Department of International Studies

Graduate School of Frontier Sciences

The University of Tokyo

2020

Master's Thesis

Returning to Relevance – The Resurgence in Climate Activism from Environmental Non-Governmental Organisations in Japan

市民 3.0

日本の気候変動運動における環境 NGO の再興

Submitted January 20, 2020

Advisor: Professor Jin Sato

Troy James Glen Stade

Acknowledgements

To begin, I am eternally indebted to my mother, Karen Stade, for her constant and unwavering support and input into all iterations of this paper. Having read and edited my drafts more than anyone else, she is as deserving of this degree as I! And to my father, Martin de Ruyter, for his interest and engagement in my work, as well as for constantly sending me links of interest and trying to broaden my horizon. We are the product of parental input, and I am here in large part because of the work of my parents; for that I am always thankful.

Massive thanks to the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, and Science of Japan (MEXT) for providing me the opportunity and resources to pursue my studies in Japan.

I am grateful for my supervisor, Professor Jin Sato, who has guided me through the nebulous process of identifying, distilling and crystallising a research topic and then making it into an interesting question – Thanks to him, in future I will forever be asking "Why is this interesting?"! Furthermore, to all of the members of Sato Lab for their advice and feedback, thank you. In particular, Lia Santee for reading my entire draft in its middle stages, which gave me another perspective on some issues within the paper. Beyond that, special mention to Ray Asada-san and Assistant Professor Kazuyo Hanai, both of whom gave me extra guidance early on in my studies. Also thank you to Shota Koga and Kaori Shiohara for their assistance in translating materials for me when my own Japanese ability was not up to scratch.

Thank you to the admin staff at the Department of International Studies and the Graduate School of Frontier Sciences, for coordinating clueless international students such as I, and for making the administrative and bureaucratic work behind academia run so smoothly.

My friends in Tokyo deserve special mention for being both pillars of support, but also avenues for mutual commiseration as we collectively went through the trials and tribulations of our academic pursuits. In particular, but in no particular order, Malte Detjens, James Rice, Viktor Könye, David Mason, Hanna Gaita, Fiodar Perakhozhau and Katya Ulanova, who are all walking a similar path to me and have made for excellent companions along this journey.

Finally, huge loving thanks to my fiancé, Claire Williamson. She was always happy to lend an ear to listen to my arguments, hypothesis and research, and also my grumbles about hiccups and roadblocks along the way. She has been, along with my parents, a constant source of support and encouragement and has helped get me over the finish line.

To all of you, thank you, kia ora, and ありがとうございます!

Contents

Tables and Figures

Table 1 - Acronyms, organisations and terms

CDP	Carbon Declaratory Project
Civil Society	Sector of society comprised of voluntary organisations greater than an individual household but lesser than the state
COP	Conference of the Parties – part of the UNFCCC framework for multilateral discussions on climate change
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
CYJ	Carbon Youth Japan
C20	Civil 20 Conference (Part of G20 framework)
ENGO	Environmental Non-Governmental Organisation
EPC	Environment Partnership Council Japan
ERCA	Environmental Restoration and Conservation Agency of Japan
FE	Future Earth Japan
GP	Greenpeace
Iron Triangle	Institutionalised power arrangement in Japan between government, bureaucracy and economic interest groups throughout latter half of the 20th century
IGES	Institute for Global Environmental Studies
ISEP	Institute for Sustainable Energy Policies
JCI	Japan Carbon Initiative
JCLP	Japan Climate Leaders Partnership
Kanbun	Japan Association of Environment and Society for the 21st Century
Keidanren	Japan Business Federation
Kiko	Kiko Network
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party

METI (formerly MITI)	Ministry for Economy, Trade and Industry (formerly Ministry of International Trade and Industry)
MoE	Ministry of the Environment
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NPO	Non-Profit Organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
REI	Renewable Energy Institute
REOH	Renewable Energy Organisation of Hokkaido
SCAP	Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
Shimin	Model of Japanese civil society, attributed to successful environmental movements; separate from, but related to, definition of *citizen*
SUSPON	Sustainable Sport NGO and NPO Network
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
WWF	World Wildlife Fund Japan
Y20	Youth 20 (Part of G20 framework)
350.org	350.org Japan

Chapter One - Introduction

Overview

Civil society in Japan has become homogenous to the state, and contributes to public welfare through following the official line – it is not there to challenge policy.[1] In other words, it is a vehicle for the problem-solving process. Despite waves of success and various transformations of civil society and activism throughout the post-war years in Japan, political advocacy emanating from civil society has found itself in a period of inactivity since the late 1990s, with a legislative reform designed to bring civil society closer to the state. While this had the effect of granting independent legal identities to civil society organisations, those who chose to incorporate under it lost their ability to engage in political advocacy. Those organisations which chose to remain unincorporated thus found themselves excluded from the networks of powers that incorporated organisations were permitted access to. This created a distinction between NPOs, who lost their political voices but gained independent legal identity, and NGOs, who retained their ability to engage in political activism while existing without any legal personality.

Recently, however, there has been an emergent paradigm shift. The year 2015 was one of transformation for these unincorporated and excluded organisations, with a revitalisation and growth in activity in the climate change space. In the nearly half decade following, the business sector of Japan has engaged in unprecedented levels of collaboration with civil society, ostensibly as part of a process of decarbonisation and the adoption of sustainable policies. While this shift in business attitudes is no doubt driven by commercial interests and pressures, that it is consistent with the attitudes of environmental civil society and gives it a vehicle to express a voice and promote its advocacy suggests a new period of success for unincorporated civil society.

The cause of this shift from the year 2015 is demonstrably arising from the landmark Paris Agreement, a multilateral climate change agreement signed through the mechanisms of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This agreement represented a departure from previous such agreements, being more amenable to voluntary efforts to decarbonise, and explicitly more business friendly. Against this context, businesses in Japan have started to regard civil society as a resource and avenue for information, expertise and credibility in sustainability measures, which in turn has led to a growth in collaboration between the business and civil society sectors.

The Japanese state is languishing behind the initiatives of civil society and business. However, as growth patterns continue in collaboration between the two sectors, so too does the potential for, and scale of, influence that can be exerted upon national policymakers. The growth that is taking place now is increasing the scope for civil society to influence climate positions, and while it may take some years for changes to manifest at national policy levels, the groundwork is very much being laid down.

The subsequent changes in attitudes among the business community in Japan have resulted in a shift in unincorporated civil society; groups that have been excluded from resources and connections to the

[1] Akihiro Ogawa, *The Failure of Civil Society? The Third Sector and the State in Contemporary Japan* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2009), 160.

state are now increasingly in a position to influence climate policies and matters to an extent that they have not been able to do for a generation.

This paper appreciates and accepts the function of non-political civil society in Japan; neighbourhood and other voluntary associations in service delivery roles provide valuable utility for wider Japanese society.[2] The purpose of this paper, and the intention of the author is, rather than labelling Japanese civil society as a "failure" politically, to instead present the argument that within some sectors there are political civil society organisations who are showing promise and resurgence in terms of their effectiveness and efficacy.[3] While the position of apolitical civil society vis-à-vis political civil society is greater in terms of proximity to policymakers and access to resources, ENGOs in particular are in a stage of growth and ascendancy; something that should be recognised and appreciated for what it represents.

Research question

Why has civil society experienced a boost in climate change activism since 2015, despite a prevailing view that civil society is a largely silent and inactive sector of Japan? Environmental civil society is proliferating, with increased attention from the commercial sector. In some instances, this has manifested in intra-stakeholder interactions increasing by more than 500%.[4]

This question is justified by examining literature on the state of Japanese civil society over the past decades. It provides an account and assessment on the role and position of civil society in terms of power and influence on policy work. Literature on Japanese civil society does not paint a flattering picture of its political effectiveness or role in Japanese society, generally suggesting it is not a significant or active part of the policymaking or advocacy space. For example, whether in terms of resourcing, or positions relative to economic interest groups, civil society organisations are not as involved politically as their foreign equivalents.

Traditionally Japanese economic interest groups have held more power and influence than civil society or citizens' groups.[5] When Japan is compared with Germany, Korea and the United States of America, three countries in which extensive civil society ranking studies have been conducted, Japanese civil society hold a far lower position in wider society.[6] These comparisons are based on wide reaching criteria, such as success in influencing policy and relative positions in domestic, pluralistic hierarchies, vis-à-vis other stakeholders such as bureaucracy, agricultural organisations and consumer groups.[7] While there was a surge in number of Non-Profit Organisations (NPOs) following legislative reform in the 1990s, it remains that there has been a limited corresponding growth in influence.[8] Japanese

[2] Yutaka Tsujinaka and Robert Pekkanen, "Civil Society and Interest Groups in Contemporary Japan", *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 80, no. 3 (2007): 422.
[3] Akihiro Ogawa, *The Failure of Civil Society?184.*
[4] "*CDP Japan 500 Climate Change Report 2018, Japan edition*" (JP), CDP Japan, 16, accessed 25 September 2019. https://6fefcbb86e61af1b2fc4-c70d8ead6ced550b4d987d7c03fcdd1d.ssl.cf3.rackcdn.com/cms/reports/documents/000/004/527/original/CDP2018-Japan-edition-climate-change-report.pdf?1557928753
[5] Yutaka Tsujinaka and Robert Pekkanen, "Civil Society and Interest Groups in Contemporary Japan", 422.
[6] Ibid. 437.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Daniel P. Aldrich, "*Revisiting the Limits of Flexible and Adaptive Institutions*", in *Critical Issues in Contemporary Japan,* ed. Jeff Kingston (Routledge, 2013), 80-81.

organisations hold fewer resources, attract less staff and membership, with a corresponding lack of influence.[9] Influence is judged by a number of metrics, based upon self-reflection by civil society organisations on their perceived ability to effect change to policy decisions in both the public and private sectors, and access to channels of power relative to other stakeholders and interests.[10]

The position of the Liberal Democrat Party (LDP) as the near continuous governmental party has allowed for a strong continuation of networks between the LDP and major economic players in Japan. This system of perpetuation makes it disproportionately harder for opposition parties to enter government, but also stifles the voices of local and citizens' initiatives.[11] Entrenched interests from within the established order give no motivation to adding plurality to the system, and so voices that are contrary to the status quo are excluded.[12] Overall, Japan has a civil society with low levels of advocacy activities, suffering from low organisational scale, lack of resources (both human and material), and a dearth of networking, due in large part to their exclusion from the Japanese policy system.[13] A common trend when describing the civil society sector as a whole from the late 1990s to the present is that it has become synonymous and indistinguishable from the state.[14] Civil society organisations, under the auspices of NPOs, are vehicles for service delivery for the state, and exist not to challenge policy, but instead as cost cutting measures through volunteerism.[15] This situation is emphasized as adding to the relevance of civil society within Japan, but only as a provider of services and not as a critical voice or activist for policy change, as is seen in other developed nations.[16]

Accordingly, it can be said the situation faced by civil society in Japan is one of comparative weakness when measured against other sectors of society, and the contemporary context is not conducive to policy advocacy and activism from civil society actors. This context makes the resurgence in the climate space all the more curious, given the presupposition held by literature and anecdotally by Japanese people of the relative ineffectiveness of civil society in Japan, and gives rise to my research question.

Hypothesis

My hypothesis is as follows:

NGOs which have been pushed out of the institutional framework of policy activism in the Japanese context are experiencing a resurgence in the climate change space due to collaboration of the business sector, under the auspices of the Paris Climate Agreement.

[9] Gesine Fojjanty-Jost, "NGOs in Environmental Networks in Germany and Japan: The Questions of Power and Influence", *Social Science Japan Journal*, vol. 8, no.1, (2005): 107.
[10] Yutaka Tsujinaka and Robert Pekkanen, "Civil Society and Interest Groups in Contemporary Japan", 422.
[11] Takeshi Ishida and Ellis S. Kraus, "*Democracy in Japan (Pitt Series in Policy and Institutional Studies)*", (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989): 108.
[12] Robert J Mason, "Whither Japan's Environmental Movement? An Assessment of Problems and Prospects at the National Level", *Pacific Affairs*, vol.72, no.2, (1999): 197.
[13] Jeong Sohn Hyuk-Sang, Cheol Bok and Taekyoon Kim, "At the Nexus of Advocacy and Accountability: New Challenges and Strategies for Japanese Development NGOs", *Pacific Focus*, vol. XXXII, no. I (April 2017): 144.
[14] Akihiro Ogawa, *The Failure of Civil Society?* 160.
[15] Ibid, 180.
[16] Yooil Bae, Dong-Ae Shin and Yong Wook Lee, "Making and unmaking of transnational environmental cooperation: the case of reclamation projects in Japan and Korea", *The Pacific Review*, vol.24, no.2, (2011): 207.

NGOs have been marginalised and are regarded as less relevant to policymaking than other, particularly economic, interests. Following legal reform in 1998, NGOs have been separated from NPOs; the latter has been embraced by the state, which has further isolated NGOs from any state apparatus. However, since 2015, there has been a paradigm shift among business stakeholders that provides an opportunity to NGOs in the climate space.

Business and economic interest groups are increasingly pressured by investors and competitors to present more climate friendly positions. This pushes these groups towards NGOs, and specifically ENGOs, as sources of expertise and other relevant resources. In this resultant cooperative relationship, an exchange occurs. Businesses gain access to knowledge, connections and credibility from ENGOs, and ENGOs are able to use the relatively powerful position of business as a platform for promoting their own agendas. Businesses have greater access to institutionalised channels of power in the Japanese state, and ENGOs can use the voice of business as a vehicle to place information in front of policymakers.

Despite the apparent situation of ineffective civil society insofar as advocacy and activism is concerned, there has been a growth in activity by civil society organisations in the latter half of the 2010s, within the environmental space; more specifically in climate change. This growth is seen in the subsector of civil society that chose not to incorporate under the legislative reforms of the 1990s, which has significant implications for its ability to engage in advocacy.

The bulk of literature is focussed on the poor position held by Japanese civil society in relation to political influence. By and large there is little focus on any specific policy sector; instead relatively sweeping generalisations are made. There has been discussion on service delivery functions held by many NPOs; with claims that civil society serves an important role in sectors such as education, welfare and tourism. However, this does not comprise of any political functions whatsoever. In terms of the functions of civil society following the Paris Agreement, and within the context of not having a significant political existence, there is little academic explanation for a rise in civil society within Japan. The bulk of publications on Japanese environmental civil society since 2015 have been very broad in terms of the Agreement itself increasing scope for civil society participation (particularly globally), and then within Japan governmental publications suggest civil society has an important role to play in climate action. Given however, that Japanese civil society has historically not existed with any consistent and significant political influence, just how the Japanese government wishes civil society to act is unclear.

Accordingly, I hypothesise that this growth is attributable to two key factors, each inextricably linked to the other;

- The Paris Agreement, and
- The involvement of Japanese business in adopting climate initiatives.

First is the signing of the Paris Agreement in 2015, a multilateral arrangement between 197 Parties, of which 187 have ratified.[17] The success of the Paris Agreement has been attributed in part to the involvement of business in the negotiations. Indeed, business actors regarded the Paris Agreement as a cause for celebration, given the commercial opportunities it presented.[1819] As a climate agreement based more on voluntary measures, in contrast to the prescriptive Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement represents a climate framework which is more attractive to businesses, granting as it does flexibility to navigate commercial realities. The Kyoto Protocol was more prescriptive in its form and function than the Paris Agreement; this being one explanation for the failure of the former to achieve any significant successes.[20] Conversely, the Paris Agreement has far more scope for voluntary and individually determined measures, which is more agreeable to neoliberal business interests. Rather than dictating what will happen, the Paris Agreement establishes what must be achieved, and leaves stakeholders to enact their own measures for reaching the goals. A further significant contrast between the two agreements was that the business sector was far more active in the negotiations at Paris. During the Paris conference, many industry CEOs declared their own decarbonisation commitments and sustainability measures.[21] Further, there was a belief among some delegates at the Paris conference that momentum generated by business is directly responsible for contributing to the successful conclusion of the Paris negotiation.[22] This indicates that global business actors regard the Paris Agreement matrix as one more suitable to them than previous rubrics, including the Kyoto Protocol.

The second factor emerges in Japan as a result of the Paris Agreement. Japanese businesses have a growing awareness of the need to actively work to mitigate climate change and decarbonisation. It is a fallacy to claim that the business community, both in Japan and internationally, was unaware of climate change and what needs to occur to mitigate and adapt to it, given the publicity it garners and weight with which it weighs upon humanity's collective conscience. All the same, the Paris Agreement codified, clarified and added momentum and awareness to necessary climate action. With universal awareness of climate change and action came investor pressure on companies to present a climate friendly image, as well as the desire to maintain an edge over competitors with sustainable positions, policies and products.[23] The Paris Agreement represents a global change in attitudes towards climate change, which is highly marketable and valuable to businesses.[24] While undoubtedly driven by commercial rather than altruistic environmental concerns, it undoubtedly serves a positive role for climate change action in Japan. The civil society sector is regarded as a holder of knowledge, and specifically about climate change, given its lengthy involvement with international science and momentum when compared to other sectors such as business.[25] This makes civil society organisations attractive partners for collaboration, connections and the provision of information from the perspective of business actors.

[17] "Paris Agreement – Status of Ratification", United Nations Climate Change, accessed 21 September 2019, https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/status-of-ratification
[18] Zach Wallens, "How the Paris Climate Agreement Impacts CSR and the Private Sector", *Businesswire.com*, 16 March 2016, accessed 21 September 2019. https://blog.businesswire.com/how-the-paris-climate-agreement-impacts-csr-and-the-private-sector
[19] Interview with REI, 17 April 2019.
[20] Paul Vallely, "The Big Question: Is the Kyoto treaty an outdated failure based on the wrong premises?", *Independent*, 26 October 2007, accessed 27 December 2019. https://www.independent.co.uk/environment/climate-change/the-big-question-is-the-kyoto-treaty-an-outdated-failure-based-on-the-wrong-premises-397927.html
[21] Christian Grossman, "We have an agreement in Paris: So, what's next for the private sector?" *IFC.org*, February 2016, accessed 27 December 2019. https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/news_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/news+and+events/news/we-have-agreement-paris-so-what-s-next-private-sector
[22] Interview with the IGES, 17 May 2019.
[23] Interview with JCLP, 21 June 2019.
[24] Interview with Keidanren, 3 June 2019.
[25] Interview with JCLP, 21 June 2019.

Consequently, the hypothesis is that the growing interest and involvement in climate change initiatives by the Japanese business sector, as a result of the momentum generated by the Paris Agreement, is pushing it towards Japanese civil society, with the latter being regarded as a partner to better enable and facilitate this transition. From the civil society perspective, this partnering with business actors has provided it with a powerful ally within the Japanese system, and in turn has enabled it to better engage in policy advocacy; hence the increase in climate activism. This represents a deviation from the established view of Japanese civil society as largely uninvolved in the activism space, and a potential new zeitgeist for Japanese civil society going forward in the environmental sector. While it appears largely restricted to the climate change space, it is reasoned that if positive and constructive relationships can be forged in the climate space between civil society and business groups, then there is potential for collaboration to extend to other areas. The extent to which this occurs is an area for future study, possibly under the lens of the Sustainable Development Goals and the wide ambit of areas they touch upon.

The Japanese state itself remains relatively stagnant on climate action. Its position on coal and fossil fuel investment in overseas development aid is such that Japan receives significant international criticism, especially at COPs. At the recent COP25 held in Madrid, Japan was recipient of the "Fossil of the Day" award by Climate Action Network International, based on climate inactivity or poor action in hindering the furtherance of climate action.[26] Japan is aware its global reputation is suffering from an "addiction to coal", but as yet limited national level policy shifts have been forthcoming.[27] However, as business and civil society activism grows and gains momentum, the gains made within the business sector stand to expand outward into governmental policies to an as yet unforeseen extent.

The current trend across civil society and business collaboration is of growth, which has two corollaries. Firstly, inter-sectoral collaboration between business and NGOs is challenging the idea that Japanese political civil society is ineffective. Secondly, because it is still in a period of establishing itself, the maximum policy output that it may be capable of has not yet been realised. Because this growth only started in the years following 2015, widespread policy gains are yet to be seen; however, the groundwork is being laid to enable significant policy advocacy and influence to be exerted in the future.

This reasoning presents a ray of hope for those civil society organisations that exist outside of the institutionalised framework established by the 1998 reforms, and provides a counter narrative to that established by much of the literature, and anecdotal perceptions held by the Japanese public generally. Non-political Japanese civil society is well established in sectors such as education and social welfare, but this momentum from 2015 onwards is relevant to the politically active subsector of civil society.[28] This new wave of political civil society, while currently limited to the climate/sustainability sectors, stands to forge new relationships with the commercial sector; an alliance that has the potential to evolve and spread into other policy areas.

Under the auspices of an indigenous, home-grown model of civil society known as "Shimin", a new period of success would appear to be emerging. This model transcends the strict definition of citizen (which is the basic definition of Shimin), and has evolved into a concept, an idea and a model for how

[26] "Fossil of the Day", *Climate Action Network International*, 5-14 December, 2019, accessed 15 January 2019. http://www.climatenetwork.org/fossil-of-the-day
[27] "Koizumi's lack of COP 25 coal commitments 'wins' Japan 2nd 'Fossil' award", *Mainichi Japan*, 12 December 2019, accessed 15 January 2019. https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20191212/p2g/00m/0fp/050000c
[28] Ian Neary, "State and Civil Society in Japan", *Asian Affairs*, vol. 34, no. 1 (2003): 30.

citizens participate in civil society. [29] In its purest form, it is a philosophy guiding and directing individuality from the state.[30] This model of citizenship has shaped waves of civil society action, and has become an operative philosophy or methodology for many organisations in Japan.

What is success and effectiveness?

> "*This thing called democracy contains a paradox. This is that democracy is given true life only by the political activity of people who do not make politics their primary career or their purpose*." – Japanese political scientist Maruyama Masao[31]

For the purposes of this study, success or effectiveness is equated with substantive interaction with the processes of policymaking. "Substantive" contrasts with tokenistic interaction and participation, or abject exclusion from access to policymakers; both of which are common experiences for politically active civil society organisations in Japan.[32] Whether at a legislative or commercial level, the post-war system in Japan was relatively "fixed", by a triumvirate of elites who, through an imbalance of power, were able to exclude other voices.[33] History shows instances driven by both necessity and active consultation where civil society organisations were forced to listen, and thus able to engage with the policymaking process (as opposed to demonstrations that met with police action, or deaf ears). However, civil society success and effectiveness here is recognised as organisations which exist outside of the established paradigms of Japanese policymaking being able to influence matters, while preserving their separate identity and not being co-opted by the state.[34] The latter point, which culminates in civil society becoming an implement of the state, is regarded as a "failure" for civil society. [35] In the contemporary sense, civil society organisations which exist within the institutionalised framework are able to work successfully with the state; however, this is apolitical and has little impact on policy work. They are not powerless in that they have no role or voice; however, they are unable to be successful in influencing the shape and architecture of policy.[36] Success is framed here by civil society working politically to influence the direction of Japan; which inherently requires the groups themselves to be able to operate politically. Examples include prompting carbon divestment policies from Japanese banks and producing policy releases that are adopted by the official Japanese long-term strategy (LTS), issued under the Paris Agreement mechanisms. Groups used for tokenistic purposes are not considered to be operating successfully, as their position is only as an instrument of the political system itself.

[29], Simon Avenell, *Making Japanese Citizens: Civil Society and the Mythology of the Shimin in Postwar Japan*. (California, University of California Press, 2010).
[30] Ibid, 3.
[31] Timothy S. George, *Minamata – Pollution and the Struggle for Democracy in Postwar Japan*, (Cambridge, Harvard University Asia Center, 2001), 280.
[32] Interview with Greenpeace Japan, 18 July 2019.
[33] Timothy S. George, *Minamata – Pollution and the Struggle for Democracy in Postwar Japan*, 120.
[34] Akihiro Ogawa, *The Failure of Civil Society?* 143.
[35] J. Karliner, *The Corporate Planet: Ecology and Politics in the Age of Globalization* (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books 1997)
[36] Yutaka Tsujinaka and Robert Pekkanen, "Civil Society and Interest Groups in Contemporary Japan", 422.

