

## The Aesthetics of Smell and Taste for the Appreciation of Landscape

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### 1. The Discovery of Landscape Feeling

In the aesthetic appreciation of nature, the objects are individual natural things contrasted with man-made objects, which include all kinds such as roses or mountains, each particular thing such as the moon, mount Fuji, my dog Taro or her cat Mike, and each natural event such as sunrise, rainbow, rain and storm. But a 'landscape' means a place that includes many different natural things and events, where a rainbow appears at the ridge of a mountain and a wind, whispering through the plain, brings a subtle fragrance of flowers. It is therefore an environment which we can look at, standing within it, as a whole.

It is doubtful that people have appreciated landscapes aesthetically in all ages and places. The original Old High German word 'landscap' meant a common region of a historical, political, and economic unity for its inhabitants, and was a geographical term. Before Petrarch went up Mont Ventoux on the 26<sup>th</sup> April, 1336, and wrote a letter: "At first I stood there almost benumbed, overwhelmed by a gale such as I had never felt before and by the unusually open and wide view,"<sup>1</sup> Western medieval people, as Kenneth Clark says, were not interested in mountains. What enchanted them was 'paradise'—the Persian for 'a walled enclosure' against dark forests and dangerous mountains—, that is 'the Hortus Conclusus (the closed garden)' in which flowers of various colors are in full bloom, vines and fruit trees grow thick, and sheep are bred. Their way of depicting nature was "to put together the precious fragments of nature" such as the carpets of flowers, the little woods, the fantastic rocks, the formalized trees "into some decorative whole," which was only changed by "a new idea of space and a new perception of light"<sup>2</sup> during the Renaissance. However, according to Gombrich, there is still "an emphasis on human activity which separates it from the idea of 'pure' landscape"<sup>3</sup> just as the following passage from Alberti's *On the Art of Building in Ten Books* shows: "We are particularly delighted when we see paintings of pleasant landscapes or harbors, scenes of fishing, hunting, bathing, or country sports, and flowery and leafy views."<sup>4</sup> Sixteenth-century landscapes were still not 'views' but largely accumulations of individual features. But before long, the painters studied "the effect through which an illusion of atmosphere and distance is obtained," which led to "the discovery of Alpine scenery." Thus, Gombrich says: "while it is usual to represent the 'discovery of the world' as the underlying motive for the development of landscape painting, we are almost tempted to reverse the formula and assert the priority of

<sup>1</sup> Francesco Petrarca, The Ascent of Mont Ventoux, transl. by H. Nachod, in: *The Renaissance Philosophy of Man*, Selections in translation, ed. by E. Cassirer, P. O. Kristeller, J. H. Randall, JR., The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1948, p. 41.

<sup>2</sup> Kenneth Clark, *Landscape into Art*, Penguin Books, 1956, p. 29.

<sup>3</sup> E. H. Gombrich, The Renaissance Theory of Art and the Rise of Landscape, in: *Norm and Form*, Phaidon, 1966, p. 111.

<sup>4</sup> Leon Battista Alberti, *On the Art of Building in Ten Books* (c. 1450), transl. by J. Rykwert, N. Leach, R. Tavernor, The MIT Press, 1988, p. 299.

landscape painting over landscape ‘feeling’.<sup>5</sup> In fact, it was as a technical term used by painters that the word ‘landscape’ was introduced into the English-speaking world at the beginning of the seventeenth century.

Probably, the concept and the feeling of landscape in the sense that we today understand have formed together with the development of landscape-painting since the sixteenth century, and therefore should be thought of as being characteristic of the modern age. Eighteenth-century aesthetics of the picturesque and the vogue of picturesque tours belong to this tradition. Allen Carlson, who calls the paradigm for appreciating the natural environment as a landscape painting ‘the landscape model’, is critical because this reduces the natural environment within which we live to a two dimensional “scene or view” represented only visually, and instead proposes ‘an environmental model’ for the appreciation of nature. Natural environments are for us surroundings experienced not only visually but with the whole range of senses, and therefore “smell, touch, and taste, and even warmth and coolness, barometric pressure and humidity”<sup>6</sup> are possibly relevant.

For Arnold Berleant, too, the aesthetically appreciated nature is environment as “nature experienced, nature lived” by us who are “continuous with environment, an integral part of its processes.” And he proposes an “aesthetics of engagement” in place of the Kantian ‘aesthetics of disinterestedness’. We step into the environment with our body and walk through it. Unlike works of the many arts in which one or two senses dominate our direct sensory experience, “environment activates the entire range of our sensory capacities.”<sup>7</sup>

Yi-Fu Tuan, a phenomenological geographer who expressed “all of the human being’s affective ties with the material environment” with the word “topophilia”, describes the aesthetic experience of nature as follows:

“An Adult must learn to be yielding and careless like a child if he were to enjoy nature polymorphously. He needs to slip into old clothes so that he could feel free to stretch out on the hay beside the brook and bathe in a meld of physical sensations: the smell of hay and of horse dung; the warmth of the ground, its hard and soft contours; the warmth of the sun tempered by breeze; the tickling of an ant making its way up the calf of his leg; the play of shifting leaf shadows on his face; the sound of water over the pebbles and boulders, the sound of cicadas and distant traffic. Such an environment might break all the formal rules of euphony and aesthetics, substituting confusion for order, and yet be wholly satisfying.”<sup>8</sup>

In the modern aesthetics based on the model of fine arts, the ‘aesthetic’ qualities have been supposed to be related exclusively to the ‘higher’ senses of sight and hearing, while there is only bodily sensuous pleasure, but not any aesthetic one, for the ‘inferior’ senses of smell and taste. If it is so, then our experience of landscape could rarely, if at all, be ‘aesthetic’. In contrast, if the aesthetic experience of landscape covers ‘the entire range of our sensory capacities’, then ‘the

<sup>5</sup> Gombrich, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

<sup>6</sup> Allen Carlson, *The Aesthetics of Environment*, Temple U. P., 1992, p. 48.

