

## Reinterpretation of Historic Language Valuation within the Pro-Ukrainian Linguistic Ideology<sup>1</sup>

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This paper examines the characteristics of pro-Ukrainian linguistic ideology in Ukraine through qualitative analysis of online journalistic articles dealing with language issues in the country. In particular, we will focus on the descriptions of linguistic situation in Ukraine during the Russian imperial and Soviet eras, as well as the sociolinguistic evaluation of spoken languages in modern days. The languages concerned in our paper are Ukrainian, Russian, and surzhyk, the latter of which is generally considered as mixed language of the first two. We will further discuss how historical events in the past are interpreted and correlated with the current circumstances within the pro-Ukrainian linguistic ideology, which we define here as a language ideology tending to promote the Ukrainian language and disapprove Russian and surzhyk. We will argue that this type of belief system in Ukraine is based upon a bifocality, which is constructed from two vectors of linguistic and sociolinguistic purification: *derussification* and *reukrainization*.

### 1. General description of the linguistic situation in Ukraine

Since 1996, Ukraine is a monolingual nation in strict legal terms, as its Constitution grants official preeminence only to the Ukrainian language. While article 10 of the fundamental law stipulates that Ukrainian is indeed the *state language* of the nation, Russian is interestingly mentioned alongside “*other languages of national minorities*” as subject of being guaranteed its free development and use.<sup>2</sup> As it has already been suggested,

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<sup>1</sup> This paper presents a preliminary report of an ongoing research conducted as part of the doctoral thesis project on linguistic ideology in Ukraine. The analysis and interpretation of the corpus discussed in this article were undertaken as a distinct phase of the study. We have dealt with the methodological aspects of the study in detail in our previous work: *Икедзавэ Т. Социолінгвістическіе рэпрэзентацыі языковых характэрыстык украінскага, русскага языков і суржыка в украінскім медыядыскурсе // Філолагічныя навукі: навуковы журнал Палтаўскага нацыянальнага педагагічнага ўніверсітэту імя В. Г. Кораленка. 2021. № 34. С. 65-73. Additionally, the present article was originally submitted in August 2021, and may not fully reflect the current events occurring since early 2022.*

<sup>2</sup> *Верховна Рада України. Конституція України* [<https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/main/en/254%D0%BA/96-%D0%B2%D1%80?lang=uk#Text>] (Retrieved August 10, 2021).

this text seems to reveal that “*a special status is being recognized for the Russian language, neither a state language, nor a simple language of a minority*”.<sup>3</sup>

As a matter of fact, Russian has such an important influence on the linguistic landscape of Ukraine that its role cannot be underestimated as a minority language. Statistics reveal the percentage of urban population speaking only Ukrainian at home to be at 32.4%, mostly Ukrainian at 13.6%, only Russian at 15.8%, mostly Russian at 12.3%, and finally both languages equally often at 24.9%.<sup>4</sup> Another survey on the proficiency in the two languages shows that both Ukrainian and Russian are acquired at about the same level on average.<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, one can observe by comparing numbers that Ukrainian is used more in the areas of school education, restaurant billboards, visual information in public transports and outdoor advertising, while Russian is widely present in television, in children’s clubs, or on the Internet.<sup>6</sup> Although these data show a tendency for higher use of Ukrainian in the western part of the country and Russian in the east, the distribution of the two languages is not simply a matter of geographic opposition, but it can also be conditioned by situational circumstances.

The bilingualism in Ukraine has been formed historically by numerous geographical, economic, or political factors which is reflected on the complexity of its current linguistic situation. To summarize some of the historical facts relevant to our study, we shall begin with the 17<sup>th</sup> century, when the territory now part of Ukraine was ruled by the Poles. Following the Russo-Polish war of 1654-1667, Russian exerted its influence in Ukraine as the language of administration and the use of Ukrainian, which was linguistically polonized by that time, was largely limited. The Valuev Circular addressed to the censorship committees in 1863 forbade the publication in the Ukrainian language apart

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Every citation from non-English sources in this paper is our translation and will be indicated in italic.

<sup>3</sup> Pascal Bonnard, “Ukraine. Enjeux du débat sur le statut de la langue russe,” *Le Courrier des pays de l’Est* 1060, no. 2 (2007), p. 88.

<sup>4</sup> Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, “Thoughts and Views of the Population on Teaching the Russian Language in Ukrainian-Speaking Schools and Granting Autonomy as a Part of Ukraine to the Uncontrolled Territories of Donbas: March 2019” [<http://kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=832&page=1>] (Retrieved August 14, 2021).

<sup>5</sup> *Кантар*. Дослідження: мовна ситуація в Україні [<https://tns-us.com/news/doslidzhennya-movna-situatsiya-v-ukrayini>] (Retrieved August 14, 2021).