Chapter Two – History and Literature

Having established the current understanding of Japanese civil society and the scope for growth that it holds under the mantle of the Paris Agreement, a more thorough look at the history of Japanese civil society is warranted. This provides context for the peaks and troughs experienced by civil society as a whole in Japan, as well as the circumstances that led to the current situation of the relative ineffectiveness of civil society.

Once again returning to the literature, a solid grounding in the historical trends of Japanese civil society can be unpacked. The general trend across literature is that civil society went through a nascent and philosophical stage in the late 1800s through the early 1900s, followed by close to two decades of inactivity in the lead up to, and completion of World War II. This enabled a resurgence of civil movements, with a variety of styles and degrees of success (and failure).

Early Modern Japan

With the reformation of the Japanese state, system of government and society through the Meiji Period (1868-1912), a reconsideration of what it meant to be "civil" took place. With the abolishment of a feudal system and the establishment of a government more in line with democratic principles came the notion of "citizenry".[37] This in turn created the term "*Shimin*" (citizen), which throughout the Meiji Period came to have connotations of bourgeois, Marxism and civil society generally.[38] This was so because of the sheer number of approaches to understanding the word "citizenry", meaning it was incredibly flexible and carried with it a plethora of interpretations.[39] From this wide and diverse range of conceptions evolved subjectivity.[40] The Japanese populace were given a degree of political freedom previously unseen, and this proliferated into a number of branches of political thought. Some of these sought to distance themselves from established paradigms of liberal thought, and over time the *Shimin* idea became associated with a philosophical and methodological approach to civil society, in addition to its strict definition as "citizen".[41]

Against this backdrop of significant reform, and the opening of public voices and activism, civil society movements have a history almost as long as "modern Japan". A large number of peasant protests occurred as a result of Meiji-era agricultural reforms between 1868 and 1877.[42] The stage was then set for Japan's first major environmental protest, from the twilight years of the 19th Century into the very early 20th Century. Legislative assembly member Tanaka Shozo led peasants and agriculturalists in protest of the crippling effects of industrial pollution emanating from the copper mine at Ashio in Tochigi Prefecture, 100 kilometres from Tokyo.[43] While the citizens' protest fell largely on deaf ears, it culminated in a series of newspaper articles which gave impetus to the passage of the 1911 Factory Law, Japan's first to address industrial pollution.[44] This period of civil advocacy died down during the

[37] Simon Avenell, *Making Japanese Citizens: Civil Society and the Mythology of the Shimin in Postwar Japan*, 10.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Robert J. Mason, "Whither Japan's Environmental Movement?", 188.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Hidefumi Imura, *Environmental Policy in Japan* (United Kingdom, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005), 18.

Taisho and early Showa Periods during which increased militarism in Japan led to nationalised one-mindedness, culminating in a total war mentality which excluded voices contrary to government policy.

Post-War Japan

The post-World War II years saw a new start for Japanese civil society, as the mechanisms of Imperial Japan were replaced with open and fully democratic institutions. This provided a fertile bed for a number of activism campaigns, which were met with varying degrees of success. Significantly, the post-war movements marked a transformation in terminology. Many of the philosopher-activists that drove these post-war movements began to identify as *Shimin*, a term not used purely in the sense of *citizenship*, but also in the style that informed the development of Shimin as a model of civil society.[45] In 1960, hundreds of thousands of people flooded the streets of Tokyo in protest of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (known in Japanese as *"Anpo"*). United by a crusade for democracy and Japanese identity, it was direct and amateur, featuring such a large number of disparate views that it had difficulty in maintaining consistency and momentum.[46] Ultimately the Treaty passed, and the protests changed nothing beyond prompting the resignation of Japan's Kishi administration, to be replaced by a more moderate successor.[47] This failure prompted the emergence of a citizen group within the Tokyo Metropolitan government called *Tosei Chosakai (都政調査会)*, connecting locals, activists and reformists to collectively advocate changes to local government policy.[48]

US bombings of North Vietnam spawned the "Citizens' Alliance for Peace in Vietnam", known as *Beheiren.*[49] Despite a range of activities (including the provision of safehouses for US deserters, newspaper advertisements, conferences and shareholder activism), their political impact was still low. However, that is not to say it was not successful in other ways; the marches, which questioned Japan's growing affluence and role in Asia, as well as incorporating artistic themes (such as flower marches symbolising peace). These served to portray a "festive" tone to activism, and separated participants from the violent displays associated with Anpo. This started a delineation of peaceful civil movements from violent and illegal ones; the former being a key trait of the Shimin movement that would soon emerge.

Another movement formed in tandem with the *Beheiren*: known as the *Zengakuren*, it was a large group of semi-militant, left wing students who formed in response to proposed reforms to the university system in Japan, which included a "Red purge" of pro-communist lecturers and professors.[50] *Zengakuren* engaged in increasingly large scale protest movements, culminating in a number of violent acts, including the storming of the National Diet on three occasions, one of which resulted in a student death; the occupation of Haneda Airport and the mobbing of the US Presidential Press Secretary.[51]

[45] Simon Avenell, *Making Japanese Citizens*, 63.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Ibid, 99.
[49] Ibid, 106.
[50] Kazuo Ikeda, "Historical Background", in *Zengakuren, Japan's Revolutionary Students*, ed. Stuart Dowsey (Tokyo, Ishi Press, 1970), 41.
[51] Hisato Harada, "The Anti-Anpo Struggle" in *Zengakuren, Japan's Revolutionary Students*, ed. Stuart Dowsey (Tokyo, Ishi Press, 1970), 75.

These mass violent protests, which at times required thousands of riot police to quell, caused numerous injuries and represented a stark contrast from the peaceful mass protests organised under *Beheiren.*

These concurrent but very different styles of activism were nevertheless very similar in one key respect; neither movement resulted in any concrete policy successes. The failure of both violent and non-violent mass protest forced a rethink of future activism, and this heralded a period where civil activism is regarded as having had some demonstrable successes. Significantly, the subsequent successes were less the result of a willing government listening to civil society, but rather civil society groups operating smarter and making their advocacy platform much more difficult to ignore.

Concrete successes – the emergence of Shimin environmental activism

Japan had been pursuing a policy of economic growth under the Yoshida Doctrine immediately following World War II; that its security was guaranteed under the Anpo Treaty allowed Japan to not have to dedicate significant resources to defence. This meant that by the end of the 1960s Japan had the second biggest economy by GDP in the world. However, this came at tremendous environmental cost. Pollution of waterways, air, denatured forests and sickness arising from pollution was so widespread that Japan was said to be committing "environmental suicide".[52] Activists began to develop their methodology to embrace state/legal instruments to affect change.[53] Through the 1960s environmental cases and intensively polluting industrial projects were taken on by civil society organisations which engaged not only in rallies and protests, but also incorporated scientific and evidence based arguments forward through the legal system.[54] Some demonstrated a pragmatic use of state instruments and showed that the legal system was not just a tool of the state – but rather, something that could be used also by civil society organisations to achieve their goals.

Japan had a very corporatist structure in the post-war decades. The long established and pro-development voices that made up this system excluded disorganised and disparate pro-environmental advocates.[55] Against this political structural context, civil society organisations had to effectively organise, mobilise and push for environmental change; something that had not happened on any real scale before in Japan. This culminated in the "Big Four" pollution cases of the two Minamata disease outbreaks, Yokkaichi asthma and Itai-Itaibyo which between the late 1960s and early 1970s demonstrated a more effectively organised and scientifically rational movement. Victim movements used subjective thought and impressions of the impact of pollution, being highly localised in Kumamoto, Niigata, Mie and Toyama prefectures.[56]

Out of the suffering brought about by the effects of pollution, and the efforts of multiapproach advocacy, Japanese environmental legislation was ratified, giving Japan some of the strictest environmental

[52] Jun Ui, *The Negative Effects of Technology in Japan's Modernization Process: The Ashio Copper Mine Incident* (Tokyo, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 1983), 41.
[53] Robert J. Mason, "Whither Japan's Environmental Movement?" 207.
[54] Simon Avenell, *Making Japanese Citizens*, 157.
[55] Thomas K. Rudel, J. Timmons Roberts, and Jo Ann Carmin, "Political Economy of the Environment", *Annual Review of Sociology*, vol.37 (2011): 222.
[56] Ibid, 157.

frameworks in the world.[57] Environmental civil society was using scientifically accurate, evidence-based reasoning on top of its own subjective philosophy, which could not be rejected or ignored by the pro-growth Japanese state. It was rational, legal and organised, which contributed to its success. It is well established that the employment of mainstream, less radical strategies to push for change enable civil society actors to be regarded as acceptable and legitimate by other stakeholders in the policy making space.[58] Environmental civil society acknowledged this and through moderate forms of activism, it was more likely to be listened to, and consequently to experience success in advocating for its reforms. While the process of pushing for pollution laws was an incredibly protracted one, and many victims of pollution died before the movements were ultimately successful, the self-help mentality as a strategy for success was undeniable.[59] The pollution cases demonstrated, that even though there may be trials and tribulations, individuals could understand their rights, turn a critical eye to the status quo, and idealise an alternate future.[60]

Was the Minamata Movement a Success?

The extent to which civil activism around the Minamata-byo industrial pollution case can be considered a success is one of considerable discussion. There is no doubt that the victims of Minamata disease suffered; the physical impact of the neurological syndrome caused by mercury poisoning was compounded by the social and psychological effects too. Communities ostracised victims, believing them to be greedy and playing the system for more compensation money, to the detriment of the company and town as a whole (it is important to note that the company responsible, Chisso, was a majority employer and provider of tax revenue for Minamata town).[61] Furthermore, in rural Japan, large scale employers were often regarded as "feudal lords", to whom loyalty was pledged by large portions of the population; this made it even harder psychologically for victims to bring claims against industry.[62] Similarly, patients had to deal with the psychological impact of relying on others for their daily lives, and ultimately the prospect of outliving the parents upon whom they depended on. There was a protracted period of multiple explanations as to the cause of the disease, which only extended the time it took to establish the truth; all the while more and more were falling sick and dying, and Chisso was generating more wealth.[63] This led to a decade of suffering, obfuscation and industrial deceit. The Japanese government had been biased in favour of Chisso from the very beginning of this long and protracted case, and it was only due to the works of a wide number of creative and pragmatic thinkers and activists that sufficient momentum was gained, and maintained, to see the case to fruition.[64]

Ultimately, cooperation between scientists, sociologists, lawyers, photographers and videographers, and unionists generated a sufficiently indicative case that demonstrated irrefutably the culpability of

[57] Kim Schumacher, "Approval procedures for large-scale renewable energy installations; Comparison of national legal frameworks in Japan, New Zealand, the EU and the US", *Energy Policy* vol.129 (2019): 141.
[58] Thomas K. Rudel, J. Timmons Roberts, and Jo Ann Carmin, "Political Economy of the Environment", 231.
[59] Simon Avenell, *Making Japanese Citizens*, 159.
[60] Narumi Masayasu, Toshi *Henkaku no Shiso to Hoho* (Tokyo: Renga Shobo, 1972), 12.
[61] Timothy S. George, *Minamata – Pollution and the Struggle for Democracy in Post-war Japan*, 204.
[62] Tsurumi Kazuko, "Some Case Studies in Minamata", *International Institute of International Relations for Advanced Studies on peace and Development in Asia, Research Papers*, Series A-51 (Tokyo: Sophia University Press, 1988): 3.
[63] Jun Ui, *Kogai no Seijigaku: Minamatabyo wo otte* (Tokyo: Sanseido, 1968), 146.
[64] Ibid, 265.

Chisso, and vindicated the claims of the Minamata victims.[65] It took a long time, and there remain many issues about those who are entitled to compensation and the criteria upon which such determinations are made, but ultimately the ruling elite and industrial powers were put on a short leash.[66] They had to pre-empt change and respond accordingly. The resultant trial culminated in a payment of 937.3 million yen; the largest compensation ever awarded by a Japanese court up to that point. [67] Being worth 2.6 billion yen in 2019 terms, it was a moral victory.[68] While it can be argued to be a pyrrhic one, it demonstrated that citizens could, by pragmatic and rational means, use the instruments of the system to vindicate themselves.[69] The first successful use of Shimin methodology in an environmental context had finally occurred.

Reaction to Civil Society Success

While the 1960s and 1970s saw success for environmental advocacy, it was not to last. There had been predictions of a massive change towards citizen participation in Japanese politics, and perhaps eventually citizen self-governance. [70] A growing middle class had formed concurrently with the developing Japanese economy, and with that an increased ability to engage in politics; something which threatened the entrenched conservative political system. Civil movements that formed around the Narita Airport development, and Yokohama's new freight line were largely ignored; in contrast to the more violent protests around Narita which were responded to with riot police.[71] Japan's polluting industries were relocated to South East Asia, and the pro-growth policies of the Japanese economy continued.

While the central Japanese state continued to pursue its economic growth policies, to the exclusion of civil society actors, local and municipal governments extensively expanded their interactions with civil society. Citizen participation would ensure that policies were more tailored for constituents, providing a happier, more included population, as well as ensuring that policy incorporated a wider range of views. With this outlook, progressive local administration collaboration with civil society broke new ground in terms of engaging with citizenry. This differed from the first peak in that citizens groups were proactively engaged with, rather than a mass movement demanding to be heard, as they had been in the environmental cases. Inspired by the Tokyo metropolitan government's Tosei Chosakai initiative to connect citizens with local policymaking, Chofu City formed a citizen consultation committee and Ueda city engaged "total citizen participation" with city-run Mayoral-citizen communication programs, city facility visits and consultation events.[72] Musashino city went even further, creating committees for long-term policy planning, which included citizens groups in the policy making process; immersing ordinary citizens in the research, formulation and implementation stages of policy work.[73]

[65] Ibid, 241-242.
[66] James W. White, "The Dynamics of Political Opposition", in *Post-war Japan as History,* ed. Andrew Gordon (Berkley, University of California Press, 1993), 440.
[67] Timothy S. George, *Minamata – Pollution and the Struggle for Democracy in Post-war Japan*, 249.
[68] Calculated through InflationTool.com, accessed 9 November 2019, https://www.inflationtool.com/japanese-yen/1973-to-present-value?amount=937300000
[69] Timothy S. George, *Minamata – Pollution and the Struggle for Democracy in Post-war Japan*, 257.
[70] Taketsugu Tsurutani, "A New Era of Japanese Politics: Tokyo's Gubernatorial Election", *Asian Survey* vol.12, no.5 (1972): 443.
[71] Hisato Harada, "*The Anti-Anpo Struggle*", 132.
[72] Simon Avenell, *Making Japanese Citizens*, 183-184.
[73] Ibid, 184.

Tensions Between Civil Society and State

In contrast to the successes that were taking place at municipal levels, however, at a national level civil society participation was still low; the industry-state complex that had formed in the post-war years lead to the expression of "Japan Inc" to describe Japan's enormous economic revitalisation following World War II.[74] The successes of Minamata and the other Big Four Pollution cases and municipal-civil participation did not go unnoticed, and the Japanese government recognised the threat that civil advocacy posed to its pro-economic growth agenda. The environmental legislation following the Big Four Pollution cases was arguably a display of damage control, providing a solution that kept further cases out of court and maintained the primacy of the bureaucrats in the Japanese system.[75] Being regarded as more of an annoyance than a legitimate policy actor on the national stage, the central state remedied the issue of mass counter-policy movements to some extent by contacting groups with similar policy goals, but which were less likely to form lawsuits protest movements. This resulted in policy actions being made before civil society could react to an issue, taking the wind out of the sails of the environmental movement before issues escalated into anything of concern to the government.[76]

This limited use of civil society to identify issues before they evolved into a large-scale movement enabled the bureaucracy to claim citizen participation without actually substantively utilising them in an advocacy position. Civil society was thus reduced at a national level to participants, largely ineffective in an advocacy space but useful to the state in order to claim civic participation. This trend continued nationally from the 1970s throughout the 1980s, but civil society remained underfunded and legally disadvantaged, as under Japanese law it was largely unable to incorporate and adopt an independent legal personality.

Under the Japanese Civil Code, there was one way in which an organisation could become incorporated, by changing into an Incorporated Public Interest Corporation.[77] These are formed under the permission of the relevant and competent government agencies, and in some cases can engage in policy advocacy. However, the system of incorporation under this scheme required strict government regulation both in terms of establishment conditions and ongoing operations.[78] The scheme proved unsuitable for many organisations as it required significant levels of bureaucracy and lack of autonomy, creating a lacuna in the options available to civil society.

Reforms

In 1995 the Kobe Earthquake struck Western Japan, causing widespread damage and thousands of casualties. In response to the disaster, citizens and volunteer groups from all over Japan converged on Kobe to provide assistance. This was paralleled by a poor initial response by the central government,

[74] Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975* (California, Stanford University Press, 1982).
[75] George, Timothy S., "*Minamata – Pollution and the Struggle for Democracy in Post-war Japan*", 267.
[76] Simon Avenell, *Making Japanese Citizens*, 195.
[77] Civil Code (Japan) 1896, Article 34.
[78] "Legal Framework", Japan NPO Center, accessed 4 September 2019, https://www.jnpoc.ne.jp/en/nonprofits-in-japan/legal-framework/

providing impetus for convincing the bureaucracy of the need for a social structure to foster and boost a voluntary third sector.[79] With over 1.3 million people joining in volunteer efforts in the year following the disaster, the inadequacies of the governmental response were laid bare, and legislative moves were pursued to enable Japanese civil society to adopt an independent legal personality.[80] The government did not have a reliable crisis-management system in place, and it recognised that if civil society was able to incorporate, it could become more self-sustainable, and thus be a useful asset for service delivery and community support, working in concert with the government.

Both in recognition of the growth in civil society organisations (refer to figure 1), and their usefulness in providing services for the state, Japan passed the Act on Promotion of Specified Non-Profit Activities in 1998 (hereby the NPO law). This law serves to confer special status for taxation purposes on eligible and registered organisations, which must fit within the following definition:

- Have an operational structure and business activities that are appropriate; [81]
- Engage in specified non-profit activities that contribute to enhancing public interest that contribute to enhancing public interest;[82]
- An organisation whose purpose is not to make profit;[83]
- Does not set any reasonable conditions for the acquisition or loss of qualification of its members;[84]
- Officers receiving remuneration are no more than one-third of all officers;[85]
- Primary purpose is not to disseminate religious teachings, conduct ceremonies and functions, and educate and nurture believers;[86]
- Primary purpose is not to promote, support or oppose any political doctrine or policy;[87]
- Does not have a purpose to recommend, support or oppose any candidate for a specific public office[88]

The law provided civil society organisations with a choice; incorporate and receive tax benefits and independent legal identity, (but at the cost of engaging in policy advocacy and activism), or remain unincorporated and keep advocacy as a primary purpose, (but not have access to the same resources as incorporated groups). Those groups that incorporated under the NPO law henceforth became referred to as NPOs, and those who chose to remain outside of the law were labelled as NGOs. Insofar as terminology is concerned, because of the restrictions imposed upon NPOs in terms of political activities, they may be considered synonymous with Non-Political Organisations.[89]

The NPO law took organisations interested in doing something for their communities, through individual subjectivity, and enthralled them to the state.[90] The strict prescription as to how organisations can operate works something like an "Iron Cage", limiting individual freedoms and activities; all work

[79] Akihiro Ogawa, *The Failure of Civil Society?* 3.
[80] Ibid, 96.
[81] Act on Promotion of Specified Non-Profit Activities (Japan) 1998, Article 1.
[82] Ibid.
[83] Ibid, Article 2(i).
[84] Ibid, Article 2(i)(a).
[85] Ibid, Article 2(i)(b).
[86] Ibid, Article 2(ii)(a).
[87] Ibid, Article 2(ii)(b).
[88] Ibid, Article 2(ii)(c).
[89] Because nothing is ever simple, is it?
[90] Akihiro Ogawa, *The Failure of Civil Society?* 112.

is for the state as the state incorporates civil activities for service delivery and policy implementation.[91] A drop in the number of NGOs can be seen at the same time as the NPO law came into force, presenting the argument that the NPO law is antithetical to civil society advocacy in Japan. By the year 2000, advocacy groups in Japan represented just 0.5% of the total Japanese civil society sector, with the remainder being those that provided service delivery for the Japanese state.[92] In short, the passage of the NPO law and subsequent growth in NPOs represents a manifestation of continued efforts by the Japanese government to shape and control civil society.[93]

Figure 1 - Number of NGOs in Japan pre-NPO Law



(Kim D. Reimann, "Building Networks from the Outside In: Japanese NGOs and the Kyoto Climate Change Conference" *Political Science Faculty Publications*, Paper 6, (2002): 174)

Civil Society Today

Under the NPO law, Japanese civil society has largely departed from the individualised and politically charged movements of the 20th Century. Through requirements of no political participation, civil society has become homogenous, largely indistinguishable from the state.[94] It exists not to challenge policy but rather function as vehicles for participation in the problem-solving and policy delivery process. Organisations are compliant, collaborative with the state and bureaucracy, and strengthen governmental positions by cutting costs.[95] This is a manifestation of global, neo-liberal cost cutting trends, and has extended to the education sector also. Volunteer experience programs formulated by the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) give students volunteer

[91] Ibid, 122.
[92] Jooha Lee and Taekyoon Kim, "Social Politics of Welfare Reform in Korea and Japan: A New Way of Mobilising Power Resources" *Voluntas*, vol. 30 (2019): 399.
[93] Apichai W. Shipper, "Foreigners and Civil Society in Japan" *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 79, no. 2, (2006): 271.
[94] Akihiro Ogawa, *The Failure of Civil Society*? 160.
[95] Ibid, 180.

experiences at all levels of schooling. It promotes volunteer involvement and creates individuals who are more likely to engage with civil society organisations that generate social services for the government.[96] By creating compliant subjects who fit the entrenched ideologies of the government, dynamic civil society is largely absent from the Japanese political system, illustrating that the advent of the NPO law brought with it an era of reduced civil society efficacy. The Japanese state provides preferential treatment towards organisations that are useful to the state, while making it difficult for issue-oriented organisations to expand, as it fears such organisations may undermine its power.[97] This is not to say that politically active civil movements are completely absent from contemporary Japan. Mass protests demanding the withdrawal of US bases from Okinawa attracts tens of thousands of people, while far smaller climate change marches similarly draw thousands.[9899] Ideological and politically active organisations have tended to prefer to remain unincorporated, in order to preserve their independent and political voice.[100] However, it is accurate to say that politically active civil society in Japan is not as present and vocal as in other developed countries. [101] This is consistent with the academic trend that indicates civil society to be a less significant sector to policy advocacy than others; particularly economic interest groups.[102]

Japan's Political Structure

Understanding the monolithic policy structure that dominated the Japanese developmental/construction state for the latter half of the 20th Century is crucial to comprehending the conditions in which civil society had to operate in order to be heard and have any degree of influence. The Japanese political structure plays a significant part of the narrative of how civil society organisations interact with the Japanese state. Japan's political system in the post-war era up until the 21st Century was the result of the American occupation (Supreme Command for Allied Powers – "SCAP") after World War II. Before the end of the war, Japanese policy was dominated by the Imperial Officer Corps, but then this focus shifted to administrative bureaucrats, which further evolved into the "Iron Triangle".[103] This model was defined in Japanese as a triangle of *kan-sei-gyo*; bureaucracy (kan, 官), the dominant party/executive (sei, 政), and major corporations (gyo, 業).[104] This manifests as a triangular system between the ruling LDP, bureaucracy and business conglomerates (most famous of which is the Keidanren, the business representative organisation that speaks for the interests of 1,412 Japanese companies, 109 industrial

