

# Money Isn't Everything: The Impact of Ideology on Congressional Trade Policy- Making

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## Introduction

Against the background of reviving protectionism, interest in US trade policies has been on the rise since the inauguration of the Trump administration. Although it has shrunk in the long run, the US domestic economy still accounts for a quarter of the global gross domestic product. Whether the US is willing to maintain open trade rules or to act in favor of its own short-term interests affects the future of the post-war liberal trade regime. For this reason, both practitioners and researchers have tried to elucidate the process of US trade policy-making.

One of the focal points of research over the past two decades has been the validity of the analytical framework called open economy politics (OEP), which has traditionally been used to analyze the decision-making process of foreign economic policies. It assumes the economic rationality of private actors and analyzes the policy process according to three stages: 1) preference formation of private actors, 2) preference aggregation to Congress or the executive branch through institutions, and 3) international interactions.<sup>1)</sup> Recent studies on the trade preferences of US private actors have heavily criticized the first stage of OEP, which assumes that private actors' preferences are formed in an economically rational manner.<sup>2)</sup> In other words, the actual trade preferences of American voters do not follow objective economic interests but rather strongly reflect various ideologies and identities. This view has become common in many empirical studies.<sup>3)</sup>

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<sup>1)</sup> For more information on the OEP framework, see David A. Lake, "Open Economy Politics: A Critical Review," *Review of International Organizations* 4, no. 3 (September 2009): 224–31.

<sup>2)</sup> Thomas Oatley, "Open Economy Politics and Trade Policy," *Review of International Political Economy* 24, no. 4 (July 2017): 701–4.

<sup>3)</sup> Edward D. Mansfield and Diana C. Mutz, "Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and out-Group Anxiety," *International Organization* 63, no. 3 (July 2009): 425–57; Yotam Margalit, "Lost in Globalization: International Economic Integration and the Sources of Popular Discontent," *International Studies Quarterly* 56, no. 3 (September, 2012): 484–500; Diana C. Mutz and Eunji Kim, "The Impact of In-Group Favoritism on Trade Preferences," *International Organization* 71, no. 4 (2017): 827–50; Brian Rathbun, "Wedges and Widgets: Liberalism, Libertarianism, and the Trade Attitudes of the American Mass Public and Elites," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 12, no. 1 (January 2016): 85–108; Sungmin Rho and Michael Tomz, "Why Don't Trade Preferences Reflect Economic Self-Interest?" *International Organization* 71, no. S1 (April 2017): S85–S108; Shahrzad Sabet, "Feelings First: Non-Material Factors as Moderators of Economic Self-Interest" (working paper, Harvard University, 2016), [https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/ssabet/files/sabet\\_feelings\\_first\\_.pdf](https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/ssabet/files/sabet_feelings_first_.pdf).

However, despite the accumulation of findings that have shaken the first stage of OEP, existing studies on the congressional level and the second and third stages of OEP, have not critically re-examined the validity of OEP. In other words, they assumed that members of congress (MOCs) primarily represent the economic interests of their constituencies in making trade policies and have not deeply examined the influence of ideology, which has been shown to be important at the private actor level. In recent years, MOCs have tended to adopt uncompromising ideological stances that have led to confrontations in many areas, but such changes have not been taken into account in the analysis of trade policies. As a result, a divide has emerged between studies at the private actor level, which have shifted to focus on non-material factors, and studies at the congressional level, which adhere to explanations centered on economic interests.

To address these problems, this study empirically tests the original hypotheses on the relative importance of economic interests and ideology in congressional trade policy-making. This study hypothesizes that, even at the congressional level, ideology has become increasingly important in trade policy-making as two changes have occurred: the decline in the weight of economic interest groups in campaign contributions and the polarization of the electorate. To test the hypotheses, we conducted a statistical analysis of House votes for the 2000 Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) bill and the 2015 Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) bill to determine how the importance of economic interests and ideology changed between the two votes. In addition, we identified the causal mechanism of the change in the importance of ideology by conducting process tracing of the case of MOCs who represented Kentucky's 4th district. The arguments and findings of this study challenge the assumption held by previous research that MOCs primarily represent economic interests and demonstrate the need to modify OEP at the congressional level, combining it with research at the private actor level.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 reviews previous research on the US trade policy-making process and points out the problem that the validity of OEP has not been re-examined at the congressional level. Section 2 presents the hypotheses that the influence of ideology has increased at the congressional level due to changes in campaign contributions and polarization and then describes the three ideologies that this study focuses on. In Section 3, we conduct a statistical analysis of MOC preferences for the 2000 PNTR and 2015 TPA bills to test these hypotheses. Finally, in Section 4, we use the process tracing of Kentucky's 4th district to confirm the causal mechanism.

## **1. Previous Research**

This section reviews previous studies on the US trade policy-making process and highlights their problems. First, it will explain that while studies at the private actor level have focused on the role of ideology, studies at the congressional level have adhered to the OEP framework based on economic interests. It then describes the problems that previous studies

have not examined, namely, whether economic interests or ideology is actually more important at the congressional level, and they have not considered long-term changes that suggest the declining influence of economic interest groups.

Looking at studies of the US trade policy-making process over the past two decades, one of the biggest changes was the growing recognition of the importance of ideology and identity in shaping the preferences of private actors. In the past, it was common to analyze the US trade policy-making process according to the OEP framework, which consists of three stages.<sup>4)</sup> The first stage is to derive trade preferences by assuming that private actors are economically rational; that is, actors that benefit economically from trade support free trade, while actors that suffer economically from trade demand trade protection. The second stage is to derive the preferences of policy-makers, such as MOCs, based on the assumption that the preferences of private actors derived in the first stage are aggregated through institutions, such as elections, to define the preferences of politicians. Finally, the third stage is to predict which policies policy-makers with derived preferences will adopt in the international environment, such as negotiations with other countries or existing trade agreements. However, recent studies have shown that contrary to the assumptions of the first stage, the trade preferences of American voters are not economically rational. In other words, economic ideology; non-economic ideology, such as social and cultural conservatism and isolationism; and social identities, such as sociotropic considerations and in-group bias, have a strong influence on voters' trade preferences.<sup>5)</sup> Since the validity of the OEP relies on the first-stage assumption that private actor preferences follow economic interests, the accumulation of the studies described above is perceived to be a serious challenge to OEP.

However, despite such changes in research in the first stage, research in the second and third stages that correspond to the congressional level has adhered to the OEP framework. In other words, they have taken the view that MOCs primarily represent the economic interests of their constituencies, and have rarely examined the influence of various ideologies, which is the focus of research in the first stage. Most studies either vaguely analyzed an economic ideology using indicators such as DW-NOMINATE,<sup>6)</sup> or considered “conservatism” or “liberalism”

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<sup>4)</sup> Lake, “Open Economy Politics,” 224–31.

