

What is Gender as a Personal Identity?

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1. Diverse positions of gender identity

Today, the term “gender identity” is popularly used to describe an individual’s sexual identity. The term is said to have been first raised by Stoller (1964), but definitions vary in different texts making it difficult to highlight one definition as the best. Given the state today, where the concept of gender identity is understood as a political and ethical, rather than a theoretical, concept, let us look at two political “definitions.”

The Yogyakarta Principles, which is considered to be the document that defines basic human rights related to sex and gender, defines gender identity as follows:

Gender identity is understood to refer to each person’s deeply felt internal and individual experience of gender, which may or may not correspond with the sex assigned at birth, including the personal sense of the body (which may involve, if freely chosen, modification of bodily appearance or function by medical, surgical or other means) and other expressions of gender, including dress, speech and mannerisms. (Introduction)

Here, the meaning of the phrase “may or may not correspond with the sex assigned at birth” is vague. What is the discrepancy between “deeply felt internal and individual experience of gender” and “the sex assigned at birth”? Possible interpretations need to be explored.

Next, let us look at the draft agreement between the ruling and opposition parties of the “LGBT Understanding Promotion Act” shelved for submission to the Diet in Japan in 2020. The agreement defines the term as follows:

The term “gender identity (*sei-jinin*)” as used in this Act shall mean awareness pertaining to the existence or non-existence of gender identity (*sei-doitsusei*) with respect to the perception of the sex to which one belongs, or the degree thereof. (Definition 2)

The definition contains two Japanese words, *sei-jinin* and *sei-doitsusei*, both of which are translations of gender identity. In English, “gender identity” would be defined in terms of “gender identity,” namely by the circular definition. However, in Japanese, the term is phrased in two different ways, so the definition is ostensibly not circular and appears to be in the form of an informative definition.

However, as long as “gender self-awareness” (literal translation of *sei-jinin*) is defined in terms of “identity of gender” (literal translation of *sei-doitsusei*), “gender” continues to be defined by “gender,” and is still not free from circulation. What is “gender”? We must define it independently of itself.

Thus, two issues stand in the way.

1. What is “gender”?
2. What is the discrepancy between “gender identity” and “sex”?

The purpose of this paper is to answer these two questions. These questions would be reduced to the question, “What is gender as a personal attribute distinct from sex?” To answer this question, we need to consider how “gender in the broad sense as a personal attribute” appears.

Therefore, we will first enumerate the attributes that might qualify as “gender in the broadest sense.” The attributes worthy of enumeration are those that are valued by one or both of the two opposing human rights movements: the genderism movement and the anti-genderism movement (in other words, gender realism and gender nominalism). Individually inspecting and comparing the discrepancies among these attributes will clarify what the “discrepancy between gender identity and sex” is and therefore what “gender as distinct from sex” is.

Candidates for gender are listed in order from a gender nominalist to a gender realist position, that is, from attributes based on natural scientific foundations to attributes based on social constructs, conventions, and artificiality, focusing on cases in which there is a discrepancy within an individual between adjacent attributes (i.e., when one of them deviates from standard correlation). In order to analyze the circumstances specific to each position, we must assume that there is no discrepancy between the previous positions. In other words, it is desirable to assume that a discrepancy typically occurs for the first time in the position in question. However, it is natural that the later the position, the higher the probability that a case in which a discrepancy has already occurred between the previous positions, so it is necessary to flexibly change the view on the actual state of discrepancy.

In fact, it is extremely important to consider the “cases involving multiple discrepancies,” i.e., “the cases where discrepancies have already occurred in some previous positions,” and they will be addressed in the final part of this paper. For now, we must list the individual positions.

Gender position 1: Gender is determined by chromosomes and genes.

The Yogyakarta Principles use the phrase “the sex assigned at birth,” but the phrase “the sex determined at the moment of fertilization” seems more apt.

Gender position 2: Gender is determined by the primary sexual characteristics, i.e., external and internal genitalia.

An individual’s sex is determined by the shape of their internal and external genitalia visible at birth. As in position 1, the sex is not “assigned” but only observed in the mother’s body. The popular term “sex assigned at birth” refers to this primary sexual characteristic.

1-2: Discrepancy between sex at fertilization and primary sexual characteristics

Cases in which the determined sex and primary sexual characteristics do not match are termed disorders of sex development (DSDs). Out of the various DSDs, two major types can be distinguished. The first are cases in which the sex itself cannot be classified as either male or female due to deviations in mitosis, etc., as in the 45,XO/46,XY mosaic intersex syndrome. The second type includes cases in which the sex determined at fertilization is clearly different from the primary sexual characteristics.

The latter is the case, for example, with 5α -reductase deficiency, in which the female sex is assigned based on the appearance of the genitalia at birth, even though the child has a Y chromosome. Such individuals often develop masculine characteristics at puberty (secondary sexual characteristics, which is the next position we will see) and are reassigned gender. Since this is an example of a child who was originally male showing female primary sexual characteristics, it would be appropriate to view this as a case in which the sex at conception did not match the primary sexual characteristics, rather than a discrepancy between the primary and secondary sexual characteristics.

It is sometimes argued that the existence of DSDs establishes the limits of determining gender by the body, but this is incorrect. In many cases of DSDs, the expression of the SRY gene in the Y chromosome can in principle determine whether a person is male or not. Let us also note that in a small percentage of cases, where gender is truly hard to determine, gender indeterminacy is derived from the indeterminacy of the body's sex. Therefore, this is not an exception to the principle that "gender is determined by the body," that is, "the way gender is determined depends on the body."

At the same time, this does not negate the position that gender is determined by factors other than the body (genes, chromosomes, genitalia, secondary sexual characteristics, etc.). Quite simply, it means that the existence of DSDs in no way disproves the position that gender is determined by the body.

Similarly, the existence of DSDs does not disprove the position of gender dualism either. Let's consider whether it is possible to have karyotypes or chromosome combinations other than 46,XX and 46,XY (e.g., 47,XXY and 47,XYY, or 47,XXY and 45,X, etc.) as the basic concept set to generate all karyotypes. Even if it is possible, such a system is unlikely to explain the mechanism of heredity, such as meiosis. The system would remain an unnatural model that does not fit the system of biology, just like color recognition based on "grue" and "bleen" (Goodman, 1955).

