Is the Buddha just like a demon? Śāntarakṣita's defense of the Buddha's teaching*

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1. Scope and method

How was a work produced and why does it take its particular form? In order to understand an author's intentions more accurately, we need to answer these questions. In other words, it is necessary for us to understand the process by which a text was brought into existence.[1] In the case of philosophical literature written in India, it is known that disputes between opponents underlie certain aspects of the texts. Buddhist logicians had to fend off attacks from Mīmāṃsakas of the preceding and contemporary era. Śāntarakṣita is no exception.[2] He had to

1 For example, Moriyama 2021 is important in that it shows that the descriptions of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla in the *Bahirarthaparīkṣā* are based on Śākyabuddhi's descriptions.

2 For earlier discussions of various aspects of the TS, including for what purpose and for whom it was written, see Marks 2019: 3, n. 3.

deal with the criticism of Buddhism from Kumārila and other Mīmāṃsakas. As Frauwallner and subsequent scholars have shown, the last three chapters of Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṃgraha* (TS),[3] which are mainly critical of Kumārila, contain many quotations from Kumārila's lost work, the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* (BṬ).[4] As I have argued in detail (Kataoka 2011), the BṬ is a modified and developed version of the *Ślokavārttika* (ŚV). Therefore, it is helpful to look at the corresponding verses of the ŚV to understand the verses of the BṬ quoted in the TS—that is, the view of Śāntarakṣita's opponent. This makes it possible to know the original form of the theory of Śāntarakṣita's opponent more precisely.

　　To be more specific, to understand exactly what Śāntarakṣita intended in the TS it is necessary to explore the correspondence between the three parts: Kumārila's ŚV, the *pūrvapakṣa* of the TS (which quotes from Kumārila's lost BṬ), and the *uttarapakṣa* of the TS. As is often the case with classics of Indian philosophy, the final chapter of the TS is also divided into *pūrvapakṣa* and *uttarapakṣa*. Therefore, it is particularly useful to check the correspondence between this *pūrvapakṣa* and *uttarapakṣa*, i.e., Kumārila's criticism and Śāntarakṣita's reply. As noted in previous scholarship, the *pūrvapakṣa* view on omniscience is a quotation from Kumārila's BṬ. Therefore, we will compare the corresponding verses of the ŚV with the *pūrvapakṣa* of the TS. By paying attention to the composition of the ŚV, it is possible to ascertain the compositional intent of the

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3　For the chapter structure of the entire TS and various interpretations of the relevant opening verses (TS 1–6), see Bhattacharyya 1926: xiv, McClintock 2010: 95–96, and Marks 2019: 40–44. For overviews of the contents of the chapters, see McClintock 2010: 98–102, Bhattacharyya 1926: xxvi-xxxvii and lxxi-cxvi, and Krishnamacharya 1926: 23–64.

4　For previous studies of the BṬ, see Kataoka 2011: II 27–59.

pūrvapakṣa of the TS in its original form.

Kataoka 2011 has clarified the general correspondence between the ŚV and the *pūrvapakṣa* of the TS on omniscience. In the present article, which focuses on elucidating TS 3592–3620, the part of the *uttarapakṣa* that discusses how the Buddha preached, we will build on Kataoka 2011 and examine the correspondences between the three parts in more detail. By doing so, it should be possible to understand Śāntarakṣita's intentions more accurately. The correspondences shown in the following table are the rough correspondences between the three parts discussed in this paper. (The numbers in parentheses indicate the number of verses.)

ŚV *Codanā*	TS *pūrvapakṣa* (=BṬ)	TS *uttarapakṣa*
137–140 (4)	3237–3245 (9)	3592–3620 (29)

We can see that the four verses of the ŚV become nine verses in the BṬ, which are answered with 29 verses in Śāntarakṣita's response.

2.   Correspondence between the *Ślokavārttika* and the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* (quoted in the 26th chapter of the *Tattvasaṃgraha*)

As I have shown in my previous work (Kataoka 2011), the *pūrvapakṣa* verses of the 26th chapter of Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṃgraha* (TS 3123–3245), which are supposed to be taken from Kumārila's lost work *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*,[5] have a close corre-

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5   It is Frauwallner's conclusion that all the verses of Kumārila in this chapter of the TS are attributed to the BṬ (Frauwallner 1962: 83(328): "Und wir dürfen daher zuversichtlich den ganzen Abschnitt der Bṛhaṭṭīkā zuschreiben."), not to the ŚV and the BṬ. The observation by McClintock 2010: 152 ("most of which are direct quotations from the extant *Ślokavārttika* and a now lost work, the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*), which she clearly

spondence with the criticism of omniscience in the *Codanā* chapter of Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika*. The table below is a modified version of the table in Kataoka 2003: 38 and Kataoka 2011: II 38; 331, n. 372.（The last part, TS 3246cd-3260, is attributed by Kamalaśīla to Sāmaṭa and Yajñaṭa, of whom we know nothing from other sources. McClintock 2010: 357 mistakenly attributed TS 3240-45 to Sāmaṭa and Yajñaṭa.[6]）

ŚV *Codanā* 110cd-155 (45.5)	TS 3123-3260 (138)
	0 upodghātaḥ 3123-26 (4)
1 bhāṣyavyākhyānam 110cd-111 (1.5)	1 bhāṣyavyākhyānam 3127 (1)
	1.1 sarvaśabdārthaḥ 3128-42 (15)
	1.2 sarvasmiñ jñāte doṣāḥ 3143-56 (14)
2 sarvaṃ jānātīty ayuktam	2 sarvaṃ jānātīty ayuktam
pramāṇavyavasthā 112-115 (4)	2.1 sarvadarśananirāsaḥ 3157-74ab (17.5)
	2.2 sarvaśravaṇanirāsaḥ 3174cd-83 (9.5)
3 sarvajñatvāpauruṣeyatve 116 (1)	3 sarvajñatvāpauruṣeyatve 3184 (1)
4 sarvajña[tva]-abhāvaḥ	4 sarvajña[tva]-abhāvaḥ
4.1 pratyakṣa-abhāvaḥ 117ab (0.5)	4.1 pratyakṣa-abhāvaḥ 3185ab (0.5)
4.2 anumāna-abhāvaḥ 117cd (0.5)	4.2 anumāna-abhāvaḥ 3185cd (0.5)
4.3 śabda-abhāvaḥ 118-136 (19)	4.3 śabda-abhāvaḥ 3186-3213 (28)
	4.4 upamāna-abhāvaḥ 3214-15 (2)
	4.5 arthāpatty-abhāvaḥ 3216-28 (13)
	4' sarvajñabuddhanirāsaḥ 3229-36 (8)
5 sarvajñapraṇītatvanirāsaḥ	5 sarvajñapraṇītatvanirāsaḥ
5.1 dṛṣṭarūpopadeśaḥ 137 (1)	**5.1 dṛṣṭarūpopadeśaḥ 3237-39 (3)**

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states is based on Frauwallner 1962, needs to be corrected for accuracy.

6　Elsewhere（McClintock 2010: 152, n. 374）, however, she correctly attributes TS 3127-45 to Kumārila.

5.2 adṛṣṭarūpopadeśaḥ 138–140 (3)	5.2 adṛṣṭarūpopadeśaḥ 3240–45 (6)
6 kevalajñānasarvajñanirāsaḥ 141–142 (2)	(omitted?)
7 nityāgamadarśanasarvajñanirāsaḥ 143–151 (9)	(moved to 2.2)
	7' svatantrasarvajñābhāvaḥ 3246ab (0.5)
8 atulyatvopasaṃhāraḥ 152–155 (4)	(omitted?)
	9 sāmaṭayajñaṭamatam 3246cd–60 (14.5)

The BṬ is considered to be an enlarged version of the ŚV. Therefore, the surest way to understand the structure of the entire 26th chapter of the TS, which consists of an exchange of *pūrvapakṣa* and *uttarapakṣa*, is to first check the simpler form in the ŚV. By clarifying the compositional intent of Kumārila and the corresponding *pūrvapakṣa* of the TS, Śāntarakṣita's compositional intent in the *uttarapakṣa* portion of the TS, which answers accordingly, should automatically become clear.[7]

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7   McClintock 2010: 157–162 offers her own perspective on the composition of the *uttarapakṣa* of Chapter 26. It is quite different from the one I recommend here—namely, the one that focuses on the correspondences between the ŚV, the TS *pūrvapakṣa* (=BṬ), and the TS *uttarapakṣa*. That her method of organizing does not explain the actual composition well is evident from her own statement. McClintock 2010: 161: "It is left only to remark that any linear presentation of the four demonstrations is more ideal than reality since, especially in the later sections of the final chapter, the authors move freely back and forth among the four demonstrations, interweaving them as well with detailed considerations of many of Kumārila's specific objections that were presented earlier in the *pūrvapakṣa*." As I reiterate in this paper, it is important to remember that the structure of this part of the TS (both the *pūrvapakṣa* and the *uttarapakṣa*) is largely bound up with the structure of Kumārila's argument in the ŚV, which is the starting point. This perspective is missing in McClintock's analysis.

3.　The Buddhist argument presupposed by Kumārila

As I have shown in my previous work（Kataoka 2011: II 38–39）, Kumārila seems to have structured his critique of omniscience in the ŚV in such a way that he assumes the following argument from the Buddhist side and then critically examines each part of the reason, *sarva-jña-praṇīta-tvāt*, used in the argument.（Here I omit Kumārila's consideration of the Jaina kind of omniscience, i.e., *kevalajñāna*. The numbers correspond to the section numbers in the table above.）

*dharme bauddha āgamaḥ pramāṇam, sarvajñapraṇītatvāt[8]

§ 1. What is "everything"（*sarva*）?

§ 2. The impossibility of knowing everything（*sarvaṃ jānāti*）

§ 3. Comparison between the Buddha's omniscience and the Veda's authorlessness

§ 4. No *pramāṇa* proves the existence of an omniscient being（*sarvajña*）

§ 5. The impossibility of the scripture being composed（*praṇītatva*）by the omniscient Buddha

TS 3237–45, the *pūrvapakṣa* corresponding to the *uttarapakṣa* of TS 3592–3620, which we are now considering, corresponds to § 5, in which Kumārila criticizes the Buddhist view that the Buddhist scripture was composed by the omniscient Buddha（*sarvajñapraṇītatva*）. As can be seen from the correspondence table

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8　Translation: "With regard to religious matters, the Buddhist scripture is valid, because it is composed by an omniscient being."

above, in the ŚV this criticism is divided into two parts: §5.1 and §5.2. In §5.1 and §5.2, Kumārila has in mind the case of the Buddha teaching in the ordinary way and the case of the Buddha teaching in the superhuman way, respectively.[9]

4. ŚV verses of §5 in comparison to the BṬ

In the following table, the corresponding verses of the ŚV and the BṬ are listed in order.

