Did Dharmakīrti Criticize Dignāga’s Assertion?:
On the Purpose of Stating vyatireka in the Pramāṇaviniścaya

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0 Introduction

As Katsura 2011 pointed out, the fact that Dharmakīrti’s (ca. 600–660)1 assertions are not consistent with Dignāga’s (ca. 480–530)2 no longer captures the attention of those presently involved in the study of Buddhist epistemology, in spite of the fact that Dharmakīrti is the legitimate successor of Dignāga. However, especially when Dharmakīrti tries to argue a position explicitly different from Dignāga’s, it is still interesting to examine this issue as well in that one can examine how Dharmakīrti builds on Dignāga’s theory. For example, Katsura points out in his article “Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on adarśanamātra and anupalabdhi” that Dharmakīrti, in order to avoid direct conflict with his predecessor Dignāga, does not refer to him when criticizing Īśvarasena’s (ca. 580–640)3 adarśanamātra theory,4 even though the theory can be traced back to Dignāga’s thought in chapter five of the Pramāṇasamuccayavṛti (henceforth, PSV).5

In this paper, I will take a similar approach and consider another instance of Dharmakīrti implicitly criticizing Dignāga’s PSV by attacking an argument that commentators attribute to

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1 Recently, Helmut Krasser has suggested that Dharmakīrti’s time of activity back into the middle of the sixth century, making him nearly contemporary with, or a little earlier than, Bhāviveka (ca. 490–570) (see Krasser 2011). I believe that more research is necessary into this issue, and until then I would like to continue to use the date established by Erich Frauwallner in this paper (cf. Frauwallner 1961: 137).
4 Īśvarasena, whose writings are completely lost besides several fragments found in Dharmakīrti’s and his successors’ texts, appears to have been a student of Dignāga and the teacher of Dharmakīrti (cf. Bu ston Chos ‘byung, 122aff. For the English translation, see Obermiller 1932: 152ff.). Ernst Steinkellner, based on the first chapter of Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika, its autocommentary Svavṛtti, Arcaṭa’s commentary on the Hetubindu as well as other materials, reconstructed Īśvarasena’s assertion that non-existence could be established by the third pramāṇa, i.e. adarśanamātra or mere non-perception (see Steinkellner 1966).
5 Dharmakīrti does not want to refute Dignāga’s theory directly even though his criticism is clearly of Dignāga’s thought. As Katsura 1992 (p. 228) says, “As a matter of fact, Dharmakīrti often tried to prove that he was the correct interpreter as well as the most legitimate successor of Dignāga, although his system of logic shows a clear departure from that of Dignāga. ... Dharmakīrti, I believe, implicitly criticized Dignāga’s whole system of logic.” Moreover, Dharmakīrti criticizes those who criticize Dignāga’s theory: paśavo ‘pi hi tāvad yad ayuktaṃ paśyanti, na tadāvā tadācaranti / so ‘yaṃ paśor api paśuḥ / mahato ‘pi mahīyarad yad avamanayata iti kim anyadanāmajñātāyāḥ / “In the first place (tāvā), even domesticated animals, for example (hi), do not approach [an object] when they perceive that it is not appropriate [object of their activity]. Thus this person (the opponent) is [just like] a domesticated animal [or even] more [foolish] than a domesticated animal. He (the opponent) criticizes the greatest [person] among great people (Dignāga), so is there any other thing [that] he (the opponent) does not know?” (PVin 1&2. p. 53,12–54,1)
In this case, the argument concerns the purpose of stating the third characteristic (vyatireka) of an inferential mark (hetu). Also, I would like to note that the subject of Dharmakīrti’s criticism cannot simply be traced back to Dignāga’s PSV (as in with the case of adarśanamātra theory), but rather it is the same as PSV.

Dharmakīrti, in the second chapter of his Pramāṇaviniścaya (henceforth, PVin), quotes and then proceeds to criticize an assertion regarding why one should mention vyatireka, i.e. the third characteristic of an inferential mark to establish the validity of a logical statement. Although Dharmakīrti does not mention whose statement he is quoting, Ernst Steinkellner has noted that the quotation is equivalent to a statement made by Dignāga in PSV. But then, if this assertion is actually equivalent to Dignāga’s statement in PSV, does this not mean that Dharmakīrti criticizes his predecessor Dignāga? It is conceivable that many commentators on PVin tried to give their answers to this apparently unfavorable situation in their passing comments on the identity of the opponent in this section. As Steinkellner has mentioned, some commentators refer to Īśvarasena as the opponent. Here we find Īśvarasena again.

Since Steinkellner’s work was published, a substantial amount of materials relating to pramāṇa-texts both in Sanskrit and Tibetan have become available to scholars, including commentaries on PVin. Thus, in this paper I would like to use these newly discovered commentaries especially in Tibetan to examine this issue further and show that some of commentators do not simply state that Īśvarasena is the opponent, but argue that the commentary on PS was not written by Dignāga but by Īśvarasena (and others). In making such a bold argument the commentators may have engaged in a guesswork, but nonetheless, it is worthwhile to examine how they, after noticing the similarity between Dharmakīrti’s quotation and Dignāga’s statement in PSV, dealt with the uncomfortable situation explaining why Dharmakīrti apparently criticized PSV.

In the following, at first, I would like to examine in brief what is the point of the argumentation between Dharmakīrti and the opponent as well as the content of Dignāga’s corresponding statement. Then I will inquire into several commentaries, which convey an explanation with reference to Īśvarasena and the statement of PSV in question. At the end of this paper, I will not judge which claim is the true, but will rather suggest the possibility that Īśvarasena had modified PSV slightly.

1 Dharmakīrti’s Criticism in the Second Chapter of the Pramāṇaviniścaya
Before analyzing the commentaries, I would like to examine Dharmakīrti’s quotation in PVin and the statement by Dignāga in PSV that corresponds to this quotation.

[1] tattulya evāṣṭī vyatireke śiddhe ’sati nāṣṭitābhidhānam asaty eva nāṣṭitā nānyatra

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6 Steinkellner 1979: 36–37, note 81. Also, Lasic 2009 identified Dharmakīrti’s quotation as equivalent to Dignāga’s description in PSV.
7 Jñānaśrībhadra’s Pramāṇaviniścayatīkā, D206a4 and Bu ston Rin chen grub’s Tshig don rab gsal, 90b1.
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na viruddha iti niyamārtham ity āha / (PVin 1&2, p. 52,6–7)

[Someone] said: Although vyatireka is [already] established by stating that [an inferential mark] is present only in what is similar to [the property to be proven] (i.e. anvaya), the statement that “[the inferential mark] is absent in the absence [of what is similar to the property to be proven (vipakṣa)]” is made in order to restrict (niyamārtham) that [the inferential mark] is absent only in the absence [of what is similar to the property to be proven], but not in what is other than or incompatible with [what is similar to the property to be proven.] (Cf. tr. Steinkellner 1979: 36)

It can be deduced that the “someone” in the above passage is trying to reply to the following question: if anvaya (positive concomitance and the second characteristic of an inferential mark) and vyatireka (negative concomitance and the third characteristic of an inferential mark) turn out to be the same, then is it not unnecessary to mention vyatireka? 8 Hence, “someone” answers that there is a reason for stating vyatireka. Namely, a description of vyatireka is indispensable in order to determine the nature of that which lacks a similar to the property to be proven (i.e. vipakṣa), in which an inferential mark must be absent.