<sup>5)</sup> Mansfield and Mutz, “Support for Free Trade,” 425–57; Margalit, “Lost in Globalization,” 484–500; Mutz and Kim, “The Impact of In-Group Favoritism,” 827–50; Rathbun, “Wedges and Widgets,” 85–108; Sabet, “Feelings First”; Rho and Tomz, “Why Don’t Trade Preferences Reflect,” S85–S108.

<sup>6)</sup> Richard S. Conley, “Derailing Presidential Fast-Track Authority: The Impact of Constituency Pressures and Political Ideology on Trade Policy in Congress,” *Political Research Quarterly* 52, no. 4 (December 1999): 785–99; Helen V. Milner and Dustin H. Tingley, “Who Supports Global Economic Engagement? The Sources of Preferences in American Foreign Economic Policy,” *International Organization* 65, no. 1 (Winter 2011): 37–68; Tao Xie, “Congressional Roll Call Voting on China Trade Policy,” *American Politics Research* 34, no. 6 (November 2006): 732–58.

without strictly defining them using voting behavior ratings.<sup>7)</sup> Some studies have pointed out the influence of more specific ideologies related to religious freedom or security, with regard to the granting of most favored nation (MFN) status to China and the approval of the US-Korea free trade agreement (FTA).<sup>8)</sup> However, these effects have been discussed as phenomena that are peculiar to each case. Previous studies on the congressional level have not attempted to elaborate on the effects of various ideologies that can generally affect preferences for trade, as in the case of research on the private actor level.<sup>9)</sup> As a result, there is a great divide between research on the level of private actors and that on the congressional level.

It is not without reason that this divide has been neglected. First, at the congressional level, economic interests appear to have some explanatory power. Regarding American voters, their preferences have diverged significantly from economic interests, and this divergence has led to a focus on ideology. On the other hand, at the congressional level, many studies have shown that economic interests have a significant effect.<sup>10)</sup> Another reason is the perception that even if voters are not economically rational, public opinion does not matter in trade policy-making in the first place. Some studies argue that many voters do not even know the trade policy supported by the MOC of their own district and that, in elections, trade is unlikely to be an issue that affects whom they vote for.<sup>11)</sup> If interest groups such as business organizations or labor unions are formed, then it is safe to expect that MOCs represent mainly economic interests, since such groups pressure politicians to align with their economic interests.<sup>12)</sup>

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<sup>7)</sup> Patrick Cronin and Benjamin Fordham, "Timeless Principles or Today's Fashion? Testing the Stability of the Linkage between Ideology and Foreign Policy in the Senate," *Journal of Politics* 61, no. 4 (November 1999): 967–98; Erik Gartzke and J. Mark Wrighton, "Thinking Globally or Acting Locally? Determinants of the GATT Vote in Congress," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 23, no. 1 (February 1998): 33; In-Bong Kang and Kenneth Greene, "A Political Economic Analysis of Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA," *Public Choice* 98, no. 3 (January 1999): 385–97; Stanley D. Nollen and Dennis P. Quinn, "Free Trade, Fair Trade, Strategic Trade, and Protectionism in the U.S. Congress, 1987–88," *International Organization* 48, no. 3 (Summer 1994): 491–525; Kenneth A. Wink, C. Don Livingston, and James C. Garand, "Dispositions, Constituencies, and Cross-Pressures: Modeling Roll-Call Voting on the North American Free Trade Agreement in the U.S. House," *Political Research Quarterly* 49, no. 4 (December 1996): 749–70.

<sup>8)</sup> Youngmi Choi, "Constituency, Ideology, and Economic Interests in U.S. Congressional Voting," *Political Research Quarterly* 68, no. 2 (June 2015): 266–79; Jungkun Seo, "Vote Switching on Foreign Policy in the U.S. House of Representatives," *American Politics Research* 38, no. 6 (November 2010): 1072–1101; Xie, "Congressional Roll Call Voting," 744.

<sup>9)</sup> Crichlow exceptionally focused on the psychological traits of MOCs, but the range of factors considered was very limited, such as distrust. Scott Crichlow, "Legislators' Personality Traits and Congressional Support for Free Trade," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46, no. 5 (October 2002): 693–711.

<sup>10)</sup> Choi, "Constituency, Ideology, and Economic Interests," 266–79; Conley, "Derailing Presidential Fast-Track Authority," 785–99; Kang and Greene, "A Political Economic Analysis," 385–97; Milner and Tingley, "Who Supports Global Economic Engagement?" 37–68; Nollen and Quinn, "Free Trade, Fair Trade," 491–525.

<sup>11)</sup> Alexandra Guisinger, "Determining Trade Policy: Do Voters Hold Politicians Accountable?" *International Organization* 63, no. 3 (July 2009): 533–57.

<sup>12)</sup> Oatley, "Open Economy Politics," 704.

However, despite this background, there are two serious problems with the current state of research. First, it has not been empirically tested whether economic interests or ideology is actually more important at the congressional level. The fact that economic interests have certain explanatory power does not mean that they are more important than ideology. Which of the two is more dominant needs to be empirically tested. Another problem is that the influence of economic interest groups on MOCs can decline. Economic interest groups have influenced MOC voting behavior through large campaign contributions and lobbying. However, as will be discussed in detail in the next section, in recent years, the weight of economic interest groups in campaign contributions has declined, and MOCs are more likely to support policies consistent with an electorate's general ideological position in a polarized environment. Therefore, the influence of economic interest groups at the congressional level has declined over the long term.

To address these issues, this study presents and empirically tests original hypotheses about the relative importance of economic interests and ideology in trade policy-making at the congressional level.<sup>13)</sup> First, in Section 2, we present our hypotheses that ideology, rather than economic interests, has come to define the preferences of MOCs as two important changes have taken place: an increase in ideological contributions and polarization. In Section 3, we test the hypotheses by examining the preferences of MOCs for the PNTR bill of 2000 and TPA bill of 2015 using both statistical analysis and case analysis.

## 2. Hypotheses: Increasing Influence of Ideology in Comparison with Economic Interests


First, we explain our hypotheses. Specifically, this study presents the logic that two long-term changes—the increase in ideology-based contributions and enlarging polarization—have reduced the importance of economic interest groups at the congressional level and increased that of ideology. Then, in preparation for the empirical tests, we describe the definitions of the three ideologies examined in the next section and their expected effects.