ŚV *Codanā* 137–140	TS 3237–45
rāgādirahite cāsmin 　　　nirvyāpāre vyavasthite/ deśanānyapraṇītaiva 　　　syād ṛte pratyavekṣaṇāt// 137	daśabhūmigataś cāsau 　　　sarvarāgādisaṃkṣaye/ śuddhasphaṭikatulyena 　　　sarvaṃ jñānena budhyate// 3237 dhyānāpannaś ca sarvārtha- 　　　viṣayāṃ dhāraṇāṃ dadhat/ tathā vyāptaś ca sarvārthaiḥ 　　　śakto naivopadeśane// 3238
	yadā copadiśed ekaṃ 　　　kiṃcit sāmānyavaktṛvat/ ekadeśajñagītaṃ tan 　　　na syāt sarvajñabhāṣitam[10]// 3239

9　Kumārila has in mind two forms of teaching: the ordinary form of teaching that can be rationally explained, and the supernatural form of teaching that cannot be rationally explained (and is therefore solely an object of faith). Kumārila is keenly aware of the underlying difference in the outward appearance of teaching. This dichotomy is illustrated by the opposition of *yukti/śraddhā* and the use of words such as *sāmānyavaktṛ*, the ordinary speaker, and *adṛśya/adṛṣṭa*, the invisible [speaker]. See also Otake 2001 on the two views in the Yogācāra tradition. According to Kuiji's *Chengweishilun-shuji*（成唯識論述記, Commentary on *Chengweishilun*）cited there, Nāgasena and Asvabhāva held that the Buddha did not preach, while Dharmapāla and Bandhuprabha held that the Buddha did preach.

sāṃnidhyamātratas tasya 　　　puṃsaś cintāmaṇer iva/ niḥsaranti yathākāmaṃ 　　　kuḍyādibhyo 'pi deśanāḥ// 138	tasmin dhyānasamāpanne 　　　cintāratnavad āsthite/ niścaranti yathākāmaṃ 　　　kuḍyādibhyo 'pi deśanāḥ// 3240 tābhir jijñāsitān arthān 　　　sarvān jānanti mānavāḥ/ hitāni ca yathābhavyaṃ 　　　kṣipram āsādayanti te[11]// 3241
evamādy ucyamānaṃ tu 　　　śraddadhānasya śobhate/ 139ab	ityādi kīrtyamānaṃ tu 　　　śraddadhāneṣu śobhate/ vayam aśraddadhānās tu 　　　ye yuktīḥ prārthayāmahe[12]// 3242
kuḍyādiniḥsṛtatvāc ca 　　　nāśvāso deśanāsu naḥ// 139cd	kuḍyādiniḥsṛtānāṃ ca 　　　na syād āptopadiṣṭatā/ viśvāsaś ca na tāsu syāt 　　　kenemāḥ kīrtitā iti// 3243
kiṃ nu buddhapraṇītāḥ syuḥ 　　　kiṃ nu kaiścid durātmabhiḥ/ adṛśyair vipralambhārthaṃ 　　　piśācādibhir īritāḥ// 140	kiṃ nu buddhapraṇītāḥ syuḥ 　　　kiṃ nu brāhmaṇavañcakaiḥ/ krīḍadbhir upadiṣṭāḥ syur 　　　dūrasthapratiśabdakaiḥ// 3244 kiṃ vā kṣudrapiśācādyair 　　　adṛṣṭair eva kīrtitāḥ/ tasmān na tāsu viśvāsaḥ 　　　kartavyaḥ prājñamānibhiḥ[13]// 3245

10　Cf. TS 3146: *svag ̣antheṣv anibaddho 'pi vijñāto 'rtho yadīṣyate/ sarvajñāḥ kavaya sarve syuḥ svakāvyanibandhanāt//*.

11　McClintock 2010: 357 mistakenly attributes these two verses to Sāmaṭa and Yajñaṭa, but they are quoted by Śāntarakṣita from the BṬ of Kumārila.

12　McClintock 2010: 357 mistakenly attributes this verse (TS 3242) to Sāmaṭa and Yaj-ñaṭa, like the two preceding verses (TS 3240–41), and explains its content as follows: "In what looks like a very reasonable response to this notion, Sāmaṭa and Yajñaṭa are represented as saying that such doctrines may be fine if one is already imbued with faith, but for those who lack such faith, some reasoning (*yukti*) should be provided."

13　McClintock 2010: 3357 succinctly summarizes the contents of the three verses (TS

All verses are translated in Kataoka 2011. The modified translations of each are provided below.

> ŚV 137. And when he remains[14] without any action because he has no desire and so on, [his] teaching can only have been composed by others without having the direct reflective observation [that the buddha has].[15]
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> → TS 3237–39. And he, after attaining the ten levels, when all of [his] desires, etc. are completely destroyed, cognizes everything with a cognition similar to a pure crystal. And he, having reached [the state of] meditation, maintaining concentration which has everything as its object, and being filled with everything in this manner, is not able to teach. And if he, like an ordinary speaker, taught one particular thing, what [he teaches] would be that which is uttered by a cognizor of [only] one thing, not uttered by a cognizor of everything.

In §5.1, Kumārila first points out that the Buddhist scriptures cannot have been

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3243–45) as follows: "They go on in the next few verses to urge that, in any case, teachings that issue spontaneously from walls and so on could not be trusted since one would not be able to verify their provenance."

14   I understand *vyavasthite* in the physical sense "stays, remains in the same state, is fixed," just like *āsthite* in TS 3240b, and not in the logical sense "is established as," as translated in Kataoka 2011: II 366. However, my view that there is a co-nonoccurrence relationship (*vyatireka*) implied in the word order of 137a, which explains the lack of desire, etc., and 137b, which explains the lack of activity, remains unchanged.

15   *Pratyavekṣājñāna*, one of the four *jñāna*s of buddhas, is a manifestation of a buddha's *sāṃbhogikakāya* (McClintock 2010: 35). In his *Kāyatrayāvatāramukha*, Nāgasena associates the *sāṃbhogikakāya* with *svārtha*, the *nairmāṇikakāya* with *parārtha*, and the *dharmakāya* with both (Hamano 1984: 720).

authored by the omniscient Buddha. In the ŚV, he points out that, based on the causal relationship between desire, etc. and action, the renounced Buddha, who is free from desire, etc., cannot engage in a teaching action, whereas in the BṬ, he points out that the Buddha in a meditative state cannot teach.[16] He also points out that a limited amount of teaching is, on the surface, no different from the teachings of a partiscient person (*ekadeśajña*).

In §5.1, Kumārila envisioned an ordinary teacher who opens his mouth to teach. In contrast, in §5.2, Kumārila assumes a case in which Buddhists advocate a superhuman form of preaching, in which the Buddha's mere presence causes teachings to flow out of a wall, etc.[17] In other words, the Buddha's teachings can flow even out of a wall, etc. at will according to the wishes of the listener, just as a wish-fulfilling jewel can grant wishes.[18] Here the intent of the ŚV and the BṬ is the same, although the BṬ has a supplementary explanation in TS 3241.

16　Yoshimizu 2022: 67-72, criticizing my view (Kataoka 2011), claims that "Kumārila does not change his perspective in denying the Buddha's omniscience from the ŚV to the BṬ" (Yoshimizu 2022: 68).

17　A wall is mentioned in Candrakīrti's MA as an example of a source from which teachings emerge. (I thank Hiroko Matsuoka for this information. This passage is quoted and translated in Matsumoto 2014: 176, n. 19.) Derge 3862 (དབུ་མ་འཇུག་པའི་བཤད་པ), vol. 102, 331A: ནམ་མཁའ་དག་གནས་རྣམས་དང་དང་དང་**སྒྲག་པ**་དང་བྲག་ལ་སོགས་པ་ལས་དེའི་མཐུས་སྣ་གང་ཞིག་འབྱུང་བ་དེ་ལས་ཀྱང་འཇིག་རྟེན་རྗེས་ཀྱིས་དེ་ཉིད་རིག་པ་ཡིན་ནོ ; For reference to Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā*, see McClintock 2010: 356-357, where Candrakīrti mentions "a mechanical chime" (*yantrakṛtaṃ tūryam*) made to sound by the wind. See also Matsumoto 2014 for Candrakīrti's view of the Buddha's teaching. Yonezawa 2006: 159 (quoted in Matsumoto 2014: 179) corrected *yantrakṛtaṃ* to *yatnakṛtaṃ* (a chime made with effort), which is better.

18　Cf. McClintock 2010: 356 for Kamalaśīla's explanation of TS 3240-42. For more information on the *Tathāgataguhyasūtra* cited by Kamalaśīla in his commentary to TS 3240, see Hamano 1987, Tanji:2002: 20, McClintock 2010: 356, n. 771.

ŚV 138. Merely through the proximity of that person, teachings flow even out of a wall, etc. as desired [by people], like from a wish-fulfilling jewel [from the presence of which everything wished-for appears].[19]

→ TS 3240–41. When he attains [the state of] meditation and remains like a wish-fulfilling jewel, [his] teachings flow even out of a wall, etc. as desired

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19   Cf. Taisho 1595（攝大乘論釋）, vol. 31, p. 243, a, ll. 8-13: 譬如如意寶無有分別。能作如衆生所願求事。譬如天鼓無人扣撃。能隨彼衆生所欲之意。出四種聲。謂怨來怨去受欲生厭。諸佛亦爾。已離分別。能起種種利益衆生事利益事有二種。一化身利益。如如意寶。二説法利益。猶如天鼓 ; Taisho 1596（攝大乘論釋）, vol. 31, p. 309, b, l. 5: 如摩尼天樂者。如如意珠離分別業。隨衆生所欲作利益事。又如天樂無有作者。隨彼天所欲。出種種聲。諸佛亦爾。離於分別而種種事成應知。此無分別甚深説中 ; Taisho 1604（大乘莊嚴經論）, vol. 31, p. 603, b, ll. 18-22: 此偈顯示佛事無功用。譬如如意寶珠雖復無心自然能作種種變現。如來亦爾。雖復無功用心自然能起種種變化。譬如天鼓雖復無心自然能出種種音聲。如來亦爾。雖復無功用心自然能説種種妙法。See also Bhāviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa*, in which a Mīmāṃsaka criticizes the Buddhist scriptures by formulating the following syllogism: "The twelve-fold teachings of dharma (*dvādaśāṅgadharmapravacanāni*) of the Buddhists were not composed by an omniscient being (*na sarvajñapraṇītāni*), because they have an author (*kartṛmattvāt*), just like treatises of the Vaiśeṣikas and so on (*vaiśeṣikādiśāstravat*)." Bhāviveka in contrast to Śāntarakṣita, points out that the reason does not apply to (*asiddha*, literally "is not established in") the subject. In other words, the Buddhist scriptures do not have an author in the first place. This is because it is seen that there are beings to be guided (*vineyasattvabhāvadarśanāt*). His teachings flow out naturally without the Tathāgata turning his attention (*anābhogena*) toward anything. This is analogous to the natural beating of a heavenly drum (*divyadundubhi*) in the air. Taisho 1566（般若燈論）, vol. 30, p. 119, b, ll. 15-19：復有彌息伽外道言。佛家所説十二部經者。非一切智人所説。有作者故。譬如鞞世師等論。論者言。若有作者。汝出因義不成。何以故。見有可化衆生故。如來無功用。自然出言説。猶如天鼓。空中自鳴。 According to Otake 2001: 48(638), Nāgasena explains the *dhyāna* of *dharmakāya* with the simile of *cintāmaṇi*. See Hamano 1984 for Nāgasena's *Kāyatrayāvatāramukha*. Yoshimizu 2022: 69-71 discusses relevant sources to the simile of *cintāmaṇi*.

[in the same manner as everything wished-for appears from the presence of a wish-fulfilling jewel]. By means of these [teachings] people know all things they wish to know and they swiftly accomplish good [results] in accordance with their suitability.

ŚV 139ab. But such things that [you] teach seem attractive [only] to a devotee.

→ TS 3242. But such things that [you] teach seem attractive [only] to devotees. But we, not being devotees, seek reason.