<sup>6</sup> *Простір свободи*. Становище української мови в Україні у 2020 році [<https://prostirsvobody.org/img/ck341/plugins/filemanager/browser/default/images/Stan.pdf>] (Retrieved 14 August, 2021). This annual report summarizes various statistics on the linguistic situation in Ukraine conducted by official agencies, sociological institutes, and the civil society itself.

from belles-lettres, condemning the language as “*exactly the same Russian language, only spoiled by the influence of Poland on it*”.<sup>7</sup> At that time, Ukrainian was not considered as an independent language, but as a *Little Russian dialect* of the *Great Russian language*, an observation also shared by Lomonosov in his *Russian Grammar*.<sup>8</sup>

During the 1920s, the Soviet regime implemented a policy promoting the development of national languages, which encouraged the use of Ukrainian in various fields such as administration, education, or the press. However, because of the “*emphasis of Russian as a common language*” under Stalin and its recognition as a “*language of interethnic exchange*” under Khrushchev, the acquisition of Russian became compulsory in schools, ending the era of *Ukrainization*.<sup>9</sup> Especially in the case of Ukraine and Belarus, “*since their ethnic languages and Russian were similar to each other, it was easy to learn each other’s language, and the rate of acquisition [of Russian] in both [countries] was high*”.<sup>10</sup>

The persisting presence of Russian not only promoted itself to be the dominant language over Ukrainian, but also gave birth to *surzhyk*, a mixed language of the two constantly used in various social situations. The term itself is a pejorative one which originally referred to a “*mixture of wheat and rye, rye and barley, barley and oats, etc.*” or “*flour of such a mixture*”,<sup>11</sup> and underwent metaphorical semantic alternation to designate a “*person of mixed race*”,<sup>12</sup> until acquiring the modern linguistic definition, “*elements of two or more languages brought together artificially without following the norm of literary language*” and “*impure language*”.<sup>13</sup> *Surzhyk* is widely understood as an example of *semilingualism*, a concept introduced by Swedish linguist Hansegard in the 1960s “as a ‘half-knowledge’ of the second language coupled with a ‘half-knowledge’ of the first language”.<sup>14</sup> In this context, *surzhyk* is generally understood in Ukrainian philology as an

<sup>7</sup> Лемке М.К. Эпоха цензурных реформ. СПб., 1904. С. 303.

<sup>8</sup> Ломоносов М.В. Российская грамматика. СПб., 1755. С. 51. He mentions that the three main Russian dialects are Muscovite, Northern and Ukrainian.

<sup>9</sup> 塩川伸明 「ソ連言語政策史再考」『スラブ研究』46号, 1999年, 169-171頁。

<sup>10</sup> 同上 183頁。

<sup>11</sup> Білодід І.К. та ін. Словник української мови. Т. 9. Київ, 1978. С. 854.

<sup>12</sup> Грінченко Б.Д. Словарь української мови. Т. 2. Берлін, 1924. С. 741.

<sup>13</sup> Білодід та ін. Словник української мови.

<sup>14</sup> Silvia Lucchini, “Semilingualism: A Concept to be Revived for a New Linguistic Policy?,” in Bert Cornillie, José Lambert and Pierre Swiggers, eds., *Linguistic identities, language shift and language policy in Europe* (Leuven: Peeters, 2009), p. 61. This is a generalized definition of Hansegard’s original one from 1968 with reference to Tove Skutnabb-Kangas, *Bilingualism or Not: The Education of Minorities* (Clevedon: Multilingual

“Ukrainian colloquialism contaminated by Russian loanwords” and “widely used in everyday speech”.<sup>15</sup>

The very existence of surzhyk further complicates the linguistic situation of Ukraine since it is often perceived as a threat to the development of the Ukrainian literary language, being accountable for its low level of mastery by the citizens. *Antisurzhyk* is an example of linguistic purism in Ukraine which mainly takes form of websites, where *false* expressions, mainly Russisms or surzhykisms, are put in a list with the *correct* correspondents. The first example of this kind of educational material is a book written by Serbens’ka in 1994.<sup>16</sup> Nowadays, there are journalistic articles, Twitter accounts, YouTube videos or even mobile applications under this name that are intended to instruct the *correct* expressions.

As for the linguistic policies in recent years, despite its significant presence in Ukraine, Russian currently has no official status. In 2012, the *Law on the Principles of State Language Policy* obliged local governments to “implement measures concerning the development, use and protection of the regional or minority language” (article 7), if the percentage of speakers of the latter represented 10% or more of the population on the territory of its existence.<sup>17</sup> Russian, along with other minority languages, has thus been officially recognized as *regional language* in many territories. However, this legislation was subject to criticism, because of its unconstitutionality,<sup>18</sup> the legal absence of a definition of *regional language*,<sup>19</sup> legislative violations during its adoption,<sup>20</sup> or its nature of evicting the Ukrainian language and threatening the stability and integrity of the country.<sup>21</sup> Following the political crisis of 2013-2014, the Supreme Rada voted for the repeal of this law, which was finally confirmed by the recognition of its unconstitutionality by the Constitutional Court in 2018. Under the former President Petro Poroshenko, a

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Matters, 1984), p. 250.