We hypothesized that two long-term changes have led to a decline in the influence of economic interest groups and an increase in that of ideology in congressional-level trade policy-making. One of these changes was the decline in the weight of economic interest groups in campaign contributions and the increase in ideological contributions. Economic interest groups wield influence over MOCs mainly through contributions and lobbying. In particular, contributions were an important means by which they gained their upper hand. Economic interest groups are prohibited from contributing directly, but they actually contribute through political action committees (PACs). As US election campaigns require a

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
<sup>13)</sup> At the private actor level, the influence of social identities, such as in-group bias, has also received much attention. However, this study focused on the influence of ideology because it is difficult to measure the social identities of MOCs reliably.

huge amount of money for advertising, economic interest groups with financial power could influence the re-election chances of MOCs and exert strong pressure through contributions. Since the 1990s, however, the proportion of contributions from corporate and labor PACs has declined, and contributions from ideological PACs have increased rapidly. As shown in Figure 1, the proportion of contributions from ideological PACs almost tripled from approximately 8% in 1990 to approximately 23% in 2020. Furthermore, during the same period, the overall weight of the contributions from PACs also declined, and the contributions from individuals dramatically increased. As shown in Figure 2, in 1990, 53% of the Democratic Party's contributions came from individuals, but by 2020, this figure had risen to 90%. The Republican Party's contributions had a high percentage of individual donations from the beginning, accounting for 69% in 1990; however, by 2020, this also increased to 86%. It is important to note that individuals tend to make contributions based on ideology, and the more individual contributions are compared with access-seeking PAC contributions, the more likely ideologically extreme politicians are elected.<sup>14)</sup> In summary, ideological contributions from both PACs and individuals increased rapidly, and the economic interest groups lost their former upper hand.



Source: "Business-Labor-Ideology Split in PAC & Individual Donations to Candidates, Parties, Super PACs and Outside Spending Groups," OpenSecrets: Following the Money in Politics, OpenSecrets, accessed December 30, 2021, <https://www.opensecrets.org/elections-overview/business-labor-ideology-split?cycle=2020>.


<sup>14)</sup> Michael J. Barber, "Ideological Donors, Contribution Limits, and the Polarization of American Legislatures," *Journal of Politics* 78, no. 1 (January 2016): 296–310.



Source: “Business-Labor-Ideology Split in PAC & Individual Donations to Candidates, Parties, Super PACs and Outside Spending Groups,” OpenSecrets: Following the Money in Politics, OpenSecrets, accessed December 30, 2021, <https://www.opensecrets.org/elections-overview/business-labor-ideology-split?cycle=2020>.

Another important change is the increasing polarization of American politics. Traditionally, Democrats and Republicans have accommodated diverse ideological positions within their ranks, which gave them room to adjust their policies according to the demands of economic interest groups. However, since the 1990s, the ideological cohesion of supporters of each political party has been increasing because of the cultural war over social and cultural issues.<sup>15)</sup> As a result, MOCs have become more likely to pursue policies uncompromisingly consistent with particular ideological positions to gain support from a highly cohesive constituency. For MOCs seeking re-election, it is important to send a signal to voters that they are adopting policies consistent with the electorate’s ideology, and they are reluctant to obscure that signal by responding to demands from economic interest groups. As shown in Figure 3, using the first dimension of DW-NOMINATE, the tendency for MOCs to vote according to ideology actually increased for both parties, with a particularly marked change in Republicans. The mean score for Democrats has changed from -0.31 to -0.37 between the 101st Congress (1989–1991) and the 116th Congress (2019–2021), while the mean score for Republicans has changed even more dramatically, from 0.34 to 0.51 over the same period.

<sup>15)</sup> “Political Polarization in the American Public,” Pew Research Center, Pew Research Center, published June 12, 2014, <https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2014/06/12/section-1-growing-ideological-consistency/>.



Data: "Polarization in Congress," Voteview.com, Department of Political Science, UCLA, last modified June 4, 2020, [https://voteview.com/articles/party\\_polarization](https://voteview.com/articles/party_polarization).

These two changes from the 1990s should have reduced the influence of economic interest groups on trade policy-making at the congressional level and increased the importance of ideology. Therefore, we hypothesize the following:

Hypothesis 1: Since the 1990s, ideology rather than economic interests have increasingly dictated trade policy-making at the congressional level.

In addition, as mentioned above, the Republican Party was highly dependent on private contributions, even at the beginning of the 1990s, and the current degree of polarization was also significantly higher than that of the Democratic Party. Therefore, the importance of ideology seems to have been greater in the Republican than in the Democratic Party. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: The influence of ideology in comparison with economic interests is stronger among Republican MOCs than among Democratic MOCs.

To test these two hypotheses, it was necessary to select specific ideologies for analysis. In this study, we analyzed three ideologies that previous studies have demonstrated to be particularly important at the private actor level. The first is economic ideology, which is captured as the spectrum between *laissez-faire* and economic interventionism. Trade liberalization has an affinity for *laissez-faire*. Thus, as has been shown for private actors, the more *laissez-faire* an MOC is, the more likely it is that the MOC should be in favor of free trade.<sup>16)</sup>

<sup>16)</sup> There is some accumulation of research on the effect of the economic ideology, even at the congressional level. Conley, "Derailing Presidential Fast-Track Authority," 785–99; Milner and Tingley, "Who Supports Global Economic Engagement?" 37–68; Xie, "Congressional Roll Call Voting," 732–58. Regarding the effect at the private actor level, see Rathbun, "Wedges and Widgets," 85–108.

The second is *social and cultural ideology*, which is captured as the spectrum between social and cultural conservatism and social and cultural liberalism. The effect of this social and cultural ideology has not been examined at the congressional level, but previous studies have pointed out that it has a very strong effect at the private actor level.<sup>17)</sup> That is, socially and culturally conservative people tend to oppose free trade because they do not like the influx of other cultures or changes in the domestic society caused by trade. Therefore, even at the congressional level, socially and culturally conservative MOCs are expected to oppose free trade.

The third is *diplomatic ideology*, which is captured as the spectrum between isolationism and internationalism. Isolationism is polysemous and is sometimes used as the principle of military non-alignment or non-intervention in Europe. In this study, however, it is taken in the same broad sense as studies at the private actor level and used as an ideology that avoids any kind of “political entanglements with other countries” in order to preserve American values and autonomy.<sup>18)</sup> This diplomatic ideology has also been shown to have a strong effect at the private actor level. That is, isolationists tend to oppose free trade agreements because they threaten American autonomy and domestic decision-making procedures.<sup>19)</sup> Therefore, isolationist MOCs are expected to oppose free trade even at the congressional level.

In the next section, the effects of these three ideologies are compared with those of economic interests. More specifically, we examine whether the hypothesized increase in the effects of ideology can be observed at the congressional level and whether the difference between Democratic and Republican MOCs can be identified.

### 3. Statistical Analysis of PNTR and TPA Voting

#### (1) Dependent Variables and Method

This section uses a statistical analysis of votes on the 2000 PNTR bill and the 2015 TPA bill to compare the importance of economic interests and ideology in trade policy-making at the congressional level. We chose the PNTR and TPA bills for three reasons: economic importance, changes in contributions and polarization, and data availability. First, these bills were economically important and had a significant impact on the US domestic economy.

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<sup>17)</sup> Margalit, “Lost in Globalization,” 484–500; Rathbun, “Wedges and Widgets,” 85–108; Sabet, “Feelings First.”