<sup>7</sup> Arnold Berleant, *The Aesthetics of Environment*, Temple U. P., 1992, p. 28.

<sup>8</sup> Tuan, *Topophilia*, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall Inc., 1974, p. 96.

aesthetic' should be conceived of as including the traditionally 'inferior' senses such as smell, taste, and touch, besides the privileged 'aesthetic' qualities modern aesthetics has attributed to the 'superior' senses of sight and hearing. But if the aesthetic experience of landscape is a confused one without order ('a meld of physical sensations' as Tuan says), how can we call it 'aesthetic'? Can't there be any aesthetic order in the 'physical sensations' including smell and taste? Anyway, to think about the beauty of nature and landscape is to pose a difficult question concerning the ambiguous concept of 'aesthetic=aisthesis' with which modern aesthetics began, and to make a new approach to it.

## 2. 'The Sensuous' and 'The Aesthetic'

In treating aesthetic objects and aesthetic experience in his book *Aesthetics* published in 1957, M. Beardsley's strategy is to amplify a model case of paintings as 'visual designs' which everyone would agree to call aesthetic objects, *mutatis mutandis*, to music and literature. In order to clear away the original ambiguity of the coined word 'aesthetica', he tackles the question "how to distinguish aesthetic objects from other perceptual objects," and answers it by setting a level of perception in the "phenomenal field" which refers to "all that one is aware of, or conscious of, at a given time." A painting, as a physical object, consists of a canvas and the accumulation of paints. But in its phenomenal field, we find "qualities of the phenomenal painting" such as "its redness, warmth of color, shape, and position within the visual field," or "the cheerfulness of the painting, the rhythmic order of its shapes, the sharp contrasts of its hues."<sup>9</sup> Then, Beardsley tries to distinguish in the phenomenal field specifically aesthetic objects from general perceptual objects in terms of "a set of characteristics that all aesthetic objects possess," i.e., "aesthetic qualities." Aesthetic objects have some noteworthy features in common; for example, "they present themselves as bounded segments of phenomenal fields, and have internal heterogeneity but with enough order to make them perceivable as wholes."<sup>10</sup> Thus "a blank sheet of paper is not a design" because it contains no heterogeneity. From this standpoint of Beardsley's, "a clear blue sky, a single note on a French horn, or a whiff of perfume"<sup>11</sup> do not constitute aesthetic objects.

Such an approach as Beardsley's of distinguishing objects with specific 'aesthetic' qualities from other objects is no less classic than Kant's idea of 'uniformity in variety', which has not lost its significance today at all. Kant's theory of taste accomplished, so to speak, a 'Copernican turn' from the classical objective criteria of beauty to the subjective ability of taste, which easily led to so-called 'aesthetic-attitude theory'. Kantian theory of taste supposes that a specific kind of object triggers a reaction in the subject, while aesthetic-attitude theories after Kant claim, as George Dickie says, that "either a certain mode of perception or consciousness is a *necessary condition* for the apprehension and appreciation of the aesthetic character which an object possesses independently of that mode of perception or consciousness." They claim that "a certain mode of perception or consciousness *imposes* an aesthetic character on (any) object," and suppose a specific mode

<sup>9</sup> M. Beardsley, *Aesthetics*, Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1957, p. 38.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 63.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 89.

of “aesthetic perception” different from “ordinary perception.” ‘Disinterestedness’ is, it is sure, another condition for the aesthetic attitude. Important is that, according to this theory, “any object can become an aesthetic object if only aesthetic perception is turned on it.”<sup>12</sup> Then, this theory leads to yet another theory.

According to Harold Osborne, who says that the aesthetic attitude can be taken up towards anything at all—‘even a sausage’, such an attitude is “a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for there to be aesthetic experience in the full sense of the word.” When we judge aesthetically, “we do not judge about sensuous pleasure or displeasure but about the adequacy of the experienced object to sustain attention with heightened awareness.” Thus, compared to ordinary “practical perception,” aesthetic perception, which is dwelling upon the sensory content of perception, reaches to the intensified, expanded, enhanced, enriched awareness of “the sensory nature” of perceptual experience, and results in “another kind of pleasure which is attendant on the enrichment of awareness itself.”<sup>13</sup> From this viewpoint, as opposed to Beardsley’s claim that just one single sensation like a color, a note, or a whiff of perfume cannot be an aesthetic object, just a single sensation can be aesthetic insofar as it gives us a purified and intensified awareness of its nature. In fact, Osborne says, when we commonly speak of good and bad ‘tone’ in music we do not mean a quality of sound “which arouses immediate sensuous pleasure like the songs of birds or the tolling of a distant bell,” but a quality “which invites and fulfills enhanced attention to the sensory nature of the sounded notes.”<sup>14</sup> Virgil Aldrich similarly distinguishes “experience of things in the aesthetic mode of perception from experience of things in the perceptual modes that ground nonaesthetic characterizations,” and says that we attend to “such characteristics as intensities or values of colors and sounds” with aesthetic perception “heightened above the ordinary threshold of bare recognitions that serve practical purposes,” which is “an ‘impressionistic’ way of looking.”<sup>15</sup>

With these theories, however, which suppose a specific attitude of perceiving an object as aesthetic and define its aesthetic qualities by means of “quantifications of our attention (as of its purity, steadfastness, intensity),” as Joseph Margolis criticizes, “we should then have made a complete circuit.”<sup>16</sup> Even if we insist that any qualities could be transformed into aesthetic ones simply by concentrating our consciousness on them, it would not be usual that people try to attend aesthetically to litter in the street or to rotten things. It is sometimes true that people do have an interest in the compositions or hues of photographs of traffic accidents, murder sites, and wars. Andy Warhol made his ‘*Death and Disaster*’ series and there exists junk art or found art which both use garbage and waste as their materials. Part of the photographs of victims slaughtered by the Pol Pot faction were purchased and exhibited by MoMA. In one kind of contemporary art, we can find a strong interest in, or a sort of obsession with things Julia Kristeva calls ‘abject’—rotten leftovers, excrement, body fluids, innards and so on which are ugly and disgusting to the usual sensibility.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>12</sup> G. Dickie, *Art and the Aesthetic*, Cornell U. P., 1974, p. 57.