<sup>15</sup> Муромцев І.В. та ін. Українська мова. Енциклопедія. Київ, 2011. С. 351.

<sup>16</sup> Сербенська О.А. Антисуржик: вчимося ввічливо поводитись і правильно говорити. Львів, 1994. С. 152.

<sup>17</sup> Верховна Рада України. Закон України «Про засади державної мовної політики» [<https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/5029-17>] (Retrieved August 18, 2021).

<sup>18</sup> Смутьська А.В. Перспективи застосування закону України «Про засади державної мовної політики» у процесі неперервної мовної освіти // Всеукраїнська наукова конференція «Історичні регіони України: минуле та сучасність» 28-29 листопада 2013 р. / За ред. А. М. Туренка та ін. Харків, 2013. С. 136.

<sup>19</sup> Ялова О.В. Мовна політика в Україні в контексті законопроектів про мови // Науковий вісник Національної академії внутрішніх справ. 2017. № 102(1). С. 24.

<sup>20</sup> Куц Ю.О. Сучасна мовна політика української держави: управлінсько-правовий аспект // Теорія та практика державного управління. 2017. № 56(1). С. 18.

<sup>21</sup> Канавець М.В. Нормативно-правове регулювання державної мовної політики в Україні: проблеми та основні виклики у її реалізації // Публічне адміністрування: теорія та практика. 2016. № 16(2). С. 4.

replacement law *On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as State Language* was adopted in February 2019, which reaffirmed that the “*only state (official) language in Ukraine is the Ukrainian language*” (Article 1) and mandated, as a general rule, the use of Ukrainian in official and public fields.<sup>22</sup>

## 2. Theoretical approach of the research

If “bilingualism is essentially a characterization of individual linguistic behavior whereas diglossia is a characterization of linguistic organization at the socio-cultural level”,<sup>23</sup> the linguistic situation in Ukraine would be best described as *dynamically fused bilingualism with a weaker degree of diglossia*. The Ukrainian society is indeed bilingual in this sense, because a large proportion of the population uses both Ukrainian and Russian individually. Furthermore, it is partially diglossic, since two languages have contrasting political status and form a certain level of social complementary distribution. However, we cannot assume a full degree of diglossia, considering that the areas of usage of Ukrainian and Russian can still overlap, hence the widespread presence of vernacular surzhyk, fusing the two languages. Finally, it is dynamic, for the linguistic situation is socio-politically conditioned by various circumstances which could change over time.

From a linguistic perspective, it is necessary to point out that the practice of the Ukrainian language itself has a dynamic character. Younger generation tends to avoid using expressions that coincide with those in the Russian language,<sup>24</sup> and unregulated puristic word forms appear in mass media.<sup>25</sup> Such an intensive inclination for derussification is due to the general rejection of Russisms in contrast to Polonisms, since Polish influence on Ukrainian “*was not caused by the language policy of the Polish government, but rather by close contact between Ukrainian and Polish societies in the condition of coexistence on the territory of one state*”.<sup>26</sup> Considering that there were numbers of fluctuations in literary

<sup>22</sup> Верховна Рада України. Закон України про забезпечення функціонування української мови як державної [https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2704-19] (Retrieved August 18, 2021).

<sup>23</sup> Joshua Fishman, “Bilingualism With and Without Diglossia; Diglossia With and Without Bilingualism,” *Journal of Social Issues* 23, no. 2 (1967), p. 34.

<sup>24</sup> Дель Гаудио С. Украинско-русская смешанная речь “суржик” в системе взаимодействия украинского и русского языков // *Slověne = Slovĕne. International Journal of Slavic Studies*. 2015. № 4(2). С. 236.

<sup>25</sup> Мозговой В.И. Культурные парадоксы языкового пуризма в Украине [Электронный ресурс] // *V Международные Севастопольские Кирилло-Мефодиевские чтения: сборник научных статей / Под ред. А. Р. Габидуллина и др. Севастополь, 2011. С. 367–374.*

<sup>26</sup> Яковець Р.П. Пуристичні тенденції в контексті когнітивної лінгвістики [Електронний ресурс] //

norm of the Ukrainian language impacting on its structure during the Soviet period<sup>27</sup> and that still nowadays orthographical reforms distancing from the Russian spelling are taking place, we suppose that the hypothetical pro-Ukrainian linguistic ideology would aim not only to *derussify* the language but also to *reukrainize* it, reinventing an ideal form of Ukrainian. Furthermore, the purification of language would be coupled with that of practice, which should incite the subjects of such an ideology to prefer the use of Ukrainian linguistic varieties over Russian or surzhyk.

