The Vedānta Simile of “Pot-space” in the Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā and the Tarkajvālā

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The “pot-space” simile (ghaṭākāśaḍṛṣṭānta), a characteristic expression of Gaudapāda’s “non-duality” (advaita) thought, is well-known in Vedānta philosophy. In the Āgama-śāstra (ĀŚ), Gaudapāda utilized the “pot-space” simile to explain how non-duality produces duality without itself being affected.¹ There is another “pot-space” simile as critically introduced in Bhāviveka’s Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā (MHK), Chapter VIII, titled “Vedāntatattvaviniścaya”. Bhāviveka introduced the simile in the pūrvapakṣa, or “opponent’s proposition,” of this chapter and then criticized it in the uttarapakṣa, or “author’s proposition”.

The similarity and possible relationship between these two “pot-space” similes have been noticed by many scholars, including Walleser, Bhattacharya, Potter, Gokhale, Lindtner, Nakamura, and Qvarnström.² There still remain, however, several unsolved questions regarding the “pot-space” simile in the MHK. Is Bhāviveka’s description of the “pot-space” simile in the MHK faithful to that in the ĀŚ? If not, how exactly do they differ from each other? When Bhāviveka criticized the “pot-space” simile, did he have Gaudapāda in mind? Can we use Bhāviveka’s dates to date Gaudapāda? Why did Bhāviveka focus only on space (ākāśa) per se but not on the “pot-space” simile as a whole? What was his interpretative goal when he introduced and criticized the Vedānta simile of “pot-space”? The present paper aims to answer the above questions.³

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¹ For Gaudapāda, “advaita” (non-duality) means the identity of individual selves (jīva) and the Self (ātman = Brahman). The identity of jīva and ātman without distinction is praised (ĀŚ 3.13), and their distinction is not a real one (ĀŚ 3.14). The non-duality is the “supreme reality” (ĀŚ 3.18). Cf. Bhattacharya 1943, pp. 53–60.

² Walleser (1910, p. 18), followed by Bhattacharya (1943, pp. 50–53), was the first to point out the relationship between the ĀŚ and MHK: MHK 8.10 (8.9 in this paper) resembles ĀŚ 3.3; MHK 8.11, 8.12 (8.10, 8.11) resemble ĀŚ 3.6cd; and MHK 8.13 (8.12) is a verbatim quotation of ĀŚ 3.5. Therefore, Walleser, Bhattacharya, and Potter (1981, p. 103) affirmatively took Bhāviveka’s dates as the terminus ad quem of Gaudapāda’s dates. Lindtner (1985, p. 278) briefly discusses how Gaudapāda may have borrowed kārikās from Bhāviveka, an idea contrary to that of Walleser, Bhattacharya, and Potter. Qvarnström (1989, p. 109) opines that Bhāviveka drew on the ĀŚ in the MHK. Gokhale (1958, p. 174) and Nakamura (1989, p. 319) mention similarities between the MHK and ĀŚ, but say nothing about their relationship.

³ Since it is difficult to understand the MHK without its commentary Tarkajvālā (TJ), in this paper, I refer to the TJ to help to collate, translate and understand the kārikās of the MHK. Concerning the authorship of the TJ, see Gokhale & Bahlukar 1985; Emda 1990; Saito 2005.
The Vedānta Simile of “Pot-space” as Referred to by Bhāviveka in the Pūrvapakṣa

In Chapter VIII of the MHK, 102 kārikās are found in the only available Sanskrit manuscript (19a1–21a6) and 95 verses in Tibetan. Among the 16 kārikās of the pūrvapakṣa, the following four (MHK 8.9–12) concern the “pot-space” simile.

1.1 Kārikā 8.9 in the MHK

MHK 8.9 appears to aim at answering such a question as given in the introductory part of the TJ ad 8.9:

If someone (Buddhists or others) asks: “If the Person (puruṣa) is omnipresent and one, from whom the bodies (deha) of the various destinations (gati), such as [those of] gods and men, are produced, then, just like embodied beings (dehin), how does [the Person] not have the nature of transience and non-omnipresence?” To this [question] an answer should be given. In order to answer that, it was said [verse 8.9].

gal te 'ba' zhig 'di skad du / gang skyes bu ni thams cad du khyab pa (PNG ins. //) gcig nyid yin la / (PNG om. //) de las lha dang mi la sogs pa 'gro ba rnam pa sna tshogs kyi lus rnam 'byung bar 'gyur ba yin na / ji ltar lus can bzhin du mi rtag pa dang / thams cad du ma khyab pa'i ngo mor mi 'gyur zhe na / de la lan gdab par bya ba'i phyir smras pa / (D Dza253a4–5, P Dza 285a7–8).

This passage means that just as the embodied beings, which produce their bodies, are transient and non-omnipresent, so the Person producing the bodies of gods, men and so on should share the same nature as them. It rejects the Vedānta view of the Self that is defined as being omnipresent and one.

Vedāntavādins answered the question in MHK 8.9:

“When a pot (ghata) is produced or destroyed, space (ākāśa) does not have that nature of the [pot]. When bodies, etc., are born or die, the Self (atman) is not considered to have that nature of the [bodies, etc.]” (MHK 8.9).

ghaṭotpattau vināśe vā nākāśasya tadātmā /

tadātmatātmano 'piṣṭā na dehādyudayavyayeō // (MHK 8.9) ⁶

bum pa 'byung zhiṅ 'jig pa ltar // nam mkha' de yi bdag nyid min //

lus can 'byung zhiṅ 'jig pa ltar // de bdag yin pas bdag mi 'dod //

(D 253a5, P 285a8-b1).

