Bhavya’s Critique of the Śāmkhya Theory of *pratibimba*

Akira Saitō

The theory of *pratibimba* (gzugs brnyan) or “reflection” is well-known as having been introduced by the Śāmkhya when explaining how puruṣa (skyes bu), or “pure consciousness”, is able to experience the objects of the intellect (*buddhi*, blo/shes pa).¹ The explanation was required since they had traditionally asserted that objects perceived by sense organs are finally discerned by the intellect, which, they say, lacks consciousness (*acentana*, sems/rto gs [pa] med [pa]) and, at the same time, puruṣa, having consciousness (*cetana*, sems/rto gs [pa] can) is regarded by the Śāmkhya as one who sees (*draṣṭṛ*, SK.19) and enjoys (*bhokṛ*, SK.17), and is conscious [of something] (*jñā*, SK.2).

Although the *pratibimba* theory was not referred to by Iśvarakṛṣṇa (ca. 5c) in his *Śāmkhyakārikā*, the following stanza may have already anticipated the possibility of its introduction to the Śāmkhya circles:

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\text{tasmāt tatsamyogād acetanāṃ cetanāvad iva liṅgam/}
\text{guṇakartṛte ca tathā karteva bhavaty udāśīnaḥ}// \text{(SK.20)}
\]

“Therefore, the non-conscious *liṅga* or ‘subtle body’ [composed of intellect, etc.] becomes as if it had consciousness on account of its contact with that [pure consciousness]. And although activity belongs to *guṇas* or ‘attributes’, the indifferent [pure consciousness] becomes as if it were an agent.”

In this respect, it is worthy of note that, as far as our present knowledge goes, Bhāviveka/Bhavya’s reference to the *pratibimba* theory represents its earliest usage, regardless of whether or not this theory derives in fact from Buddhist or, strictly speaking, Yogācāra usage of *pratibimba* as already found in the *Śamādhiśīla* (ca. early 4c) in their proof of the well-known tenet of representation-only (*vijñaptimatratā)*.²

Although not a few studies have so far been conducted on this particular issue of the Śāmkhya theory of *pratibimba*, we are still far from having obtained a satisfactory understanding of what it really means, especially regarding the question of whether and in what sense the *pratibimba* simile represents pure consciousness or intellect. In this regard, Bhavya’s critical discussion of this topic in his *Tarkajvāla*, Chapter 6, entitled “Śāmkhyatattvatvāvatāra”, is no doubt an important source for clarifying the meaning of this theory as propounded by the early Śāmkhya.

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The TJ is available only in Tibetan, while the mūla text, Madhyamakahrdayakārikā on which the TJ comments, is presently accessible to us in both Sanskrit and Tibetan.

Despite a few difficulties related to the Tibetan translation of the TJ, the present paper deals mainly with the following three points. First, what type of theory of pratibimba was introduced by Bhāvya as the pūrva-pakṣa or “opponent’s proposition”? Secondly, what is the reason for Bhāvya’s critique of this theory? Thirdly, what are the problems with the Tibetan translation of the TJ made by Dīpankaraśrījñāna and Tshul khrims rgyal ba?3

0 The structure of Bhāvya’s discussion in the TJ, Chapter VI

First, before entering upon an analysis of the discussion, let us cast a glance over the structure of the chapter in question. The following is the contents of the TJ, Chapter 6, titled “Sāmkhyatattvāvatā” (Grangs can gyi de kho na nyid la ’jug pa) or “Entering into the Reality of the Sāṃkhya [Tenets]”:

I. The Sāṃkhya’s propositions of puruṣa and prakṛti “original-matter” (kk.1–4)
   1 The characteristics of prakṛti and puruṣa (k.1)
   2 The relationship between buddhi and puruṣa (k.2)
   3 The Sāṃkhya theory of liberation (kk.3–4)
   3.1 Puruṣa’s liberation (k.3)
   3.2 Prakṛti’s liberation (k.4)

II. Bhāvya’s critique of the above propositions (TJ ad kk.5–65)
   1 Critique of puruṣa’s characteristic of having consciousness and the theory of its liberation (kk.4–24)
   2 Critique of the Sāṃkhya proof of the existence of prakṛti and puruṣa (kk.25–61)
      2.1 Critique of the existence of prakṛti (1) (kk.25–42)
      2.2 Critique of the existence of puruṣa (1) (kk.43–46)
      2.3 Critique of the existence of prakṛti (2) (kk.47–51)
      2.4 Critique of the existence of puruṣa (2) (kk.52–61)
   3 Epilogue (kk.62–65)

In the above synopsis, Bhāvya introduces the Sāṃkhya theory of pratibimba in I.2, (TJ ad k.2) and refutes it in II.1 (TJ ad k.23).