[96] Ibid, 178.
[97] Apichai W. Shipper, "Foreigners and Civil Society in Japan", 271.
[98] Bruce Konviser, "Thousands in Okinawa protest US Marine base relocation", *Deutsche Welle*, 11 August 2018, accessed 23 October 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/thousands-in-okinawa-protest-us-marine-base-relocation/a-45046501
[99] Ryusei Takahashi, "Japanese activists join global climate strike ahead of U.N. summit on global warming", *Japan Times*, 20 September 2019, accessed 23 October 2019, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/09/20/national/japanese-activists-join-global-climate-strike-ahead-u-n-summit-global-warming/#.Xa-w3OgzaUk
[100] Apichai W. Shipper, "Foreigners and Civil Society in Japan", 272.
[101] Yutaka Tsujinaka and Robert Pekkanen, "*Civil Society and Interest Groups in Contemporary Japan*", 437.
[102] Christopher Rootes, Anthony Zito and John Barry, "Climate change, national politics and grassroots action: an introduction", *Environmental Politics*, vol. 21, no. 5, (2012): 685.
[103] Brendan Howe, "Between Normality and Uniqueness: Unwrapping the Enigma of Japanese Security Policy Decision-Making" *Modern Asian Studies* vol. 44, no. 6 (2010): 1323.
[104] Roger W. Bowen, *Japan's dysfunctional democracy: The Liberal Democratic Party and structural corruption*, (New York: M.E. Sharpe Armonk, 2003), 72.

associations and 47 regional economic organisations.[105]) As a system of bureaucratic dominance, with highly corporatist representation, the associational structure of Japan tends to be characterised by the strength of business or economic interests over others.[106]

Figure 2 - Basic Structure of the Iron Triangle



(By the author)

Within this insular matrix, policy and support was generated between and for the benefit of the composite actors, to the exclusion of others, including civil society (refer to figure 3).[107] Under the Yoshida Doctrine of *économie concertée*, economic growth was prioritised over all other sectors of policy. Policymaking was dominated by interests within the three component organisations, to the exclusion of outside voices. It was a huge public works system that favoured the industrialised and rural populations of Japan which are disproportionately represented in Japanese national politics.[108] Despite there being growing interaction between sectors and governments worldwide, the stability and self-propelled perpetuation of the Iron Triangle largely prevented the need for civil society inclusion in the bulk of Japanese developmental policymaking.[109] The fusion of technocratic elites and corporatist industry bodies worked to pacify the political Japanese public, eroding individuals' sense of their right to resist and push for change.[110] This was done through welfare policies and formal but ineffective mechanisms for political involvement, such as universal suffrage.[111] Labour unions, traditionally a vocal force for policy advocacy and protection of rights, were reformulated into company organised movements.[112] While they are traditionally excluded from the Iron Triangle matrix, they fit within the

[105] As of 1 April 2019. "About Keidanren" Keidanren, accessed 23 June 2019, https://www.keidanren.or.jp/en/profile/pro001.html
[106] Yutaka Tsujinaka and Robert Pekkanen, "*Civil Society and Interest Groups in Contemporary Japan*", 420.
[107] Eiji Oyamada, "Anti-corruption measures the Japanese way: prevention matters", *Graduate School of Global Studies, Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan Asian Education and Development Studies*, vol.4, no.1, (2015): 25.
[108] Robert J. Mason, "Whither Japan's Environmental Movement?", 190.
[109] Kjell Skjelsbaek, "The Growth of International Nongovernmental Organization in the Twentieth Century", *International Organization, Transnational Relations and World Politics*, vol.25, no.3, (Summer, 1971): 428.
[110] Simon Avenell, "Japan and the global revival of the 'civil society' idea: contemporaneity and the retreat of criticality" *Japan Forum*, vol. 23, no. 3 (2011): 328.
[111] Ibid.
[112] Ian Neary, *The State and Politics in Japan*, (Polity Press, 2002), 48-49.

broader business sector as stakeholders. The Japanese public could feel they were involved with the political process, but the extent to which they were actually involved was incredibly limited.

Figure 3- Exclusion of civil society under the pre-NPO law Iron Triangle model



(By the author)

Following the passage of the NPO law, and the inclusion of civil society organisations as vehicles for service delivery, the number of incorporated groups has increased, as this is the best way for organisations to access resources and enact their agendas. This is an ideal situation for organisations interested in poverty relief, education, and other fields which are not politically contentious, as they can rely on a steady flow of resources from the state to enable them to perform these functions. Similarly, for the government this situation is a positive one, as voluntary groups cost far less than professional organisations; with the result being that cost cutting across national budgets is possible.[113]

[113] Akihiro Ogawa, *The Failure of Civil Society?* 21.

Figure 4- Number of NPOs incorporated under the NPO law



(Yu Ishida and Naoko, "Local Charitable Giving and Civil Society Organizations in Japan", Voluntas, *vol.26, (2015): 1171.)*

This growth in cooperation between the state and NPOs leads to justifiable claims that not all of civil society is ineffective in the current system. Neighbourhood associations remain a strong part of Japanese communities and philanthropy through the provision of local public goods and services.[114] The Japanese state can claim to have civil participation in the policymaking process, even if it is in reality little more than tokenism. However, when it comes to the civil society organisations that chose not to incorporate, the NGOs, the situation is different. They remain excluded by the Japanese system, and struggle to be heard by stakeholders who hold resources, let alone have their agendas furthered (refer to figure 5). Citizen participation can be said to have increased under the NPO law, however governmental decision making is not characterised by acceptance or taking into account of this input.[115]

[114] Ibid, 1173.
[115] Benoit Graniera and Hiroko Kudo, "How are citizens involved in smart cities? Analysing citizen participation in Japanese smart cities", *Information Polity* vol.21 (2016): 62.

Figure 5 - Civil society engagement with the Japanese state under the NPO law



(By the author)

Japan does not have a politically active civil society sector that is as well established as those overseas. It is under-emphasized as a legitimate actor for policy work, and generally perceived as being a non-professional entity, with a lacuna in reputation as a result. Part of this is because of implicit understandings that the non-profit nature of NGOs means they are voluntary, and because of the subservient role played by incorporated NPOs, civil society is regarded as an extension of the hand of government rather than an active player in the formation of policy.[116] While Japan has a history of well-developed labour unions, there has been a trend of reduced membership and political clout among the largest union, The Japanese Trade Union Confederation (*Rengo*).[117] This has culminated in a degraded union presence and waning political influence as business interests are consolidated under the Abe administration. A regressive labour union movement and under-developed political civil society contributes to general attitudes that policy advocacy from actors outside of the institutionalised framework of power networks is irrelevant, unfeasible and ineffective.

[116] Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation: JANIC, "NGOs and Development Effectiveness in Japan", *JANIC Issue Paper* no.1, (May 2010): 26 https://www.janic.org/MT/pdf/janic_issuepaper_english.pdf
[117] "Rengo's daunting challenges", *Japan Times Editorial*, 24 November 2019, accessed 29 December 2019 https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/11/24/editorials/rengos-daunting-challenges/#.XggNIkczaUk

Academic discussion has considered the extent to which Confucianism has shaped this attitude. Within the Confucianism approach to government, where filial piety and respect for authority is paramount, people are expected to, and generally do, accept the authority of central government.[118] However, given the breadth of East Asia, it is impossible to neatly conceptualise Asian reactions to civil society as Confucian.[119]

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries Japan somewhat rejected Confucianism, as its victories over China, which had long been the dominant power in Asia, demonstrated universal Chinese Confucian statecraft to be inadequate for the modern world.[120] However in the post-war context, when Japan's *economie concertée* was booming, discourse shifted from classical to post Confucianism, or at least some form of distinctly Asian cultural and social values.[121] Japan demonstrated that massive economic growth could happen in parallel with low crime and corruption rates, suggesting a clearly non-Weberian mindset where communitarianism was prevalent; group solidarity triumphed over individualism and direct competition.[122] As Japan's economy stagnated following the bubble burst in the early 1990s, counterarguments emerged. Tying in the century-earlier arguments about Confucianism being incompatible with the modern state, the successes of Asia in the post-war context were attributed to new ideology of modernisation engineered by the developmental state.[123] In essence, economic and political motivations were masked by ideological labels; in other words cultural identity was no more responsible for the Japanese state than the German *Kultur* movement was in late 19th century Germany.[124]

While the range of academic commentary is divided on the role Confucianism has played in shaping Japanese civil society, the consensus supports the notion of the state being a strong and patriarchal entity which has formulated the rules, with civil society an essentially subordinate sphere within this matrix.[125] This state-centric model produced, through socio-cultural engineering, a national consensus towards economic growth and industrialisation that drove the post-war agenda in Japan.[126] This in turn developed a strong sense of faith in the government; as long as the economy was growing, the government and its policies were largely acceptable to the populace.[127] In the half century before the economic burst of the 1990s, the Japanese population had time to accept the political status quo and become sceptical of outside voices trying to enact change. This acceptance can be seen in contemporary Japanese national elections, where voter participation is low, suggesting compliance with the status quo and a widely-held view that there is no viable alternative to the LDP.[128]

[118] Robert J. Mason, "Whither Japan's Environmental Movement?", 207.
[119] Paul Waley, "Ruining and Restoring Rivers: The State and Civil Society in Japan", *Pacific Affairs*, vol.78, no.2 (Summer, 2005): 199.
[120] Leigh Jenco, "Revisiting Asian Values", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, vol.74, no.2 (April 2013): 240.
[121] Roderick MacFarquhar, "The Post-Confucian Challenge", *The Economist*, 9 February, 1980, 71.
[122] Ezra Vogel, *Japan as Number One: Lessons for America* (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1979), 129.
[123] Leigh Jenco, "*Revisiting Asian Values*", 252.
[124] Mark Thompson, "Whatever Happened to 'Asian Values'?", *Journal of* Democracy, vol.12, (2001): 158-159.
[125] Paul Waley, "*Ruining and Restoring Rivers: The State and Civil Society in Japan*", 204.
[126] Kwon Keedon, "Economic Development in East Asia and a Critique of the Post-Confucian Thesis", *Theory and Society*, vol.36 (2007).
[127] Jooha Lee and Taekyoon Kim, "Social Politics of Welfare Reform in Korea and Japan", 393.
[128] Takashi Inoguchi, "Abenomics and Abegeopolitics", in *Japanese and Korean Politics: Alone and Apart from each Other, ed.* Takashi Inoguchi (United States, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 15.

While Japan does not have the lowest voter turnout of OECD countries, it ranks very near to the bottom; indicating a largely apolitical population (refer to figure 6).[129] In this context, it is difficult for organisations existing outside of the governmentally supported NPO law framework to attain sufficient numbers from within the general public to create a groundswell of momentum to pursue their agenda in an effective manner. If a population is less engaged to vote, it cannot be expected to support civil activism; a far more engaged process. Paradoxically, it does not appear that lower voter engagement comes from widely held trust in the government and a desire to retain whichever party is governing. Conversely, Japan has relatively low levels of trust in government (39% of Japanese trusted their government in 2019, compared with the global average of 47%); low voter turnout suggests something more like a systematic inability to change political actors.[130] These factors all have wider implications for the extent to which civil society organisations receive support from the general public; corresponding with lower membership than overseas counterparts.

Figure 6 - Voter turnout in Japanese general elections (%)



(Sean Richley, "*Voter Turnout in Japan and the United States*", Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, accessed 20 October 2019, https://www.jsps.go.jp/english/e-plaza/e-sdialogue/03_data/Dr_Richey.pdf)

The literature is consistent in suggesting that Japanese civil society has split into a fork after decades of institutionalised relegation from significance. Japanese civil advocacy had some success with the Ashio copper mine case, but following that it was subsumed by state interests in the remaining pre-war years. It was only following the 1945 defeat of Japan that civil society emerged as a legitimate, if insignificant, player. This was proceeded by peaks and troughs of success, particularly in the environmental sector, and culminated in state recognition of the role of civil society through the passage of the NPO law in 1998. From this point, civil society was split into two groups; NPOs and NGOs, the former of which has become much closer to the state. In this context there are two schools of thought about Japanese civil society; one emphasizing and praising the successes of NPOs in service delivery, and the other lamenting the lack of politicisation of civil society following the passage of the NPO law.

[129] "Voter Turnout", OECD Library, accessed 16 September 2019, https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/how-s-life-2017/voter-turnout-percentage-of-votes-cast-among-the-population-registered-to-vote-latest-available-year_how_life-2017-graph183-en#page1
[130] "2019 Edelman Trust Barometer Global Report" Edelman.com (2019): 41, accessed 29 December 2019, https://www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/2019-03/2019_Edelman_Trust_Barometer_Global_Report.pdf?utm_source=website&utm_medium=global_report&utm_campaign=downloads

Both of these schools of thought emphasise NPOs, however. The conclusion of this is implicitly that NGOs, the unincorporated sector of civil society, has been neutered in terms of its effectiveness; leading to claims that civil society has failed in Japan.[131]

Despite this, there has been a resurgence in environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGOs), particularly in the climate change sector. As discussed earlier in the hypothesis, I believe this resurgence can be ascribed to a growth in activity by the business sector in Japan; one of the three pillars of the Iron Triangle model, and a powerful and relevant actor. ENGOs are regarded by business as holders of knowledge about climate change, as they have been involved with international science and momentum for a longer time than other sectors.[132] As such, ENGOs are attractive partners for collaboration, connections, and the provision of information. This has led to new avenues for ENGOs to approach, and be approached by businesses, to work with them on specific projects, or more permanent arrangements for the mutual furtherance of climate related agendas. Businesses have acted, since 2015, as a vehicle which has brought ENGOs forward in terms of relevance and activism in the climate change sector.

[131] Akihiro Ogawa, *The Failure of Civil Society?*
[132] Interview with JCLP, 21 June, 2019.

Chapter Three – Shimin History and Present Data

Evolution of the Shimin model of civil society

Most of the effective Japanese civil activism movements in the environmental space (of which climate change is a subset) have been ascribed to the Shimin model of civil society. Rather than being an esoteric school of philosophical thought, its roots come from attempts to provide the Japanese people with a tool to negotiate daily life.[133] In turn this came to inform how civil movements should engage with the state to produce tangible and successful results. This model of citizenship has shaped waves of civil society action, and has become an operative philosophy or methodology for many organisations in Japan. These waves, so labelled as Shimin 1.0 and 2.0, correspond with the periods of success experienced by Shimin since its formation.

These waves can be characterised by apogees in policy success which can be attributed to the Shimin movement; starting with environmental policy and the state, followed by prefectural policies and municipal governments. The third wave, which is argued as starting to emerge, is similarly in the environmental space, more specifically climate change, and is the result of collaboration with the business sector.

Starting as a movement that enabled individual thought and action following the dismantling of the total war Japanese state, it was limited to the esotericism of philosophers and academics. Its central vision, as articulated by Japanese academic Tsurumi Yoshiyuki, is that individual autonomy is able to transcend the control of the state, which is then able to be harnessed into action.[134] Individual citizens were now in a position to think for themselves and found themselves living in a new and liberal system thrust upon them by SCAP in the immediate post-war months; this presented an opportunity to conceptualise a future and idealised Japan. Against the backdrop of political structural change, reassessments of Japanese mindsets, were taking place by the Japanese themselves. Many Japanese felt collective guilt for their country's role in the war, and regretted the near total absence of attempts to form proactive resistance movements.[135]

Shimin emphasised independence from the state as a way to embrace free thought and individual liberty – indeed Tsurumi Yoshiyuki relinquished his status as *Kokumin* (lit. "person of a nation") to become a *Shimin*, with the conceptual freedoms that granted.[136] Rather than being anti-establishmentarian, it is rooted in collaborative efforts designed to improve Japan and cultivate action based on the individual perceptions of what any given issue is.[137] The individual who could not voice a dissenting opinion in matters politic during the militaristic years of Japan was now able to analyse an issue through their own eyes and shape it into something that could help Japan's transformation into a modern and pluralistic society; this is the essence of Shimin as a model of civil society. While there were instances of civil movements in the Meiji Era, notably at Ashio Mine, and further into Japanese history in the form of peasant revolts, the post-war reforms were significant from a civil society perspective.[138] Individual

[133] Simon Avenell, *Making Japanese Citizens*, 27.
[134] Ibid, 2.
[135] Ibid, 12.
[136] Ibid, 11.
[137] Tsuneo Yasuda, *Gendaishi ni okeru Jichi ga Ugoku Toki: Shakai no Henkaku to NPO no Kanosei* (Tokyo: Gyosei, 1999), 95.
[138] Robert J. Mason, "Whither Japan's Environmental Movement?", 188.

Japanese were citizens, rather than subjects, and pro-democracy institutional changes provided, at least theoretically, a space in which to develop and foster pluralistic and dissenting voices to policy. On this ground, the schools of thought that promoted individual and subjective consciousness were arguably a success, given the proliferation of free-thinking organisations that were to come.

Being a system designed to improve the state, Shimin does not shy away from using the implements and apparatus of the state; indeed, this is a hallmark of its method. Rather than engaging in mass violent protest, such as the *Anpo* and *Zengakuren* movements, Shimin became a method of activism that simultaneously used legitimate and direct channels as consonant with democratic ideals.[139] This further developed into the thought of pragmatism, with citizens existing not in a universal society (as they had in wartime Japan), but rather progressive and subjective; this was designed to allow people to "unlock" themselves and to better engage with Japanese politics.[140] Over time, with the help of Japanese philosopher Tsurumi Shunsuke and his Institute for the Science of Thought (*Shiso no Kagaku Kenkyukai, 思想の科学研究会*), this further developed and fostered the context in which successful civil activism would take place in the latter half of the 20th Century.[141]

Shimin thinking was further influenced by the unsuccessful *Anpo* and *Beheiren* movements, which lacked direction and focus. These movements were driven more by individual interests à la desires to preserve the status quo. They were collective movements based on a conservative defence of daily life instead of a forward thinking approach for what could be; the latter being what Shimin strives towards[142] Following the failures of these movements, Shimin began to manifest in citizens groups that brought about pluralistic interests and opinions while also employing them in a meaningful way to engage direct democracy. Shimin was evolving away from mass protest and towards a movement that utilised the mechanics of state to achieve its goals. Shimin was about to become a style of civil advocacy that engaged evidence, the courts, and science.

The first success for the movement came with the "Big Four" pollution cases. While there were large protest marches, including some violent ones, these cases were unprecedented in the use of the courts by activists. Inspired by citizen-organised scientific studies organised by successful anti-industrial movements in 1964, *Shimin* informed the development of anti-pollution activism.[143] To say the cases were an unmitigated success is inaccurate, given the years of suffering by people poisoned by mercury. However, that citizens were able to present scientific evidence in court and successfully challenge big industry and policies of unrestrained growth was a huge development. This wave of legal and rational citizen participation in politics heralded predictions of a massive change in Japanese politics and citizen self-governance.[144] Japan's middle class was growing, and with more disposable income people were more able and willing to engage in politics, which posed a threat to the entrenched conservative system. Shimin presented a model of civil activism that did not alienate law-abiding people, and crucially it had been shown to work. There was increasingly a view that "…citizens movements and new communities

[139] Ellis Krauss and Bradford Simcock, *Citizens Movements, The Growth and Impact of Environmental Protest in Japan*, in *Political Opposition and Local Politics in Japan*, ed. Kurt Steiner, Ellis Krauss and Scott Flanagan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 214.
[140] Simon Avenell, *Making Japanese Citizens*, 34.
[141] Ibid, 22.
[142] Kato Hidetoshi, *Chukan Bunka*, (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1957), 4-8.
[143] Simon Avenell, *Making Japanese Citizens*, 152.
[144] Taketsugu Tsurutani, "A New Era of Japanese Politics: Tokyo's Gubernatorial Election", 443.

must be watched closely; they may hold the key to Japan's future".[145] Being the zenith of the anti-pollution campaigns, this time can be labelled as "Shimin 1.0", marking the first period of success for the model.

By 1973 the Big Four cases were all positively resolved, and preventative action was taken before proposed industrial developments could progress, such as a paper mill in Shizuoka Prefecture.[146] However, from the mid-1970s the government started to move against Shimin style civil activism given the risk it posed to pro-growth policies. It began working with more moderate citizens in a limited capacity in order to claim it was consulting pluralistic groups, and by deflecting conflicts before they escalated into protest, the wind was taken out of the sails of Shimin style activism.[147]

At municipal levels, however, Shimin was starting to flourish. Where the 1960s and early 1970s saw an antagonistic relationship between Prefectures and activism in the context of fighting industrial development, from the late 1970s there was a boom in citizen consultation. Chofu city had a permanent citizen consultation committee, Ueda city in Nagano requested total citizen participation in city government, and Musashino city created citizen committees for long term policy planning, which went beyond feedback on bureaucrat's work, but also researched, formulated and implemented policy.[148] Civil society had transcended simply working with local government but was now actively playing a part in shaping the policy and direction of municipalities.

It was understandable that the reaction to Shimin styled civil society differed between local and prefectural governments, and the central government. While civil minimums were postulated at local levels by Shimin theorists to guarantee bottom lines for rights of daily life and living standards, the central government barely regarded civil society.[149] Local bureaucrats and citizen bureaucrats worked alongside each other to express meaningful and pluralistic civic self-governance; it was the culmination of civil society utilising instruments of the state to influence policy.[150] Shimin had moved from working against the state, albeit with a positive vision in mind, to a movement that worked with governments to foster such change. While it was not able to engage with national politics as much as it had during the Shimin 1.0 period, this era of close cooperation and strong influence on local and prefectural politics justifies the label of "Shimin 2.0"

Into the early 1990s, there were pushes to allow civil society organisations (Shimin included) to incorporate and receive tax benefits, as recognition of their positive contribution to the state. This was largely ignored by the central government until after the 1995 Kobe earthquake, where civil society embarrassed the government by the speed and effectiveness of its recovery response, in comparison with that of the government. This convinced the central government of the benefit of civil society, and in 1998 the NPO law was passed. While on the face of it, this law would free civic groups from some of their resourcing issues, the limitations placed on groups which incorporated to become NPOs meant that political activism fell. The central government had a growing number of NPOs which were able to

[145] Daikichi Irokawa, "The Survival Struggle of the Japanese Community", in *Authority and Individual in Japan: Citizen Protest in Historical Perspective*, ed. J. Victor Koschmann (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1978), 282.
[146] Simon Avenell, *Making Japanese Citizens*, 157.
[147] Ibid, 192.
[148] Ibid, 183-184.
[149] Narumi Masayasu, *Chiho bunken no shiso: Jichitai Kaikaku no Kiseki to Tenbo* (Tokyo: Gakuyo Shobo, 1994), 222-223.
[150] Matsushita Keiichi, *Toshigata Shaka no Jichi*, (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha, 1987), 89-90.

work to deliver state policies, and the state could claim it was working with a variety of groups in its policy work, thus shutting down voices to the contrary.

Under this legislative framework, NPOs have become a vehicle replacing the government as the actor for the provision of services.[151] Education programs have been developed to institutionalise volunteerism within individuals as a way of creating citizens who will work voluntarily, which can be harnessed to help uplift the Japanese economy.[152] This use of auxiliaries has been considered a way of getting around labour laws, and because of the massive power imbalances between government and NPOs, the government can manipulate them to be in a position to better serve public needs.[153]

NGOs have ceased to be relevant actors in the civil society sector, as the government has a captive partner in NPOs. In this context, Shimin, which is inextricably linked with political advocacy, has been relegated into irrelevance, and with it the NGOs that engage in policy work. This situation is consistent with the literature which refers to the historic successes of civil society, but in the modern context, civil society is regarded in either of two ways;

- Civil society has "failed", for its general inability to engage in political advocacy and enthrallment to the LDP[154], or
- Civil society is successful in terms of positive utility provided by NPOs in their service delivery role[155]

Shimin has continued to exist as a model for civil society, but on the fringes of the civil sector. It is only in the second half of the 2010s that it was able to experience the beginning of a resurgence in climate change matters. This was itself the result of changes in attitudes from an important and institutionalised pillar of the Japanese system: business. In Japan, business is a long-institutionalised actor within the channels of power and policymaking. Because of this power, business represents a potent ally for civil society actors generally, and specifically for Shimin, as it provides a conduit to other actors in the policymaking matrix. The Shimin model of civil society uses pragmatism and strategy to achieve its goals, combined with utilisation of legitimate instruments of state. As business is an institutionalised and recognised pillar of the Japanese state, it perfectly fulfils the criteria of a state instrument that the Shimin model seeks to employ for the furtherance of the goals of given organisations. NGOs utilising the Shimin model have an opportunity for a new phase of collaboration, which in turn may culminate in new successes and positions of influence within the Japanese policy space, at least insofar as climate matters are concerned. It is reasoned that, given this re-emergence in successes and activism, that the collaboration with the business sector is heralding a new wave of success for Shimin; a "Shimin 3.0". This labelling is predicated by the categorisation of two previous "waves"; Shimin 1.0 and Shimin 2.0, respectively (refer to table 2).