The TJ explains the MHK 8.9 as follows:

For example, when a pot, vessel, etc., is produced or destroyed, space does not come

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⁵ Both Sanskrit and Tibetan verses are counted according to the critical edition that I have collated. The numbering is a little different from Nakamura’s and Qvarnström’s editions. I have collated the Tibetan translation of the MHK by utilizing five bsTan ‘gyur editions, namely, the versions in the sDe dge, Co ne, Peking, sNar thang and Golden editions. See He 2011, pp. 329–398.
⁶ō = GV, Q, L; Ms, SG ⁶‘vyayam. Tib. reads *dehādy- instead of dehādy-.
to obtain the nature of the pot, [vessel, etc.]. Likewise, even when the Person (puruṣa) experiences the origination and destruction of all different kinds of embodied beings (dehin), [the Person] does not come to obtain the nature of embodied beings (dehin).

It is worth paying attention to the difference of Tibetan “lus” and “lus can” found in the MHK and TJ respectively. In MHK 8.9, Sanskrit “deha” is translated by “lus can” and not by the usual “lus”. On the other hand, “lus can” is used in the TJ ad 8.9. Generally speaking, “lus can” is usually a rendition of “dehin,” and “lus” is “deha”. “Deha” means “body,” while “dehin” denotes “possessing body,” “embodied (living) being,” or “soul enveloped in the body”. In the ĀŚ, Gauḍapāda only once used “deha” and never “dehin,” while he seems to have preferred to use the term “saṅghāṭa” to denote a body or the like. In the MHK and TJ in question, “lus can” has the same nature as “lus,” which is transience and non-omnipresence. For this reason, “lus can” should be understood as “an embodied being” or “a living being”.

It is clear, therefore, in MHK 8.9, space is likened to the Self (ātman = Person, puruṣa), whereas bodies (living beings) are likened to pots, no individual self (jīva) of Vedānta is mentioned. The nature of space is different from the nature of pots, so space is not produced or destroyed as is the pots. Similarly, the nature of the Self is different from the nature of bodies, so the Self is not produced, destroyed, or even changed as bodies are. In other words, the Self has the nature of eternal and omnipresent.

By demonstrating different natures between space and pots, Vedāntavādins clearly distinguish the Self from bodies. Consequently, Buddhists cannot add the attributes of bodies, such as non-eternality and non-omnipresence, to the Self. Vedāntavādins thus defend the Vedānta’s theory of ātman in MHK 8.9.

The above “pot-space” simile is similar to that in the ĀŚ 3.3–4:

“The Self (ātman) arises in the forms of individual selves (jīva), just as the space (ākāśa) arises in the forms of space in pots (ghaṭākāśa); and [the Self arises by its illusion (māyā)] in the forms of conglomerates (bodies), just like pots etc. This is the illustration of origination” (ĀŚ 3.3).

“Just as when the pots, etc., are destroyed the space in pots (ghaṭākāśa) etc., are com-

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7 The only “deha” appears in ĀŚ 1.2: “Viśva is in the front of the right eye, within the mind is Taijasa, while Prājña is in the sky in the heart. Thus he remains in the body in three ways.” daksināksīnāke viśvo manasy antas tu taijaśaḥ / ākāśe ca hydy prājñāṣ prīdī dehe vyavasthitah // (See Bhattacharya 1943, p. 1). The term “saṅghāṭa” can be found in ĀŚ 3.3 (see below) and 3.10. ĀŚ 3.10: “All conglomerations are like dream being projected by the illusion of ātman. As regards their superiority or the equality of all of them there is no ground.” saṅghāṭāḥ svapnavat sarve ātmanāyaśvisarjitāḥ / ādhikye sarvasāmye vā nopapattir hi vidyate // (See Bhattacharya 1943, p. 54).
Huanhuan

pletely merged into space (ākāśa), so are the individual selves [completely merged] into this very Self. [This is the illustration of extinction]” (ĀŚ 3.4).

ātmā hy ākāśavaj jīvair ghaṭākāśaśair ivoditaḥ /
ghaṭādivac ca saṅghātair jātāv etan nidarśanam // (ĀŚ 3.3)
ghaṭādiṣa pralīnesu ghaṭākāśādanyayathā /
ākāśe sampraliyante tadvaj jīvā iḥātmani // (ĀŚ 3.4)

In short, space is likened to the Self, space in pots is likened to individual selves, and bodies are likened to pots; this is a complete “pot-space” simile in ĀŚ 3.3–4. From the relationship of these three, i.e., space, space in pots and pots, the basic relationship between the Self (ātman), individual selves (jīva) and conglomerates (bodies, saṅghāta) in the ĀŚ can be easily understood.

It is noteworthy that ĀŚ 3.9 can be regarded as a supplement of the “pot-space” simile in ĀŚ 3.3–4, which is also similar to MHK 8.9. ĀŚ 3.9 reads:

“In death and in birth, in moving forward and backward, (ātman) in all bodies exists just like space.”

marāṇe sambhave caiva gatyāgamanayor api /
sthitah sarvasārīresu ākāśenāvīlakṣanāḥ // (ĀŚ 3.9)

As a result, the “pot-space” similes in the MHK and ĀŚ parallel each other. They both make analogies of space and pots with ātman and bodies, while explaining the process of origination and extinction. In spite of the similarity, however, the difference between them is obvious and important, especially with regards to the meaning and purpose of the “pot-space” similes.