<sup>18)</sup> Rathbun, “Wedges and Widgets,” 93. For historical studies that captured American isolationism in this sense, see Ralph H. Smuckler, “The Region of Isolationism,” *American Political Science Review* 47, no. 2 (June 1953): 389; Albert K. Weinberg, “The Historical Meaning of the American Doctrine of Isolation,” *American Political Science* 34, no. 3 (June 1940): 541–45.

<sup>19)</sup> Mansfield and Mutz, “Support for Free Trade,” 425–57; Rathbun, “Wedges and Widgets,” 85–108; Rho and Tomz, “Why Don’t Trade Preferences Reflect,” S85–S108.

When examining trade policies that have only a small economic impact, ideology should have a greater than usual influence on the outcome. Therefore, to persuasively demonstrate that ideology has generally become more important than economic interests, it is desirable to choose bills with a large economic impact. From this perspective, these bills are the most important trade-related bills that the US Congress has dealt with since the 2000s. The passage of the PNTR bill established a stable trade relationship with China by making MFN treatment permanent and paved the way for China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) at the same time. The Obama administration required the TPA bill, which would give the executive branch the authority to negotiate trade deals, to conclude the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations, and the TPP was expected to build a massive free trade zone around the Pacific Rim. Second, the structure of contributions and the extent of polarization rapidly changed between 2000 and 2015, and these bills are suitable for testing our hypothesis that ideology became more important as these changes progressed. Third, the period for which the necessary data exists is very limited. In particular, some ideological indicators explained below cannot be obtained for the 1990s and before. It is also difficult to obtain district-level economic data because of the lack of House district-level census data before the 2000s. Therefore, we limited our analysis to the period in which we could collect data essential for testing the hypotheses.

The unit of analysis was the *vote of each member of the House*; a summary is shown in Table 1. As the dependent variable, we coded a vote for free trade as 1 and a vote against it as 0. Since the dependent variable was binary, we used logistic regression analysis.

**Table 1. Overview of PNTR and TPA Votes**

	PNTR	TPA
Bill	106 <sup>th</sup> Congress, H. R. 4444	114 <sup>th</sup> Congress, H.R. 2146
Roll call no.	228	374
Vote date	May 24, 2000	June 18, 2015
Result	Aye 237 (Dem. 73, Rep. 164) No 197 (Dem. 138, Rep. 57)	Aye 218 (Dem. 28, Rep. 190) No 208 (Dem. 158, Rep. 50)

## (2) Independent Variables

To measure the extent to which MOCs represent an ideology, we followed previous studies and used the rating of an interest group that promoted that ideology. The rating is the proportion of each MOC's vote consistent with the preferences of the interest group to dozens of important bills selected by that group for each session. It takes a value between zero and one. The higher the rating, the more consistently the MOC represents the ideology of that interest group in voting.

First, as an indicator of economic ideology, we used the *rating of the National Taxpayers Union (NTU)*.<sup>20)</sup> While many conservative organizations advocate both economic conservatism and social and cultural conservatism simultaneously, the NTU is one of the representative organizations that support only economic conservatism. The NTU aims to promote laissez-faire, that is, a small government, through lower taxes and less economic intervention.<sup>21)</sup> Therefore, the higher the rating, the more laissez-faire an MOC is, and the lower the rating, the more interventionist the MOC is.

Next, as an indicator of social and cultural ideology, we used the *Campaign for Working Families (CWF) rating*.<sup>22)</sup> The CWF is an organization that focuses on opposition to abortion and same-sex marriage and primarily advocates support for socially and culturally conservative MOCs.<sup>23)</sup> Therefore, the higher the rating, the more socially and culturally conservative the MOC is, and the lower the rating, the more socially and culturally liberal the MOC is.

Finally, as an indicator of foreign policy ideology, we used the *John Birch Society (JBS) rating*.<sup>24)</sup> The JBS is known as an extreme isolationist group among conservative organizations, and the votes used in the rating are often on foreign policies.<sup>25)</sup> The JBS aims to defend the US Constitution and the American values enshrined in it and opposes any foreign involvement that restricts American autonomy, such as participation in the United Nations.<sup>26)</sup> Although there is a problem that the original rating calculation published by the JBS includes the PNTR and TPA bills, this study used the originally recalculated data that excluded both bills.

Regarding the economic interests of the constituencies with which we compare ideologies, we followed previous studies and considered the following variables. First, to capture the impact of free trade on employment and wages in each district, we include the *proportion of skilled workers to the working-age population in each district*. As the Stolper-Samuelson

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<sup>20)</sup> “Rates Congress,” NTU, National Taxpayers Union, accessed December 1, 2021, <https://www.ntu.org/ratecongress/>.

<sup>21)</sup> “About,” NTU, National Taxpayers Union, accessed December 1, 2021, <https://www.ntu.org/about/>.

<sup>22)</sup> We could not obtain the past ratings from the CWF’s official website, and we used the data preserved by Vote Smart. “Campaign for Working Families,” Vote Smart: Facts Matter, Vote Smart, accessed December 1, 2021, <https://justfacts.votesmart.org/interest-group/1086/campaign-for-working-families>.

<sup>23)</sup> “About Us,” Campaign for Working Families, Campaign for Working Families, accessed December 1, 2021, <https://www.cwfpac.com/about>.

<sup>24)</sup> “Freedom Index,” JBS.org, The John Birch Society, accessed December 1, 2021, <https://jbs.org/education/freedom-index/>.

<sup>25)</sup> The JBS’s principle is sometimes described as radical unilateralism rather than isolationism. However, since the definition of isolationism in this study is the defense of American values and autonomy, it is consistent with such an assessment. Charles A. Kupchan, *Isolationism: A History of America’s Efforts to Shield Itself from the World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), 314–15.

<sup>26)</sup> “Get Us Out! of the UN,” JBS.org, The John Birch Society, accessed December 1, 2021, <https://jbs.org/un/>.

theorem predicts, recently in the US, businesses and skilled workers tend to benefit from trade, and unskilled workers tend to suffer.<sup>27)</sup> This is especially true for trade with China and the emerging economies included in the TPP, which have an abundance of unskilled workers. Therefore, MOCs representing districts with large proportions of skilled workers may be more likely to support free trade to improve the economic situation of their constituencies and gain an advantage in future elections. For the number of skilled workers, we followed previous studies and used the number of workers in executive, managerial, administrative, and professional occupations.<sup>28)</sup> As a robustness check, we also used the proportion of the population with a higher educational degree than a college degree in each district, but the main results remained the same.<sup>29)</sup>

Next, to capture the pressure from economic interest groups on MOCs, we included the contributions from PACs and the proportion of agricultural workers. As noted above, in recent years, businesses have tended to benefit from free trade, and unskilled workers have tended to suffer. MOCs whose base of support is business organizations are more likely to support free trade, while those whose base of support is labor unions are more likely to oppose it. Therefore, we included the *amount of contribution to each MOC from business PACs and the amount of contribution to each MOC from labor union PACs* in each session.<sup>30)</sup> In addition, agricultural workers are a particularly powerful interest group in the US, as in many countries, and have promoted free trade as a major export industry. Therefore, we included the *proportion*

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<sup>27)</sup> Jeffrey W. Ladewig, “Domestic Influences on International Trade Policy: Factor Mobility in the United States, 1963 to 1992,” *International Organization* 60, no. 1 (Winter 2006): 69–103; Milner and Tingley, “Who Supports Global Economic Engagement?” 37–68.