It goes without saying that such unusual and supernatural form of teaching is unacceptable to a non-Buddhist like Kumārila. Kumārila sarcastically points out that the claims of such Buddhists can only appeal to their devotees. He demands a rational explanation from Buddhists.

ŚV 139cd, And we do not trust [such] teachings [precisely] because they have flowed out of a wall, etc.

→ TS 3243. And these [teachings] which have flowed out of a wall, etc. cannot have been taught by a trustworthy person. And [we] won't trust the [teachings], [because we have a doubt:] by whom have these [teachings] been uttered?

Furthermore, Kumārila points out that such teachings are unreliable because they flowed from a wall, etc., and therefore the authorship is unknown.

ŚV 140. [Are they] composed by the Buddha [himself]? Or [are they] ut-

tered by some evil-minded ones such as goblins and the like, who are invisible, in order to deceive [us]?

→ TS 3244–45. [Are they] taught by the Buddha [himself]? Or [are they] taught by those who are playing to deceive brahmins by means of distant echoes?[20] Or [are they] stated by unseen evil-minded goblins and the like? Therefore those who regard [themselves] as wise men should not trust these [teachings].

Kumārila expresses his concern that such teachings may have been composed by invisible goblins and so on to tease people.

The following table shows the correspondence between the ŚV and the BṬ according to the contents.

5 sarvajñapraṇītatvanirāsaḥ	ŚV *Codanā* 137–140	TS *pūrvapakṣaḥ* 3237–45
5.1 dṛṣṭarūpopadeśaḥ		
5.1.1 upadeśāśaktiḥ	137	**3237–38**
5.1.2 ekadeśajñaḥ		**3239**
5.2 adṛṣṭarūpopadeśaḥ		
5.2.1 cintāratnavat	138	3240–41
5.2.2 śraddadhāneṣu śobhate	139ab	3242ab
5.2.3 vayam aśraddadhānāḥ		3242cd
5.2.4 kuḍyādiniḥsṛtatvam	139cd	3243
5.2.5 piśācādipraṇītāḥ	140	3244–45

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20 The reference to echo seems to have been made with the view in mind that the Tathāgata's voice, which does not have an agent, lacks arising and ceasing like the echo（呼響）. See Iwagami 2000: 59–60, n. 23.

As noted and discussed in detail in Kataoka 2011: II 366–8, n. 425 (also II 48–50), in §5.1 Kumārila's method of criticism undergoes a significant change. Perhaps in reply to Dharmakīrti's response in PV I 12, Kumārila changed his method of criticizing the teaching action of the omniscient Buddha in the BṬ. That is, he has changed his method of criticism from one based on co-occurrence and conononoccurrence using the causal relationship between desire, etc. and activity to one that focuses on the gap between the state of omniscience and the state of teaching.

　　Thus, the criticisms newly introduced by Kumārila in the BṬ (TS 3237–39) have not yet been answered by Dharmakīrti. Śāntarakṣita's task was to respond adequately to Kumārila's criticism. His criticism in TS 3237–38 is to be answered by Śāntarakṣita especially with respect to Kumārila's *prasaṅga*-based method of argumentation, and Kumārila's criticism in TS 3239 is to be answered with respect to whether the Buddha's conceptualization-based teaching could be valid. The latter topic is also a major issue for Buddhists, and is related to the concept of "post-acquired pure worldly reflective cognition" (TSP 1126,8: *pṛṣṭhalabdhena ca śuddhalaukikena parāmarśapratyayena*), which is considered mundane in a way, but pure at the same time.[21]

5.　Correspondence between the *pūrvapakṣa* (of §5) and the *uttarapakṣa*
If we analyze the contents of the *pūrvapakṣa* in §5.1 and §5.2 in detail and identify their corresponding verses in the *uttarapakṣa*, we can organize them as shown in the following table:

21　For the "mundane insight obtained subsequently to the supramundane [insight]" (tr. Kramer 2018: 333), see, for example, MSABh ad 11.31 (Levi 62,23–63.1; Funahashi 2000: 45,6–7): *na kalpo nāpi cākalpo lokottarapṛṣṭhalabdhaṃ laukikaṃ jñānam.*

5 sarvajñapraṇītatvanirāsaḥ	TS 3237–45 (*pūrvapakṣaḥ*)	TS 3592–3620 (*uttarapakṣaḥ*)
5.1 dṛṣṭarūpopadeśaḥ		
5.1.1 upadeśāśaktiḥ	3237–38	3601–6
5.1.2 ekadeśajñaḥ	3239	**3592–99**
5.2 adṛṣṭarūpopadeśaḥ		
5.2.1 cintāratnavat	3240–41	3607–8
5.2.2 śraddadhāneṣu śobhate	3242ab	3600
5.2.3 vayam aśraddadhānāḥ	3242cd	3609
5.2.4 kuḍyādiniḥsṛtatvam	3243	3610
5.2.5 piśācādipraṇītāḥ	3244–45	3611–20

As can be seen from the table, especially from the fact that the position of TS 3592–99 is not at the beginning, in the *uttarapakṣa* Śāntarakṣita does not reply to Kumārila's criticisms in the order they are given in the *pūrvapakṣa*. As suggested by the table, he arranges the order of the *uttarapakṣa* in a way that strengthens his argument. The following table shows the order of the *uttarapakṣa* and the corresponding *pūrvapakṣa*. In addition, for arguments that will be discussed in detail in the *uttarapakṣa* (TS 3592–3599), the subdivisions are indicated in detail.

5 sarvajñapraṇītatvanirāsaḥ	TS 3592–3620 (*uttarapakṣaḥ*)	TS 3237–45 (*pūrvapakṣaḥ*)
5.1 dṛṣṭarūpopadeśaḥ (savikalpa-upadeśaḥ)[22]		
5.1.1 ekadeśajñaḥ	**3592–95**	3239

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22 As can be seen from the reference to *vikalpa* in §§5.1.2–3, from the perspective of Śāntarakṣita, the focus is on the qualitative difference of whether teaching is based on conceptualization or not, rather than on the outward distinction of teaching.

5.1.2 kuśalo vikalpaḥ	**3596-97**	
5.1.3 māyākāravat	**3598-99**	
5.2 adṛṣṭarūpopadeśaḥ （avikalpa-upadeśaḥ）	3600	3242ab
5.2.1 upadeśāśaktiḥ	3601-6	**3237-38**
5.2.2 cintāratnavat	3607-8	3240-41
5.2.3 prasaṅgārthājñānam	3609	3242cd
5.2.4 kuḍyādiniḥsṛtatvam	3610	3243
5.2.5 piśācādipraṇītāḥ	**3611-20**	3244-45

First of all, it is noteworthy that the answer to the very first part（TS 3237-38），which contends that the Buddha in a meditative state cannot teach, has been moved back in the reply to TS 3601-6. This is a big change. Śāntarakṣita rejects Kumārila's very criticism that one cannot open one's mouth to teach in a meditative state. On the contrary, he affirms, on the basis of reason（*yukti*），that one can teach in a superhuman way even in a meditative state. Therefore, Kumārila's criticism is not a criticism at all for Śāntarakṣita. In contrast to Kumārila's expectation of the normal way of teaching, the open-mouthed way of teaching, Śāntarakṣita would instead accept the supernatural way. Therefore, Kumārila's criticism, in which he intended to point out an undesirable consequence, is not a criticism for Śāntarakṣita. This is the reason why Śāntarakṣita moved his answer （TS 3601-3606）from the first section（§5.1）to the second section（§5.2），that is, to point out the inadequacy of Kumārila's method of criticism in the section explaining supernatural teaching.

Another characteristic is that Kumārila's criticism in the following verse（TS 3239）is answered in detail. Kumārila's point is that when an omniscient being teaches, it is no different from the teaching of a partiscient being（*ekadeśajña*）

because he can only say a limited number of things. We can imagine from the way Śāntarakṣita answered the question that this too was a serious problem for him.

Kumārila pointed out the problem of the quantity of preaching, but the serious problem for Śāntarakṣita was the problem of guaranteeing the quality of the content of teaching when an omniscient person leaves the meditative state and teaches verbally with conceptualization. Is the content of the Buddha's verbal teachings based on omniscience? This is the first issue to be discussed. Next, the conceptualization that inevitably accompanies the process of verbalization is justified. Here, Śāntarakṣita introduces the distinction between wholesome (*kuśala*) conceptualization and afflicted/defiled (*kliṣṭa*) conceptualization. The Buddha's teaching is valid because it is based on pure conceptualization of what he has experienced.

Furthermore, Śāntarakṣita finally resolves the problem of the erroneous nature of conceptualization. Just as an illusionist who sees a phantom horse with awakened eyes does not believe that it really exists, so the Buddha, while using conceptualization, does not believe that the content of his conceptual cognition really exists in the external world. He sees the conceptualization with awakened eyes, so there is no error in the Buddha. He is just like an illusionist (*māyākārasamo hy asau*).[23]

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23 Cf. Taisho 310 (大寶積經), vol. 11, p. 405, a, ll. 15-16: 如幻師作幻　自於幻不迷 以知幻虛故　佛觀世亦然 ; Taisho 1593 (攝大乘論), vol. 31, p. 123, c, l. 1: 菩薩如幻師 於一切幻事自了無倒 ; Taisho 1509 (大智度論), vol. 25, p. 692, b, l. 19: 如幻師雖幻作 種種物知其無實而不著 ; MSA 13.28: *māyākāra iva jñeye prajñayā pratipadyate/ pratipattir yathā yasmin bodhisattvasya sā matā//*; *Āryadharmasaṃgīti* (quoted in BhK III 243,12-13): *māyākāro yathā kaścin nirmitaṃ moktum udyataḥ/ na cāsya nirmite saṅgo*

Furthermore, in TS 3611–20 Śāntarakṣita concludes with a rather detailed rebuttal of Kumārila's suspicion（TS 3244–45）that the teaching may have been authored by an invisible goblin, etc., since it flows out of a wall, etc. Interestingly, Śāntarakṣita goes so far as to say that if these valid teachings are the teachings of goblins or demons, then it is okay to call them that, i.e., even if he makes up the name "demon" for the enlightened one, it doesn't change the nature of reality. Śāntarakṣita accuses Kumārila, saying that it is he whom people will censure for calling the Buddha a demon.

6. Correspondence between the *uttarapakṣa* and the *pūrvapakṣa* in § 5

The following is a table of correspondences between the *uttarapakṣa* and the *pūrvapakṣa*, according to the order of the verses in the *uttarapakṣa*.（The text of the TS is based on a critical edition by Sato 2021. Only important variants are recorded.）

TS 3592–3620（*uttarapakṣa*）	TS 3237–3245（*pūrvapakṣa*）
ekadeśajñagītaṃ tan　　　　　na syāt sarvajñabhāṣitam/ ity atrāpi puraḥ[24] proktaṃ[25]　　　　　"sarvajñānānvayād"[26] iti// 3592 yathaiveṣṭādikān arthān　　　　　anubhūyālpadarśanaḥ/	yadā copadiśed ekaṃ　　　　　kiṃcit sāmānyavaktṛvat/ ekadeśajñagītaṃ tan　　　　　na syāt sarvajñabhāṣitam// 3239

jñātapūrvo yato 'sya saḥ//（Taisho 761, vol. 17, p. 627, b, ll. 19–22: 如世間幻師　發心度幻人　彼幻不著幻　以未曾有故）. For a Japanese translation of the BhK, see Ichigo 2011.