From these premises, we attempt to reconstruct the dominant linguistic ideology in Ukraine by analyzing the perception of the *three* languages emphasized in discourse dedicated to languages of the nation. As for the methodological aspects, we rely firstly on the theory of *social representations*, “*a form of knowledge, socially elaborated and shared, having a practical aim and contributing to the construction of a reality common to a social group*”.<sup>28</sup> The sociolinguistic category of such representations, or *sociolinguistic representations*, are social representations related to a given language, its usage, and the users of the linguistic community.<sup>29</sup> These shared views could reflect the perceived linguistic valuation, or *majoration* and *minoration* of languages: the former term designates a “*reduction, in varying degrees, of the normal societal exercise (and thus communicative areas) of a language*”, while the latter presents the opposite result or process.<sup>30</sup> One could distinguish the qualitative aspect of language minoration and majoration, which concerns the subjective criteria such as sociopolitical status, notion of inferiority or domination of a language, from the quantitative aspect, measuring numerical factors such as proportion of speakers or the social spread of use.<sup>31</sup>

Based on the view that an ideology consists of “*a system (network) of representations in interconnection*”,<sup>32</sup> we have carried out a qualitative analysis of journalistic articles as a source of sociolinguistic representations contributing to the

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Науковий вісник Херсонського державного університету. Серія “Лінгвістика”. 2006. № 4. С. 312–315.

<sup>27</sup> Kateryna Karunyk, “The Ukrainian Spelling Reforms, Half-Reforms, Non-Reforms and Anti-Reforms as Manifestation of the Soviet Language Policy,” *Studi Slavistici* 14 (2017), p. 91-110.

<sup>28</sup> Denise Jodelet, “Représentations sociales : un domaine en expansion,” in Denise Jodelet, ed., *Les représentations sociales* (Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 2003), p. 53.

<sup>29</sup> Henri Boyer, *Introduction à la sociolinguistique* (Malakoff : Dunod, 2017), p. 62.

<sup>30</sup> Henri Boyer, “Présentation,” *Études de linguistique appliquée* 143, no. 3 (2006), p. 261.

<sup>31</sup> Philippe Blanchet, “Minorations, minorisations, minorités : essai de théorisation d’un processus complexe,” *Cahiers de sociolinguistique* 10, no. 1 (2005), p. 27.

<sup>32</sup> Pierre Mannoni, *Les représentations sociales* (Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 2016), p. 56.

domination or subordination of each language within the pro-Ukrainian linguistic ideology. From the following section, we present some of the data that strongly suggest an interdependence between the image of languages and the diachronic political climate.<sup>33</sup>

### 3. Characterization of Ukrainian as heroic state language

Generally speaking, the Ukrainian language is evaluated positively throughout our articles, providing a standardized model to be followed in the face of its antagonistic opponent, namely Russian, as well as their mixed variant. The idealistic appreciation of the language is remarkably expressed in simple sentences, as in the example below.

На свята, приурочені мовам світу чи рідній мові [...] ми любимо оспівувати нашу мову особливо. І є за що: мелодійна, милозвучна, красива і надзвичайно сильна.<sup>34</sup>

*On holidays dedicated to the languages of the world or to the native language [...] we love to sing and praise our language especially. And there is a reason for it: it is melodious, sweetly sounding, beautiful and extremely strong.*

Thus, the linguistic discourse on the country's only official language presupposes that it plays a heroic role among the *three* languages. The degree of mastery of Ukrainian literary language, serving as a source of the country's cultural heritage, defines how cultured one is. Literature occupies an important position in the perception of its authenticity, as well as the justification of its dissemination.

Але я зрозуміла, що не хочу «балакати, як усі». Я хочу розмовляти правильно, красивою мовою, якою написані найкращі твори української літератури.<sup>35</sup>

*But I realized that I do not want to “talk like everyone”. I want to correctly speak the beautiful language, in which the best works of the Ukrainian literature were written.*

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<sup>33</sup> Our corpus consists of 39 articles dealing with language issues in Ukraine published during the years 2012-2019. Out of the total 508 enunciation units identified, 143 of them related to the symbolic notions associated with one of the three languages are concerned in the present study. The examples cited in the following sections are the ones we consider to be mostly representative among the others.

<sup>34</sup> Зінченко Т. Як твої діла, рідна мово? Суржик: як перетворити його мінуси на плюси [https://espreso.tv/article/2019/11/07/yak\_tvoyi\_dila\_ridna\_movo\_surzhyk\_yak\_peretvoryty\_yogo\_minusy\_n\_a\_plyusy] (Retrieved 17 August, 2021).

<sup>35</sup> Рацібарська Ю. Русифікація. Фільм-дослідження про українську мову зняли у 5 країнах [https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/30299166.html] (Retrieved 17 August, 2021).

Although these features do not seem to be surprising, the reading of texts becomes interesting when the language is dealt with from a historical point of view. The historic deflation of Ukrainian is described in relation to tsarism or to the Soviet regime, accusing the political environment of its subordination under formerly prestigious Russian.

При російському царизмі українську мову забороняли століттями, але навіть 1910 року на території сучасної України понад 70% людей, навіть на сході, розмовляли українською мовою.<sup>36</sup>

*Under Russian tsarism, the Ukrainian language was banned for centuries, but even by 1910 in the territory of today's Ukraine more than 70% of the population, even in the east, spoke Ukrainian.*

What is striking to us is that these repressions are narrated on the subject not only of the language itself, but also of its promoters and speakers. The history of language is thus paralleled with that of the country, which becomes evident in the following example.