<sup>28)</sup> We used the data made by Milner and Tingley for the analysis of the PNTR and the 2015 American Community Survey (ACS) for the analysis of the TPA. Dustin Tingley, “Who Supports Global Economic Engagement? The Sources of Preferences in American Foreign Economic Policy,” V2, Harvard Dataverse, published February 28, 2010, <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/GTG5DG>; U.S. Census Bureau “2015 ACS 1-year Estimates,” Explore Census Data, U.S. Census Bureau, accessed December 1, 2021, <https://data.census.gov/cedsci/>. Working age population is the civilian workforce plus military population defined by the U.S. Census. Hereafter the same will apply.

<sup>29)</sup> For the analysis of the PNTR, we used the data of the proportion of working age population with collage degree made by Milner and Tingley. For the analysis of the TPA, we used the data on the proportion of the population aged 25–64 with a college or associate’s degree obtained from 2015 ACS. Tingley, “Who Supports”; U.S. Census Bureau, “2015 ACS.”

<sup>30)</sup> We used the PAC contribution breakdown for each member of Congress for each session, which OpenSecrets produced from the Federal Election Commission data. “Congress,” OpenSecrets: Following the Money in Politics, OpenSecrets, accessed December 30, 2021, <https://www.opensecrets.org/members-of-congress>.

*of agricultural workers in the working-age population in each district.*<sup>31)</sup>

Finally, to account for the possibility that the economic situation of a district affects public opinion on free trade, we included estimates of the unemployment rate, proportion of manufacturing workers, and proportion of jobs lost to trade with China. In districts with high unemployment, opposition to free trade may increase as a result of the—often counterfactual—association of trade with unemployment in voters' perceptions. Therefore, we included the *unemployment rate in each district* in our analysis of both PNTR and TPA votes.<sup>32)</sup> There is also a view that after China joined the WTO in 2001, a surge in imports from China led to a decline in US manufacturing, which led to opposition to free trade, especially in the Rust Belt. Therefore, in the analysis of the 2015 TPA bill, we also included the *proportion of manufacturing workers in the working-age population* and an estimate of the *proportion of jobs lost to trade with China between 2001 and 2015*.<sup>33)</sup>

### (3) Control Variables

As control variables, we included a party dummy, the proportion of votes for the Republican presidential candidate, and a Tea Party dummy. For the party dummy, we coded Democratic MOCs as 0 and Republican MOCs as 1. We also expected that the higher the support for the incumbent president in a district, the more likely the MOC of that district will take a conciliatory stance toward the president's trade policy. Conversely, if many voters oppose the president, MOCs may be more likely to oppose, regardless of the content of that policy. Therefore, in the PNTR analysis, we included the *proportion of votes to the Republican candidate, Bob Dole, by House district in the 1996 presidential election*. In the TPA analysis,

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<sup>31)</sup> For the analysis of the PNTR, we used the 1997–1998 data produced by Adler, because district-level Census data was not available for 2000. E. Scott Adler, “Congressional District Data File, 105th,” Congressional District Data, University of Colorado, accessed December 30, 2021, <https://sites.google.com/a/colorado.edu/adler-scott/data/congressional-district-data>. New York, Virginia, and North Carolina were redistricted between 1998 and 2000 and the size of error should be larger for the samples of these three states. However, even when those samples were excluded, the main results remained the same. For the analysis of the TPA, we used the proportion of workers in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting to the working age population, obtained from 2015 ACS. U.S. Census Bureau, “2015 ACS.”

<sup>32)</sup> For the analysis of the PNTR, we used the data made by Milner and Tingley, and for the analysis of the TPA, we used the unemployment rate for people aged 16 and older obtained from the 2015 ACS. Tingley, “Who Supports”; U.S. Census Bureau, “2015 ACS.”

<sup>33)</sup> For the proportion of manufacturing workers, we used the 2015 ACS data. U.S. Census Bureau, “2015 ACS.” For the proportion of jobs lost to trade with China, we divided the number of lost jobs, calculated by Scott, by the working age population of the 2015 ACS. Robert E. Scott, “Growth in U.S.–China Trade Deficit Between 2001 and 2015 Cost 3.4 Million Jobs: Here’s How to Rebalance Trade and Rebuild American Manufacturing,” Economic Policy Institute, Economic Policy Institute, January 31, 2017, <https://www.epi.org/publication/growth-in-u-s-china-trade-deficit-between-2001-and-2015-cost-3-4-million-jobs-heres-how-to-rebalance-trade-and-rebuild-american-manufacturing/>.

we included the *proportion of votes to the Republican candidate, Mitt Romney, by House district in the 2012 presidential election*.<sup>34)</sup> Finally, the Tea Party movement gained power in Congress after the 2010 midterm elections, and its affiliated MOCs tended to oppose free trade despite their laissez-faire goals.<sup>35)</sup> Therefore, we included a Tea Party dummy in the analysis of the 2015 TPA, and members of the Tea Party-affiliated caucuses in the House, namely the Freedom Caucus and the Liberty Caucus, were coded as 1.

We published the codebook of all variables, replication data, and do-files in Harvard Dataverse (<https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/GNHI45>).

#### (4) Results

The results of the analysis of the 2000 PNTR vote are presented in Table 2. We also present AUC, AIC, and BIC as measures of model prediction accuracy. The full model of all MOCs confirms that isolationism has a statistically significant and very strong effect, which changes the probability of support for PNTR by -30.3% per standard deviation.<sup>36)</sup> Laissez-faire also had a strong effect of 14.3% per standard deviation but was statistically significant only at the 10% level, and social and cultural conservatism had no statistically discernible effect. Existing studies have argued that socially and culturally conservative MOCs opposed the PNTR, because China did not allow religious freedom.<sup>37)</sup> However, these results show that socially and culturally conservative MOCs did not tend to oppose PNTR, but isolationist MOCs did.

A comparison of Model 2, which includes only economic variables and control variables, and Model 3, which includes only ideological variables and control variables, demonstrates that Model 2 has a higher prediction accuracy. This means that economic interests as a whole determine the voting behavior of MOCs more strongly than ideology. However, when we examine the results by party, there is a large difference in the supremacy of economic interests. Models 4 and 5 compare the explanatory power of the two factors only among the Democrats. The results show that economic interests fit better than ideology, and that economic interests have large supremacy, as shown by the AUC of 80.6% for economic interests alone and 71.3% for ideology alone. However, when we look at Models 6 and 7, which analyzed only Republicans, economic interests alone still fit better, but the differences in AUC, AIC, and BIC

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<sup>34)</sup> We used the data of Milner and Tingley in the PNTR analysis, and the data of Daily Kos in the TPA analysis. Tingley, “Who Supports”; David Nir, “Daily Kos Elections’ Presidential Results by Congressional District for 2020, 2016, and 2012,” Daily Kos, Kos Media, LLC, last modified November 20, 2020, <https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2012/11/19/1163009/-Daily-Kos-Elections->.