This is exactly what Dignāga wrote in PSV:9

8 The discussion on the necessity for stating the third characteristic (i.e. saying that “vipakṣe [hetoh] asattvam”) separately from the second characteristic (i.e. “sapakṣe [hetoh] sattvam”) continued for a long time after Dignāga. According to the Tarkabhāṣā by Moksākara-gupta (cf. TBh 61.27–31), commentators offer three reasons for stating the third characteristic. The first is to determine the nature of vipakṣa (vipakṣaniyamārtham). Kajiyama, in his English translation of Tarkabhāṣā, designates “Dignāga and others” as those who offer this reason (see Kajiyama 1989: 71 [256]). It seems to be derived from the PS(V)’s statements, especially in v. 19–20c of PS 3, as Kajiyama has noted (Ibid., p. 71 [256], note 181). The second reason is to restrict an inferential form (prayoganiyamārtham) since it depends on whether the debater can understand svabhāvatpratibandha with an inferential form (prayoga) using anvaya or vyatireka. In this way, regardless of the fact that it is redundant, one should utter both of two. This is the very reason that Dharmakīrti insists in PVin that it is necessary to state vyatireka (cf. note 13). Lastly, the third reason is to determine whether one should present an inferential form with a similar example (sādharmyaprayoga) or a dissimilar example (vaidharmyaprayoga) depending on the opponent’s understanding (sādharmyavaidharmyaprayogasācanārtham). This reason can be found in Dignāga’s statement in his Nyāyamukha (cf. with the Japanese translation, Katsura 1981: 73–74). Dharmakīrti appeals to this statement as a reliable authority when stating his opinion in PVin (cf. PVin 1&2, p. 53,10).

9 For the materials on PSV, see Hattori 1968:12–20. Masa-aki Hattori deduced that Kanakavarman’s translation of PSV appeared later than the last quarter of the fifteenth century, since the name of Dadpa’i shes rab, who was the assistant translator when Kanakavarman translated PSV in Tibetan, cannot be found in the Deb ther sngon po.

Iuchi Maho and Yoshimizu Chizuko, however, note that Pa tshab nyi ma grags (1055–?), who was a contemporary of rNgog, re-translated the Prasannapāda with Kanakavarman. Moreover, they point out that the master Kanakavarman from Kashmir is the translator of PS and PSV. (Cf. Iuchi and Yoshimizu 2011: 7f.)

In addition, Dar ma rin chen, who was a scholar of the dGe lugs tradition in the late fourteenth century and early fifteenth century, noticed that there was another translation separately from Vasudhararaksita’s translation of PSV, but he could not obtain it. Therefore, he just based his commentary on the verses of PS and the auto-commentary by Dignāga (possibly in Sanskrit), the translation of PSV by
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[2] na tarhi vaktavyam — asati nāstītā iti. etat punah — asaty eva nāstītā, nānyatra, na viruddha iti niyamārtham. (Lasic 2009: 19, in Appendix: Reconstruction of PS(V) 5cd.)

[Objection:] If so, “the absence [of the inferential mark] in the absence [of what is similar to the property to be proven (vipākṣa)]” should not be stated.

[Answer:] It [has to be stated], however (punah), in order to restrict (niyamārtham) that [the inferential mark is] absent only in the absence [of what is similar to the property to be proven], but not in what is other than or incompatible with [what is similar to the property to be proven.]

In this statement, Dignāga proclaims that the phrase “asati nāstītā,” which refers to vyatireka,10 should be stated separately from anvaya to specify where the inferential mark cannot be present. Namely, with respect to vipākṣa, only the absence (asati) of what is similar to the property to be proved (sādhyadharma) should be recognized, but not what is other (anya) than the property to be proven or incompatible (viruddha) with it.

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Vasudhararakṣita, and Jinendrabuddhi’s subcommentary on PSV, which has several completely different portions from Pa tshab nyi ma grag’s translation of PSV, when he composed the commentary on PSV. (Cf. Tshad ma mdo’i rnam bshad, 123a5–6: rgya gar gi mkhan po rigs pa smra ba gtsug gi nor bur grags pa ba su b-ha ra raksi ta (Zhol : ba su dha ra raksi ta sKung ’bum ed., 131a6) nor ’dzin bsrun gba zhes pas legs par bshad pa dang / bod kyi lo ts-tsha ba dge bsnyen zham seng-ge (Zhol : zha ma seng gi sKung ’bum ed., 131b1) rgyal mtshan gyis / rgya gar gi skad las bod kyi skad du bskyur cing zhus te ’chad nyan gyis gan la phab pa’o // Ibid, 125a6–b2: ’gyur ’di ma gogs rtsa ba dang rang ’grel gyi ’gyur gzhan yod par grags na ’ang ma rnyed cing / bod kyi dge ba’i bshes gnyen gyis byas pa’i bsuds don1 dang / rnam bshad sogz kyang ma rnyed pas rtsa ’grel gyi tshig don la cing zad rgyad pa dang / slob don rgyal pa’i ’dhang po’i blo gros kyi mzdad pa’i ’grel bshad dang lo ts-tsha ba blo gros bgtan pas bskyur ba ’di dang ’gyur ches shin tu mi mthun pa mang ba gcig yod pa la rgyad nas byas pa’o // For the Japanese translation and notes on this later part, see Murakami 2008: 162, note 82.)

Therefore, Kanakavarman’s translation of PSV might have appeared later than the eleventh century.

1 For the usage of bsuds don in a title of a text, see Kano 2008: 136ff. Kazuo Kano writes, “The term bsuds don is often used in the sense of ‘topical outline’ in titles of works composed by Rngog lo’s Tibetan contemporaries and the inheritors of his tradition, ... Hence we can observe a tendency in the early and middle phyi dar period to use the term bsuds don to indicate ‘topical outlines’. Later traditions, however, preferred to use the term sa bcad instead of the term bsuds don to indicate this type of work.” But Kano points out that the term bsuds don in a title of a work indicates not only the “topical outlines” but also “essential meaning.” As he said: “In his other extant compositions …, Rngog lo obviously uses the term don bsuds not in the sense of ‘topical outlines,’ but of ‘essential meaning.’”

