and the possibility of their a priori construction, is grounded in this a priori necessity of space.7)

This procedure of argument also holds in the “Exposition of Time” and it reappears in the second edition that was rewritten considerably. In the second edition, Kant discusses the ontological a priori in the part newly called “Metaphysical Exposition,” while he deals with the foundation of the epistemological a priori in the added part, “Transcendental Exposition.”

This kind of foundation could not easily be established in the case of the “pure concepts of understanding,” i.e. “categories.” There seem to be difficulties in identifying the ontological a priori in the categories, because, as Kant himself states, the categories are not the direct conditions for the appearance of objects, unlike space and time. It is generally agreed that the difficulty of the “Transcendental Deduction” comes from this situation. Based on the first edition, we can examine how Kant identifies the ontological a priori of the categories. (The second edition, it seems to me, obscures the fact that the main task of the “Deduction” lies in identifying the ontological a priori.)

The problem Kant must solve is this: Are the categories precedent conditions for the possibilities of the objects of experiences, just as the forms of sensibility are precedent conditions? If we can affirm this, the categories will turn out to be conditions for empirical knowledge and to have “objective validity”8 as conditions for the possibilities of all knowledge.9) The procedure through which the epistemological a priori is founded on the ontological a priori should be the same as that for the forms of sensibility. How does Kant solve this problem then? What is decisive is that Kant modifies the concept of “object” for which the ontological a priori is the condition. Now, Kant does not put into question an object as something that is given through passive sensibility, but regards an object as a unity of rule (Regel) that resists arbitrariness and floating. Kant says:

the object is viewed as that which prevents our modes of knowledge from being haphazard or arbitrary, and which determines them a priori in some definite fashion. For in so far they are to relate to an object, they
must necessarily agree with one another, that is, must possess that unity which constitutes the concept of an object.\textsuperscript{10}

For example, a material object is not something transcendent that is supposed to be outside consciousness and to cause some inner appearances in consciousness. But rather, it appears directly as something stable because it is a unity of rules, namely a unity of causality, substantiality, and the rest. Since it is the concepts that supply these rules, we can justify the concepts as the precedent conditions for constituting objects. However, this in itself does not guarantee that the categories independent of experiences necessarily function as the ontological a priori in all cases. To establish this point Kant must refer to the identity of “transcendental apperception.” The reason the categories are the ontological a priori in the sense of “not otherwise” is that the unity of self-consciousness forms a rigidly stable element, and that the unity through the categories is coextensive with this unity of self-consciousness.

All necessity [of concepts], without exception, is grounded in a transcendental condition. There must, therefore, be a transcendental ground of the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions, and consequently also of the concepts of objects in general, and so of all objects of experience.... This original and transcendental condition is no other than transcendental apperception.\textsuperscript{11}

A complete study of the idea that the ontological condition as necessity is based on the unity of self-consciousness lies outside the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that, in the case of the categories too, the epistemological a priori will be established once the ontological a priori is established.

3. The ontological a priori in Heidegger’s early philosophy.

That Kant’s critical philosophy had an indelible influence on Heidegger’s thought in the period of Being and Time, is ascertainable from the passages where Kant is mentioned as the first and only philosopher who set out to investigate the “Temporality (Temporalität) of Being.” It is also undeniable that the idea of seeing temporality as the ontological meaning of Dasein is analogous to Kant’s theory of time. What is more, Heidegger’s ontology is in its heart more closely related to Kant’s thought than it appears; the idea
of the ontological a priori we have been discussing is decisive in Heidegger’s ontology. In this section I will clarify this point.

As I have already noted, the idea of the “Being of entities” (das Sein des Seienden) is a focal point of the inquiry into being in Being and Time. Heidegger works out this idea by introducing the idea of the ontological difference between Being and entities.

Heidegger himself does not clearly explain what this difference is, but he gives a crucial clue: in elucidating the concept of “phenomenology” that functions as the method of ontology, he formally characterizes “phenomenon” as “that which shows itself in itself” (das Sich-an-ihm-selbst-zeigende). There are two candidates that satisfy this formal characterization and must be shown to be phenomena. First, what phenomenology as ontology must exhibit explicitly is “something that proximally and for the most part does not show itself: it is something that lies hidden, in contrast to that which proximally and for the most part does show itself; but at the same time it is something that belongs to what thus shows itself, and it belongs to it so essentially as to constitute its meaning and its ground.” What must be exhibited in Heidegger’s phenomenology is the Being of entities, which constitutes the phenomenological conception of “phenomenon.” Second, since Being is the Being of entities, the entities that show themselves must be exhibited as the essential starting points for the investigations of Being; the ordinary conception of “phenomenon” is indispensable. These remarks about the difference between the two sorts of phenomenon suggest that Heidegger attributes the characteristic of “ground” or “meaning” to Being in contrasting it with entities, and that he proceeds in the same way as Kant did with his new causal concept: the conditions of possibilities.

This suggestion can be fully certified in another explanation of “phenomenon” in Being and Time, where Heidegger has recourse to the Kantian dichotomy of “a priori and a posteriori” in order to distinguish the phenomenological conception of phenomenon from the ordinary one. He maintains here that the entities that constitute the ordinary conception of phenomenon are accessible through “empirical intuition.” In contrast, the phenomenon in the phenomenological sense (that is, Being) is “that which already shows itself in the appearance as prior to the ‘phenomenon’ as understood ordinarily and as accompanying it in every case.” The example of the latter case is, for Heidegger, “the forms of intuition” in Kant. Heidegger obviously applies the dichotomy “a priori and a posteriori” to the
difference between Being and entities; he explains the ontological difference through the idea of the ontological a priori.