1 The Sāṃkhya theory of pratibimba as introduced by Bhāvya in the TJ ad k.2

Tuning to Bhāvya’s discussion, let us first cite the opponent’s, viz. Sāṃkhya, theory of pratibimba as introduced by Bhāvya in the above section I.2, corresponding to the TJ on verse 2:

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3 D No.3856, P No.5256. For the title and translation of both MHK and TJ, see Saito [2005].
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[Translation]

“Intelligence (sattva) predominating in the mind (manas), pure consciousness (pumṣ) resembles the activity of intellect (buddhi) either by the appearance of a reflection or by the transformation [of pure consciousness]. (k.2)

Intelligence is said [by the Sāṃkhya] to have the nature of brightness (prakāśa, gsal ba). Predominating is ‘working most powerfully’, that is, the [mind] which has the predominance of intelligence is the mind in which intelligence predominates.

(P[ūrva-paśa]1) When an object is perceived by the mind (i.e. mental organ), the perceived reflection (*pratibimba, gzugs brnyan) comes to appear in pure consciousness. For instance, even when a reflection of the moon is seen on the still water, there is no change [in the water] at all. Likewise, pure consciousness being without change, the reflection of an object cognized by the intellect (buddhi, blo) also appears though there has been no change [in pure consciousness] at all.

(P2) Or [pure consciousness] resembles the intellect’s cognition of an object; therefore, it transforms (parināma, yongs su ’gyur ba) but does not change (vikṛti, ’gyur ba), like a reflection in the mirror.”

[Text]4

udbhūtasattvē manasi buddhivrtyanukāritā2/
pratibimbodayāt pumṣah parināmād athāpi vā// (k.2)
(1 emended; tadbhūtasattvē Ms, SG, N, L, cf.k.20c: udbhūtasattvē manasi.
2 emended; -anukāriṇāḥ Ms, SG, N, L, cf. Tib. and TJ ad k.22)
(yid la (=P; las D) snying stobs skyes pa can//
skyes bu’i gzugs brnyan ’byung ba ’am//
de bzhin yongs su ’gyur nas ni//
勃 jad pa yi rjes su byed// (k.2)

snying stobs ni gsal ba’i bdag nyid can du bstan pa’o// skyes pa ni lhag par ’jug pa ste/ gang
la snying stobs de skyes pa yod pa de ni yid las (=DP; read la) snying stobs skyes pa can noi//
(P1) yid kyis don rtogs par ’jug pa na rtogs pa’i gzugs brnyan skyes bu la ’byung bar ’gyur
ba ni ji ltar chu mi g-yo ba la zla ba’i gzugs brnyan mthong bar gyur kyang ’gyur ba ni nam
yang yod pa ma yin no// de bzhin du skyes bu las ’gyur ba med kyang blos yongs su shes pa’i
don gyi gzugs brnyan yang ’byung bar ’gyur la/ gyur pa nam yang yod pa ma yin no//
(P2) yang na blos don rtogs pa’i rjes su yang byed pas me long gi gzugs brnyan bzhin du
yongs su ’gyur ba yin gyi ’gyur ba ni ma yin no// (D Dza 229b7–230a3; P Dza 257a4–8)

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4 Hereafter, the Skt. text of MHK is based on my own edition collating Ms, SG, N and Tib, whereas TJ Tib. is based on sDe dge and Peking editions. For the Tibetan text of TJ, Chapters 3 and 6, see also Yasuma [2007] pp.94–228 and Hé [2011] pp.257–304 respectively. Nakada [1972a] and [1983a] provide us with the texts of both the first 7 verses, out of 65, of MHK VI and TJ on them.
As regards the above two reasons for pure consciousness’s resembling the activity of intellect, the paragraph (P1) explains how the reflection [of an object] appears in pure consciousness corresponding to still water, while the paragraph (P2) gives a brief explanation of pure consciousness’s transformation (parināma, yongs su ’gyur ba). In his explanation of the latter (P2), it is interesting to note that Bhavya introduces the example of a reflection in a mirror in which, unlike (P1), the reflection appears to correspond to the transformation of pure consciousness.

