

## Two Arguments for Gender Attribution

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### Section 1 Defects in the “political definition”

Compared to rights advocacy movements based on race, gender, disability, and sexual orientation, despite media success, transgenderism activities have not received widespread support. I wonder why. Transgenderism is defined as a position that accepts a minimal proposition common to all versions of transgender advocacy. The propositions are as follows: “as an attribute of an individual, there is a sexuality called gender that is distinguished from biological sex, and the person knows his or her gender through gender identity.”

The biggest reason that transgenderism is less popular than other rights advocacy movements is that the concept of “gender” or “gender identity” is generally difficult to understand. The “definition of gender” most often cited, in the context of analytic philosophy, as the backbone of genderism in general on which transgenderism rests is the following.

*S is a woman* iff<sub>df</sub> S is systematically subordinated along some dimension (economic, political, legal, social, etc.), and S is “marked” as a target for this treatment by observed or imagined bodily features presumed to be evidence of a female’s biological role in reproduction.

*S is a man* iff<sub>df</sub> S is systematically privileged along some dimension (economic, political, legal, social, etc.), and S is “marked” as a target for this treatment by observed or imagined bodily features presumed to be evidence of a male’s biological role in reproduction (Haslanger, 2000, p.39, 2003, pp. 6–7).

The definition includes “observed or imagined bodily features,” so it does not recognize self-identified gender identity for transgender people who have not fully passed the test. However, it is still considered meaningful as a first step toward a trans-inclusive society and has been received favorably by transgenderists in attempts to improve it (e.g., Haslanger, 2012; Jenkins, 2016).

It should be noted that this type of social-reform-oriented definition stereotypes women as the SUBORDINATE gender and men as the PRIVILEGED gender in its emphasis while assuming the reality of current “sexism.” Under such a conception of gender, it is determined without empirical verification that such an Amazonian society is impossible, and the assumption of “gender role reversal” becomes impossible. As social roles are tied to gender, individual roles can change, but gender roles cannot. Although this definition accommodates transgenderism as it implies that if an individual can buy a role, his or her gender can also change, it is doubtful that this definition is truly consistent with transgenderism given that some people change their gender roles without changing their subjective gender identity.

Furthermore, since this definition makes the concept of gender dependent on the reality of gender discrimination, it has highly counterintuitive implications, including the possibility of erasing of

“men” and “women” where gender discrimination is eliminated in a given society. The goal of feminism would be the erasure of “women” and not their liberation. Furthermore, in today’s society, the existence of individuals who are biologically and consciously female, but are not actually women because they are not subordinated, would be recognized.<sup>1</sup> It may be argued that every woman is subordinated, regardless of how unsubordinated she appears to be. For example, Queen Elizabeth and Hillary Clinton were actually far more oppressed than the average working man. Conversely, however, to argue that all men are privileged, no matter how unprivileged they may appear, seems a somewhat ruthless perspective in the face of many vulnerable men (including trans men, according to transgenderism) who face oppression and abuse in real life.

In any case, the “ameliorative definition” should have to be formulated by the state of society after it has been ameliorated, not before. While leaving pre-ameliorated reality out of the definition may be interpreted as a disregard of reality, which may be unbearable for activists, “making explicit in the definition the reality one wishes to emphasize in practice, as an expression of one’s theoretical emphasis as well,” could be counterproductive in practice. For example, entrenched interests in helping the vulnerable could exert pressure to ensure and maintain discrimination. Being defined as “subordinated or discriminated against” may bind women to a subordinate position<sup>2</sup>. For “political correctness,” one must first secure a straightforward “correctness.”

Thus, the ideology of genderism on which transgenderism relies has many irrational consequences, both logical and ethical. By proposing a definition that puts political goals in the foreground, it has led to its own collapse, as if to deny the legitimacy and feasibility of its political ideology itself. Therefore, we must shed our shortsighted ideological posture and examine the logical structure of the concept of “gender” in a purely intellectual manner.