<sup>35)</sup> Alexandra Guisinger, *American Opinion on Trade: Preferences without Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 257–58.

<sup>36)</sup> Hereafter, when referring to the effect per standard deviation, it refers to the effect in a case that the variable in question is varied from the mean value minus 0.5 standard deviation to mean value plus 0.5 standard deviation with other variables fixed at their means.

<sup>37)</sup> Seo, “Vote Switching,” 1072–101; Xie, “Congressional Roll Call Voting,” 744.

are all very small. In other words, there was no marked difference between the importance of economic interests and that of ideology among the Republicans. This result is consistent with Hypothesis 2 and may indicate that the influence of economic interest groups was weaker in the Republican than in the Democratic Party because of reliance on private contributions. In short, at the time of the PNTR vote in 2000, economic interests were more important, but the difference in explanatory power between economic interests and ideology was small among the Republicans.

The results of the TPA vote analysis for 2015 are presented in Table 3. In the full model of all MOCs, social and cultural conservatism remained insignificant, but laissez-faire and isolationism both had statistically significant and strong effects. The effect of laissez-faire was 47.0% per standard deviation and the effect of isolationism was -47.4% per standard deviation. Both were stronger than they had been in the PNTR vote in 2000, suggesting that ideology strongly affected MOC decision-making in the TPA vote. In this regard, it is worth noting that isolationism explains the tendency of Tea Party members to be laissez-faire but opposed to free trade at the same time, which some previous studies have pointed out with puzzlement.<sup>38)</sup> As shown in Model 2, the Tea Party dummy works strongly in the direction of the opposing TPA unless isolationism is included in the model. However, as shown in Model 1, when isolationism was included in the model, the Tea Party dummy had no significant effect. This indicates that isolationism was also important in terms of creating opposition from Tea Party members.

A comparison of Model 3, which includes only economic variables and control variables, and Model 4, which includes only ideological variables and control variables, demonstrates that Model 4 has a higher prediction accuracy. Even when calculating the simple percentage correctly predicted, Model 4 can accurately predict 89.1% of the actual votes, compared to 87.5% for Model 3. This result is consistent with Hypothesis 1 and indicates that ideology was a stronger determinant of voting behavior than economic interests in 2015 when changes in contributions and polarization had already occurred. However, there is still a difference in this trend among the parties. Models 5 and 6 compare the explanatory power of the two factors only among the Democrats. The difference in AUC between these two models is 3.5%, which is smaller than the 9.3% difference in the 2000 PNTR vote (Table 2, Models 4 and 5). While this implies that the relative explanatory power of ideology improved, economic interests still had more explanatory power than ideology among the Democrats. On the other hand, when we look at Models 7 and 8, which analyzed only Republicans, the AUC was 4.8% higher in Model 8, and the explanatory power of ideology clearly exceeded that of economic interest. This result is also consistent with Hypothesis 2 and may be due to the fact that the Republican Party was much more polarized than the Democratic Party and that Republican MOCs respected ideological consistency.

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<sup>38)</sup> Guisinger, *American Opinion on Trade*, 257–58; Craig VanGrasstek, *Trade and American Leadership: The Paradoxes of Power and Wealth from Alexander Hamilton to Donald Trump* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 158–60.

In summary, although social and cultural ideology did not have a significant effect, it was confirmed that the more laissez-faire an MOC was, the more likely it was that the MOC was to be in favor of free trade, and the more isolationist an MOC was, the more likely it was to oppose it. When looking at Congress as a whole, the explanatory power of economic interests was higher in the 2000 PNTR vote, but ideology defined voting behavior more strongly than economic interests in the 2015 TPA vote. These results suggest that ideology has become more influential in recent years and are consistent with Hypothesis 1: the influence of ideology has increased as changes in contributions and polarization have occurred. Furthermore, the influence of ideology was stronger among the Republicans than among the Democrats, and, especially in the 2015 TPA vote, the explanatory power of ideology clearly outweighed that of economic interests among the Republicans. This is also consistent with Hypothesis 2: the influence of ideology is particularly strong among the Republicans, who are more dependent on private contributions and more polarized than the Democrats. Overall, these results suggest that ideology is as important as economic interests, even at the congressional level, and in recent years, it has overtaken the influence of economic interests.

Table 2. Logistic Regression Analysis of the 2000 PNTR Vote

	All MOCs			Democratic MOCs		Republican MOCs	
	(1) Full Model	(2) Economic	(3) Ideological	(4) Economic	(5) Ideological	(6) Economic	(7) Ideological
Laissez-faire	5.176 (2.914) <sup>†</sup>		4.205 (2.431) <sup>†</sup>		3.813 (3.589)		3.749 (3.463)
Social and cultural con.	-0.836 (1.050)		-0.383 (0.867)		-0.066 (1.217)		-3.070 (2.203)
Isolationism	-11.743 (2.700) <sup>****</sup>		-9.713 (2.230) <sup>****</sup>		-9.563 (4.408) <sup>*</sup>		-8.338 (2.863) <sup>**</sup>
Skilled worker	5.613 (2.568) <sup>*</sup>	7.840 (2.305) <sup>****</sup>		6.802 (3.180) <sup>*</sup>		13.448 (3.916) <sup>****</sup>	
Business PAC	4.128 (0.863) <sup>****</sup>	4.052 (0.774) <sup>****</sup>		6.115 (1.383) <sup>****</sup>		2.794 (0.936) <sup>**</sup>	
Labor PAC	-16.057 (2.776) <sup>****</sup>	-11.473 (2.350) <sup>****</sup>		-12.000 (2.716) <sup>****</sup>		-23.988 (7.155) <sup>****</sup>	
Agricultural worker	30.575 (8.207) <sup>****</sup>	26.028 (7.353) <sup>****</sup>		14.006 (9.725)		41.170 (14.142) <sup>***</sup>	
Unemployment	10.016 (9.404)	6.101 (8.553)		9.447 (12.042)		11.308 (15.608)	
Republican	0.967 (0.863)	-0.148 (0.400)	2.458 (0.757) <sup>**</sup>				
1996 Dole	7.215 (1.994) <sup>****</sup>	1.644 (1.593)	6.846 (1.431) <sup>****</sup>	3.413 (2.383)	7.308 (1.752) <sup>****</sup>	-4.040 (2.726)	5.155 (2.607) <sup>*</sup>
Constant	-3.143 (1.732) <sup>†</sup>	-3.968 (1.552) <sup>*</sup>	-1.549 (0.563) <sup>**</sup>	-4.630 (2.260) <sup>*</sup>	-1.746 (0.786) <sup>*</sup>	-2.963 (2.418)	3.658 (2.318)
Observations	430	431	431	211	211	220	220
AUC	0.871	0.825	0.801	0.806	0.713	0.758	0.751
AIC	405.710	451.104	483.385	225.276	257.854	221.276	230.370
BIC	450.411	483.633	507.781	248.739	274.6133	245.032	247.338