2 Bhavya’s critique of the Sāṃkhya theory of pratibimba in the TJ ad k.23

Let us now turn to the uttara-pakṣa or “author’s proposition”. The two verses kk.22 and 23 provide the author’s critique of the above-mentioned two reasons, i.e. parināmāt and pratibimbodayāt respectively.

[Translation]
(U[ttara-pakṣa]2) “Furthermore, the [Sāṃkhya] assertion that ‘pure consciousness resembles the activity of intellect (buddhi-vr̥tyanukārītā...pumṣah)’ (=k.2bc) is not proved. It is because

If pure consciousness transforms, pure consciousness is ‘lacking consciousness’, not non-cause, nor omnipresent, because it transforms, like milk. (k.22)

It means, pure consciousness is not ‘having consciousness’, because it transforms, like milk. Pure consciousness is not non-cause, [because it transforms], like milk. Pure consciousness is not omnipresent, [because it transforms], like milk.”

(U1) “Further, to those who assert that pure consciousness is liberated from the appearance of a reflection:

Even if the conscious (viz. pure consciousness) does not change, those faults as mentioned [in k.22] follow because it is the cause of a reflection, like a face as the original [of its reflection on water and so on]. (k.23)

(P1’) The opponent’s [= Sāṃkhya] assertion is as follows: “Even when a face as the original [of its reflection] and the cause of the appearance of a reflection on water and so forth is near, the [face] does not transform. Likewise, the consciousness (*cetanā, rtogs pa) of the conscious (citi, sems) does not transform even when it is near [to the object], which, only by being at a close distance, has the nature of an assisting cause for the reflection of an object seen by the intellect (buddhi, shes pa).”

To this also [we reply as follows]: Having the nature of cause like the original [of its reflection], pure consciousness is without consciousness, not non-cause, nor omnipresent, like a face as the original [of its reflection, i.e., facial image]. This is because [the opponent’s reason: “pratibimbodayāt pumṣah (k.2c)”, “pratibimbasya hetuvāt (k.23a)”] is the opposite of the property-possessor itself (*dharma-svarūpa-viparīṭa-sādhana) which is defined [by the Sāṃkhya as “having consciousness” (cetana, rtogs pa can), “non-cause” (ahetu, rgyu
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med pa), and “omnipresent” (svaratrāga, khyab pa) in contradiction to the cause of the appearance of a reflection.

[U2] gang yang skyes bu ni blo ’jug pa’i rjes su byed pa yin no zhes bya bar ’dod pa de yang mi ’grub ste/ gang gi phyir/

acetanā 1na cāhetur1 naiva sarvagataḥ pumān/
parināmār2 payovat syār2 pumṣah parinātir yaddi/ (k.22)
(1 = Ms, SG; na vā hetur L. 2 = Ms, SG; yathā dadhmaḥ L)

gal te skyes bu ’gyur zhe na/
skies bu rтроgs pa med pa dang/
rgyu med khyab pa ma yin te/
skies bu ’gyur phyir ’o ma bzhin// (k.22)

sems ni ’gyur ba med na yang/
gzi gzugs bnyan gya ni rgyu yin phyir/
ji skad smras pa’i skyon ldan par/
’byung ste gdong gi gzugs bnyan bzhin// (k.23)

(P1) ji ltar gdong gi gzugs chu la sog pa la gzugs bnyan ’byung ba’i rgyu nye bar gnas kyang yongs su ’gyur ba med pa de bzhin du/ sms kyi rтоgs pa yang shes pas bltas pa’i don gya gzugs bnyan nye bar gnas pa tsam phan par byed pa nyid kyi rgyu’i ngo bor nye bar gnas na yang yongs su ’gyur ba med pa yin no zhes bya ba ’di ni pha rol po’i ’dod pa yin no/

’dir yang gzugs bnyan bzhin du rgyu’i ngo bor gyur pa nyid kyi skyes bu ni gdong gi gzugs bnyan bzhin du rтоgs pa med pa nyid dang/ rgyu med pa nyid dang/ khyab pa ma yin pas chos can gya rang gi go bo las bzung pa yin pa’i phyir gzugs bnyan ’byung ba’i rgyu dang ’gal ba’i don du gnas pa nyid yin no/ (D Dza 234a1–4; P Dza 262a5–b2)