24　*puraḥ*] Jaisalmer ms.; *purā* BB, GOS

25　Cf. TS 3362: *asarvajñapraṇītatvaṃ na caivaṃ tasya yujyate/ sarvajñatāsamākṣepād ataḥ saṃvādanaṃ bhavet//.*

26　This expression corresponds to TS 3362c: *sarvajñatāsamākṣepād.*

cetasy āropya tān paścāt
    pravakty anubhavāśrayān[27]// 3593
na ca tadvacanaṃ tasya
    tadvastujñānajanma na[28]/
evaṃ sarvajñavākyaṃ syād,
    dhetubhedāt tu bhidyate// 3594
samastavastuvijñānam
    asya kāraṇatāṃ gatam/
kiṃcinmātrārthavijñānaṃ
    nimittaṃ tasya tu sthitam// 3595	

vikalpāsaṃbhave tasya
    vivakṣā nanu kīdṛśī/
prahīṇāvaraṇatvād dhi
    vikalpo nāsya vartate// 3596
naivaṃ, kliṣṭo hi saṃkalpas
    tasya nāsty āvṛtikṣayāt/
jagaddhitānukūlas tu
    kuśalaḥ kena vāryate// 3597	

na ca tasya vikalpasya
    so 'rthavattām avasyati/
taṃ hi vetti nirālambaṃ
    māyākārasamo hy asau// 3598
māyākāro yathā kaścin
    [29]nirmitāśvādigocaram/	

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27 Cf. TS 3363ab: *anubhūya yathā kaścid auṣṇyaṃ paścāt prabhāṣate/*.

28 Cf. TS 3363cd: *tasmād vastvavisaṃvādas tadarthānubhavodbhavāt//*.

29 On the basis of the Jaisalmer manuscript *nirmita* has been adopted instead of *niścita*. TS 3599 is quoted in AAA 342,21–22.（Thanks to Toshio Horiuchi for this reference.）Cf. also RNA 24,8–12: *yathā māyākāro nirmitāśvādiviṣayaṃ vijñānaṃ nirviṣayatvena niścinvan na bhrāntaḥ, tadanyasmāc ca śreṣṭhaḥ, tathā bhagavān api śuddhalaukikavikalpasaṃmukhībhāve 'pi na bhrānto nāpi pṛthagjanasamāna iti. tataś ca nirvikalpakasarvajñajñānavikalpayor virodhābhāvād vaktṛtvaṃ sarvajñatvena sahāviruddham eva.* "The illusionist, determining that the cognition of the created horse or other object has no［corresponding external］object, is not deluded and is superior

ceto nirviṣayaṃ vetti, 　　　tena bhrānto na jāyate// 3599	
ityādi kīrtyamānaṃ tu 　　　śraddadhāneṣu śobhate/ prakṛtārthānurūpeṇa 　　　proktaṃ naitad dvijātinā// 3600	ityādi kīrtyamānaṃ tu 　　　śraddadhāneṣu śobhate/ 3242ab
tathā vyāptaś ca sarvārthaiḥ 　　　śakto naivopadeśane/ ity etat prakṛtaṃ hy atra, 　　　tatra cāhur mahādhiyaḥ// 3601 "tasyopadeśane śaktir 　　　na syāc cet, kiṃ tadā bhavet"/ tato bhavadbhir vaktavyam 　　　"āgamo na bhaved" iti// 3602 atrāpy āhur "bhavatv evaṃ, 　　　kiṃ dṛṣṭo 'sau tvayā vadan"30/ prasaṅgasādhanenedam 　　　aniṣṭaṃ codyate yadi// 3603 na ced vaktṛtvam iṣyeta 　　　nāgamopagamo bhavet/	daśabhūmigataś cāsau 　　　sarvarāgādisaṃkṣaye/ śuddhasphaṭikatulyena 　　　sarvaṃ jñānena budhyate// 3237 dhyānāpannaś ca sarvārtha- 　　　viṣayāṃ dhāraṇāṃ dadhat/ tathā vyāptaś ca sarvārthaiḥ 　　　śakto naivopadeśane// 3238

to other people. In the same way, the revered [Buddha] too is not deluded, even though pure mundane conceptualization is at work, nor is he like the ordinary person. And therefore, since the non-conceptual cognition of an omniscient being and his conceptual [cognition] are not contradictory, his speakerhood is never contradictory to omniscience."

30　Cf. TS 3370–71ab: *ucyate, yadi vaktṛtvaṃ svatantraṃ sādhanaṃ matam/ tadānīm āśrayāsiddhaḥ saṃdigdhāsiddhatātha vā// asya cārthasya saṃdehāt saṃdigdhāsiddhatā sthirā/*.

tatpraṇītāgameṣṭau tu tasya vaktṛtvam iṣyatām[31]// 3604 yady evam, īdṛśo nyāyaḥ prasiddho nyāyavādinām/ prasaṅgasādhane dharmaḥ śraddhāmātrāt parair mataḥ[32]// 3605 yuktiprasiddhatāyāṃ ca svatantraṃ sādhanaṃ bhavet[33]/ īdṛśaś ca pareneṣṭas tatpraṇītaḥ sa āgamaḥ[34]// 3606	
saṃbhārāvedhatas tasya puṃsaś cintāmaṇer iva/ niḥsaranti yathākāmaṃ kuḍyādibhyo 'pi deśanāḥ[35]// 3607 ādhipatyaprapattyātaḥ[36]	tasmin dhyānasamāpanne cintāratnavad āsthite/ niścaranti yathākāmaṃ kuḍyādibhyo 'pi deśanāḥ// 3240 tābhir jijñāsitān arthān

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31 Cf. TS 3359ab: *vikalpe sati vaktṛtvam, sarvajñaś cāvikalpataḥ/.*

32 Cf. TS 3371cd-3372ab: *prasaṅgasādhanaṃ tasmāt tvayā vaktavyam īdṛśam// tatra cāgamamātreṇa siddho dharmaḥ prakāśyate/.*

33 Cf. TS 3372cd: *na tu tadbhāvasiddhyarthaṃ jñāpakaṃ vidyate param/.*

34 Cf. also TSP ad 3372 (1071,18): *na ca vaktṛtvaṃ parasyāgamamātreṇa prasiddham.*

35 Cf. TS 3367: *cakrabhramaṇayogena nirvikalpe 'pi tāyini/ saṃbhārāvedhasāmarthyād deśanā saṃpravartate//.*

36 The reading *ādhipatyaprapattyātaḥ* (=ādhipatya-prapattyā ataḥ) is supported by a parallel expression in TS 276c: *ādhipatyaṃ prapadyante*. There the meaning is: [Latent traces (*saṃskāra*s)] attain the state of an *adhipati*, i.e. a lord/ruler/king; in other words, they have a power [over *ahaṃkāra*]. Kamalaśīla equates *ādhipatya* (power, sovereignty, lordship) with *prabhāva* (power). Therefore, the attainment of power is the meaning of *ādhipatya-prapatti*. In a similar context, Kamalaśīla identifies this power as *adhipatipratyaya* (TSP ad 3368cd, 1070,11). Thus, this can be identified with the predominance condition, one of the four conditions (*pratyaya*), i.e., the causal factor that governs/reigns/dominates/determines something. Interestingly, TS 276 (*uttarapakṣa*) is an answer to TS 229 (*pūrvapakṣa*), the verse which Śāntarakṣita probably quotes from the BṬ. There Kumārila uses the expression *ahaṃbuddhir jñātāraṃ*

praṇetā so 'bhidhīyate[37]/ vikalpānugataṃ tasya 　　na vaktṛtvaṃ prasajyate// 3608	sarvān jānanti mānavāḥ/ hitāni ca yathābhavyaṃ 　　kṣipram āsādayanti te// 3241
vayam aśraddadhānās tu 　　ye yuktīḥ prārthayāmahe[38]/ itīdaṃ gaditaṃ tasmāt 　　prasaṅgārtham ajānatā// 3609	vayam aśraddadhānās tu 　　ye yuktīḥ prārthayāmahe// 3242cd
kuḍyādiniḥsṛtānāṃ ca 　　kasmān nāptopadiṣṭatā/ tadādhipatyabhāvena 　　yadā tāsāṃ pravartanam// 3610	kuḍyādiniḥsṛtānāṃ ca 　　na syād āptopadiṣṭatā/ viśvāsaś ca na tāsu syāt 　　kenemāḥ kīrtitā iti// 3243
saṃbhinnālāpahiṃsādi- 　　kutsitārthavivarjitāḥ/ krīḍāśīlapiśācādi- 　　praṇītāḥ syuḥ kathaṃ ca tāḥ// 3611 saṃbhinnālāpahiṃsādi- 　　kutsitārthopadeśanam/ krīḍāśīlapiśācādi- 　　kāryaṃ tāsu na vidyate// 3612 pramāṇadvayasaṃvādi 　　mataṃ tadviṣaye 'khile/ yasya bādhā pramāṇābhyām 　　anīyasy api nekṣyate// 3613 yac cātyantaparokṣe 'pi	kiṃ nu buddhapraṇītāḥ syuḥ 　　kiṃ nu brāhmaṇavañcakaiḥ/ krīḍadbhir upadiṣṭāḥ syur 　　dūrasthapratiśabdakaiḥ// 3244 kiṃ vā kṣudrapiśācādyair 　　adṛṣṭair eva kīrtitāḥ/ tasmān na tāsu viśvāsaḥ 　　kartavyaḥ prājñamānibhiḥ// 3245

pratipadyate ("I-cognition understands/cognizes a cognizor"). Probably Śāntarakṣita's choice of prapatti in TS 276c, a noun rarely used in the sense of attainment, is somehow influenced by Kumārila's expression pratipadyate (which here means "understands," although etymologically it means "attains"). Moreover, this BṬ verse parallels ŚV Ātman 110, where Kumārila states: ahambuddhir jñātāram adhigacchati. Again, adhigacchati is used here in the sense of "understands." Probably we can understand prapatti as similar to pratipatti, but in the sense of "attainment" rather than "understanding" in the present context.

37　Cf. TS 3368cd: vaktṛtvaṃ yat tu lokena matam ādhyavasāyikam//.

38　Cf. TS 3369cd: nanu cāsiddhatā kena mate 'trānupapattike//.

pūrvāparavibādhitam/
karuṇādiguṇotpattau
      sarvapuṃsāṃ prayojakam// 3614
sarvākāravaropetaṃ
      sadvṛttapratipādakam/
ihāmutra ca bhavyānāṃ
      vividhābhyudayāvaham// 3615
sarvānuśayasaṃdoha-
      pratipakṣābhidhāyakam/
nirvāṇanagaradvāra-
      kapāṭapuṭabhedi ca// 3616
tac cet krīḍanaśīlānāṃ
      rakṣasāṃ vā vaco bhavet/
ta eva santu saṃbuddhāḥ
      sarvatallakṣaṇasthiteḥ// 3617
na hi nāmāntaraklptau
      vasturūpaṃ nivartate/
viśiṣṭe 'śiṣṭasaṃjñāṃ tu
      kurvan nindyaḥ satāṃ bhavet//
      3618
kāmamithyāsamācāra-
      prāṇihiṃsādilakṣaṇāḥ/
asabhyās tu kriyā yena
      vacasā saṃprakāśitāḥ// 3619
tad bhujaṅgapiśācādi-
      praṇītam iti śaṅkyate/
tacceṣṭābhiratānāṃ hi
      tādṛk saṃbhāvyate vacaḥ// 3620	

7. Translation and comments on the *uttarapakṣa* of the TS

In §5.1.1, Kumārila pointed out the gap between the quantity of omniscience of the omniscient Buddha and the limited quantity of what he has actually taught.[39]

39　This issue is also related to the Buddhist problem of the Buddha's entire teaching in one word (*ekasvareṇodāharati*; *ekapadavyāhāra*). See Lamotte 1962: 109-110, n. 52 and Tanji 2002.