<sup>13</sup> Harold Osborne, Odours and Appreciation, in: *British Journal of Aesthetics*, vol. 17, No. 1, 1977, p. 39.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 41.

<sup>15</sup> Virgil C. Aldrich, *Philosophy of Art*, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963, p. 22.

<sup>16</sup> Joseph Margolis, *The Language of Art & Art Criticism*, Wayne State U. P., 1965, p. 28.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Kiyokazu Nishimura, The Aesthetics of Abject Art, in: *JTLA* (Journal of the Faculty of Letters, The

Yet, it is also natural that Thierry de Duve confessed his embarrassment about the aesthetic attitude which he took unconsciously toward those photographs of victims taken by a young photographer employed by Pol Pot.<sup>18</sup> Beardsley is notably leaning toward aesthetic-attitude theory in his article ‘The Aesthetic Point of View’ and says that “there is nothing—no object or event—that is per se wrong to consider from the aesthetic point of view.” But at the same time he says: “Suddenly a whole new field of aesthetic gratification opens up. Trivial objects, the accidental, the neglected, the meretricious and vulgar, all take on new excitement” by “the way of aestheticizing everything—of taking the aesthetic point of view wherever possible,” and he finds there “the dilemma of aesthetic education.”<sup>19</sup>

Certainly, we can find a radical tendency of ‘aestheticization’ in some claims of ‘the aesthetics of everyday life’ which have attracted attention lately. Joseph Kupfer, for example, takes ‘art’ in the traditional sense as a paradigm of aesthetic experience, but finds aesthetic experiences in various realms of everyday life. “A basketball game is more enjoyable when appreciated as an aesthetic whole, with its changing rhythms, its sudden grace, and its dramatic tensions finally, decisively, resolved.”<sup>20</sup> The existence of harmony between parts and the whole in an aesthetic object supposes that “an aesthetic object consists of a community of parts or members.” Then, when family members, workers or students cooperate with each other to organize a harmonious community like a family, a workplace or a classroom, there are established “aesthetic relations” which stand in analogy to “the communal structure of the aesthetic object.”<sup>21</sup> David Novitz says that we need “organized bodies of skills designed to serve a certain end” in order to work well or to live a good life, and that “the creativity of the fine arts is to be found as well in the practical skills, the arts, of everyday living.”<sup>22</sup> So for Novitz artistic values and aesthetic values are interchangeable. In these aestheticizations of the world, do we possibly find, as Wolfgang Iser says, “a reversal of the relationship between the artistic and the aesthetic”? Formerly, “the concept of art was meant to provide the core concept of the aesthetic...Now art is considered as just one province of the aesthetic...” Thus, Iser says that art is now conceived as “an intensification of the aesthetic,” and that for this reason sport “might well enter the predicational sphere of art”<sup>23</sup> in our days when sport has become “a show for the amusement of the entertainment society” and drawn “the increased attention to the aesthetic element in its performance...to the spectator’s aesthetic delight.”

Most of these claims of expanding the aesthetic to any realms of everyday life and of discarding the boundaries between traditional ‘fine arts’ and ‘arts of living’ are based on John Dewey’s theory of aesthetic experience. Dewey uses the word ‘art’ first of all in the general sense of

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<sup>18</sup> Thierry de Duve, *Art in the Face of Radical Evil*, in: *Congress Book 1. XVIIIth International Congress of Aesthetics*, published by SANART, 2008.

<sup>19</sup> M. Beardsley, *The Aesthetic Point of View*, ed. by M. J. Wreen & D. M. Callen, Cornell U. P., 1982, p. 31.

<sup>20</sup> Joseph H. Kupfer, *Experience as Art: Aesthetics in Everyday Life*, State Univ. of New York Press, 1983, p. 3.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 71..

<sup>22</sup> David Novitz, *The Boundaries of Art: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Place of Art in Everyday Life*, Cybereditions, 2001, p. 86.

<sup>23</sup> Wolfgang Iser, *Sport Viewed Aesthetically, and Even as Art?*, in: Andrew Light, Jonathan M. Smith (eds.) *The Aesthetics of Everyday Life*, Columbia U. P., New York, 2005, p. 140.

the classical Latin word ‘ars’. When “a process of doing or making” runs its course from disorder and tension to balance and harmony, and reaches “a consummation”<sup>24</sup> through “ordered and organized movement,” Dewey says, a piece of its work is “finished in a way that is satisfactory” and “we have *an* experience” which is a whole and carries with it its own individualizing quality and self-sufficiency whether working with “useful or technological art,” playing a game of baseball, carrying on a conversation, eating a meal, or taking a part in a political campaign. And here, Dewey finds an “artistic structure” and claims that “it is esthetic.” Since ‘artistic’ refers primarily to the act of production and ‘esthetic’ to that of perception and enjoyment, “artistic and esthetic quality is implicit in every normal experience.” What we call ‘fine art’ in particular “brings to living consciousness an experience that is unified and total” which is also implicit in every normal experience. Fine art makes it possible for us to experience such ‘an experience’ as “*distinctively* esthetic.”<sup>25</sup>

Now, let us turn our back on the theories which regard all ‘arts’ on the basis of the classical word ‘ars=art’ as essentially one and the same, and on those which claim that anything can become an aesthetic object if only the right aesthetic attitude is taken. Let us question again the difference and relationship between the dimension of non-aesthetic sensuous experience and that of an aesthetic one.