Gender position 3: Gender is determined by secondary sexual characteristics.

Gender is determined by so-called "adult masculinity and femininity" such as body shape, voice, and sexual orientation. Derivatively, it can also include all the so-called "appearance of 'character'" such as clothing, language, and gestures. In particular, clothing is a typical "extended phenotype" (Dawkins, 1982) and can be viewed as a culturally conditioned attribute of secondary sexual characteristics in general.

2-3: Discrepancy between primary and secondary sexual characteristics

Secondary sexual characteristics produce the so-called "masculinity" and "femininity" differentiation, and this gender expression may deviate from the gender typicality derived from primary sexual characteristics. Among DSDs, androgen insensitivity may result in the development of breasts in boys, and femininity may not develop in girls with Turner syndrome. Even if no physical discrepancy is observed, homosexuality, in which the sexual orientation is towards the same sex, tends to make boys appear more feminine and girls more masculine, in that it deviates from typical heterosexual behavior.

In addition to common discrepancies such as butch (masculine woman) and femme (feminine man), we can also include certain paraphilias, such as cross-dressing, fetishism, skoliosexual, and

sexual object perversions such as zoophilia, pedophilia, autogynephilia, and autoandrophilia, which have a sexual orientation outside of the typical¹. Note that, here, the terms autogynephilia and autoandrophilia refer to perversions of the sexual object (de re type, in which oneself imagined as the opposite sex is the sexual object), but there is also another type of autogynephilia and autoandrophilia as perversions of the sexual aim (de dicto type, in which one feels sexual arousal by imagining oneself in a situation where one is the opposite sex).² The de dicto type will be discussed later as position 10.

Gender position 4: Gender is determined by sex roles; namely gender roles.

The distinction between the sexes, differentiated by their roles in reproduction, leads to the division of other life roles that are easier to fulfill as natural extensions and derivatives of the reproductive roles. For example, women are expected to share the work of treating children well as an extension of childbirth and lactation, to be involved in the caregiving professions in general, or to behave kindly in all their relationships. Because these roles are perceived to be natural for each sex, gender can be determined directly by these roles, bypassing the body. The so-called concept of “gender” was originally formed with this “gender role” at its core. The differences between the roles of men and women have been established as convergent evolution, in an almost similar way across all cultures on the planet.

The only difference between position 3 and position 4 is the difference in how biological the attributes are. Therefore, factors enumerated in position 3 that can be separated in principle from the body structure, such as “dress,” “language,” and “gestures,” can be incorporated into position 4, if we emphasize the aspect of cultural conditioning.

3-4: Discrepancy between secondary sexual characteristics and gender roles

Gender roles are often viewed as social constructs, or fictions. However, when each person chooses social roles such as occupation, academic major, and status according to his or her preference, statistical bias occurs for each gender in any society, and sex and gender discrepancies are seldom observed in the respective tendencies of men and women. However, that is a collective statistic, and on an individual level, it is not uncommon to find women who take the initiative to join the military, or men who like to raise children and do household chores. Of all the discrepancies examined in this paper, discrepancies at this level are the most frequently observed and least often viewed as anomalies. Moreover, viewing them as anomalies draws moral criticism for being discriminatory.

Being overly conscious of this discrepancy as a “discrepancy” is often a precursor to “gender dysphoria,” which is a discrepancy at later stages. For example, a man who tends to see the gender roles of “men” in a uniform and inflexible manner tends to accept the typicality of “men” as the norm.

¹ LGBT is sometimes criticized as a bad category that mixes LGB, a sexual orientation, with T, a gender identity, but the recognition presented in this section of the paper suggests a new unified framework that reinterprets LGB, and even Q, as a kind of T in the broadest sense.

² The distinction between the sexual object and the sexual aim was introduced in Freud, 1905. The reason that the distinction is interpreted in this paper as one between de re and de dicto is just to connect it to future logical-analytic considerations.

Finding the discrepancy 3-4 in himself tends to directly lead him to the awareness that “I’m a disqualified male” or “ I’m not really a guy.” Particularly in areas where discrimination against homosexuality is severe, it is common for people who are aware of their homosexuality to become transgender, self-identifying as the opposite sex in order to achieve heterosexual status and to avoid being discriminated against. This process is mostly unintentional and an unconscious defensive reaction.

Conversely, “gender dysphoria” tends to be less likely when this discrepancy has not occurred. However, this cannot be generalized. As we will see later, the number of transwomen who dare to remain masculine also tends to increase (as the position number in this paper grows).

Gender position 5: Gender is determined by the gender category with which one identifies (empathizes) in the psychoanalytic sense.

To belong to a particular gender is to commit to a “way of life” specific to that gender. In other words, it is to be aware of the gender norms imposed on oneself and to follow or resist them. For a woman to be willing to adapt to feminine norms and be feminine, or for a woman to challenge them and act as a powerful feminist, are both attitudes of taking on feminine norms as one’s own issues, even though they seem diametrically opposed to each other. They are indicative of the “femininity” understood in position 5.³

Circularity emerges in this definition of gender for the first time. Gender is defined by gender itself, as in “gender is the gender with which one identifies oneself.” However, since we are attempting to define gender constructively in order from position 1, we can assume that “gender” here refers to the gender category identified before position 3, that is, biologically. Thus, there is no true circulation.

4-5: Discrepancy between gender roles and psychoanalytic identification

A person may be male and yet feel solidarity with women, feel an affinity for the norms of womanhood, internalize a sense of women’s rights and resistance, or be committed to femininity. In some cases, women may have the same type of feelings toward the masculine gender. This can be described as identification with the opposite-sex category. Unlike “identity,” identification, here, refers to Freudian empathy. For men, this is the case when they identify themselves as femismo or feminist.

The concept of male and female brains may provide a clue as to the cause of this identification and empathy. Men with female brains become femismo or feminists, and so on. However, it is not known for certain whether the statistical relation between brain and gender can be used to derive the gender of an individual⁴.