За радянської влади українських селян, основних носіїв української, заморили голодоморами. Письменників, вчителів – масово репресували. Українську мову витіснили практично з усіх сфер життя. Її вивчення, на відміну від російської, не давало жодних кар'єрних перспектив.<sup>37</sup>

*Under the Soviet regime, Ukrainian peasants, the main speakers of the Ukrainian language, were starved to death by the Holodomor. Writers and teachers were massively repressed. The Ukrainian language was expelled from practically all aspects of life. Its study, unlike Russian, did not ensure any career prospects.*

The term *Holodomor* refers to the famine that took place in 1932-1933 in Ukraine, caused by the agricultural policies of the USSR, costing the lives of millions of people. Despite the tragic nature of such a painful historic event, it is presented as an important element of the historical discourse concerning the Ukrainian language. Below is an example where one of the creators of a documentary film dedicated to the historic

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<sup>36</sup> *Лицук А.* «Прицейкаты» і «щітаю»: черкашани розповіли, чи готові відмовитися від суржику [<https://vycherpno.ck.ua/cherkashani-rozpovili-chi-gotovi-vidmovitisya/>] (Retrieved 17 August, 2021).

<sup>37</sup> *Набока М.* Суржик: за і проти [<https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/28856281.html>] (Retrieved 17 August, 2021).



russification of Ukrainian stresses the need to accept the historical facts as such.

Замість того, щоб розпочати щирю розмову про те, що відбувалось з нашою культурою, нашою мовою всі ці роки, в тому числі, у радянському періоді, ми намагались примиритися з наслідками цієї трагедії.<sup>38</sup>

*Instead of starting an honest conversation about what happened to our culture and language during all these years, including the Soviet period, we tried to bear the consequences of this tragedy.*

If we turn ourselves to the modern days, political and ethnic aspects of the language become one of the main elements of its sociolinguistic valuation. Ukrainian is associated with the state of Ukraine officially representing the nation as stipulated in the Constitution. While the language is seen as one of the factors of nation building, some authors and interviewees call for an obligation to speak Ukrainian, which is justified not only by its legislative status.

Я думаю, що неважливо, якою мовою ти говориш, але важливо відчувати себе громадянином України. Проте знати українську мову має кожен, бо це наша рідна мова.<sup>39</sup>  
*I think that it is not important, in which language you speak, but it is important to feel yourself as a citizen of Ukraine. However, every person should know the Ukrainian language because it is our mother tongue.*

Here, it is interesting that the nativeness of the language applies to “*every person*”, which is theoretically and statistically contradictory to the current linguistic situation. Moreover, the social function of the language is often metaphorically presented by the words *symbol* and *amulet*, which unites and protects the Ukrainian people and nation. This call to unify the country through language is manifested on several occasions, hence its function as a criterion for admission to the state, nation, citizenship, or the people.

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<sup>38</sup> Гончарова Є. Леся Воронюк: “Намагання начебто об’єднати країну, залишивши за дужками питання рідної мови, призводить до протилежного” [<https://tyzhden.ua/Culture/237733>] (Retrieved 17 August, 2021).

<sup>39</sup> Ліцук. «Прицейкать» і «шітаю».

#### 4. Russian as former and current threat to the state

Whereas the discourse on Ukrainian is marked by the notion of *us*, that on the Russian language is a formidable example of the *other*. The two languages are placed in an opposition, as we clearly see in the example below.

Російська мова була мовою вищих соціальних верств і, за державної підтримки, обслуговувала потреби державного апарату, науки, техніки, освіти, армії та флоту. А українська - фольклор, побут, село.<sup>40</sup>

*The Russian language was the language of the upper social strata and, with the support of the state, met the needs of state institutions, science, technology, education, the army, and the navy. The Ukrainian language met the needs of folklore, everyday life, and countryside.*

This excerpt already suggests that Russian represents the hostile side of the struggle experienced by the Ukrainian linguistic community, leading to the intolerance for its usage. Russian is generally depreciated to the extent that its use itself is subject to emotional accusation, which can be contrasted with Ukrainian.

Бабуся свариться, коли розмовляю зі сином російською. Бабуня, моя мама, виховательі дитсадка спілкуються з [ним] українською.<sup>41</sup>

*My grandmother quarrels when I speak Russian with my son. My grandmother, my mother, kindergarten teachers communicate in Ukrainian with [him].*

In this generally negative context, the language bears witness to the old repressive regime, the Russian Empire, and the Soviet Union. The Russian language can therefore be directly associated with the repressions that took place before the independence of Ukraine.

Це ж нонсенс — топтати і зневажати своє, натомість підносити чуже, нав'язане репресіями та голодоморами.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Зінченко Т. Як твої діла, рідна мово?.

<sup>41</sup> Шурина В. «В одному з київських театрів мені перед виходом на сцену в туплі скла насипали...» [<https://wz.lviv.ua/interview/384522-v-odnomu-z-kyivskykh-teatriv-meni-pered-vykhodom-na-stsenu-v-tufli-skla-nasypaly>] (Retrieved 30 October, 2021).