Not many people currently accept, as literally true, the claim that “trans women are women,” which has become a leading motto of transgenderism. Let us examine again whether this unpopularity is based on misunderstanding or incomprehension or whether it is a natural consequence of the inherent flaws of the claim. In other words, the purpose of this paper is to logically examine whether there is any basis for asserting that trans women are women. In sections 2 and 3, I will present separate arguments for determining the “true” gender of transgender people. The two arguments coincide in their negative conclusion against “trans women are women.” This conclusion, in the first instance, indicates that transgenderism is a logical failure, but it is nothing more than a presentation of the challenges that transgenderism must overcome to be as successful as anti-racist and anti-sexist movements, which may have been a conceptual arrangement contributed to the ultimate success of transgenderism.

Two arguments, argument A and argument B, are presented below.

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<sup>1</sup> Haslanger originally accepted these consequences derived from her own definitions; see e.g. Haslanger, 2000, §5.

<sup>2</sup> This is why the enactment of laws that explicitly “prohibit discrimination against LGBT persons” is harmful in a country like Japan, where discrimination against LGBT persons is inherently rare.

## Section 2 Argument A (Functional Argument): Logical Structure of Gender

First, we will redefine “what gender is” from a standpoint free from the traditional political tints of various arguments. After acknowledging the following four axioms to characterize gender, which are unlikely to be disputed, we obtained an ontological definition of the true nature of gender from these axioms:

### Four Axioms of the Nature of Gender

- A1. Gender is a social construct.
- A2. Gender has its origin in bodily sex.
- A3. Gender is a distinct concept from bodily sex.
- A4. Gender is represented as a stereotypical attribute of men and women.

These four axioms are simply a list of the basic general assumptions regarding gender, and no meaningful objections are likely to be raised. Moreover, no other basic properties characterize gender. We applied these four axioms to derive a concept of gender.

First, the fact that A1 refers to a socially constructed concept suggests that gender is a higher-order concept that is “constructed” by transforming naturally occurring preconceived concepts. Therefore, we consider gender as a conceptual transformation device and formulate the working hypothesis that “gender is a function.”

In fact, any concept, including not only constructive but also spontaneous concepts, can be reinterpreted as a function. Any attribute can be considered a function from objects to propositions or truth values, or from possible worlds to sets of objects. Any relation can be considered a function from ordered n-tuples to propositions or truth values, or from possible worlds to sets of ordered n-tuples. Any proposition can be considered a function from possible worlds to truth values.

Thus, the notion of a function can provide a construct that can be interpreted as identical to any ontological entity. Of course, it is not always necessary to define a concept in a way that makes its functional nature explicit. However, since gender is generally said to be a social “constructed concept,” it is highly likely that it cannot be defined without explicitly stating its functional nature as a transforming device. Therefore, it is reasonable to articulate gender as a function that produces output from several inputs. Let us identify the function (singular) that naturally follows from A1-A4.

First, A1, which explicitly states that it is a “social” construct, suggests that one of the inputs is “society.” It could be vaguely “society,” or it could be “community,” “environment,” “cultural sphere,” “ethnic group,” “nation,” or whatever. One input is an appropriate social unit for creating gender.

A2 suggests that physical sex is another input.

A3 is intended to eliminate a particular usage of the word “gender.” The word “gender” is often used as a euphemism for physical sex. In this context, transgenderism cannot be logically estab-

lished.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, gender must be defined as a function that provides an output that is extensionally different from physical sex. Note, however, that when we speak of “extensionally different,” we do not mean different in the same way that reckoning a person’s numerical age based on their birthday and reckoning it on the calendar year (East Asian traditional age reckoning) are different. This is because in a “two sexes” relationship, such as the East Asian two-age system, where one value systematically determines the other, the notion of “trans” between sex and gender remains meaningless.

How physical sex differs from gender output is clarified by A4. The output must be a stereotypical attribute, “what it means to be a man” or “what it means to be a woman,” rather than some gender itself. This is because the representation of gender is a stereotype, which means that the output of the function of gender is a manifested gender stereotype.

Therefore, from A1-A4, the following “definition of gender” can be obtained.