Someone might ask: Is not this a strategic retreat to more easily explain the ontological difference to beginners in Heidegger’s ontology in a traditionally acknowledged way? I do not think so. On the contrary, it is the idea of the ontological a priori that sustains the whole ontological idea in Being and Time; Heidegger’s essential contribution in this book to ontology lies in explaining the ontological a priori in his own way, and developing this idea thoroughly and widely through his phenomenology. Let us make this clear for the three main ontological categories in Being and Time respectively: availableness, Dasein, and occurrentness.

(1) In the analysis of the available, the ontological difference between an entity and its Being is introduced as the difference between a piece of equipment that Dasein currently encounters and the whole nexus of equipment that makes such an encounter possible. A piece of equipment that somebody uses at some time could not be encountered without the reference to the use of this equipment. Heidegger calls the structure of this reference, which constitutes the condition of this equipment or this encounter with equipment, the “Being” of equipment, or to put it in a Heideggerian jargon. “Bewandtnis.” Because the Being of equipment constitutes the condition of the possibilities of encountering equipment, it seems reasonable to speak here of “the ontological a priori.” Heidegger goes on to say:

In a workshop, for example, the totality of Bewandtnis which is constitutive for the available in its availableness, is ‘earlier’ than any single item of equipment.\footnote{15} 

What does this “earlier” (früher) mean? Does it mean that the Bewandtnis that constitutes the Being of equipment comes as an event before any single item of equipment in time? Imagine the workshop situation in which a worker is using a hammer as equipment and the totality of Bewandtnis comes before this use. There are at least two possibilities to explain this situation while sticking to this ordinary time order. The first possibility is that the totality forms a causal condition for encountering equipment.\footnote{16} However, this explanation does not show why the whole nexus of equipment gives some meaning to the encounter. Unless the nexus constitutes some
in intelligible relationship to the encounter—for example, rationalization, means-end relationship, symbol relationship, and/or others—the explanation by causation has no point.\textsuperscript{17}

This leads to the second possibility: the nexus is memorized beforehand in the user’s mind, and the nexus thus represented in the mind provides the encountering with that intelligibility. This is the very idea Heidegger is strongly criticising. In what way is the nexus represented in the mind? If it is stored as a bundle of explicit propositional contents, such as “if I move a hammer in such-and-such a way I will nail something,” it does not make any piece of equipment available. The nexus between that hammer and the nailing works only when it ceases to be the explicit instructions; its intelligibility is only embodied in our factual relevant comportment corresponding to our situations. Likewise, we cannot explain this embodiment by referring to the \textit{unconscious} representations in the mind. For these representations also do not give us the relevancy to ignore what we ought to ignore under a wide variety of different circumstances; in the form of mental representation, the mind, with its limited resources, cannot select relevant knowledge, which was clearly shown in the “frame problem” of Artificial Intelligence. It is impossible to characterize the understanding of relevancy concerning the nexus of equipment in terms of traditional knowledge in the form of propositional and perceptual representation; this understanding spreads across two interrelated and inseparable components: the comportment and skills of the user of the equipment, and the suitable arrangements of the environment in which the equipment is used.

It is to express this relevancy of the encountering of equipment that Heidegger introduces the strange German word “Bewandtnis.” He says, “In Bewandtnis liegt: bewenden lassen mit etwas bei etwas.”\textsuperscript{18} If we strictly keep the root meaning of “bewenden,”\textsuperscript{19} we are to translate this sentence as follows: the essence of “relevancy” is to let something (equipment) go its own way towards something else (use, purpose, service, etc.). The translation has its implication: the relevancy, i.e. the nexus of the reference of equipment, does not mean a formal relationship between several terms that can be represented in our minds, but a niche that makes the equipment display its own essence in that it has been taken for granted in the light of some purpose or use, and in accordance with the user’s skills and the environmental arrangements.

However, the relevancy is not complete in itself. The relevancy of equip-
ment is always the relevancy to a certain orientation of human activity; a hammer is necessarily related through its use to some direction of action, for example, building a house purposefully or, more generally, being a worker. (I use the word “orientation” to mean something broader and less tied to intent than purpose.) Heidegger calls these orientations the “possibilities” of Dasein, which function as the “for-the-sake-of-which” (Worum-willen) of all the totalities of equipment. So the encountering of equipment only becomes possible under the guidance of Dasein’s orientation in accordance with relevancy; “Bewendenlassen” (letting something go its own way) is the way the use of equipment is oriented.

We should be cautious of a possible misunderstanding of Dasein’s orientation: Dasein’s orientation is nothing other than the representational anticipation of the following future events, anticipations such as expectation and desire. However, simple expectations and desires with certain propositional contents do not necessarily guide Dasein’s encountering of equipment. Consider my desire to build a house for my family. The reasons that my desire does not necessarily guide my using a hammer are twofold: first, as noted, unless my desire is meshed with my relevant skills for carpentry and the relevant circumstances for my action, my desire remains only a desire in my private mental space; second, more importantly, my desire might compete with my other desires such as spending my time on my academic life, and it is plausible that my desire to build a house is outweighed by my spending time on my academic life. To put it in Michael Bratman’s terminology, ordinary desires are not “conduct-controlling pro-attitudes.”[20] The orientation for my using a hammer is not such a mental state that it sometimes guides my encountering of equipment and sometimes not; rather it has already and always been guiding, if my encountering of equipment occurs. The mode in which this orientation guides the encountering of equipment should be called “overall commitment to Dasein’s possibilities.”

