

## English Translation of Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's

### *Summary of Theology (al-Muḥaṣṣal)*

#### (1) Epistemology

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### I. Translator's Introduction

Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), the renewer (*mujaddid*) of the Šāfi'ite-Aš'arite Islam at the end of the sixth AH century, composed *The Lights for Qiwām al-Dīn about the Secrets of Theology* in the prime of his life.<sup>(1)</sup> This concise compendium circulated as the *Summary (al-Muḥaṣṣal)* among later intellectuals of diverse backgrounds, and "some excellent men," the Shi'ite Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274) prefaces his critical commentary on it, "have attempted to clarify it and comment on it, and others to refute and invalidate its principles."<sup>(2)</sup> One of those earliest commentaries was by a major disciple of al-Rāzī, Quṭb al-Dīn al-Miṣrī (d. 618/1221). Remarkably, its half extant copy (Ms. Istanbul: Raḡīb Paşa 792) was made in 625/1228 by Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī (d. 675/1277?), who also authored a renowned commentary on the treatise before Ṭūsī, his colleague under the Ilkhanid rule. Not only these Muslim philosophers but also their associated non-Muslim thinkers, namely the Syrian Orthodox maphrian Barhebraeus (Ibn al-'Ibrī, d. 685/1286) and the Jewish Ibn Kammūna (d. 683/1284), utilized the *Summary* in their respective theological and philosophical works.<sup>(3)</sup> It has also been revealed that the prominent Sunnite scholars in the next century, 'Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d. 756/1355) and Sa'd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 793/1390), relied on the *Summary* for their theological compositions, while Ibn

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<sup>(1)</sup> Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Anwār al-qiwāmīya fī al-asrār al-kalāmīya* (Ms. Istanbul: Fatih 2901, fol. 120b-72a). For further information on the work and the patron, see E. Altaş, "Fahredden er-Rāzī'nin Hayatı, Hâmileri, İlmî ve Siyasî İlişkileri," in Ö. Türker and O. Demir (eds.), *İslâm Düşüncesinin Dönüşüm Çağında Fahreddin er-Râzî* (İstanbul: İSAM Yayınları, 2013), 52-3; E. Altaş, "Fahredden er-Râzî'nin Eserlerinin Kronolojisi," in *ibid.*, 118-20.

<sup>(2)</sup> Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, *Talḥīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal al-ma'rūf bi-Naqd al-Muḥaṣṣal*, ed. 'A. Nūrānī, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Aḍwā', 1985), 2. Cf. T. Jaffer, *Rāzī: Master of Qur'ānic Interpretation and Theological Reasoning* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 20.

<sup>(3)</sup> R. Pourjavady and S. Schmidtke, *A Jewish Philosopher of Baghdad: 'Izz al-Dawla Ibn Kammūna (d. 683/1284) and His Writings* (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 79-83; H. Takahashi, "Reception of Islamic Theology among Syriac Christians in the Thirteenth Century: The Use of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī in Barhebraeus's *Candelabrum of the Sanctuary*," *Intellectual History of the Islamicate World* 2, 2014, 170-92; B. Roggema, "Ibn Kammūna's and Ibn al-'Ibrī's Responses to Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's Proofs of Muḥammad's Prophethood," *Intellectual History of the Islamicate World* 2, 2014, 193-213.

Taymīya (d. 728/1328) was so censorious of it that he supposedly authored a refutation of it.<sup>(4)</sup>

The *Summary* is thus undoubtedly a significant theological summa to the intellectual history of the Islamicate world from the thirteenth century onward. It consists of four pillars (*arkān*): premises (*muqaddimāt*), objects of knowledge (*ma'lūmāt*), theological issues (*ilāhīyāt*), and revelational issues (*sam'iyāt*). The first pillar summarizes the epistemological arguments of *kalām* (Islamic dialectical theology) and *falsafa* (philosophy). The second pillar examines created beings by employing both theological and philosophical concepts such as necessary, possible, eternal, originated, substance, accident, and so on. The third pillar deals with the essence of God, divine attributes, actions, and divine names. The final pillar treats such religious issues as the prophethood, the hereafter, belief, and the Imamate (Caliphate). As a study of the work as well as the intellectual history of philosophical theology from al-Rāzī to his followers and critics in the seventh/thirteenth century, I here translate the introduction and the first pillar—the epistemological premises—of the *Summary*. As will be shown, he there “summarizes” ideas of the past and develops his differing view characterized by the synthesis of *kalām* and Arabic philosophy.

The present translation is based on Ms. Istanbul: Süleymaniye Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Fatih 2901, fol. 120b-7b, which was copied in 680/1281 under the original title. I also consulted the printed text in Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī's *Talḥīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 3-71. I referred to the commentaries by Quṭb al-Dīn al-Miṣrī (Ms. Istanbul: Ragib Paşa Kütüphanesi 792, fol. 1b-49b), by Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī (*al-Muḥaṣṣal fī ṣarḥ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, Ms. Istanbul: Süleymaniye Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Damad İbrahim Paşa 821, copied by the commentator himself in 662/1264, fol. 1b-29b), and by Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī as well as the Turkish translation by H. Atay as *Kelām'a Giriş: el-Muḥaṣṣal* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1978). Atay has also edited the Arabic text (Cairo: Maktabat Dār al-Turāṭ, 1991), but it was not available to me for the present translation. The parentheses in the translation indicate original Arabic words or explanations by the translator, while the square brackets are used for supplements by the translator.

## II. Translation

In the name of God the Merciful and the Compassionate

My God, bestow Your favor and grace!

Praise be to God, the Exalted by His lofty oneness above resemblance to any accident and substance, the Sanctified by His sublime independence from correlation with any estimation and notion, the Free by His elevated eternity from confronting any glance and eye. By His perfect power, He does not need

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<sup>4</sup> J. van Ess, *Die Erkenntnislehre des 'Aḍudaddīn al-Īcī: Übersetzung und Kommentar des ersten Buches seiner Mawāqif* (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1966); W. Madelung, “al-Taftāzānī und die sunnitischen Philosophie,” in *Logik und Theologie: das Organon im arabischen und im lateinischen Mittelalter*, eds. D. Perler and U. Rudolph (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2005), 228-36; Jaffer, *Rāzī*, 19n16.

support by any similar and comparable thing. He is the Omniscient, and none of stored secrets and concealed innermost escapes from His knowledge. He is the Mighty, and speculations by ancients and thoughts by moderns delved into studying the lights from His magnificence. May God bless and grant peace Muḥammad who was sent to both the commons and the nobles and mediates venial and great sins, his Family, and his Companions.

Now, I had made an effort to come close to the lofty position of al-Ṣadr al-ʿĀdil Qiwām al-Dawla wa-l-Dīn Nizām al-Islām ʿUmīd al-Mamālik—may God strengthen his followers and double his power. Upon him, God the Exalted has bestowed the sacred soul and the leadership of human beings and has made him the chief of spiritual virtues and human excellence. Then, I authored this book which contains only the points among the worthiest matters. In it, I have made the summary of the thoughts of ancients, moderns, and theologians (*muḥaṣṣal afkār al-mutaqaddimīn wa-l-mutaʿaḥḥirīn wa-l-mutakallimīn*), and named it *The Lights for Qiwām al-Dīn about the Secrets of Theology*. I ask God the Exalted to guard me against errors in the reports and to support me in assistance of explanation. Verily, He is the Good who gives success and supports us.

Know: Theology is organized on [four] pillars.

## The First Pillar: The Three Premises

### 1. The First Premise: Primary Knowledge (*awwalīyāt*)

When we perceive a reality (*ḥaqīqa*), we either consider it insofar as it is without any judgment (*ḥukm*) on it neither by negation (*naḥy*) nor by affirmation (*ittibāt*)—this is conception (*taṣawwur*)—or judge it by negation or affirmation—this is verification (*taṣdīq*).<sup>(5)</sup>

#### [1-1] On Conceptions

In my opinion, any conception is not acquirable (*ḡayr-muktasab*) for two reasons. First, if the demanded [object] is not noticed, it is absurd to demand it because the self (*nafs*) does not come to demand what does not attract any notice. Even if noticed, it is absurd to demand, because it is absurd to obtain the obtained. If you argue, “It is noticed in an aspect but not in another aspect,” I say that the noticed aspect is other than the unnoticed; we cannot demand the former since it has been obtained, and we cannot demand the latter also since it is unnoticed at all.