³ Note that the awareness of resistance to the norm in this position is not gender dysphoria as we see in positions 6,7 and beyond, but is a sign of belonging to the gender in question.

⁴ It is noteworthy that Jenkins, 2018, representing the trans-affirmative position, and Stock, 2021, representing the gender-critical position, both specify a mentality corresponding to position 5 as a reasonable definition of “gender identity.” The fact that the same position is considered legitimate by diametrically opposed political, ethical, and philosophical standpoints means that the position 5 may deserve to be favored from a neutral standpoint and, by extension, in a universal sense, as the first candidate for the true meaning of “deeply felt internal and individual experience of gender identity” stated in the Yogyakarta Principles.

Gender position 6: Sense of and feelings about one's own gender

This is a stage that is difficult for those not involved to understand. Normally, one is aware of one's gender by the genitalia observed on one's body and is not aware of any problems with it. Therefore, this position-specific "gender" is never perceived. However, there are parties who report that they feel an internal "gender" that is separate from their actual body, gender roles, identification, and solidarity.

5-6: Gender dysphoria to one's own identifying gender / Discrepancy between gender identification and internal sense of gender

Assuming that any discrepancy does not occur earlier, it may be easier to imagine this stage as a "gender dysphoria with respect to secondary sexual characteristics or gender roles" by shifting the criteria to earlier than position 5. This is the discrepancy between "the gender of secondary sexual characteristics, gender roles, or empathy" and "the gender one feels one should be."

In other words, discrepancies 3-4 and 4-5 are not accompanied by discomfort with one's secondary sexual characteristics, whereas discrepancies 5-6 are. If a man says that he is comfortable with being a man, but would have felt more natural if he had been a woman, he is in discrepancy 4-5; another who says seriously that he feels uncomfortable with not being a woman and with being a man is in discrepancy 5-6. Discrepancy 5-6 can be seen as the "intensification" of normative, customary, and life-sensory gender identification, namely discrepancy 4-5, into an emotional and physiological gender dysphoria. However, discrepancy 5-6 does not necessarily include the discrepancy 4-5. This is because many male (female) cases suffer from physiological gender dysphoria even though they are normatively attached to the masculine (feminine) gender, that is, have not quite internalized feminine (masculine) values and issues.

There are two types of gender dysphoria: body gender dysphoria and non-somatic gender dysphoria. Body gender dysphoria refers to "gender identity disorder (GID)."⁵ GID is a type of Body Dysphoria in general, in other words, a type of Body Integrity Identity Disorder (BIID). Body Dysphoria is a symptom of a misalignment between the real body and the body map in the brain, causing intense discomfort to the patient. There have been reports of cases in which patients have strongly desired to have their arms cut off or their eyes blinded, and have consulted their doctors, or have opted for self-mutilation if their wishes are not heard (Ananthaswamy, 2020). It is the same psychological mechanism that causes people with gender identity disorder to desire sex reassignment surgery. They feel uncomfortable with the secondary sexual characteristics of their own body.

On the contrary, non-somatic gender dysphoria, which we will refer to simply as "gender dysphoria" from now on, is a case of emotional discomfort with "gender status" or "gendered social position," without a specific concrete object of discomfort as in the case of body dysphoria. This involves the case of males who avoid sex reassignment surgery and, in some cases, do not even take female hormones, but want "gender transition" and prefer to use women's restrooms and locker

⁵ Although the name "Gender Identity Disorder" has been replaced by "Gender Dysphoria" and even "Gender Incongruence," the term "Gender Identity Disorder" (GID) is used in this paper as a term specifically referring to position 6.

rooms without changing their masculine appearance⁶. This type of gender dysphoria is often a symptom of developmental disorders such as autism, or schizophrenia, dissociative disorders, or manic-depressive disorders. Furthermore, an increasing number of cases have recently occurred as a psychic contagion among adolescents (Shrier, 2020).

Since body dysphoria and gender dysphoria are distinctly different, let us re-register the sensation that causes body dysphoria as position 6 and the sensation that is the source of gender dysphoria as a new position. In other words,

Gender position 6 (revised): Gender felt appropriate as one's physical gender

5-6 (revised): Physical gender dysphoria to the gender with which one identifies

Gender position 7: Gender felt appropriate as one's social gender

6-7: Social gender dysphoria to the gender felt appropriate as one's physical gender

Of course, there can also be a "social gender dysphoria to the gender with which one identifies," that is, 5-7 social gender dysphoria. If a female feminist acts as a trans man without body dysphoria, it is due to discrepancies 5&6-7, and if she acts as a trans man with body dysphoria, it is due to discrepancies 5-6&7.

Let us note that the case of a female feminist in position 5 who rebels against the female norm because of her adaptation to the social gender of woman, and the case of a female in position 7 who feels gender dysphoria because of her inability to adapt to the social gender of woman, are based on psychological states opposite to each other. People with gender dysphoria detest gender norms not because they are self-affirming, as feminists do, but rather because they hate their own non-conformity to the norms and have doubts about their own gender, while endorsing gender norms more firmly than the average person. However, both of these can occur simultaneously in the same person. That is the discrepancy 5-7. Adaptation and maladaptation are opposite states, but can occur simultaneously in different aspects of the same norm⁷.

Compared to position 6, which is a straightforward physiological response, position 7 is a higher-order sensation and is generally more difficult to understand. Non-somatic gender dysphoria falls under "diagnosis by exclusion" about "Gender Identity Disorder" because we cannot rule out the possibility that the gender dysphoria is based on a false assumption that sees variable gender attributes (depending on the environment) as fixed gender stereotypes. The nature of this illusion may be excessively cultural and artificial.

Gender position 8: Gender-related self-knowledge

Gender dysphoria, which is related to positions 6 and 7, is an aversive feeling toward the gender that is recognized for oneself by others and by society. This negative feeling and the longing for the

⁶ Gender dysphoria can occur without the desire for using women's spaces, or any gender transition in general. Conversely, gender transition desires can exist without any gender dysphoria. The latter will be discussed later in position 9 and beyond.