\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, † p<0.1 Standard errors in parentheses. AUC = area under receiver operating characteristic curve

Table 3. Logistic Regression Analysis of the 2015 TPA Vote

	All MOCs				Democratic MOCs				Republican MOCs	
	(1) Full Model	(2) w/o Isolationism	(3) Economic	(4) Ideological	(5) Economic	(6) Ideological	(7) Economic	(8) Ideological		
Laissez-faire	34.144 (7.267)***	3.118 (3.869)		46.370 (6.319)***		45.118 (9.691)***		61.300 (10.088)***		
Social and cultural con.	-4.027 (3.464)	-3.256 (2.696)		-8.096 (2.907)***		-18.784 (6.953)**		-1.698 (3.868)		
Isolationism	-30.760 (5.038)***			-28.295 (3.913)***		-21.533 (5.993)***		-39.912 (6.440)***		
Skilled worker	6.358 (4.739)	2.394 (3.651)	2.497 (3.549)		-0.924 (5.585)		4.488 (6.338)			
Business PAC	1.305 (0.708) <sup>†</sup>	2.963 (0.594)***	2.991 (0.579)***		3.615 (1.052)***		2.632 (0.781)***			
Labor PAC	-28.573 (5.119)***	-28.787 (4.571)***	-29.704 (4.287)***		-41.797 (8.163)***		-22.267 (5.621)***			
Agricultural worker	12.813 (15.184)	12.459 (11.144)	13.036 (11.007)		1.120 (14.245)		24.260 (21.962)			
Unemployment	-0.042 (0.192)	-0.166 (0.145)	-0.178 (0.142)		-0.154 (0.253)		-0.118 (0.200)			
Manufacturing worker	11.822 (6.168) <sup>†</sup>	3.311 (4.728)	3.152 (4.744)		-9.656 (12.828)		6.748 (5.445)			
Jobs lost to China	-31.384 (21.359)	-20.249 (16.350)	-18.805 (16.215)		1.973 (23.125)		-22.675 (25.695)			
Republican	1.127 (2.576)	2.657 (1.965)	1.379 (0.610)*	-0.851 (2.264)				-2.279 (0.493)***	-1.460 (0.723)*	
Tea Party	-1.061 (0.672)	-2.653 (0.544)***	-2.479 (0.471)***	-1.695 (0.625)**				-0.033 (0.030)	-0.051 (0.038)	
2012 Romney	-0.054 (0.028) <sup>†</sup>	-0.005 (0.023)	-0.007 (0.020)	-0.049 (0.023)*	0.049 (0.035)	-0.053 (0.032) <sup>†</sup>		1.643 (4.032)	-15.621 (4.043)***	
Constant	-1.892 (3.196)	-0.267 (2.455)	0.345 (2.334)	-4.559 (0.885)***	0.790 (3.832)	-4.764 (1.552)**				
Observations	420	422	424	420	186	183		238	237	
AUC	0.974	0.951	0.951	0.953	0.953	0.918		0.881	0.929	
AIC	197.257	260.708	258.537	249.286	86.2485	106.118		177.735	135.490	
BIC	253.821	313.293	303.084	277.568	115.280	122.166		212.458	156.299	

\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, <sup>†</sup> p<0.1 Standard errors in parentheses. AUC = area under receiver operating characteristic curve

#### 4. Case Analysis of Kentucky's 4th District

The previous section demonstrated that the influence of ideology has become comparable or superior to that of economic interests, even at the congressional level. This section adopts the process tracing of Kentucky's 4th district to examine the mechanism of change. The reason for choosing Kentucky's 4th district is that there was a serious conflict between economic interests and ideology in that district, and we expected that we would observe the process by which the latter had surpassed the former. Kentucky's 4th district has benefited greatly from free trade, and successive MOCs representing the district before 2012 supported further trade liberalization. Nonetheless, Thomas Massie, a Republican MOC elected in 2012, strongly opposed the 2015 TPA bill. This section will show that this change was due to the polarization of the district and the increase in ideological campaign contributions.

Kentucky is home to skilled labor-intensive manufacturing industries, such as automobiles and aircraft, and is an area that benefits greatly from free trade. Kentucky's 4th district also has a higher percentage of skilled workers than the US as a whole, with 13% of the workforce employed in manufacturing as of 2015, well above the median of 9% for all districts.<sup>39)</sup> Many of these manufacturing jobs are in internationally competitive export industries, and Kentucky's 4th district is characterized by a higher percentage of jobs supported by exports and a lower percentage of jobs lost to competition from China than the median of all districts.<sup>40)</sup> Free trade was also important for maintaining and expanding production networks with other countries because jobs were created from inward foreign direct investment, such as Toyota's large production facility built nearby.<sup>41)</sup> Ken Lucas, a Democratic MOC who represented this district until 2005, voted in favor of the PNTR bill, while many other Democratic MOCs opposed it. Geoff Davis, a Republican MOC who represented this district from 2005 to 2012, was also a strong supporter of trade liberalization. He was a member of the Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means, which oversees trade legislation, and supported free trade agreements with Colombia and South Korea.<sup>42)</sup> He was also favorable to the TPP for both economic and diplomatic reasons, such as countering Chinese influence. In a congressional hearing of the TPP, he commented as follows:

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<sup>39)</sup> U.S. Census Bureau, "2015 ACS."

<sup>40)</sup> Scott, "Growth in U.S.-China Trade"; "Kentucky - District 4," Trade Supports Jobs, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, accessed January 29, 2016, <http://www.tradesupportsjobs.com/state/KY/4>.

<sup>41)</sup> Business Roundtable, *A TPP Agreement: An Opportunity for Kentucky*, July 2014, [https://tradepartnership.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/BRT\\_TPP\\_KY.pdf](https://tradepartnership.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/BRT_TPP_KY.pdf).

<sup>42)</sup> 112 Cong. Rec. H6489-H6490 (daily ed. October 3, 2011) (statement of Rep. Davis).