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<sup>(5)</sup> Al-Rāzī “differs from other philosophers on *taṣdīq*. For him, it is the perception with judgment while conception is the perception without judgment. For them, however, *taṣdīq* is just a judgment without conception entering the understood like a part enters a whole, and thus conception is a plain perception” [Tūsī, *Talḥīs*, 6]. See also al-Rāzī, *Manṭiq al-Mulaḥḥas*, eds. A. F. Karamaleki and A. Asḡarinezhad (Tehran: Dānišgāh-i Imām Ṣādiq, 2003), 7; al-Rāzī, *Nihāyat al-ʿuqūl fī dirāyat al-uṣūl*, ed. Saʿīd ʿAbd Allāh al-Laṭīf Fawda, 4 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Ḍaḥāʿir, 2015), i. 103. Al-Miṣrī [*Ṣarḥ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, fol. 2b-3a] emphasizes the impossibility to identify ‘conception’ and ‘verification’ by definition or description because we immediately know that we perceive a thing and verify it.

Second, identification [i.e., definition (*ḥadd*) or description (*rasm*)] of a quiddity (*māhīya*) is either (a) by [the quiddity] itself, (b) by what is inside it, (c) by what is outside it, or (d) by what is composed of the latter two. (a) Identification [of the quiddity] by itself is absurd. For the identified [quidity] would then be known before the identified [quidity]; in other words, if we identify a thing by itself, its knowledge needs to precede its knowledge, which is absurd. (b) Identification [of the quiddity] by the internal matters is absurd. Such identification would be either by the total of those matters—this is false because it is [the identification] by the very total; the identification of the total by the total itself is the identification of a thing by itself, which is absurd—or by some of its parts, which is also absurd. We can identify a composite quiddity only by means of identifying its parts. If a part of the quiddity identifies it, then the part would be identifying the whole parts of the quiddity, which means, the part would be identifying the part itself—which is absurd—and all the other parts. This requires a thing to identify what is outside itself, which is (c) the third case. But it is also absurd. Different quiddities may share a concomitant (*lāzim*). If so, an external depiction (*waṣf*) is not useful to identify the depicted quiddity but when we recognize that nothing but this quiddity is depicted by it. The knowledge of this, however, depends on not only the conception of the depicted [quiddity] but also the conception of all except it, which is absurd; for the former implies a vicious circle, and the latter requires to conceive in advance the whole quiddities, which can be unlimitedly detailed. (d) As to its identification by what is composed of the internal and the external, the invalidity of the preceding cases requires its invalidity.

No one can say, “We find ourselves demanding to conceive the quiddity of angels or spirits. What is your opinion about that?” We say, it is either a demand for an explanation of the word or a demand for a demonstration of the existence of the conceived, and both are verifications.

**Admonition:** It is clear that man can conceive nothing but what he perceives by his senses (*ḥiss*) and emotion (*wajd*)—like pain and pleasure—as the nature of self (*fiṭrat al-nafs*), [what he perceives] as noetic intuition (*badīhat al-‘aql*) like the conception of existence, oneness, and multiplicity, and what the intellect, the imagery (*ḥayāl*), and the estimation (*wahm*) assemble from these [conceptions]. Besides them, he does not conceive at all. Investigations will establish this.<sup>(6)</sup>

**Deviation:** Those who claim that conception may be acquirable still agree that not all of it is like that—it otherwise implies an ingress and a vicious circle—and there must be conceptions in no need of acquisition. As a rule, any conception on which a non-acquirable verification depends is non-acquirable. What an acquirable verification depends on, however, may or may not be acquirable. They agree that the acquirer cannot be the acquired itself but either the total of its parts, which is ‘complete definition’ (*al-ḥadd al-tāmm*), some of its equal parts, which is ‘diminished definition’ (*al-ḥadd al-*

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<sup>(6)</sup> Al-Miṣrī notes that “the difference between sensory knowledge and emotional knowledge is that sensory knowledge is sometimes specified in the soul but sometimes specified outside the perceiving soul. Emotional knowledge is something that is not perceived by the five senses [i.e. hearing, sight, smell, taste, and touch]; it is knowledge connected to a known [object] which subsists on the soul, and so is not perceived by the five senses” [*Ṣarḥ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, fol. 6a-b].

*nāqīṣ*), the external matter alone, which is 'diminished description' (*al-rasm al-nāqīṣ*), or what is a composite of the external and the internal, which is 'complete description' (*al-rasm al-tāmm*).<sup>(7)</sup>

**Follow-ups:** First, the simple [like God] of which others are not composed does not identify and is not identified. The composite [like 'animal'] of which others are composed does identify and is identified. The composite [like 'human'] of which others are not composed does identify but is not identified. The simple [like 'substance'] of which others are composed does not identify but is identified. The intention of these classifications is definitional identifications (*al-ta'rīfāt al-ḥaddīya*). Second, we must be cautious about the identification of a thing by what looks like, or by the hidden, and about the identification of a thing by itself and by what is identified only by it either in a degree or in degrees. Third, we must premise the more general part to the more particular, because the more general is more recognized, and it is more appropriate to premise the more recognized.

## [1-2] On Verifications

Verifications are not altogether intuitive—this [fact] is intuitive—but they are not [altogether] speculative because we otherwise get a regress or a vicious circle, which are absurd. Instead, that must lead [people to question] what [kind of knowledge] is in no need of acquisition. Except sensory knowledge (*ḥissīyāt*) such as the knowledge that 'the sun is luminous' and 'fire is hot,' emotional knowledge (*wijdānīyāt*) as everyone knows one's hunger and fullness—which are unshared, so less useful—and intuitive knowledge (*badīḥīyāt*) like the knowledge that 'negation and affirmation are not combined nor eliminated,' what is that? On this topic, people in the world became four groups.

**The First Group** are those who acknowledge sensory knowledge and intuitive knowledge [as the knowledge not to acquire], and they are the majority.

**The Second Group** are those who reject sensory knowledge alone. Plato, Aristotle, Ptolemy, and Galen claimed that certain knowledge (*yaqīnīyāt*) was intelligible, not sensible. They argued so as follows.

Sensory judgments are considered regarding either particulars or wholes. [Any sensory judgment] on particulars is unacceptable. Such judgments are subject to errors, and if so, such judgments alone are unacceptable. The former [proposition] is explained by five instances:

(1) Eyesight may perceive the small as big. For example, a remote fire in the dark looks great, a grape in water looks [big] like a pear, and we see a finger ring like a bracelet when we bring it close to the eye. It may perceive the big as small like remote things. It may perceive one as two. When we, for example, blink one of the eyes and gaze at the moon, we see two moons as cross-eyed men do.

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<sup>(7)</sup> 'Acquirer' (*kāṣib*) here means proof, definition, and description, and al-Rāzī intends that "a thing cannot be a proof of itself, a definition and a description to identify itself" [al-Miṣrī, *Šarḥ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, fol. 7a]. To identify, for example, 'human being,' 'a rational animal' is a complete definition, 'rational' is a diminished definition, 'laughing body' is a diminished description, and 'laughing animal' is a complete description. See al-Kātibī, *al-Mufaṣṣal*, fol. 4b.

Likewise, we see a moon in water and another moon in the sky when we gaze at the water beneath the risen moon. We may see multiple things as one. When we, for example, draw many lines close together in various colors from the center of a quern to its surrounding, and then we rotate it fast, we see on it one color as if it is mixed of all those colors. We may regard the absent (*ma 'dūm*) as existent (*mawjūd*) like a mirage or things a man with dexterity and jugglery shows. Likewise, we see a falling drop as a straight line and a torch rotated fast as a circle. We see the moving as motionless like a shadow and the motionless as moving like a passenger on a ship, but he observes the motionless shore as moving and the moving ship as motionless. The moving in a direction may be seen moving in the opposite direction. The moving in a direction sees a star moving in the [same] direction when he observes a cloud beneath the star, although the star is [actually] moving in a different direction. The moon may be seen as if it is headed to the cloud, although it is moving in a different direction when the cloud is headed to it. The straight may be seen as inverted like trees on the sides of a stream. And when we gaze at a mirror, we see the face long, wide, and bent according to the different shapes of mirrors. All these [examples] show errors of senses.

(2) Senses may assure [you] of the continuance of a thing, but this is not the case. Senses do not distinguish a thing from its likes. Hence, confusion occurs of a thing with its likes. Senses, by supposing the succession of the likes, assume one continuous existence though it is not the case. According to the Sunnites, therefore, colors are not lasting but God the Exalted is renewing them at once and once, and the eyesight judges the existence of one continuous color. If this [theory of God's perpetual creation] is probable, however, it is also probable to say, "Bodies do not last continuously. God the Exalted is renewing them at once and once. However, as they are identical and successive, senses assume it one thing." It is thus affirmed that the judgment by senses on continuance is unacceptable.

