2024-03-29T09:23:36Z
https://repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/oai
oai:repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp:00042761
2022-12-19T05:07:03Z
62:7433:7434
9:7435:7436
Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information
Matsushima, Hitoshi
105768
Miyazaki, Koichi
105769
Yagi, Nobuyuki
105770
330
Multitask Agency
Hidden Information
Group Decisions
Linking Machanisms
JEL Classificaion Numbers: C70, D71, D78, D82
application/pdf
We investigate the adverse selection problem where a principal delegates multiple tasks to individuals. The individuals form a group as a single agent and share their private signals in order to maximize their average payoff. We characterize the virtually implementable social choice functions by using the linking mechanism proposed by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2005) that restricts the message spaces. The principal does not require any incentive wage schemes and can therefore avoid any information rent and welfare loss due to risk aversion. We show the resemblance between the functioning of this message space restriction and that of incentive wage schemes.
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technical report
日本経済国際共同センター
2006-02
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F
CIRJE-F-401
AA11450569
eng
http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2006/2006cf401ab.html
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/35812
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