The “pot-space” simile in the ĀŚ is purported to explain origination and extinction, by focusing on the special relationship between the ātman and jīva. In origination, the ātman arises in the form of jīva, while in extinction the jīva is completely merged into the ātman, just like the origination and extinction of the space in pot from the space per se. This kind of relationship between individual selves (jīva) and the Self (ātman) is called “non-duality” (advaita). ĀŚ 3.3–4 show Gauḍāpāda’s main points regarding the non-duality theory, and Śaṅkara (c.700–750) had the same ideas in mind when he employed this simile.8

The “pot-space” simile in MHK 8.9, because of lacking the “space in pot” (ghaṭākāśa), strictly speaking, is not a complete “pot-space” simile. The space in pot is supplied by the kārikās that follow. Furthermore, MHK 8.9 focuses on the different natures between the Self and bodies, but not on the relationship between the Self and bodies, nor on the Self and individual selves, as in the ĀŚ. Namely, the different natures of space and pots are likened to the differences that exist between the Self and bodies. Therefore, this simile aims to demonstrate that the Self, unlike bodies, can possess attributes such as eternity, omnipresence, oneness and so forth.

8 For Śaṅkara’s understanding of the “pot-space” simile, see Potter 1981, p. 83.
The Vedānta Simile of “Pot-space” in the Madhyamakahrdayakārikā and the Tarkajvālā

Therefore, the two “pot-space” similes in MHK 8.9 and ĀŚ 3.3–4 are quite different for they serve different interpretative standpoints and goals.

1.2 Kārikās 8.10, 8.11 in the MHK

MHK 8.10 reads:

“If [an objection is raised that] the one [i.e., the Self] is diverse, like the space in pots, [we reply that] when the pot is broken, all [the space in pots] are regarded as one and the same, because there is no difference” (MHK 8.10).

ghaṭākāśavad ekaśya nānātvam ād abhedataḥ /
ghaṭabhedena caikatvam śāmyaḥ sarvasya saṃmatam / (MHK 8.10) 9

bum pa’i nam mkha’ bzhin du gcig // du ma’o zhe na bum pa dag //
chag (PK, NK, GK chags) na dbye (DC dbyer) med gcig nyid du // thams cad mnyam (PK, NK, GK nyams) par ’gyur bar ’dod // (D 253a7, P 285b3)

The TJ comments as follows:

If it is said “Though, for you, space is one, it becomes diverse because of pots’ difference [in size], big or small, etc. Similarly, the Self is also like that.” [Answer:] “That is untenable. Space in all pots has no difference. As the space in one pot which is being broken and that in another pot which has already been broken have no difference. So is the space in all pots. In the same way, the Self has also no difference in all embodied beings. Therefore, despite different bodies, the Self exists equally in all; consequently, the pot-space simile is not unestablished.”

gang khyod kyi nam mkha’ geig nyid yin yang bum pa che chung la sogs pa’i dbye bas tha dad pa nyid du ’gyur ba ltar bdag kyang de dang ’dra’o zhe na / de ni mi rigs te / bum pa thams cad kyi nam mkha’ la khyad par med pa nyid yin te / bum pa geig chag par gyur pa’i nam mkha’ dag / (PNG om. /) bum pa gzhan chag pa’i nam mkha’ khyad par med pa de bzhin du bum pa thams cad kyi nam mkha’ ying yin la / de bzhin du bdag kyang lus can thams cad la khyad par med pa yin pas lus tha dad na yang bdag ni thams cad la mnyam par yod pa’i phyir bum pa’i nam mkha’ dpe ma grub pa ma yin no // (D 253a7-b2, P 285b3–6).

According to the TJ, the first half of MHK 8.10 is a question posed by Buddhists: when space is divided into separate parts in accordance with the different shapes of pots, space then inevitably acquires the diversity. Therefore, the “pot-space” simile does not demonstrate the oneness of the Self, but rather the diversity of the Self.

Then, Vedāntavādins respond to this question in the second half of MHK 8.10: the space in one pot which has already been broken and that in another pot which is being broken are not different from each other, because no distinction exists within the space in all pots. In

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9 ॐ = GV, Q, L; Ms, SG dehabhedataḥ. ॐ = GV, Q, L; Ms, SG caikasya. ॐ = Q, L; Ms, SG, GV = śāmyaḥ. ॐ Cf. Tib.; Ms janmatam; SG, GV janmavat; Q, L yan matam.
the same way, the Self does not exist differently in all bodies, and in spite of the multiplicity of bodies, the Self is one in all of them. In this way, it seems that Vedāntavādins defend the validity of the “pot-space” simile.

