2024-03-29T00:58:03Z
https://repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/oai
oai:repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp:00042973
2022-12-19T04:17:27Z
62:7433:7434
9:7435:7436
Employment Protection Regulations and New Hiring
Eguchi, Kyota
98828
330
JEL: J41, K31
application/pdf
In the real world, there are various regulations concerned with the dismissal of employees. We consider the effects of dismissal regulations with a simple incomplete labor contract model. Under moral hazard, the existence of a regulation always increases wage level and decreases firms'profits. However, the regulation can improve social welfare if workers'outside option is sufficiently low. Furthermore, we will show that the regulation can enhance new hiring.
「雇用保護規制の効果と労働組合」 (in Japanese). 『現代経済学の潮流2000』.岡田他編. 東洋経済新報社, 第5章, p. 149-176, 掲載予定.
本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこと
technical report
日本経済国際共同センター
2000-08
Discussion paper series. CIRJE-F
CF-88
AA11450569
eng
http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2000/2000cf88.pdf
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