⁷ For example, while adapting and empathizing on the macro level, such as a sense of women's rights, one may feel aversion to the micro level, such as a lifestyle necessarily constrained by reproductive roles.

opposite gender as a reaction to it are considered to form the main components of what is commonly referred to as “gender identity.”

One of the Japanese translations of “gender identity” is *sei-jinin*, which means “gender self-awareness.” It literally refers to the “self-knowledge” of this position. In order to “know,” it is necessary to “believe accurately on legitimate grounds,” but we shall term the broad psychological state that includes the weaker cognitive state of simply believing as “cognitive” or “recognizing.” Cognitive terms such as “self-belief” and “self-awareness”, expressed by the parties involved, are often used in a semantically non-cognitive sense, but bring a cognitive impression only from a pragmatic point of view. In other words, they are mostly rhetoric to gain social acceptance of non-cognitive “discomfort,” “hope,” and “feelings” that do not reach the level of belief.

In other words, the subjective usage of “gender identity” usually arises only in the self-descriptions of people with gender dysphoria. So-called cisgender people identify their gender just by their genitalia and by the medical system or other social recognitions based on their genitalia. No “recognition” is generally made by any other factor (although it may be “hoped,” “disgusted,” or “imagined”). In the case of transgender persons, however, it is sometimes claimed, in good faith, that they have a unique gender self-knowledge, regardless of how they have been treated by others or by their environment.

Beliefs about one’s own gender are in a constant state of coming-out in the case of cisgender people, as a way of being treated publicly in society. In contrast, a transgender person’s “gender awareness” and “gender beliefs” may remain in the subjective world or may only demand treatment within a very narrow private circle, unless they deliberately come out.

6, 7-8: Self-knowledge of gender contrary to the gender to which the self feels adapted

Among the cases where transgender people assert their gender identity due to gender dysphoria, there can be instances where they truly “believe” in their own gender, even if the power of that discourse is almost always supported by emotional rather than cognitive significance⁸. If this is proven, it may be evidence that cisgender people also have an internal gender recognition ability, a “gender qualia,” so to speak, that is not based on external cues such as genitalia. It is possible to believe that both transgender and cisgender people have unconscious self-gender recognition, like a common rhythm of everyday consciousness, with the only difference being that the qualia may or may not be manifested when stimulated by the sensation or feeling of gender dysphoria. It is a universally present self-knowledge of gender identity.

Sensory or emotional gender consciousness (positions 6,7) and cognitive gender recognition (position 8) are independent of each other. There is no evidence that most transgender people have a cognitive gender identity that is more advanced than their sense of gender dysphoria. Conversely, transgender people who claim to be aware of their true gender do not necessarily have gender identity as a sensory or emotional realization.

⁸ Among the psychological states lumped together under the term “emotional,” as we will see later in position 10, there is a significant difference between the case of “sensations” such as discomfort and the case of “desires.” Here, they are grouped together as psychological states in the same category in terms of forming “beliefs about one’s own gender.”

In other words, discrepancy 6&7-8 does not necessarily include discrepancy 5-6&7, and vice versa. It is possible to nonchalantly perceive oneself as a person who belongs to the gender opposite to one's physical gender without feeling uncomfortable. However, it is not clear what kind of psychological state this perception or cognition is. Are gender qualia real? Or, rather than qualia, is gender only known "in an intuitionist way" without question, as a kind of framework of viewpoints?⁹ In any case, if the perceived gender of the self does not match the socially recognized gender, how does the person know that the given qualia or framework is the correct cue for true gender? Subjectively, this may be the psychological state of John Money's patient Brenda Reimer (Colapinto, 2000). However, in that case, the discrepancy 1-2 had already been imposed on the individual by medical care. Therefore, it remains to be seen whether there is a self-knowledge of the opposite gender as the first discrepancy to arise in position 8.

The most likely case of pure discrepancy 7-8 would be hallucinations or delusions due to a dissociative disorder or schizophrenia. However, most of these cases should be considered as cases of discrepancies 5-6&7 that have already occurred and have developed into discrepancies 6&7-8 by reinforcing the gender dysphoria.

Nevertheless, it does not seem impossible to have a psychological state in which one perceives oneself as belonging to the opposite gender without anything like gender dysphoria, that is, one is convinced that one belongs to a gender different from the one indicated by secondary sexual characteristics/gender sensation. It would not be surprising if there are special cases among dissociative disorders and schizophrenia in which, without being uncomfortable with their secondary sexual characteristics, they somehow perceive themselves as the opposite sex and are uncomfortable with that "fact." It should be assumed to be an example of "Capgras delusion about categories" that is different from so-called transgender and not strictly related to gender or sexuality. It could be understood as a case in which the signifiers "man" and "woman" are used completely opaquely, so to speak.

Gender position 9: Desire for social approval and self-esteem

It is natural to want to be socially treated as belonging to the same gender as one's self-perceived gender. This "need for approval" is seldom conscious, since it is usually satisfied without conscious effort. It is only in the case of transgender people not passing as self-identified gender that it becomes a problem.

Therefore, while "gender transition" based on the "need for approval" is an action that occurs uniquely in transgender people, the "need for approval" itself is a psychological state that is potentially shared by cisgender people and is a strong candidate for defining gender.

8-9: Transition to gender not consistent with self-knowledge / Desire for approval, gender transition

⁹ Just as we can be certain of the existence of the self not as an object of perception, but as a framework of perception. See Searle, 2001, chapter3.

When a biological male seeks to be “treated as a woman” or “officially recognized as a woman” by being called by a female name, female pronouns, or using female spaces, he is expressing a desire for approval of his gender transition. Where discrepancy 6&7-8 occur through gender self-knowledge, or discrepancy 5-6&7 occur through gender feelings or longings, there is a high probability that this desire for approval and even gender transition would have occurred if the person had come out¹⁰. This is because, under normal linguistic conditions, coming-out itself is an expression of desire for approval¹¹, and in a more or less trans-friendly society, the expression of desire for approval can be expected to lead to actual approval and the completion of gender transition.