In this sense, the concept of orientation with the mode of overall commitment behaves like the concept of intention in human actions; if I have an intention to build my house and nothing interferes, I will simply proceed to execute my intention. However, Dasein’s orientation needs not be present in the human mind in the form of a mental state individualized by a specific propositional content. In our ordinary encountering of equipment, we neither form an explicit mental state of intention, nor specify this state with a certain propositional content beforehand; nevertheless, every encountering
of equipment presupposes a future-directed intentional orientation, whose content is not specified in a propositional form but which is articulated enough to be interpreted in an actual action and a retrospective explanation.

Now we are in a position to understand the meaning of the "earlier" of Bewandtnis: by this term, Heidegger gives an ontological structure of the holistic explanation for availableness. The relevancy of the nexus of equipment and Dasein’s orientation of this relevancy constitute the holistic conditions of an entity as a piece of equipment encountered in a current action of Dasein. The term “earlier” means the ontological dependence of such an entity on the whole of relevancy and orientation; if any single entity within the whole were earlier than this whole—that is, it showed up independently of this whole—it would have lost its being within the practical nexus. Yet, the holistic structure here is not formal in the sense that the value of a constituent within the whole is determined by the configuration of the whole, as in the case of the configuration of chess pieces. Rather, the holistic structure is practical, because it is embodied in the skills and the situation skillfully coped with, which are not representable beforehand in the form of explicit instructions and rules; it is temporal, because the holistic horizon that Dasein’s orientation with the mode of commitment opens up always makes room for its indefinite directedness to the future. The future that is indefinite in how it will be interpreted, but which is articulated enough to orient the current encountering of an entity, plays an essential role in the holistic structure in the use of equipment.

This idea of “earlier” will be developed into the concept of “a priori,” as can be seen in the following quotations:

This ‘a priori’ letting-something-go-its-own-way is the condition for the possibility of encountering anything available.21) ... When we speak of having already let something go its own way, so that it has been freed for that relevancy, we are using a perfect tense a priori [apriorisches Perfekt] which characterizes the kind of Being belonging to Dasein itself.22)

Heidegger’s marginal note on these passages shows that “a perfect tense a priori” is not the “ontically past” (ein ontisch Vergangenes), but the “earlier in each case” (das jeweils Frühere), which we are referred back to in the question about entities as such.23) And another expression for “a perfect
tense a priori," Heidegger suggests, could be "an ontological or transcendental perfect tense" (ontologisches oder transzendentes Perfekt). This suggestion definitely makes it plausible that Heidegger and Kant share the idea of the ontological a priori: the conditions that have already constituted the current showing up of entities.

But for Kant, the constitution is narrowly restricted to the necessary regulation through concepts with a view to founding the epistemological a priori, whereas, for Heidegger, the constitution is exactly the same as the holistic making up of contextuality. We have already seen four main components of contextuality: intelligibility, relevancy, orientation, and commitment. Relevancy with certain intelligibility constitutes the Being of the available only insofar as it con-forms the contextuality for Dasein's activities with and for the sake of a certain oriented commitment of Dasein. In this sense, the Being of the available is context-conforming. The Being of Dasein, in turn, is context-forming insofar as Dasein commits itself to certain oriented possibilities in accordance with their relevant circumstances.\(^{24}\)

Orientation and commitment are the two aspects of "understanding" (Verstehen) as a way of Being-in of Dasein. If Heidegger focuses on the aspect of understanding that organizes the intelligible structures between Dasein's activities and intraworldly entities, i.e. structures such as "for the sake of which," "significance as worldhood," and "relevancy", the concept of "possibility" comes to the fore; "orientation" should designate this aspect. If he, on the other hand, turns to the aspect of understanding that has the mode of overall commitment, he uses the term "projection" (Entwurf):

Why does the understanding... always press forward into possibilities? It is because the understanding has in itself the existential structure which we call "projection." With equal primordiality the understanding projects Dasein's Being both upon its "for-the-sake-of-which" and upon significance, as the worldhood of its current world.\(^{25}\)

Nobody would miss the fact that projection is the way in which the holistic structure functions temporally in the use of equipment; it is because of the projection upon Dasein's own possibilities that these future possibilities orient and guide Dasein's current action and the current showing up of equipment, in a constant and intrinsically indefinite way. For example, if my hammer actually shows up for me, this showing up turns out to have been
necessarily oriented and guided by the possibility of building my house. This possibility constantly guides the showing up, in the sense that not the anticipation of the future, but rather the commitment to the future makes possible the effective matching between Dasein’s skills of hammering and the hammer-use situation which is to be skillfully coped with. The guidance necessarily comes from the indefinite future of that possibility, because the definite and propositional representations of the future, such as “I will build my house by hammering” will not guide my particular action of hammering. My action of hammering is uniquely particular in each instant. If the definite representations of the future guided this uniquely particular action, then they would have to contain every detail of this action, which is impossible; if, on the other hand, the unique particularity of the action emerged from no guidance and orientation, the action would be an unpredictable happening, which is unacceptable. One solution to this dilemma would be a compromise to distinguish between the elements of action guided by prior representations and those left to chance. But who could exactly discern which parts of an action are guided and which parts are not? Is this smooth movement of my hammering guided, or not? Heidegger’s solution is to give up this alleged distinction and to look upon my entire action as guided by my possibility in an indefinite, nonrepresentational way; in my every action, this indefinitely projected possibility has developed itself in a definite and particular way; the definite representation of this possibility is only a developed picture of this possibility and does not contribute to the guidance of an action. So Heidegger talks about projection in the following way:

Furthermore, the character of understanding as projection is such that the understanding does not grasp thematically that upon which it projects—that is to say, possibilities. Grasping it in such a manner would take away from what is projected its very character as a possibility, and would reduce it to the given contents which we have in mind;26)

Insofar as the Being of the available is the holistic nexus of equipment, and this holistic nexus only functions within the horizon of Dasein’s possibilities opened up by the temporal structure of projection, Dasein’s understanding of Being as the ontological a priori turns out to essentially depend on this structure. So Heidegger declares in Being and Time, “Understanding of Being has already been taken for granted in projecting upon possibilities. In
projection, Being is understood, though not ontologically conceived.\textsuperscript{27}) Further in the lecture of 1927, he tries to explicate the ontological a priori by referring to projection:

\begin{quote}
It is only by means of the Temporality \{Temporalität\} of the understanding of Being that it can be explained why the ontological determination of Being have the character of apriority.... The possibility of comportment toward beings demands a precursory \{vorgängig\} understanding of Being, and the possibility of the understanding of Being demands in its turn a precursory projection upon time.\textsuperscript{28})
\end{quote}

This explanation, Heidegger assumes, is also what is missing from the Kantian explanation of the ontological a priori. In fact he tries to reinterpret the unity of concepts which Kant elaborates in the first edition of \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}——a type of ontological a priori——by means of the concept of projection.\textsuperscript{29})

(2) In elucidating the Being of the available we have been led to the Being of Dasein: context-forming Being. This Being not only makes up the context in which the available appears, but it also provides the conditions in which a person is him- or herself as he or she shows up currently; through the ontological difference between the Being of Dasein and Dasein as an entity, we can find what makes the present self of Dasein possible.

This move is completely opposite to the traditional view of selfhood. In this view, whether it be empiricist or rationalist, we construct or assume the whole self starting from the self-sufficient present states of consciousness. Consider, for example, the empiricist attempt to construct self-identity from these elemental states. Heidegger does not think that these states are identifiable in themselves; they appear only in the abstract disregard for contextuality. Therefore, Heidegger’s inquiry into the self first focuses on the currently active self dealing with its circumstances, and secondly seeks the Being of Dasein that provides the holistic conditions of this active self.

There is one thing to mention here: we have to distinguish two meanings for the term “Being” of Dasein. The term is used in a narrow meaning, when the “existence” of Dasein is at issue in the phrase: “in its \{= Dasein’s\} very Being, that Being is an issue for it” (es diesem Seienden in seinem Sein um dieses Sein selbst geht).\textsuperscript{30}) The existence as the Being of Dasein obvious-
ly indicates the possibility of self, i.e. the oriented commitment to the future. On the other hand, Heidegger calls the total ontological structure of Dasein “Care” (Sorge): the Being of Dasein in a broad meaning. The following will be concerned only with the narrow meaning. For, in the midst of the activities of Dasein, it is the Being of “existence” that plays an constituting role for an active self and remains the center of the ontological structure, “Care.”

The assertion “in Dasein’s very Being that Being is an issue for it” means neither that a human being is compelled to deliberate on serious ethical problems, nor that he or she is conscious of him- or herself in a psychologically special way. The Being of oneself is an issue even when one devotes oneself to using equipment or even in the midst of habitual actions. For example, when a basketball player is absorbed in her play, the possibility of her “winning the game” is an issue. Her current bodily movements, then, are given the meaning and orientation of action by becoming an integrated part of the possibility of “winning the game.” Our action does not consist of the assemblage of elemental bodily movements at each moment. On the contrary, an elemental bodily movement becomes an action only when it is situated within the horizon which has been already opened up through the possibility of action. As already noted, the way the possibility of an action orients and guides the action is constant and indefinite. The possibility of “winning the game” is not an anticipation of the future event of winning the game; it constantly guides the skillful play of the player and forms the context of her interaction with her basketball-situation. The projection of the possibility is indefinite; the definite propositional representation of the future, such as “I will win the game,” does not really guide the details of a particular play; rather, the indefinitely projected possibility of winning the game develops itself into a series of particular plays. This projection of possibilities forms the ontological a priori of Dasein in the sense that it has already given the room for maneuver of Dasein’s single action.

Here, one might raise a question: if an agent does not beforehand entertain some propositional representation that determines its satisfaction condition, isn’t it impossible for her to form her possibility with some determination such as “winning the game?” My suggestion is that we should distinguish between definite propositionality and indefinite articulation. Even if an agent does not form a propositional content of her possibility, that is, her possibility lacks definite propositionality, we can ascribe to her a possibility
with some determination; we may speak, for example, of her possibility of “winning the game,” or she can interpret her possibility as “winning the game.” This is because Dasein’s possibility is projected in an indefinitely articulated way. Heidegger claims that “intelligibility [Verständlichkeit] has always been articulated, even before there is any appropriative interpretation of it.”32) The possibility of that basketball player absorbed in her play is so articulated that she can roughly answer what she was doing or why she was doing so; but this never means that she must have formed the propositional content for this possibility.