[151] Akihiro Ogawa, *The Failure of Civil Society?* 93.
[152] Ibid, 103.
[153] Ibid, 126.
[154] Akihiro Ogawa, *The Failure of Civil Society?*
[155] Yutaka Tsujinaka and Robert Pekkanen, "Civil Society and Interest Groups in Contemporary Japan".

Table 2 – Characteristics of Shimin waves

Wave of Shimin	Active Years	Characteristics	Successes
Shimin 1.0	1959-1973	Civil society vs. state Citizen science Pragmatic, legal activism Use of courts	Big Four Pollution Cases Strong industrial pollution law reform
Shimin 2.0	Late 1970s-1990s	Civil society with municipal government Collaborative, start to finish policy input	Plurality in city policy Incorporation of citizen subjectivity into policy affairs
Shimin 3.0	2015 onwards	Civil society with business Driven by commercial concerns Flexible and pragmatic, reflective of business needs Climate focussed	Increased civil activism from outside of NPO framework Access to institutionalised policymaking structures using business as a vehicle

(By the author)

It is impossible to quantify "success" in such a qualitative field such as this, and as such indicative values are shown in graph form to demonstrate the "waves" of success embodied by Shimin 1.0, 2.0 and 3.0 (refer to figure 8). Shimin 1.0 represents a lower value than Shimin 2.0, on account of the length of time it took for resolution, and the continued struggles of some victims to be certified as having Minamata-byo. Shimin 2.0 was a peak of collaboration between cities and civil society; being a voluntary collaborative matrix with local government inviting civil society to participate. As a recognition of the potency of civil society, municipalities actively courted civil society organisations for involvement in local policy matters. As such, with this recognition comes more success and effectiveness, given civil society was actively working with policymakers rather than fighting them for influence. The involvement of civil society during the Kyoto Protocol negotiations does suggest a shift away from the traditional exclusionary system in Japan; however, this was not sufficient to warrant labelling as a "wave" of Shimin.

Figure 7 - Indicative and demonstrative waves of Japanese civil society utilising Shimin



(By the author)

Each of the waves ends in a return to near efficacy. This reflects a combination of issues-based activism and the realities of the Japanese system in responding to, and excluding, Japanese political civil society. Shimin 1.0 was very much focussed on addressing localised pollution issues, and did not extend further, essentially resetting Shimin for another issue. Within the peak of the Iron Triangle and subsequent bursting of the bubble econo5my in Japan, at the national level, policymaking was very much consolidated within the three actors of the Iron Triangle. Furthermore, the 1998 NPO law set NGOs backwards, as it brought the apolitical NPOs to the fore and provided the state with a politically neutered source of collaboration. The state could claim to be working with civil society (and indeed it was), but in doing so it could also exclude the voices from political civil society. This reduced NGOs to relative obscurity and meant they had to wait for a new catalyst for action. This was produced by the Paris Agreement, and gave momentum after the non-starter of Kyoto to a new wave of ascendency. The extent to which this will finally achieve is impossible to determine; however commensurate with trends of growing ENGO and business collaboration is the ability to exert influence on policy direction.

Shimin is unlike other forms of civil society in that it is not necessarily predisposed to be against the state. While Japanese civil society has generally viewed their relationship with Japanese policymakers as antagonistic, this does not always apply to Shimin.[156] Shimin regards the ultimate goal of civil advocacy as being the inclusion of citizens within policymaking; where some methods of civil advocacy would blanche at the prospect of actively cooperating with the bureaucracy or executive, Shimin

[156] Ibid, 430.

embraces and desires it.[157] This can be seen in the evolution of Shimin between waves, as the main thrust of civil advocacy shifted away from a confrontational to collaborative approach. Within Shimin 1.0, the Japanese government and industry was regarded as an opponent, first to be reasoned with, and then through the courts, taken on and defeated. Shimin 2.0 saw municipal government and civil society working together to incorporate civic input within the policymaking process. This was a mutually beneficial situation, and highlighted that Shimin sees itself ultimately as a source of collaborative and constructive, rather than confrontational, policy input. This is further seen in Shimin 3.0 as the commercial and civil sectors, who traditionally are at odds with one another on a great many issues, are working together to improve climate action. The recognition of the merits of civic inclusion by business in policy decisions, provides another case for Shimin society to act cooperatively rather than confrontationally.

As will be discussed later, the involvement of civil society at the Kyoto Protocol negotiations was largely a result of the Japanese government wanting to project a pluralistic image to the international domain. As such, much of the activism done by civil society was because the Japanese state allowed it, rather than it being a result of a Shimin modelled movement in and of itself.[158] Accordingly, while there was civil society participation, it was tokenistic more than anything, and thus not qualifying as a "wave" of Shimin.

Research Process

Methodology

To explore the hypothesis that NGOs, specifically ENGOs, are experiencing a resurgence in activism in climate change matters due to the involvement of the business sector, an examination of the relationship between the two sectors was necessary. To achieve this, a number of Japanese ENGOs were approached and interviewed about their experiences and collaboration with business. This approach facilitated better communication and allowed for clarification of questions more seamlessly than would be possible over numerous email chains. It also enabled me to receive physical documentation that individuals regarded as relevant to my research, such as reports, articles and newsletters, which were subsequently utilised in my research. Where organisations were unavailable for a physical interview, email discussions followed as a practical solution. Interviews were recorded with permission, or where permission was not given, limited notetaking occurred to an extent deemed acceptable by the interviewee. These interviews were then transcribed for easy reference.

[157] Keiichi Matsushita, *Toshigata Shaka no Jichi* (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha, 1987), 89-90.
[158] Kim D. Reimann, "Building Networks from the Outside In", 182.

Because climate change is not a geospatially restricted issue, the physical location of the ENGOs was not a determining factor for selection; rather another set of criteria was used:

- Mentioned climate change, decarbonisation, sustainability or global warming related issues among their projects
- Had an English language component to their website
- Were contactable by email

These criteria reflect the limitations of the author, given the restrictions of Japanese language interviews; these were determined as being too time consuming. Conducting a satisfactory interview in Japanese would take longer than the time generally allocated, and so English was the primary mode for interviews. This is not necessarily a fatal limitation, as Japanese is not an official language of the IPCC or the Paris Agreement in international terms, with English used as the primary language by Japanese delegations. Accordingly, there was a capable familiarity in English among groups that engage with the text of the Paris Agreement, and it was determined the absence of Japanese in interviews was not a major issue. Email was regarded as the best method of initial communication given both language difficulties and the ease of sending out numerous appeals for interviews.

Initial selection of NGOs to approach for interviews was made by referring to the Environmental Restoration and Conservation Agency of Japan (ERCA), which is partially administered by the Japanese Minister of the Environment. [159] Groups were identified from the Financial Year 2015[160], 2016[161], 2017[162] and 2018[163] lists that conformed to the above criteria: The identified groups were approached via email for comment, and if amenable, for interviews. Interviews were arranged and conducted in a variety of locations around Tokyo, with the same 10 questions being asked of each organisation. In the course of interviews, mention of other groups and individuals sometimes occurred, in which case contact was attempted if they were not included in the initial round of approaches. Between 21-23 April 2019 the C20 (Civil Society 20) Conference was held in Tokyo. At this conference other groups and individuals were met, which led to further contact and outreaches for interviews. This approach was slightly ad hoc but was flexible enough to not exclude other organisations that came to my attention during the course of research. There were many instances of recommendations being made to approach organisations that had already been contacted, indicating a satisfactory degree of penetration into the Japanese ENGO population.

Through this system, 29 such organisations were identified and approached, with a return of 21 civil society organisations. In addition, two business groups (Keidanren and Mitsubishi Corporation) were caught within the ambit of these interviews and were interviewed as relevant organisations. Of these total groups, the breakdown is as follows:

[159] "Outline of ERCA", Environmental Restoration and Conservation Agency of Japan (ERCA), accessed 15 May 2019 https://www.erca.go.jp/erca/english/outline.html
[160] "Projects Funded by Japan Fund for Global Environment FY 2015", Environmental Restoration and Conservation Agency of Japan (ERCA), accessed 15 May 2019 https://www.erca.go.jp/jfge/english/wwd/recipients/15_c.html
[161] "Projects Funded by Japan Fund for Global Environment FY 2016", Environmental Restoration and Conservation Agency of Japan (ERCA) , accessed 15 May 2019 https://www.erca.go.jp/jfge/english/wwd/recipients/16_c.html
[162] "Projects Funded by Japan Fund for Global Environment FY 2017", Environmental Restoration and Conservation Agency of Japan (ERCA) , accessed 15 May 2019 https://www.erca.go.jp/jfge/english/wwd/recipients/17_c.html
[163] "Projects Funded by Japan Fund for Global Environment FY 2018", Environmental Restoration and Conservation Agency of Japan (ERCA) , accessed 15 May 2019 https://www.erca.go.jp/jfge/english/wwd/recipients/18_c.html

Figure 8 - Interviewed civil society organisation breakdown



(By the author)

The inclusion of the three NPOs was only identified when the groups themselves indicated they were NPOs rather than NGOs; something not immediately apparent when they were initially identified. Accordingly, their views are only semi-relevant to this research, given they fall within the ambit of institutionalised civil society.

Within the 16 NGOs, there is a further breakdown that reflects the different types of organisation. These are largely semantic; however, they give an indication of how the individual groups frame their activities. These wide-ranging organisations all have environmental, and in many cases, climate specific manifestos. The extent to which this selection is representative of the total number of ENGOs in Japan is uncertain, however; as NGOs exist outside of the same registration requirements as NPOs, there is no accurate figure for their total number. The difficulties in accurately determining the number of NGOs in any given sector is embodied by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, which itself can only estimate the number of Japanese NGOs engaged in international cooperation activities.[164] Given the criteria included only English language capable organisations, there are undoubtedly ones which were missed. However, as ENGOs which had already been interviewed were being recommended to the author by the end of the process, there is high confidence that all the pertinent organisations were approached.

[164] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: MOFA, "International Cooperation and NGOs. Partnership between the Ministry of Foreign Ministry of Japan and Japanese NGOs" (sic), (2013): 3, accessed 17 January 2020 https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000024755.pdf

Figure 9 - Breakdown of interviewed NGOs



(By the author)

As the name suggests, the Business Coalition NGOs are formed primarily of businesses, however they operate more or less exactly the same as traditional NGOs. The third category is broader, particularly insofar as Think Tanks are concerned; they are primarily research organisations but exist as NGOs. Overall however, all of the organisations within this breakdown exist outside of the NPO law framework and are qualified as NGOs.

Interviews

Table 3 - List of interviews

Organisation Name	**Date Interviewed**	**Type of Organisation**
350.org Japan	5 June 2019	NGO
Carbon Declaratory Project Japan	16 April 2019	NGO (Charitable Organisation)
Climate Youth Japan	14 April 2019	NGO
Citizens Environmental Foundation	25 July 2019	NPO
Environmental Partnership Council Japan	12 June 2019	NGO
Education for Sustainable Development Japan	15 April 2019	NPO
Future Earth Japan	19 June 2019	NGO
Greenpeace Japan	18 July 2019	NGO
Institute for Global Environment Studies	17 May 2019	NGO (Public Interest Foundation)
Institute for Sustainable Energy Policies	7 May 2019	NGO (Think Tank)
Japan Carbon Initiative	18 July 2019	NGO
Japan Climate Leaders Partnership	21 June 2019	NGO (Business Coalition)
Japan Association of Environment and Society for the 21st Century	29 May 2019	NPO
Keidanren	3 June 2019	Business
Kiko Network	24 April 2019	NGO
Mitsubishi Corporation	7 June 2019	Business
Renewable Energy Institute	17 April 2019; 8 May 2019	NGO (Think Tank)
Renewable Energy Organisation of Hokkaido	11 June 2019	NGO
Sustainable Sport NGO and NPO Network	12 June 2019	NGO
WWF Japan	18 July 2019	NGO
Youth20 Japan	7 July 2019	NGO

As discussed above in reference to my methodology for identifying and selecting groups to approach, I selected a reasonably wide range of organisations from across the spectrum of activities and affiliations. This was done within my own specific constraints such as requiring reasonable English language ability of my interviewees, but nevertheless has provided me with a good scope for analysis into the changing functions of civil society in Japan regarding climate change, within the post-COP21 context.

Furthermore, for the sake of consistency, only the data from the 16 NGOs will be considered. NPOs exist within the institutional framework of the NPO law, and thus outside of the ambit of this study. The Keidanren is strictly speaking an NGO, but it is not a climate focussed organisation, and being an established part of the traditional machinations of political power in Japan, it is not consistent with traditional notions of civil society.

Chapter Four – Challenging Notions of Japanese Civil Society Ineffectiveness

Japanese ENGOs are working collaboratively in a multitude of ways with Japanese businesses to assist in climate actions and transitions. This variety reflects the different needs of businesses, but also serves to showcase the number of ways in which ENGOs can, and are, having a concrete impact on climate policies in Japan.

Analysis of change

Given the number of organisations, and varieties of approaches to civil activism, my analysis of their experiences in climate policy issues will be categorised into several sections; these will then form the basis of my argument. These categorisations are as follows;

- Organisational growth and activities
- Presence of collaboration with other sectors (business and civil society)
- Efficacy and challenges within the Japanese government and political context
- Role of the Paris Agreement

Additionally, there will be a more in-depth analysis of some specific instances of business/civil society collaboration to further argue the role of the Paris Agreement in changing the function of Japanese civil society.

Growth over time

The organisations interviewed, have existed for as little as one year and as many as 47 years; some are very well established within the Japanese civil sector, and others are relative newcomers.

Figure 10 - Age of interviewed groups in Japan (years)



(By the author)

With an average age of approximately 13 and a half years, the organisations interviewed provide a good assessment of changes throughout the first two decades of the 21st Century, and in some cases back into the 1990s and earlier. This enables a greater depth of historical understanding, as well as adding validity to their perceptions of change for the future.

Growth and changes to organisations

Organisational growth was a consistent trend across most organisations; whether this was measured in revenue or membership. Metrics for growth varied across organisations as sensitivities of discussing finances, among other things may have emerged, however most were happy to talk in some capacity about their growth. One metric for this is the increase in engagement with the business sector.

Table 4 - Growth of select ENGOs

Group Name	**Form of collaborative activities**	**Growth**
Carbon Declaratory Project	Holds seminars to release its grading result for the year; facilitates dialogue between companies to further commitment to decarbonisation policies	3 Employees in 2006 12 Employees in 2019
Institute for Sustainable Energy Policies	Connects companies with renewable energy technology providers and operates a policymaking department for consultation with companies	3 Employees in 2003 30 Employees in 2019
Kiko Network	Operates through other NGOs to collaborate with companies	Membership consisted of 50 organisations and 150 individuals in 1998 Membership consisted of 100 organisations and 510 individuals in 2019
Institute for Global Environmental Strategies	Provides networking opportunities for business	Membership consisted of 20 organisations in 1998 Membership consisted of over 100 organisations in 2019

Japan Carbon Initiative	Gathers companies together to share information, facilitate communication and formulate policies for specific sectors	Membership consisted of 105 organisations in 2018 Membership consisted of 446 organisations (17 January 2020)
Japan Climate Leaders Partnership	Gathers companies under the mantle of decarbonisation Produces policy proposals for renewable energy and decarbonisation	Membership consisted of 35 organisations in 2017 Membership consisted of 131 organisations on 17 January 2020

One organisation has experienced a drop in membership over time, and provided specific figures for these.

Japan Association of Environment and Society for the 21st Century (Kanbun)	Provides opportunities for networking among companies and NGOs; information provision to companies	Membership consisted of 700 in 1998 Membership consisted of over 300 in 2019

This is significant given the Japan Association of Environment and Society for the 21st Century's status as an NPO; being restricted in its ability to engage in policy advocacy it conforms with the hypothesis that NGOs, rather than NPOs, are attractive for collaboration from the business sector. The organisations that all experienced, and provided specific figures for, growth were NGOs. This suggests that NGOs, being free to engage in policy advocacy unlike NPOs, are being regarded by business as a more promising vehicle for climate change related initiatives.

Such growth is reflective of the attitude among ENGOs that in order to influence Japanese politics, a critical mass of business voices is necessary. The Japanese state has proven itself as more receptive to listening to business interests when it comes to policymaking. Currently it is operating under strong fossil fuel interests, but as business voices indicating a desire to increase renewable energy and divest from coal grow, then the chances it will begin national-level policy shifts grow commensurately. As a reflection of this, many ENGO activities have been in a phase of growth in the post 2015 years so as to attract a significant portion of the Japanese business sector; with this their voices to move away from fossil fuels are all the stronger and carry with them a greater change of motivating change.

Differences in activities

As the interviewed organisations have a range of compositions and roles, so do their activities. Policy advocacy was engaged in by a majority of interviewed ENGOs, with one group in a process of transition towards it.

Figure 11 - NGOs engaged in policy advocacy



(By the author)

Of the 13 organisations that engage in policy advocacy, the majority are traditional NGOs, with the minority being a business coalition and a blend of alternative forms of NGO. However, it is stressed that all of these organisations exist outside of the NPO law framework and from a legal perspective are outside of the institutionalised system of NPOs as promulgated by the NPO law. Accordingly, they are not considered instruments of the state, making them consistent with the Shimin model of independent civil society.

Figure 12 - Types of organisation engaged in policy advocacy



(By the author)

Of the three Think Tank/Research Organisations, one was established by an entrepreneur and is not voluntary as to its membership in the same way a traditional NGO is. However, it operates in the same space as environmental civil society organisations insofar as policy advocacy is concerned. Similarly, it operates under a not-for-profit model and so is similarly inclined when compared to traditional NGOs. The second such organisation is an independent research institute focussed on researching and promoting renewable energy. As with the other Think Tank/Research Institute, it does not have a voluntary membership, but is non-governmental and operates on a not-for-profit basis. However, it does have an affiliated wing which operates on a for-profit basis, working with local government and companies to import and set up renewable energy generation equipment. The research and promotion aspect of the organisation is siloed from the for-profit wing, and it is this that is most consistent with the notion of an NGO. The final organisation was established at the request of the Japanese government in 1998, and incorporated as a Public Interest Incorporated Corporation in concert with the Japanese government, as is required under the Japanese Civil Code. It now exists as an entity separate from the Japanese government, but one which was established as a Japanese government initiative. It has an open membership, and since it attained Public Interest Incorporated Corporation status it falls within the ambit of a civil society organisation.

The Business Coalition is a group of over 100 member companies which provide policy advocacy related to climate change and the business community. While their membership consists solely of Japanese companies, their secretariat includes other NGOs with voluntary membership models, so it is tangentially associated with broader civil society at a management level.

Groups not engaged in policy advocacy

The two groups that do not engage in policy advocacy have a number of reasons for doing so. The first organisation engages primarily in information disclosure, and so while they may advise stakeholders, it does not take the form of policy advice. It is a scientific NGO, and holds seminars and conferences

purely for disseminating the latest in climate science in order to enable better decision making on the parts of companies and governments, but no explicit policy advocacy occurs. The rationale behind this however is to ensure voluntary measures by companies and governments are based in science, and thus more likely to stand up to robust scientific scrutiny. The other organisation aggregates and scores companies based on their performance in processes including, but not limited to, decarbonisation. This rating system is then employed internationally to indicate to investors and capital markets the degree to which individual companies are committed to, and actually acting upon, policies and practices designed with decarbonisation and climate change in mind. It is not advising companies what they should do, but the message sent through its rating system is utilised by investors when determining how to invest capital; this can be used as marketing for companies where a high score is awarded, or conversely, indicate that a company could do more to make itself more attractive to investment.

The final organisation does not yet engage in policy advocacy, but is entering a transition period towards this goal. It was formed in July 2018 and has until this point been pursuing a program of education and growth; attracting member companies to join, and providing a platform for the exchange of ideas, education and individual actions. Within a period of 12 months it has tripled in size to have more than 380 Japanese companies, and is now that it has achieved sufficient scale, it is in the process of transitioning towards a model of releasing policy statements and proposals. An NGO made up of member companies and civil society actors, it has a secretariat managed by three other NGOs.

While policy advocacy is the largest area of NGO action, there is a variety of roles played, all of which are designed to generate momentum for climate action and decarbonisation. Furthermore, some organisations engage in multiple forms of action, creating a wide scope for collaboration with other partners.

Figure 13 - Interviewed NGO activity (proportionately represented)



(By the author)

Cross-sector collaboration

The activities of the NGOs are varied, but they all have application through collaborative efforts with business. Within each category of activity there is evidence of growing activity, which in turn is directly linked to the involvement of business; consistent with the hypothesis that business is driving a resurgence in activity among NGOs which exist outside of the institutional framework of the NPO law.

Ranking companies

Several ENGOs work primarily as a scoring mechanism for companies, which voluntarily provide them with such data as their carbon emissions, water consumption, and renewable energy mix. This data is collated and ranked by the ENGO. Companies are then allocated scores on an alphanumeric metric based upon their performance. This system is of particular relevance to investors, whom companies perceive as increasingly wanting to invest in "green" companies. The Carbon Declaratory Project (CDP), an ENGO formed by Michael Bloomberg, established a Japanese chapter in 2006.

CDP Japan has produced reports on the top 500 Japanese companies as a metric for assessing the responsivity of the Japanese corporate sector to climate change issues for the following years (refer to figure 14):

- 2018 [165]
- 2017 [166]
- 2016 [167]
- 2015 [168]
- 2009-2014 [169]

[165] "CDP Japan 500 Climate Change Report 2018, Japan edition" (JP), CDP Japan, 16, accessed 25 September 2019 https://6fefcbb86e61af1b2fc4-c70d8ead6ced550b4d987d7c03fcdd1d.ssl.cf3.rackcdn.com/cms/reports/documents/000/004/527/original/CDP2018-Japan-edition-climate-change-report.pdf?1557928753

[166] "CDP Japan 500 Climate Change Report 2017, Japan edition" (JP), CDP Japan, 22, accessed 25 September 2019 https://6fefcbb86e61af1b2fc4-c70d8ead6ced550b4d987d7c03fcdd1d.ssl.cf3.rackcdn.com/cms/reports/documents/000/002/762/original/Japan-edition-climate-change-report-2017.pdf?1511285921

[167] "CDP Japan 500 Climate Change Report 2016, Japan edition" (EN), CDP Japan, 22, accessed 25 September 2019 https://6fefcbb86e61af1b2fc4-c70d8ead6ced550b4d987d7c03fcdd1d.ssl.cf3.rackcdn.com/cms/reports/documents/000/001/762/original/Japan_edition__climate_change_report_2016_EN.pdf?1487954394

[168] "CDP Japan 500 Climate Change Report 2015, Japan edition" (JP), CDP Japan, 16, accessed 25 September 2019 https://6fefcbb86e61af1b2fc4-c70d8ead6ced550b4d987d7c03fcdd1d.ssl.cf3.rackcdn.com/cms/reports/documents/000/000/788/original/CDP-japan-Climate-Change-Report-2015.pdf?1471962163

[169] "CDP Japan 500 Climate Change Report 2014", CDP Japan, 12, accessed 25 September 2019 https://6fefcbb86e61af1b2fc4-c70d8ead6ced550b4d987d7c03fcdd1d.ssl.cf3.rackcdn.com/cms/reports/documents/000/000/855/original/CDP-japan-climate-change-report-2014-english.pdf?1472040216

Figure 14 - Top 500 Japan companies' responses to CDP Japan



(compiled from CDP Japan data – refer to footnotes 165-169)

Responsiveness

With a dollar value of over 100 trillion USD, the Japan 500 companies represent a massive portion of the Japanese economy and are worth more than the entire 2018 GDP of Japan.[170] Rising pressure on Japanese companies to commit to climate action can be seen in the almost unbroken trend of growth across the 10 years of reports (2013 experiencing a drop of two companies). Similarly, the massive leap of 188 companies between 2014-2015 indicates an "awakening" of the important role this ENGO is playing. The response rate of around 50% is a far cry from those of their equivalent companies in the US, UK and Europe (65%, 63% and 88%, respectively), as well as Global 500 companies (76%) the growth is nevertheless significant.[171]

Looking deeper into the membership of these companies, there is a trend towards the inclusion of Science Based Targets (SBT) for their business policies and strategies. The number of companies utilising such targets for their emissions reductions surpassed 50% for the first time in 2016, indicating a growing awareness among the Japanese business sector of incorporating science into its policymaking.[172] Also of significance is the shift towards companies engaging with value chain partners to reduce the carbon footprint along the production line and consumption of products. This extends from the raw materials for production, as well as the environmental profile of suppliers and retailers of finished products. Such a transition goes beyond individual companies, but demonstrates them seeking to use their economic clout to persuade other stakeholders to reduce their emissions; a domino effect of carbon reduction. Nearly 60% of companies within CDP's top 500 membership seek to exert leverage over suppliers to improve their position; this is a result in part of CDP ranking companies based on the carbon footprint of their supply and value chains.[173]

[170] Approximately 5.1 trillion USD. "Japanese Economy", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, accessed 25 September 2019 https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/japan/index.html
[171] "CDP Japan 500 Climate Change Report 2016", CDP Japan, 22.
[172] Ibid, 25.
[173] Ibid, 26.