### 3. Aesthetic Framing

Some theories sketched above show typical ways in which modern aesthetics has discussed aesthetic objects, aesthetic experience, and aesthetic attitude, and not all of their claims fail to grasp any aspects of our real experience. Beardsley’s description of an object’s aesthetic characteristics—bounded segments of phenomenal fields which have enough order to make the object perceivable as a whole—, for example, might be one condition for an object to be considered aesthetic, though abstract and too general. The failure common to the traditional theories about ‘the aesthetic’ results from conceptions that a sort of quality properly named ‘aesthetic’, differentiated from ‘the sensuous’, exists as such somewhere, phenomenal or potentially, which we can find out by taking a proper attitude, and that we can define ‘the aesthetic’ by enumerating such qualities as we find in this way. As opposed to this, Frank Sibley did not find the aesthetic qualities as potentially existent in objects and developed a very persuasive theory that the experiences of aesthetic qualities are our particular ‘responses’ to ‘non-aesthetic’ features belonging to objects and thus “depend upon”<sup>26</sup> the non-aesthetic features. However, he did not explain in any more detail what kind of relationship the ‘dependence’ of aesthetic experiences on non-aesthetic features is. He just says that our aesthetic responses to non-aesthetic and sensuous features and the aesthetic concepts which describe those responses are social and cultural common properties, and learned and passed down from generation to generation. Moreover, he simply presupposes as a fact of experience the perception of non-aesthetic features on the one hand, and the experience of aesthetic qualities as our reaction to them

<sup>24</sup> John Dewey, *Art as Experience*, Minton, Balch & Company: New York, 7<sup>th</sup>. impression, 1934, p. 35.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 55.

<sup>26</sup> Frank Sibley, Aesthetic Concepts, in: *The Philosophical Review*, vol. 68, No. 4, 1959, p. 424. Cf. my paper, The Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature, in: *JTLA*, Vol. 32, 2007, p. 25f.

on the other. Yet, what we want to know is just what sort of dependence it is, and how our ‘aesthetic’ responses are caused after discriminating non-aesthetic qualities through the five senses.

Let us paraphrase this question more simply as follows: what difference is there between a blue panel and Yves Klein’s *Monochrome bleu sans titre (IKB75)*? We could use the Klein as a color sample of a particular blue called ‘International Klein Blue’ when we bring people who do not know the color ‘IKB’ to the painting and indicate it. Then we experience simply the non-aesthetic and sensuous features of this painting just as a blue panel. But when we look at this as a work of contemporary art and say aesthetically ‘it is elegant’ or ‘deep’, we experience its aesthetic qualities. Accordingly, we can describe one and physically the same blue panel in three different ways as follows:

- (a) This is a color sample of an unique ‘blue’.
  - (b) The ‘blue’ this sample cloth shows is ‘chic’ as a suit material.
  - (c) This is a work by Eve Klein, *Monochrome bleu sans titre (IKB75)*, which is ‘elegant’ and ‘deep’.
- These three descriptions can be, according to Sibley, divided into non-aesthetic features (a) of the object and its aesthetic qualities (b, c). Then, the question is what it means when we say that three different experiences and descriptions are possible concerning the physically and therefore sensuously identical blue panel; and what makes this transfiguration—from the sensation of its non-aesthetic features to an experience of its aesthetic qualities—possible, if the dependence of the latter upon the former is not condition-governed.

For Kant, as widely known, a simple color like the green of a plain and a simple note on a violin are no more than “just agreeable sensations (bloß angenehme Empfindungen).”<sup>27</sup> These simple colors or musical notes can be “counted as the beautiful”<sup>28</sup> only if they are put into “the formal determination of the unity in diversity” and produce “the beauty of their composition.”<sup>29</sup> Beardsley also claims, as mentioned above, that ‘a blank sheet of paper is not a design’ and therefore not an aesthetic object, and that ‘a clear blue sky, a single note on a French horn, or a whiff of perfume’ does not constitute an aesthetic object, saying that a visual design as an aesthetic object must have a unity, an order, and some heterogeneity. By contrast, Harold Osborne claims, on the basis of ‘aesthetic-attitude’ theory, that we can experience a simple smell aesthetically as well as a color or a musical note by sustaining attention with heightened awareness to the sensory content itself.

When a piano tuner listens attentively to each note of a piano, what he tries to catch must be its sensory purity, however intense his attention towards it may be, and we do not say that a blue in a color sample book, perceived separately, is chic or elegant. In reality, to perceive a color or a musical note separately is exceptional in everyday life, not to mention a hospital or a laboratory of physiology. Usually, we look at a color sample as, say, the color of a suit we have a tailor make, and according to the standard of the particular aesthetic qualities proper to the concept of a suit the fashion industry has established we say that this dark blue is more chic and elegant than an indigo

<sup>27</sup> I. Kant, *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (1790), Dritte Auflage, Berlin, 1799, S. 212.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, S. 40.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, S. 212.

in different hue and saturation.