However, from the perspective of others, it is impossible to determine whether or not discrepancy 6&7-8 or 5-6&7 is really occurring in the person’s mind. It is also hard to shake off the suspicion that discrepancy 8-9 is independent, or “spoofing,” in which the alleged position 9 is detached and baseless. Even if evidence of non-spoofing, that is, evidence of discrepancies occurring prior to discrepancy 8-9, were obtained, it would not matter much in many cases. It is a red herring to question the process of the genesis of position 9, especially for women, since the fact that a biological male wishes to use a female space may itself be perceived as sexual harassment. It is certainly difficult for the public to imagine how the distress borne by trans women could be when they are compelled to use male spaces, which also trivializes the issue of whether their gender transition needs are genuine or not.¹²

Particularly, if a person who has not come out with the discrepancy 6&7-8 or discrepancy 5-6&7 expresses a discrepancy 8-9 (desire for approval of gender transition), it is not surprising that they are often pursued for moral defect or “spoofing.” The line between “true transgender or spoofing” will be decided by the frequency of expression of the desire for gender transition. In this gender transition declaration, the discomfort of the people around the person rather than the person himself/herself forms the sphere of issues that should be taken into consideration¹³.

If the gender transition is based on the “belief in one’s own gender,” the probability of gaining society’s acceptance of the gender transition is not small; we can say this even if it is based only on the “dysphoria with one’s own gender.” However, what about the case where it is clear that both gender dysphoria and beliefs are lacking? Let us examine the “lack” and “fullness” in various stages.

First, there will be a state in which the person actually has a desire or an intention to make a gender transition, proceeding from the state of position 8, in which the person has a belief in the

¹⁰ There is a gap between the state in which the desire for gender transition arises and the state in which one actually begins the process of gender transition (to be precise, there are four phases: intention formation, determination to act, initiation of action, and completion of action; Searle, 2001), but it is not theoretically significant here to distinguish them as separate phases.

¹¹ Of course, this does not apply to coming-out as an expression of concern or as a form of consultation.

¹² Whether it is simply a social gender transition or a formal legal gender change is also of little importance. This is because cases of social but not legal gender transition are often created by external factors such as the difficulty of the conditions for legal gender change in the society concerned.

¹³ In cases where gender transition is desired, the presence or absence of gender dysphoria or self-knowledge of the parties is not of practical importance from a third party perspective, so the term “gender dysphoria” may include all discrepancies after discrepancy 8-9. The subjective reason for gender dysphoria in this broad sense could be any of the discrepancies 1-2 and beyond. For an attempt to classify gender dysphoria based on an analogy with the mind–body problem, see Miura, 2022.

opposite gender, regardless of whether it is accompanied by a sensory psychological state such as gender dysphoria. Let us re-register this fulfillment state as gender position 9. Then, let us write down the following three lack states as positions 10, 11, and 12 in advance.

Gender position 9 (revised): Cognitive need for approval, mainly based on belief in gender

8-9 (revised): Cognitive gender transition, mainly based on belief in gender

Gender position 10: Non-cognitive need for approval, mainly based on imagination of gender

9-10: Non-cognitive gender transition, mainly based on imagination of gender

Gender position 11: Non-cognitive need for approval, mainly based on desire for gender

10-11: Non-cognitive gender transition, mainly based on desire for gender

Gender position 12: Non-cognitive need for approval mainly based on the will to change gender

11-12: Non-cognitive gender transition mainly based on the will to change gender

In order for an action to occur, a “desire” and a “belief or imagination” must arise in the mind of the person concerned. For example, for the act of going to the kitchen to drink water, the desire to drink water must be combined with the belief that (with a certain probability) there is water in the kitchen. In the case of gender transition, the desire to change one’s gender must be combined with the belief or imagination (depending on subjective probability) that one’s gender can be changed¹⁴. The subsequent motivation for the desire to change one’s gender will be composed of various subordinate desires. The main subordinate desires are, respectively, “the desire to conform to one’s belief in one’s true gender” in position 9, “the desire to belong to the gender one imagines oneself to belong to” in position 10, “the desire for the consequences of gender change” in position 11, and “the desire to fulfill the significance in the very fact of gender change” in position 12.

In other words, from position 10 onward, individuals do not believe in the opposite gender as in position 9, but are guided by a different motivational desire. They often prefer to imagine themselves belonging to the opposite gender and to achieve gender transition as a natural demonstration of their imagination¹⁵, which is position 10.

This is another version of the “autogynephilia” and “autoandrophilia” seen in position 3, although in position 3 they appeared as a mismatch between secondary sexual characteristics and sexual orientation. Here, autogynephilia appears as a preference for sexual behavior. It is not *de re* autogynephilia of sexual object perversion, but *de dicto* autogynephilia of sexual aim perversion. In other words, it is not sexual love for “oneself” who is imagined to be the opposite sex, but sexual love for “imagined situation” about oneself being the opposite sex. In other words, it is the propensity to

¹⁴ If one believes that one’s social gender has been incorrectly assigned from the beginning, “the desire to reclaim one’s gender” and “one’s gender can be reclaimed” would be more accurate. See Overall, 2009, for a discussion of when transgender people’s gender was determined. About the “i-desire view,” which holds that desires that combine with beliefs to cause action are dissimilar to desires that combine with imagination to cause action, and the “regular-desire view,” which holds that they are the same, see Walton, 1990, and Nichols and Stich, 2013, respectively.

¹⁵ It is not necessary to “not believe P” in order to “imagine P” but here we include the case of believing oneself to belong to the opposite gender in position 9, and isolate the preference for imagining that lacks belief in position 10.

get sexually aroused by imagining oneself in a situation where one is the opposite sex.

Narcissistic *de re* autogynephilia, which is a perversion of sexual object, is often satisfied by dressing up as a woman in private and masturbating in a secret room. However, the *de dicto* autogynephilia of sexual aim perversion tends to seek a theatrical environment because it cannot be fully aroused without actualizing the situation. In other words, they will show off their cross-dressing in public and try to get it to pass.

This type of demonstration is an act of desire for sexual arousal, not for gender transition itself. However, this distinction may not be clear to the bystander or even to the parties themselves. They may also assume that they believe in their assumed gender, even though they are simply imagining it. This is the so-called state of “immersion.”