Ranking of companies based on their climate change policies is not limited to CDP; WWF Japan also makes use of the Japan 500 company lists in their own reporting, through which they deliver rankings determined by their own metrics, based on 100- and 50-point scales.[174]

While CDP does not sit within an advocacy role, differing from WWF, which engages in some policy formulation, both function as globally recognised and respected institutions through which reliable information on companies may be acquired. Japanese companies are recognising this and are joining the rating regimes of the ENGOs as part of an investment-minded approach to climate change.

These ranking mechanisms go further than simply awarding a score to companies for performance. Seminars run by ENGOs serve to provide a wide platform for the release of ranking data, but also function as opportunities for high scoring companies to exchange ideas and information relating to their own policies and progress. These companies are then able to collaborate and exchange data with ENGOs so that they might be better positioned to increase their attractiveness over competitors, and marketability towards investors and clients.

Based on the actions of the top 500 Japanese companies, there is a growing awareness of the need to actively mitigate climate change and decarbonisation. While undoubtedly driven by commercial rather than altruistic environmental concerns, it undoubtedly promotes a positive role for climate change action in Japan. In terms of the catalyst for this awareness, there are suggestions that the Paris Agreement and SDGs have both had an impact. The latter has been regarded as highlighting the need for business to improve in CSR and sustainability generally; climate matters included.[175] Businesses are particularly interested in the SDGs as they are holistic and compatible with business practice.[176] Businesses can work on issues such as gender equality or access to clean water without necessarily having much, if any regard to climate issues.[177] The Paris Agreement on the other hand has concretely emphasised the need to improve climate positions by all stakeholders, and the targets that need to be met.[178] However, both the SDGs and the Paris Agreement have utility in promoting climate awareness. The intertwining and collaboration of environmental concerns and commercial sensibilities from the ENGO and business sectors has enabled a rigorous and increasingly cooperative relationship, which demonstrates the changing nuances and perceptions between the civil society and corporate sectors.

Management

Within the context of ENGO/business collaboration, there exists a niche for ENGOs to operate in a way that does not compromise the ability of business to act voluntarily and with commercial interests as the fundamental pillar of their operations. As such, one significant area of collaboration has ENGOs coordinating and managing businesses within the sphere of coalition structures between businesses.

[174] "Japanese Top 500 companies rated by sector for their efforts and impact in reducing emissions – and the results are surprising!", WWF Japan, accessed 25 September 2019 https://www.wwf.or.jp/eng/activities/768.html
[175] Interview with the Keidanren, 3 June 2019.
[176] Ibid.
[177] Interview with JCLP, 21 June 2019.
[178] Ibid.

JCI is a network of ENGOs, companies and other stakeholders committed to strengthening communication and implementing climate change action in Japan.[179] Including over 280 companies, signatories are committed to action that meets the Paris Agreement. To this end, transitions towards decarbonisation, sustainable development and the adoption of renewable energies are undertaken by members. While companies represent the bulk of the membership, the management of the organisation is performed by the steering committee, comprised of CDP Japan, WWF Japan, and the REI.[180] This organisational structure reflects the reality of commercial interests and pressures for businesses to undertake voluntary measures in the Japanese context; however that companies accept the management of ENGOs indicates a willingness by business to cooperate with civil society. From the ENGO perspective, JCI is a way through which ENGOs can cooperate with business and share knowledge, shaping actions and providing information.[181] Being a relatively new organisation, the first phase of JCI's existence has been based primarily around growth (increasing from 105 signatories at launch to 398 in September 2019); this is now shifting towards policy proposals formation.[182] It is in this area that ENGOs stand to exert the most influence; as companies begin reaching a stage of possessing sufficient information to make effective and realistic policies, the ENGOs of the steering committee are in a position to supervise and coordinate the formation of climate policy proposals from the various sectors represented by JCI.[183] Consequently, JCI represents a voluntary avenue through which companies can engage with ENGOs within a business-friendly context while contemporaneously allowing ENGOs to play a very active role in supporting and coordinating the decarbonisation and adoption of climate policies by the commercial sector in Japan.

JCLP is another business coalition, formed in 2009 under the auspices of decarbonisation and engaging in climate policy formation. Since the Paris Agreement its membership has grown from fewer than 40 signatories to over 130.[184] Similar to JCI, it is primarily focussed on business efforts, however its secretariat is engaged with ENGOs who play a role in assisting in the management and coordination of the organisation. Under this structure, ENGOs are able to have some influence, not just on the efforts of individual companies to decarbonise, but also on the policy proposals issued by JCLP as a wider organisation. There have been 19 policy recommendations issued by JCLP, some of which have been picked up by the government and put forward into official government policy through the Long Term Strategy (LTS) issued under the Paris Agreement machinations in June 2019.[185][186] This LTS is the manifestation of the Japanese government's desire for business led initiatives; but it is also the result of some collaboration with ENGOs. In this way, Japanese ENGOs which have been historically marginalised and alienated from policymaking, are able to engage in a meaningful, if slightly collateral, way.

[179] "Homepage", JCI, accessed 25 September 2019 https://japanclimate.org/english/
[180] Ibid.
[181] Interview with JCI, 18 July 2019.
[182] Ibid.
[183] Ibid.
[184] (highest figure current as of 17 January 2020) Interview with JCLP, 21 June, 2019.
[185] Ibid.
[186] Leila Mead, "Japan's Long-term Strategy Pledges Emission Reductions Through 'Virtuous Cycle of Environment and Growth '", Sustainable Development Goals Knowledge Hub, 9 July 2019 accessed 25 September 2019 http://sdg.iisd.org/news/japans-long-term-strategy-pledges-emission-reductions-through-virtuous-cycle-of-environment-and-growth/

The emergence of ENGOs as managerial players who are responsible for coordinating large groups of businesses reflects both the respect the business community is increasingly having for ENGOs, and also their willingness to collaborate with, and listen to, environmental civil society.

Connecting and informing businesses

ENGOs are regarded by business as holders of knowledge about climate change, as they have been involved with international science and momentum for a longer time than other sectors.[187] As such, ENGOs are attractive partners for collaboration, connections, and the provision of information. This has led to new avenues for ENGOs to approach, be approached by, and work with the business sector on specific projects, or in the case of networking, to establish regular mechanisms for businesses to get more information for their own use. From the ENGO perspective, this represents an opportunity to be actively listened to about climate change, with the hope this information will then be incorporated by the business into its own policies and strategies, or be used for policy proposals outside of its own operations.

Networking

The following organisations all work to bring relevant parties together to develop climate relevant policies and initiatives, and the provision of information:

- ISEP [188]
- REI [189]
- EPC [190]
- FE [191]

ISEP has a focus on the development of renewable energy technologies and policies; to this end it conducts its own research, and through a for-profit affiliated wing of the organisation, works with companies and cities to establish and improve renewable energy capacity and policy.[192] Since its formation in 2000, it has worked on 36 renewable energy projects across Japan; most of which were post -Tohoku Earthquake.[193] These have included collaborations with extant companies to establish small-scale, community-based renewable-energy generation. They also connect companies that want to incorporate renewable generation into their facilities with producers of renewable generation technology, and develop implementation policies for them.[194] Through this process ISEP acts as a start-to-finish collaborative partner for companies to further the implementation of renewable energy uptake.

[187] Interview with JCLP, 21 June, 2019.
[188] "Homepage", ISEP, accessed 26 September 2019 https://www.isep.or.jp/en/.
[189] "Homepage", REI, accessed 26 September 2019 https://www.renewable-ei.org/en/
[190] "Homepage", EPC, accessed 26 September 2019 https://www.epc.or.jp/
[191] "Homepage", Future Earth Asia, accessed 26 September 2019 http://old.futureearth.org/asiacentre/
[192] Interview with ISEP, 7 May 2019.
[193] "ISEP 15th Anniversary Movie: Trajectory and the Future", ISEP, accessed 26 September 2019 https://www.isep.or.jp/en/428/
[194] Interview with ISEP, 7 May 2019.

Information provision

The information and networking roles performed by ENGOs serve as a less political and more neutral activity for organisations. Through being objective and an instrument for accessing scientific evidence, ENGOs that engage in the provision of information and networking opportunities are regarded as good avenues for collaboration by companies seeking to improve their own understanding of the issues (refer to figure 16). While not necessarily culminating in direct policy advocacy or ranking mechanisms, the use of ENGOs as collaborative partners for educative purposes still represents a shift from the trend of other stakeholders ignoring ENGOs; in other words, the business sector regards ENGOs as a legitimate source of information and a mechanism for networking with evidence and technologies.

Figure 15 - Impact of ENGOs providing information and networking opportunities to business in the climate change sector



(By the author)

REI conducts research on energy systems and climate change for the purpose of dissemination to companies and politicians. Within this range of activities, it has issued over 130 academic reports and articles, and has been cited in interviews over 1,000 times, describing itself as the most referred-to organisation in terms of renewables in Japan.[195] It holds cross-sector conferences with a large attendance, both by companies and government. However, policy advocacy is limited to information provision; REI considers itself a neutral organisation that works across the political spectrum.[196] Similarly this extends to companies; information is provided to the extent that REI wants to provide, all of which is aimed at enabling better decision making and increased renewable-energy uptake, whilst remaining as neutral as possible.

EPC was formed to create a cross-sector partnership system between corporate and ENGO actors.[197]Under these auspices, it is engaged in business education programs; these take the form of both open seminars and invitational sessions at individual businesses.[198] Businesses are increasingly aware of the need to transition towards renewables, and so EPC is accepted as one avenue for this to occur. The relevance of this information provision has grown with increasing understanding of the necessity

[195] Interview with REI, 17 April 2019.
[196] Ibid.
[197] "Group Overview", Environment Partnership Council, accessed 26 September 2019 https://epc.or.jp/about#link7
[198] Interview with EPC, 12 June 2019.

to decarbonise, and consequently EPC is expanding its work beyond the Tokyo area, educating businesses in Japan's minor cities.[199]

Future Earth Asia is a Regional Centre for the Future Earth initiative, networking with actors in Asia, and providing platforms for enhanced interactions between the research community and other stakeholders.[200] Insofar as Japanese operations are concerned, its climate change initiatives are in response to the perception that accurate scientific evidence is too remote from decision makers in the business sector.[201] Their work is completely separate from policy advice, instead focussing on connecting relevant scientific actors and evidence with businesses, which can then use this information to inform their own decision and policymaking processes.[202] With a large global reputation, Future Earth Asia is increasingly being asked to work with businesses in educational campaigns to provide information to companies; this information can then influence company constitutions and policies.

Forums

Forums exist as a way of gathering together individual actors, be they companies, individual people, or organisations for disclosure and information exchange (refer to figure 17). Being more than just the ENGO itself, in this context forums provide an opportunity for the business community to exchange ideas and push for policies they want.

CDP holds several such seminars annually, as a way of announcing its rankings for the year, but also as a way for its constituents to exchange information on how they are working to improve their own scores.[203] These serve to also celebrate the A ranked companies, with many CEOs and other executives presenting. The Japanese government is interested in what these companies have to say, as their experiences reflect how business is impacted by Japanese governmental policy. Similarly, as CDP ranks companies on their supply chains, these seminars are an opportunity for big businesses to exert pressure on smaller companies to improve their own position; this in turn will positively impact the bigger companies.[204]

REI similarly holds forums and conferences, with the purpose of advancing renewable energy initiatives as part of addressing climate change. These conferences regularly have over 2,000 attendees, and have contributed to their success as an ENGO of influence.[205] One instance of this was a 2016 conference at which Apple was an attendee. Apple's representative spoke about issues in sourcing sufficient renewable energy in Japan, which had the effect of causing a change in policy from the Japanese Ministry of the Environment (MoE) to advocate for 100% renewable energy generation in Japan.[206] While this proposal would still need the support of the Ministry for Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), it demonstrates both that the Japanese government will listen to businesses, and that ENGOs can serve as a vehicle for promoting such messages from the business sector.

[199] Ibid.
[200] "What We Do", Future Earth Asia, accessed 26 September 2019 http://old.futureearth.org/asiacentre/what-we-do
[201] Interview with Future Earth Asia, 19 June, 2019.
[202] Ibid.
[203] Interview with CDP, 16 April 2019.
[204] Ibid.
[205] Interview with REI, 17 April 2019.
[206] Ibid.

JCI is a movement inspired by a US NGO, We Are Still In, and connects businesses, NGOs and local government together through a declaration by members to do whatever they can in an individual capacity to decarbonise and address climate change.[207] Through holding twice-annual events they also have a network with overseas initiatives which connects international momentum and expertise to the Japanese context. As discussed above, JCI has been in a period of growth. As it was only founded in July 2018, very little concrete action has come of these events yet. However, that it has grown from 105 signatories at launch to 445 demonstrates that it has a very broad and significant appeal.[208] These events are also attended by bureaucrats and ministers from all of the relevant ministries; highlighting the attractiveness of business-driven initiatives to the Japanese government, and consequently the importance of business to the resurgence of ENGO climate activism.

Figure 16 - Impact of ENGOs providing forums for business to exchange and publicise successes



(By the author)

Forums exist as a way to bring multiple actors together and speak with one voice, as well as exchanging ideas and connecting actors together. They are a mechanism through which ENGOs can expand their activities to reach a broader range of actors in a shorter time. In the Japanese context they are significant as they attract powerful players from the Japanese government; being willing as it is to primarily listen to the needs of business, any forum with a significant business presence is likely to have more sway than one which consists largely of civil society organisations. Running and coordinating the agenda of these events puts ENGOs in a position of influence, as through the voice of business they can direct the discussion and overall message in a far greater way than ever before.

[207] Interview with JCI, 18 July 2019.
[208] As of 17 January 2020.

Policy and constitution advice

A more hands-on and tangible impact ENGOs can have is in helping the formation of climate policy. Much of this is being done voluntarily and autonomously by business, however some ENGOs engage companies in reviewing and amending policies and constitutions to be more in line with decarbonisation and sustainability principles.

As discussed above, ISEP works in the provision of information and connecting companies with renewable technology producers. As an anti-nuclear organisation, the bulk of its advice is in the area of energy supply and mix; the 2011 Earthquake and subsequent nuclear disaster served to only increase the significance of this cause.[209] Japan's Feed in Tariff (FIT) power scheme was enacted with bipartisan support, heavily influenced by ISEP's advocacy, and in 2001 the first renewable energy project utilising ISEP policy work was finalised in Hokkaido.[210] Working in concert with its NFP research wing is a for profit department which works in policy advice for companies and cities; this leads to the uptake of renewable generation within client entities.[211] Two demonstrative projects are as follows:

- policy work for the development of solar plants in Fukushima [212]
- implementation of a low carbon Niigata city in Oratte [213]

This work is acknowledged as not being done explicitly for climate change reasons; however, decarbonisation is inextricably linked with climate change, and as such ISEP accepts it is working in the same space as other, more "pure" climate focussed organisations.[214]

350.org is a global ENGO with a Japanese office, focussed on divestment from fossil fuels and 100% renewable energy uptake as its primary goals.[215] In the post Paris Agreement context, most of its policy advocacy has been in the banking and financial sector; pushing for divestment away from fossil fuels and the adoption of renewable investment portfolios. This campaign, called "Cool Bank", is driven by the transferral of banking services away from banks which maintain fossil fuel-based investment portfolios towards those which have more sustainable investment principles.[216] Outside of encouraging people to change banks, 350.org Japan is actively engaged in consulting with the biggest banks in Japan to amend their policies on investment.[217] Since 2017, 350.org Japan has met twice yearly with the major Japanese banks (Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group, Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group and Mizuho Financial Group) to discuss their carbon investment policies, a breakthrough for ENGO/finance sector collaboration on policymaking.[218] Since 2018, these banking groups have been asking for reviews of policy proposals by 350.org, which culminated in policy reassessments by Sumitomo[219] and Mitsubishi

[209] Osamu Tsukimori and Kentaro Hamada, "Japan's pro-nuclear policy at odds with global trend: ISEP head", Reuters news, 20 May, 2014, accessed 26 September 2019 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-summit-isep/japans-pro-nuclear-policy-at-odds-with-global-trend-isep-head-idUSBREA4J0B020140520
[210] "ISEP 15th Anniversary Movie: Trajectory and the Future" ISEP.
[211] Interview with ISEP, 7 May 2019.
[212] Shota Furuya, "Towards Local Autonomy – The Challenge of AiPOWER in Fukushima", Energy Democracy, 11 March, 2015, accessed 26 September 2019 https://www.energy-democracy.jp/751
[213] "ISEP 15th Anniversary Movie: Trajectory and the Future", ISEP.
[214] Interview with ISEP, 7 May 2019.
[215] "Homepage", 350.org Japan, accessed 26 September 2019 https://world.350.org/ja/
[216] "Let's Divest!", 350.org Japan accessed 26 September 2019 https://world.350.org/ja/lets-divest/
[217] Interview with 350.org Japan, 5 June 2019.
[218] Ibid.
[219] Ibid.

financial groups.[220] This then evolved into Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group further revising its policy framework to exclude finance to new coal power plants.[221] This significant policy shift from a massive investor in fossil fuel industry was no doubt tied in no small part to overseas investor pressure, but that it coincided with policy meetings and advocacy from 350.org suggests a connection between the work of the ENGO and the policy change from Mitsubishi UFJ.

In addition to networking and information provision activities, EPC engages in policy advocacy. Outside of central government lobbying, which takes the form of collating proposals from across the ENGO sector before presenting them to MoE, EPC also engages in some long term plan and company policy advice.[222] This goes hand in hand with EPC's work with companies to provide information and education opportunities; companies approach EPC to formulate transition strategies and implement sustainable mechanisms.[223] Through the mix of objective and neutral information provision, and policy advice, EPC is able to straddle the separation between active and passive collaboration with the commercial sector.

Other ENGOs engage in policy advocacy across the private sector. Sustainable Sport NGO and NPO Network (SUSPON) is engaged in advocating policies for a sustainable 2020 Olympic Games in Tokyo. While this goes beyond climate change exclusively, it involves issues of renewable energy and sustainable procurement; both of which maintain a climate focus.[224] In accordance with this approach, they are in talks with Coca Cola to roll out sustainably produced renewable cups for the duration of the game; [225] again while not strictly climate change focussed, it remains within the sphere of relevance with the issue.[226]

Greenpeace Japan is engaged in policy advocacy along with 350.org Japan to push for divestment from within the financial and banking sector; their roles and impact are much the same given both are large internationally based ENGOs.[227] Specifically, the Japanese chapter of Greenpeace endeavours to be less aggressive towards companies than its overseas counterparts; however it recognises that it has a reputation internationally and can use this to increase its leverage.[228] Furthermore, Greenpeace Japan uses shareholder advocacy to further pressure companies to change; by investing in companies it can attend shareholder AGMs and ask questions of management; this enables it to be heard asking potentially difficult questions, in a situation where company directors cannot ignore them.[229]

As discussed above, WWF Japan engages in a ranking system of companies based on their corporate data, covering all number of emission and sustainability metrics, in a manner similar to CDP Japan. What is different is that WWF operates as a form of consultant with ranked companies, whereby policy

[220] Shin Furuno, *"*Environmental NGOs respond to statement by Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group CEO on restricting coal-fired power financing", Banktrack.org, 17 May 2018, accessed 26 September 2019 https://www.banktrack.org/news/environmental_ngos_respond_to_statement_by_sumitomo_mitsui_financial_group_ceo_on_restricting_coalfired_power_financing#

[221] Van Phong, "Japan's MUFG commits to end financing for new coal projects, NGOs call for further steps*",* Market Forces.org, 16 May 2019, accessed 26 September 2019 https://www.marketforces.org.au/media-release-japans-mufg-commits-to-end-financing-for-new-coal-projects-ngos-call-for-further-steps/

[222] Interview with EPC, 12 June 2019.

[223] Ibid.

[224] *"*Activity Report", SUSPON, accessed 26 September 2019 https://suspon.net/activities

[225] Takeshi Nozawa, *"*What is the focus of Tokyo 2020 NGOs*?",* Econetworks.jp, 4 July 2017, accessed 26 September 2019 https://www.econetworks.jp/internatenw/2017/07/2020ngo/

[226] Interview with EPC, 12 June 2019.

[227] Interview with Greenpeace Japan, 18 July 2019.

[228] Ibid.

[229] Ibid.

and strategy advice can be proffered to companies which desire it; ostensibly so that they can then improve their rankings for subsequent years.[230] However this is only taken up by a minority of companies; with no discernible growth pattern taking place.

Policy advice manifests in a number of ways for Japanese ENGOs. From acting as consultants to helping in the formation of new companies and renewable energy projects, Japanese ENGOs collaborate with a variety of businesses from across the private sector to improve, or in many cases, establish, renewable and sustainable policies. From this the uptake of renewable energies can be increased, and ENGOs are able to develop more productive relationships with business sector actors than they have historically had. Similarly, it operates positively for the Japanese government, which encourages voluntary efforts from the private sector; for business and ENGOs to collaborate to create renewable energy initiatives or divest from fossil fuels conforms with the governmental agenda.

Whether in terms of active collaboration between ENGOs and business, or a more co-ordinational or facilitatory function as seen in networking and management functions, business involvement has played a massive role in expanding the relevance and size of ENGO activism, and in extending its reach. With more and more companies joining these initiatives and collaborating with ENGOs, the more momentum is gained, and the potential for further activism increases.

Japanese business culture traditionally favours voluntary measures and tends not to broadcast or celebrate individual company success; thinking tends to be insular.[231] With this in mind, the work of ENGOs to help facilitate better voluntary measures (through information provision, networking and policy advice), or operate systems that more actively celebrate successes and enable more open dialogues (through management and the holding of forums) plays a vital part in spreading climate awareness and responses.

Efficacy and challenges within the Japanese political context

A consistent trend across interviews was the difficulty faced by civil society generally when it comes to interacting with the Japanese government. Broadly speaking, the most common issues raised were;

- The power of METI over MoE when it comes to policy proposals
- Positions of the LDP being non-conducive to ENGO collaboration
- Difficulty of NGOs to access resources
- Lack of institutional and cultural recognition of the role of NGOs

ENGOs are institutionally disadvantaged when it comes to engaging with the mechanisms of the Japanese state. The power and influence of relevant ministries is skewed heavily in favour of business and pro-growth policies, and ultimately this creates an echo chamber where opposing views go unheard or unheeded.