We might neglect a simple blue panel as a meaningless empty panel. But it is an artwork if we know that it is Yves Klein's *Monochrome bleu sans titre (IKB75)*, and a critic might say that it is 'empty', which means, as Danto says, not "literally empty,"<sup>30</sup> i. e., non-aesthetically empty, but aesthetically empty. According to Klein, it is without any dimension, immaterial, and therefore absolute. It is certain that the simple non-aesthetic quality of a blue panel can be transfigured into an aesthetic one not by just taking an arbitrary aesthetic attitude or viewpoint towards it, but by the artworld which makes one of the two blue, indiscernible panels an artwork. It is important, as Danto rightly says, not that the particular aesthetic qualities an object possesses in themselves make it an artwork, but on the contrary that the aesthetic qualities proper to the object can be experienced exclusively according to an appropriate frame set up by conferring the status of an artwork on it. Here, then, is not a discovering and an actualizing of the potential aesthetic qualities of an object with an arbitrary change of subjective aesthetic viewpoint or attitude, but a social, cultural, and conventional shift of the aesthetic organization of the non-aesthetic perceptions of the object under an appropriate frame based on a particular concept (e.g., an artworld)<sup>31</sup>. Let us call this social and cultural discourse and behavior 'aesthetic framing'.

Paul Ziff claims that "anything that can be viewed is a fit object for aesthetic attention." Even the litter scattered on the street can be seen as "an object for aesthetic attitude: a manifestation of a fundamental physical factor: entropy."<sup>32</sup> Besides, there does really exist junk art. Yet, Ziff makes an additional remark that one must "create an appropriate frame and enviroing conditions for what one sees" within limits and depending on one's power. In this respect, he does not take sides with so-called aesthetic attitude theory. His idea of 'an appropriate frame' can be understood, say, as a 'concept' like art, or an 'artworld' which makes art possible. If we dare to enumerate some conditions for the aesthetic organization of non-aesthetic perceptions of an object within the realm framed by a concept like art, they could be what those philosophers we have mentioned above almost unanimously accept as the most universal elements of aesthetic qualities: the order or relation of colors, forms or sounds perceived in an object, or its coherence and totality. But here, we should not say with Beardsley that when, for instance, a simple panel has 'internal heterogeneity but with enough order to make it perceivable as a whole' it is an aesthetic object like a painting. In truth, this order and relation, coherence and totality are not logically "condition-governed"<sup>33</sup> by non-aesthetic features perceived in the object and are therefore not definable in a general way. We should say, on the contrary, that when such a panel is acknowledged by the artworld as a painting

<sup>30</sup> A. Danto, *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace*, Harvard U. P., 1981, p. 2.

<sup>31</sup> Ziff says that "[F]iguratively and on occasion literally speaking works of art are framed objects" (ibid., p. 287). The 'frame' in the literal sense means, for example, the frame of a painting or the pedestal of a sculpture. The word 'figuratively' here means the fact that "works of art are framed mounted hung illuminated displayed exhibited" (p. 288). In this respect, the concept of 'aesthetic framing' is not identical with Derrida's concept of 'parergon' which is more similar to the word 'framed' of Ziff, although 'aesthetic framing' involves the dimension of 'parergon'.

<sup>32</sup> Paul Ziff, Anything Viewed, in: E. Saarinen and others (eds.), *Essays in Honour of JAAKKO HINTIKKA, on the Occasion of His fiftieth Birthday on January 12, 1979*, D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979, p. 291.

<sup>33</sup> Sibley, *Aesthetic Concepts*, p. 424.

it will have a *frame* proper to a painting and therefore also the order or relation within its ‘bounded segments of phenomenal fields’, which transfigures the panel, making it now an object experienced with regard to the aesthetic qualities proper to a painting. In organizing various non-aesthetic features into an appropriate order under a particular aesthetic framing, a selection is inevitable. While the coughing in the concert hall is usually neglected as a noise, there can exist an artwork like John Cage’s *4’33”*, which focuses upon and organizes these noises as music under a radically new framing and makes the audience experience them aesthetically. Certainly, people must learn the required social discourse and behavior and acquire different acts of “aspection,”<sup>34</sup> as Ziff says, on the basis of some knowledge of the genres, skills, histories and styles of artworks in order to notice the aesthetic order organized under such a fundamental aesthetic framing. It is the critics, specialists of this knowledge, who help to indicate, ostensibly, the underlying aesthetic framing of a particular period and culture and bring people to notice it and to ‘aspect’ the aesthetic qualities of particular artworks.

Aesthetic framing is not restricted to the artworld. According to the mode of aesthetic framing based on the taste of their societies and times, woodworkers selected some non-aesthetic practical qualities of lines, forms, and planes which the legs or backrest of a chair have in terms of its function, and composed them into aesthetic qualities such as the pageantry and grace of Baroque and Rococo, or as the simpleness and sharpness of Art Deco and Bauhaus. Essential in the aesthetic framing of a practical object such as a desk, therefore, is not the ‘disinterestedness’ of seeing it only as a visual design in disregard of its concept and function, but a particular “aesthetic interest”<sup>35</sup> corresponding to the ordinary and practical interests concerning its functions and structures, as Sibley correctly mentions. Urmson hits the same mark when he explains with “the functional view of aesthetics” the fact that “we like our motor-cars in attractive tones and we like them to look fast.” While the smooth movement of an engine and its speed are “non-aesthetically desirable” in terms of the function of a car, “looking to possess some quality which is non-aesthetically desirable that matters”<sup>36</sup> contributes to the aesthetic quality of the car.

It is, simply speaking, because we respond aesthetically to some aesthetic qualities of an object that they belong to a specifically aesthetic order apart from the logical or functional order of the object. Such an argument seems to be ‘circular’. Yet, here is not a logical and meaningless ‘vicious circle’, but ‘a structural circle’ in an aesthetic community which shares the aesthetic framing proper to it<sup>37</sup>. The rules for using the word ‘art’ in a period, in a culture, are given by the artworld consisting of art history and art theories, and enable the creation and experience of aesthetic qualities in the realm of art, which is also a structural circle in the artworld. The artworld is the discourse of aesthetic framing which determines what to create as an art and how to respond aesthetically to it. It is on the basis of this discourse that we can say there exist experiences of aesthetic qualities

<sup>34</sup> Paul Ziff, *Reasons in Art Criticism*, in: I. Scheffler (ed.), *Philosophy and Education*, Boston, 1958, p. 234.