“Imagining and performing” is an act of make-believe, essentially an act of enjoying fiction. “Believing and acting” is merely role-playing, an act of living in reality. The psychology of the in-between, that is, between “imagining” and “believing,” is the state of “immersion,” and the spectrum extends between belief-based position 9 and imagination-based position 10. Position x ($9 \leq x \leq 10$) is the general form of the psychology of the in-between and refers to gender identity as “immersion in gender,” extreme positions of which are position 9 and 10.¹⁶

Comparing the case of “believing” (position 8,9) and “imagining” (position 10) that one belongs to the opposite gender, it would be normal to consider that the psychological transition is more advanced and solid in the case of “believing.” However, let us recall that we are evaluating the case of “making the gender transition” (position 9,10). If we compare the case of transitioning to a gender based on beliefs about that gender with the case of transitioning to a gender based on mere imaginings about that gender, we should say that the latter case is more psychologically deviant and deep-rooted because the person dares to transition based on a weaker foundation. The psychological condition that leads a person to demonstrate an imaginary situation in real life, rather than in a make-believe, based on mere imagination, is one that rarely arises. Therefore, the degree of immersion in gender is inversely related to the degree of deviance (queerness) of gender transition.¹⁷

Position 11 is a psychological state in which the main reason is “desire” to transition to the gender in question. Individuals desire gender transition regardless of whether or not they have a belief in a gender opposite to their own, and regardless of whether or not they enjoy imagining it. Desires of this kind include professional interests, fashion orientation, avoidance of homosexuality, and gaining security in one’s identity, among others. These are desires for the consequences of gender transition rather than the transition itself, and as a basis for the desire for approval, they are more

¹⁶ Acknowledging the continuity between belief and imagination increases the credibility of the “regular-desire view” (see note 14); see Schellenberg, 2013. Continuity in positions can also be observed between many other positions. Recall, for example, the spread of various physical and non-physical gender expressions between positions 3 and 4.

¹⁷ When limited to x and y without gender transition, the degree of immersion in sexual discrepancy is positively correlated with the degree of queerness. For example, this paper determines that the degree of queerness is higher for position 8 cross-gender self-knowledge than for position 3 autogynephilia. The equation $x \geq y \equiv Q(\text{position } x) \geq Q(\text{position } y)$ is true for all x and y . However, note that when the propensity of gender transition shifts from 0% to 100% ($8 \leq x, y \leq 9$), the correlation of the degree of immersion and of queerness flips from positive to negative. So, phase 10 autogynephilia is judged to be more queer than phase 8.

non-cognitive than the “belief in gender” in position 9 and more non-immersive (less related to physiological needs) than the “imagination of gender” in position 10. Although the desire for approval is very artificial in that sense, position 11 is similar to position 10 in that it can easily trigger a psychological state that justifies the desire for gender transition by falsely believing the desire to be a belief.

Position 12 is the type that seeks gender transition not through imagination or desire, but solely through “will to transition,” regardless of whether or not one feels pleasure in imagining a situation in which one belongs to the opposite gender, and regardless of whether or not one is aware of the personal benefits. This is the most non-immersive, non-physiological, and artificial type of gender transition, in which the person wills gender transition through mechanisms that have nothing to do with the various motives that are naturally imagined as human, such as discomfort, beliefs, desires, and sexual proclivities. The system commonly referred to as “self-ID” is the only gender transition criterion required for this position because it provides gender recognition based on declaration alone, without regard to the reason for transition.

However, who would be willing to transition without gender dysphoria, gender beliefs or desires, or imaginative sexual desire¹⁸? Of course, such people exist. As a matter of fact, queers, a sector of growing importance among sexual minorities, value performativity and the act of deviant sexuality by free choice, not by impulse or needs. They pride themselves on deviance for the sake of deviance, gender identity for the sake of gender identity, and transition for the sake of transition. Underlying this is a sense of mission to change society, to overthrow the dominant system, and to break sexual norms. As part of the “strategic mission,” gender transition becomes a sort of political autotelism.

If LGBTQ is to be a sustainable social movement alongside SDGs, BLM, #MeToo, etc., it is understandable that it should break free of naturalistic constraints and be situated as an emergent entity in the layers of culture (for example, “gender independent of sex”). It is no exaggeration to say that position 12—this purely cultural, anti-naturalistic, non-cognitive gender transition that seems to lack the most “rational basis”—is the very heart of the sexual minority movement.

The weakness of this position, however, is that gender identity may degenerate into an environment-driven “parameter” rather than an “individual’s identity,” contrary to the premise of the parties, and gender becomes merely a nominal title devoid of substance. While this policy may be effective for the destruction of the social system, it is unclear why the targeted coordinate must be gender rather than age or race. In particular, there are unresolved issues, such as whether the same questions that transracial and transethnic people are charged with, such as “cultural appropriation” and other crimes, should be asked of transgender people as well (Brubaker, 2016). The positions are supported by the motivations involving gender-specific internal attributes and external relations until position 11, but position 12 does not seem to find a meaningful association with anything gender-specific.

Incidentally, up until position 11, not all transgender people cross-dress or take cross-sex

¹⁸ The difference between the desire for gender itself (position 9) and the will to change gender (position 12) is analogous to the difference between the sexual object perversion version and the sexual aim perversion version of autogynophilia (positions 3 and 10).

hormones, but in position 12, there are the majority of cases of gender transition without cross-dressing, without taking hormones, and even with a beard, since non-passing transgender people can maintain a more appealing political position as a symbol of the socially vulnerable and potentially discriminated, especially in the case of males. Compared to males, females are generally more likely to self-identify as “non-binary” or “genderqueer” rather than fully trans, but their new categories such as “gender-neutral,” “bi-gender,” and “a-gender” do not seem to satisfy the creedal purpose of position 12 as much, since their efficacy to override the gender binary is harder to assess and their impact on the gender binary system is smaller than that of regular transgender people.