We need to add several important points concerning the concept of the possibility of Dasein.

First, although the relationship between a current action and the possibility of Dasein is intelligible in a way, the relationship need not be the sort of teleological one as in the case of the basketball player. Even if I am sitting on the bench with no specific purpose, I am committed to the possibility of “continuing to sit.” My current action of sitting on the bench remains under the guidance of my oriented possibility of action, and we can find some intelligible relationship there. I continue to sit on the bench by sitting on it —— I am not unconscious of this. However, this “by” relationship between an action and its possibility is not a means-end relationship.

Second, the concept of the projection of possibility gives a refined explanation of the intentionality of our intentional action, as could be foreseen from the preceding passages. The classical view about intentional action over the last thirty years is the desire-belief model: an action is intentional because it is explained by the fact that the action is caused and rationalized by the mental events of the desire of doing the action and the relevant belief; then, the intentionality of intentional action can be explained in terms of the causal connection between desire-belief and action, and the concept of intention becomes redundant. However, as we have seen, ordinary desires are not conduct-controlling attitudes and do not involve an overall commitment to action. Some theorists of action seek to give the concept of intention an assured status as distinct from the concept of desire.33) Heidegger’s concept of projection satisfies this requirement in the sense that it constantly guides Dasein’s action. Yet, if we accept the irreducibility thesis of intention and assume the intention that existed prior to the action itself, we will encounter serious problems.34) In emergency situations or ordinary habitual situations, we perform intentional actions without having formed prior intentions.
Moreover, even if we have already formed a prior intention, it is doubtful that this intention can control the entire action in a suitable particular way.

Hugh McCann, who argues that actions are not made intentional by a causal relationship to any prior intention of the agent, seems to be on the right track. What does make actions intentional, then? McCann's idea is that the ongoing mental activity of an agent, which is volitional and intrinsically intentional, accounts for the fact that the agent acts intentionally. He goes on to say:

What is necessary for an action to be intentional is not that it arise out of a prior intention, but rather that the sequence of events constitutive of the action instantiate a representation of action that guides the volitional activity of the agent who brings them about. And this, in turn, requires only that the agent be presented with such a representation at the moment of action.\(^{35}\)

Here are some problematical ambiguities. First of all, McCann considers the relationship between the particular details of an action and the representation that guides the agent as the relationship of instantiation. Certainly, the possibility of building my house will be instantiated through a series of hammering actions; but the concept of instantiation is just a logical relationship and does not suffice to explain the guidance in intentional action. Thus, the explanatory fulcrum must be shifted to the expression, "a representation of action that guides the volitional activity of the agent." Here again arises the problem of how a possibility directed to the future guides a current action. If the "representation" of which McCann talks is a definite propositional representation, as we have seen, it is impossible for this sort of representation to guide every detail of an action; on the other hand, his determination of "representation" is too obscure for us to come up with another reading of it. While both McCann and Heidegger justifiably reject the primary status of intention as a mental state, what McCann misses and Heidegger exactly captures is the idea that an indefinite but articulated possibility may guide an action, and that this guidance is not a causation between events but rather the self-development of indefinite possibility into definite details of particular actions.\(^{36}\)

For Heidegger, Dasein in ordinary behavior constantly commits itself to its possibilities. Because of this commitment, our current habitual behavior
appears as an intentional action; my hammering is an intentional action only for the sake of the indefinitely projected possibility of my building a house and/or other possibilities. The difference between the occurrence of an intentional action and the absence of it is neither the difference between the presence of the mental state of desire or intention that causes the action and the absence of it, nor the difference between the presence of the definite representation that guides an action and the absence of it. The difference rather depends on whether Dasein's commitment is articulated sufficiently to form an intentional action; an intentional action is not behavior with sufficient desire or volition, but behavior with enough reason to give intelligible interpretations of that behavior.

Consider the following two examples: I continue to sit on the bench with no specific purpose, and I rush to rescue someone in a fire. It is quite likely that both actions are intentional and are done with no prior intentions; yet, it would be natural to suppose that the second action is more intentional than the first one. What makes this difference is neither the presence of the mental state of an intention nor the presence of the definite representation of the action, but the extent of how the action is articulated. I, as a rescuer, could answer the question of why I did so like this: "I do not remember well how I went into action, but I knew I should rescue her, she is my daughter, and if she had not been my daughter, I would have hesitated...." In the case of the first action, I do not have such a detailed story about the reason for my action, except in some unusual situations—for example, I am a professional meditator. In our ordinary action we can tell the story about the reason for the action with no prior existence of the propositional content, and this story can retrospectively show how intentional the action was.

Third, the possibility of Dasein also forms the condition for Dasein's encountering itself. How do we know our active selves? Insofar as Heidegger rejects starting from the self-sufficient present states of consciousness, he no longer walks the path from self-certainty to the existence of the individual self. Our knowledge of ourselves comes only from the know-how of our current action and the way the reasons of our action are articulated and interpreted. If this is so, our self-knowledge straddles individuality and shared sociality; my supposedly idiosyncratic interpretation of my action might be only a stereotype of our community. This is why the self-knowledge of Dasein is termed "Durchsichtigkeit":

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The sight which is related primarily and on the whole to existence we call Durchsichtigkeit. We choose this term to designate ‘knowledge of the self’... so as to indicate that here it is not a matter of perceptually tracking down and inspecting a point called the ‘self,’ but rather one of seizing upon the full disclosedness of Being-in-the-world throughout all [hindurch-durch] the constitutive items.... In existing, entities sight [sichtet] ‘themselves’ only insofar as they have become transparent [durchsichtig] to themselves with equal primordiality in those items which are constitutive for their existence: their Being-amidst the world and their Being-with Others.\[37\]