<sup>35</sup> Sibley, *Aesthetic Concepts*, p. 449.

<sup>36</sup> J. O. Urmson, *What Makes a Situation Aesthetic?*, in: *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary Volume, Vol. 31, 1957, p. 89.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Kiyokazu Nishimura, *The Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature*, in: *JTLA* (Journal of the Faculty of Letters, The University of Tokyo, Aesthetics), Vol. 32, 2007, p. 26.

proper to art. The concept of ‘aesthetic’ is empty in its intension and logically indefinable, and only refers to the general rules for using the word ‘aesthetic’ in a period, in a culture. Not only art but also non-artistic artifacts have their own aesthetic framings (which determine our particular response, for example, to cars or swords as we appreciate the speediness and elegance of a car or the coolness and serenity of a sword) apart from their logical order or technical functions. And with regard to nature, as I have argued on another occasion, we have a concept of ‘natureworld’<sup>38</sup> based on a “common-sense/scientific knowledge”<sup>39</sup> of nature which enables us to appreciate natural things, events, and landscapes not as artworks nor landscape paintings but as ‘natural’, and we also have a framing determining our ‘aesthetic’ response to nature which a particular period and culture acknowledges as appropriate. The rules for using the word ‘aesthetic’ are given by a society and its tradition, and shared by the members of the community through learning them. In fact, it is by this sharing of a particular aesthetic framing for the organization of non-aesthetic sensuous features into responses the society has named ‘aesthetic’ in its tradition that there exist distinctive responses called ‘aesthetic’ in each society. This is what the structural circle in an aesthetic community means. Consequently, we can determine the concrete meaning of the word ‘aesthetic’ only by describing individual experiences which we have as irreducible to the sensations of non-aesthetic features under a particular framing set up for each realm (such as art, non-artistic artifacts, or nature) by a society.

Our concept of aesthetic framing is different from Dewey’s concept of the ‘esthetic’ which consists in the ‘consummation’ of a chain of events, whatever it may be in all realms of everyday life, through ordered and organized movement; our concept therefore does not claim that any experiences can have ‘artistic structures’ and be enjoyed aesthetically insofar as they are “demarcated in the general stream of experience from other experiences” as ‘*an* experience’<sup>40</sup>. The modes of aesthetic framing differ from each other with the concepts or categories of objects such as chairs, urinals, cars or fashion items, and with the times and cultures. What Dewey calls ‘artistic’ qualities or ‘artistic’ structures is, in fact, organized within the boundaries of an aesthetic framing proper only to the artworld of Western modern times and can be enjoyed only as such. And so the claim of Dewey and Novitz that ‘artistic value (qualities)’ and ‘aesthetic value (qualities)’ are synonymous is wrong. Our ‘aesthetic framing’ is not content with recognizing the fact that there exist the non-aesthetic level of physical sensations on the one hand, and the level of particularly aesthetic responses handed down in a society on the other, nor with indicating that there exists a sort of dependence between both, as Sibley’s notion of ‘aesthetic concepts’ is. What the concept of ‘aesthetic framing’ emphasizes is a realm of social practices and discourses of selecting some non-aesthetic features perceived in an object (a chair, a car or an artwork) according to its concept, category, and function, and of organizing and experiencing them within the system each period or culture has conceived to be ‘aesthetic’ and handed down from generation to generation. It is wrong to imagine that there are common qualities called ‘aesthetic’ among chairs, cars, artworks, and so on. There

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<sup>38</sup> Ibid., p. 21f.

<sup>39</sup> Carlson, op. cit., p. 49.

<sup>40</sup> Dewey, op. cit., p. 35.

exist the aesthetic qualities *of* a chair, *of* a car, *of* an artwork. Just so, various kinds of aesthetic qualities under different kinds of aesthetic framing shared traditionally by one society or another are everywhere, not only in the artworld but in ordinary life. Aesthetic framing, aesthetic circle, and aesthetic omnipresence are the structural properties of such social practices and discourses.

#### 4. The Aesthetics of Smell and Taste

The traditional theories of aesthetic experience, as we have mentioned above, which made a model of the aesthetic qualities of 'visual designs' like paintings and enlarged it to auditory designs and literature, could not treat the senses of smell, taste and touch which might be indispensable for the aesthetic appreciation of landscape. How can this 'aesthetic framing' theory we are proposing now deal with aesthetic qualities of taste, smell, and touch?

Traditionally, smell and taste have been thought to be exclusively practical and inferior senses based on the instinct of self-preservation and not to effect aesthetic appreciation with detachment as vision and hearing do. Roger Scruton says that "in tasting, both the object and the desire for it are steadily consumed," and that "no such thing is true of aesthetic attention."<sup>41</sup> But this claim is not persuasive. In fact, a musical note and a firework die out soon, and we know well that the standards of beauty based on visual and auditory senses are not uniform but diverse.