(In the above text, the double-underlined gzugs bnyan is to be read as gzugs (*bimba))

Bhavya’s critique of the opponent’s reason “parināmār” (k.2d’) found in the above (U2) is rather simple. He points out three consequences, all of which are unacceptable by the Sāṃkhya, who traditionally define pure consciousness (puruṣa, skyes bu) as having consciousness (cetanā, see k.15; SK.11), non-cause (ahetu, probably = aprasavātikā [cf. k.1]
and aprasavadharmin [cf. SK.11]), and omnipresent (sarvagata [kk.16, 22], vyāpin [SK.10]).

In contrast, his discussion against the opponent’s reason “pratibimbodayārī” (k.2c’) given in the above (U1) is seemingly unclear regarding his understanding of whether the quoted assertion (P1’) has the same meaning as that given in (P1). In the above (U1), the author Bhavya does not clearly explain whether pure consciousness corresponds to “the still water” as found in (P1) or the original (bimba, gzugs) of its reflection (pratibimba, gzugs brnyan) given in the above simile. However, judging from his introductory words to verse 23 and his reference to pure consciousness by its character of “assisting cause” (*upakāri-hetu, phan par byed pa nyid kyi rgyu) rather than a “cause” (hetu, rgyu) as attributed to the “face as the original [of its reflection]” (mukhabimba, gdong gi gzugs), it is most probable that here too Bhavya regards pure consciousness as corresponding to the water on which the reflection of a face appears but not to the face as the original of its reflection on the water. In this interpretation, both pure consciousness and the face as the original of its reflection have in common their characteristic as a cause. Only when they are placed at a close distance to each other do they both work for a reflection of the original face, having equally no change before and after the appearance of the facial reflection. This interpretation can also be attested by his discussion given in the TJ ad MHK, Chapter 3, verse 53.

3 Bhavya’s critique of the Saṁkhya theory of pratibimba in the TJ ad MHK III, k.53

The relevant discussion is found in the context of Bhavya’s criticism of sense organs (kk.45–65) in the TJ, Chapter 3, titled “Tattvajñānasāna” (De kho na nyid kyi shes pa ’tshol ba) or “Searching for the Knowledge of Reality”, specifically in his critique of pure consciousness as the agent of seeing, i.e. one who sees (k.53). The following is the Saṁkhya assertion (P3) followed by Bhavya’s refutation (U3):

[Translation]

(P3) “The Sāṁkhya said, ‘Our established tenet is this: A sense organ connects itself with its object. Subsequently the mind (i.e. mental organ) discerns the object connected with the sense organ. ‘I’-consciousness adheres to that discerned by the mind. The intellect thinks of that adhered to by ‘I’-consciousness. That object thought of by the intellect appears in pure consciousness. For example, we make expressions such as ‘the appearance of a reflection of the moon’s form is seen on the still water which lies [working] as an assistant, only by its being at a close distance.’ and so on. Likewise, when one nature (dharma, chos) arises and another nature ceases in pure consciousness, i.e. an entity with a certain existence, the own-nature of pure consciousness is not damaged nor is [pure consciousness] bereft of original nature. Therefore, pure consciousness is not transient, not without own-nature, not many, nor non-agent.’ ”

(U3) “To this [the author of the MHK, Bhāviveka] replies:

(1 = N, L, Tib. rtag tu; yatah Ms, SG )
It is untenable that this [pure consciousness] is one who sees, because the latter relies on eyes (i.e. visual organ) etc., like the mind (i.e. mental organ, which relies on eyes, etc.). It is also [untenable] because [the pure consciousness] transforms and the reflection [of an object] appears [in it]. (MHK III, k.53)

If this [pure consciousness] had the nature of one who sees (draṣṭr, lta ba po), it should be only tenable that it does not rely on a multitude [of the necessary conditions] of an agent. [However, in reality one who sees relies on those necessary conditions. Therefore,] it is also transient (anitya, mi rtag), because it transforms, like milk, etc. It is untenable that this [pure consciousness] is one who sees, because the reflection [of an object] appears [in it], like water on which the reflection of a face appears.”