10 According to Katsura 2000, Dignāga does not use the term “anvaya” and “vyatireka”, and furthermore, he did not incorporate the word “eva” into the formulation of the second characteristic when he explains the three characteristics of an inferential mark in v. 5 of PS(V) 2. Rather he uses the term “anvaya” and “vyatireka” in v.5 of PS(V) 2 when discussing how a word (śabda) expresses its object. In addition, Katsura assumed that Dignāga actually intended to insert the word “eva” into the vyatireka formula and thought that the pervasion (vyāpti) between a property to be proven and an inferential mark would become clear by using the restrictive word “eva”.

Notwithstanding the above complicated situation, for the sake of convenience, I would like to use the word “anvaya” and “vyatireka,” even in the context of PS(V).
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As I mentioned above, after assertion [1], which is very similar to Dignāga’s statement [2], Dharmakīrti proclaims his own thought by rejecting this assertion. For the sake of convenience, I would like to summarize what is the differences between Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s thoughts. Namely, there are two overt differences between two. First, unlike Dignāga’s statement that only the absence of what is similar to the property to be proven should be recognized as vipākṣa, Dharmakīrti affirms all of three types of vipākṣa. Second, there is clear difference of perspective regarding the purpose of stating vyatireka. Dignāga believes one states vyatireka in order to determine the nature of vipākṣa. On the other hand, Dharmakīrti insists that the purpose is to determine the inferential form. In this respect, it is fully conceivable that Dharmakīrti does not agree with Dignāga’s thought in question.

It also goes without saying that the possibility that Dharmakīrti criticized Dignāga’s assertion is unfavorable in the eyes of the commentators on PVin, because Dharmakīrti usu-

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11 Dharmakīrti seems to think that assertion [1] is in response to an opponent doubting that an inferential mark may exist in what is other than or incompatible with what is similar to the property to be proven. Thus Dharmakīrti says that such a doubt is unnecessary. Dharmakīrti explains: tatrāsambhavād eva nānyadharmavyāvrittinisahāśankā / virudhanisahāsāhe ‘pi tatraiva nisēde dosaḥ syāt / na ca tattulya eva vṛtir ity atattulyo viruddha eva, yena tata eva vyaṭirekād agnir avyayam na gamayet / kim tārhi tattulyavyātirekore ‘pi / tenāyam aḍaśa ity avācyam eva tṛīyaṃ rāpam syāt / (PVin 1&2, p. 52,7–11) “Since [it is] impossible [that an inferential mark] occurs in the [absence of what is similar to the property to be proven (vipākṣa)], one will not have a doubt about the rejection of that [an inferential mark would] exist in other property[1] [than what is similar to the property to be proven (sakṣa)]. Even in the case of [an inferential mark] rejected in what is incompatible [with the similar to the property to be proven], if [someone says that an inferential mark] is rejected only in that [incompatible property, then it] may [turns out to be] a fault. And being [said that] tattulya eva vṛtih, the dissimilar (atattulya) [does not] [mean] only that is incompatible [with what is similar to the property to be proven], because [if the dissimilar means only that is incompatible, an inferential mark will] be excluded from only that [is incompatible], and a fire may not make [us] understand the heat. Rather, [whatever] is excluded from the similar (tattulya) [i.e. that is other than the similar] is also [the dissimilar]. In this regard, there is no fault [or no doubt like that which the opponent may have]. Therefore the third characteristic comes to be not necessarily stated.”

12 According to PVInT(Dh) D187b6: [...] chos gzhan la yod pa [...] des na de la ‘gal ba nyid las rnam par geon par thal ba'i phyir ro zhes khyed kyi sbyin brjod pa'i skyon med pa de'i phyir/

13 As follows: prayogadarsanarthatvād adoṣāḥ — anvayavyatirekavāy niścitavyāptikam ekam api rāpam prayuktam arthāpattāya dviṣṭyam gamayatīti / (PVin 1&2, p. 52,11–13) “There is no problem [regarding the uselessness of stating vyatireka] because it intends to show an inferential form (prayoga). Namely, [through] the application of just one characteristic - either the [previously] determined positive-pervasion (anvaya-vyāpīti) [characteristic] or negative-pervasion (vyatireka-vyāpīti) [characteristic] - [the debaters] know the second [pervasion that is not applied to an inferential form] by implication.”

As Katsura indicated, regardless of this disagreement between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, some disciples of Dharmakīrti who were influenced by his thought tend to interpret Dignāga’s assertions here from Dharmakīrti’s point of view. For instance, Jinendrabuddhi (8c.), in his comments on PS(V) i.e. the Pramāṇasamuccayaṭāka (henceforth, PST), expresses the same view as Dharmakīrti by means of adding some extra words and he aims to preserve the meaning of given words in a text, even in the case of PS 3.v.19 and Dignāga’s commentaries. Cf. especially Kitagawa 1973: 99 (note 82), 179–180 (note 321), and Katsura 2003: 27–31.
ally makes use of Dignāga’s statement as a reliable source for justifying his own theory. In this regard, for the commentators recognizing Iśvarasena as the opponent may have been the best solution to the problem that Dharmakīrti criticized his predecessor Dignāga, a person of authority, or his great treatise PSV.

2 Who is the Opponent?

Several designate Iśvarasena as the opponent when discussing quotation [1]. I have listed below the names of those commentators and commentaries, as well as the folio-number in which they refer to Iśvarasena (Tib. dBang phyug sde), as the advocate of this position.

• Jñānaśīrībhadra (11c.). Pramāṇaviniścayāṭikā, 206a4: […] źhes slob dpon dbang phyug sde zer ro //

• Phy(w)a pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169, henceforth, Phya pa). Shes rab ’od zer, 99b9–100a1: slob dpon dbang phyug sdes[...]

14 Commentaries on PVin seem to have written frequently by Tibetan scholars, especially from the eleventh to fourteenth century. It can be estimated that they come to more than twenty, if one includes non-extant texts. According to A khu ching shes rab rgya mtsho’s (1803–1875) the Tho yig, there was a commentary by Blo gros ’byung gnas (11c.), a disciple of rNgog Blo ldan shes rab a† (1059–1109, henceforth, rNgog), and another one by rGya dmar ba Byang chub grags (11c.), a disciple of Phya pa chos kyi seng ge, but those are, still, unavailable. Cf. Tho yig: (673)–(677).

a† After the publication of the bKa’ gsalms pa’i gsung ’bum, rNgog’s works became partially available - nine out of what is said to be approximately 50 items. For rNgog’s works in the bKa’ gsalms pa’i gsung ’bum, see Kano 2007, 2008, 2009.

15 As scholars assumed, it is safe to say that rNgog was a contemporary of Jñānaśīrībhadra (cf. Hadano 1975, van der Kuijp 1983, and Kawagoe 1984). And I would like to suggest that rNgog might have been younger than Jñānaśīrībhadra, and might not have had any chance to look over Jñānaśīrībhadra’s commentary on PVin. At the same time, Jñānaśīrībhadra might not have known of rNgog’s commentary on PVin and rNgog’s new translation of PVin when he was writing his commentary on PVin.

