

論文の内容の要旨

**Correlation between Built-Environment and Socio-Economic Factors in
Protracted Refugee Situations**

Case Study of Kakuma Refugee Camp in Northern Kenya

(長期化する難民状態における建造環境と多様な社会経済要因の相関

北ケニアにおけるカクマ難民キャンプの事例研究)

氏 名 ダスティッド フェラティ
 Ferati Dastid

Abstract:

Refugee camps are settlements whose main function is to provide safe havens for people who were forcibly displaced, thus, until one of the three durable solutions [(1) repatriation, (2) local integration or (3) resettlement to a third country] are possible for them. Since its foundation in 1951, UNHCR got involved in an immense number of refugee situations, in most of them by establishing refugee camps. Some of those camps were temporary indeed, such as camps in Balkans during the civil wars of 1990s, but most of the camps lasted way longer than it was initially anticipated. As a matter of fact, the average lifespan of the camps has increased to 17 years, and counting. Some refugee settlements, such as Mayukwayuka in Zambia, has been in a `limbo` situation since 1966, or Kakuma Refugee Camp, which was established in 1991. This situation is known as Protracted Refugee Situations (PRS), which according to UNHCR, is a situation where 25,000 or more refugees find themselves in a long-lasting and intractable state of limbo.

Even though UN discourages the use of spontaneous camps because they are temporary,

Refugee Camps in general are treated temporary even in protracted refugee-situations. The switch from temporary to permanent is very complicated due to its political implications it can have and thus it rarely occurs. Switching from temporary to permanent camps would be very controversial, both to refugees and host countries, as it would appear as an acceptance and normalization of the status quo. On the other hand, UNHCR, which is assigned for camp-making and managing for most of the camps would wide, also is reluctant towards permanent camps since that would have a very high-cost, which UNHCR avoids at all costs. this means, that technically, refugee camps are temporary and cannot be permanent, since that would imply `a local integration`, which normally, most host countries oppose. The problem with the current system is that the camp-making policies are generalized, in terms of duration and geographical as well. The same planning tools are used when building camps in the African savannah, in forests of Thailand or Pakistan or in Urban areas in Kosovo, and they all end up looking the same. According to UNHCR guideline, the ideal camp should not exceed the number of 20,000 refugees, and should be divided into four sectors (5000 refugees each), further divided into 16 communities, each community containing 16 families (UNHCR U. , 2007). Such an approach leads to high modular, hierarchical and almost modernistic planning principles. Furthermore, such planning principles disregards the background of the refugees, their culture and lifestyle. The current system, though dependent on each country, doesn't allow refugees to work, own lands or properties, and sometimes not even move out of the camp. The number of refugees has reached an all-time high record, with around 68.8 million refugees, most of them living in about 1000 camps in 60 different countries, yet the plan-making guidelines remains generalized. A lot of research has been conducted on refugee camps, and most of them argue that the camps are failing. However, very few from these research projects focus on the built-environment and the correlation of it with other aspects, that might cause such a failure. Therefore, this study has asked a very general question `why do these camps fail and how can the camp-making law be enhanced`.

In order to answer those questions, it was necessary to survey in one many PRS-Camps. Africa has been producing most of the refugees worldwide, especially the Horn of Africa, where most of the countries have ongoing armed conflicts. However, several countries like Kenya and Uganda, are relatively peaceful therefore a convenient place for refugees to seek a safe haven. For this reason, as the main case study area for this study was chosen Kakuma Refugee Camp in northern Kenya. As supplementary case studies, I also conducted research in camps in Greece and also worked with Urban Refugees in Nairobi and Uganda.

To answer the aforementioned question, it was necessary to first understand how the system works, which is the main topic in Chapter two. This chapter begins with the study of creation of UNHCR and its predecessors, refugee definition and its mandate. It shows how the refugee definition together with other laws worked at first but just a few years later it was challenged. By this, this study claims that the refugee law should face constant change, in order to align it to the current circumstances, and not try to adjust circumstances to the law, which has been the case in countless occasions.

Until recently, all laws and institutions, considered refugee situations to be temporary, and thus build the camps as such. The second part of chapter two studies the roots of conflicts in South Sudan and Somalia, and argues that the situation in the two countries is not expected to get better any time soon, hence, the refugees in Kakuma are expected to remain there for at least a few more years.

Chapter begins with Kenyan laws on refugees, first in a national level and then continues with the county laws, where Kakuma is located. It also studies briefly the host community's culture, people and built-environment. This chapter concludes that despite what is often believed, Kakuma camp has long ago ceased to be a 'normal camp', and in fact is much closer to being a normal settlement than the agencies and host government wants to believe. However, the questions raised at the end of this chapter, that if Kakuma is different from what was initially planned and how, needed a study on a deeper level, for what this study continues to study Kakuma in a block level. To do this, chapter two first analysis the debate of what is and what should be considered a camp, where I write also the contribution of this study in the debate. To understand why the camp turns so different, and to see if there is any correlation between culture, refugees' background and their built environment, this study conducted 120 in-depth interviews, each 2-4 hours long. The second part of chapter four analysis the data and concludes that there are huge differences between the communities. The most noticeable difference was the use of material i.e. one community uses mud which is free in Kakuma, and the other uses iron-sheet which is relatively very expensive. Therefore, the hypothesis of chapter four is that the more refugees have money the more they use the iron-sheet. To prove this, it was then necessary to study the income of these 119 families.

Chapter five is divided into two main subchapters. The first, trying to measure the aforementioned hypothesis of correlation between materials and refugees' income, analysis in details the refugees' income beside the humanitarian aid they get: businesses, jobs, remittances and community assistance. It concludes that indeed there is such a relationship and the iron-sheet is a sign of affluence in Kakuma. However,

detecting such a correlation is not enough, without understanding why some communities make much more money than others, where in fact, they all begin their lives in Kakuma relatively the same. They also all get the same amount of food, money and land. So why do some communities succeed in businesses much more than others? To understand this, it was necessary to study the main markets in Kakuma. For this purpose, three out of four markets in Zone 1, Kakuma 1, were studied. The most important finding in this subchapter was that all Ethiopian and Somali refugees answered they got help from the community to start their business, whereas South Sudanese all answered that they used their own money. This meant, that the fact the South Sudanese have to start with their own money, makes them less likely to succeed. This finding imposed a new question and hypothesis: there is strong correlation between businesses and community assistance, therefore, indirectly, strong community bonds affects the built-environment. To prove this, it was necessary to study each community and then compare them with each-other.

Chapter six begins with the study of tribalism, as one of the main issues in Africa and Kakuma. It then continues to study each community and finally compares them. This chapter found out that Somalis are much more dependent on each-other than South Sudanese. It also proved that most Somali and Rwandans get constant assistance from their community in Kakuma or elsewhere. It also proved that the fact so many Somalis got resettled, there is a huge amount of remittances entering the block, which was much different from the South Sudanese Block.

This study then, concluded that the camps are not, and should not be treated as non-places, nor too differently from the way settlements usually are. I am not implying that camps are settlements, because just the fact that refugees have no legal right to work, to own land or other real estate properties and also the fact that they get food and other items for free, makes it not a common settlement. However, the camps are, as has been shown here, much closer to settlement than the agencies and host governments want to believe.

This study has also concluded that the latter are result of strong community bonds, which impacts therefore their livelihoods and indirectly, the built-environment. The communities and intercommunity have also great influence on the relationship with the host community, including employment opportunities.

This conclusion disproves therefore that the built-environment, shelter design and spatial planning of the camps doesn't require research, since up to this point, it is one of the most under-researched aspects of the camp.