[230] Interview with WWF Japan, 18 July 2019.
[231] Interview with Keidanren, 3 June 2019.

The pre-eminence of METI in Japanese political activity is well established by the literature. Historically METI, along with the other ministries within the bureaucracy, has been responsible for policy architecture, something that is changing under the current Abe administration. However, despite reforms by the Abe administration to reign in bureaucratic power and consolidate it under the executive, METI remains especially prevalent in policymaking within the economic and industrial policy sectors. There is a documented sense of rivalry and competition which verges into egotism between METI and ministries which have a contrasting area of interest, such as MoE. MoE is comparably weaker than METI overall, even without examining their influences on their respective sectors. In contrast to METI, MoE has comparatively small financial and personnel resources, and lacks the exclusive information on technology potentials or company costs. That MoE only evolved into a ministry in 2001 (having previously been an agency, which is akin to being a department within a ministry) means it does not have the same well entrenched networks of METI, with a consequential lack of influence.[232] The paucity of financial resources is highlighted by its low allocation of budget and personnel – in 2005 it had only 9% of the budget for implementing the Outline for Promotion to Prevent Global Warming; the lowest of all ministries working on climate change.[233] It has been one of the smallest ministries in Japan, and has historically experienced the largest budget cuts as a percentage of all ministries. By contrast, METI is the largest ministry in Japan, with a budget of three times that of MoE's for climate change in 2009 and eight times as many staff.[234] All of this results in MoE being a politically weaker ministry than METI, before even an examination of their respective roles in climate policies takes place.

MoE's responsibilities do not extend to energy, which sits solely with METI, meaning while MoE can issue policy statements that utilise renewable energy, it cannot directly draft policy on the topic. The competition between the two ministries is highlighted by their conflicting positions on what climate policy should achieve. METI opposes emissions trading schemes for fear they will hurt industry and increase production costs; this is echoed by the Keidanren overall, which do not support any policy that will increase its costs. MoE on the other hand favours an emissions trading scheme (ETS) or carbon pricing, but because of hugely disparate levels of political power and influence, METI's positions are the ones that more often than not go through to the legislature. Before even getting to the LDP and policy making machinations of the legislature, this leads to a politically institutionalised scepticism of cost-induced market-based climate policies.

One instance of the power exerted by the bureaucracy in climate related sectors pertains to energy policy. Japan's climate change position and policies have experienced significant change since 2011. Climate change has been subsumed by energy security policy in the post-3/11 triple disaster in East Japan. Political and financial resources that were committed to climate change before the Great Tohoku Earthquake were reallocated to disaster recovery, and climate policy lost significant momentum politically, even in MoE. In the aftermath of the shutdown of nuclear reactors, coal-fired power plants were given more attention as a way to make up energy shortfalls, and so ENGOs faced a bureaucracy that was even less inclined towards climate policy than it had been before.

The dichotomy between the supportive ENGOs and MoE, and the considerably less supportive METI, coupled with a massive disparity in resources and power between the two ministries, was consistently

[232] Sven Rudolph, and Friedrich Scheider, "Political barriers of implementing carbon markets in Japan: A Public Choice analysis and the empirical evidence before and after the Fukushima nuclear disaster", *Environ Econ Policy Study*, vol. 15, (2013): 229.
[233] Ibid.
[234] Ibid.

raised to the author as a challenge faced by ENGOs in Japan. Comments such as "…MoE is very weak, and the Ministry of Trade (METI) is very powerful, with stakeholders like the Keidanren",[235] and "There is internal conflict among bureaucrats, so opinions by MoE are not major (in relation to those of METI)"[236] were offered.

Indeed, of all the organisations interviewed, the challenges presented by the bureaucracy and ministries represented the second biggest single issue. The perception held by ENGOs was that they were up against the strongest ministry in Japan, one with considerable history and experience in establishing policy. Any support from MoE garnered by an ENGO would be more likely than not overwhelmed by the superior position of METI.

A corollary of the power of METI vis-à-vis MoE is that METI does not need to collaborate with ENGOs for the most part; it has sufficient political clout and resourcing to produce and push its own political agenda without consulting civil society. One ENGO commented in its interview that METI tries to gain support from it in some policy matters as it is easier to push the policy without ENGO criticism.; this speaks to the resources and connections of that individual organisation rather than the perception of ENGOs generally as held by METI. As such, in the present context of the post Paris Agreement years, it appears that ENGOs must look beyond the bureaucracy for collaboration and concrete successes in climate policies.

Just as the bureaucracy of Japan was identified as a challenge preventing ENGO operations in the climate change sector, so was the LDP; indeed, it was the single largest actor identified. Reasons for this included issues of proximity – those groups that work closely or are affiliated with the Japanese government in particular (such as those incorporated under the NPO law) are not able to speak out against the government line.[237] Similarly the dominant position of the LDP within government across most of Japan's post-war history was put forward as an issue; with such an entrenched position comes very fixed ideas and networks of support, few of which, if any, are supportive of significant input and change from ENGOs.

With a tradition of consulting stakeholders from within the Iron Triangle model, it has always been difficult for ENGOs to engage with the government; this can be seen historically in the struggles that Shimin organisations had during the Big Four Pollution cases as well as the preference for dealing with local rather than national government in the 1980s.[238]

In terms of the governmental policies on climate change, there are divergent positions within the LDP itself. The Great Tohoku Earthquake rendered impossible Japan's Kyoto Protocol pledge of slashing GHG emissions by 25% by 2020, as the switching off of Japan's nuclear power plants means fossil fuel generation had to be increased to compensate; putting the emphasis on high-efficiency, low-emission coal fired power plants.[239] By 2014, 95% Japan's energy supply was accounted for through fossil fuels. The voices for renewable energy were drowned out, in part by the necessities of energy security, but also because of the cost of implementation.[240] Now that nine nuclear plants (as of July 2019) are

[235] Interview with IGES, 17 May 2019.
[236] Interview with 350.org, 5 June 2019.
[237] Interview with Climate Youth Japan, April 14, 2019.
[238] Werner Pascha, Patrick Kollner and Aurel Croissant, "*Japan Country Report*", SGI Sustainable Governance Indicators (2019): 37.
[239] Ibid, 19.
[240] Emma Anderson and Marina Zaloznaya, "Global civil society and the test of Kyoto: A theoretical extension", *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, vol. 59, no. 3 (2018): 194.

reactivated, with six more ready for operations to resume and three new ones under construction, nuclear power remains a strong area of policy interest from the government.[241]

Because of the government's pro-nuclear and fossil fuel stance, it has been left to the business community to develop the renewable energy sector; the majority of work that has been done at a bureaucratic and governmental level is the opening up of the energy market through liberalisation policies.[242] This has resulted in the door being largely shut now to ENGOs working effectively with the government in terms of renewable energy policy, requiring them to look elsewhere.

The LDP under Prime Minister Abe has been regarded as acting "heavy-handedly" since 2013, with a number of controversial personnel decisions with conservative placements in senior management and supervisory roles.[243] The 2014 Cabinet Bureau of Personnel Affairs was established to put responsibility for high level bureaucratic appointments in the hands of the Cabinet Office and served to consolidate power in the hands of the LDP.[244] This has made the LDP and bureaucracy more interlinked in terms of their political leanings, and in doing so has further alienated ENGOs from meaningful engagement with the LDP. Within this new arrangement, Japan's governmental trustworthiness as held by its citizens was only 37% in 2019 – the lowest point it has ever been.[245] The LDP is increasingly less willing to accommodate views of interest groups overall as the depth and breadth of groups (including civil society) has grown and businesses have become more globalised and thus susceptible to global (but not necessarily Japanese) trends.[246]

Overall, the Japanese state seeks to nurture civil society groups that foster social capital, and discourages pluralistic or lobbying-type civil society groups.[247] Reflecting the perception of many Japanese ENGOs that the Japanese government is not a viable partner for collaboration or action, the belief that a change of administration would result in a positive shift for ENGOs was consistent across numerous groups.

Because of a lack of historic cooperation between civil society and the LDP, as well as the current inclination of the government towards "clean" fossil fuels and nuclear energy, there is not a lot of scope for ENGO/government collaboration. However, that is not to say there is no engagement between the two sectors.

Among the interviewed organisations, numerous instances of ENGOs working with the government and LDP specifically were present. A common trend was for relevant ministers to attend seminars and conferences organised by ENGOs. Here the ENGOs have an opportunity to promote their policies and ask questions directly of the ministers. Despite this apparent plurality and engagement with various interest groups, the composition of the ENGOs that specifically mentioned governmental attendance suggests a continuation of the status quo.

---

[241] "*Japan's Nuclear Power Plants*", Nippon.com, July 8 2019 , accessed 11 September 2019 https://www.nippon.com/en/features/h00238/japan%E2%80%99s-nuclear-power-plants.html
[242] "*The Electric Power Industry in Japan*", Japan Electric Power Information Center Inc., (2019): 7, accessed 12 September 2019 https://www.jepic.or.jp/pub/pdf/epijJepic2019.pdf
[243] Werner Pascha, Patrick Kollner and Aurel Croissant, "*Japan Country Report*", 23.
[244] Ibid, 34.
[245] "2019 Edelman Trust Barometer, Japan", Edelman, accessed 11 September 2019 https://www.edelman.jp/research/edelman-trust-barometer-2019
[246] Ibid, 48.
[247] Robert. Pekkanen, Molding Japanese Civil Society: State-Structured Incentives and the Patterning of Civil Society, in *The State and Civil Society in Japan,* ed. Schwartz and Pharr (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 118.

The events specifically mentioned were all by ENGOs composed primarily of Japanese companies. While the purposes of the member companies may be different; receiving ranks based on their climate performance, exchanging ideas and information or formulating policy proposals, the government seems to be more visible at events that have a heavy presence of Japanese companies. This would appear to be a perpetuation of the Iron Triangle model, where the government and bureaucracy was primarily interested in the issues presented by the Japanese business community. The Japanese government has committed to a "business-led" approach to dealing with climate change as per the Japanese Long-term Strategy under the Paris Agreement, released by the Japanese Cabinet Office on 11 June 2019.[248] The preference for business leading the way towards sustainability and pro-climate action is consistent between Japan's climate strategy under the Paris Agreement framework, and in the bulk of positive ENGO-government interactions within the same framework.

Similarly, in the 1990s, ENGOs had an agenda that was supported by international momentum, and in principle by other actors, including the Japanese government, but was also inconsistent with economic growth and *économie concertée*. ENGOs have a long history, globally and in Japan specifically, of promoting decarbonisation, fossil fuel divestment and renewable energy uptake, but the political circumstances in Japan were not conducive to this being taken up at a policymaking level.

The Kyoto Protocol is a good case of this; an initiative driven by ENGOs that was principally supported by influential Japanese stakeholders, but in reality, not acted upon at a policymaking level. In 1997 Japanese ENGOs mobilised a movement around climate change, becoming a national movement the likes of which had not been seen since the Big Four Pollution cases.[249] This was largely the result of support from foreign governments and NGOs including those of Germany and Norway, and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund.[250] Ultimately, this movement was able to participate in the Kyoto Protocol negotiation process because of concerns about Japan's image internationally. Japan was keen to achieve concrete results as the host country, with all the diplomatic benefits that would confer, and to have excluded civil society from this would have projected a bad image to visiting nations and delegations.[251] With access to the diplomatic process, Japanese ENGOs lobbied for higher greenhouse gas emission reduction targets and contributed to both the successful conclusion of the negotiations, and Japan's ratification of the first commitment period.[252]

While this would appear to be a success for Japanese ENGOs, and climate action generally, in Japan the Kyoto Protocol had limited effect; there was an immediate ratification and adherence to its principles, but this faltered. Japan technically met its obligations under the first commitment period, but only through the utilisation of carbon offsets; indeed, its total emissions actually increased 1.4% a year between 2008 and 2013.[253] When the second commitment period came up in late 2010, Japan resolved not to participate, citing economic considerations.[254] In the context of the 2008 global financial crisis, and 2011's Fukushima nuclear disaster and subsequent reactor shutdowns, the Japanese state had to

[248] "Japan Long-term Strategy under the Paris Agreement" Japanese Ministry of the Environment, accessed 12 September 2019 https://www.env.go.jp/press/802.pdf
[249] Kim D. Reimann, "Building Networks from the Outside In", 173.
[250] Ibid, 179.
[251] Ibid, 182.
[252] Emma Anderson and Marina Zaloznaya, "Global civil society and the test of Kyoto", 180.
[253] Osamu Tsukimori, "Japan uses offsets to meet Kyoto emission goal: media", Reuters, 17 November 2013, accessed 31 October 2019 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-climate-japan-co2/japan-uses-offsets-to-meet-kyoto-emission-goal-media-idUSBRE9AG02420131117
[254] Kobayashi Hikaru, "Japan on the Trailing Edge of Global Climate Action", Nippon.com, 11 September 2015, accessed 31 October 2019https://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00191/japan-on-the-trailing-edge-of-global-climate-action.html

boost its fossil fuel consumption to increase economic output and compensate for the lack of nuclear production in its electricity mix.[255] Emission reductions were put on the backburner as energy security took primacy over other considerations; public support for emissions reductions mirrored this.[256] Ultimately Japan withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in 2012, and has condemned it ever since.[257] The Japanese government's enthusiasm for the Protocol was initially motivated primarily by international perceptions, rather than domestic ENGO activism. This eventually culminated in a trend of reduced commitment and prioritisation of economic growth and fossil fuel dependency, and ultimately in rejection of the Kyoto Protocol. While ENGOs had been able to engage in the initial stage of the process, it was only in a tokenistic manner, and was followed by a return to exclusion from climate policymaking in the years following the agreement.[258] There was still a limited appetite for change among the politically influential actors in Japan, and the prescriptive, rather than voluntary mechanisms of the protocol ran contrary to Japanese business sensibilities.[259] Because of this, it is hard to say that ENGOs using Shimin were legitimate independent and effective actors, and so while there was some limited success, it does not warrant labelling as a new "peak" of Shimin.

Not every ENGO/government interaction is with groups composed mainly of businesses. Within the interviewed ENGOs that have more of a composition mix of businesses and other groups, there was some discussion of engagement with the Japanese government. A group of youth has been heavily involved in COPs, attending every year since 2010. This has given it some gravitas within the Japanese government and led to the group being invited for discussions with ministers and bureaucrats. Originally it had to request such interviews but the group's reputation has allowed this relationship dynamic to change. Significantly the group also cited the Paris Agreement as crucial to this change; the Japanese government realised its value as regular and engaged attendees of the COPs and the Paris conference in particular.[260] One further group mentioned being able to engage with the Japanese government to a certain extent; but this was not the status quo, rather it occurred only on the basis of whether the government supported whatever project was being run by the ENGO at the time. Instead of being readily accessible for engagement, the Japanese government made itself available to the ENGO only when it suited it.

The inclusion of ENGOs within Japanese delegations was also raised by several ENGOs. However, in all cases of this, the ENGO was cynical of the intention, claiming it was a demonstration of tokenism. In one instance it was claimed that ENGOs were muffled by governmental staff in international conferences, and that within domestic committees and boards, ENGO members were listened to but not taken seriously. One other organisation suggested that the Japanese government's attitude towards civil society extended beyond environmental/climate organisations, to civil society generally; the general exclusion of constructive civil society engagement by the Japanese government at G7 and G20 conferences was cited as evidence of this.

The Japanese government was consistently labelled as a challenge for ENGOs in terms of being an active and engaged partner for collaboration in policymaking work. Similarly, the disparities in power

[255] Ibid.
[256] Ibid.
[257] "Japan's position regarding the Kyoto Protocol", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, December 2010, accessed 31 October 2019 https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/environment/warm/cop/kp_pos_1012.html
[258] Emma Anderson and Marina Zaloznaya, "Global civil society and the test of Kyoto", 185.
[259] Interview with Keidanren, 3 June 2019.
[260] Interview with Climate Youth Japan, 14 April 2019.

between MoE, which is amenable to working with ENGOs, and METI, which is considered by ENGOs to be generally directly opposed to ENGO collaboration, mean that the traditional avenues of policymaking are unavailable to ENGOs for partnerships, even in the post-Paris Agreement context. This institutionalised difficulty in working with state policymakers has driven ENGOs to identify other stakeholders in the Japanese context who have the resources and influence to affect meaningful change in the climate change sector.

While Japanese ENGOs face significant challenges in terms of being regarded as viable partners for the government and bureaucracy, resourcing also presents a massive issue for groups. The NPO Law enabled incorporated groups to receive a tax benefit status, but groups outside of this matrix must be self-reliant when it comes to gathering sufficient funds for their operations. Funding for incorporated NPOs is tracked within Japan, and the breakdown in 2015 was as follows:

Figure 17 - Funding sources for incorporated NPOs in Japan (%)



"Non Profits in Japan Q&A", Japan NPO Center, accessed 12 September, 2019 https://www.jnpoc.ne.jp/en/nonprofits-in-japan/q-and-a/

Earned income represents the fees, however nominal, that registered NPOs may charge for their service provision activities. In contrast, no such centralised repository of funding data exists for NGOs that exist outside of the NPO law framework; they are treated as being out in the wild by the Japanese state. This is not to say that ENGOs outside of the NPO law matrix are completely without help from the Japanese government; indeed, several of the interviewed organisations had received governmental funds over the years following the Paris Agreement. It must be emphasized however that these disbursements were project-based and thus represented an inconsistent supply of capital (refer to table 5); it would be impossible for an ENGO to rely entirely on such funding sources.

Table 5 - Average value of governmental funds received by interviewed ENGOs from the Japanese government managed Japan Fund for Global Environment

Financial Year	Funds received (1000 JPY)	Total Disbursements for NPOs and NGOs (includes interviewed and non-interviewed organisations)
2015 [261]	3,033	643,164
2016 [262]	3,120	659,850
2017 [263]	15,600	640,700
2018 [264]	3,650	623,218

Data on incorporated NPOs is more readily accessible, given the relationship they have with the government, and so only non-direct parallels can be drawn. However, in 2012 the average annual salary of fulltime staff in an incorporated NPO in Japan was 2.22 million JPY (in contrast with an annual salary of a fulltime worker within a private Japanese company of 4.14 million JPY).[265] Further complicating this is the low revenue of NPOs (16.5 million yen per annum in 2003), and the opacity and difficulty of easily determining revenues across the NPO sector.[266] There is no digital public record of NPO finances, meaning the monetary situations of each NPO is highly siloed and largely inaccessible – the only database that in any way addresses this is the Center for Nonprofit Research and Information of Osaka University which has used 2003 data to compile its tabulations.[267] Despite being unincorporated within the NPO law framework, NGOs exist in a similar space, and both struggle with resourcing. This makes difficult for NGOs to secure human resources specialised in policy and advocacy.[268]

To this end, private sources of capital are required for NGOs to have sufficient funds to cover operations. Organisations such as the Toyota Foundation and the Keidanren were mentioned as being donors to organisations, and throughout the interviews the role of private companies was highlighted as being a crucial source of money for ENGOs.[269][270]

In contrast to NPOs, NGOs do not exist within the same service delivery paradigm as NPOs in Japan. They therefore do not have the same degree of access to the earned income that comes from governmentally sanctioned education and community programs. Given this represents almost two thirds

[261] "Projects Funded by Japan Fund for Global Environment FY 2015", Environmental Restoration and Conservation Agency of Japan (ERCA), accessed 12 September, 2019 https://www.erca.go.jp/jfge/english/wwd/recipients/15_c.html
[262] "Projects Funded by Japan Fund for Global Environment FY 2016", Environmental Restoration and Conservation Agency of Japan (ERCA), accessed 12 September, 2019 https://www.erca.go.jp/jfge/english/wwd/recipients/16_c.html
[263] "Projects Funded by Japan Fund for Global Environment FY 2017", Environmental Restoration and Conservation Agency of Japan (ERCA), accessed 12 September, 2019 https://www.erca.go.jp/jfge/english/wwd/recipients/17_c.html
[264] "Projects Funded by Japan Fund for Global Environment FY 2018", Environmental Restoration and Conservation Agency of Japan (ERCA), accessed 12 September, 2019 https://www.erca.go.jp/jfge/english/wwd/recipients/18_c.html
[265] "Size and Scope of NPOs", Japan NPO Center, accessed 13 September 2019 https://www.jnpoc.ne.jp/en/nonprofits-in-japan/size-and-scope/
[266] Yu Ishida, and Naoko Okuyama, "Local Charitable Giving and Civil Society Organizations in Japan", 1170.
[267] N. Yamauchi, "New public sphere and civil society", in *Nonprofit almanac 2010*, ed. N. Yamauchi, K. Tanaka, and N. Okuyama (Osaka: The Center of Nonprofit Research and Information at Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University, 2010).
[268] "NGOs and Development Effectiveness in Japan", Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation: JANIC, 26.
[269] "Grant Program for Community Activities in Japan", The Toyota Foundation accessed 13 September 2019 https://www.toyotafound.or.jp/english/other/community.html
[270] "Keidanren Nature Conservation Fund" Keidanren, accessed 13 September 2019 http://www.keidanren.net/kncf/en/

of average NPO income, for an NGO to not be able to consistently tap into these funds represents a significant funding gap that must be resolved elsewhere. Because of the difficulties in sourcing consistent revenue, and the fact that incorporated NPOs largely monopolise the revenue streams derived from service delivery roles, NGOs have to rely on other actors for funding, or levy greater fees from their membership.

Summary

Businesses favour the Paris Agreement framework because of the flexibility it holds for climate action. This is consistent with Japanese business preferring voluntary over prescriptive measures towards dealing with climate change.[271] In this context, the form of collaborative actions performed by ENGOs with businesses has been varied and generally compliant with individual business aspirations. As businesses' awareness of the need to act increases, their actions remain regulated by commercial sensitivities, and with this comes a requirement for choices from which to select. To this end, ENGOs are providing a number of different avenues for cooperation with business. In effect businesses can "shop around" to find the ENGO that provides the expertise or service that best suits its particular commercial requirements and pressures. Whether it is through the provision of one-on-one policy advice and advocacy, tabulation and ranking of companies based on performance, management of business conglomerates within an ENGO matrix, or networking and education services, there is a range of functions provided by ENGOs to help serve business transitions towards climate action.

Regardless of the exact type of collaborative action that has taken place, the trend has consistently been of growth and increased relevance. Whether in terms of membership, number of submissions, or actual policy outcomes, the collaboration between ENGOs and business in the climate change space represents a marked shift away from the traditional position of Japanese civil society as an oft-excluded and politically ineffective actor. Businesses have provided ENGOs with a well-resourced partner for cooperation, and in return they receive the expertise, credibility and scientific evidence required to make well-informed and voluntary shifts towards meaningful climate action.

ENGOs struggle for existence in the Japanese system due to funding issues and inconsistent levels of governmental support. Collaborating with businesses gives ENGOs greater voice in climate policy discussions at a national level through use of business as a vehicle for policy advocacy, and ENGOs have improved prospects for resourcing through their cooperation. These two points are critical for ENGOs as they enable them to continue their work, and also extend their reach in the Japanese political space.

[271] Interview with Keidanren, 3 June 2019.

Chapter Five – Implications of Shimin and Business Collaboration

Impact of the Paris Agreement

Significantly, these instances of ENGO collaborative activity with business have all happened within the latter half of the 2010s. There is increased consensus as to what needs to be done, a wealth of scientific material for use, and deepened and wider attention across society on the issue. More specifically, there is a trend of attributing this emergent business-ENGO collaboration to the Paris Agreement. Since 2015, the year of the agreement, there has been a link between the international climate change consensus as codified by the agreement, and the desire of companies to improve their climate change performance. This is likely generally to be the result of commercial realities; investor pressure and increasingly climate-oriented competition all drive companies to keep up with environmental trends. Similarly, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) have had some impact, being both highly visible and marketable mechanisms to demonstrate positive action, both in terms of the climate, but also social and other environmental issues. Despite being a multifaceted context in which there are numerous pressures and mechanisms through which climate action can be justified or necessitated, the Paris Agreement has played a crucial role in framing the new relationship between businesses and Japanese ENGOs.