(3) A sleeper sees a thing in the dream and assures himself of its certainty (*tubūt*), and it then turns out in the awakening that the assurance was false. If this can be, why cannot there be the 'third state' where the deceit of what we see in the awakening will turn out?

(4) A man with a cerebral disease may conceive figures which have no external existence. He may observe them, assure himself that they exist, and cry for fear of them. This proves that the state in which man sees what is not externally existent as existent can happen to him. If this can be, why cannot the affair about what healthy men observe be like this? If you say, "The causer of that state is the disease, so it is not existent with health," they (the major philosophers) would say, "Disproving one cause does not necessarily disprove the judgment. This probability is propelled only by listing the causes of that deceptive imagination, explaining its disproofs, and then explaining that the result cannot occur and last when the causes are disproved. However, all these premises are sorts of what can be explained only by, if possible, accurate speculations. It is implied that the existence of a sensible thing can be assured of only after knowing those proofs." This is one of what proves that judgments

alone by senses are unacceptable.

(5) We see snow extremely white, but when we gaze at it attentively, we see it a composite of frozen tiny parts, and each of those parts is thin and devoid of colors. Snow itself is thus uncolored, but we see it colored by the color white. No one can say, "That is because of the reflection of rays from some surfaces of those frozen parts to others," because they would say, "That does not reject our purpose since what you have stated is nothing but the explanation of the reason (*'illa*) why we see the snow white though it as itself is not white." We do not proceed than this extent. Also, we see crushed glass white though each of its parts is thin and devoid of colors, and any temperamental quality does not originate in what is between those parts, for they are solid and dry between which any action (*fi 'l*) and any reaction (*infi 'āl*) do not occur. Moreover, we see white cracks of thick or thin glass though there is nothing but the compressed air in that clack. The air is uncolored, and the glass is uncolored. We thus know that we see a thing colored though it as itself is uncolored.

By these [five] cases, it is affirmed that sensory judgments may be false and may be true. In that case, it is not permitted to rely on those judgments. Since the suspicious has no credibility, a judge other than [senses] is necessary to distinguish their mistakes from their correct [judgements]. On this supposition, senses are not the most important judge. This is the demanded [conclusion].

As to wholes, senses do not grasp them at all, because senses observe nothing but 'this whole' and 'this part'; the depiction of 'being the greatest' (*a 'zamīya*) is imperceptible by senses. People may suppose that such a depiction is perceptible, but the perceptible is 'This whole is greater than this part,' and it is imperceptible by senses that 'A whole is a whole, which is greater than its part.' Even if one perceives the 'whole' of the existing wholes and parts, he does not perceive the 'whole' whose possibility he conceives; for what is intended by such a 'whole' cannot be only the 'whole' of that quiddity in the external existence but the 'whole' which, because of its external existence, is verified to be a single [part] of that quiddity. That is one of the things the sensation cannot come to. It is thus affirmed that senses are unable to grasp wholes at all.

**The Third Group** are who acknowledge sensory knowledge but reject intuitive knowledge. "Intelligible objects," they say, "are branches of sensible objects, and this is why a man deprived of senses, such as the born blind and the unsexed, is deprived of knowledge. The root is stronger than the branches."<sup>(8)</sup> Thereby, five arguments prove the weakness of intuitive knowledge.

**The first argument** is that "the most obvious intuitive knowledge is the knowledge that a thing *is* or *is not*, but this proposition [viz the law of noncontradiction] is in fact not indisputable. When even

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<sup>(8)</sup> Al-Miṣṭī explains that this group is known as *Šamanīya*, who "limits perceptible knowledge to sensory knowledge and claimed that nothing is known but by way of senses" [*Šarḥ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, fol. 13b]. By *Šamanīya*, Abū al-Rayḥān al-Bīrūnī (d. c. 440/1048) obviously designates Buddhists although his report includes misunderstandings compared to what we moderns know about Buddhists [*Kitāb al-Bīrūnī fī taḥqīq mā lil-Hind min maqūla maqbūla fī al-'aql aw mal'dūla* (Hayderabad: Osmania Oriental Publications Bureau, 1958), 15-6; 30; *Alberuni's India*, trans. E. C. Sachau (reprint London: Routledge, 1964), 21; 40].

the strongest primary knowledge is not indisputable, what will you assume about the weakest one?"

(1) First, they explain as follows. We see those who rely on intuitive knowledge stating its four examples: (a) negation and affirmation do not combine together nor eliminate each other [i.e.,  $\neg(A \wedge \neg A)$ ], (b) a whole is greater than its part [i.e.,  $(A+B) > A$ ], (c) things equal to a thing are equal [i.e.,  $A=C$ ;  $B=C$ ; then  $A=B$ ], and (d) one body is not in two places at the same time simultaneously. We find the latter three are secondary to the first. As to (b) 'a whole is greater than its part,' if not so, the existence of another part and its absence would be equivalent, and at that time, its being existent and [its being] absent simultaneously are combined in that part. As to (c) 'things equal to a thing are equal,' if not so,  $A$  which is judged to be equal to blackness is certainly blackness, and insofar as it is judged to be equal to what is not blackness, it must not be blackness. If it is equal to the two things, it is implied to be blackness as well as not to be blackness, which combines negation and affirmation. As to (d) 'one body is not in two places at the same time simultaneously,' if that can be, then one body that occurs in the two different places is not distinguished from two bodies which occur samely [in the two different places], and at that time, the existence of the other body is not distinguished from its absence. This applies to that it is existent and absent simultaneously.

No one can say, "Any rational person will intuitively know the trueness of these three propositions, but that precise argument you have stated will not come to one's mind." They would say, "We do not accept that the judgments by rational men do not depend on these propositions. They, therefore, say, 'If a whole were not greater than its part, the other parts would [be non-existent] without any trace. And if one thing were equal to two different [things], it would be different from itself.' This indicates what we have stated. Of course, they cannot express that argument in the manner we have excerpted. Yet, its meaning is [already] settled in their intellects, and the expression deserves no attention."

Apparently, the most obvious intuitive knowledge is (a) 'negation and affirmation do not combine together nor eliminate each other.' But indeed, they claim, it is not indisputable on the following points. First, this verification depends on the conception of the fundamental absence (*aṣl al-'adam*), about which people have been perplexed. A conceived [thing] is definitely distinguished from others. [A thing] distinguished from others is specified in itself. Everything specified in itself is affirmed in itself. So, anything conceived is affirmed in itself. What is not affirmed is inconceivable, and the absent is unaffirmed. So, it is not conceivable. When that verification is secondary to this conception, and this conception is impossible (*mumtani*), then that verification is impossible.

No one can say, "A conceived but absent [thing] has certainty in mind (*dihn*). The statement, 'an absent [thing] is inconceivable,' is a judgment on the absent [thing] that it is inconceivable. A judgment on a thing requires the judged [thing] to be conceived. If the absent is not conceivable, then the judgment that it is inconceivable is impossible." They would answer to the former, "The affirmed in mind is a part of the absolutely affirmed. The discourse is now about the conception of the counterpart (*muqābila*) of the absolutely affirmed. This counterpart is absurd to be affirmed in any respect. It

would otherwise fall under the absolutely affirmed as its part (*qism*), not as its copartner (*qasīm*).” [They would answer] to the latter, “What you have stated is not an answer to our proof that the absent is inconceivable. It rather newly establishes a proof that the absent is conceivable, which leads to a contradiction of two decisive proofs of one question.” This is one of the proofs that reject the intuitive knowledge.

(2) Secondly, even if we accept that it is possible to conceive absence, the claim that ‘negation and affirmation are not combined together’ requires to distinguish absence from existence, and to distinguish absence from existence requires what is called ‘absence’ to be a ‘being’ (*hūwīya*) distinguished from existence. But this is absurd. The intellect points out any ‘being’ and can eliminate it. It otherwise has no counterpart, and it is implied that absence has no counterpart, which implies the negation of existence, which is false. It is thus affirmed that the elimination of the ‘being’ called ‘absence’ is intelligible (*ma‘qūl*), but the elimination of that ‘being’ is a specific elimination. Then, [absence] falls under the absolute absence, and the copartner of absence is a part of it, which is a contradiction [to the distinction between absence and existence].