More persuasive seems to be Beardsley's claim that "we cannot, at least not yet, arrange them [smells and tastes] in series and so we cannot work out constructive principles to make larger works out of them," because smells and tastes do not have such articulations as the hues of colors and the pitches of musical notes. It is sure that a dinner includes foods different in flavor, texture, shape, and color. But "there does not seem to be enough order within these sensory fields to construct aesthetic objects with balance, climax, development, or pattern. This...seems to explain the absence of taste-symphonies and smell-sonatas."<sup>42</sup> Sidney Zink similarly claims that "the apprehension of various odors and flavors consists of a succession of experiences qualitatively independent, where to shift attention from one sensation is to lose it and to impose on any return the necessity of a new seizure." If several ingredients of a salad or a dinner are taken together, "the eventuating quality is either something different from any part, or is the quality of one predominating part." In the case of the courses in a meal, certainly, "elements are so arranged as to provide in their apprehension as a group" intended by a chef as a "harmonious composition similar to that of colors and sounds," yet "flavors in combination are capable of effecting several kinds of enjoyment, none of which is esthetic"<sup>43</sup> because there is no order of organic unity among them. Couldn't some peculiar odor and flavor of Proust's Madeleine biscuit dunked in tea call forth those sleeping memories which are either actually aesthetic character revived, or potentially aesthetic experiences acquiring aesthetic character from the objectivity and selectivity of remoteness? On these occasions, Zink says, it just "seems to contain the experience's esthetic essence" because "odor is the herald and symbol of the experience" associated with it. Once we get absorbed in the reminiscence, the odor and taste are

<sup>41</sup> Roger Scruton, *The Aesthetics of Architecture*, Methuen & Co. Ltd, London, p. 114.

<sup>42</sup> Beardsley, *Aesthetics*, p. 99.

<sup>43</sup> Sidney Zink, Esthetic Appreciation and Its Distinction from Sense Pleasure, in: *The Journal of Philosophy*, vol. XXXIX, No. 26, 1942, p. 707.

dispensed with and only the aesthetic “visual image”<sup>44</sup> evoked by them remains in consciousness.

From the standpoint of Beardsley and Zink who demand order and articulation as elements of aesthetic quality, even a simple color or musical note, not to mention smell and taste, must have, therefore, no aesthetic quality. As opposed to this, from such aesthetic attitude theory as Osborne claims, smell, taste and touch can be experienced aesthetically. At Exeter, England, in the 1930’s, the first ‘fragrance garden’ for the blind was opened, where, Osborne says, persons deprived of the sense of sight can cultivate sensibility to the smell and texture of plants, and exercise the sensibility they have cultivated<sup>45</sup>. In enjoying the taste of a particular kind of ice cream, Emily Brady says, “we may be involved in contemplation” when “we reflect on the taste, making comparisons,” and “call the taste of vanilla ice cream smooth, silky and mellow.”<sup>46</sup> And Urmson allows “an aesthetic satisfaction to the connoisseur of wines and to the gourmet”<sup>47</sup> because things, whatever they might be, can be aesthetic insofar as they “have sensible qualities which affect us favourably or unfavourably” with no ulterior practical grounds.

In reality, so many metaphors are commonly used and sometimes such ridiculously exaggerated expressions are found in the discourses of specialists of food and wine that we are forced to doubt the standard of their criticism. A comment about a wine that ‘it has a lively, green, springlike taste’ is comparatively moderate. Sibley quotes the following, rather absurd, description: “the 1982 and 1983 vintages in Bordeaux are like two brothers. The first is extrovert, handsome, and charming, destined to be head of school...and for a brilliant career. The second is reticent, attractive in character, promising at least a top second at university.”<sup>48</sup> Yet, when Scruton himself, after ridiculing those who “take the chatter of wine snobbery” seriously, characterizes a building (Borromini’s Oratory) as follows: “Here we find a perfect marriage between the inventive and flexible exterior, in which elegant variety is presented as at the same time a species of unassuming simplicity, and a quiet ponderous quality within...,”<sup>49</sup> this aesthetic chatter of Scruton is not so far from that of the wine snobbery which Sibley criticizes. Sibley himself says in his posthumous manuscript ‘Taste, Smells, and Aesthetics’ that “there is no logical impediment to contemplating”<sup>50</sup> tastes and smells aesthetically, and claims that even if they have only slight and trivial “minimal *aesthetic* values” we have no reason to eliminate them, as merely “the sensuous”, from the aesthetic. But here, we are bothered all the more because we know his distinction between aesthetic qualities and non-aesthetic features, or between aesthetic ‘tastes and sensibilities’ and ‘sense perceptions’. When he enumerates in his manuscript as descriptive terms of tastes and smells, for example, ‘charming, gracious, pure, clean, clear, fresh, soft, gentle, summery’ and ‘simplistic, thin, meagre, impoverished, unbalanced, bossy’, it seems now that his original distinction between the aesthetic

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., p. 710.

<sup>45</sup> Osborne, op. cit., p. 41.

<sup>46</sup> Emily Brady, Sniffing and Savoring: The Aesthetics of Smells and Tastes, in: *The Aesthetics of Everyday Life*, p. 183.

<sup>47</sup> Urmson, op. cit., p. 76.

<sup>48</sup> Frank Sibley, Taste, Smells, and Aesthetics, in: *Approach to Aesthetics*, ed. by J. Benson, B. Redfern, J. R. Cox, Clarendon Press, 2001, p. 238.

<sup>49</sup> Scruton, op. cit., p. 120f.

<sup>50</sup> Sibley, Taste, Smells, and Aesthetics, p. 254.

and the non-aesthetic is no longer mentioned. He stands so eagerly against the traditional theories which eliminate tastes and smells as merely sensuous from the realm of the aesthetic that he himself goes in the opposite direction and claims that all tastes and smells have some, if minimal, aesthetic qualities, which results in his contradicting his own theory.