Using membership as the metric, the Paris Agreement can be directly attributed as a cause for bringing business/es into a position where they actively seek out relationships with ENGOs for a variety of schemes. As seen in figure 15, CDP Japan and JCLP experienced a big spike in membership following the Paris Agreement, and JCI which was formed post Paris as a way of helping to realise its goals has tripled in size since its launch. Consistent across interviews was the view held that the Paris Agreement clarified what needs to be done for climate action, and served to connect the importance of the business sector in realising this;[272] climate change is not only a problem, but also an opportunity for profitable commercial success.[273] Because of scientific clarity about the climate, international consensus and general interest that comes about from the momentum the Paris Agreement has achieved globally, the business sector can no longer ignore climate issues. Accordingly, in this context, ENGOs are increasingly finding themselves held in higher esteem and sought out by the business community as sources of information, connections, and in some cases, credible and informed resources for policy advice and criticism. These attitudes are reflected in the Japanese business community itself, which sees a growth in individual companies collaborating with ENGOs as a way of incorporating civil society's institutionalised knowledge with the commercial opportunities presented by investing in renewable energy and adopting more sustainable policies.[274]

Of all the organisations interviewed, there was an overwhelming indication of the positive role of the Paris Agreement in the development of individual ENGOs. Whether in terms of ENGO growth, or through clarifying and publicising the issues and imperatives, the Paris Agreement has been integral to

[272] Interview with REI, 17 April 2019.
[273] "Al Gore and the Climate Reality Project to Host First-Ever Climate Leadership Workshop in Tokyo", The Climate Reality Project, 20 August 2019, accessed 20 November 2019 https://www.climaterealityproject.org/press/al-gore-and-climate-reality-project-host-first-ever-climate-leadership-workshop-tokyo
[274] Interview with Keidanren, 3 June 2019.

changing the attitudes of business towards climate change, and by extension, towards ENGOs in Japan (refer to figure 20).

Figure 18 - Impact of the Paris Agreement on operations of interviewed ENGOs based on author interviews



(by the author)[275]

From the ENGO perspective, the Paris Agreement has been beneficial to their activism due to its effect in publicising and clarifying what needs to be done to address climate change. It allows NGOs to have a clear and simple message that is easy to deliver.[276] In the paradigm created by the Paris Agreement, there is a wealth of scientific evidence and material available for consumption by both businesses and ENGOs. Just as civil society was able to use scientific evidence to make a successfully compelling case for the Big Four Pollution cases, Japanese ENGOs today are able to use the science produced under the sphere of the Paris Agreement, and prior climate change discussions, to further their cause; either in terms of education, research or concrete policy advice. This reinforces the traditional notions of civil society generally as keepers of knowledge, and makes them attractive partners for collaboration with businesses and the private sector. Similarly it has drawn the attention of a lot of actors outside of civil society who are now seeking to take action under its auspices.[277] Insofar as business is concerned, climate change can now be regarded in terms of opportunities, rather than just costs; this has also been recognised at governmental levels.[278] Investment in sustainable assets quadrupled between 2016 and 2018, from 3% of total professionally managed assets to 18%, making Japan the third largest centre for sustainable investment.[279] In terms of private sector investment, this equates to approximately USD2.4 trillion.[280]

[275] See interviews table on p. 40.
[276] Interview with Future Earth Asia, 19 June, 2019.
[277] Interview with Kanbun, 29 May 2019.
[278] "Meeting on a Long-Term Strategy under the Paris Agreement as Growth Strategy", Office of the Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2 April 2019, accessed 30 October 2019 https://japan.kantei.go.jp/98_abe/actions/201904/_00008.html.
[279] "2018 Global Sustainable Investment Review" Global Sustainable Investment Alliance.org, (2018): 4, accessed 30 October 2019 http://www.gsi-alliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/GSIR_Review2018F.pdf
[280] Ibid.

Structural Reforms

Historically the business sector has been inextricably linked with the pro-growth patterns of "Japan, Inc.", and the Iron Triangle as a whole. Within the current political climate of the government pushing for voluntary efforts from businesses, business interests have moved away from the stances of monolithic associations that represent them, such as the Keidanren, and started taking their own climate positions; this paradigm shift in turn leads to a context in which a business is more amenable to collaborating with ENGOs.[281]

The Iron Triangle itself is currently being rebalanced into a system that puts more policy discretion in the hands of the executive, and specifically the Office of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.[282] This initiative came about as a result of LDP lawmakers feeling increasingly left out of the policymaking process, being side-lined by policy interest groups and other partisans.[283] Now under the reforms which were started by Prime Minister Koizumi and have been taken up by Prime Minister Abe, there is significant discretion in the policymaking process, particularly in terms of bureaucratic appointments and policy direction are being vested in the Cabinet Office, rather than individual ministries. METI has largely escaped this rebalancing, however, and so despite this reallocation, the traditional sources of power and influence in climate change policy in Japan remain essentially as they have been historically. This in turn perpetuates the status quo of excluding politically active civil society (as opposed to those NPOs which incorporated under the NPO law and became linked to the state). To best effect change in climate policy, ENGOs need to engage with those who have institutionalised power; nevertheless, the challenge remains that the LDP and bureaucracy are largely disinterested in working with them. As business, driven by the momentum caused by the Paris Agreement, has an increased interest in learning about and addressing climate change, they are becoming valuable partners for collaboration from the ENGO perspective. This represents a significant win and further opportunity for ENGOs as they can secure partnerships with actors who have long held institutionalised positions within the systems of political power in Japan.

Connection to Shimin

As discussed above, Shimin is a model of civil society that has evolved to use instruments of the state coupled with rational and scientific evidence to promote causes. It is not limited to any one sector of society, and can be employed by any individual or group engaged in political advocacy and activism. It has roots in the opening up of free thought following the end of WWII, and while it is similar in principle to other social movement theories and models from around the world, it has evolved from a purely Japanese context and as such is endemic.

[281] Ibid.
[282] Aurelia George Mulgan, "Loosening the Ties that Bind: Japan's Agricultural Policy Triangle and Reform of Cooperatives (JA)", *The Journal of Japanese Studies*, vol.42, no.2, (Summer 2016): 245.
[283] Bui Thi Thu Linh, Phung Thi Thu Ha, Ko Aung, Nguyen Thi Nhung and Seunghoo Lim, "The Breakdown of the Iron Triangle in the Process of Japan's Trinity Reform: An Application of the Multiple Streams Framework to Compare Stakeholder Dynamics Inherent in Policy Change", *Lex Localis – Journal of Local Self-Government*, vol.15, no.2, (2017): 227.

While it was able to attain notable levels of success in policy activism through the Big Four and municipal collaboration cases of the 1960s and 1980s, with the passage of the NPO law in 1998, civil society was institutionalised and incorporated into a position vis-à-vis the state that rendered it irrelevant to the Japanese state. Where previously civil society was able to engage in Shimin-style activism to be heard and have its aims successfully implemented (in contrast to the violent Anpo and Zengakuren movements), the Japanese government is now provided with tens of thousands of incorporated and apolitical NPOs which can be used for service delivery and cost-cutting instruments of the state.[284] For the two decades following the passage of the NPO law, NGOs, the civil society organisations that chose not to incorporate, were in an awkward position. They were able to freely engage in political advocacy, being as they were absent from the NPO law framework, but conversely there was an absence of politically powerful actors with whom NGOs could work.

The consistent narrative throughout the ups and downs of Japanese civil society has been the strength of the business sector, and inherent favouritism held for it by the government. What business has needed or advocated for has taken priority over the interests of contrary voices; such was demonstrated with tragic consequences in the Minamata-byo case on 1973. This becomes relevant in the current situation where ENGOs are increasingly cooperating with business groups to assist in their transitions towards sustainable policies and production. As the business sector finds the current policy matrix is insufficient for its needs, it is in a position where it can more effectively lobby the state for policy changes (refer to figure 21).

Figure 19 - Causal mechanism of collaboration between ENGOs and business on national level policy



(By the author)

This mechanism has been demonstrated in the work of REI with their seminars having an influence on the Ministry for the Environment revising a renewable energy policy. A similar impact was seen with JCLP and the Japanese government's LTS which was heavily influenced by the ENGO's policy proposals formed in concert with businesses.

[284] Akihiro Ogawa, *The Failure of Civil Society?* 112.

In comparison with civil society, businesses have always been listened to more in policy matters, and it is this that makes businesses crucial vehicles for the development of, and pressure for, policy reform by the Japanese government. Civil society and businesses are traditionally sectors that are viewed in adversarial terms, but ENGOs have recognised the value in working with them in a shared vision.[285] While there is likely to be some differences in terms of the motivation for pushing towards climate policies (commercial, investor and profitability concerns versus environmental and altruistic positions), ENGOs are forging ahead with collaborative engagements with business. Business represents an institutionalised pillar of the Japanese state under both the *economie concertée* and Iron Triangle matrices, and also in terms of the esteem in which the state regards business over civil society. As they are facing increasing pressures to reform themselves, businesses are fast becoming an amenable recipient of ENGO contributions and cooperation when it comes to changing their own policies. Furthermore, as they themselves change, in part through the efforts of ENGOs, they themselves become voices for change at a national policy level. This represents pragmatic use of an institutionalised actor by ENGOs to push for and advocate change, towards a governmental system that traditionally has not put much weight on the advocacy work of civil society. By using business as a vehicle for promoting policy change, ENGOs under the Shimin model have recognised they themselves do not have the same gravitas in terms of advocating for policies at a national level, when compared with business. This culminates in a situation where ENGO/business collaborative models stand to make more progress in changing Japan's climate policy frameworks.

At a more micro level, that is within the business sector itself, ENGOs and Shimin 3.0 have been well utilised to reform business policies and positions. Consistent with the pragmatic and creative approaches of the Shimin model, the interviewed ENGOs engage in processes that work with, and for, business. Rather than pushing businesses far beyond what could be construed as being within their commercial sensitivities, the Shimin model provides an ethos and methodology for ENGOs to push their agenda while remaining pragmatic and realistic. Rather than pushing a hard-line ideological agenda, they take a scientific and reasoned approach that reflects the needs of their collaborative partners, business groups. This embodies the cooperative, legitimate and subjective elements that are inextricably linked with the model; businesses can adapt as required by their own circumstances, and ENGOs are in a position to drive this change.

It may be said that businesses are in a position to adapt as required, without the assistance of ENGOs, however the trend of businesses approaching ENGOs to provide collaborative input suggests that businesses see the value in doing so. This increases the relevance of ENGOs and civil society broadly, giving credence to ENGO hopes of a continual and sustainable growth in success and effectiveness for promoting climate change policies. Coming from a place of irrelevance under the NPO law, ENGOs are now growing in importance, as drivers and influencers of change within the business sector. Their ability to engage in policy work as a primary activity also means they can design and push for policy change beyond business to a national scale; business being the vehicle for this momentum. Through voluntary cooperation between sectors, Japan's business community is evolving to respond to climate change, which then provides a fertile ground and momentum for expanding this transformation to the national scale. An example of this is coal, which represents roughly one third of Japan's electricity

[285] Arno Kourula, "Corporate engagement with non-governmental organizations in different institutional contexts – A case study of a forest products company", *Journal of World Business*, vol. 45 (2010): 396.

generation.[286] Its continued use is promoted at a national level as being crucial for energy security, but calls to divest from coal are growing from within parts of the business community.[287] Just as businesses are sensitive to investor pressure, so is the Japanese government to any damage to Japan's international reputation. If the country's continued reliance on coal is seen to hurt the reputation of Japanese businesses, then there are signs that the calls for a move away from coal are making an impact.[288] This impact is still in a nascent stage, given the number of collaborations that are still in, or recently emerging from, a period of growth. The accumulation of a critical mass of business voices has been the first priority, with increased policy advocacy and output being forecast once this is attained. ENGOs may not be said to be the primary players in this paradigm any longer, business being the primary vehicle of change; however, if the Japanese system responds better to the needs of business, and business interests are aligned with those of ENGOs, a win-win situation is to be realised by both.

Shimin Challenging the Status Quo

The bulk of the current literature indicates that Japanese civil society is either largely irrelevant in the Japanese system, or where it has a useful function, it is in a service delivery or community role. Outside of a few limited instances the academic consensus is that Japanese civil society has not had any significant impact on policy directions in Japan; instead that policy momentum largely came from the matrix of the Iron Triangle actors. While that matrix is now experiencing a rebalance, the literature is consistent in suggesting Japanese civil society remains largely irrelevant in the policy space.

This paper challenges the assertion that Japanese civil society is politically irrelevant or ineffective, specifically in matters of climate change. It does not seek to undermine the argument that NPOs have an important function within Japanese society; indeed, neighbourhood associations and NPOs in service delivery roles fulfil numerous positive niches and to discount them would present a straw-man argument – this would be a convenient and easy avenue for rebuttal by future researchers.[289] Instead it desires to demonstrate that Japanese NGOs, the political tribe within civil society as a whole, has not "failed", and that despite being cast out into the organisational wilderness by the 1998 NPO law, they are demonstrating they have something to offer and are in resurgence. Despite claims the bulk of Japanese civil society has "failed" by being forced to become apolitical, those vestiges that chose not to incorporate are, through the Shimin model, stirring.[290] This paper argues that, through Japanese ENGOs, Japanese political civil society should not be completely written off as a failure. Instead, they should be acknowledged as proponents for change, both within climate policy in the Japanese context, but also systemic; becoming as they are drivers of shifts within the business sector and beyond.

In the climate change policy sector, Japanese ENGOs have experiences a significant growth in activity, most notably since 2015 with the signing of the Paris Agreement. Splitting from the established norm of a politically irrelevant civil society, ENGOs are collaborating with an increasing number of willing businesses, who in turn see ENGOs as a way to facilitate their own transitions towards climate action.

[286] "Japan is the world's third-largest coal-importing country" U.S. Energy Information Administration, 14 June 2019, accessed 4 January 2019 https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=39853
[287] Interview with JCI, 18 July 2019.
[288] Interview with IGES, 17 May 2019.
[289] Yutaka Tsujinaka and Robert Pekkanen, "Civil Society and Interest Groups in Contemporary Japan", 422.
[290] Akihiro Ogawa, *The Failure of Civil Society?* 184.

While this is largely done for commercial and marketing purposes, it has helped ENGOs to project their voices into a sector that traditionally has eschewed them; this in turn has provided more momentum and clout for the climate action agenda in Japan. As businesses that are being guided by ENGOs increasingly need policy shifts to be made at the governmental level, the government is more likely to listen to business voices when it comes to considering these changes.

This growth in the relevance of ENGOs is being experienced by those who utilise the Shimin model of civil activism – independence from the state coupled with subjective, rational, evidentiary actions and use of state instruments to pursue agenda. Shimin has informed two crucial areas of success in the past: industrial pollution with the Big Four Pollution cases, and municipal policy collaboration in the 1980s. Externally it was also employed at the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, however as ENGOs were present only at a tokenistic level by the Japanese government, they were not truly independent, and thus the presence of Shimin there is debateable at best.

In addition to the assertion that Japanese ENGOs are experiencing a rise in policy relevance, this paper seeks to categorise previous instances of successful policy activism as experienced by the Shimin approach to civil society. It does so by modelling these successes into a wave structure; with an ebb and flow pattern marking the relative shifts between periods of effective and ineffective politicking.

Challenging the general academic consensus that Japanese civil society is politically irrelevant in the climate change space, and producing a model to demonstrate the cyclical nature of success patterns as experienced by Shimin, opens up new avenues of research.

The Paris Agreement produced a climate specific framework which has generated momentum among the business community. However, at the same time, businesses are engaging in CSR under the auspices of the SDGs. The concurrent collaboration in climate change matters with ENGOs and increased CSR awareness among business may provide impetus for collaboration among businesses and NGOs with a focus in areas outside of the climate, be it in environmental, social or economic sectors.

Accordingly, future research could be undertaken on whether there exists, and then the extent to which, policy activism is taking place within collaborative arrangements between NGOs and business in areas outside of climate change. Has the relationship between NGOs and business, forged through climate change frameworks, evolved and expanded into other sectors? If this question is found to be answered in the affirmative, it could be used to confirm the assertion that Japanese civil society can be effective across policymaking spaces. Additionally, it could challenge the wave model proffered by this paper. All of the periods of success experienced by Shimin have been largely issues based – be it industrial pollution or municipal decision making; neither have expanded into other sectors, making Shimin reliant on the next crisis to become relevant again. If successful collaboration between Shimin NGOs and business is demonstrably shown to expand beyond climate change, it could suggest that Shimin 3.0 is less of a wave and more of a transformation for politically active civil society; becoming the first iteration that has transcended the issue around which it formed, and moving into other sectors.

Conclusion

Why are Japanese ENGOs experiencing a boost in climate change policy activism in the post 2015 context, despite cultural and systematic factors that have long excluded them from policymaking discussions? ENGOs have been able to forge collaborative relationships with the Japanese business sector, who themselves are facing mounting pressures since the 2015 Paris Agreement to become more climate friendly. In addition to the benefits afforded to business, ENGOs are able to use the institutionalised clout possessed by Japanese business to project their message. As policymakers are more inclined to listen to business interests, being in a position to influence business positions represents a major potential for future policy advocacy on the part of ENGOs.

Japanese civil society has experienced a boost in climate activism since 2015, in spite of prevailing views that it is a largely silent and politically inactive sector of Japan. The momentum for this boost has three causes, namely the Paris Agreement, attitudes of the Japanese business sector changing, and the use of Shimin methodology by Japanese ENGOs. The Paris Agreement established a new framework for climate action, and provided impetus for businesses to adapt due to commercial and investor pressures. This pushed businesses to engage with ENGOs as collaborative partners, utilising the expertise, credibility and other beneficial-for-business functions of civil society organisations.

This collaboration between Japanese ENGOs and businesses in the climate change space since 2015 marks the emergence of a new period of success and effectiveness for the sector of civil society that exists outside of the institutionalised civil society framework of Japan.

Japanese civil society is often regarded as being small, poorly resourced, and a minor, even ineffective, player in the Japanese policymaking space. Since 1998, there has been a split in the types of organisations, creating two distinct categories; Non-Profit Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations. The former incorporates under the law to achieve tax status, and to gain a proximity to the government that enables them to act as service delivery agents; operating educational, welfare and other social policies. This comes at a cost, however, as these organisations are limited in the extent they may engage in policy advocacy. NGOs, on the other hand, are fully free to be politically active in terms of advocacy and activism; however, they exist outside of the proximate relationship with the government, with all the resourcing and inclusion this offers. This legislative framework leaves Japanese civil society organisations of being in a position of having access to resources, or a political voice, but not both. This contributes significantly to the impression that civil society is a minor player in Japanese policymaking. Further reinforcing this impression is the well-entrenched positions of the government, in particular the LDP, the bureaucracy, and businesses. The latter has been regarded by the state as being the most important interest group within the paradigm of Japan's pro-growth, *economie concertée* model, which has served to further exclude civil society groups from the table insofar as policy advocacy is concerned.

Despite this prevailing impression, there have been periods of success in varying forms, by politically active civil society organisations. Through a model of civil activism known as "Shimin", which is based on individuality from the state, subjective analysis of issues, scientific and evidentiary reasoning, and utilisation of state instruments are used to achieve the goals of individual groups. This can manifest in, but is not limited to, the use of courts, shareholder activism, or institutions for collaborating with

decisionmakers. Furthermore, it is a peaceful model, contrasting with the violent protests that accompanied the *Anpo*, *Beheiren* and Narita movements. A model that emerged in the post-war years as a way of liberating thought and fostering independence from the state, it is about citizens working with decision makers, whilst preserving their independence, to develop and improve the state for everyone. There have been two periods of successes for this movement, labelled here as "Shimin 1.0" and "Shimin 2.0", respectively.

Shimin 1.0 emerged from the Big Four pollution cases, most notably Minamata-byo, as the first instance of civil society organisations being able to successfully force major policy change in terms of industrial pollution laws. While arguments can be made as to the total success of this movement, given the length of time it took, and the ongoing struggles for expanding the class of people who can claim compensation, it was nevertheless a significant milestone for civil society standing up to the state.

Shimin 1.0 lost momentum relatively quickly however, and was unable to carry over to other societal issues. The government took preventative action to stymie further civil action, though this lends credence to the argument that the Big Four movements were effective, given as they did shake the government and its complete adherence to pro-growth policies.

Shimin 2.0 came about as municipalities recognised the value of including civil society decision making in their own local government processes. This saw the establishment of bodies within local governments that enabled civil society to participate in all periods of the policymaking process, whilst also preserving their autonomy. This was the ultimate format for Shimin, as it was using state instruments cooperatively with the state, rather than against it, to help improve policies.

Shimin 2.0, and civil society generally, fell into a trough following the passage of the NPO law in 1998. Ostensibly a law to help civil society organisations which had proved their worth in the aftermath of the 1995 Kobe earthquake, it served to create a schism between groups that wanted to incorporate and those who wished to preserve their independence. By forcing civil society groups to lose their political voice if they wanted to gain access to much needed financial resources, the law reduced the instances of organisations utilising Shimin. Furthermore, those groups which chose to incorporate, the NPOs, essentially became tools of the state, as neoliberal cost cutting mechanisms for service and policy delivery.

Under this system, Shimin faded into obscurity, and politically active civil society "failed" in Japan.[291] This changed as a trend of collaboration between ENGOs and businesses started to emerge from the mid-2010s, in the climate change space. Faced with mounting commercial and investor pressures, businesses are starting to seek ways in which they can adapt their policies and operations to become more consistent with what is needed to tackle climate change. This is a result of the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement, a landmark agreement which is more business-friendly than previous international climate frameworks. Businesses want to reform to the necessities of climate change under the auspices of the Paris Agreement, and to help them in this process they are seeking the help of ENGOs. As a result. ENGOs have been more vocal in the climate change space on account of being able to speak out politically, meaning they are more visible for businesses to approach. From an ENGO perspective, businesses represent a powerful and influential actor within the traditional policymaking framework of

[291] Akihiro Ogawa, "*The Failure of Civil Society?".*

Japan; to be able to work with them in a collaborative relationship presents a very useful platform and vehicle for promoting climate policies.

Shimin 1.0 used the courts for success against industrial pollution, and inter-municipal government bodies and committees were essential to the successes of Shimin 2.0; both being instruments of the state. Through this Shimin was able to evolve away from a confrontational framework into something more collaborative; this being Shimin's ultimate goal. This trend has continued into the climate change context. Businesses are such an important part of the Japanese state that they are similarly institutionalised instruments, and are available for use by a new wave of Shimin. Whether it be through large forums and conferences, or ENGOs with a large business membership, ENGOs are able to help businesses reform their own operations, provide information and policy advice and assess the specific performance of individual businesses. This then enables business to become a platform for advocacy at a governmental level; for example, lobbying the Japanese government for more renewable energy so the business can get enough green energy as required for it to achieve its own goals of 100% renewable consumption. However, ENGOs are still not in a position where they are fully acknowledged and listened to by national policymakers. By enabling businesses to present a case for, and put weight behind climate initiatives, while using momentum that results from significant ENGO input, businesses become an instrument for climate activism.

There has been significant growth in the number of companies working with ENGOs, consistent with the argument that businesses want to work with ENGOs rather than operating on their own. This in turn sets the stage and lays the groundwork for a large and unified business/civil society voice to challenge the positions of the Japanese state in climate policy; as Shimin 3.0 moves more concertedly from growth towards policy advocacy directed at the national level, the increase in weight and influence is anticipated to result in more policy change at the governmental level. This trend corresponds with the conclusion of the Paris Agreement negotiations, and so the Shimin movement can, in the environmental and climate space at least, be labelled as being in a third period of success and effectiveness; Shimin 3.0.

Bibliography

350.org Japan. “Homepage.” Accessed 26 September 2019. https://world.350.org/ja/

350.org Japan. “Let’s Divest!” Accessed 26 September 2019. https://world.350.org/ja/lets-divest/

Act on Promotion of Specified Non-Profit Activities 1998 (Japan).