(3) Thirdly, if we accept the distinction [between existence and absence], then (a) what is intended by affirmation and negation may be the [existential] certainty of a thing in itself and its absence in itself, like ‘blackness is either existent or not existent’ or (b) what is intended by both (affirmation and negation) may be the certainty of a thing for another or its absence from another, like ‘a body is either black or not.’

(a) As immediately known, ‘blackness is either existent or absent’ is not verified but after one conceives both ‘blackness is existent’ and ‘blackness is absent.’ However, each of them is false.

(a1) As to the former, if we say, “Blackness is existent,” then its being blackness is either its being existent itself or different from it. If the former [is the case], ‘blackness is existent’ would be used in the same sense as ‘blackness is blackness’ or ‘the existent is existent,’ but as known, it is not the case because the latter [two sentences] are prattle. In this case, the first [sentence, i.e., “blackness is existent”] is beneficial (*mufīd*). However, this latter [case that ‘being blackness’ is different from ‘being existent’] is false for two reasons. Firstly, if the existence subsists on the blackness, and the blackness in itself is not existent—the examination of [blackness] would otherwise return—then one thing is, being one, existent twice. And if so, the existence subsists on what is not existent. But existence is an existent attribute; otherwise, the medium (*wāsiṭa*) between the existent and the absent is affirmed, which you have denied. Then, the existent attribute would be a state on an absent substrate (*maḥall*), which is unintelligible. If that can be, the substrate of such colors and movements could be non-existent (*ḡayr-mawjūda*), and that would necessitate the doubt on the existence of bodies, which is the very sophistry. Secondly, if the existence is different from the quiddity, what we call ‘blackness’ is other than what we call ‘existent.’ Then, if we say, “blackness is existent,” to mean that the blackness *is* [equal to] existent, that is a judgment on the oneness of two, which is absurd.

If you say, “What is intended by ‘blackness is existent’ is not that what is called ‘blackness’ is what is called ‘existent.’ Rather, it intends that ‘blackness’ is described by ‘being existent’ (*mawjūdīya*),” then they would say, “Then, the discourse will be moved to what is called ‘being described’ (*mawṣūfīya*). It is either that what is called ‘blackness’ is what is called ‘being described by existence’—which is absurd because then ‘blackness is described by existence’ would be used in the same senses as ‘blackness is blackness’—or that [‘blackness’] is different from [the ‘being described by existence’]. Then, the judgment on the blackness to be described by existence is a judgment on the oneness of two. It would otherwise be said that what is intended by ‘blackness is described by existence’ is that it is described by the ‘being described,’ and the case of the second ‘being described’ then returns, ingresses, which is absurd, and requires eliminating the ‘being described.’ Therefore, ‘blackness is existent’ is false on account of the quiddity being other than the ‘being existent.’

(a2) As to ‘blackness is absent,’ if we say, “The existence of blackness is exactly its being blackness,” then ‘blackness is not existent’ would be used in the same sense as ‘blackness is not blackness’ or ‘the existent is not existent.’ As known, it is contradictory.

If we say, “Its existence is added to it,” difficulties turn out in three respects. First, that implies the subsistence of existence, which is an existent attribute, on the absent quiddity, which is absurd. Second, it is not possible to deny the existence to the quiddity of, for example, blackness unless the blackness is not distinguished from others. Anything distinguished from others has a specification in itself, and all who has a specification in itself has certainty in itself. Therefore, blackness is possible to be denied to certainty only when it is affirmed in itself. Its obtainment of the existence is a condition to deny the existence to it. This is a contradiction. If you say, “What denies the existence to it is existent in mind,” they would say, “If it is existent in mind, it would be absurd to deny it to the absolute existent (*muṭlaq al-wujūd*), because the existent in mind is more specific than the absolute existent. The existent in mind is verified to be existent, but it is then not verified not to be existent. Our discourse is now on what confronts the absolute existent, not on what confronts a specific existence.” Third, we establish the proof of the issue, ‘the absent is not a thing,’ on that a quiddity is impossible to be devoid of existence, and by this, it becomes absurd to judge the absence by the quiddity.

It thus turns out that both ‘blackness is existent’ and ‘blackness is absent’ are not obtainable nor understandable. If so, ‘blackness is either existent or absent’ has no validated concept. If so, its verification is impossible, to say nothing of that this verification is intuitive.

(b) As to the second case: ‘a body is either black or not,’ clearly—they say—it is possible to be verified only after we conceive the meanings both of ‘a body is black’ and of ‘a body is not black.’ If we—they argue—say, “a body is black,” it is absurd in two points. (b1) It is a judgment on the unity of two, which was false as established above. (b2) The ‘being described by blackness’ of a body is either a privative (‘*adamī*’) or positive (‘*tubūī*’). The former is absurd: it is the contrary of the ‘not being described’ (‘*lā-mawṣūfīya*’), which is a denial depiction; a contrary of the denial is positive; so the ‘being

described' cannot be a privative affair. And it is also absurd to be a positive affair. On this supposition, it would be either the very existence of both the body and the blackness or different from both. The former is absurd: all who intellects the existence of the body and the existence of blackness intellects that the body is described by blackness. The latter is also absurd: if the 'being described by blackness' of the body is an added attribute, the 'being described by that attribute' of the body would be added to it, but this is absurd. It is thus affirmed that the 'being described by other' of a thing is not intelligible.

If you say, "The 'being described' is affirmed in mind, not externally," they would say: "If the mind corresponds to the external, the suspicion will return—it otherwise deserves no attention—because the 'being described by a thing' of a thing is a relation between them, and the relation between two things is absurd to occur in others than them. If so, the truth from this disjunctive would be the denial part definitely, not affirmative, but that is false according to you."

(4) As the fourth refutation to 'A thing either *is* or *is not*,' [they say,] "We accept the conception of this proposition about some particulars, but we do not accept the absence of a medium." It is demonstrated in two ways. (a) What is called 'impossibility' is either existent, absent, non-existent, or non-absent. It cannot be existent; the described by it would otherwise be existent because 'existent' is absurd to subsist on the absent, and therefore if the described by it is existent, the impossible is not impossible but either necessary (*wājib*) or possible. Neither can it be absent because it is the contrary of the 'non-impossibility' which is possible to ascribe to the absent, and the 'non-impossibility' would be privative, and 'impossibility' is not privative.

Furthermore, 'impossibility' is a quiddity specified in itself and distinguished from other quiddities because, if not so, it would be absurd for the intellect to point to it, and if so, it would be absurd to be a pure negation. If one says, "It has certainty in mind," they would say, "This is false. The impossible is impossible in itself whether or not there is intellect. Rational postulation (*farḍ*), if corresponding to the external, is the demanded. It would be otherwise a lie. Our discourse is not about that but about what corresponds to existence. If what is in mind is existent, it would be absurd to attribute it to 'impossibility' because the existent is not the impossible existent. And if [what is in mind] is not existent, the impossibility subsistent on it would be existent, for it is absurd for the existent to subsist on what is not existent." It is thus affirmed that what is called 'impossibility' is not existent nor absent, and that is the medium.

(b) What is called 'origination' (*ḥudūt*)—emergence from absence into existence—is other than both what is called 'absence' and what is called 'existence.' Otherwise, what is called 'emergence from absence into existence' would be verified [only] when either what is called 'absence' or what is called 'existence' is verified, which is however absurd. If they say, this is affirmed, then the quiddity would be either existent, absent, non-existent, or non-absent at the moment in which what is called 'emergence from absence into existence' is verified to the quiddity. (b1) If it is existent, then it has been verified that the existent emerges from absence into existence to be like that, which is like to be

said, “The existent emerges into the existence.” Then, a thing is existent twice, which is absurd. (b2) If it is absent, that would be absurd on the following two grounds. First, what is called ‘origination’ is an existent attribute. Otherwise, the medium is affirmed since it is absurd for an existent attribute to subsist on the absent. Second, as long as it is absent, the original absence would remain, and as long as the original absence remains, the ‘changing from absence’ would never occur. It is thus affirmed that the quiddity is a state, not existent nor absent, of the origination.

That has another account. When the quiddity is transferred (*intaqalat*) from absence to existence, the state of the transfer is definitely not be absent nor existent. It, if absent, would yet not be prepared for the conveying but it remains like it was before that. If [the state of the transfer is] existent, the transferred to it is already obtained. At the time the transferred to it is totally obtained, the transfer does not remain but is interrupted. It turns out that the state of the occurrence of the transfer must be a medium between the transferred from it and the transferred to it. It must be external to the definition of pure absence and does not yet reach the definition of pure existence.