2. Identifying gender as distinct from sex

While “gender diversity” commonly spoken of is implicitly horizontal, with categories such as M, F, MtF, FtM, non-binary, genderqueer, etc., we have reviewed vertical “gender diversity,” that is, the layers that exist across these various categories. Specifically, we have classified the candidates of “genders” from the biological, physical, and natural layers and then through into the mental, socially constructed, and artificial layers, and organized the structure of the concept. We must now answer the question posed at the beginning of this paper: What is gender as a personal attribute distinct from sex? What is the discrepancy between “deeply felt internal and individual experience of gender” and “the sex assigned at birth?” In light of the spectral structure of gender that we have organized, any discrepancy between any two positions would deserve respect and attention.

It is important to note that the distinctions between the positions, which are conceptually clear, are often difficult to discern in various aspects of individual human beings in real life. Moreover, it is often difficult or impossible to distinguish between cases belonging not only to adjacent positions, but also to significantly distant positions.

For example, the primary psychological cause of actual gender transition among young people is the inability to adapt to the stereotypical “masculinity and femininity” in position 4. They transfer their discomfort with a society that implicitly imposes gender stereotypes, into discomfort with themselves for not conforming to the stereotypes, and further mistake it for discomfort with their own gender. This leads them to internalize the cramped gender norm even more affirmatively, deny themselves, and move into a pseudo-position 7, or superficial gender dysphoria. In the case of girls, their mental confusion at the secondary sexual characteristics of position 3, especially menarche, is perceived as abnormal, and they often mistakenly believe themselves as having body discomfort, which often manifests itself as pseudo-position 6, or superficial body dysphoria. The developmentally disabled girl, who has no friends, is unable to know through chatter among girls that other girls also feel the same confusion about menstruation, and assumes that she is exceptionally suffering from a queer kind of discomfort.

Another pattern of conversion to position 6 is the case of paraphilias. The position 3 and position 10 types of autogynephilia are so similar that they can barely be distinguished by how open their preferences are. Both types tend to not be satisfied with their mere imaginations, and enough of them even go as far as gender reassignment surgery. Such “immersive” autogynephilia is indistinguishable from gender identity disorder with body dysphoria in position 6. This indistinguishability is

established not only from a third party's point of view, but also from one's own.

Positions 5 and 12 are also separated by the major difference between adhering to a particular gender and gender transition pursuit per se, but this distinction is difficult to see. In addition, as has been already mentioned, it is not uncommon for discrepancy 2-3 homosexuals to transition to position 11 because of their avoidance of the status quo. However, if they become more comfortable with their homosexuality due to changes in the environment, such as a better understanding of homosexuality, they would go back to position 3. In the cases of a de-transition (people who change gender and then re-change), they would go back and forth between various positions being foregrounded as well as opposite genders.

Among these difficult to distinguish positions, positions 1 and 2 cannot be confused with the other positions because no psychological factors intervene. The historical formation and social definition of the category concept of male and female has been established by reproductive roles spanning positions 3 and 4, but positions 1 and 2, identified as their physical basis, have been the uncontroversial criteria as the true "sex" in "the sex assigned at birth." The ultimate criteria for understanding "gender dysphoria" leads back to positions 1 and 2.¹⁹

In contrast, the "deeply felt internal and individual experience of gender" that may or may not coincide with sex can be any of position 3 and above. From homosexuality or transvestism in position 3 to political performance in position 12, each may self-identify as "transgender" without necessarily self-identifying with that position.

The pioneer of legal gender reassignment was position 6 gender identity disorder based on the medical model, but now gender identity disorder has been renamed "Gender Incongruence" in WHO's ICD-11 and de-pathologized, being placed rather on the margins of trans human rights activism. Not only that, but "transmedicalists," who believe that body dysphoria or gender dysphoria and the desire to transition are necessary conditions for gender transition, are considered to be transphobes trapped in the medical model and are even denounced with the derogatory term "truscum." Since the medical model can be interpreted as mandating the surrender of gender autonomy in subordination to the institutional authority of the doctor, it is inevitable that GID will be excluded in the trans movement led by position 12. While the image of transgender people is still represented in the general public by body dysphoria, it is fair to say that the major trans movements operate with the typical human rights requiring protection as a mere stepping stone.

Thus, there is no consensus among common sense, academia, or political activists as to which position qualifies for the title of "deeply felt internal and individual experience of gender."²⁰ In light of these empirical facts, while "sex" can be clearly defined in terms of genes, chromosomes, and reproductive organs, "gender" remains unintelligible. This is a serious problem from the standpoint

¹⁹ The underlying property, position 1, is not even accessible to the individual himself/herself in daily life except through position 2, and the discrepancy between positions 1 and 2 (DSDs) arises only through professional scrutiny. If the person's psychological incongruence is such that "gender identity" is affected by the discrepancy 1-2 found through scrutiny, it should be manifested as one of the discrepancies 2-3 and beyond.

²⁰ Even when public opinion polls show a majority of trans-inclusive views, a change in the wording of the question can dramatically change or divide opinion (see e.g., Joyce, 2021, Chapter 11). It is fair to say that this fact demonstrates that there is widespread disagreement about which position "gender" or "gender identity" in the popular understanding of the term falls under.

of gender realism. Let us try the following thought experiment.

It is possible that a discrepancy between position x and position $x+1$ is occurring for all x at the same time in one person. Now, for the sake of clarity, let us consider a person for whom the match/discrepancy alternates for half of the values of x , namely almost every other value. This is not an unrealistic assumption in light of the reality that there are many transgender people who self-identify as gender fluid. If the “gender” of each position oscillates, it is more likely that each position will change in different directions at disparate times than that they will all change in the same direction at the same time. It is, therefore, not surprising that at any given time, discrepancies occur in almost half of the adjacent position pairs.