Is it true that the tasting of a sommelier or a gourmet is an 'aesthetic' taste different from the usual sensuous taste? Even if a gourmet can discriminate subtle flavors of a dinner involving various foodstuffs and spices, is it not a non-aesthetic experience of guessing the right ingredients with the aid of his exercised palate? Despite the rhetoric of his saying 'this wine has a lively, green, springlike taste', is it not just the description of a sensuous quality perceived in his mouth? When we have a smell of a perfume and say 'it smells nice' or 'delicious', is it an aesthetic description as Tom Leddy<sup>51</sup> claims? Is it not just a figurative description of its non-aesthetic qualities and intensity?

As we have already seen, when we direct our attention to a deep blue in the color sample book, or listen to just one clear note in a piano piece by Debussy repeatedly, our experience remains a non-aesthetic sense of a particular color or tone just as is to the sensitive ear of a piano tuner. The individual senses, not only of smell and taste, but also of vision and hearing, must be considered in themselves as non-aesthetic 'raw materials'. Then, it might be said that even smell and taste can be objects of aesthetic experience when they are inserted and organized into a particular order within an aesthetic framing. It is true that smell and taste do not have such distinct articulations in themselves as hues and pitches, and Beardsley is probably right, saying that we cannot work out constructive principles to make 'taste-symphonies and smell-sonatas' out of them. Even so, to say that smell and taste have nothing to do with aesthetic experiences is a mistake caused by unawareness that he Beardsley himself already selected and presupposed the aesthetic framing of a particular artworld which acknowledges the forms of symphonies and sonatas.

There exist, most certainly, aesthetic framings concerning smell and/or taste. The odor of a rose or the taste of a sea breeze is not, as Zink says, a non-aesthetic "accidental"<sup>52</sup> quality which only enhances the aesthetic pleasure of "the visual composition" of a flower or a seashore, but rather, as Urmson says,<sup>53</sup> an indispensable constituent for the aesthetic experience of the 'rose' or the 'seashore'. Our aesthetic experience of a rose and that of a violet would totally change if their perfumes were transposed. It is true that the smell and taste of Proust's Madeleine biscuit dunked in tea are 'the herald and symbol' of the experience associated with the past sweet reminiscences, yet what is experienced now is not the 'visual image' recalled in his mind but the aesthetic experience during the past afternoon tea which was filled with the odor and taste of tea and Madeleine biscuits. A magnificent dinner party, where gorgeous dishes and beautiful flowers are arranged on the tables with music played gently and where ladies are dressed in elegance with graceful perfumes, would be unsuccessful as an aesthetic gathering if the smell of the dinner spoils the atmosphere and its taste is plain. The smell of lard which is in itself oily and not pleasant in terms of its sensuous non-

<sup>51</sup> Tom Leddy, *The Nature of Everyday Aesthetics*, in: *The Aesthetics of Everyday Life*, p. 9.

<sup>52</sup> Zink, op. cit., p. 710.

<sup>53</sup> Urmson, op. cit., p. 88.

aesthetic quality is an indispensable constituent of the works of Joseph Beuys, and in *Babylon*, an installation by Christian Skeelin and Morten Scriverin (1997, the Kiasma Museum, Helsinki), twenty-nine ceramic pots each of which contains a different scent are set on a long table. And we, Japanese, can enumerate ‘sa-do’ (the tea ceremony) and ‘kou-do’ (the art of incense) as examples of Japanese traditional aesthetic framing concerning smell and taste.

Then, what about nature? Do we bathe in a disordered ‘meld of physical sensations’ (of everything filling our surroundings such as the smell of the hay and of horse dung, the taste of the breeze over the prairie, the warmth and the tickling, the sound of water, of cicadas and distant traffic), as Tuan says, when we stand still within the landscape and experience it aesthetically? Or else, on the contrary, should we say with David Prall that even though “we know no modes of arranging smells or tastes or vital feelings or even noises in works of art, nature does not hesitate to combine the southing of pines, the fragrance of mountain air, and the taste of mountain water or its coolness on the skin, with dazzling mountain sunlight and the forms and colors of rocks and forests”<sup>54</sup>?

Sibley argues against the claim that smells and tastes cannot be aesthetic for lack of articulation and a suitable structure, and points out the fact that “many natural phenomena widely regarded as having aesthetic interest, even splendour—sunrises, storms, expanses of sky and cloud, landscapes, mountain ranges—have no clear boundaries, or any obvious organization, order, structure, or pattern in their heterogeneity.”<sup>55</sup> It is true that natural phenomena themselves are nothing other than a disordered meld of all the senses including not only the visual and the auditory sense but also taste, smell, and touch. And it is not nature but we ourselves who set the whole of these confused phenomena in an order. So, in order to appreciate the natural environment aesthetically we must know that it is not an artifact nor an artwork but nature. Moreover, when we stand in our surroundings with this concept of nature and natural environment, we must have the knowledge to focus our attention on the aesthetically significant parts or aspects of the environment because everything within it is not necessarily aesthetic. Thus, standing still in environment with a particular aesthetic framing based on the concept of natural environment as ‘landscape’, we organize the raw materials of our five senses into some particular order and appreciate it, the landscape, as ‘aesthetic’. In this sense, ‘landscape’ might be considered as one of the aesthetic categories<sup>56</sup> which we establish under the restriction of times and cultures as a frame for ‘landscap’ which originally meant just a geographical section of nature. To appreciate natural environment aesthetically is to frame and aspect it under the aesthetic category of ‘landscape’.

<sup>54</sup> David W. Prall, *Aesthetic Judgement*, Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1929, p. 67.

<sup>55</sup> Sibley, *Taste, Smells, and Aesthetics*, p. 227.

<sup>56</sup> T. J. Diffey also presents the idea that ‘landscape’ could be considered as one of the aesthetic categories, though not yet elaborated in detail (Natural Beauty without Metaphysics, in: Salim Kemal, Ivan Gaskell (eds.), *Landscape, Natural Beauty and the Arts*, Cambridge U. P., 1993, p. 60).