These dubiousities are some drops from the ocean of dubiousities brought to ‘A thing either *is* or *is not*.’ If the state of the strongest intuitive [knowledge] is like that, what do you assume about the weakest one?

**The second argument** by those who deny intuitive knowledge: “We find the intellect assures [us] of many affairs as it assures [us] of primary knowledge, but we cannot assure ourselves of it. That necessitates suspicion even about rational judgments.” The demonstration is in [the following] aspects.

(1) When we see Zayd, close the eyes a moment, and open them at once, we observe Zayd again. We assure ourselves that Zayd whom we secondly observe is that whom we observed and did not [while closing the eyes]. But this cannot be assured of. It is probable that God the Exalted made absent the first Zayd at that moment when we closed the eyes and created him similarly at once. This is according to the doctrine of Muslims. However, according to the doctrine of philosophers, a strange celestial figure perhaps originates and causes this kind of conduct on matter (*hayūlá*) in the world of generation and corruption. This, even if very unlikely, is permissible for them. On this supposition, Zayd whom we secondly observe is other than the first Zayd.

(2) If we observe a man, be he elder or young, we immediately know that he is not created now all at once without a father and a mother. He, before that, was a baby, a child, and a young, and then has become elder now. But this assurance is unaffirmed because of the voluntary agent [i.e., God] according to the doctrine of Muslims or because of a strange figure according to the doctrine of philosophers.

(3) When I go out my house, I know that the vessels in the house will never change into excellent men precise in logic or geometry, the stones in the house will never change into gold or ruby. And [I know] that there are not a hundred thousand kilograms of ruby under the feet, and the rivers will never change into blood or oil. But all the probabilities are still there. When I see them secondly, I find them

as they were, but [the probabilities] are not eliminated. It is probable to say that they changed into these attributes in the time when I was hidden from them, and when I returned to them, they became as they had been because of the voluntary agent or the strange figure.

(4) When I address a man, and he responds in a tidy, simple statement suitable to my addressing, I immediately know that he is living, intelligent, and understanding. But this assurance is not affirmable. What is required for this assurance is either his statements or his actions. His statements are not necessary because they are separated sounds, and their occurrence itself does not require the essence (*dāt*) to be living and intelligent. The actions also do not prove [that he is living, intelligent, and understanding] because it is probable that the voluntary agent or the strange figure causes the occurrence of those specific utterances (*alfāz*) that indicate the things suitable for the purpose of the addressing. It is thus affirmed that words and actions do not prove that he is living, intelligent, and understanding, but we are obliged to know that.

(5) It is reported in the traditions (*ḥadīth*) that Gabriel—peace be upon him—appeared in the form of Diḥya al-Kalbī. When this is not impossible according to the intuition of intellect, it is not impossible to appear in the form of any other person. When I see my son, perhaps he is not my son but Gabriel—peace be upon him—, and a fly which flies in the air perhaps is not a fly but an angel. It is thus affirmed that this possibility (*tajwīz*) is firm even though [we] have the immediate knowledge of its absence.

On these [five] grounds, it is affirmed that the intuition assures [us] of these judgments even though its assurance is false. When even [the intuition] is suspected, its judgment is never acceptable since the suspected has no credibility. No one can say, “Intellect’s assurance about these propositions is deductive (*istidlālī*), not intuitive,” because they would say, “If so, this assurance must occur only for the man who recognizes that proof. If not so and it occurs to children, insane, and men who do not operate any proof, we know that it is intuitive, not speculative. When we return to ourselves and contemplate our states, we know that my knowledge—on that Zayd whom I observe now is that whom you observed a moment before; you cannot say that the first became absent, and the similar has been originated—is not weaker than my knowledge that a thing is either existent or absent.”

**The third argument** [by the third group]: The pursuit of rational arts proves that two proofs of a rational issue may conflict in a man insofar as he is unable to reject both of them either by constant disability or in some states. The disability turns out to be true only when he is obliged to believe the whole premises in the two proofs to be correct. Doubtlessly, each of them is wrong. Otherwise, the two contraries would be verified. This proves that the intuition may assure [us] of what cannot be assured of.

**The fourth argument** [by the third group]: A man may assure himself that the whole premises of a specific proof are correct, but then an error in some of these premises is demonstrated for him. Therefore, people move from doctrine to doctrine. His assurance about the correctness of this false

premise is false. It is thus clear that the intuition is suspicious.

**The fifth argument** [by the third group]: We see the difference in temperaments (*amzija*) and habits (*ādāt*) affecting beliefs, and this rejects intuitive knowledge. As to temperaments, a man with weak temperament dislikes to hurt [someone], but a cruel-hearted man with rough temperaments may appreciate it. Thus, many a man appreciates a thing, while others dislike it. As to habits, some who goes in for and is fond of the words of philosophers from the beginning to the end of his life even declares the correctness of what they say and the corruption of all what their opponents say. Those who go in for the discourse of theologians have the circumstance on the contrary. The same applies to people of religions. Muslims conforming (*muqallid*) [blindly what others say] dislike the discourse of Jews at first sight, and Jews do on the contrary. That is nothing but because of the habits. When it is affirmed that the difference of temperaments and habits has effects on the assurance of what we must not always assure ourselves, perhaps the assurance about this intuitive knowledge is by a common temperament or a common custom. On this supposition, we must not be confident of any [intuitive knowledge].

No one can say, “A man may postulate himself to be devoid of what the temperaments and the habits require, and what the intellect assures him in that state is true, because that which assures him in that state is the pure intellect, not temperaments nor habits,” because they would say, “Even if we postulate ourselves to be devoid of temperaments and habits, to postulate such liberation does not necessitate its occurrence. Perhaps even if we postulate ourselves to be devoid of them, then as long as [the self] is not devoid of them, the assurance then could be caused by them, not by the intellect. Even if we accept that to postulate such liberation necessitates it, perhaps there are in ourselves the structures of temperaments and habits we do not recognize by detailing. We, therefore, are not able to postulate ourselves to be devoid of them, and this is the reason for suspicion.”

This is the collection of the proofs by those who challenge intuitive knowledge. They then say to their opponents, “You may or not occupy yourselves to answer to what we have stated. If you occupy yourselves to answer, our purpose will be obtained because you then acknowledge that the foundation of intuitive knowledge will be pure from defects only by answering these questions. Doubtlessly, the answer to them is obtained only by accurate speculation. What depends on speculative knowledge is more likely to be speculative. Intuitive knowledge needs speculative knowledge which needs intuitive knowledge, but this is a contradiction. If you do not occupy yourselves with answering, the stated doubt remains devoid of an answer. As known by the intuition, if it remains, assurance never occurs on intuitive knowledge.” The rejection of intuitive knowledge is based on both suppositions.

**The fourth group** is sophists (*sūfistā`īya*), who reject both intuitive knowledge and sensory knowledge. “By what the two groups imply,” they say, “suspicion appears even to judgments by the senses, the imagery, and the intellect. In addition to them, there must be another judge. But that judge cannot be a deduction since it is their branch. If we certify them by it, that implies a vicious circle. We

will not find another judge. Therefore, there is no path but suspension (*tawaqquf*). No one can say, 'If this discourse you have stated lets you know the corruption of both sensory and intuitive knowledge, then you are already in contradictory. Otherwise, you have acknowledged the collapse [of your argument].' We say that this discourse you have stated notifies the confidence on the certainty [of sensory and intuitive knowledge], but what I have stated notifies the suspicion. Doubt is generated indeed in this manner. We are doubting, and doubting that I am doubting, and so on."

**Know:** To be engaged in answering this doubt will result in their purpose by what they settled in their words. It is right for us to be detained from answering that. We know that our knowledge of 'One is half of two,' 'Fire is hot,' and 'The sun is luminous' never disappear by what they stated. Instead, the path is to torment them until they recognize sensory knowledge. When they acknowledge sensory knowledge, they will know the intuitive knowledge, that is, the distinction between the existence and absence of pain. Detailed answers to these questions will come in the later chapters if God the Exalted wills.<sup>(9)</sup>

## 2. The Second Premise: On Speculation

Those who acknowledge intuitive and sensory verifications disagree on whether it is possible to combine them insofar as this combination leads to the outcome that what was not known is known. The majority of people in the world argue for that. The discourse on that and its definition calls for issues.