<sup>42</sup> Шурина В. Щойно суспільство вирветься з гнилої матриці пристосуванства і брехні, стане очевидно: без книжки нам не обійтися [<https://wz.lviv.ua/interview/401260-shchoino-suspilstvo-vyrvetsia-z-hnyloi-matrytsi-prystosuvanstva-i-brekhni-stane-ochevyдно-bez-knyzhky-nam-ne-obiitysia>] (Retrieved 17 August, 2021).

*It is nonsense to trample and humiliate what is ours, and on top of that to praise what is of the others imposed by repressions and the Holodomor.*

Comparing with the previous example on Ukrainian, we can point out that a contrast emerges between the language symbolizing the past oppression at the hands of Russians and the one that has suffered it. In addition, the current political and diplomatic relations with Russia are reflected in the perception of the Russian language.

Більшість київських шкіл — з українською мовою навчання. Деякі — лише формально, адже часто-густо вчителі дозволяють собі спілкуватися з учнями мовою окупанта не лише на перервах, а й на уроках. На мою думку, під час війни це — злочин. У самій російській мові нічого поганого немає, але нехай нею послуговуються росіяни.<sup>43</sup>

*The majority of schools in Kiev are taught in Ukrainian. It is only formal in some schools, because teachers often allow themselves to speak the language of the occupiers with their students, not only during breaks, but also in class. In my opinion, this is a crime during the war. The Russian language itself does not have anything wrong, but let Russians speak Russian.*

This example states that teachers should not speak Russian with their students since the language represents the state of Russia, which, according to the article, is waging war against Ukraine. The last sentence clearly reveals the conception of *otherness* according to a political distinction, demanding the Russian-speaking citizens to communicate in Ukrainian.

## 5. Notion of “incompleteness” surrounding the mixed language

As far as surzhyk is concerned, its conceptualization in our articles is a more complex one, being related to both languages. In contrast with often idealized literary Ukrainian, the mixed language is severely pejorated with strong wording.

Літературну мову називають “чистою”, при цьому суржик іноді вважаючи “брудним”. Соромлячись його.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Там же.

<sup>44</sup> Чанай, А. Нехай суржик еднає серця – письменник [https://uainfo.org/blognews/1551426908-nehay-surzhik-ednae-sertsya.html] (Retrieved 17 August, 2021).

*Literary language is called “pure”, considering sometimes that surzhyk is “dirty”. Being ashamed of it.*

Along with other terms such as “*pollution*”, “*destruction*”, or “*illiteracy*”, we observe here the possible *bifocality* of the pro-Ukrainian linguistic ideology, based on *derussification* and *reukrainization*. Such terms characterizing the negative effects of surzhyk have the standard Ukrainian as a point of reference, while encouraging the exclusion of Russian linguistic elements. As to the origin of the mixed language, some journalists insist on the important presence of the Russian speakers in Ukraine.

Наш експерт вважає, що пов'язано це з тим, що переважна більшість дорослого населення у свій час багато розмовляли російською мовою, навчалися в російських школах і є носіями двох мов — російської та української.<sup>45</sup>

*Our expert believes that this is because a large majority of the adult population spoke a lot of Russian in their time, studied in Russian schools and are speakers of the two languages: Russian and Ukrainian.*

Considering that the origin of this mixture is due to the presence of the Russian language and that this point of view is frequently underlined in the enunciations devoted to the linguistic situation in the past, we believe that the mixed variant represents the history of undesirable subordination to the Russian Empire, to the Soviet Union and the diplomatic influence on the part of today’s Russian Federation. On a political level, some authors go further to say that surzhyk represents the imperialist character of the Russians.

Не знаючи до ладу жодної мови, українці намагалися говорити російською, щоб «вивищитися». А на практиці виходив суржик – продукт колоніального панування.<sup>46</sup>

*Not knowing any language clearly, Ukrainians tried to speak Russian to “rise up”. Thus, in practice was born surzhyk, a product of colonial domination.*

In this case, the linguistic assimilation where Ukrainians historically started to

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<sup>45</sup> Коваленко К. «Ідем тудою чи сюдою?»: вінницький суржик [https://vn.20minut.ua/Osvita/idem-tudoyu-chi-syudoyu-vinnitskiy-surzhyk-10651055.html] (Retrieved 17 August, 2021).

<sup>46</sup> Набока. Суржик: за і проти.

speak Russian, is considered as a result of Russia's colonialist ambition. Additionally, it should also be noted that a similar view appears in the context of the current war in Donbass.

Суржик – це гріх. Ми українську мову знищуємо, починаємо добавляти інші слова, з іншої мови іншої країни, і це при тому, що ми туди додаємо російську мову, а ми воюємо з Росією.<sup>47</sup>

*Surzhyk is a mistake. We destroy the Ukrainian language, start adding other words from another language of another country, and while we add Russian to the language, we are yet at war with Russia.*

Although we do see some differences in the perceived urgency, the linguistic issues are often problematized in a way that language is viewed as a contributor to the resolution of various political or economic difficulties. While the ability to speak correct Ukrainian is a condition to participate in such a deed, using surzhyk symbolizes the underdevelopment or uncultivation of its speakers.