In MHK 8.11, Bhāviveka’s attention shifts from the pot-space to the material cause of the pot, namely, clay, so we can call it the “pot-clay” simile:

“Although pots, etc., may be different, the clay is not differentiated. Similarly, although the bodies, etc., may be different, there is no difference in the Self” (MHK 8.11).

yathā ghaṭā dibhede ‘pi mṛdhedo nāsti kaś cana /
tathaiva dehabhede ‘pi nātmabheda ‘sti kaś cana // (MHK 8.11) 10
ji ltar bum sogs tha dad kyang // sa la tha dad ‘ga’ yang med //
de bzhin lus ni tha dad kyang // bdağ la tha dad ‘ga’ yang med // (D 253b2–3, P 285b6–7)
TJ ad 8.11 explained the kārikā as follows:

“Although different substances such as pots, jars and so on exist, there is no difference at all in their cause (clay). Likewise, although the difference of the bodies of deities, etc., exists, there is no difference at all in the Self.”

ji ltar bum pa dang kham phor la sogs pa rdzas tha dad du yod du zin kyang / de’i rgyur gyur pas (pa?) yin pa la dbyae ba ‘ga’ yang med pa de bzhin du lha la sogs pa’i lus kyi dbyae ba yod du zin kyang / (PNG om. /) bdağ la ni dbyae ba ‘ga’ yang med do //
(D 253b3–4, P 285b7–8).

It can be found that MHK 8.10–11 bear a similarity to k.3.6 in the Ā Ś:

“Shapes, functions, and names differ here and there, but there is no difference in space, similar is the conclusion with regard to individual selves.”11 (ĀŚ 3.6)

rūpakāryasamākhyāś ca bhidyante tatra tatra vai /
ākāśasya na bhedo ‘sti tadvaj jīveṣu niṁṇayaḥ // (ĀŚ 3.6)

Gaudapāda argues that individual selves (jīva) are as what in ĀŚ 3.6. He aims to preclude the over-interpretation of the different states of individual selves (ĀŚ 3.5, see below). Although bodies, analogous to pots, etc., are all different from one another in their shapes, etc., and individual selves can be in different states, individual selves, analogous to space in pots, are in fact not different in nature, since they are finally identified with the Self (ātman).

It is clear that the meaning of MHK 8.10 is similar to that of ĀŚ 3.6. However, their conclusions and interpretative goals differ. MHK 8.10 emphasizes the fact that the Self has the nature of oneness, whereas ĀŚ 3.6 points out that individual selves in various bodies are not differentiated.

10 The second half of the kārikā is missing in the manuscript. Gokhale reconstructed it from Tibetan. See Gokhale 1958, p. 175.
Both MHK 8.11 and ĀŚ 3.6 begin by demonstrating the differences in the shapes, functions, names of pots, etc., which are likened to the diversity of bodies, etc. However, the simile in MHK 8.11 differs from that in ĀŚ 3.6. The simile in MHK 8.11 should be called the “pot-clay” simile rather than the “pot-space” simile, since it is the clay, instead of space, that is likened to the Self in order to demonstrate the oneness of the Self. 12 ĀŚ 3.6 moves forward from the “pot-space” simile of ĀŚ 3.3–5 and confirms the non-difference of individual selves.

1.3  Kārikā 8.12 in the MHK

“When one space in pot has been obscured by dust, smoke, etc., it is not that all [space in pots] becomes similarly [affected]; likewise, the Self is not [affected] by pleasure, etc” (MHK 8.12).

TJ ad 8.12 explains the above kārikā in detail:

The faults of “the speakers of Self” (ātmavādin) that have been pointed out previously by Buddhists are: “If the Self (ātman) is omnipresent, all will also be happy when one becomes happy” and so on. In order to remove these, [Vedāntavādins] said: “Although space is omnipresent, it is not that space in all pots become covered when space in one pot becomes covered by dust, smoke, etc. And, not all [space in pots] are freed from covering [when space in] one [pot] is freed from covering. Likewise, here, when one Self becomes happy, not all [selves] become happy. And, when one becomes suffered, not all become suffered.”

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12 In the introductory part of TJ ad 8.11, it says that kārikā 8.11 is used “in order to prove the oneness of the Self by means of a different approach.” yang tshul gzhan gyis bdag gcig pa nyid du sgrub pa’i phyir / (D 253b2, P 285b6)

13 = SG, GV, Q, L; Ms sukhādair.
According to the TJ, therefore, MHK 8.12 means that because of the obstruction of the pot, space in other pots and space in general are not affected by the smoke, etc., in one pot. Similarly, even if the Self of Vedānta has the attributes of oneness and omnipresence, when one person is happy, others need not be happy at the same time. In other words, the attributes of the Self, such as omnipresence, oneness, and so forth, are reasonable and bring no harm to living beings in the world.

The above kārikā bears a close resemblance to in the ĀŚ 3.5:

“Just as when one space in pot becomes filled with dust, smoke, etc., it is not that every [space in pots] become filled with [them]; so are the individual selves with pleasure etc” (ĀŚ 3.5).

yathaikesmin ghatākāśe rajadhūnādibhir yute / na sarve samprayujyante tad vaj jīvāḥ sukhādibhiḥ. (ĀŚ 3.5)

ĀŚ 3.5 argues against a potential objection that opponents of Vedānta may raise. If individual selves and the Self are “advaita” (non-dual), then all individual selves are identical. Consequently, when one person feels happy, all other persons should also be happy at the same time. This is untenable. By introducing “dust, smoke, and so forth” into the “pot-space” simile, this problem can be smoothly solved. The dust, smoke, etc., in one pot should not affect the space in other pots. Likewise, the feelings such as happiness of one person should not affect other persons.14

MHK 8.12 and ĀŚ 3.5 appear to be similar to each other. The first pādas of the two kārikās are almost literally identical. The “pot-space” simile in k.3.5 in the ĀŚ, however, must be understood against the background of the idea of non-duality theory of ātman and jīvas, while the “pot-space” simile in MHK 8.12 does not concern the non-duality thought, even no mention of jīva. For this reason, contrary to the understanding of Walleser, Bhattacharya, and Potter, among others,15 one should not consider the “pot-space” similes in MHK 8.12 and ĀŚ 3.5 to be identical.

