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Implementation and Mind Control
Matsushima, Hitoshi
98510
335
Implementation
Unique Nash Equilibrium
Dynamic Decision-Making
Social Psychology
Mind Control Methods
Expectation-Based Obedience
Tail-Chasing Competition
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D78, D81, D86
application/pdf
This paper incorporates social psychology into implementation theory, where an uninformed principal manipulates a dynamic decision-making process without employing any tailored contractual device. We demonstrate the principal's mind-control method through which he can effectively utilize social psychology tactics to incentivize informed agents to announce their information in keeping with his wishes. We show that with incentive compatibility, the principal can implement any alternative that he wishes as the unique Nash equilibrium outcome, even if the psychological cost of each agent from disobeying the principal's wishes is small as compared to his total material benefits.
本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと
technical report
日本経済国際共同センター
2009-09
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F
CIRJE-F-673
AA11450569
eng
http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2009/2009cf673ab.html
http://hdl.handle.net/2261/52779
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