[Text]
(P3) grangs can dag gis smras pa/ kho bo cag gi grub pa’i mtha ni ’di yin te/ dbang po ni yul dang phrad par byed do// dbang po dang phrad pa’i yul la yid kyis rjes su gcod par byed do// yid kyis bcad pa la nga rgyal gyis rlom par byed do// nga rgyal gyis rlom pa la blos sems par byed do// blos bsams pa’i yul de skyes bu la snang bar ’gyur te/ dper na chu rnyog pa med pa nye bar gnas pa tsam gyis phan ’dogs par gnas pa’i nang du zla ba’i gzugs kyi gzugs brnyan shar ba la blta ba la soqs pa’i tha snyad du brjod pa yod pa de bzhin du skyes bu’i rdzas nges par gnas pa nyid la chos gzhan ’byung ba dang/ chos gzhan ’gag pa na skyes bu’i ngo bo nyid nyams par yang mi ’gyur la/ rang bzhin dang bral bar yang mi ’gyur bas de’i phyir skyes bu ni mi rtag pa yang ma yin la/ ngo bo nyid med pa yang ma yin/ du ma yang ma yin zhih byed pa ma yin pa yang ma yin no zhe na/ (U3) ’dir bshad pa/

na cāsyā draṣṭrā yuktā cakṣurādivyapekṣanāṭ/
manovat pariṇāmitvāt pratītimbodayãt tathā// (MHK III, k.53)
de ni lta po nyid mi rigs//
mig la soqs la bltos pa’i phyir//
yid bzhin yongs su ’gyur phyir dang//
de bzhin gzugs brnyan ’char phyir ro// (MHK III, k.53)

The above description of the Sāṃkhya theory of perception (P3) is rather clear-cut and provides us with a more detailed explanation of the pure consciousness’s involvement in the process of perception and understanding of the objects of sense organs than the above (P1) and (P1’). And pure consciousness is therein said to operate, just like the still water, as an

\[6\] = Ms, SG, E, L.
Assistant (*upakārin, pha n ’dogs pa), i.e. assisting cause, for the appearance of the reflection of an object.

Bhāviveka/Bhavya’s critique (U3) against this tenet of the Sāmkhya is also simple and quite like the Mādhyaṃkika’s discussion. Interestingly enough, the second and third reasons for the author’s discussion tally exactly with those found in the above (P2)(U2) and (P1)(U1) respectively. It is to be noted that unlike in (U1), Bhavya, the author of the TJ, adds to the third reason “pratibimbandayāt” the simile of “the water on which the reflection of a face appears” (bzhin gyi gzugs brnyan ’char ba’i chu bzhin no//= *mukhapratibimbodayāmbhovat). On the other hand, Bhavya gives the simile of milk, etc. (’o ma la sogs pa bzhin no//= *paya-ādivat) to the second reason: “parināmitvāt” in the same way as in (U2).

Conclusion

From the above discussion, we may draw the following conclusions. First, as far as Bhavya’s reference to the Sāmkhya theory of pratibimba is concerned, it can be safely concluded that as long as it resembles the activity of intellect (buddhi, blo/ shes pa), pure consciousness (puruṣa, skyes bu) is compared to the still water (ambhas) on which reflections (pratibimba) of the moon, etc., appear. The reflections there represent the objects finally discerned by the intellect in the process of perception and understanding.

Secondly, according to the Sāmkhya understanding as introduced by Bhavya, pure consciousness can indirectly experience the objects discerned by the intellect without any change (vikṛti, ’gyur ba) before and after its very experience.

Thirdly, on the other hand, according to Bhavya’s critique, the pratibimba theory in the above sense results in the unacceptable fault that pure consciousness operates as an assisting cause for the appearance of a reflection of the object discerned by the intellect, which contradicts some of the characteristics of pure consciousness as defined by Sāmkhya itself, such as non-cause, consciousness, and omnipresence.

Fourthly, as found in (P2) and (U2), it is interesting to note that besides the pratibimba theory, some of the then proponents of Sāmkhya also advocated pure consciousness’s transformation (parināma) theory when explaining how pure consciousness resembles the activity of intellect. A consideration of this topic remains a task for the future since the term “transformation” is used in the so-called Sāmkhya tradition in relation to original-matter (prakṛti, SK.16) or attributes (guna, SK.27), but not pure consciousness.