### Issue [1: Speculation and Thinking]

Speculation (*naẓar*) is a sequence of verifications to gain other verifications. For the man who verifies that 'the world is changeable' and 'all the changeable is possible,' it is requisite for him to verify that 'the world is possible.' His 'thinking' (*fīkr*) does not mean but the two verifications present in his mind which necessitate the third verification. If the two [verifications] that necessitate [the third verification] are indisputable, what is implied is also [indisputable], and if both are assumptive or one of them [is assumptive], what is implied is also [assumptive]. Some people regard 'thinking' as an affair beyond these sequential verifications either privative—this is what they say, "thinking is to denude the intellect of negligences"—or existential (*wujūdī*)—this is what they say, "thinking is for the intellect to stare at the intelligible" as the glance at the seen precedes the vision by the eyes, which is turning the glance toward it in search for its vision by the eyesight, and also the vision by intellect is preceded by the intellect's staring at the intelligible objects in search of in search of its vision by the insight.

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<sup>(9)</sup> Concerning 'pain' (*alam*) and 'pleasure' (*ladḍa*), Ṭūsī mentions "his student Quṭb al-Dīn al-Miṣrī—may God be pleased with him" [*Talḥīṣ*, 172. Cf. al-Miṣrī, *Ṣarḥ*, fol. 132a-133b].

## **Issue [2: Thinking and Knowledge]**

The thinking which notifies knowledge is existent. The *Šamanīya* deny that absolutely, and a group of geometricians acknowledges that in arithmetic and geometry but deny that in theological issues. They claim that its farthest purpose is to grasp the most likely and adequate [conclusion], but there is no way to assure ourselves of it. In our opinion, each of the two premises of the above-mentioned example is indisputable, and both may be combined together in mind and necessitate the conclusion mentioned above. Therefore, the speculation which notifies knowledge is existent.

Those who absolutely deny [any speculation] argue four [following] affairs. (a) It is known that the belief (*i'tiqād*) obtained subsequently to speculation is knowledge which cannot be immediate—since the fact is often uncovered to be the contrary—nor speculative because a vicious circle is otherwise implied, which is absurd. (b) If the demanded is known, there is no benefit to demand it. Otherwise, when he finds it, how does he recognize that that is the demanded? (c) A man may be insistent on the correctness of a proof for a long time, but later its weakness becomes clear to him by the second proof. That probability subsists in that second [proof], and because of the subsistent probability, the specification will not be obtained. (d) The knowledge of two premises is not obtained simultaneously in mind. As a proof, we find in ourselves that, whenever we turn the mind toward making present a known [premise], it is impractical for us in that state to turn the mind toward making present another known [premise]. The present in mind is definitely nothing but the knowledge of one premise, and, by agreement, that is not productive (*muntij*). Thus, thinking does not notify knowledge.

Those who deny any speculation in theological issues argue two aspects. (e) The possibility to demand a verification depends on the conception of the subject (*mawḍū'*) and predicate (*maḥmūl*). The divine realities are inconceivable for us since, as shown above, we conceive nothing but what we find by our senses, our souls, or our intellects. If we are deprived of conception, which is the condition of verification, verification is also impossible. (f) The most obvious thing for a man, the nearest thing to him, is his 'being' (*hūwīya*) which he points out by his statement: 'I' (*anā*). Intelligent men disagree on this 'being' so that we can hardly assure ourselves of one of their [opinions]: some say that it is this sensible [physical] structure, some say, "bodies spread in it," some say, "an indivisible part in the heart," some say, "the mixture," and some say, "the rational soul." If a man's knowledge on his most obvious and nearest affair is like that, how will he recognize the most unknown and farthest affairs in relation to it?

**The answer** to (a): That is speculative, and a regress is not implied. If the implication of the conclusion from two premises is immediate and [the two premises] are immediate either at the beginning or at the medium, then it is also the case with [the conclusion] since he has the immediate knowledge that what is implied by the immediate is immediate. It is immediately known that what is obtained is knowledge. For (b): The known by conception is the unknown by verification, and the demanded is the verification. If he finds it, he distinguishes it from its others by the conception of the

known. For (c): That is a refute to errors of senses. For (d): We may apprehend a conditional proposition, which is a composite of two sentences. The judgment by the implication of one of the two sentences on the other calls for the presence of the knowledge of both during the judgment by that implication. This proves the possibility to combine two pieces of knowledge all at once in the mind. For (e): Suppose that those [divine] quiddities are inconceivable concerning to their realities, but they are conceivable concerning to their accidents shared between them and originated things. This is sufficient for the possibility of the verification. For (f): What you have stated proves the difficulty to obtain this knowledge, not its impossibility.

### **Issue [3: Instructor for the Recognition of God]**

[We] do not need any instructor (*mu'allim*) to recognize God the Exalted and Sanctified, contrary to the apostates (*malāḥida*, *Ismā'īlīs*). For us, whenever we obtain the knowledge of 'the world is possible' and 'all the possibles have one who influences (*mu'attir*),' we know that the world has one who influences it, no matter whether or not an instructor is here. The majority of the Mu'tazilites and us are confident in the falsehood of their claim by two points. (1) Firstly, if an instructor is needed to obtain the knowledge of a thing, the instructor needs another instructor to be an instructor, and a regress is implied. (2) Secondly, we know the instructor to be truthful only after knowing that God the Exalted verifies him by manifesting miracles through him. If the knowledge about God the Exalted depends on his word, a vicious circle is implied.

These two grounds, however, are weak for me. (1) As to the first, the intellect of the Prophet—peace be upon him—or the Imam is probably more perfect than those of other people. Surely, his intellect possesses the perception of realities, while those of the others does not possess it, so they need instruction. (2) As to the second, although that [vicious circle] is implied for those who say, "The intellect is absolutely useless, so only the word of the instructor notifies knowledge," that is not implied for those who say, "We need the intellect, but it is not sufficient. In addition to it, we need an instructor who guides us to proofs and acquaints us of the answer for doubts." They say, "Our intellects do not possess the recognition of proofs and the answer for doubts. We need an Imam who instructs us those proofs and answers so that we, by his instruction and the strength of our intellects, recognize those realities. He instructs us what proves his Imamate as one of all those realities." But on this supposition, a vicious circle and a regress are implied, so they argue, "We see the disagreement enduring among people in the world. If the intellect is sufficient, that will not be like that. We see that man alone does not independently obtain the weakest knowledge. He needs a teacher who leads him. This proves that the intellect is not sufficient."

**The answer** to the first (1): What you have stated does not happen to those who bring speculation on the stated aspect. To the second (2): There is no dispute about the difficulty, but the impossibility is impossible. Otherwise, a regress is implied. We then demand from them to specify that Imam, and

we explicate that he is one of the most ignorant people.

#### **Issue [4: Speculator and the Demanded]**

The speculator must not be a knower of the demanded, because the speculation is a demand, and it is absurd to demand what is obtained. No one can say, “Sometimes we know a thing and then speculate about deducing it by a second proof,” because, we say, the demanded here is not the proven but [the fact] that the second [proof] is its proof, which is unknown, and that he is not compositely ignorant—the possessor of this [kind of] ignorance assures himself that he knows. This [belief] prevents him from engaging in the demand.<sup>(10)</sup> Here, the impossibility to combine [speculation and composite ignorance] is either essential or by a distraction (*ṣārif*), but there is a famous disagreement on this.

#### **Issue [5: The Obligation of Speculation]**

A famous explication of the obligation to speculate: It is obligatory to recognize God the Exalted, and we can obtain it only by speculation. What the absolutely obligated [affair] depends on, if the assigned (*mukallaf*) is capable [of it], is obligatory. Its explication will be given in *uṣūl al-fiqh* (the principles of jurisprudence) if God wills.

**The objection:** We do not accept that it is possible to obligate knowledge on anyone. Verification depends on the obtainment of the conceptions of two extremes,<sup>(11)</sup> and, as shown above, conception is not acquirable. Once both [conceptions] are obtained, they imply a verification like [it does] about primary knowledge, so verification is also non-acquirable. If [verification] is not immediate, the mediation by another premise is needed in that [verification], but the state in [the other premise] is like in the first [premise]. It does not limitlessly regress but leads up to primary knowledge, which is non-acquirable. There is no conception of its two extremes, so those two conceptions do not necessitate the verification by affirming, or denying, one of them to the other. The implication which is implied from them is immediate, and likewise, the discourse on the third implied [premise] and the fourth. It turns out that knowledge is not within the human capability at all, and the command for them is a command for what is unbearable, which is not permissible. If it is correct [for God to command what is unbearable for human beings], the root of the proof becomes false, [that is, we cannot obtain the recognition of God].