1.4

In summary, use of the “pot-space” simile in MHK 8.9 is close to that in ĀŚ 3.3–4, but the two similes differ from each other in that the focus of the former is space per se, while the focus of the latter is the relationship between space per se and space in pots. The interpretative aim of the former is to distinguish the Self from bodies, viz., to prove that nature (or attributes) of the Self, such as oneness and omnipresence, are plausible, while the latter expands on how

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14 See ĀŚ 3.18: “The supreme reality is non-duality, and duality is said to be of it a particular state or effect of it, while according to them (i.e., dualists) there is duality in both ways. Therefore it does not conflict.”

advaitam paramārtho hi dvaitam tad bheda ucye / teṣām ubhayatā dvaitam tenāyaṁ na virudhyate // (see Bhattacharya 1943, pp. 59–60).

15 See footnote 2.
The Vedānta Simile of “Pot-space” in the *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* and the *Tarkajvālā*

the Self and individual selves are in non-duality.

Although both MHK 8.10 and ĀŠ 3.6 argue that bodies, etc., are different, with individual selves being the same, these two kārikās are fundamentally different in that the latter takes non-duality thought into consideration, while the former does not.

The wording of MHK 8.11 and ĀŚ 3.6 is similar, but their difference is also important: the former emphasizes the oneness of the Self, whereas the latter highlights the non-difference of individual selves.

MHK 8.12 and ĀŚ 3.5 are almost identical to each other in their wording. However, MHK 8.12 aims to demonstrate that the attributes of the Self, such as oneness and omnipresence, are not incompatible with multiple individual selves. ĀŚ 3.5, on the other hand, aims to explain how individual selves, which originate from the Self, each can possess their own attributes without any logical contradiction.

ĀŚ 3.7 is another kārikā concerned with the “pot-space” simile: “As the space in pot is neither a transformation nor part of the space, so is always a jīva neither a transformation nor a part of ātman.”

We do not find any similar expressions in the MHK.

2 Bhāviveka’s Critique of the Vedānta Simile of “Pot-space”

In the *uttarapakṣa* of the MHK, Chapter VIII, Bhāviveka employs five kārikās (MHK 8.63–67) to criticize the so-called “pot-space” simile. Reading the *uttarapakṣa* in conjunction with the *pūrvapakṣa*, we can better understand the “pot-space” simile from the Buddhist point of view.

2.1
The “pot-space” simile is proposed by Vedāntavādins again in the *uttarapakṣa* to defend the validity of their ātman theory. TJ ad 8.63ab reads:

> “Even if we assumed that ātman is one [and] without any particularity, such as supporting elements, etc., and the ignorant, etc., there is no invalidation (of our thesis), just as I explained in the pot-space simile which is accepted by both sides.”

> gal te ’byung ba (DC om. ba) la sogs pa’i rten nyid dang / byis pa la sogs pa’i khyad par med pa gcig pa nyid du bdag gis btags su zin kyang gnod pa ni ci yang med de / ji ltar bdag gis phyogs gnyi ga la grags pa’i bum pa’i nam mkha’ dper bstan pa yin (PNG bzhi) no zhe na / (D 264b6–7, P 298b7–8).

By using the “pot-space” simile, which is said to be accepted by both Vedānta and Buddhism, Vedāntavādins try to defend their ātman theory. Bhāviveka, however, challenges the validity of the so-called “pot-space” simile in MHK 8.63:

> “No. [Your assertion is unreasonable.] According to the pot-space simile, the [oneness] is not possible for everything. Because the oneness of space is not even established by

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16 ĀŚ 3.7: nākāsasya ghatākāśo vikārāvayavaḥ yathā / naivātmanah sadā jīvo vikārāvayavaḥ tathā // (see Bhattacharyya 1943, p. 53).
Bhāviveka holds a view opposite to that of Vaiśeṣika. He does not acknowledge that the “pot-space” simile is accepted by both sides, and considers the “pot-space” simile inappropriate for the ātman theory of Vaiśeṣika. Furthermore, it is clear that what Bhāviveka is paying attention to is not the “pot-space” simile as a whole, but only space per se. That “the oneness of space is not established” is Bhāviveka’s argument against the Vaiśeṣika theory of ātman.

In Bhāviveka’s opinion, Vaiśeṣika’s definition of space is erroneous. In regard to space, Vaiśeṣika holds: “[Space] with its own-nature, exists as a substance, and has become the substratum on which entities other than it depend.”¹⁸

Bhāviveka agrees with the Sautrāntika idea of space, mere the absence of obstructing substances is “space”. In other words, space does not exist with an intrinsic nature, and instead it depends on the existence of other entities. Space has the nature of non-existence. In the final analysis, therefore, space does not actually exist.

