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Investment and Ultimatum Games : Experiments
Matsushima, Hitoshi
97115
Shima, Toshihiko
97116
335
Ultimatum game
Hold-up problem
Social preference
Investment efficiency
Risky investment
Investor’s privilege
Libertarian doctrine
JEL Classification: C78, C91, D03
application/pdf
This paper examines the ultimatum game preceded by a single player's investment decision that is risky in that the business opportunity could fail to be discovered. The experiment's results show that the functioning of social preference connecting the baseline ultimatum game with the investment crucially depends on the model's specifications, such as whether the proposer or the responder is the investor or the riskiness of the investment. The noninvestor/proposer tends to act in consideration of the efficiency of the investment, but not its riskiness. Such tendencies of the noninvestor's/proposer's social preferences are diametrically opposite to that of the investor/proposer.
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technical report
日本経済国際共同センター
2011-03
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F
CIRJE-F-790
AA11450569
eng
http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2011/2011cf790ab.html
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