According to rNgog’s biography, specifically the Blo ldan shes rab kyi rnam thar (cf. van der Kuijp 1983: 32–33) by gSer mdog Pan chen Shākya mchog ldan (1428–1507), rNgog took part in a Buddhist religious council (chos ’khor) held by King rTse lde of mNga’ ris province in 1076, when he was 18 years old. From that year to 1092, rNgog studied abroad in Kashmir for 17 years. During his stay, rNgog learned the Five Treatises of Maitreya, Madhyamaka, and Pramāṇa, and translated several texts under Parahitabhadra (gZhan la phan pa’i bzang po), Bhavyarāja (sKal ldan rgyal po) and Sajjana (var. Sadjana, Sañjana). rNgog translated not only PVin but also Dharmottara’s commentary on PVin into Tibetan and composed his autocommentary, the bKa’ gnas rnam bshad, in Kashmir (cf. rNam nges dGongs pa rab gal, 259a1–2: [...] lo ts-tsha ba shākya’i dge slob blo ldan shes rab kyi kha che’i grong khyer dpe med du rgya gar gyi skad las bod kyi skad du bsgyur te ’chad nyan gyis legs par gtan la phab pa’o’/). Although the date of composition of the bKa’ gnas rnam bshad is unknown, and not even stated in its colophon, it can be guessed that rNgog may had written the bKa’ gnas rnam bshad when studying abroad in Kashmir, before he became 35 years old.

Incidentally, there are no many biographical details regarding Jñānaśīrībhadra. According to Hakuyū Hadano, Jñānaśīrībhadra was a famous Buddhist scholar from India, and most of all, the authority on Dharmakīrti’s seven works. It is significant that Jñānaśīrībhadra belonged to the same school as Sajjana who was a teacher of rNgog, being a disciple of Manjivajra. Also, he wrote a commentary on PVin and translated it into Tibetan together with a Tibetan scholar. It is also remarkable that some disciples of Jñānaśīrībhadra attended to the same council that rNgog took part in. (Cf. Hadano 1975)

In this regard, I assume that rNgog was a contemporary of Jñānaśīrībhadra, however both of them do not seem to have known of each other’s commentaries on PVin when they were writing their own.
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- gTsang nag pa brTson 'grus seng ge (12c., henceforth, gTsang nag pa). *rNam nges Legs bshad bsdus pa*, 105b4: *kha cig slob dpon dbang phyug sde ji skad ce na* [...]
- bCom ldan rig pa’i ral gri Da ma rgyal mtshan (1227–1305, henceforth, bCom ldan rig ral). *rNam nges rgyan gyi me tog*, 268: *slob dpon dbang phyug sde na re* /
- Bu ston Rin chen grub (1290–1364, henceforth, Bu ston). *Tshig don rab gsal*, 90b1: [...]
- rGyal tshab rje Da ma rin chen (1364–1432, henceforth, Dar ma rin chen). *rNam nges dGongs pa rab gsal*, 184b1: *slob dpon dbang phyug sde na re* /16

The solution that these commentators came up with is to attribute assertion [1] to Iśvarasena, thereby freeing Dharmakīrti of the suspicion that he criticized of Dignāga’s statement.

However, in doing so, the problem of the relationship between Dharmakīrti and Dignāga shifts to that of Iśvarasena and Dignāga. Is PSV, which includes [2], written by Iśvarasena? Or, did Iśvarasena write a separate text that consists of a passage that coincidentally matches PSV’s [2]? At any rate, the commentators’ attribution of [1] to Iśvarasena cannot be confirmed or denied since Iśvarasena’s work is not extant. Nevertheless, the commentators’ statements regarding this issue are worthwhile to investigate because they support Bu ston’s claim that Iśvarasena wrote a commentary on PS(V).17

On the other hand, Dharmottara, in his commentary, does not designate Iśvarasena as the opponent when explaining quotation [1]. He merely points out that Dharmakīrti argues that limiting the nature of *vipakṣa* is not the purpose of stating the third characteristic of an inferential mark (cf. PVinT(Dh) D187b5–6). In this regard, it is conceivable that Dharmottara did not realize at this moment that Dharmakīrti’s assertion conflicted with that of Dignāga. Nevertheless, Dharmottara’s explanation is quite interesting because despite the fact that [1] corresponds to [2], he strongly supports Dharmakīrti’s disapproval of [1]. Furthermore, soon after he paraphrases v. 19 of PS 3 and presents it as Dharmakīrti’s true intent (*slob dpon gyi dgongs pa*).18

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16 Among the commentators listed above, it seems that Bu ston and Da ma rin chen were aware that there is an equivalent statement in PSV and wrote that the statement in PSV does not reflect true intention of Dignāga - it has revised by Iśvarasena. I will discuss it later in section three.
18 Cf. PVinT(Dh) D188b2–4: *slob dpon gyi dgongs pa ni ’di yin te* / *med pa la med pa de ni gan tshigs yin no zhes bya ba ’di yin no* / *’gal ba gzhan la ldog pa dag kyang med pa tsam du ni khyad par med do* / *de’i phyir na gan tshigs kyi bsgrub bya’i chos med pa tsam la med pa ni tshul gsun par bshad pa yin no* / *’gal ba tshig med pa tsam la med pa ni tshul gsun par bshad pa yin no* (PS 3.19) “The following is the master’s true intention. The purpose of stating ‘being absent in the absence’ is this: whatever is absent in only (tsam, *mātra*) the absence [of what is similar to the
3 Did Dharmakīrti Criticize Īśvarasena’s Commentary on PST?

It is remarkable that while Dharmottara does not suggest that Īśvarasena is the opponent in the portion [1], he later raises again the issue of Dharmakīrti’s criticism and its relationship to Īśvarasena when he interprets PVin’s verse for transforming merits. The last verse of PVin is:

\[
yukto \ 'yam artha iti sūtram amoghanīter \\
draṣṭur mayā gamitam āgaman adhyupekṣya /
\]
\[\text{tasyāpy avaśyamavadātadhiyo 'yam eva}
\]
\[bhāvo 'vibhāvātadhiyāvidito janena // (PVin 3, p. 137,7–10)
\]

Since this [text, \textit{Pramāṇaviniścaya}’s] content is correct, the sūtra of one who sees the un-failing guiding principle (Dignāga) has been comprehended by me (Dharmakīrti) without consulting the tradition (āgama). Only this [text, the \textit{Pramāṇaviniścaya}] is the very intention of the [author, Dignāga] who has clear understanding, [which is] unknown by the people who possess unclear understanding.