In the face of the inextricability of individuality and shared sociality in our ordinary self-knowledge, Heidegger does not give up the concept of pure individuality, but he begins anew the search for an authentic encountering of our truly individual self. It would require another line of inquiry to discuss this search made in the second half of Being and Time.\[38\]

(3) The structure of Dasein, i.e. that it projects its possibilities toward the future, applies not only to the problem of the Being of equipment, but also in general to the problem of the Being of entities. So the ontological category of occurrentness is also explained by the ontological a priori:

The totality of relevancy is revealed as the categorial whole of a possibility of the nexus of the available. But even the ‘unity’ of the manifold occurrent, of Nature, can be discovered only if a possibility of it has been disclosed. Is it accidental that the question about the Being of Nature aims at the ‘conditions of its possibility’?\[39\]

From this point of view, the essential problem with which Kant is confronted is to make clear this ontological a priori of occurrent physical Nature. Heidegger's lecture on Kant immediately after the publication of Being and Time addresses this point in full. In this lecture, Heidegger interprets Kant's question “how are a priori synthetic judgments possible” as a question relative to the understanding of the Being of entities, and interprets the “categories” in Critique of Pure Reason as “what the occurrent in its occurrentness determines, ... what the Being of entities constitutes.”\[40\] However, according to Heidegger, Kant could not establish a foundation for this
ontological a priori as the conditions of possibilities. As I have suggested, Heidegger himself tries to establish a foundation by introducing the concept of projection.

This means that the ontological category of occurrenctness is also given a kind of contextuality for the sake of Dasein’s context-forming. Although philosophical theories depending on this category are criticized thoroughly in Being and Time, the Being of the occurrent has its legitimate ground in Dasein’s projection and in a way can be interpreted as the ontological a priori. Heidegger’s point is that Dasein’s encountering of the occurrent results from the transformation of an ontological a priori that forms the condition for the encountering of the available. We find this transformation in various places in Being and Time, and one of these shows how the ontological a priori functions in the natural view of modern mathematical physics:

What is decisive for its [=mathematical physics'] development... lies rather in the way in which Nature herself is mathematically projected. In this projection something constantly occurrent (matter) is uncovered beforehand, and the horizon is opened so that one may be guided by looking at those constitutive items in it which are quantitatively determinable (motion, force, location, and time)... In the mathematical projection of Nature, moreover, what is decisive is not primarily the mathematical as such; what is decisive is that this projection discloses something that is a priori.\textsuperscript{41}

To this extent, Robert Brandom, who considers the transformation from availableness to occurrentness to be “not one of decontextualization, but of recontextualization,”\textsuperscript{42} is right. According to Brandom, encountering something as occurrent is not ignoring its social significance, but socially responding to the significance for the correctness of assertions about it. However, I cannot readily believe that occurrentness is context-conforming Being on a par with availableness.

Brandom misses how occurrentness depends on the Being of the available: the assertion that constitutes occurrentness maintains itself on the basis of the practical contextuality of the available. To Brandom, assertion is socially produced as something available as equipment for publicly pointing out something. Then, if this product becomes indifferent to the practical
ends of the assertor and gains the autonomy of justification and inference, there appears the autonomy of the properties of the occurrent. The question is: Is the assertion still a piece of equipment at this stage? If it is so, occurrentness is a subclass of availableness, which seems incompatible with Heidegger's claim about occurrentness. Brandom, obviously, denies that assertion is equipment. But he cautiously suggests the relationship between occurrentness and Dasein's practice:

The only way in which the present-at-hand can affect Dasein's projects is by being the subject of an assertion which ultimately plays some role in practical inference. It is not that the present-at-hand is irrelevant to non-assertional practice, it is that its relevance is indirect.\(^{43}\)

Is this the only way occurrentness is related to Dasein's practice, and therefore to the practical contextuality of the available? I disagree. If the understanding of an assertion implies the ascription of a belief to the person who asserts it, this very activity of ascription needs the practical contextuality of the available.

Consider the case in which I understand your objective assertion "The cat is on the roof" and ascribe the corresponding belief to you. This means that on hearing this I will have certain responses, such as: given my knowledge of your catphobia, I will be astonished at your climbing onto the roof, I will not expect you to say "The cat is not on the roof," and so on. Without referring to this repertoire of my possible responses, it would be impossible to identify my belief-ascription; there is no definite content in our minds with which we can identify my belief-ascription, insofar as we deny the idea that in understanding of the words of others shared ideal representations come into our minds. The way this repertoire makes my belief-ascription possible is holistic in the same way as the nexus of the available makes a piece of equipment possible; my belief-ascription is made possible by the constitution of a context in which the ascription is located. The context of the ascription only functions if I give up my enumerating a definite set of criteria for judging which responses are sufficient for the ascription. For the relationship between the ascription and the repertoire is not inferential; the repertoire does not support the ascription in the form of propositional contents, such as: "I will be astonished at your climbing onto the roof and I will have other responses, therefore, I ascribe the belief 'the cat is on the roof' to you."
The ascription, rather, is given its relevant position within the context through my actual and possible comportment: for example, by looking at the cat on the roof, I simply endorse and provide the context of the ascription.