In other words, he was pointing out the difference between all (*sarva*) and some (*ekadeśa*). To this, Śāntarakṣita replies as follows:

> TS 3592–95. "What [he teaches] would be that which is uttered by a cognizor of [only] one thing, not uttered by a cognizor of everything." To this [criticism from Mīmāṃsā], too, I already replied before [in TS 3362], "because the cognition of everything continues."[40] Just as [an ordinary] person who perceives only a little, having directly experienced desired objects, etc., and put them in his mind, later speaks of them based on direct experience, and yet his statement about them does arise from his cognition of that entity, the same is true of the sentence of the omniscient [Buddha]. But the latter [kind of sentence] differs [from the former kind of sentence] in terms of the difference of cause. Cognition of all real entities is the cause of the latter, whereas cognition of only a few [objects] is the cause of the former.

It is true that the teachings preached are partial, but if they are based on the omniscience of an omniscient being, this does not change the fact that they are valid. If the teaching is based on the direct experience of the omniscient Buddha, then it should be considered valid.[41]

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40 Cf. TS 3362–63 (quoted above): "And it is not appropriate to say that if so it was composed by a non-omniscient being, because consistency [with other means of valid cognition] is possible due to the indirect power of his omniscience. It is just like a person who has experienced heat and then speaks of it. There is no betrayal of reality based on [his statement] that arose from his direct experience of that object."

41 For Śāntarakṣita's argument, which acknowledges the contradictory relationship between speakerhood with conceptualization and omniscience without conceptualization, but still asserts that the Buddha's scriptures, which he spoke with conceptualiza-

TS 3596-97. [Mīmāṃsaka:] What kind of desire to speak does he have when conceptualization is not possible for him? For conceptualization does not work for him, since he has eliminated [the two kinds of] obstructions. [Buddhist:] Not so. For he does not have defiled conceptualization because he has destroyed obstructions, but his wholesome conceptualization for the benefit of people is not rejected.[42]

Kumārila had already pointed out in TS 3237-38 that the Buddha could not teach in the omniscient state of meditation, but this posed a further problem for Śāntarakṣita: the difference between the state of omniscience and the state of conceptual cognition. In the system of Buddhist epistemology, conceptual cognition is essentially mistaken (*bhrānta*). Therefore, if the Buddha's utterances are based on conceptualization, they are erroneous. For this reason, Śāntarakṣita answers this question by introducing "wholesome (*kuśala*) conceptualization" as opposed to "defiled (*kliṣṭa*) conceptualization." The teachings of the Buddha, who has no defilements, are valid because they are based on wholesome conceptualization, not defiled conceptualization.

Śāntarakṣita's method of fending off Kumārila's criticism by introducing two categories of conceptualization, the good and the bad, is in some ways parallel to

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tion after coming out of meditation, are valid, see TS 3360-66 on the subject of speakerhood (a subsection of his response to TS 3156 in §1.2).

42　These two verses are quoted and translated in McClintock 2010: 355, n. 770: "[Objection:] If conceptuality is impossible for him, how could there be any kind of intention to speak? Since [as you assert] he has eliminated the obstructions, there is no conceptuality for him. [Response:] That is not so, for that one has no afflicted notions (*saṃkalpa*) because he has eliminated the obscurations. But who would deny that he has positive [conceptions] that are conducive to the benefit of the world?"

Dharmakīrti's method. By introducing two categories of desire, good desire and bad desire, Dharmakīrti was explaining that the Buddha could teach because his desire to teach was based on compassion, which is a good desire.[43] In the same way, Śāntarakṣita replied that good conceptualization makes valid teaching possible.

Furthermore, Śāntarakṣita emphasizes that even if the Buddha uses erroneous conceptualization, he is not mistaken because, just like an illusionist, he does not really believe that there is an external object corresponding to the conceptual cognition.

> TS 3598-99. Nor does he assume that his conceptual cognition [really] has an object. For he knows [correctly] that his [conceptual cognition] has no [corresponding] external object. This is because he is like an illusionist. Just as some illusionist knows that his cognition of a horse or other object created [by his illusion] does not [actually] have a [corresponding] external object and therefore he is not in error.[44]

After pointing out that the Buddha in the meditative state could not open his mouth to teach, Kumārila criticized the supernatural form of teaching as lacking explanation and unacceptable. Śāntarakṣita points out that Kumārila's criticism

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43　In TSP 1069,7-15, Kamalaśīla summarizes Dharmakīrti's argument.

44　The two verses (TS 3598-99) are quoted and translated in McClintock 2010: 355, n. 770: "And he does not consider that conception to have an object, for like a magician, he knows that it is without an objective referent, just as a magician knows that the mind that ascertains an object such as a horse [when in fact that appearance is just an illusion] is objectless. Therefore no error arises." The word *bhrānto* in 3599d should be understood as referring to the *māyākāraḥ*.

misses the point.

> TS 3600. "But such things being proclaimed [by the Buddhists] seem attractive [only] to [Buddhist] devotees. [But since we Mīmāṃsakas are not devotees, we seek a rational basis.]" The brahmin did not present this in line with the issue at hand.

Śāntarakṣita intends to argue that such an explanation is rather well supported by reason (*yukti*).[45] In other words, Śāntarakṣita argues that the Buddha's miraculous method of preaching without conceptualization can be rationally justified on the basis of reason. It is not an object of faith based solely on scripture. It is Śāntarakṣita's intention to argue that the Buddha can teach while remaining filled with all objects. First, he summarizes Kumārila's argument as follows:

> 3601abc. For the present issue here is the following: "And he, being filled with everything in this manner, is not able to teach."

What is at issue here is that the Buddha in the meditative state, being filled with everything, is incapable of teaching (*upadeśāśaktatva*).

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45   A parallel argument to this has already been made in TS 3367–72. That is, in the debate over speakerhood (*vaktṛtva*), Śāntarakṣita, after an argument with ordinary forms of preaching in mind (TS 3360–66), also gives a response to the case for supernatural preaching (TS 3367–72). The distinction between independent proof (*svatantram sādhanam*) and reductio ad absurdum (*prasaṅgasādhana*), which is relevant to the argument here, is also explained.

$$sarvārthavyāptatva \quad \rightarrow \quad upadeśāśaktatva$$

In other words, Kumārila's point can be logically summarized in the following *prasaṅga*-argument. If Buddhists accept the meditative state of the Buddha as one in which he is filled with everything (**sarvārthavyāptatva*), then an undesirable consequence, i.e., inability to teach (*upadeśāśaktatva*), would follow. That is, there would be an absence of authorhood (*praṇetṛtvābhāva) or absence of speakerhood (*vaktṛtvābhāva).[46]

3601d. And in response to the above, very wise [Buddhists] state: "If the [Buddha] is not capable of teaching, what then?"

3602ab. Then you [Mīmāṃsaka] must reply, "There would be no [Buddhist] scripture."

46　Here, *upadeśaśaktatva, praṇetṛtva*, and *vaktṛtva* are interchangeable in their roles in the argument, though with different nuances. Śāntarakṣita mentions speakerhood later (TS 3604d). In the preceding section, TS 3358–72, speakerhood is also frequently mentioned. On the other hand, *praṇetṛ* is used in TS 3608b. TS 3604c: *tatpraṇītāgama* also provides indirect evidence. Kumārila has only speakerhood with conceptualization in mind. On the other hand, the kind of speaker Śāntarakṣita really accepts here is not an open-mouthed, *savikalpa* speaker in the usual sense, but a *nirvikalpa* speaker. That Śāntarakṣita is conscious of the difference between *avikalpa* speakerhood and ordinary *savikalpa* speakerhood is suggested by the expression in TS 3368cd: *vaktṛtvaṃ lokena matam ādhyavasāyikam*. Normal *savikalpa* speakerhood is also expressed in TS 3360ab as *pravaktṛtvaṃ vitarkānuvidhānataḥ* and in TS 3608cd as *vikalpānugataṃ vaktṛtvam*, while *avikalpa* speakerhood is expressed in TS 3367b as *nirvikalpe tāyini*. On the substitutability of *tāyin* here for the Buddha as speaker, see PV II 145ab (Vetter 1990: 52): *tāyaḥ svadṛṣṭamārgoktir*.

Here Śāntarakṣita makes it clear that the argument is a *prasaṅgasādhana* by revealing that the further consequence is the absence of scripture (*āgamābhāva*).

$$sarvārthavyāptatva \quad \rightarrow \quad upadeśāśaktatva \quad \rightarrow \quad āgamābhāva$$

By referring to his earlier discussion of speakerhood in TS 3358–72,[47] Śāntarakṣita's intention here becomes clearer. There, Śāntarakṣita raises the question of whether the reason-property presented is *svatantrasādhana* or *prasaṅgasādhana*. The former, an independent reason, is approved of by both parties in the debate, whereas the latter, a reason-property that leads to an undesirable consequence, is approved of only by the opponents on the basis of their own scriptures. Here, first of all, Śāntarakṣita asks what is argued by this reason, bearing in mind that the reason-property, the Buddha's omniscient state of being filled with everything (*sarvārthavyāptatva*), is a *prasaṅgasādhana* that leads to an undesirable consequence, inability to teach.[48] According to the Mīmāṃsakas' answer, this would ultimately lead to the absence of scripture. Needless to say, there is a causal relationship between teaching ability (authorhood/speakerhood) and scripture. If the Buddha had the ability to teach, then the scriptures composed by him could exist, but if he did not have the ability to teach, then the scriptures composed by him could not exist.

upadeśāśakti/praṇetṛtva/vaktṛtva	=>	āgama
~~upadeśāśakti/praṇetṛtva/vaktṛtva~~	→	~~āgama~~

If the Buddhists accept the omniscient state of being filled with everything, then

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47 The present author will discuss this preceding section in a separate article.

48 Kamalaśīla makes it clear that the reason in question is a *prasaṅgasādhana* (TSP 1118, 13: *prasaṅgasādhanatvam eva*).

the undesirable consequence that the Buddha is incapable to teach, i.e., the absence of his speakerhood, would follow;[49] and this would further lead to the undesirable consequence, the absence of scripture. But how did the Mīmāṃsaka confirm this undesirable consequence, the absence of his speakerhood? Since he did not directly see the Buddha speaking in the past, he has no way of denying this fact.

> 3603ab. In response to this, too, [very wise Buddhists] state, "So be it. [Suppose that there would be no scripture. But] did you see him speaking [in person at all]?"

The undesirable consequence, i.e., the absence of his speakerhood, has not been confirmed. In other words, we cannot be sure that he did not speak. Therefore, it is not certain that this reason, being filled with everything, leads to an undesirable consequence.

> 3603cd. If you [Mīmāṃsakas] say: "I condemn this undesirable consequence by means of a reason that leads to an undesirable consequence, [that is, by means of reductio ad absurdum]."

Next, the Mīmāṃsaka reveals that his intention is elsewhere, that what is intended as an undesirable consequence is the speakerhood of the Buddha, which results from acknowledging his scripture.

49　For the absence of contradiction between speaking and omniscience, see also PV III 92–94 (Tosaki 1979: 166–169). See also Kawasaki 1992: 244.

3604ab. If [you Buddhists] did not acknowledge [that the Buddha is] a speaker, then you could not acknowledge the scripture.

