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Endogenous Timing of Price Discrimination with Technological Incompatibility
Matsushima, Noriaki
107909
300
application/pdf
We consider two period models in which two firms supply differentiated services and devices for using such services. The firms can discriminate between their own previous customers and other customers. We consider the standardization problem of the devices and the firms'decisions concerning when to offer discriminatory prices. We derive the following results. Standardization increases the firms'profits and social surplus but decreases the consumer surplus. Both firms offer discriminatory prices after (resp. before) the first-period consumption if their devices are incompatible and the production cost is low (resp. high). Neither of the firms offers discriminatory prices if the devices are compatible.
departmental bulletin paper
東京大学社会科学研究所
2004-03-18
application/pdf
社會科學研究
3-4
55
65
92
AN00108966
03873307
https://repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/record/17273/files/KJ00004192018.pdf
eng