Such a person, with XY chromosomes, for example, would be as follows. He/she was born with a penis and testes, became a transvestite homosexual (the object of his/her sexual love is male) at puberty, and although his/her gestures are feminine, he has internalized the male norm and is committed to masculinity and does not wish to undergo gender reassignment surgery because he is not dissatisfied with his male body. However, he/she harbors gender dysphoria in light of his/her own gender normative consciousness and believes he is a woman. However, he/she has no desire to be socially approved as a woman and is content to be treated as a man. Despite this, he/she is fascinated by transgenderism, which is consistent with his/her belief that shaking up social norms will improve society, and he/she dares to renounce living as a man, deciding to “live as a woman” and undergo legal gender transition procedures, even though this is not his/her true feelings. For this procedure, he/she expresses his/her desire to undergo gender reassignment surgery if necessary (as in Japan).

Such a person, if we call him/her Z , has discrepancies 2-3, 4-5, 6-7, 8-9, 11-12, and is otherwise consistent. Now, would Z be a man or a woman?

Z is not a person who self-identifies as so-called “non-binary.” In all positions, Z places themselves either on the male or female side. On average, Z might deserve to be judged “non-binary,” but Z , from a first-person perspective, places a special emphasis on one of the positions, and will self-identify with the gender that matches it. The question is whether this is objectively valid.

At the moment, for example, in Japan, popular understanding would determine that Z is a man. However, as long as Z wants gender reassignment surgery, the doctor should issue a diagnosis of gender identity disorder and guarantee that Z will legally become a woman. In countries with advanced self-ID systems, Z would be officially considered a woman even without the desire for gender reassignment surgery. However, on an individual level, if not institutionally, many people would feel that Z , who neither has gender dysphoria as a man nor the desire for recognition as a woman, would not be recognized as a true woman. Still, there may be just as many who feel that Z is a woman as long as Z intends to be a woman in the final stage of real life performance.

Even if we take the position of leaving it to Z 's own declaration, we cannot decide whether “I am a woman” as a creedal premise or “I am a man” as a physiological desire should be given priority.

In any case, the fact that we were able to create even one thought experiment in which the gender of a person cannot be determined in general means that no single position can be a sufficient condition for gender determination. It is possible to find several combinations of three, four or more

positions matched to each other, by which gender is uniquely determined,²¹ but this becomes less interesting as the number of positions required for each combination increases.

Additionally, there is the fact that the structure of the division into positions substantially undermines the validity of the gender concept itself. There are at least as many as 2 to the 12th power, or 4,096 possible patterns of zigzag correspondence for each position. Moreover, the shape of any zigzag pattern can change over time in one person, in accordance with the “gender fluid” convention. If we allow for the “non-binary” within each position (which, following the recent trend of the LGBTQ movement, we must admit), gender as an attribute of the individual diverges into an infinite number of varieties, ending up with myriad “personalities” or “individualities” each tied to just one person. We can, thus, say that gender loses its significance as a category (much less as an identity-determining category).

3. Conclusion

The conclusions that can be drawn from the above discussion are as follows.

There is no way to recognize gender as an “individual’s identity” other than to project the sex of positions 1 and 2, which does not change throughout life as an attribute of the individual, directly onto social status. If one dares to choose any other, only position 6, which is directly related to position 2 by corporeal analogy, may be recognized as metaphorically equivalent to position 2 (only if the mental discrepancy is permanent, not fluid). Any of the other positions do not deserve a gender that is comparable to or supersedes sex, and they are nothing but arbitrary as a basis for legal gender reassignment.

Thus, the result of this examination of the subdivision of the gender concept into various positions observed in reality is a rejection of gender realism, and thus a call for a reexamination of the significance of the current trans rights activities.

Finally, let us answer a question that may arise in response to the above discussion. If we must subdivide the different possible interpretations, aspects or phases of any given concept and determine that the concept is futile unless public agreement converges on one of them, does that not render any concept futile?

However, our method of conceptual analysis applies specially to “gender.” Because the traditional interpretation of gender as the mere social projection of sex, a biological concept, is well established, for adopting a gender realism that dares to replace it with another interpretation, it is necessary to state the appropriate utility to be gained by doing so.²² Moreover, gender was originally,

²¹ This is the so-called “cluster account.” For a very simple example, see Stoljar, 1995, 2000.

²² The structural counterparts of the physical definition of gender play a similar foundational role in other areas as well. In the definition of art, for example, the proposition “something produced with the intention of giving it the capacity to satisfy aesthetic interest” (Beardsley, 1983), the “aesthetic definition,” corresponds to that. The underlying position 1 and phenomenal position 2 correspond to the hidden intention and the capacity to satisfy the aesthetic interest, respectively, in art. For other positions, for example, gender as gender role or gender norm (position 4 or 5) would correspond to an institutionalist definition of art (Dickie, 1974), while gender as performativity (position 12) would correspond to an anti-essentialist “art theory as decision problem” view (Weitz, 1956). See Miura, 2020.

by its very usage, a statistical tendency found in the totality of people belonging to each sex and the cultural norms derived from it, or a theoretical construct in sociological research. Thus, it is a category-mistake to treat gender as an attribute of an individual, much less to regard it as an individual's "identity." There is no guarantee that statistical trends in the real psychology and behavior of biological men and women will be permanent or common to all cultures, even as the local environment changes; in position 4 and above, the correspondence between the internal attributes of sex and gender can be reversed from known societies, as in the case of Amazonian societies, and so on. Individuals cannot a priori "correctly" perceive their own gender (without relying on their physical sex) because any gender can be codified in a variety of ways in a variety of circumstances. Not only is the inborn recognition of gender independent of the body empirically impossible, it is also logically impossible.

By isolating as comprehensively as possible the multiple meanings of "gender" currently in circulation, it is confirmed that a gender that does not rely on sex is not a personal identity. In other words, if there is a gender as a personal identity, it is only a shadow of sex (as articulated explicitly in position 6). Such a gender nominalist conclusion is consistent with the technical purpose of the concept of "gender," which was originally set up as a sociological analytical device rather than a personal attribute. Although it remains possible that other approaches could bring to light the essence of "gender as an identity independent of sex," at least in this analytical examination of the various positions assumed in many areas, above all the genderist movements, we believe that we have shown that the concept "gender as a personal identity" is a product of illusion. Since this conclusion is based on a conceptual map within the framework of the genderist movements, which is the most energetic proponents of the gender concept, we believe that it is a conclusion with some persuasive power.

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