3604cd. On the other hand, if you approve of the scripture that he composed, then you should approve of his speakerhood."[50]

Needless to say, the explanation here assumes the above causal relationship. In other words, without speakerhood, there is no scripture, and if one accepts scripture, one must accept speakerhood.

	upadeśaśakti/praṇetṛtva/vaktṛtva	=>	āgama
3604ab	~~upadeśaśakti/praṇetṛtva/vaktṛtva~~	→	~~āgama~~
3604cd	upadeśaśakti/praṇetṛtva/vaktṛtva	←	āgama

Here the Mīmāṃsaka focuses on the latter view which the Buddhists approve of. The Mīmāṃsaka explains that acceptance of scripture leads to an undesirable consequence. That is, it leads to the undesirable consequence for Buddhists that the Buddha is a speaker.

Śāntarakṣita then points out that if the reason-property, i.e., scripture com-

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50   TS 3601–4 are quoted and translated in McClintock 2010: 358: "For here, the context is the statement, "And thus not possessing all objects [of knowledge] he is not able to teach." And in this regard, wise persons say, "If he were to have no capacity to teach, then what?" At this point, you should say, "Then there would be no scripture:" But [in fact,] you then say, "Let it be thus [that the Buddha has no capacity to speak]; but have you seen the speaker [of those scriptures]?" If you urge an objection through the means of a *prasaṅga*, then the undesired consequence is this: "If speakerhood is not accepted, then there would be no scripture. But if a scripture promulgated by that one [is accepted], then you must accept his speakerhood."" The subject of 3603a (*atrāpy āhur*) should be Buddhists. Furthermore, 3601a: *tathāvyāptaś* (*tathā-avyāptaś*) should be read and interpreted as *tathā vyāptaś*.

posed by him, were a reason that leads to an undesirable consequence (*prasaṅgasādhana*), then this reason-property would not be based on rationality, i.e., it would not be something that both parties have approved of by means of valid cognition.

> 3605ab. If so, [very wise Buddhists answer as follows:] the following rule [of debate] is well known among espousers of formal reasoning.[51]
> 3605cd. The reason that leads to an undesirable consequence, [i.e., the reason-property to be stated in the reductio ad absurdum,] is that which is approved of [only] by the opponents on the basis of faith alone. [But the reason in question, scripture composed by him, is not so, because it is based on reason.]

Śāntarakṣita here reminds Mīmāṃsakas of the definition of *prasaṅgasādhana*. The reason-properties that should be pointed out as leading to an undesirable consequence are those that the opponent claims on the basis of their scripture alone. In other words, they are the reasons that only the opponent asserts unilaterally. Such reasons can be called objects of faith alone because they are not based on rationality. However, the Buddhist scripture approved of by Buddhists is not so.

> 3606ab. And if [the reason-property] were well-based on reason [and accepted by both sides of debaters], it could be an independent reason-property.

51　For the connotation of *nyāyavādin*, see McClintock 2010: 61–62.

3606cd. And such is the scripture which the opponent [Buddhist] acknowledges that he composed. [In other words, the reason-property, scripture composed by him, is a property that is very much based on reason, that is, on the means of valid cognition, and not on faith alone.]

As explained above, *svatantrasādhana*, as opposed to *prasaṅgasādhana*, is a reason-property based on rationality and endorsed by both parties. The existence of the Buddhist scripture in question, although miraculously composed by the Buddha, can be rationally explained. Hence, it is inappropriate for the Mīmāṃsaka to present it as a *prasaṅgasādhana*. In the following, the claimants and the core of their arguments are presented in a clear form with the help of the preceding parallel discussion in TS 3358–72. (K: Kumārila; Ś: Śāntarakṣita)

0	Ś: K's criticism that the Buddha's extraordinary form of teaching is irrational misses the point.	3600
1	*Prasaṅgasādhana* I: The reason-property in question is the meditative state of the Buddha being filled with everything that would lead to his inability to teach.	3601abc
1.1	Ś: What would follow from his inability to teach?	3601d-2ab
1.2	K: Absence of his scripture would undesirably follow.	3602cd
1.3	Ś: But you cannot confirm the absence of his speakerhood.	3603ab
2	*Prasaṅgasādhana* II (scripture composed by him)	
2.1	K: The reason, scripture composed by him, is presented as a *prasaṅgasādhana* that leads to an undesirable consequence, his speakerhood.	3603cd
2.1.1	Without speakerhood, there is no scripture.	3604ab
2.1.2	If the Buddha composed a scripture, he would be a speaker with conceptualization and therefore would not be omniscient.	3604cd

| 2.2 | Ś: I remind you of the definition of *prasaṅgasādhana*. The reason does not meet the definition. | 3605 |
| 2.3 | Rather the reason, scripture composed by him, fulfills the definition of *svatantrasādhana* inasmuch as it can be justified rationally. | 3606 |

The main points of his arguments can be summarized as follows. If "being filled with everything" (**sarvārthavyāptatva*) is intended by the Mīmāṃsaka as a *prasaṅgasādhana* that leads to an undesirable consequence for the Buddhists, it is flawed because there is no way to verify the absence of speakerhood that the Mīmāṃsaka claims would follow. On the other hand, if "scripture composed by him" (*tatpraṇītāgama*) is intended as a *prasaṅgasādhana* that would lead to an undesirable consequence, i.e., speakerhood, it does not meet its definition, because the existence of the Buddha's scripture, although authored by him in a miraculous way, can be rationally justified and therefore should be accepted by both parties as a *svatantrasādhana*. (P: *prasaṅgasādhana*)

P	Mīmāṃsaka	Śāntarakṣita
I	**sarvārthavyāptatva** → vaktṛtvābhāva → āgamābhāva	The undesirable consequence, absence of speakerhood, cannot be verified.
II	vaktṛtva ← **āgama**	The reason-property, scripture composed by him, cannot be a *prasaṅgasādhana*.

It may come as a surprise to the modern mind, but here Śāntarakṣita intends to argue that it is possible and reasonable to be an author without opening one's mouth and without conceptualization. The Buddha's extraordinary form of teaching can be rationally justified. In other words, he is asserting that his assumption of the Buddha's superhuman form of teaching is based on reason. The following are the grounds for this claim.

TS 3607–8. Owing to the continuing force of the person's accumulation [of merit and wisdom], his teachings flow even out of a wall, etc. as desired [by people] in the same manner as [everything wished-for appears from the presence of] a wish-fulfilling jewel.[52] Hence, he is called an author because he has attained a power (predominance). There is not the undesirable consequence that he has speakerhood that co-occurs with conceptualization.

Thus, Śāntarakṣita readily admits the supernatural form of teaching. The Buddha can teach while remaining in the state of omniscience. And even though the Buddha is not a speaker in the ordinary sense, he is still the author of the Buddhist scriptures. Here, to explain the rationality of this seemingly irrational theory, Śāntarakṣita introduces two conceptual devices to justify his argument: *saṃbhārāvedha*, i.e., the continuing force (continual momentum) of the accumulation of merit and wisdom, and *ādhipatya*, i.e., the predominance condition that governs an effect.[53]

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52   Cf. TS 3367: *cakrabhramaṇayogena nirvikalpe 'pi tāyini/ saṃbhārāvedhasāmarthyād deśanā saṃpravartate//* "In the way the wheel turns, his teaching occurs due to the continuing force of the accumulation [of merit and wisdom], even though the savior is free of conceptualization." For Prajñākaragupta's adoption of this theory, see Inami 2011: 182. For examples of this metaphor in Sāṃkhya (*Sāṃkhyakārikā* 67), Advaita-Vedantin (*Śāṅkarabhāṣya* ad *Brahmasūtra* 4.1.15), and Jaina (*Tattvārthādhigamasūtra* 10.7), see Inami 2011: 182, n. 22.

53   Keeping in mind TS 3601–4, which points out the misuse of the *prasaṅga* argument, McClintock gives a negative assessment of the way Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla responded to Kumārila's criticism of the extraordinary form of teaching—which she considers to be a criticism from Sāmaṭa and Yajñaṭa. McClintock 2010: 358: "Yet when Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla get around to answering this objection near the end of the chapter, they seem to rely on a rather cheap trick. That is, rather than answering

TS 3609. Therefore, one who does not know what "reductio ad absurdum" means said, "But we, not being devotees, seek reason."

Thus, the seemingly unreasonable claims of the Buddhists are actually based on rationality, according to Śāntarakṣita. Therefore, Kumārila's criticism of the demand for reason is pointless.

TS 3610. And how could [the teachings] that flowed out of a wall, etc. not have been taught by a trustworthy person, since they worked due to the presence of his power?

Kumārila criticized such teachings as unreliable because they flowed out of a wall, etc. and were not clearly authored by a trustworthy person, but as already explained above, his power allows the Buddha to make teachings out of a wall, etc. possible. Therefore, the teachings out of a wall, etc. are authored by a trustworthy person, and therefore are valid.

TS 3611-20. And since they do not contain any [teaching of] idle talk, killing, etc., and [other] reprehensible things, how could they have been com-

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the substance of the charge—namely, that the doctrine of the spontaneous Buddha sounds good to those who have faith in it but lacks convincing evidence for judicious persons—they instead complain that their Mīmāṃsaka opponents have incorrectly applied the rules of formal reasoning. The gist of the complaint is that the Mīmāṃsaka opponents have not followed through on the implication of their objection. ... Although not very satisfying as a response to Sāmaṭa and Yajñaṭa, in terms of the arguments that we examined earlier on the question of religious authority, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalasīla's answer here makes good sense."

posed by goblins, etc. who make it their habit to make fun [of others]? In those [teachings], there is no [teaching of] idle talk, killing, etc., and [other] reprehensible things, which are the work of goblins, etc. who make it their habit to make fun [of people]. [His teaching] is accepted as consistent with the two means of valid cognition with respect to all the objects of the two [means of valid cognition]. We do not see, in the least, that [his teaching] is refuted by the two means of valid cognition. And his teaching is not inconsistent back and forth, even with respect to a completely imperceptible [object]. It causes all people to produce virtues such as compassion. It has all the highest forms and preaches good deeds. And it brings different kinds of prosperity to those who are born in this world and the next. It describes the antidotes for all latent defilements. And it opens the coverings of the door-panel to the city of Nirvana. If you say that this is the statement of [goblins, etc.] who have the habit of teasing, or of demons, then let them be the very ones who are enlightened, because they have all the characteristics of the [enlightened ones]. For it is not that the essence of an entity is lost when you make up another name. On the contrary, you will be the target of the condemnation of the righteous because you call a good man a bad man. On the other hand, if a statement affirms vulgar deeds characterized by sexual misconduct, killing living creatures, etc., it is suspected that it was composed by a serpent (i.e. a rogue), a goblin, or the like. This is because such a statement is conceivable to those who delight in such actions.

Kumārila pointed out that there was concern that the teachings out of a wall, etc., were authored by a goblin, etc., and not by the Buddha. To this, Śāntarakṣita replies that there is nothing wrong with the content of the teachings in the Bud-

dhist scriptures, in other words, they meet the definition of verbal testimony, and that if one were to call such a superior author a demon, it would be Kumārila who would be condemned for using an unjust name.

Here Kumārila, with critical intent, likens the Buddha's teachings as similar to the demonic pranks of *piśāca* and *rakṣas*, but Śāntarakṣita replies, without losing his smile, that if the Buddha's teachings are correct, then it is practically irrelevant what name we call him.