Gender is a function  $G$ , such that

$$G(x, y) = z$$

The domain is

$$x \dots \{\♂, ♀\}$$

where  $\♂$  is the set of biological males, and  $\♀$  is the set of biological females.<sup>4</sup>

$y \dots$  specific social environment

Range  $z$  is a bundle of attributes that synthesizes various gender stereotypes (psychological properties or bottom-up tendencies, such as gender expression, and top-down norms, such as gender roles).

This definition of function  $G$  satisfies A1-A4. In nonformal terms, gender is the mechanism or correlation by which a particular biological sex group statistically exhibits certain stereotypical characteristics in a particular social environment. This definition is both intuitive and consistent with the common sense understanding of “gender.” This finding is also consistent with academic usages.

This definition indicated that gender is not an attribute of an individual. If this was an attribute of an individual, then one of the inputs would be the individual.<sup>5</sup> However, in this definition,

<sup>3</sup> When a person’s body is externally transsexualized through sex reassignment surgery, it can be said that he or she has “transitioned his or her physical sex” in a derivative or metaphorical sense. However, A3 is essential to transgenderism because the reality is that people who have not undergone or do not intend to undergo sex reassignment surgery are also called transgender, and transgenderism is a position which asserts that true gender is determined by “gender identity” rather than physical transition.

<sup>4</sup> The question may arise as to whether only two sexes should be considered. There is no need to add disorders of sex development to the domain. Any disorder of sex development can be classified as either  $\♂$  or  $\♀$ , depending on whether the SRY gene is expressed or not, and does not correlate with any specific stereotype (e.g., “gestures typical of Turner syndrome,” “occupation typical of Androgen insensitivity syndrome,” etc.).

<sup>5</sup> The values of the first term  $x$  of  $G$ ,  $\♂$  and  $\♀$ , are individual attributes (functions with individuals as inputs and truth values as outputs) or sets of individuals. When  $G$  is a higher-order attribute with individual attributes  $\♂$  and  $\♀$  as terms, we know that even if  $G$  is an attribute of individuals (even if we forcefully add a third term  $u$  to  $G$  with the value of individuals), it cannot be an intrinsic personal attribute as the word “gender identity” implies. Moreover, the third term assignment does not work. This is because there are any number of people who change their gender expression and sexual commitment in the course of their lifetime. In other words, if

constructed according to the four axioms, the inputs are the set of physical gender and the social environment alone. Since the first term  $x$  of the input is only two, ♂ and ♀, it is easier to understand if we fix each of them and divide them into two functions. That is, the binomial function  $G$  is transformed into two types of unary predicates,  $G^♂$  and  $G^♀$ .

$$G^♂(y) = z$$

$$G^♀(y) = z$$

Thus, it is accurate to state that gender is an attribute of society, and not of an individual.<sup>6</sup> This also fits an intuitive image. Gender is a bundle of stereotypical attributes of masculinity and femininity that each society assigns to ♂ as a group and ♀ as a group, respectively. Alternatively, the difference between the two stereotypes is derivatively recognized from them. What bundles of attributes are assigned to ♂ and ♀, and what gender differences are perceived as gender, differ from society to society.

Female gender outputs, in 21st-century America, are quite different stereotypes than in 10th-century Islamic societies. Male gender may output diametrically opposed stereotypes in 8th-century Japan and Amazonian society K somewhere someday. If a self-proclaimed trans woman, born and raised in 21st-century Japan, migrates to Amazonian society K, it is difficult to predict what criteria she will use to determine her own gender. While gender is an attribute of a society, as long as the relationship between society and individuals is fluid, it is only natural that gender as the essence of the individual (i.e., supra social) is not determined.

The above discussion confirms that gender is not an attribute of the individual, insofar as it differs from physical sex (insofar as it is given its own *raison d'être* as a concept). Even less so, can this be an individual's identity? In other words, there is no such thing as a gender identity. There is no room for gender identity to mediate between individuals and gender. The biological male is unequivocally male and the biological female is unequivocally female.