Vaiśeṣika refute this:

“If in that way space is totally non-existent, why has your teacher, the Buddha, taught that [space] is the substratum of wind? Does not the following passage occur? ‘O Gautama, on what does earth depend? O Brahmin, earth depends on water. On what does water depend? It depends on wind. On what does wind depend? Wind depends on space.’ From the same sutra, having ascertainment, it is taught: ‘O Gautama, on what does space depend? O Brahmin, now you are going too far! It is difficult to understand the limit of the question.’ If space is formless, invisible, and non-obstructing, [then] on what does it depend?”²⁰

gal te ‘di ltar nam mkha’ shin tu med pa zhig yin na / ci’i phyir khyod kyi (G kyi) ston

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¹⁷ = NH, Q, L; Ms, SG ghātākāśadrṣṭāntā; = NH, Q, L; Ms, SG ākāśa[...grato]. = NH, Q, L; Ms, SG siddham. = L, cf. Tib.; Ms, SG, Q bhāvatāpi; NH bhavato ’pi.
¹⁸ TJ ad 8.64: "According to the view of Sautrāntika, mere the absence of obstructing substances is ‘space’": mdo sde pa’i lha ba’i rjes su ‘brangs nas thogs pa dang bcas pa’i rdzas kyi dngos po med pa tsam nam mkha’o zhes... (D 265a2–3, P 299a2–3).
²⁰ QVARNSTRÖM reports that this unknown sutra-passage seems to recur frequently in the polemics between Buddhists and Vaiśeṣika philosophers. It is quoted in the Sphutārthāvākyā of Yaśomitra and alluded to in the Brahmāsūtrabhāṣya of Śāmkara, in the Ratnagotravibhāga, and in the Vākyapādiya of Bhartṛhari. See QVARNSTRÖM 1989, pp. 120–121.
The Vedānta Simile of “Pot-space” in the Madhyamakārakārikā and the Tarkajvalā

pa sangs rgyas kyi de rlun gi rten (PNG brten) yin par bstan (DC brten) / ji lta (PNG ci ltar) zhe na / gau ta ma sa ci la brten te (PNG ins.) / gnas zhes gsal pa dang / bram ze sa ni chu la brten (G rten) te gnas so // chu ci la brten chu ni rlun la brten (PNG rten) to // rlun ci la brten rlung ni nam mkha’ la brten to (PNG ins. //) zhes ‘byung ba ma yin nam zhe na / mdo de nyid las nges par byas nas bstan pa yin te / gau ta ma nam mkha’ ci la brten zhes gsal pa dang / bram ze shin tu ‘da’ bar byed de dris pa’i mtha’ rtags par nus par dka’o // nam mkha’ ni gzugs med pa / bstan du med pa / thogs pa med pa yin na de ci zhig la brten par ‘gyur / (TJ ad 8.64; D 265a7-b2, P 299a7-b3).

Bhāviveka answers:

“Depending on the ‘brightness’ (meaning of ākāśa’s verbal root kāś), it is designated as ‘space’, so space is formless, invisible, non-obstructing, and non-dependent. Therefore, space is indicated not to exist as a [real] substance. Since [space] is simply designated on the basis of brightness, it is simply a designation (prajñapti), and is conventionally true (samvrtisatyā). Therefore, the substance of so called ‘space’ does not exist at all.”

’on kyang snang ba la brten nas nam mkha’ zhes ’dogs par byed de / de’i phyir gzugs med pa / (G om. /) bstan du med pa / thogs pa med pa nyid dang / rten med pa nyid yin pa’i phyir nam mkha’ ni rdzas med pa nyid du bstan pa yin te / snang ba la brten nas btags pa nyid yin pas btags pa tsam nyid ni kun rdzob kyi bden pa yin no // des na nam mkha’ zhes bya ba’i rdzas ni cung zhig kyang yod pa ma yin no // (PNG om. //) (TJ ad 8.64; D 265b2–3, P 299b3–5).

Bhāviveka analyzes space in the framework of his “conventional truth” (samvṛtī-satya) theory. In Bhāviveka’s opinion, the “conventional truth” is designation in the world (lokavyavahāra), it does not contradict to the common knowledge or direct cognition in the word, such as saying “Devadatta is walking,” “Viśṇumitra is eating,” etc. are true in the world level.21 However, in the ultimate truth,22 neither constructed things (samskṛta) nor unconstructed things (asamskṛta) have real existence.23

As a result, even if space exists and has attributes such as oneness, omnipresence, and so forth, this kind of space can only exist on the conventional level as a kind of designation, and can never exist on the level of ultimate truth.

It is clear that the “pot-space” simile is not accepted by Bhāviveka. However, what is more important is that Bhāviveka and Vedāntavādins hold different views of space per se, the focal point of Bhāviveka’s attention in the uttarapakṣa.

21 See Prajñāpradīpa, 24 chapter (D Tsha 286a5–7).
22 For Bhāviveka’s understanding of “ultimate truth” (paramārtha), see Enma 1980, pp. 102–105; Saito 1999, pp. 66–81.
23 See Dà Shēng Zhōng zhěn lùn 大乘掌珍論: “From the ultimate truth (tattvatas), the constructed is empty, just like the illusion, because of producing by conditions. [From the ultimate truth,] the unconstructed is not real existent, [because of] no origination, just like the sky-flower,” “真相為有空，如幻緣生故，無為無有實，不起似空華” (T.30, No. 1578, p. 268).
Bhāviveka focuses on space per se and not on the “pot-space” simile in the following two kārikās:

“Space, therefore, is neither non-obstructing nor a provider of room. Even if the reason for the [existence of space] is given [by the opponent], the reason cannot be established. (MHK 8.65)

Nor is space regarded as an entity, since it does not have a [valid] reason. It does not, therefore, possess the nature of oneness [because of its non-existence], just as a son of a barren woman” (MHK 8.66).