In terms of the concept of *ādhipatya*, Śāntarakṣita's view could be further interpreted as a parallel to the simile of a ghost possessing human beings and dominating the minds of others.[54] In other words, the Buddha's teachings out of the wall, etc., could be viewed *positively* in Buddhism as being analogous to possession by a ghost. This simile could be a "rational" explanation for the people of that time. At least, it was commonly accepted as seen in the Ayurvedic perspective on possession. Naturally, however, given the negative connotations of this metaphor, Śāntarakṣita did not substantially push for haunted possession. He retorts that it is the Vedas that are considered to be demonic teachings.

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54 For the old association of *ādhipatya* with *bhūtagraha*, see Kambala's *Ālokamālā* 86: *sadasanmitrasaṃparkād viśeṣo yaś ca saṃtataḥ/ paracittādhipatyena so 'pi bhūtagrahādivat//*. "Also, the differences that arise from associating with good and bad friends are [possible] by the predominance [condition that governs] the minds of others. Just like the possession of a ghost and so on." See also Vasubandhu's *Viṃśikā* 19 for the association between *piśāca*, *ādhipatya* and *bhūtagraha*. Dharmakīrti's description in the *Saṃtānāntarasiddhi* concerning the *adhipatipratyaya* in relation to *paracitta* is also instructive. See §6.2 (verse 63) in Katsura 1983: 110, 118 and Stcherbatsky 1975: 80.

8. Summary of the arguments

Śāntarakṣita's responses to Kumārila's criticisms can be summarized as follows (K: Kumārila; Ś: Śāntarakṣita):

§ 5.1. The author as a speaker who uses his mouth to speak: The ordinary form of teaching with conceptualization

§ 5.1.1. K: He taught a little, not all. → Ś: His statement based on direct experience is valid.

§ 5.1.2. K: He has no conceptualization, so he should not be able to speak. → Ś: He has a wholesome conceptualization that is not defiled.

§ 5.1.3. K: As long as he has a conceptualization, he is deluded. → Ś: Like an illusionist, he does not believe that his conceptual cognition corresponds to an external object.

§ 5.2. The omniscient Buddha can be an author without speaking: The extraordinary form of teaching without conceptualization

§ 5.2.1. K: The omniscient Buddha in a meditative state cannot teach. → Ś: Your *prasaṅga*-argument is invalid.

§ 5.2.2. K: Are you saying that the teachings can flow out of a wall, etc. by the mere presence of the Buddha in the same manner as a wish-fulfilling jewel? → Ś: That's right. This is made possible by the continuing force of his accumulation of merit and wisdom and his power (predominance).

§ 5.2.3. K: We non-devotees are looking for a rational explanation. → Ś: You are ignorant of logical argument.

§ 5.2.4. K: I don't trust the teachings out of a wall, etc. because they are not authored by a trustworthy person. → Ś: They are authored by a trustworthy person, because he is teaching due to his power (predominance).

§ 5.2.5. K: Such teachings are not to be trusted, as they may have been composed by invisible goblins, etc. who make fun of people. → Ś: The content of the teachings is perfect and without any flaws. If you want to call the author of such teachings a demon, so be it. You are the one to blame. Your Vedic scriptures, which teach sexually problematic practices and killing, are more likely to have been authored by rogues and goblins.

5 sarvajñapraṇītatvanirāsaḥ	TS 3592–3620 (*uttarapakṣaḥ*)	TS 3237–45 (*pūrvapakṣaḥ*)	ŚV *Codanā* 137–140
5.1 dṛṣṭarūpopadeśaḥ			
5.1.1 ekadeśajñaḥ	3592–3595	3239	
5.1.2 kuśalo vikalpaḥ	3596–3597		
5.1.3 māyākāravat	3598–3599		
5.2 adṛṣṭarūpopadeśaḥ	3600	3242ab	139ab
5.2.1 upadeśāśaktiḥ	3601–3606	3237–3238	137
5.2.2 cintāratnavat	3607–3608	3240–3241	138
5.2.3 prasaṅgārthājñānam	3609	3242cd	
5.2.4 kuḍyādiniḥsṛtatvam	3610	3243	139cd
5.2.5 piśācādipraṇītāḥ	3611–3620	3244–3245	140

9.　Two models of the Buddha's teaching

McClintock 2010: 355 evaluates the form of extraordinary teaching she calls "the spontaneous omniscience model" (McClintock 2010: 355) and "teachings issuing spontaneously through the Buddha's power even from inanimate objects like walls and so on" (McClintock 2010: 357) as follows:

I think that there can be no doubt that this represents the authors' ultimate perspective on omniscience in the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and the *Pañjikā*, and

probably at their Madhyamaka level of analysis as well. Not only does it occur in their final chapter dedicated to the explication of the reality of dependent arising, it is also the answer that they give to their fellow Buddhists when pushed on the question of the actual nature of the Buddha's awareness. It is also the only scenario that resolves the tensions inherent in the problem of how the Buddha can be a speaker if he has eliminated all desire（including, presumably, the desire to speak）.

Here McClintock attempts to apply the levels of analysis—Sautrāntika, Yogācāra, and Mādhyamika—to the two forms of teaching as well, as evidenced by her mention of Madhyamaka. According to her, the extraordinary form of teaching（mentioned in TS 2048 in the *Bahirarthaparīkṣā*）is the ultimate and final one. The ordinary form of teaching is not. Therefore, she evaluates the ordinary form of teaching（presupposed in TS 3596–99）as follows:

McClintock 2010: 355, n. 770: This solution to the problem of how the Buddha can be a speaker appears to be one step short of the final solution in which the Buddha's teachings are spontaneous and utterly devoid of conceptuality.

What should we think about the two different forms of teaching presented by Śāntarakṣita, i.e., the ordinary way of teaching with conceptualization and the extraordinary way of teaching without conceptualization? Which form of teaching does he himself approve of? Is it really the case, as McClintock says, that the extraordinary form of teaching is the ultimate one and the normal form is one step short? Furthermore, is it reasonable to apply the sliding scale of analysis to these

two forms?

At least as far as this section is concerned, there is no evidence that Śāntarakṣita gives priority to one over the other. Śāntarakṣita presents both forms in accordance with Kumārila's assumption. In other words, in conformity with the two Buddhist positions predicted by Kumārila, Śāntarakṣita criticizes Kumārila back without making any omissions. It is not the case that Śāntarakṣita prefers one to the other. In fact, in the section of the passage he refers to as "previously mentioned" (TS 3592c: *puraḥ proktaṃ*)[55] Śāntarakṣita similarly assumes both of the two forms of preaching in accordance with Kumārila's possible assumption of the two forms of teaching (TS 3360-66; 3367-3372).[56] In his commentary on the beginning of that section, Kamalaśīla explains as follows:[57]

55　In his commentary on TS 3363-64, Kamalaśīla states that the same issue will be discussed later. TSP 1068,24-1069,7: *etac ca paścād āśaṅkya codyaṃ parihariṣyati.*

56　These two subsections are located in the *uttarapakṣa* where Śāntarakṣita answers to Kumārila regarding *vaktṛtva* implied with the word *ādi* in TS 3156 in the *pūrvapakṣa*. Furthermore, as Kataoka 2011: II 334, n. 376 shows, TS 3156 corresponds to ŚV *Codanā* 132. See also Kataoka 2011: II 45, 357. These subsections were discussed in detail in a separate article of mine (Kataoka forthcoming).

ŚV *Codanā*	TS *pūrvapakṣa* (=BT)	TS *uttarapakṣa*
132: prameyatvādi	3156: jñeya-prameyatva-vastu-sattva**di**	jñeyatvādi 3353-54
		sattvādi 3355-57
		vaktṛtva 3358-59
		savikalpa-upadeśa 3360-66
		avikalpa-upadeśa 3367-72
		upasaṃhāra 3373

57　TSP ad TS 3358-61 (1067,20-21): *kecid bhagavato vaktṛtvaṃ vikalpasammukhībhāvād eveti pratipannāḥ. anye tu pūrvāvedhavaśād evāvikalpato 'pi vacanapravṛttir bhagavata iti varṇayanti.*

Some understand that it is only through the actual operation of conceptualization that the Lord can be a speaker. Others, on the other hand, explain that the Lord's utterances occur without conceptualization, due only to the continuing force of the previous [accumulation of merit and wisdom].

As suggested by the manner in which they are presented here, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are not favoring one or the other as their own theory, but simply acknowledging both theories that Kumārila assumed as Buddhist theories, and answering them without omission.[58]

Why, then, in TS 2048 in the *Bahirarathaparīkṣā*, did Śāntarakṣita mention only the spontaneous model and not the other?[59] We need to look at the context

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58   According to Matsumoto 2014: 166, for Candrakīrti, the Buddha's preaching is not the verbal activity of the *saṃbhogakāya* and the *nirmāṇakāya* based on his *lokottara-pṛṣṭhalabdhaṃ laukikaṃ jñānam*, as claimed in the Yogācāra school, but the speech of the *saṃbhogakāya* and the *nirmāṇakāya* based on the power of the *dharmakāya*, and the speech coming out of air, tree, or stone.

59   TS 2048–49 (Saccone 2018: 203): *kalpapādapavat sarvasaṃkalpapavanair muniḥ/ *akampyo 'pi karoty eva lokānām arthasampadam// tenādarśanam apy ahuḥ sarve sarvavidaṃ jinam/ anābhogena niḥśeṣasarvavitkāryasādhanāt***// Tr. by Saccone 2018: 300: "Although [He] cannot be shaken by the winds of all concepts, like a wish-fulfilling tree, the ascetic acts, indeed, for the accomplishment of the benefit of all beings. Therefore, all [Buddhists] call [Him] omniscient winner, although devoid of vision, because [He] effortlessly accomplishes all the duties of the omniscient." *akampyo] corrected by Kurihara 1994: 887(196), n. 14; *akampo* GOS, McClintock; *akampye* BB. (Cf. also TS 3439cd: *doṣavātāvikampyātmā sarvajño gamyate jinaḥ//*.) The reading before the correction in the Jaisalmer manuscript is not clear. It probably reads *akampo*, but the corrected reading (which has been rewritten above it) clearly reads *akampyo*. The Patan manuscript also reads *akampyo*. Saccone correctly adopts *akampyo*. McClintock 2010: 354: "Like a wish-fulfilling tree, due to the purification of

of who and what criticism Śāntarakṣita is responding to before we apply the sliding scale of analysis. In TS 2040,[60] in order to defend his theory, Śubhagupta argues that just as in the *nirākāra* theory of the Yogācāras where a cognition without form (TS 2040ab: *jñānaṃ nirākāraṃ*) is said to cognize a non-existent form (TS 2040c: *vetti cābhūtam ākāraṃ*), so in his own externalist theory a cognition without form cognizes an external real object (TS 2040d: *[nirākāraṃ jñānaṃ vetti] bhūtam arthaṃ tathaiva*). The crux of the matter here is Śubhagupta's use of the transitive verb *vetti*. Śāntarakṣita denies the connotation of transitivity. According to Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, in the Yogācāra view, there is only a unique instance of awareness (*saṃvedana*) that shines forth in our mind, and cognition does not have the transitive function of grasping or cognizing some-

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all conceptions, the sage accomplishes the aim of worldly beings, even without being shaken. Even though he is unseeing, everyone says the Jina is omniscient, because he knows everything simultaneously as an effect [of his previous vows]." The compound *sarvasaṃkalpapavanair*, which means "by all wish-winds," should be connected with *akampyo*, as Saccone interprets. For the last part, TS 2049d, Saccone adopts the reading *anābhogena niḥśeṣasarvavitkārya**sādhanāt*** instead of -**saṃbhavāt**, the reading adopted in the editions. Cf. also Jha 1991: 1049: "The great sage is like the *Kalpa-tree*, unshaken by the winds of desires; and yet he brings about the welfare of men. Even though he has no cognitions, all men regard the blessed *Jina* (*Buddha*) to be omniscient; because by reason of the absence of limitations, he knows all things, without exception, — as is clear from what he does (for the welfare of people)." There is a Japanese translation by Moriyama 2021: 58 for this part of the TS. For the meaning of *ābhoga*, see Harada 2002.