Judging from the context of this passage, it can be said that “sūtra” (mdo) refers to Dignāga’s PS, “āgama” (lung) refers to a commentary on PS, and “mayā gamita” (ngas bshad) means that the true meaning of PS has been explained in PVin by Dharmakīrti himself. From this statement, it appears that in PVin Dharmakīrti interpreted Dignāga’s property to be proven] is the very inferential mark. In the mere absence [of an inferential mark,] there is no difference between [A] [being absent] in what is incompatible [with what is similar to the property to be proven], and [B] being absent in what is other than [what is similar to the property to be proven]. Hence, [one can] explain the third characteristic as being absent in the mere absence of the property that is to be inferred [by] an inferential mark. An [inferential mark] is not absent in what is merely incompatible [with what is similar to the property to be proven] and in what is merely other than [what is similar to the property to be proven]. [If] only what is incompatible is the dissimilar case (mi mthun pa’i phyogs), then [the inferential mark] would be removed from the only [thing that is incompatible with what is similar to the property to be proven].”

Bu ston, whose commentary on PVin follows PVinT. (Dh) substantially, also quotes from v. 19 of PS 3 after explaining Dharmakīrti’s criticism and Dharmottara’s interpretation. Furthermore, it should be noted that he understood the phrase “slob dpon gyi dgongs pa” in PVinT. (Dh: D188b2) as meaning “Dignāga’s true intention”. This is reflected in his paraphrasing of it to “phyogs glang gi dgongs pa,” even though it is not clear that “slob dpon” refers to Dignāga or Dharmakīrti from the original context in PVinT(Dh).

Based on Katsura’s reconstruction of v. 19 of PS 3 based on Jinendrabuddhi’s PST and two Tibetan translations of PSV (“tato ’nyas tadviruddho vā nāsapakṣo dvidhāpi hi / hetvabhāvo viruddhāc ca vyavacchedah prasayajate”) (in Katsura 2009), it can be said that Dharmottara’s previous interpretation in PVinT and Jinendrabuddhi’s interpretation in PST follows Dharmakīrti’s understanding, but at the same time, is out of step with Dignāga’s auto-commentary on v. 19 (Hidenori Kitagawa says that their arbitrary interpretations of Dignāga’s statement misses the meaning of Dignāga’s text (see Kitagawa 1973: 179–180, note 321)).
intention without referring to any other commentaries on PS.

At this portion, Dharmottara seems to have become aware that he needs to give an explanation for Dharmakīrti’s apparent criticism of Dignāga.

[The opponent’s question:] If [Dharmakīrti intends to] explain the Pramāṇasamuccaya, why does he abandon some of the statements found in the Pramāṇasamuccaya itself? For instance, [in the Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti] there is the explanation: “The third characteristic is for restricting. That is, the purpose of mentioning the third characteristic [of an inferential mark] is to restrict [that the inferential mark is] absent only in the absence [of what is similar to the property to be proven], but not in what is other than or incompatible with [what is similar to the property to be proven].” [However,] you [Dharmakīrti] stated that [vyatireka] has to be said in order to understand the inferential form ([which consists of] the positive concomitance or the negative concomitance). [Does this not mean that you criticizing the Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti?] In the same way, [the same thing could be] said regarding [your other points] as well.

To explain: [Dharmakīrti] elucidates following the śūtra (mdo dag, i.e. the Pramāṇasamuccaya), [but] not the commentary [because] the commentary is not the same [as the śūtra]. Īśvarasena and other previous followers [of him] wrongly made [their] commentaries.20

First, Dharmottara brings up again assertion [1] in spite of the fact that it is not mentioned in Dharmakīrti’s last verse. Then he postulates the question that if Dharmakīrti really wanted to interpret Dignāga’s PS, then why did he deny his assertion? This question seems to reflect the fact that Dharmottara just noticed that the subject of Dharmakīrti’s criticism is

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20 PVinṬ(Dh) D178a2–4=P208b2–4: ci ste gal te kun las btras pa bstan par ’dod na / ci ltar de nyid la lar spong ste / dper na ’di n'i neś pa bya ba/i don yin te / med pa nyid la med pa yin gyi gzh an pa la la ma yin la ’gal ba la yang ma yin no tzhes tshul gsun pa nges pa/i don yin par bshad la / khyod kyis ni rjes su ’gro ba dang ldog pa dag gi shyor ba shes par bya ba/i don du brjod pa lta bu ste / de bzhin du yang shyar ro zhe na / bshad pa / mdo (D : mdo ba P) dag gyis bstan gyi / ’grel pas (D : ’brel ba P) ni ma yin gyi ’grel pa (D : ’brel pa P) ni ’di nyid ma yin no (D : ’di nyid yin no P) // dbang phyug sde dang de/i phyogs pa gzh an snga ma dag giś ni ’grel (’grel em. : ’brel D, P) pa phyin ci log tu byas so // Although the opponent here is asking Dharmakīrti directly, I think that the person who is answering (bshad) the opponent’s question is Dharmottara instead of Dharmakīrti owing to the fact that there are no such statements in PVin.
equivalent to Dignāga’s statement [2] from PSV. In reply, he says that Dharmakīrti interpreted Dignāga’s intention based on PS, but did not depend on commentaries because they are not PS itself and that those of Iśvarasena and his successors are mistaken. And then Dharmottara argues that “the tradition” (āgama) is an untrustworthy commentary on PS by attributing it to Iśvarasena, something that is not specified by Dharmakīrti.21 In this way, Dharmottara is the first person who claimed that Iśvarasena (and his followers) wrote a commentary on PS and the possibility that Iśvarasena’s comment on v.5 of PS 2 has to do with PSV’s [2].

Following Dharmottara’s commentary bCom ldan rig ral, Bu ston and Dar ma rin chen said that Dharmakīrti’s opponent is Iśvarasena but not Dignāga, and that the assertion [1] is from Iśvarasena’s own commentary on PS.22

Specifically regarding Dar ma rin chen, he offers a more complex explanation, ascribing the first half of [1] to Dignāga and stating that only the second half is the object of Dharmakīrti’s criticism. He states:

The passage from the statement that “[It has to be] stated that “[the inferential mark is] absent in the absence [of what is similar to the property to be proven]” to “[but not in what is other than or] neither in what is incompatible with [what is similar to the property to be proven]” is a [citation] from [Dignāga’s] autocommentary on the Pramāṇasamuccaya. Hence [Dharmakīrti] does not criticize it. Rather . . . he criticizes the assertion [that] in order to further restrict [the nature of vipakṣa] it is necessary to explain the third characteristic separately [from the second characteristic].23

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21 He does not make it clear whether or not he thinks that there was a textual commentary or an oral explanation given to Dharmakīrti by Iśvarasena. This is reflected in the fact that Dharmottara wrote, “Iśvarasena and his predecessors wrongly made a commentary” but did not clearly state, “they wrote a wrong commentary” or “they explained PS orally.” Anyhow, it is most likely that there was a commentary on PS that existed separately from Dignāga’s autocommentary. I believe that Dharmottara’s comment influenced Bu ston’s claim that Iśvarasena wrote a subcommentary on PSV.