А що таке суржик? Суржик - це те, що ми засвідчуємо недоопрацювання особистості над собою.<sup>48</sup>

*And what is surzhyk? Surzhyk is what confirms us the incompleteness of personality.*

In this sort of discourse, the perception is that those who do not make efforts to look after the purity of their speech are psychologically immature. The following excerpt insists that the fight against surzhyk presupposes a drastic change in its speakers' attitude, regarding the low valuation of Ukrainian and the inferiority complex among the population as a problem.

Суржик функціонує там, де немає літературної мови. Загалом будь-яка форма репрезентації мови має різне місце, бо є різні групи населення. Проте групи, яка б репрезентувала суржик, немає. [...] Чи зможемо ми побороти суржик, залежить від внутрішньої настанови мовця.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Терещук Т. Півсотні відеороликів: Учні львівської школи захищають правильну українську мову [<https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/ukrajinska-mova-surzhyk/29783144.html>] (Retrieved 17 August, 2021).

<sup>48</sup> Зінченко. Як твої діла, рідна мово?

<sup>49</sup> Лицук. «Прицейкать» і «шітаю».

*Surzhyk functions where there is no literary language. Generally, any form of representations of language takes various places, because there are various groups of population. However, there is no group that would represent surzhyk. [...] Whether we can overcome surzhyk depends on the speaker's internal orientation.*

Being neither Ukrainian nor Russian, surzhyk is considered to be only a relic of the past, Ukrainian being henceforth the prestigious choice. The incompleteness of surzhyk also testifies to the limited linguistic capacity of its speakers, or to their indifference to the desirable use of languages.

## 6. Historization and construction of alterity

By reorganizing the language valuation in the Ukrainian media, we can point out that there is a certain correspondence between the discourses dedicated to the state of languages in the past and those in the modern days, or even in the envisaged future. To begin with, the martyred nature of the Ukrainian language is repeatedly mentioned in our articles. Its history before the country's independence in 1991 is marked by political domination on the part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, which triggered the omnipresence of the Russian language. Since Ukrainian was subcategorized as a dialect of the Great Russian language, the former was qualitatively depreciated in relation to the latter. As we have seen, the role of Russian as a developed, interethnic language during the imperialist and Soviet eras is emphasized, which suggests that the promoters of the Ukrainian language strive for the equalization of its symbolic status with that of the hostile language.

As to the quantitative devaluation of Ukrainian in the past, it is often narrated in relation with the oppression of the people by the Russians. The repressive linguistic measures are associated not only with the prohibition of the language, but also with the Holodomor. The undermining of Ukrainian represents the crucial historical events of the nation, which goes beyond the linguistic field. Quantitative devaluation of the language before the independence refers not only to the relative decrease in the number of its speakers, but also to the absolute disappearance of a part of the people, who carried the development of the Ukrainian language on their shoulders.

We thus consider that the historical depreciation of Ukrainian in both qualitative and quantitative aspects is coupled with the history of the country. As previously mentioned,

while Ukraine was under the control of the Russians since the 17<sup>th</sup> century until the dissolution of the USSR, the language itself was also subordinated to Russian, before being granted the status of the only official language of the nation.

In the present circumstances, the Ukrainian language benefits from its qualitative appreciation. Considering the hostile character of Russian, we assume that the war in Donbass and the annexation of Crimea played a decisive role in creating the conceptual opposition between Ukrainian, the language of *us*, and Russian, the language of the *enemy*. Under the time of a war, the emphasis is placed on the uniqueness of the language, based on its role as a cultural heritage, historical witness, or unifier of the nation. To these collective representations, the notion of linguistic moralization is added, according to which citizens who are part of *us* are obliged to master the state language. By mentioning the psychological functions of language, the promoters of Ukrainian associate linguistic competence as well as sensitivity to purity of the language with personal cultivation, intellectual development, or political attitude. In this way, they prepare a strain of discourse concerning not only the whole linguistic community but also each individual. Citizens are advised to make a right choice between the *three* languages, then to respect the chosen language, and finally to be proud of it. This proposed scenario would inevitably contribute to further appreciation of the Ukrainian language, its main competitor being represented by *separatists* or *colonizers*.

Russian is presented as an antagonistic language to Ukrainian in all aspects. Its use is not tolerated in wartime and is considered as a negative linguistic behavior. Such an opposition would last as long as the conflict between the two states persists, where Ukrainian plays the heroic role of defending its own people. Regarding surzhyk, its qualitative pejoration is argued not only by the necessity of excluding Russian linguistic elements, but also by the notion that it *is not* a language. Condemned as *impure* and *illiterate* variant, the mixed speech is of a higher concern than the simple presence of Russian, since it could jeopardize the alterity established by the two *languages*. Linguistic activists would not consider the presence of Russian *on the outside* to be a problem, but a mixed language has no place whatsoever to be allowed its existence.