60　TS 2040 (Saccone 2018: 200): *yathā hi bhavatāṃ jñānaṃ nirākāraṃ ca tattvataḥ/ vetti cābhūtam ākāraṃ bhūtam arthaṃ tathaiva cet//*. Saccone 2018: 296: "If [Śubhagupta objects,] "As, indeed, in your opinion, cognition is devoid of images in reality, and [yet still] brings an unreal image to awareness, similarly [it will also bring] a real object [to awareness]." (BASK 101)"

thing else.[61]

This is also true of the transitive character of *upa-lambha*, literally "per-ception," which in fact does not have the function of grasping the other. In spite of the fact that there is no "knowing of the other," cognition is spontaneously self-aware. This is why Śāntarakṣita appeals to the spontaneous functioning of the omniscient Buddha. That is, it is possible to know everything without turning one's mind to the object. In other words, Śāntarakṣita appeals to the spontaneous functioning of the meditative state of omniscience in order to convince Śubhagupta. If he had referred to the model of pure conceptualization after leaving the meditative state instead of the spontaneous model, the transitivity of the verb would have rendered the example unpersuasive. In other words, Śāntarakṣita just chose a convenient example to persuade Śubhagupta. His intention was to appeal to the example of the Buddha, who works even in meditation, to show that cognition is complete within cognition and spontaneous, even though it does not have the dynamic function of "grasping others."

In light of the above, there seems to be no need to apply the sliding scale of analysis to the two forms of preaching. In other words, there is no need to admit that Śāntarakṣita considered the spontaneous model to be ultimate and the other lesser in the TS.[62]

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61 Cf. TSP ad 2041 (698,17–18). For Dharmakīrti's theory of self-luminosity of cognition (PV III 478–480: *svayam eva prakāśate*; *svayaṃ dhīḥ samprakāśate*), see Kataoka 2017: 209–211.

62 Śāntarakṣita responds to the Sarvāstivādins (TS 1788cd) who assert the existence of the past and future because of the division in the yogic practitioner's cognition of the past and future, from both the position of accepting the pure worldly wisdom (*śuddhalaukikavijñāna*) with conceptualization (TS 1852–54), and the position of accepting non-conceptual cognition (TS 1855). See Shiga 2022 for text and translation.

10.　Conclusion

Some of the new findings or observations and corrections or additions to previous studies in this paper are restated below.

1.　In order to understand the intention of Śāntarakṣita in the *uttarapakṣa* of the TS, it is essential and effective to trace the corresponding *pūrvapakṣa* (i.e., the verses of Kumārila's lost BṬ) and to check the latter's correspondence with Kumārila's preceding work, the ŚV. In other words, it is necessary to trace the correspondence between the three, namely, the ŚV, the TS *pūrvapakṣa*, and the TS *uttarapakṣa*. McClintock was not fully aware of the correspondence between the three, because she did not have an accurate understanding of the verses of the TS *pūrvapakṣa* that were all attributed to the BṬ, and thought of them as a mixture of the ŚV and the BṬ. This was because she did not grasp Frauwallner's conclusion.

2.　In both the ŚV and the BṬ (quoted in the TS *pūrvapakṣa*), Kumārila has in mind two forms of teaching, the ordinary form of teaching and the extraordinary form of teaching, as the Buddha's method of teaching. In the *uttarapakṣa* of the TS, Śāntarakṣita replies to Kumārila's criticism in two different places (TS 3358-72; 3592-3620), keeping in mind both forms of teaching in both places.

3.　The verses in the *pūrvapakṣa* of the TS criticizing the extraordinary form of teaching are from Kumārila's BṬ, not from the lost works of Sāmaṭa and Yajñaṭa as McClintock states. Therefore, it is possible to find a correspondence between this part of the TS and the ŚV.

4.　Contrary to McClintock's view, there is no evidence in the TS that Śāntarakṣita regarded the extraordinary form of teaching as the ultimate

form and the ordinary form of teaching as a step below it. Śāntarakṣita, in line with Kumārila's criticism, is simply responding to both. Furthermore, the way Kamalaśīla presents the two views does not put one above the other. It is inappropriate to apply the sliding scale of analysis to evaluate the two forms of teaching advocated by Śāntarakṣita. Rather, it is more important to look at the correspondence with the verses of Kumārila.

5. With regard to the two forms of teaching, Kumārila, in the BṬ, used the outward appearance of their difference—being still and meditating on all versus open-mouthed and speaking some—as a criterion. Śāntarakṣita, on the other hand, took the difference seriously as a qualitative one between non-conceptual and conceptual awareness, and tried to solve the problem earnestly both in the case of teaching without conceptualization and in the case of teaching with conceptualization. He tries to explain the extraordinary form of teaching in a "rational" way, using the concepts of *āvedha* and *ādhipatya*. Unlike McClintock's assessment, Śāntarakṣita provides what he considers to be a well-reasoned response to Kumārila's criticism. On the other hand, Śāntarakṣita justifies the teaching with conceptualization by the notion *kuśalo vikalpaḥ*, which we can identify as post-acquired pure worldly reflective cognition. There he probably uses Dharmakīrti's discussion of compassion as a good desire as a model.

6. The technical discussion that Śāntarakṣita gives in TS 3601−6 about *prasaṅgasādhana* is highly abbreviated. However, if one refers to his discussion of speakerhood in TS 3358−72, his intention becomes clear. If the reason-property "scripture composed by him" is presented by the Mīmāṃsaka as a *prasaṅgasādhana* that leads to an undesirable consequence for Buddhists, then this reason-property must be a unilateral claim by the Bud-

dhists. However, the reason-property presented by the Buddhists is not so. The scripture composed by the Buddha（in the conceptuality-free state）is a well-grounded reason-property. Śāntarakṣita replies to Kumārila with a rational explanation, who accused the Buddhists of being irrational in accepting scriptures preached in a meditative state.

Abbreviations and Bibliography

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AAA　*Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā. Abhisamayālaṃkār'ālokā Prajñāpāramitāvyākhyā*（*Commentary on Aṣṭasāhasrikā-Prajñāpāramitā*）*by Haribhadra together with the text commented on.* Ed. Unrai Wogihara. Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko,, 1932‒35.

AM　*Ālokamālā. Miscellanea Buddhica.* Ed. Chr. Lindtner.（Indiske Studier 5）Copenhagen, 1985.

TS（P）　*Tattvasaṃgraha*（*pañjikā*）.

　BB　*Tattvasṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣta with the Commentary Pañjikā of Shri Kamalashīla*. Ed. Dvārikadāsa Śāstrī. 2 vols. Varanasi: Baudha Bharati, 1981, 1982.（Second edition）［Corrections not otherwise noted are based on the edition by Sato 2021.］

　GOS　*Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita, with the commentary of Kamalaśīla.* Ed. Embar Krishnamacharya. 2 vols. Baroda: Oriental Institute（Gaekwad's Oriental Series 30‒31）, 1926.

Taisho　The SAT Daizōkyō Text Database, 2018.（SAT 2018）.

NBh　*Nyāyabhāṣya. Gautamīyanyāyadarśana with Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana.* Ed. Anantalal Thakur. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1997.

NV   *Nyāyavārttika. Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika of Bhāradvāja Uddyotakara.* Ed. Anantalal Thakur. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1997.

NS   *Nyāyasūtra.* See NBh.

PPU   *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* of Ratnākaraśānti. An unpublished critical edition being prepared by Luo Hong.

PV I   *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti. The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti: the First Chapter with the Autocommentary.* Ed. Raniero Gnoli. Roma: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1960.

PV II   *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika.* See Vetter 1990.

PV III   See Tosaki 1979, 1985.

BṬ   *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* (quoted in TS)

BhK   *Bhāvanākrama. Bhāvanākramaḥ of Ācārya Kamalaśīla.* Ed. Gyaltsen Namdol. Sarnath: Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, 1985.

MA   *Madhyamakāvatāra* of Candrakīrti. Tibetan translation. Derge 3862 (དབུ་མ་ལ་འཇུག་པའི་བཤད་པ) mdo 'grel (dbu ma), 'a 220b-348a (vol. 102).

MSA(Bh)   *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* (bhāṣya). *Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra. Exposé de la doctrine du grand véhicule selon le système Yogācāra.* Edited and translated by Sylvain Lévi. Tome I. Paris: Librairie honoré Champion, 1907. See also Funahashi 2000 for the eleventh chapter.

RNA   *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvaliḥ.* Ed. Anantalal Thakur. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1975.

VP   *Vākyapadīya. Bhartṛharis Vākyapadīya.* Ed. Wilhelm Rau. Wies-

baden: Franz Steiner, 1977.

Vim　　　*Viṃśikā. Materials Toward the Study of Vasubandhu's Viṃśikā
　　　　　（I）. Sanskrit and Tibetan Critical Editions of the Verses and Auto-
　　　　　commentary; An English Translation and Annotations.* Edited and
　　　　　translated by Jonathan A. Silk. Harvard Oriental Series 81. Cam-
　　　　　bridge MA: Department of South Asian Studies, Harvard Univer-
　　　　　sity, 2018.

ŚBh　　　*Śābarabhāṣya.* See Frauwallner 1968.

ŚV　　　*Ślokavārttika. Ślokavārttika of Śrī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa with the Com-
　　　　　mentary Nyāyaratnākara of Śrī Pārthasārathi Miśra.* Ed. Swāmī
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Is the Buddha just like a demon?
Śāntarakṣita's defense of
the Buddha's teaching

Kei Kataoka

In his *Tattvasaṃgraha* (TS), Śāntarakṣita, a Buddhist of the eighth century AD, criticizes various theories of other schools of his time. In the final chapter, Chapter 26, he attempts to defend the authority of the Buddha from attacks on omniscience from the Mīmāṃsā school. This paper addresses the issues surrounding the two types of preaching discussed in the final chapter. That is, it looks at the problem of the two kinds of preaching: the form in which the Buddha preaches through his mouth as usual, and the supernatural form of preaching in which the Buddha is just there and the preaching flows out from the walls, etc. The criticism of the Buddha from the Mīmāṃsā scholar Kumārila on this and the response from Śāntarakṣita are analyzed in detail. The main focus of this paper is to elucidate TS 3237-45, the reply of Śāntarakṣita, and to trace in detail its correspondence with the criticism from Kumārila. Specifically, we look in detail at the correspondences in three places: *Ślokavārttika Codanā* 137-140, TS 3237-45 (*pūrvapakṣa*), and TS 3592-3620 (*uttarapakṣa*). This clarifies the compositional intent of the TS verses, which can ultimately be traced back to Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika*, and thus clarifies how Śāntarakṣita's arguments are structured and what they answer, including the historical development of the arguments. By presenting the original sources, English translations, compositional framework, and

comparative correspondence, the issues and intentions of Kumārila and Śāntarakṣita's exchange of arguments are clarified. Through specific discussions, we are also able to clarify that the comparison of the three places mentioned above is essential for the philological and historical study of the TS.