Bhāviveka concludes that space in fact is dissimilar to the Self. Both are said by Vedāntavādins to be permanent, omnipresent, and possessing the nature of oneness. Hence, the conception of space in Vedānta is erroneous, not to mention their application of this untenable model to prove the existence and attributes of ātman.

2.3

In MHK 8.67, Bhāviveka analyzes the “pot-clay” simile, which appears in the pūrva-pákṣa:

“The clay in the shape of pots, etc., is one [and the same] since it belongs to the class of clay; [but] it is ever different in jars, etc., hence, the Self is not one” (MHK 8.67).

Although the clay of which different pots are made is the same, during the process of making pots the clay changes in various ways. If the Self is similar to clay in regard of

\[\text{\textsuperscript{24}}\] = NH, Q, L; Ms, SG nāvṛ[.].

\[\text{\textsuperscript{25}}\] = Q, L; Ms, SG, NH hetvanupādānākāśaṃ.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{26}}\] = NH, Q, L; Ms, SG ānatah.
producing others, then the Self also changes in various ways as the clay does. Such a kind of Self contradicts Vedānta’s definition of ātman.

Strictly speaking, in MHK 8.63–67 only k.8.67 deals with the pūrvapakṣa, namely, MHK 8.11. Kārikās 8.63–66 do not criticize the “pot-space” simile described in the pūrvapakṣa, nor that in the ĀŚ. Although these four kārikās do mention the “pot-space” simile, the real target of their argument is the Vedāntavādins’ view of space per se. In other words, Bhāviveka does not concern himself with the relationship between the Self and bodies, nor with the relationship between the Self and individual selves (jīvas).

3 Conclusion

Admittedly, the “pot-space” simile described in kk.8.9–12 in the pūrvapakṣa of the MHK bears some superficial similarity to the “pot-space” simile in kk.3.3–6 in the ĀŚ, as both contain the same figurative elements such as space, pot, Self, etc. The meaning and purpose of the two similes, however, are significantly different.

In MHK 8.9–12, the “pot-space” simile aims to prove the existence and unique attributes (nature) of the Self. In ĀŚ 3.3–6, the “pot-space” simile aims to explain how ātman and jīva can be in non-duality while producing duality without contradiction. Moreover, in the uttarapakṣa (MHK 8.63–67), Bhāviveka focuses his argument not on the “pot-space” simile, but only on space per se. He does not pay attention to the relationship between space per se and space in pots, etc., nor to the non-duality thought.

Furthermore, Bhāviveka’s real purpose in describing and criticizing the “pot-space” simile of Vedānta is to argue against the existence of space per se, that is to say, to argue against the existence of the Self proclaimed by Vedānta. He did not argue against Gauḍapāda’s non-duality theory. Bhāviveka’s focus on the existence of the Self is what Buddhists most concern themselves with, since it contradicts the basic teaching of the Buddha, namely, the non-existence of ātman.

As a corollary, the existence of the “pot-space” simile in the MHK cannot be used as a hard evidence for establishing the chronological relationship between the ĀŚ and the MHK. In other words, it is untenable to determine Gauḍapāda’s dates on the basis of Bhāviveka’s dates. 27

The negation of the existence of ātman is the fundamental Buddhist doctrine that differs from Vedānta. In Bhāviveka’s opinion, if the existence of ātman is negated, then all of ātman’s attributes and other related theories, such as the relationship between ātman and

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27 See footnote 2. In addition, Qvarnström points out that the Āryasatyadvayāvatāra-sūtra quoted in the Prasannapadā apparently already knew of the “pot-space” simile; cf. Qvarnström 1989, p. 109. However, the “pot-space” simile in the Āryasatyadvayāvatāra-sūtra is strictly not used in the same context as the “pot-space” simile in the ĀŚ. The simile in the former sūtra is adopted in order to point out that the space in a clay pot (mrdbhājana) is the same as the space in a bejeweled pot (ratnabhājana), which illustrates the absolute non-arising (atyantājati) of all dharmas. See Prasannapadā ad MMK XVIII.9 (La Vallée Poussin 1903–1913, pp. 374–375).
He, Huanhuan

*jīvas*, etc., can be repudiated because all these theories assume the existence of ātman. Therefore, although Bhāviveka describes in detail the “pot-space” simile in the *pūrvapakṣa* of the *MHK*, he argues only against the existence and attributes of space per se under the aegis of the “pot-space” simile.

The “pot-space” simile of Vedānta described and criticized in the *MHK* shows, on the one hand, Bhāviveka’s profound knowledge of Vedānta philosophy, a distinguishing characteristic that sets him apart from other Buddhist thinkers. On the other hand, it also illustrates that when describing, and especially criticizing other schools, Bhāviveka, like other Buddhist philosophers, deals only with the points that concern him most, but not as the theories originally stand.

**Abbreviations and Texts**

**ĀŚ** *Agamaśāstra*; see Bhattacharya 1943.

**C** *dBya ma’i snying po’i grel pa rTog ge ‘bar ba, Co ne bsTan ‘gyur,* scanned at Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center, New York City, 2003.