22 Bu ston just summarizes Dharmottara’s commentary. He brings up his question, and explains the reasons that Dharmakīrti endeavored to interpret PS without relying on the erroneous commentary of Iśvarasena and his successors. Cf. Tshig don rab gsal, 300a6–7: slob dpon gyi dgongs par bstan pa ni / ci ste khyed kun las btras ‘chad na / der bshad pa’i med pa nyid la med pa yin gi gzhban pa la yin la ’gal ba la yang ma yin no // zhes bshad pa la sogs pa la dgag pa byed pa ci zhe na / bshad ces drang ngo // gang gis na / ngas te chos grags bdag gis so // gang na / mdo nyid bshad kyi / ’grel pa ni dbang phyag sde dang de’i phyogs pa snga ma dag gis phyin ci log tu byas kyi / slob dpon gyi gzhbang min te /

Also bCom ldan rig ral’s commentary corresponds to that of Dharmottara and Bu ston: rNam nges rgyan gyi me tog, 519,24–520,9: gal te tshad ma kun las btras pa bshad par ’dod na slob don dbang phyag sde’i ’grel pa ltar bshad par bya ba ma yin na ji ltar na ’ga’ zhig tu de ’gog par byed ce na / [...] slob don dbang phyag sde la sogs pa’i lung yang yal bar dor nas bshad de de dag ni mngon par mi brtson pas blo bshad pas mdo’i don ji ita bar mthong ba ma yin pa’i phyir ro //

On the other hand, namely Jñānaśrībhadra, rNgog, Phya pa and GTsang nag pa, in contrast to Dharmottara, do not specify what “the tradition” refers to.

23 rNam nges dGongs pa rab gsal, 184b3–6: med pa la med pa nyid brjod pa ni zhes pa nas / ’gal ba la yang ma yin no / zhes pa’i bar tshad ma kun las btras kyi rang ’grel gis tshig yin pas de la dgag pa mdzad pa ma yin gyi [...] slar yang nges par bya ba’i don du smos pa tshal gsum pa logs su bshad pa’i dgos par ’dod pa la dgag pa mdzad pa yin no //
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Dar ma rin chen identifies the first half of the assertion [1] as Dignāga’s statement from his autocommentary on PS. However, it was impossible for Dar ma rin chen to accept the possibility that Dharmakīrti denies Dignāga’s assertion. Thus, he says that only the second half of the statement - “in order to restrict (niyama-artham)” is the part which Dharmakīrti intended to criticize.

In addition, Dar ma rin chen was aware that the phrase “in order to restrict” does not appear in PSV, but rather in Iśvarasena’s commentary.

If this statement is taken at face value, it is conceivable that assertion [1] is from Iśvarasena’s commentary on PS.

Such analysis by Dar ma rin chen seems to be groundless and not supported by the content of PSV or PVin. If only the phrase “in order to restrict” is the object of Dharmakīrti’s criticism, Dharmakīrti would have recognized as valid the assertion regarding the nature of vipākṣa: an inferential reason is absent only in the absence of what is similar to the property to be proven, but not in what is other than or exclusive with what is similar to the property to be proven. However, Dharmakīrti denies this assertion and argues that all the three types of vipākṣa can be recognized as the places where the inferential mark should be absent.

Furthermore, it is a more natural interpretation to include the words “in order to restrict” as a part of Dignāga’s statement when it is read in the context of PS(V). Most of all, if we accept Dar ma rin chen’s argument that only the phrase “in order to restrict” is not Dignāga’s assertion but that of Iśvarasena and it is the object of Dharmakīrti’s criticism, how can we explain the meaning of the phrase “in order to restrict” actually involved in PSV?

Nevertheless, Dar ma rin chen, apparently without any reservation, makes this claim because others in Tibet held the view, as reflected by Bu ston’s aforementioned text, that Iśvarasena wrote a subcommentary on PS. This may originally be based on Dharmottara’s comments on the last verse of PVin. In the following section, I would like to introduce two Tibetan texts claim that Iśvarasena revised PSV more immoderately than Dar ma rin chen.

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24 In this regard, he argued that criticizing the (erroneous) commentary on PS and explaining true meaning of PS are not mutually exclusive. rNam nges dGongs pa rab gsal, 258a4–7: gal te tshad ma kun las btus pa ’chad pa ’dod na de’i ’grel par tshul gsum pa logs su smos pa nges pa’i don can yin pa bkag nas sbyor ba’i dbye ba bstan pa’i don can du ’chad ce na / kun las btus kyi ’grel pa kha cig bkag pa dang / tshad ma kun las btus kyi mdo’i dgyongs pa ji lta ba bzhin du ’chad pa mi ’gal te / slob dpon dbang phyug sde la sogs pas byas pa’i ’grel pa skyon can gyi lung yang shes byed du byed pa dor nas mdo mdzad pa’i dgyongs pa rigs pa yang dag la brten nas chos kyi grags pa ngas bshad pa’i phyir/  

25 Dar ma rin chen wrote in his annotation of [1] that Iśvarasena was interpreting the meaning of v.5 of PS. rNam nges dGongs pa rab gsal, 184b1–3: de’i lan la slob dpon dbang phyug sde na re / tshad ma mdo/ de dang mthun pa nyid la yod pa zhes bya ba’i don nges pas rtags mi mthun phyogs la med pa’i ldog pa grub mod kyi yang logs su med pa la med pa nyid brjod pa ni / dgos pa med pa ma yin te / rtags ma mthun phyogs dang las ldog pa mi / bsgrub bya i chos med pa mi mthun phyogs kho na la med pa nyid yin gyi bsgrub bya’i chos las ldog pa gzhon pa la yang med pa ma yin la ’gal ba mi mthun phyogs kho no la la yang med pa ma yin no zhes rjes ’gro’i nges gzung rtogs pa’i shugs la mi mthun phyogs la med pa grub sin kyang ldog yul ngos bzung ste / grub sin de nyid bsin gan nas nges par bya ba’i phyir yin no zhes zer to//

4 The Development of the Claim in Tibet that Īśvarasena Revised PSV

In this chapter, I will examine the claim found in Dar ma rin chen’s commentary on PS, the Tshad ma mdo’i rnam bshad and in mKhas grub rje dGe legs dpal bzang’s (1385–1438, henceforth, mKhas grub rje) work, the Tshad ’bras chen mo. The former commentary states as follows:

According to my the highest guide, the great venerable (Red mda’ ba gzhon nu blo gros: 1349–1412, henceforth Red mda’ ba), a phrase such as this (tshig ‘di ltar ’byung ba) is presented as equivalent to the master Īśvarasena’s assertion (which [from the standpoint of today] is an proclamation of the past [and is] exhaustively criticized in the Pramāṇavītinīcāya). Thus [this phrase is] not actually the phrase of [Dignāga’s] auto-commentary, [rather, it is] a revision attached by Īśvarasena to [Dignāga’s] auto-commentary.28

I believe it is best to view this claim with caution because this comment is on Dignāga’s PSV, not Dharmakīrti’s PVin. Thus, in this text, Dar ma rin chen is expected to explain Dignāga’s thought. Furthermore, Dar ma rin chen’s aim here is to just convey the existence of this claim, not to affirm the truth of it, and he does not state that it has to be justified. It is confusing to the reader how Dar ma rin chen understood Dignāga’s assertion when he was reading PS(V).29

He just concludes the text by referring readers hoping for a conclusion to PVin.30

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27 As Atsuki Murakami said, based on its colophon (Tshad ma mdo’i rnam bshad, 125a4–126b6. Cf. sKu ‘bum ed. 131a1ff.) it is clear that “rje btsun pa” refers to Red mda’ ba.¹ That is, Dar ma rin chen wrote down the name of his instructor: “dpal ldan rje btsun dam pa ku ma ra ma ti’i zhal snga nas [...]” (126b3) and “rje rin po che thams cad mkhyen pa blo bzang grags pa dpal bzang po’i zhal snga nas [...]” (126b3–4). “rje btsun pa” refers to Red mda’ ba pa and “rje thams cad mkhyen pa” refers to Tsong kha bpa blo bzang grags pa.

¹ See Murakami 2008 :162, note 81.

28 Tshad ma mdo’i rnam bshad, 39b6–40a1: bdag gi ’dren pa dam pa rje rtsun chen po’i gsung gis / tshig ’di ltar ’byung ba ni / slob don dbang phyug sde’i ’dod pa tshad ma rnam nges su rgyas par bkag pa’i phyogs snga ma dang mthun par gnang bas dbang phyug sdes rang ’grel la bsonon pa btob pa yin gyi / rang ’grel dngos ma yin zhugs sungs so //

29 Immediately after this statement, Dar ma rin chen also introduced Tsong kha pa’s interpretation, which argues that the assertion is permissible in Buddhist logic. Tshad ma mdo’i rnam bshad, 40a1–3: rje thams cad mkhyen pa ni / de rang lugs su khas blangs kyang skyon med de / mthun phyogs kho na la yod par bstan pas mi mthun phyogs la ldog pa grub kyang / med pa la med pa zhes lugs su smos pa’i dgos pa ni / mi mthun phyogs tsam las ldog pa yin gyi / gzhan pa dang ’gal ba mi mthun phyogs kho na las ldog pa ma yin no / zhes tshul gsum pa nges pa’i don can du bstan pa kho na de’i dgos par ’dod pa bkag pa yin gyi / spyir tshul gsum nges pa’i don can du ’dod pa bkag pa min no zhes zhugs ngsos //

30 Putting aside the question of how Dar ma rin chen understands Dignāga’s statement in PSV, Dar ma rin chen’s interpretation and concrete conclusion about this argument seems follow Dharmakīrti’s assertion in PVin. Actually, Dar ma rin chen is criticizing a proclamation which is very close to Red mda’ ba’s here, but without explicitly referring to it. rNam nges dGongs pa rab gsal, 184b6–185a2: des na tshad ma kun las btsus kyi rang ’grel la ’dir dgag pa mdzad mi srid pas tshad ma kun las btsus kyi ’grel pa’i tshig de ni dbang phyug sdes byas pa’i ’grel pa’i tshig yin gyi / slob don phyogs kyi glang po rang gi lugs ma yin no zhes zer ba yang skabs ’dir dbang phyug sde’i ’dod pa gang la dgag pa byas pa so gs chib tu ma rto gs pa’i rnam ’gyur yin no //
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Anyhow, this passage is worthwhile to consider as it reveals that commentators and readers were puzzled by Dharmakīrti’s apparent criticism of Dignāga, and that there was a certain claim regarding Īśvarasena’s revision of PSV in Tibet.

Next, in his own treatise on the topic of the result of *pramāṇa*, the Tshad ’bras chen mo, mKhas grub rje describes the transmission more specifically.

As is well known among predecessors, the older translation (*’gyur rnying*) of only the autocommentary [on the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and not the sūtra itself] is based on an inadequate Indian manuscript (*rgya dpe ma dag pa*), which has many of in-line notes by Īśvarasena attached to it. [It is] obvious that [this older translation] has many of errors. Thus, the omniscient one (Tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa, 1357–1419, henceforth Tsong kha pa) said that one should explain the meaning of the verse [of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*] by following a proper understanding [formed] after consulting [Jinendrabuddhi’s] subcommentary. And [Tsong kha pa said that one] should regard master Dharmottar[a]’s commentary] as an unerring authority when one gives an explanation regarding the meaning of Dharmakīrti’s treatises. (Cf. tr. Murakami 2008: 140–141)

Although this statement does not deal with assertion [1], it reveals not only that the claim accounts for the autocommentary on PS linked to Īśvarasena, but also which commentaries Tibetan scholars trusted in when they examined PS and Dharmakīrti’s treatises.

Anyhow, mKhas grub rje’s specific statements are striking: he says there was “an inadequate Indian manuscript” containing Īśvarasena’s in-line notes, and that it is an older translation of the autocommentary on PS (different than the one contained in the present-day *bsTan ’gyur* set). Moreover, such views were handed down to the mKhas grub rje’s contemporaries.

As above, in contrast with Dhamottara’s interpretation of the assertion [1], concerning the ages of Red mda’ ba and mKhas grub rje chronologically, in mKhas grub rje’s statements

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Thus, it is safe to accept the comments by Dar ma rin chen in his commentary on PVin as his final view. Cf. *Tshad ma mdo’i nyan bshad*, 40a3–4: *slob dpon rang gi bzhed pa ni* / *’dod pa de bkag nas khyab pa gang rung gcig dngos su bstan pas* / *cig shos shugs la ’phen pa’i sbyor ba gnyis kyi dbye ba riogs pa’i don du med la med pa legs su smos par nyan cing su bshad do // “The master [Dignāga’s] own intention is explained [by Dharmakīrti] in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. After [Dharmakīrti] criticizes the assertion [found in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*], he declares (smos pa) [that the phrase] “[The inferential mark is] absent in the absence [of what is similar to the property to be proven]” [was mentioned] so that [the opponent can] understand the kind of an inferential form which derives from the other [pervasion] by means of setting forth directly one of the pervasions [i.e. the positive pervasion and the negative pervasion].”