## 7. Vision of derussification and reukrainization

The authors of our texts promoting the Ukrainian language do not hesitate to recite its painful history, but on the contrary, the fact that Ukrainian was subordinated to Russian

in both quantitative and qualitative aspects is presented as essential component of the nation's linguistic history.

Since languages are narrated not only synchronically (i.e., in the current political context) but also diachronically (considering the history of a language), we believe that the pro-Ukrainian linguistic discourse consists in the reversal of their approval and disapproval relations. In the case of Ukrainian, the aim is to impute its quantitative devaluation not only to the Russians themselves but also to the historical appreciation of the Russian language. The Ukrainian language, representing the Ukrainian people who have lived through numerous repressions, is subject to qualitative appreciation justified by its quantitative diminution in the past. Russian, on the other hand, suffers a qualitative devaluation as a punishment for their past dominance over Ukrainian. Surzhyk is also qualitatively minorized, not only because of its partial Russian traits, but also because of its potential to dissolve the distinction between the two languages, which may threaten the strategy of Ukrainian language promoters by blurring the valuational system between Ukrainian and Russian languages.

As a concluding note we point out that the reinterpretation of historical quantitative valuation into today's qualitative valuation seeks to modify the current linguistic situation by stimulating a further increase in number of adherents to the promotion of the Ukrainian language. The positivization of Ukrainian and negativization of Russian, in which patriotic representations are granted to the former and the othering as *enemy* to the latter, would ultimately contribute to turning the linguistic circumstances in favor of the state language. The important aspect of the pro-Ukrainian linguistic ideology is thus the reconfirmation of the historical valuation of languages, which is carried out in two ideological vectors of *derussification* and *reukrainization*, each on both the sociocultural and the linguistic levels. *Derussification* refers to the circumvention of qualitative appraisal of the Russian language, together with the exclusion of foreign linguistic elements from surzhyk, which functions as the everyday speech of many Ukrainians. *Reukrainization* concerns to qualitatively positivize the Ukrainian language, reaffirming its tragic history, as well as recreating the state language by replacing existing Russisms with corresponding *more Ukrainian* expressions on a linguistic level. It is this bifocality and multidimensionality that characterize the linguistic ideology in question.



## ウクライナ言語イデオロギーにおける歴史的言語評価の再解釈

池澤匠

本論文は、ウクライナの言語問題を扱ったオンラインのメディア記事の質的分析により、同国における言語イデオロギーの特徴を考察することを目的とする。

現代のウクライナではウクライナ語が唯一の国家語として憲法に規定されるが、実際にはロシア語が広く用いられているのが現状である。同国の二言語併用状態は様々な歴史的・政治的・経済的要因によって形作られてきたものであり、その言語史の中ではロシア帝政・ソ連時代に起こったウクライナ語話者の弾圧が大きな立ち位置を占めている。両時代を通じ、ロシア語がウクライナ語に対して支配的な状態が長く続いたことにより、混合言語変種であるスルジクも発生している。スルジクは今でも幅を利かす口語であるが、ウクライナ文語に対する脅威として認識されており、「アンチスルジク」なる純粹主義運動が盛んである。

このような複雑な言語状況を記述すべく、本研究では社会言語学的表象と言語の多数化・少数化の理論に基づき、同国にて支配的な言語イデオロギーを再構築することを目指している。資料体としては2012年から2019年に公開されたウェブニュース記事から抽出した508件の言明単位の内、言語の象徴的役割に関する143件を分析に用いている。

概してウクライナ語は英雄的な「自己の言語」を象徴しており、国家の文化的・歴史的・政治的発展を双肩に担う姿が描かれている。2013年から2014年にかけての政治危機以降、ウクライナがロシアとの外交的対立にあるなか、当該イデオロギーはウクライナ人に対して自らの帰属を、言語行動を以て明示することを課している。反してロシア語は「敵国の言語」を指し示しており、数世紀に渡ってウクライナを抑圧してきた者と関連付けられる。現代の対立にあっても、ロシア語は敵国たるロシア連邦と関連付けられており、同語は低い社会言語学的評価を被っている。スルジクは抑圧の悲劇的遺物であり、長きに渡るロシアならびにロシア語の支配の産物として描かれる。当該混合語は文語規範に合致し得ず、両語に対して低く評価されるのみならず、その話者も言語問題に対する無関心と無教養の烙印を受ける。

これらの言語評価を通時的に解すると、ウクライナにおける言語イデオロギーの本質は過去におけるロシア語の支配性ならびにウクライナ語の被支配性を再確認し、その立場を逆転させることにあることが導き出される。スルジクという混合言語形態とウクライナ人の言語行動の双方に対して「脱ロシア化」ならびに「再ウクライナ化」という、

二つの言語純化の方向性を適用することにより，当該思想体系はウクライナ語による単一言語主義を実現することを目指している。