**CK** *dBya ma’i snying po’i tshig le’ur byas pa, Co ne bsTan ‘gyur,* scanned at Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center, New York City, 2003.

**D** *dBya ma’i snying po’i grel pa rTog ge ‘bar ba, sDe dge bsTan ‘gyur,* No. 3856, Delhi Karmapae Chodhey, Gyalwae Sungrab Partun Khang, 1985.

**DK** *dBya ma’i snying po’i tshig le’ur byas pa, sDe dge bsTan ‘gyur,* No. 3855, Delhi Karmapae Chodhey, Gyalwae Sungrab Partun Khang, 1985.

**G** *dBya ma’i snying po’i grel pa rTog ge ‘bar ba,* 《金寫＜丹珠爾＞影印本》，中國民族圖書館整理，天津古籍出版社，1988.

**GK** *dBya ma’i snying po’i tshig le’ur byas pa,* 《金寫＜丹珠爾＞影印本》，中國民族圖書館整理，天津古籍出版社，1988.

**GV** Gokhale’s edition of *MHK*; see Gokhale 1958.

**ins.** Insert(s).

**L** Lindtner’s edition of *MHK*; see Lindtner 2001.

**MHK** *Madhyamakahṛdayaḥakārikā*.

**MMK** *Mūlamadhyamakahārikā*.

**Ms** Manuscript; see Jiang 1991.

**N** *dBya ma’i snying po’i grel pa rTog ge ‘bar ba, sNar thang bsTan ‘gyur,* No. 3247, Library of Tibet House, New Delhi, scanned at Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center, New York City, 2003.

**NH** Nakamura’s edition of *MHK*; see Nakamura 1989.

**NK** *dBya ma’i snying po’i tshig le’ur byas pa, sNar thang bsTan ‘gyur,* No. 3246, Library of Tibet House, New Delhi, scanned at Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center, New York City, 2003.

**om.** Omitted.
The Vedānta Simile of “Pot-space” in the Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā and the Tarkajvālā


Q Qvarnström’s edition of MHK; see Qvarnström 1989.

SG Gokhale’s manuscript of MHK; see Bāhulkar 1994.

T 大正新修大藏經.

TJ Tarkajvālā.

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バーヴィヴェーカの初期不二一元論批判
—『中観心論』および『論理の炎』に見る「瓶空喩」をめぐって—

何 歴歴

「瓶空喩」（ghaṭākāśadrṣṭānta）は、初期ヴェーダーツパの学匠、ガウダバーダの「不二一元」（advaita）論を特徴づける譬例として知られている。『アーガマシャーツトラ』（Āgama-sāstra、別名『マーンドゥーキャヤ』）の中でガウダバーダは、「瓶空喩」を適用する際に、なぜゆえ「不二」のアートマンは、変化することなく「二」の個我（jīva）を生じるのかを論じる。一方で、これらはやや異なる意味合いをもつ「瓶空喩」がバーヴィヴェーカ（Bhāviveka）の『中観心論』 Madhyamakahrdayakārikā に見いだされる。すなわち、第八章の「ヴェーダーツパ〔派〕の真実の〔批判的〕確定」（Vedāntatattvaviniścaya）においてである。この章の前主張（pūrvapakṣa）で著者のバーヴィヴェーカは「瓶空喩」を紹介し、後主張（uttarapakṣa）中でその「瓶空喩」等に批判を加えている。

たかは、「ヴェーダーツパ〔派〕の真実の〔批判的〕確定」章の前主張の第 9–12 僧と『アーガマシャーツ トラ』第 3 章の第 3–6 僧には、いくつかの表面的な類似性がある。例えば、両書ともに「虚空」と「瓶」などの譬例的な要素を含んでいる。しかしながら、実際には二つの「瓶空喩」の意味と目的はかなり異なるのである。後主張の第 63–67 僧の中でバーヴィヴェーカは、ヴェーダーツパ派が説く意味での「瓶空喩」ではなく、むしろ「空虚（ākāśa）」のみに焦点を当てて批判している。彼は「虚空」（外の空）と「瓶空」（瓶の中の空）との関係に論述しないばかりでなく、ガウダバーダの「不二一元」論にも関心を示さないのである。

それゆえ、二つの「瓶空喩」にみる類似点と相違点をと比較考察することによって、未解決の興味深い問題が浮かび上がってくる。すなわち、バーヴィヴェーカが紹介する「瓶空喩」は「アーガマシャーツトラ」のそれに忠実に従うものであるか？忠実に従うものでないと仮して、両者は厳密にどのような点で異なるのか？バーヴィヴェーカが「瓶空喩」に批判を加えるとき、はたして彼はガウダバーダの思想を念頭に置いていたのであろうか？ なにゆえバーヴィヴェーカは「瓶空喩」全体ではなく、虚空（ākāśa）のみに焦点を当てたのか？ 彼がヴェーダーツパ派の「瓶空喩」を紹介し、批判した目的は何であったのか？ バーヴィヴェーカの年代（490–570 年）によって、ガウダバーダの生存年代を推定できるであろうか？ 等々の問題である。

本発表では、バーヴィヴェーカが初期のヴェーダーツパ思想を紹介・批判する具体的な方法とその背景を検証するために、『中観心論』とその注釈『論理の炎』の第 8 章の分析をとおして、以上のような関連する複数の問題を考察し、基本的な回答を提示したい。