Even if we accept the possibility of the command to ‘know’ [God], we do not accept the possibility of the command to ‘recognize’ God. The recognition of obligatory requirement (*ijāb*) depends on that

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<sup>(10)</sup> Al-Miṣrī [*Ṣarḥ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, fol. 27a] here comments that ‘ignorance’ (*jahl*) has two types. One of them is ‘simple’ (*basīṭ*) absence of knowledge. The second one is the ‘composite ignorance’, which indicates the belief on what a man assures himself of though it is not true.

<sup>(11)</sup> The two extremes (*ṭarafayn*) are “the two terms in a syllogism that are not the middle-term (*al-ḥadd al-awsaṭ*) and that are brought together to form the conclusion” [Kh. El-Rouayheb, *Relational Syllogisms and the History of Arabic Logic, 900-1900* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 263].

who obligates (*mūjib*). Before recognizing who obligates, it is not possible to recognize the obligatory requirement. Therefore, the command to recognize who obligates is an assignment (*taklīf*) [of duties] on the absurdity.

Even if we accept that [possibility], we do not accept that its command was given. The given command is rather to conformably believe, be it 'conformism' (*taqlīd*) or as knowledge, because he—peace be upon him—did not assign these proofs to anyone. Even if we accept that the conformism is not sufficient, then why do you say, "Likely assumption is not sufficient"? To rely on His the Exalted word: *And know* is weak because likely assumption may be called 'knowledge,' because the addressing is specific, and because verbal proof is not indisputable as will be shown [in the Third Premise, Issue 2]—if God wills—and indisputable subjects thus cannot be built on them.

Even if we accept that, then what does prove that there is no path to recognize [God] but speculation? We would state, just as a contribution, other paths such as the word of the infallible Imam, the inspiration, or the internal purification as Sufis say. And if we say, "There is no path but [speculative] deduction," Muslims, if they debate with materialists (*dahrī*), would definitely cease to believe in Islam at once and not remain in the religion, for the doubt on one premise of the proof is sufficient for doubt on the proven to occur. That leads Muslims to deviate from the religion in every moment due to all questions which come to their notion.

Even if we accept that, then why do you say, "The only thing by which the obligatory is completed is obligatory"? If you say, "If it is not obligated, that would be an assignment of what is unbearable," I say, "Why do you say that it is not permissible? Rather, assignments are altogether like that, because those that God the Exalted knows to occur are obligatory, and those He knows to be absent are impossible. Even if we accept that, the assignment of what is unbearable is implied indeed if the command to recognize [God] is affirmed in any respect, which is impossible. And why cannot [His word, *And know*,] be an imperative statement that is absolute in the utterance but confined in the meaning like in His word: *And give zakāt* (Q. 2:43, etc.)? The most likely answer to this question, if possible, will be to resolve upon the externals of the [revelational] texts such as His the Exalted word: *Say, "Speculate"* (Q. 10:101).

#### **Issue [6: The Obligation to Speculate is Revelational]**

The obligation to speculate is revelational (*sam'ī*), contrary to the Mu'tazilites and some Šāfi'ite and Ḥanafite jurists. We have His word: *We will not punish until we send a messenger* (Q. 17:15). The benefit of obligation is reward and punishment, and none of the actions [including even punishment] by God the Exalted is bad. So it is impossible to be convinced, by the intellect, of the reward and punishment. It is thus impossible to be convinced of the obligation.

They argue, however, "If the obligation is affirmed only by the revelation whose rightness we know only by speculation, the opponent would say, 'I don't speculate as long as I don't recognize the

revelation is truthful,' which leads to the refutation of prophets." **The answer:** That is implied to you also. The obligation to speculate, even if rational as you say, would not be immediately known. The knowledge of the obligation to speculate—according to the Mu'tazilites—depends on the knowledge of the obligation to recognize God the Exalted, and speculation is a path to it, but there is no path to it other than that, so the only thing by which the obligated is completed is obligated. Each of these premises is speculative, and what depends on the speculative is speculative, so the knowledge of the obligation to speculate is—for them—speculative. But the opponent would say [to them], "I don't speculate as long as I don't recognize the obligation to speculate." Then, the answer would be that the obligation does not depend on the knowledge of the obligation. Otherwise, a vicious circle is implied. The possibility to know the obligation is sufficient here, and the possibility is thus obtained at last.

### **Issue [7: The First Obligation]**

People disagree on the first obligation. Some say, "It is the recognition," but some [such as the Mu'tazilites and Abū Ishāq al-Isfarāyīnī] say, "It is the speculation which notifies the recognition." Furthermore, some [like Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī] says, "It is purposing that speculation." However, this is a verbal difference. If what is intended by the 'first obligation' is the 'purport by the first purposing,' it is doubtlessly the 'recognition' according to those who regard it within the human capability and the 'speculation' according to those who do not regard the knowledge within the human capability. Thus doubtlessly, what is intended by the 'first obligation' is, in any case, 'purposing' (*qaṣd*).<sup>(12)</sup>

### **Issue [8: Obtainment of Knowledge]**

The obtainment of knowledge subsequently to correct speculation is, according to al-Aš'arī, by the 'habit' (*āda*), and according to the Mu'tazilites, it is by 'generation' (*tawallud*). But the most correct [idea] is 'necessity' (*wujūb*) not by way of generation. As to necessity, for a man who knows that the world is changeable and all changeable is possible, it is absurd, with the presence of these two pieces of knowledge in mind, not to know that the world is possible. The knowledge of this impossibility is immediate. As to the falsehood of generation, knowledge itself is possible and within the capability of God the Exalted, so its incidence is impossible but by His power.

The analogy (*qiyās*) [of speculation] to memory (*taḍakkur*) [by al-Aš'arī] does not notify the indisputability nor the implication [that the obtainment of knowledge is by the habit]. They (the Mu'tazilites) do not claim [the theory of generation] about memory, because a cause can [be found in memory but] not found in speculation. [Memory is sometimes obtained without purposing, but speculation is not obtained without purposing.] When that cause is correct, the distinction [between memory and speculation] is clear, [and the deduction by this analogy becomes invalid]. Otherwise,

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<sup>(12)</sup> See Ṭūsī, *Talḥīṣ*, 59.

they refuse the judgment about [memory as] the root [of the analogy].<sup>(13)</sup>

### **Issue [9: Invalid Speculation and Ignorance]**

Invalid speculation does not generate nor necessitates ignorance according to the majority of the Mu'tazilites and us. It is said, however, that it may necessitate that; this is the truth for me. [For example,] for anyone who believes that the world is pre-eternal and that anything pre-eternal does not need that who influences it, it is absurd, with the presence of these two ignorances, not to believe that the world does not need that who influences it, which is ignorance.

They argue, "If suspicious speculation necessitates ignorance, the speculation of a truthful man about the suspicion of a liar will notify him of the ignorance." **The answer:** That is disputing that, if the speculation on proof notifies [him] of the knowledge, the speculation of a liar on proof by a truthful man notifies him of the knowledge. You here regard the belief on the trueness of those premises as a condition of the notification. This is our answer to what they say.

### **Issue [10: Correct Thinking and Invalid Thinking]**

As you have already known, thinking is a sequence of verifications to gain other verifications. Now, when the verifications are necessitated to be in agreement with their pertaining, this is correct thinking. Otherwise, that is invalid thinking.

### **Issue [11: Presence of Two Premises is Sufficient to Obtain the Result]**

Ibn Sīnā argues that the presence of two premises in mind is not sufficient to obtain the result. A man may know that this animal is a female mule and that any female mule is barren. Perhaps he, despite these two pieces of knowledge, sees a female mule with a swollen belly and assumes that it is pregnant.<sup>(14)</sup> Indeed, in addition to the presence of these two premises, he must comprehend (*tafaṭṭun*) how to allocate the particular premise to the universal [premise].

However, this is weak. The allocation of one of two premises to the other is known to be or not to be different from those two premises. When it is different [from the two], there must be the other premise in order to conclude. The discourse about how to fit it with the two primary propositions is the same as the discourse about how to fit primary propositions. That requires to consider the premises endlessly. When that [allocation] is not known to be different from the two premises, it is absurd to be the condition to conclude because a condition is different from the conditioned, but here it is not different, so it is not the condition. As to the narrative of the female mule, that is possible when the present premise in mind is just one of the two, be it the minor [premise] or major [premise]. We,

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<sup>(13)</sup> See *ibid.*, 60-1.