Thus, the fallacy of transgenderism is obvious. As gender, by its logical structure, cannot be used to describe an individual, transgenderism, which allows individuals to self-identify, is systematically exposing a category mistake. Even if an individual subjectively has a "gender self-identifi-

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individual  $u$  is an effective input that affects the output, the definition of gender "as a function" fails because the output is not uniquely determined. In the end, only  $x$  and  $y$  determine the output,  $u$  becomes an empty variable, and  $G$  is not recognized as an attribute of the individual.

<sup>6</sup> The question may arise as to whether a particular society may rearrange a particular sex stereotype (gender expression or gender norm). This does not affect the validity of the definition of "gender as a function of society." This is because if a significant change in output  $z$  is observed for the same sex, it should be estimated that the input  $y$  also has a different value. If the gender expression and gender roles of men and women have changed, this should have caused significant differences in other areas of the community concerned, and the society would be identified as being different from the original society. Whereas individuals can change their gender expressions while maintaining their self-identity, societies cannot change their gender stereotypes without changing their identity. In other words, gender stereotypes, which link material culture (biology and medicine) and spiritual culture, are part of the essence of society and are the ingredients that determine the identity of society. In reality, it is unlikely that the gender of a particular region will change completely in a short period. Even when a major social change occurs, such as "women gaining the right to vote", it cannot easily be regarded as a change in gender (and identity) in that society at that point.

cation” that differs from his or her physical sex, it is in a sense unrelated to gender (an attribute of society). Just as it is logically impossible for an individual’s “age self-identification” to be the average age or age-specific occupational composition of the society in question, an individual’s subjective identity can’t be a personal gender attribute that is “gender.” Something like Haslanger’s definition of gender as we saw at the beginning of this article is logically hopeless.

Why, then, is the word “gender,” which refers to a social attribute, used, as a matter of course, to refer to an individual attribute? This is because of the confusion regarding homonyms. As mentioned earlier, the word “gender” has often been used as a euphemism for physical sex.<sup>7</sup> In this sense, “gender” refers to an attribute of an individual. By mixing this with the traditional “gender” that refers to the impersonal concept of social gender stereotypes, it is misinterpreted as if individuals have another sexuality, “gender,” separate from physical sex, and this false image has been allowed to materialize and the superstition of nonphysical sex has taken root. The mechanism by which gender realism, a glaring fallacy, is readily propagated is surprisingly simple.

One might object as follows. Just because gender realism began with the homonym confusion, does not mean that gender realism is a fallacy. This confusion may have led to the discovery of a meaningful new concept of gender. Fallacies in origin do not inevitably lead to fallacies in results. What transgenderism’s use of the term “gender” refers to is the image of gender before it was logically reconstructed as in argument A (Functional argument). This attribute may emerge when social gender is projected onto an individual’s inner life. It may not be incorporated into a logically coherent conceptual network but may be said to belong to the individual as a psychological fact. If a particular individual in a particular society strongly self-identifies with the gender stereotypes of that society, it may be naively accepted that the individual has that “gender” in that society. This “feeling,” which may subjectively differ from the psychological counterpart of the individual’s physical gender, is an important attribute of the individual, isn’t it?

However, note that recognizing such gender as an identity is the opposite of the liberal morality to which transgenderism belongs, especially the morality that aims at “not fixate gender.” The assumption that one is not a woman because one does not fit the “feminine stereotype” is a denial of diversity. The stereotyped attributes of  $G♂$  and  $G♀$  are only standard tendencies, and at the individual level, there is diversity within  $♀$ , and there is diversity within  $♂$ . Self-awareness such as “I am a man because I am out of the feminine standard and close to the masculine standard” are nonsense equivalent to saying “I am a man because I like model trains” or “I am not Korean because my penis is this big.”<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, as mentioned above, when people move to a society with different stereotypical attribute outputs of  $G♂$  and  $G♀$ , they are forced to change or question their self-identified gender, and it becomes difficult to establish even as a subjective attribute.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>7</sup> In Japanese, the word “seibetsu,” meaning sex, does not even imply the meaning of “intercourse,” so there is no need to euphemistically rephrase it, but the fate of the Japanese academic community, which tends to feel unfoundedly compelled to import English-speaking conventions, has led to the same confusion that prevails in the West.

