

## 論文の内容の要旨

論文題目 Soviet Contribution to the Global Built Environment of the Cold War Era, 1946-1991  
(冷戦期 (1946-1991) におけるソ連のグローバルな建造環境に対する貢献)

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This thesis examines the results and the process of the Soviet Union's international cooperation during the Cold War period, and the development of the built environment as one of its forms. It calls on a comprehensive analysis of the conditions that enabled such cooperation. However, as the Soviet foreign policy was changing from a continental to a more global freewheeling one, and from intransigence to compromise, we argue that the approach to built environment development also changed over time as well. Therefore, we sought to explain the historical background of each such change of approach, to provide information about the specialists, the process of project implementation, and the institutions related to the cooperation and design process. The broadest palette of scales from housing development, buildings, and complexes of social significance to large-scale infrastructural projects realized with innovative technologies was used for the study.

The thesis suggests that the comprehensive representation of each period can be made through patterns reflecting the relationship between humans and the built environment, and that the dynamics of contributions to the global built environment throughout the Cold War indicate a trend. For this, we: (a) analyzed archival materials from government sources to make clear the historical and political conditions that shaped the approach to international cooperation and the built environment contribution, as well as the change that the project implementation process underwent; (b) To reveal this change, we analyzed various publications of the time - reports, monographs, and individual contracts - by each of the related construction and design research institutes in charge of project implementation; (c) To show the influences of the Soviet approach on the built environment in various regions and at different scales, we analyzed technical documentation and records of project discussion with local governmental organs, which defined spatial characteristics proper to the Soviet Union and implemented in foreign countries. Eventually, to assess Soviet contribution to the global built environment, we attempted to detect trends in the Soviet approach to international cooperation regarding the built environment, its process, and background, using patterns.

In *Chapter 1*, we explained how the international cooperation of the Soviet Union was set as a process. We showed that there was a gradual change from the propagandist doctrine of the late 1920s and 1930s to an institutionalization. Through a series of political resolutions, the USSR

accessed the global construction and education market through joining UNSECO and by creating Comecon as an integrated space of economic activity for the field of construction, among others. The door of cultural exchange was held open by meetings with foreign architects at specific events, as well as exchanges of delegations and literature. Its consistent market presence was grounded on national research institutes and the improvement of its inner system. As a result, by 1983, more than 600 bilateral agreements were signed. We also explained the development of the Socialist architectural paradigm that went through stages of holistic ensembles, scientific and technological progress demonstration to local context considerations, and long-term urban prognoses.

*Chapter 2* (1) explained that in terms of background, the first hotspots of the Soviet Cold War cooperation in 1946-1956 were in East Asia and Eastern Europe because of proxy-conflicts with the West. (2) The cooperation process was somewhat limited and scattered, and worked only in the vicinity of Soviet borders — in China, North Korea, Mongolia, and in Eastern Europe. The ideological constraints and undefined cooperation system were among the factors slowing down the process. (3) The tangible result of this cooperation was represented by industries and infrastructural network developments over architecture, in number. Architecture and city were thought as a whole and shaped with architectural masses of streets, squares, and the adorning architecture using a vocabulary of symbolism. (4) By creating built environments that demonstrated authority and had Socialist Realist features, the Soviet Union sought to promote and impose its values. (5) In comparison, the reconstruction in the Western Bloc was often different. Thus, in general, the European postwar reconstruction was dedicated to speeding up the economic recovery and responding to social needs, while the Soviet way consisted of creating monuments and heroic memorials to praise the regime. Therefore, the pattern of this period can be synthesized as decorated hardware of ideology for the masses.

*Chapter 3* explained how in the 1950s, the USSR changed its foreign policy from a closed continental one to a freewheeling global one, to balance US foreign policy which had long-term influences on the global nature of the Soviet cooperation from, broadly, 1954 to the 1970s. The new doctrine of scientific and technological progress supported knowledge-intensive projects in countries liberated from colonial rule, mainly in Southeast Asia and Africa. (2) The USSR was aiming for a so-called "normalization" of its image in the global arena, while the market atmosphere was growing more present internationally. Therefore, the USSR became a part of the two-sided system of multiple institutions in the global economy, politics, and, in our case, the technological transfer. USSR was thus showing consistency in being practical at the international level by using CMEA, UNESCO, IBEC, WHO, and by improving its system of construction and design research institutes at the domestic level. (3) With the new ideology of the scientific and technological progress, the Soviet Union's cooperation focus shifted to fine engineering, design of sports and leisure facilities, or sharing technical knowledge. Moreover, essential contributions, such as infrastructural projects like dams and roads, stadiums and recreational facilities, and technical schools and universities, considered local climates. (4) In other words, by capitalizing on their technical skills in a wide range of countries, the USSR created built environments that could respond to the needs on trend, were context-considerate, and useful in the long run. The ideology focused on demonstrating technological advances. (5) During this period, the US and USSR become the leading global forces. The Soviet government chose to make its mark through built environments competitively, but not aggressively. Thus, the US became a vehicle of cultural leadership, while the USSR claimed to bring a scientific-technical revolution. The pattern of the period can be represented as a broad application of the technology that still stays ideologically non-flexible, yet has to show flexibility at the global market of international cooperation by responding to the needs and trends locally, while also not imposing unnecessary symbolism in architecture.