<sup>(14)</sup> See Ibn Sīnā, *al-Najā fī al-ḥikma al-manṭiqīya wa-l-ṭabī'īya wa-l-ilāhīya*, ed. Muḥy al-Dīn Ṣabrī al-Kurdī, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. ([Cairo], 1938), 57-8.

therefore, do not accept that, with the combination of those two [premises], doubt about the conclusion is possible.

### **Issue [12: Knowledge and Proof]**

People disagree on whether or not the knowledge of the proving point of a proof of the proven is the very knowledge of the proven. But the truth is that there are three matters here: (1) the knowledge of the proof itself like the knowledge of the possibility of the world; (2) the knowledge of the proven itself like the knowledge that the world necessarily has one who influences it; and (3) the knowledge that the proof is a proof of the proven. (1) The knowledge of the proof itself is different from the knowledge of the proven itself but necessitates it. (3) The knowledge that the proof is a proof of the proven is different from the knowledge of the proof itself and the proven itself. It is the knowledge of the relation of a matter to a matter, and the relation between two things is different from both, so the knowledge of it is different from the knowledge of both. What is necessitated by (2) the knowledge of the proven cannot be the knowledge that the proof is a proof of the proven, because the knowledge of the relation of a matter to a matter depends on the knowledge of the two related matters, and the knowledge of the proof being a proof of the proven depends on the knowledge of the existence of the proven. So, if the knowledge of the existence of the proven is notified by the knowledge of the proof being its proof, a vicious circle is implied, which is absurd.

## **3. The Third Premise: Proofs and their Types**

### **Issue [1: Proof and Indication]**

Proof (*dalīl*) is that whose knowledge implies knowledge of the existence of the proven, and indication (*amāra*) is that whose knowledge implies an assumption of the existence of the proven. Each of them is either purely rational, purely revelational, or a composite of them. Rational one must be the state whose existence implies the existence of the proven, and the implication is obtained inevitably from this extreme since it is not obtained from the other extreme. This is the deduction from the conditioned to the condition like the deduction from 'knowledge' to 'life.' When it is obtained from the other extreme, this is the deduction either from the specified reason to the specified result, from the specified result to the absolute and specified reason if the equivalence is affirmed, from a separated proof, from one of the two results to the second, which is a composite of the two primary propositions, or from one of the two which mutually imply the other like the two relata (*mutaḍā'if*). Purely revelational [proof] is absurd because information from others whose truthfulness is not known is not beneficial. The composite is clear.

### **Issue [2: Verbal Proof]**

A verbal proof notifies the indisputability only with conviction of ten matters: (1) the infallibility

of every single transmitter, (2) the desinential inflection (*i'rāb*), (3) the conjugation (*taṣrīf*) of those words; (4) the absence of homonymy (*ištirāk*) and (5) metaphor (*majāz*); the absence of particularisation to (6) individuals and (7) times; (8) the absence of ellipsis (*iḍmār*), (8) pre-posing (*taqdīm*), and (9) post-posing (*ta'hīr*); and (10) the absence of rational opposition which, if it is, is preferred because the preference of the script over the intellect requires to reject the intellect that necessitates rejecting the script for its lack of it. And when the productive is assumptive, you do not assume the conclusion.<sup>(15)</sup>

### Issue [3: Scriptural Knowledge]

All the scriptural knowledge (*naqlīyāt*) relies on the truthfulness of the Messenger (Muḥammad)—peace be upon him. If the knowledge of the truthfulness of the Messenger depends on the knowledge of something else, we cannot affirm it by the script. Otherwise, a vicious circle is implied. As to things unlike that, the path to anything—that assures [us] that things happen which rationally does not always happen—is the script and nothing else. That is either 'common' like habitual knowledge or 'specific' like the Book (the Qur'an) and the Sunna. Things beyond the two categories can be finally affirmed by the intellect and the script together.

### Issue [4: Deduction]

When we deduce a thing from a thing, one of them is more specific than the other, or not. The former case has two types: we either deduce the specific from the general—*qiyās* (syllogism) in the usage of logicians—or *vice versa*, which is induction (*istiqrā'*).<sup>(16)</sup> As to the latter case, we can deduce one of them from the other only when both are allocated to the depiction shared between them. You deduce, from the certainty of the judgment on one of the two forms, that the reason (*manāṭ*) is what is shared. After that, you then deduce its certainty in the other form. This is *qiyās* (analogy) in the usage of jurists [or *tamīl* according to logicians], which is, in fact, a composite of the first two categories [i.e., syllogism and induction].

*Qiyās* in the former senses [i.e., syllogism] has five types. (1) When we judge by the implication of a thing for a thing, the existence of what implies implies the existence of what is implied, so does the absence of what is implied the absence of what implies, as confirming the implication (*taḥqīq<sup>an</sup>*

<sup>(15)</sup> As the majority of the Aš'arite and Mu'tazilite theologians, al-Rāzī here argues that verbal proofs are assumptive because the absence of those ten matters are assumptive. See al-Kātibī, *al-Mufaṣṣal*, fol. 26a. Ṭūsī [*Talḥīs*, 68] informs that "in some copies, 'the absence of abolition (*nash*)' is added."

<sup>(16)</sup> Induction is a judgment on the universal (*kullī*) by what is affirmed by its particulars (*juz'īyāt*). When the particulars are limited—for example, "Numbers are either even or odd; every even is counted by one; every odd is counted by one; then every number is counted by one"—the judgment is indisputable (*yaqīnī*). When the particulars are not limited, however, then the judgment will be assumptive (*zannī*) because it is probable that the last particular is different from what has been stated. For example, the judgment that "Every animal moves its lower jaw when chewing" is not indisputable because of a counterexample like crocodile.

*lil-luzūm*). However, the absence of what implies does not imply the absence of what is implied, nor does the existence of what is implied the existence of the what implies, as certifying the generality (*taṣhīḥ<sup>an</sup> lil-‘umūm*).<sup>(17)</sup> (2) The classification is limited to two types: the elimination of one of the two [disjuncts] implies the certainty of the other, and the affirmation of one of them [implies] the elimination of the other.<sup>(18)</sup> (3) When we judge either the certainty of *A* about anything about which *B* is affirmed or the lack of *A* from anything about which *B* is affirmed, and we see *B* as affirmed about all *J* or some *J*, then we judge the certainty of *A* about, or its lack from, all *J* or some *J*.<sup>(19)</sup> (4) When we judge that *A* is affirmed about *B* but denied to *J*, and the time of the denial and the affirmation is one, that is sufficient for the two extremes to be distinct. When the time is not specified, it concludes only in regard of the duration in one of the two extremes, because, in any case, the duration of one of two opposed [propositions] necessitates the falsity of the other.<sup>(20)</sup> (5) When two depictions are obtained in one substrate, they have joined each other in it. Outside it, such a joint is sometimes obtained, but sometimes not obtained. Definitely, what is implied by it is a particular judgment.<sup>(21)</sup> Details about these methods are stated in our books on logic.

### Acknowledgment

This translation project is partially supported by JSPS KAKENHI under Grant Number 18J10539.

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<sup>(17)</sup> Syllogism is either ‘repetitive’ (*istiṭnā’ī*) or ‘connective’ (*iqtirānī*). In the former, the conclusion or the contradiction is actually (*bil-fi’l*), or obviously (*ṣarīḥ*), mentioned (*maḍkūra*). The latter is unlike that. Repetitive syllogisms are classified into two types: ‘conjunctive’ (*muttaṣila*) and ‘disjunctive’ (*munfaṣila*). As for conjunctive syllogisms, the existence of knowledge, for example, implies the existence of life, but the absence of knowledge does not imply the absence of life.

<sup>(18)</sup> Al-Rāzī here briefly explains disjunctive syllogism. As to “Number A is even or odd,” for example, “It is even/odd, so it is not odd/even” or “It is not even/odd, so it is odd/even.”

<sup>(19)</sup> Connective syllogism is classified into four figures (*ṣakl*). Al-Rāzī here discusses briefly that the first figure concludes four moods (*ḍurūb*): ‘universal affirmative’ (*mūjiba kullīya*) (A belongs to all J (AaJ)); ‘universal negative’ (*sālība kullīya*) (A does not belong to any J (AeJ)); ‘particular affirmative’ (*mūjiba juz’īya*) (A belongs to some J (AiJ)); and ‘particular negative’ (*sālība juz’īya*) (A does not belong to some J (AoJ)).

<sup>(20)</sup> This is the second figure. Its conclusion is also four moods, which are either universal negative (AeJ) or particular negative (AoJ).

<sup>(21)</sup> This is the third figure. Its conclusion has six moods, all of which is particular affirmative (AiJ) or negative (AoJ).