Thus, if we recognize the role of the contextuality of the available in assertion and its understanding, we truly understand what Heidegger means when he states: "Assertion is not a free-floating kind of behavior which, in its own right, might be capable of disclosing entities in general in a primary way: on the contrary, it always maintains itself on the basis of Being-in-the-world." Insofar as we focus on the contextuality that defines the Being of the available, the contextuality of the occurrent is not a genuine one, but is only borrowed from the practical contextuality of the available.

Brandom not only misses the connection between occurrentness and availableness, but he also ignores the fact that context-annihilation constitutes an essential feature of the occurrent. Heidegger repeatedly relates occurrentness to the annihilation of relevancy. On the "as" structure of assertion he writes:

The as-structure of interpretation has undergone a modification. In its function of appropriating what is understood, the 'as' no longer reaches out into a totality of relevancy. As regards its possibilities for articulating reference-relations, it has been cut off from that significance which, as such, constitutes environmentality. How could we interpret this claim? Brandom certainly admits the possible reading that the occurrent could become entirely irrelevant to practical concerns. But, according to him, this pure occurrentness is only a "philosopher's misunderstanding of the significance of the category of presence-at-hand, and a bad idea." Brandom's general idea is that the annihilation of contextuality sometimes occurs only on the level of philosophical theories, and that, specifically in the practice of natural scientists, we have a different kind of contextuality than that of relevancy concerning the occurrent.

These ideas not only ignore the decisive role of the contextuality of the available, as I have suggested, but they are also unable to do justice to the fact that Heidegger sees the annihilation of contextuality as a fundamental tendency of Dasein. Is it possible to separate this tendency from our contextualized activities concerning both the available and the occurrent? Heidegger's answer seems negative. Pointing out the derivative character
of the truth of assertion, he explains the existential origin of the annihilation:

Yet that which is last in the order of the way things are connected in their foundations existentially and ontologically [= the truth of assertion], is regarded ontically and factically as that which is first and closest to us. The necessity of this Fact, however, is based in turn upon the kind of Being which Dasein itself possesses. Dasein, in its concernful absorption, understands itself in terms of what it encounters within-the-world. 47)

How could we reconcile the seemingly conflicting claims in Heidegger's texts? On the one hand, he accepts that the occurrent only shows up for our contextualized activities, but, on the other hand, he finds that the annihilation of contextuality is ineradicable in our theoretical attitudes. My reading of the texts runs as follows: Dasein encounters the occurrent through the social activity of assertion and its understanding——to this extent I agree with Brandom——which is regulated by the norms of justification; this activity borrows contextuality from the available, and constitutes quasi-contextuality with restricted modes of intelligibility and orientation; the quasi-contextuality contains the annihilation of contextuality as the self-interpretation, i.e. it is independent of other factors than its restricted intelligibility and orientation. The quasi-contextuality and this self-interpretation are both essential to occurrentness.

For example, natural sciences presuppose the contextuality of the available as the scientific skills shared among contemporary scientists,48) and, based on this contextuality, they constitute their quasi-contextuality along with their own normativity.49) Then, they necessarily interpret themselves exclusively in terms of the norms and ontological concepts that they have constituted within the quasi-contextuality, because this self-interpretation is a necessary condition for them to keep their directions already constituted; otherwise they could not continue their activities in a stable way. This self-interpretation, in turn, might well affect the way the contextuality of the available works for occurrentness; the shared skills never develop themselves into their elaborate forms without the guidance of this self-interpretation. Yet, this effect does not occur in the form of practical inference as is expected by Brandom, but it implicitly and unconsciously pervades the skills in each era.
If the self-interpretation forms an essential part of occurrenctness, and its relation to our appropriation of contextuality determines our current understanding of Being, then Heidegger’s ontology has to grapple with the problem of how this self-interpretation plays its role in this relationship. We could not develop this problem without recourse to the history of this self-interpretation. For this self-interpretation has had no unique form, but it has shown itself only through the various ontological claims in the history of philosophy and scientific theories, whether these claims be explicit or not. This is a crucial reason why, in early Heidegger, ontology “destroys the history of ontology,” and, in later Heidegger, the history of Being becomes a serious issue.

Thus, occurrentness depends on our everyday activity in two ways: first, it borrows its contextuality from practical contextuality, and secondly, its self-interpretation is, as is clear from the quotation above, motivated by Dasein’s concernful absorption in intraworldly entities, i.e. the occurrent and the available. On the second point, we have to briefly answer the following question: Why does Dasein’s absorption motivate the self-interpretation of occurrentness?

Heidegger gives a clear answer in Being and Time: because of its absorption, Dasein fails to thematically understand the Being of Dasein that is context-forming, and through this failure, it loses sight of contextuality in general. He notes, “Dasein has a tendency to understand its own Being in terms of that entity towards which it comportes itself proximally and in a way which is essentially constant—in terms of the ‘world’,” and further, “if one fails to see being-in-the-world as a makeup of Dasein, the phenomenon of worldhood [=contextuality] likewise gets passed over.” But in his later works, he seems to give a deeper explanation of this fact. He no longer ascribes the responsibility for the annihilation of contextuality to the absorption of Dasein, but to the essence of Being itself, which makes possible the showing up of entities by concealing itself:

The withdrawal, in which form Being itself occurs essentially, does not rob the entity of Being. Nonetheless the entity, precisely and only when it is an entity, stands in the withdrawal of Being itself. We might say that the entity is abandoned by Being itself.... The abandonment by Being of the entity as such takes place. When does it happen?... Since the entity came into the unconcealed as the entity itself.
Heidegger on the Ontological A Priori

Does not this move revise the idea of the ontological a priori, an idea that depends on the structure of Dasein's projection? Indeed, the change in Heidegger's ontology, which is supposed to have happened in the 1930s, is closely tied to the change in the evaluation of the ontological a priori. Heidegger reinterprets the ontological a priori as the logic of western metaphysics that has forgotten Being itself. If this is so, it is only by accepting the idea of the ontological a priori seriously that we can take a step forward in interpreting the enigmatic words about Being in Heidegger's later works.