With the expanding interest in joining the TPP, I think it is an important validation of a broader goal of the agreement to create a free trade area for the Asia-Pacific region. And this effort will have significant commercial benefits, but it could also have an important effect on China's expanding influence. TPP would help to deepen trade ties with key allies in the Pacific and serve as a counterweight to Chinese influence.<sup>43)</sup>

However, Massie, who was elected in 2012 following Davis's resignation, shared the same economic interests in the district but had a very different base of support and contributions. First, while Congressman Davis had a corporate support base, Massie's base was the Tea Party movement, which was gaining ground at the time. Massie garnered support from the Tea Party since the beginning of his candidacy and won the primary election by a 16% margin over Alecia Webb-Edgington, the candidate endorsed by Davis and other relatively centrist Republican MOCs. Massie was an MOC born against the background of polarization. Furthermore, MOCs affiliated with the Tea Party tend to collect many contributions from individuals, and Massie also received very few donations from economic interest groups. His predecessor, Davis, received only 28% of his 2009–2010 contributions from individuals, and almost all his remaining PAC contributions (98%) came from economic interest groups.<sup>44)</sup> By contrast, Massie received 53% of his 2013–2014 contributions from individuals, and 17% of his remaining PAC contributions came from ideological PACs.<sup>45)</sup> In other words, Massie also depended on ideologically oriented individuals and interest groups for their contributions. Tea Party voters were economically laissez-faire but also shared a kind of isolationism that deters international cooperation.<sup>46)</sup> They also opposed free trade as harshly as labor union members did based on this isolationism.<sup>47)</sup> The fact that Massie's base of support was a group of voters who valued ideological consistency over material interests led to a significant shift in his foreign policy preferences, including trade policy, from his predecessor Davis.

Massie showed prominent isolationist tendencies and was one of the Congress members who voted against the defense of press freedom in Latin America, promotion of democracy in Congo, and assistance with the election in Ukraine. He also criticized support for Syrian dissidents and voted against the resolution to condemn war crimes of the Assad regime

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<sup>43)</sup> Subcommittee on Trade, Trans-Pacific Partnership, H.R. Doc. No. 112-TR4 at 18 (2012) (hearing).

<sup>44)</sup> OpenSecrets, "Congress."

<sup>45)</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46)</sup> Rathbun showed that Tea Party supporters are not *Jeffersonian* isolationists, but basically unilateralist. However, this argument does not contradict the isolationism noted in this study, which is defined as an ideology that defend American autonomy, i.e., freedom of action. Brian Rathbun, "Steeped in International Affairs?: The Foreign Policy Views of the Tea Party," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 9, no. 1 (January 2013): 21–37.

<sup>47)</sup> VanGrasstek, *Trade and American Leadership*, 158–60.

on the grounds that the Syrian Civil War was unrelated to the US.<sup>48)</sup> In addition, he frequently upheld the spirit of the US Constitution in his public pronouncements.<sup>49)</sup> It is a typical claim of the isolationists that the US should not be involved in or affected by foreign affairs because it infringes on the values and decision-making process stipulated by the Constitution.<sup>50)</sup> Congressman Massie had exactly that quality, and the JBS gave very high ratings to his voting records.<sup>51)</sup>

He also voted against the TPA, which the Obama administration required to conclude the TPP based on isolationism. He commented against the TPA, referencing the case of US regulations being changed according to WTO rules.

Whether that is a good thing or whether that is a bad thing—that doesn't matter. What disturbs me is that the reason for writing this law this week was the World Trade Organization told us we had to. They said we have got to do that. We swore an oath to the Constitution, not to the World Trade Organization. My concern is that this trade agreement (TPP) could bind us to things that we don't even understand yet because, surely, some trade agreement years ago has caused us this week to change our food labeling laws.<sup>52)</sup>

The above statement also shows that he opposed the TPA based on isolationism. On both security and trade issues, his actions were based on a common isolationist principle, not the economic interests of his district.

In summary, while Congressman Lucas and Davis, who had economic interest groups and relatively centrist voters as their base of support, promoted free trade, Congressman Massie was not constrained by economic interest groups because he utilized polarization and individual contributions to win. As a result, even though he represented a constituency that benefited economically from free trade, he opposed the TPA in favor of adopting ideologically consistent policies and gaining support from the polarized electorate. As he said, whether the TPP was economically a good thing or a bad thing did not matter.

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<sup>48)</sup> “Press Release: U.S. Representative Massie Votes against Intervention in Syria,” Thomas Massie, published September 17, 2014, <https://massie.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=395194>.

<sup>49)</sup> For example, “Press Release: U.S. Representative Massie Votes to Force Congressional Debate on the Troops in Iraq and Syria,” Thomas Massie, published June 17, 2015, <https://massie.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=395209>.

<sup>50)</sup> Robert W. Tucker, *A New Isolationism: Threat or Promise?* (New York: Universe Books, 1972), 35–36.

<sup>51)</sup> The John Birch Society, “Freedom Index.”

<sup>52)</sup> 161 Cong. Rec. H4339 (daily ed. June 12, 2015) (statement of Rep. Massie).

## Conclusion

Recent studies at the private actor level have focused on the role of ideology and identities in the US trade policy-making process. However, congressional-level studies have adhered to the OEP framework and failed to empirically examine whether ideology or economic interests are more important. Moreover, they did not consider some ongoing changes that could lead to a decline in the influence of economic interest groups. Therefore, this study presented the hypotheses that the importance of economic interests decreased and that of ideology increased, even at the congressional level, as the change in contributions and polarization progressed. These hypotheses were tested using a quantitative analysis of votes for the 2000 PNTR bill and the 2015 TPA bill, as well as process tracking in Kentucky's 4th district.

This study makes three main contributions to the literature. First, it has demonstrated that even at the congressional level, ideology has an influence comparable to economic interest, and that the OEP framework needs to be revised further. Previous studies have assumed that, even if voters are economically irrational, it is not necessary to reconsider OEP at the congressional level because it is an economic interest group that affects MOCs. However, the results of this study indicate that the influence of economic interest groups declined and that the influence of ideology overtook the influence of economic interests. In other words, at both the congressional level and the private actor level, it is necessary to modify the analytical framework that focuses on economic interests and consider a wide range of ideologies and identities.

Second, this study shows that isolationism, an ideology that has not been examined in previous studies, has a strong influence on the trade preferences of MOCs. Isolationism has been demonstrated to have a strong effect at the private actor level, but its effect at the congressional level has not been considered. However, the results of this study show that isolationism has an effect equal to or greater than each economic interest variable and economic ideology variable that many existing studies have considered. It is important to consider isolationism in future research on congressional trade policy-making.

Third, the argument and results of this study suggest the need for broader theoretical and empirical research on the preference aggregation mechanism linking the private actor level and the congressional level. Previous studies have assumed that it is mainly economic interest groups that define the preferences of MOCs, and thus have assumed simple preference aggregation mechanisms. In other words, it is not necessary to consider who wins by what mechanism when many heterogeneous groups of ideological voters and economic interest groups are in conflict. However, this study showed that ideological constituencies and economic interest groups are vying for influence over MOCs on trade. In this study, we lumped ideological voters together and predicted that they would have more influence than economic interest groups in terms of contributions and polarization. However, this logic has not yet been fully developed because it does not predict which specific groups of voters with which ideologies are more likely to be influential in what situation. For example, socially and culturally conservative voters did not appear to have affected MOC preferences, while

laissez-faire or isolationist voters did. When OEP is reconsidered in the future, the preference aggregation mechanisms that link the private actor level to the congressional level will need to be more thoroughly theorized and tested.

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