2024-03-28T14:01:19Z
https://repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/oai
oai:repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp:00017272
2022-12-19T03:55:57Z
55:864:972:976
9:504:867:974:977
Social Inefficiency of Entry under Imperfect Competition : A Consistent Explanation
Ohkawa, Takao
107905
Okamura, Makoto
107906
300
application/pdf
We consistently explain the excess entry theorem from the standpoint of the difference between the social planner's objective and each firm's one under standard oligopoly model. We introduce industry cost function which is derived from fitting-in function, and establish as follows : (1) Under second-best regulation, the real objective discrepancy results in the social inefficiency of entry from the first-best viewpoint. (2) Under no intervention the fictitious objective discrepancy generates entry bias from the second-best viewpoint, and both discrepancies generate this bias from the first-best one.
departmental bulletin paper
東京大学社会科学研究所
2004-03-18
application/pdf
社會科學研究
3-4
55
55
64
AN00108966
03873307
https://repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/record/17272/files/KJ00004192017.pdf
eng