Notes
1) The original version of this paper was read under the title of "Kant and Heidegger on the Ontological A Priori" at the American/Japanese Phenomenology Conference that was held at the University of Tokyo Komaba in the fall of 1992. I rewrote this version completely during my stay at the Dep. of Philosophy of UC Berkeley from 1998 to 1999. I would like to thank Prof. Hubert Dreyfus for his helpful comments.

2) The term "context-forming" corresponds to Heidegger's term "weltbildend" in his lecture in the years of 1929/30. See Martin Heidegger, Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik Welt-Endlichkeit-Einsamkeit, Gesamtausgabe Bd. 29/30 (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983), sec. 42 et passim.


5) KdrV, A94/B126 (p. 126).
6) KdrV, A24 (p. 68).
7) Ibid.
8) KdrV, A89 (p. 124).
9) KdrV, A93f. (pp. 126-27).
10) KdrV, A104f. (pp. 134-35).
11) KdrV, A106 (pp. 135-36).

13) SZ, p. 47 (p. 59).
14) SZ, p. 42 (pp. 54–55).
15) Ibid.
16) In the following, I will use the term “causal” not in the broad meaning of *aitia*, but in the ordinary meaning of causal relationship, of which the sequential order of time between events constitutes a necessary part. As the reader will see, it is one of Heidegger’s main concerns to liberate us from a traditional approach to human beings, an approach to deal with the problems concerning human action within the latter causal framework.
18) SZ, p. 112. (p. 115).
21) SZ, p. 113 (p. 117).
22) SZ, p. 114 (p. 117).
23) SZ, p. 114.
24) In the text of *Being and Time*, “signify” (be-deuten) is another term for “context-form,” as is clear from the following: “In its familiarity with these relationships [= the nexus of equipment], Dasein ‘signifies’ to itself: in a primordial manner it gives itself both its Being and its potentiality-for-Being as something which it is to understand with regard to its Being-in-the-world.” SZ, p. 116 (p. 120).
26) SZ, p. 193 (p. 185).
27) SZ, p. 196 (p. 187).
28) Martin Heidegger, *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, Gesamtausgabe Bd. 24 (Frankfurt : Vittorio Klostermann, 1975), pp. 462–463; *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* translated by A. Hofstadter (Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 1988), p. 325. There is a subtle difference between the concept of projection in *Being and Time* and that in *The Basic Problems*. In the former, the projection is directed to the indefinite future, while in the latter the projection is directed to temporality in general.

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30) SZ, p. 16 (p. 32).
31) This does not make unnecessary the task of integrating the other two structures of Care into the picture depicted here. For example, we could not understand the self-interpretation intrinsic to occurrentness without considering the structure of falling. See my discussion of occurrentness near the end of this paper.
32) SZ, p. 213–214 (p. 203).
33) The first to notice this problem was Donald Davidson, who had been a strong advocate of the desire-belief model. See “Intending” in Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980). For one of the most eminent discussions on this problem, see Bratman, Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason, Ch. 2, Ch. 3.
35) Ibid., p. 145.
36) Dreyfus seems to call this kind of guidance “governing causality.” Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I, p. 191. Insofar as this concept of guidance explains the intentionality of intentional action in a non-causalist way, Dreyfus’ terminology might hide this non-causalist aspect in Heidegger’s action theory.
37) SZ, p. 195 (pp. 186–187).
38) The questions should run as follows: How could we conceive of our ordinary individual self within the inextricability of individuality and shared sociality? If we already possess that conception in that case—and I think we possess it—why do we need the concept of authenticity besides?
39) SZ, p. 192 (p. 184).
40) Heidegger, Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p. 295; Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, translated by P. Emad and K. Maly, p. 201. See Martin Heidegger, Die Frage nach dem Ding, Gesamtausgabe Bd. 41 (Frankfurt : Vittorio Klostermann, 1984), sec. 27. In this lecture Heidegger elaborates on “die Grundsätze” constituting the ontological a priori of things.
41) SZ, p. 479 (pp. 413–14).
43) Ibid., p. 61.
44) SZ, p. 208 (p. 199).
47) SZ, p. 298 (p. 268).
48) These skills work as a background together with the linguistic skills that I have noted. Dreyfus rightly argues that Heidegger shares the same idea with Thomas Kuhn in this point. See Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I*, p. 82.

49) Concerning this normativity, Heidegger says: “When the basic concepts of that understanding of Being [in the mathematical projection of Nature] by which we are guided have been worked out, the clues of its methods, the structure of its way of conceiving things, the possibility of truth and certainty which belongs to it, the ways in which things get grounded or proved, the mode it is binding for us, and the way it is communicated—all these will be determined.” SZ, pp. 479-480 (p. 414).

50) SZ, p. 27 (p. 41).

51) SZ, pp. 21-22 (p. 36).

52) SZ, p. 88 (p. 93).