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1 I have referred to the *Tshad ’bras chen mo*’s critical edition of this text and the Japanese translation by Murakami. Regarding mKhas grub rje’s “predecessors”, Murakami reckons that mKhas grub rje may have included Red mda’ ba as one of them. Cf. Murakami 2008: 161, note 81.

2 *Tshad ’bras chen mo*, 99 (= bKra shis lhun po ed., 20b4–5): *rang ’gre’i rgyang pa’i ’gyur rnying ni* / *dbang phyug sde’i mehan ba’i rgya dpe ma dag pa las bsgyur bar snga ma dag la grags pa ltar gya sbyin mang du yod par mnong pas* ’gre’i bshad dang bstan nas legs par dpya’i rjes su ’brangs te rtsa ba’i don bshad dgos so zhes kyang rje thams cad mkhyen pa gsgang zhi ng / chos graigs kyi gzhung ’di dag gi don ’gre’i pa la slob dpon chos mchog ’khrul med kyi tshad mar bya’o zhes lan cig ma yin par gsgang ngo //
we can see the development of a more concrete claim regarding Íśvarasena’s revision.

5 Conclusion

As I mentioned in the beginning of this paper, Dhamakīrti’s theories may be considered more or less a departure from that of Dignāga. Nevertheless, the issue of Dhamakīrti’s apparent criticism of Dignāga struck me as unusual because he generally tends to build on his predecessor’s opinions rather than refute them directly. I wanted to understand this seemingly peculiar situation by examining the commentaries. After all, I noticed that the explanations found in several commentaries are quite similar to the case of adarśanamātra theory considered by Steinkellner and Katsura. In that case, Dhamakīrti’s criticism is interpreted as being directed towards Íśvarasena’s adarśanamātra theory and not Dignāga’s statement, even though it seems to be the source of the theory. The same method can be found in the argumentation in PVin.

As we have seen, though Dhamakīrti did not designate his opponent’s name or the source of the quotation in his PVin (=[1]), it is obvious that he is criticizing an assertion that is very similar to the statements found in PSV’s chapter two (=[2]). The problem is that PSV is generally attributed to Dignāga. In this regard, it is certainly warranted to question whether or not Dhamakīrti is criticizing Dignāga’s assertion.

Although Dhamakīrti may not have intended to criticize Dignāga’s assertion, nevertheless it is probable that commentators felt the need to refute this possibility. Dhammadṛta did not designate who is the opponent when explaining the argument in portion [1]. Rather, he raised this issue when discussing the last verse of PVin, stating that the assertion is not from PS but belongs to a commentary by Íśvarasena and others. Under the influence of this explanation, later commentators explicitly state that Dhamakīrti is criticizing Íśvarasena. Among them, bCom ldan rig ral, Bu ston, and Dar ma rin chen most likely consciously treated Íśvarasena’s commentary separately from Dignāga’s autocommentary. However, Red mda’ ba’s (quoted by Dar ma rin chen) and mKhas grub rje’s comments on Íśvarasena and PSV [2]’s problem are more developed and striking as they suggested that Íśvarasena added some words to Dignāga’s autocommentary.33

However, even if we assume that assertion [1] is a part of Íśvarasena’s commentary on PS and consider Dhamakīrti’s criticism of assertion [1] as being directed towards Íśvarasena (as many of the commentators have done), the question of the relationship between Íśvarasena and PSV still remains. Or if we accept the commentators’ claim that the assertion [1] is from

33 This reference supports Bu ston’s claim that there was a subcommentary on PSV by Íśvarasena1 and that Íśvarasena encouraged to Dhamakīrti to compose a commentary after he taught Dhamakīrti PS.2 In this regard, commentators that I have dealt with above can also be useful for their bibliographic information, as they are providing illuminating details.

1 See notes 4 and 17.
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Īsvarasena’s work and not Dignāga’s auto-commentary on PS, then the writer of the statement [2] in PSV becomes unclear, because if we accept the bibliographical information like the colophon of PS(V), the commentators’ claims must be false. Accepting Red mda’ ba and mKhas grub rje’s argument that Īsvarasena revised PSV may be the easiest.

In this respect, it is clear that more research is needed before arriving at a definite conclusion regarding the relationship between Īsvarasena and PSV. But I would like to say very carefully that Īsvarasena’s commentary has something to do with PSV’s [2] based on the fact that to several commentaries on PVin mention his name.

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ダルマキールティはディグナーガを批判したのか？
—Pramāṇaviniścayaにおける
vyatirekaの陳述目的をめぐる議論を中心として—

崔 境真

ダルマキールティは、自著『量決択』Pramāṇaviniścaya第2章の中で、前主張を提示した上で、その同じ主張を批判しながら自説を展開している。当該箇所においてダルマキールティ自身は、誰がその前主張を述べたかを明記していないものの、E. Steinkellnerも指摘するように、その前主張と同様の陳述がダルマキールティの先師に当たるディグナーガの『集量論註』Pramāṇaviniścayavṛttiにも見られること、現在広く知られている。もし『量決択』に引用された前主張が『集量論註』に述べられるディグナーガの主張だとした場合、ダルマキールティは、ディグナーガの主張を批判して、それとは異なる自説を述べていることになってしまう。ダルマキールティは、自分の論理学思想はディグナーガに由来するものであるとして、ディグナーガの思想を説明しない再解釈する立場にあることを強調する。であるにもかかわらず、ダルマキールティがディグナーガの主張を批判したとすると、解釈上不都合な問題が生まれることになる。この問題を意識していたのか、『量決択』に対する複数の註釈者は、その前主張をイーシュヴァラセーナに帰し、ダルマキールティの批判はディグナーガではなくイーシュヴァラセーナに向けられていて理解している。

本論文では、以上のような議論の背景を念頭に置きながら、E. Steinkellnerらの先行研究を踏まえ、当時は利用不可能であった『量決択』の註釈書などの新出資料を含め、従来の研究では参照されることのなかった諸文献を基礎資料として、この問題にあらためて考察を加えたい。というのも、『量決択』に引用されている前主張が、仮にイーシュヴァラセーナの説だとしていたとしても、『集量論註』の当該の主張もまたディグナーガ自身の主張ではなかったのかという問題が新たに生じる。また一方で、ダルマキールティの批判がイーシュヴァラセーナとディグナーガのいずれにむけられていたかが判然としないままに残ることになってしまう。この点で興味深いことに、一部のチベット人による『量決択』の註釈では、『集量論註』をイーシュヴァラセーナに帰している。あるいはまた、『集量論註』の当該箇所をイーシュヴァラセーナが書き換えたと伝えている。

本論文はそれゆえ、当該の問題に関する以上のようなく複数の解釈を紹介しながら、『量決択』の註釈者たちが、ダルマキールティの批判がディグナーガに向けられてしまうという不都合な事態を避けるために、どのような解釈を施したかという軌跡を辿り、あらためて当該の問題を整理し、再検証する。