Lastly, as was shown in (U2), setting aside the inconsistent rendering of particular terms such as buddhi (blo/ sems pa) and acetana (rtogs [pa] med [pa]/ sems [pa] med [pa]), some of the Tibetan words used in Chapter 6 are worth reconsidering both in their context and in comparison with the Sanskrit text of those verses cited from the Madhyamakahrdayakārikā.

Abbreviations

E Ejima, Y., Chūgan-shisō no Tenkai (Development of the Mādhyaṃkika Philosophy in India), Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1980, pp.259–403: The Sanskrit text of
Bhāvaviveka’s *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* III. Tatttvajñānaisaṅgā, collated with its Tibetan version, and an Index of Sanskrit words.

**MHK**  
*Madhyamakahrdayakārikā*.

**Ms**  

**L**  
Lindtner [2001].

**N**  
Nakada [1972a].

**Pl, 2, 3**  
pūrva-pakṣa 1, 2, 3.

**SK**  
*Sāmkhyakārikā*.

**SG**  

**TJ**  
*Tarkajvālā*: D No.3856, P No.5256.

**U1, 2, 3**  
uttara-pakṣa 1, 2, 3.

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サーンキヤ派のpratibimba（影像）説に対するバヴィアの批判
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初期サーンキヤ派が導入した学説の一つにpratibimba（影像）説がある。この学説は、原質（prakrti）と純粋精神（puraṣa）との二元論に立脚する学説派にとって、いかにして原質由来の非精神的な知性（buddhi）等が知覚という精神的もといえる行為をなし、他方また、行為主体でないと規定された純粋精神が对象を知覚しその結果を享受する行為をなし得るのか、という根本問題への回答という文脈において導入された。じっと同学者で進行することなく、変化することがなく、遍在すると規定される一方、見る者、知る者、結果を享受する者等と伝統内の特徴づけられている。

サーンキヤ派のpratibimba説については従来の研究も少なくない。「中観心論」Madhyamakahrdayakārikāおよびその注釈「論理玄論」Tarkajñālāを通して、バヴィアによる学説批判を論じた研究も複数ある。しかしながら、これらはいずれも「中観心論」のサンスクリット語写本の公開と本格的校訂研究以前の成果であり、同写本とその校訂作業を基礎にした本論題に関する再検証が待たれていた。一方、同派のpratibimba説は、イシュヴァラクリシュナ（4-5世紀）作『サーンキヤ・カーリーカ』には見られず、伝説では第二祖のアースリ師に帰せられるという。しかしながら、じっと同同師が引用されるのは、後世のヴァイシューシカ派やジャイナ教徒等の手になる論典あるいは注釈文献であり、そのテキストと解釈についても今なお問題を残している。

このような意味で、「中観心論」およびその注釈「論理玄論」の第6章「サーンキヤ派の真実（説への批判）入門」は、サーンキヤ派による初期のpratibimba説を伝える資料としてきわめて重要である。本稿では、総計65偈からなる同章の中から、pratibimba説の前主張を示す第2偈、および後主張にあたる第22、23両偈を、それぞれに対するバヴィアの注釈内容とともに分析する。これと併せ、「中観心論」第3章「真実知の探求」第53偈と同偈に対する注釈を手掛かりとして考察し、以下のような結論を得た。

(1) バヴィアが紹介するサーンキヤ派のpratibimba説によれば、純粋精神は、その上に月の影像などが映し出される静かな水に喰えられる。すなわち、影像を映す水に喰えられるのは知性（buddhi）ではなく純粋精神（puraṣa）である。
(2) したがって、このはあい静かな水に喰えられる純粋精神は、知性によって確認された知覚対象を間接的に喰し出すのであり、あたかもその映像の前後において水自体に変化がないように、純粋精神そのものに変化はないとサーンキヤ派は主張する。
(3) 以上のような前主張に対して、pratibimba説は「他のものを生じる原因とはならない」「変化しない」といわれる純粋精神の特質に矛盾すると、バヴィアは批判する。
(4) バヴィアはまた、初期のサーンキヤ派には、純粋精神が知性に似てはたくことの理由を、pratibimba説とならび、純粋精神の変異（parināma）によると説く学説があったことを紹介する。この学説に対してバヴィアは、精神性、非原因、遍在性という純粋精神本来の特質との矛盾を指摘して批判を加える。