Aldrich, Daniel P. “*Revisiting the Limits of Flexible and Adaptive Institutions*”, in *Critical Issues in Contemporary Japan*, ed. Jeff Kingston, 75-87. Routledge, 2013.

Anderson, Emma and Zaloznaya, Marina. “Global civil society and the test of Kyoto: A theoretical extension.” *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, vol. 59, no. 3 (2018): 179-211.

Avenell, Simon, “Japan and the global revival of the ‘civil society’ idea: contemporaneity and the retreat of criticality.” *Japan Forum,* vol. 23, no. 3 (2011): 311-388.

Avenell, Simon. *Making Japanese Citizens: Civil Society and the Mythology of the Shimin in Postwar Japan*. University of California Press, 2010.

Bae, Yooil, Shin, Dong-Ae and Lee, Yong Wook. “Making and unmaking of transnational environmental cooperation: the case of reclamation projects in Japan and Korea.” *The Pacific Review*, vol. 24, no. 2, (2011): 201-223.

Bowen, Roger W. *Japan’s dysfunctional democracy: The Liberal Democratic Party and structural corruption.* New York: M.E. Sharpe Armonk, 2003.

CDP Japan. “CDP Japan 500 Climate Change Report 2014.” Accessed 25 September 2019. https://6fefcbb86e61af1b2fc4-c70d8ead6ced550b4d987d7c03fcdd1d.ssl.cf3.rackcdn.com/cms/reports/documents/000/000/855/original/CDP-japan-climate-change-report-2014-english.pdf?1472040216

CDP Japan. “CDP Japan 500 Climate Change Report 2015, Japan edition” (JP). Accessed 25 September 2019. https://6fefcbb86e61af1b2fc4-c70d8ead6ced550b4d987d7c03fcdd1d.ssl.cf3.rackcdn.com/cms/reports/documents/000/000/788/original/CDP-japan-Climate-Change-Report-2015.pdf?1471962163

CDP Japan. “CDP Japan 500 Climate Change Report 2016, Japan edition (EN).” Accessed 25 September 2019. https://6fefcbb86e61af1b2fc4-c70d8ead6ced550b4d987d7c03fcdd1d.ssl.cf3.rackcdn.com/cms/reports/documents/000/001/762/original/Japan_edition__climate_change_report_2016_EN.pdf?1487954394

CDP Japan “CDP Japan 500 Climate Change Report 2017, Japan edition” (JP). Accessed 25 September 2019. .https://6fefcbb86e61af1b2fc4-c70d8ead6ced550b4d987d7c03fcdd1d.ssl.cf3.rackcdn.com/cms/reports/documents/000/002/762/original/Japan-edition-climate-change-report-2017.pdf?1511285921

CDP Japan “CDP Japan 500 Climate Change Report 2018, Japan edition” (JP). Accessed 25 September 2019. https://6fefcbb86e61af1b2fc4-c70d8ead6ced550b4d987d7c03fcdd1d.ssl.cf3.rackcdn.com/cms/reports/documents/000/004/527/original/CDP2018-Japan-edition-climate-change-report.pdf?1557928753

Civil Code 1896 (Japan).

Climate Action Network International. “Fossil of the Day.” Published 5-14 December, 2019. Accessed 15 January 2019. http://www.climatenetwork.org/fossil-of-the-day

Edelman. “2019 Edelman Trust Barometer Global Report.” Accessed 29 December 2019. https://www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/2019-03/2019_Edelman_Trust_Barometer_Global_Report.pdf?utm_source=website&utm_medium=global_report&utm_campaign=downloads

Edelman. “2019 Edelman Trust Barometer, Japan.” Accessed 11 September 2019. https://www.edelman.jp/research/edelman-trust-barometer-2019

Environment Partnership Council. *“*Group Overview.*”* Accessed 26 September 2019. https://epc.or.jp/about#link7

Environment Partnership Council. “Homepage.” Accessed 26 September 2019. https://www.epc.or.jp/

Environmental Restoration and Conservation Agency of Japan (ERCA). “Outline of ERCA.” Accessed 15 May 2019. https://www.erca.go.jp/erca/english/outline.html

Environmental Restoration and Conservation Agency of Japan (ERCA). “Projects Funded by Japan Fund for Global Environment FY 2015.” Accessed 15 May 2019. https://www.erca.go.jp/jfge/english/wwd/recipients/15_c.html

Environmental Restoration and Conservation Agency of Japan (ERCA). “Projects Funded by Japan Fund for Global Environment FY 2016.” Accessed 15 May 2019. https://www.erca.go.jp/jfge/english/wwd/recipients/16_c.html

Environmental Restoration and Conservation Agency of Japan (ERCA). “Projects Funded by Japan Fund for Global Environment FY 2017.” Accessed 15 May 2019. https://www.erca.go.jp/jfge/english/wwd/recipients/17_c.html

Environmental Restoration and Conservation Agency of Japan (ERCA). “Projects Funded by Japan Fund for Global Environment FY 2018.” Accessed 15 May 2019. https://www.erca.go.jp/jfge/english/wwd/recipients/18_c.html

Fojjanty-Jost, Gesine. “NGOs in Environmental Networks in Germany and Japan: The Questions of Power and Influence.” *Social Science Japan Journal*, vol. 8, no.1 (2005): 103-117.

Furuno, Shin. *“*Environmental NGOs respond to statement by Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group CEO on restricting coal-fired power financing.” Banktrack.org. Published 17 May 2018. Accessed 26 September 2019. https://www.banktrack.org/news/environmental_ngos_respond_to_statement_by_sumitomo_mitsui_financial_group_ceo_on_restricting_coalfired_power_financing#_

Furuya, Shota. "Towards Local Autonomy – The Challenge of AiPOWER in Fukushima." Energy Democracy. Published 11 March, 2015. Accessed 26 September 2019. https://www.energy-democracy.jp/751

Future Earth Asia. "Homepage." Accessed 26 September 2019. http://old.futureearth.org/asiacentre/

Future Earth Asia. "What We Do." Accessed 26 September 2019. http://old.futureearth.org/asiacentre/what-we-do

George, Timothy S. *Minamata – Pollution and the Struggle for Democracy in Postwar Japan.* United States: Harvard University Asia Center, 2001.

Global Sustainable Investment Alliance. "2018 Global Sustainable Investment Review." Accessed 30 October 2019. http://www.gsi-alliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/GSIR_Review2018F.pdf

Graniera, Benoit; Kudo, Hiroko. "How are citizens involved in smart cities? Analysing citizen participation in Japanese smart cities." *Information Polity* vol. 21 (2016): 61-76.

Grossman, Christian. "We have an agreement in Paris: So, what's next for the private sector?" IFC.org. Published February 2016. Accessed 27 December 2019. https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/news_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/news+and+events/news/we-have-agreement-paris-so-what-s-next-private-sector

Harada Hisato. "The Anti-Anpo Struggle", in *"Zengakuren" Japan's Revolutionary Students*, edited by Stuart Dowsey, 75-100. Tokyo: Ishi Press, 1970.

Hidetoshi, Kato. *Chukan Bunka.* Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1957.

Howe, Brendan. "Between Normality and Uniqueness: Unwrapping the Enigma of Japanese Security Policy Decision-Making." *Modern Asian Studies* vol. 44, no. 6 (2010): 1313-1336.

Ikeda Kazuo. "Historical Background", in *Zengakuren" Japan's Revolutionary Students*, edited by Stuart Dowsey, 9-42. Tokyo: Ishi Press, 1970.

Imura Hidefumi. *Environmental Policy in Japan*. United Kingdom: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005.

InflationTool.com. "Homepage." Accessed 9 November 2019. https://www.inflationtool.com/japanese-yen/1973-to-present-value?amount=937300000

Inoguchi, Takashi. "Abenomics and Abegeopolitics", in *Japanese and Korean Politics: Alone and Apart from each Other*, edited by Takashi Inoguchi, 9-20. United States: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.

Institute for Sustainable Energy Policies. "Homepage." Accessed 26 September 2019. https://www.isep.or.jp/en/

Institute for Sustainable Energy Policies. "ISEP 15th Anniversary Movie: Trajectory and the Future." Accessed 26 September 2019. https://www.isep.or.jp/en/428/

Irokawa Daikichi. “The Survival Struggle of the Japanese Community”, in *Authority and Individual in Japan: Citizen Protest in Historical Perspective*, edited by J. Victor Koschmann. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1978.

Ishida, Takeshi; Kraus, Ellis S. *Democracy in Japan (Pitt Series in Policy and Institutional Studies)*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989.

Ishida, Yu and Okuyama, Naoko. “Local Charitable Giving and Civil Society Organizations in Japan”, *Voluntas*, vol.26, (2015): 1164-1188.

Japan Carbon Initiative. “Homepage.” Accessed 25 September 2019. https://japanclimate.org/english/

Japan Electric Power Information Center Inc. “The Electric Power Industry in Japan 2019.” Accessed 12 September 2019. https://www.jepic.or.jp/pub/pdf/epijJepic2019.pdf

Japanese Ministry of the Environment. “Japan Long-term Strategy under the Paris Agreement.” Accessed 12 September 2019. https://www.env.go.jp/press/802.pdf

Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation. “NGOs and Development Effectiveness in Japan.”, *JANIC Issue Paper* no.1, (May 2010): 1-40. Accessed September 13, 2019. https://www.janic.org/MT/pdf/janic_issuepaper_english.pdf

Japan NPO Center. “Legal Framework.” Accessed 4 September 2019. https://www.jnpoc.ne.jp/en/nonprofits-in-japan/legal-framework/

Japan NPO Center. “Non Profits in Japan Q&A.” Accessed 12 September 2019. https://www.jnpoc.ne.jp/en/nonprofits-in-japan/q-and-a/

Japan NPO Center. “Size and Scope of NPOs.” Accessed 13 September 2019. https://www.jnpoc.ne.jp/en/nonprofits-in-japan/size-and-scope/

Johnson, Chalmers. *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975*. California: Stanford University Press, 1982.

Karliner, J. *The Corporate Planet: Ecology and Politics in the Age of Globalization.* San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1997.

Kazuko, Tsurumi. “Some Case Studies in Minamata”, *International Institute of International Relations for Advanced Studies on peace and Development in Asia, Research Papers, Series A-51* Tokyo: Sophia University Press, 1988.

Keedon Kwon, “Economic Development in East Asia and a Critique of the Post-Confucian Thesis.” *Theory and Society* vol. 36 (2007): 55-83.

Keidanren. “About Keidanren.” Accessed 23 June 2019. https://www.keidanren.or.jp/en/profile/pro001.html

Keidanren. “Keidanren Nature Conservation Fund.” Accessed 13 September, 2019. http://www.keidanren.net/kncf/en/

Keiichi, Matsushita. *Toshigata Shaka no Jichi.* Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha, 1987.

Kobayashi, Hikaru. “Japan on the Trailing Edge of Global Climate Action.” Nippon.com. Published 11 September 2015. Accessed 31 October 2019. https://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00191/japan-on-the-trailing-edge-of-global-climate-action.html

Konviser, Bruce. “Thousands in Okinawa protest US Marine base relocation.” Deutsche Welle News. Published 11 August 2018. Accessed 23 October 2019. https://www.dw.com/en/thousands-in-okinawa-protest-us-marine-base-relocation/a-45046501

Kourula, Arno. “Corporate engagement with non-governmental organizations in different institutional contexts – A case study of a forest products company.” *Journal of World Business*, vol. 45 (2010): 395-404.

Krauss, Ellis and Simcock, Bradford. “Citizens Movements, The Growth and Impact of Environmental Protest in Japan”, in *Political Opposition and Local Politics in Japan,* edited by Kurt Steiner, Ellis Krauss and Scott Flanagan, 187-227. United States: Princeton University Press, 1981.

Lee, Jooha; Kim, Taekyoon, “Social Politics of Welfare Reform in Korea and Japan: A New Way of Mobilising Power Resources.” *Voluntas,* vol. 30 (2019): 393-407.

Leigh Jenco, “Revisiting Asian Values.” *Journal of the History of Ideas*, vol.74, no.2 (April 2013): 237-258.

Linh, Bui Thi Thu; Ha, Phung Thi Thu; Aung, Ko; Nhung, Nguyen Thi; Lim, Seunghoo. “The Breakdown of the Iron Triangle in the Process of Japan’s Trinity Reform: An Application of the Multiple Streams Framework to Compare Stakeholder Dynamics Inherent in Policy Change.” *Lex Localis – Journal of Local Self-Government,* vol. 15, no. 2, (2017): 221-242.

MacFarquhar, Roderick., “The Post-Confucian Challenge”, *The Economist* (February 9, 1980).

Mainichi Japan. “Koizumi’s lack of COP 25 coal commitments ‘wins’ Japan 2nd ‘Fossil’ award.” Published 12 December 2019. Accessed 15 January 2019. https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20191212/p2g/00m/0fp/050000c

Masayasu, Narumi. *Chiho bunken no shiso: Jichitai Kaikaku no Kiseki to Tenbo.* Tokyo: Gakuyo Shobo, 1994.

Masayasu, Narumi. *Toshi Henkaku no Shiso to Hoho.* Tokyo: Renga Shobo, 1972.

Mason, Robert J. “Whither Japan’s Environmental Movement? An Assessment of Problems and Prospects at the National Level.” *Pacific Affairs*, vol.72, no.2, (1999): 187-207.

Mead, Leila. “Japan’s Long-term Strategy Pledges Emission Reductions Through “Virtuous Cycle of Environment and Growth.” Sustainable Development Goals Knowledge Hub. Published 9 July 2019. Accessed 25 September 2019. http://sdg.iisd.org/news/japans-long-term-strategy-pledges-emission-reductions-through-virtuous-cycle-of-environment-and-growth/

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Japan’s position regarding the Kyoto Protocol.” Published December 2010. Accessed 31 December 2019. https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/environment/warm/cop/kp_pos_1012.html

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Japanese Economy.” Accessed 25 September 2019. https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/japan/index.html

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: MOFA, “International Cooperation and NGOs. Partnership between the Ministry of Foreign Ministry of Japan and Japanese NGOs” (sic), (2013): 3, accessed 17 January 2020. https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000024755.pdf

Mulgan, Aurelia George. “Loosening the Ties that Bind: Japan’s Agricultural Policy Triangle and Reform of Cooperatives (JA).” *The Journal of Japanese Studies*, vol. 42, no. 2, (Summer 2016): 221-246.

Neary, Ian, “State and Civil Society in Japan.” *Asian Affairs,* vol. 34, no. 1 (2003): 27-32.

Neary, Ian. *The State and Politics in Japan.* Polity Press, 2002.

Nippon.com. “Japan’s Nuclear Power Plants.” Published 8 July 2019. Accessed September 11, 2019. https://www.nippon.com/en/features/h00238/japan%E2%80%99s-nuclear-power-plants.html

Nozawa, Takeshi., *“*What is the focus of Tokyo 2020 NGOs?” Econetworks.jp. Published 4 July, 2017. Accessed 26 September 2019. https://www.econetworks.jp/internatenw/2017/07/2020ngo/

OECD Library. “Voter Turnout.” Accessed September 16 2019. https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/how-s-life-2017/voter-turnout-percentage-of-votes-cast-among-the-population-registered-to-vote-latest-available-year_how_life-2017-graph183-en#page1

Office of the Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. “Meeting on a Long-Term Strategy under the Paris Agreement as Growth Strategy.” Published 2 April 2019. Accessed 30 October 2019. https://japan.kantei.go.jp/98_abe/actions/201904/_00008.html

Ogawa, Akihiro. *The Failure of Civil Society? The Third Sector and the State in Contemporary Japan*. United States: State University of New York Press, 2009.

Oyamada, Eiji. “Anti-corruption measures the Japanese way: prevention matters.” *Graduate School of Global Studies, Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan Asian Education and Development Studies*, vol. 4 no. 1, (2015): 24-50.

Pascha, Werner, Kollner, Patrick and Croissant Aurel, “Japan Country Report.” *SGI Sustainable Governance Indicators* (2019) 1-50.

Pekkanen, Robert. “Molding Japanese Civil Society: State-Structured Incentives and the Patterning of Civil Society”, in *The State and Civil Society in Japan,* edited by Schwartz and Pharr, 116-134. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Phong, Van. “Japan’s MUFG commits to end financing for new coal projects, NGOs call for further steps.” Market Forces.org. Published 16 May 2019. Accessed 26 September 2019. https://www.marketforces.org.au/media-release-japans-mufg-commits-to-end-financing-for-new-coal-projects-ngos-call-for-further-steps/

Reimann, Kim D., "Building Networks from the Outside In: Japanese NGOs and the Kyoto Climate Change Conference." *Political Science Faculty Publications,* paper 6, (2002): 173-187.

Renewable Energy Institute. “Homepage.” Accessed 26 September 2019. https://www.renewable-ei.org/en/

Richley, Sean. “Voter Turnout in Japan and the United States.” Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. Accessed 20 October 2019. https://www.jsps.go.jp/english/e-plaza/e-sdialogue/03_data/Dr_Richey.pdf

Rootes, Christopher; Zito, Anthony; Barry, John. “Climate change, national politics and grassroots action: an introduction.” *Environmental Politics*, vol. 21, no. 5, (2012): 677-690.

Rudel, Thomas K., Roberts, J. Timmons, & Carmin, Jo Ann., “Political Economy of the Environment.” *Annual Review of Sociology*, vol. 37 (2011): 221-238.

Rudolph, Sven; Scheider, Friedrich. “Political barriers of implementing carbon markets in Japan: A Public Choice analysis and the empirical evidence before and after the Fukushima nuclear disaster.” *Environ Econ Policy Study*, vol. 15, (2013): 211-235.

Schumacher, Kim. “Approval procedures for large-scale renewable energy installations; Comparison of national legal frameworks in Japan, New Zealand, the EU and the US.” *Energy Policy*, vol.129 (2019): 139-152.

Shipper, Apichai W., “Foreigners and Civil Society in Japan.” *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 79, no. 2, (2006): 269-289.

Skjelsbaek, Kjell., “The Growth of International Nongovernmental Organization in the Twentieth Century.” *International Organization, Transnational Relations and World Politics*, vol. 25, no. 3, (Summer, 1971): 420-442.

Sohn Hyuk-Sang, Jeong, Bok Cheol and Kim Taekyoon, “At the Nexus of Advocacy and Accountability: New Challenges and Strategies for Japanese Development NGOs.” *Pacific Focus*, vol. XXXII, no. 1 (April 2017): 129-153.

Sustainable Sport NGO and NPO Network. *“*Activity Report.” Accessed 26 September 2019. https://suspon.net/activities

Takahashi, Ryusei. “Japanese activists join global climate strike ahead of U.N. summit on global warming.” Japan Times. Published 20 September 2019. Accessed 23 October 2019. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/09/20/national/japanese-activists-join-global-climate-strike-ahead-u-n-summit-global-warming/#.Xa-w3OgzaUk

The Climate Reality Project. “Al Gore and the Climate Reality Project to Host First-Ever Climate Leadership Workshop in Tokyo.” Published 20 August 2019. Accessed 20 November 2019. https://www.climaterealityproject.org/press/al-gore-and-climate-reality-project-host-first-ever-climate-leadership-workshop-tokyo

The Japan Times Editorial. “Rengo’s daunting challenges.” Published 24 November 2019. Accessed 29 December 2019. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/11/24/editorials/rengos-daunting-challenges/#.XggNIkczaUk

Thompson, Mark, "Whatever Happened to 'Asian Values'?" *Journal of* Democracy, vol. 12 (2001): 154-65.

Toyota Foundation. "Grant Program for Community Activities in Japan." Accessed September 13, 2019. https://www.toyotafound.or.jp/english/other/community.html

Tsujinaka, Yutaka; Pekkanen, Robert. "Civil Society and Interest Groups in Contemporary Japan." *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 80, no. 3 (2007): 419-437.

Tsukimori, Osamu and Hamada Kentaro. "Japan's pro-nuclear policy at odds with global trend: ISEP head." Reuters news. Published 20 May, 2014. Accessed 26 September 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-summit-isep/japans-pro-nuclear-policy-at-odds-with-global-trend-isep-head-idUSBREA4J0B020140520

Tsukimori, Osamu. "Japan uses offsets to meet Kyoto emission goal: media." Reuters news. Published 17 November 2013. Accessed 31 October 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-climate-japan-co2/japan-uses-offsets-to-meet-kyoto-emission-goal-media-idUSBRE9AG02420131117

Tsurutani, Taketsugu., "A New Era of Japanese Politics: Tokyo's Gubernatorial Election." *Asian Survey*, vol. 12, no.5, (1972): 429-443.

Ui, Jun. *Kogai no Seijigaku: Minamatabyo wo otte.* Tokyo: Sanseido, 1968.

Ui, Jun. *The Negative Effects of Technology in Japan's Modernization Process: The Ashio Copper Mine Incident.* Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1983.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. "Paris Agreement – Status of Ratification." Accessed 21 September 2019. https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/status-of-ratification

U.S. Energy Information Administration. "Japan is the world's third-largest coal-importing country." Published 14 June 2019. Accessed 4 January 2019. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=39853

Vallely, Paul. "The Big Question: Is the Kyoto treaty an outdated failure based on the wrong premises?" The Independent. Published 26 October 2007. Accessed 27 December 2019. https://www.independent.co.uk/environment/climate-change/the-big-question-is-the-kyoto-treaty-an-outdated-failure-based-on-the-wrong-premises-397927.html

Vogel, Ezra. *Japan as Number One: Lessons for America.* Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1979.

Waley, Paul. "Ruining and Restoring Rivers: The State and Civil Society in Japan", *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 78, no.2 (Summer, 2005): 195-215.

Wallens, Zach. "How the Paris Climate Agreement Impacts CSR and the Private Sector." Businesswire.com. Published 16 March 2016. Accessed 21 September 2019. https://blog.businesswire.com/how-the-paris-climate-agreement-impacts-csr-and-the-private-sector

White, James W. "The Dynamics of Political Opposition", in *Post-war Japan as History*, edited by Andrew Gordon, 424-448. Berkley: University of California Press, 1993.

World Wildlife Fund Japan. “Japanese Top 500 companies rated by sector for their efforts and impact in reducing emissions – and the results are surprising!” Published 12 April 2016. Accessed 25 September 2019. https://www.wwf.or.jp/eng/activities/768.html

Yamauchi, N. “New public sphere and civil society”, in *Nonprofit almanac 2010,* edited by N. Yamauchi, K. Tanaka and N. Okuyama. Japan: The Center of Nonprofit Research and Information at Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University, 2010.

Yasuda Tsuneo. *Gendaishi ni okeru Jichi ga Ugoku Toki: Shakai no Henkaku to NPO no Kanosei* Tokyo: Gyosei, 1999.

Interviews

Interview with 350.org Japan, 5 June 2019.

Interview with Carbon Declaratory Project Japan, 16 April 2019.

Interview with Citizens Environment Foundation, 25 July 2019.

Interview with Climate Youth Japan, April 14 2019.

Interview with Education for Sustainable Development Japan, 15 April 2019.

Interview with Environmental Partnership Council Japan, 12 June 2019.

Interview with Future Earth Asia, 19 June, 2019.

Interview with Greenpeace Japan, 18 July 2019.

Interview with Institute for Global Environment Studies, 17 May 2019.

Interview with Institute for Sustainable Energy Policies, 7 May 2019.

Interview with Japan Association of Environment and Society for the 21st Century, 29 May 2019.

Interview with Japan Carbon Initiative, 18 July 2019.

Interview with Japan Climate Leaders’ Partnership, 21 June 2019.

Interview with Keidanren, 3 June 2019.

Interview with Kiko Network, 24 April 2019.

Interview with Mitsubishi Corporation, 7 June 2019.

Interview with Renewable Energy Institute, 17 April 2019.

Interview with Renewable Energy Organisation of Hokkaido, 11 June 2019.

Interview with Sustainable Sport NGO and NPO Network, 12 June 2019.

Interview with World Wildlife Fund Japan, 18 July, 2019.

Interview with Youth20 Japan, 7 July 2019.