*Chapter 4* demonstrated how (1) the notorious Tashkent Earthquake of 1966 demanded the implementation of the biggest reconstruction project after the end of the postwar reconstruction program. Moreover, it was to prove the leading socialist country's resilience. (2) In terms of process, a natural disaster for the first time after the Ashgabat earthquake of 1948 demanded mobilization of the whole country's resources, and pushed Soviet planners to invest all their knowledge into this project, exclusively locally and thus with no regulatory thresholds. (3) The reconstruction plan of 1967 defined new buildings so they would respond to acute issues, such as seismic activity, local climate conditions, and local culture. (4) In terms of evaluation, although Tashkent's instance differed from others, it represented a platform for an experiment for future projects. The USSR attempted to show its leadership in the reconstruction of a socialist city with the achievements of scientific and technological progress. (5) The comparison with Skopje reconstruction by Kenzo Tange showed that even if it was happening in two socialist countries, the commitment of Western countries was not enough to realize the project entirely within the existing economic reality. In contrast, the Soviet Union need to protect its image as a leading global power forced it to achieve more significant results. The pattern of this period can be summarized as the USSR showing extraordinary resilience and the ability to engage in dialogue in response to the sensitive domestic situation that could put its reputation at risk.

*Chapter 5* described the context of the 1970s-1980s when (1) the world depended on decisions made in Kremlin and Washington, but their influence was gradually eroding due to the emergence of new stakeholders in the global arena. However, during this period, amidst massive Soviet constructions, we notice its liberal attitude allowing the participation of others. Vietnam and Afghanistan became the scene of such a process. (2) The project implementation process was similar to that of the 1950-60s. However, at this point, the local technology was advancing, and more local companies could participate in the process. Therefore, there was a lot more dialogue between Soviet specialists and foreign customers. (3) For the cities of Kabul and Hanoi, as for capitals of new regimes was adopted an image of the modern capital with futuristic forms, the contextualized decor, and environmental considerations. (4) The new built environment was believed to bring about economic growth through considerations of urban comfort and a better relationship to the city. More attention was paid to new infrastructures, the latest concepts of sanitation, green belts, traffic improvement, and housing solutions. However, the inadequate Soviet economic system could not respond to the political and economic realities in those countries, and only a few projects were realized. (5) Compared to the positions the US construction companies occupied globally in the 1980s, the imminent failure of the Soviet system became apparent, yet certain countries would still rely on the Soviet experience for different political and social reasons. The built environment contribution pattern they were creating was to bring economic growth through engaging in dialogue with local stakeholders and better consideration of the local context.

This research has shown that the history of Soviet contribution to the global built environment can be studied through a series of patterns representing the architectural thought and its physical implementation in the form of architecture, urban planning, and infrastructure on one side and connected to it political and socioeconomic environment on the other. The background, process, tangible results, and evaluation of each discussed period can be summarized as:

1. Socialism was more naturally introduced in the countries where societies had overcome a struggle against imperialist forces;
2. The construction process was changing from unquestionable Soviet domination to more participative practices while the Soviet Union was accepting its role as the second global power, the existence of which was accepted as a norm.

3. Although there was a reinforcement of ideology in architecture until 1954, the global progress of technologies and the change in the Soviet policy towards the technological progress-oriented doctrine gradually annihilated the visual aspect of architecture and rendered it more practical and close to the international concepts. The knowledge-intensive projects were growing, and the local environment and actors were given more careful attention.
4. The social model was changing from mass thinking with communist values, to capitalist thinking with more individualistic values and as the image of the USSR in the global arena was normalizing, its actions were changing from domination to liberal participation in the global processes of international cooperation and at the global construction market.

Therefore, (1) the Soviet contribution change from hard domination to liberal participation can be stated at the macro level of the built environment history. However, at the specific level, this appeared to vary. Such additional factors as a business-oriented attitude and the need to protect the image of a leading force introduced modifications to the general process. Ideology remained in the background, although the general change was towards the practical. (2) As big actors need to be agile to respond to global trends, the export of ideology to strengthen the Eastern Bloc gradually became only the background of the cooperation process, which itself shows how socialist countries were intrinsically approaching capitalism. (3) While the foreign and domestic policy did define the approach to international cooperation, the fight for leadership replaced pure ideology and was defining the Soviet's behavior in the global arena the most.

During the Cold War and until its collapse, the USSR was number two in global leadership. To protect its position, the USSR chose to keep up with the global trends and learned to solve real problems instead of aggressively imposing the ideology. The Soviet government, while restricting humanitarian thinking and creative and civic freedom, favored industrialization and technical progress for the sake of preserving its place as the only US opponent. As the technical achievements became the USSR's name card, the visual aspect of Soviet architecture or urban planning became less critical. Soviet contribution consisted primarily of improving or creating underlying layers of regional and urban development, providing, through project implementation, necessary and better quality of life, the base to invigorate the economies, nurturing local experts, and providing facilities that could support long-term growth and independence. Only recently, such global achievements became the aims of sustainable project development indispensable in today's global cooperation. Thus understanding the Cold War period gives us an insight into today's international cooperation. It also shows that the absence of private ownership and enterprises, agile and liberal domestic policy, and ideological restrictions did not allow the Soviet Union to reach leading positions in the field of construction nor to offer a significantly aesthetic corpus of architectural projects.

Although the all-encompassing inventory could not be made within one research time limits, this research provides new statistical data, reveals many paths and sources for other researches, and by deepening understanding of the Soviet contribution to the global built environment, recounts the Cold War history from one more perspective.