<sup>8</sup> A trans-Korean British influencer who repeatedly underwent plastic surgery in admiration of BTS’s Jimin came under fire when he said he would undergo penis reduction surgery to become 100% Korean. <https://www.tvgroove.com/?p=87819>

<sup>9</sup> A gender identity disorder with body dysphoria can create a consistent “gender identity” in different societies.

It is true that this confused and excessive affirmation of commonplace “likeness,” “gender self-identification,” which is now nothing more than a caricatured and defensive prejudice, has somehow been evaluated by transgenderists as an attitude that has the utility of disturbing gender norms. It is also true that the recognition of the attribute of “gender identity,” presented in its undefined form, has been reported in the media as the “new morality.”<sup>10</sup>

Therefore, let us try to make a concession. Let us venture to concur with the perspectives of the mass media. Even though it is unclear how the “gender” of gender identity is “new” (and how it can be established as a personal attribute in the first place), if it can be established as a practical “gender” based on the personal attribute of “gender identity” that both transgender people and transgenderists affirm, is there another objection that could be applied to that personal gender attribute?

For now, we consider the hypothetical attribute as the “real gender” of each individual. We may call this metaphysical gender, but let us formally acknowledge the existence of such a personal attribute. In the next section, we attempt a thought experiment on what one should consider one’s “true gender” for any individual. From this, we will verify whether we can obtain the results expected by transgenderism—a consistent recognition system that concludes that “woman = df gender identity being woman (or female).”

### Section 3 Argument B (Counterfactual Argument): How to Identify “Personal Gender”

Common phrases in transgenderism include “gender is diverse,” “born in the wrong body,” “mind trapped in the wrong body,” and “who I should be.” These phrases strongly suggest a model in which each individual has a true ideal of the relationship between the body and gender, which is in some way an attribute of the individual. Since reality may differ from this ideal, it is desirable to seek to restore the ideal situation. From this, we can observe that the following are the main principles of transgenderism. The first principle is that gender is nonbinary and that a transgender person is “a being who was originally cisgender (or at least could have been cisgender from the beginning).”

The first principle, or the principle of nonbinaryness, can be seen as the principle of multivalence, fluidity, or spectrality and can be articulated as respecting the general phenomenon of nonbinary genderfluid as a gender identity.

The second principle, or the “wrong body” principle, can be articulated as the importance of assuming the counterfactual situation of “if not wrong.”

From the above, it can be seen that, as axioms, the following two propositions should be accepted: B1 and B2 are the most basic and plausible propositions under the assumption that gender is an individual attribute.

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Since that “gender identity” does not depend on social stereotypes, it is manifestly independent of gender and can be recognized as derivative sex. See note 3.

<sup>10</sup> Gilbert Ryle’s insight applies to “gender identity.” “Myths often do a lot of theoretical good while they are still new” (Ryle, 1949, p. 23). One might say that gender identity myth has served a theoretical role in the sense that by shaking up the extension of gender (the stability of an individual’s gender), it has paradoxically made the normative solidity of the intension of gender (gender stereotypes) painfully apparent.



B1. Transgender (MtF and FtM) and cisgender (MtM and FtF) are extreme forms of nonbinary positions in the spectrum (at the extremes of masculinity and femininity) and extreme forms of the temporal stability of the genderfluid (at the extremes that happen to produce no fluctuations in gender identity). In other words, all humans are generally nonbinary and genderfluid to varying degrees.<sup>11</sup>

B2. The necessary and sufficient condition for individual *x* to be a man is as follows: <If *x* were cisgender, then *x* would be a cis-man> (M-version).

The necessary and sufficient condition for individual *x* to be a woman is as follows: <If *x* were cisgender, then *x* would be a cis-woman> (W-version)<sup>12</sup>

B1 relies on the fact that it is impossible to predict with certainty when or whether one's gender identity will fluctuate, even for those who believe that they are stable cis or stable trans. Since the subjective phenomena of nonbinary and genderfluid have been empirically reported, anyone's gender identity can swing to any position on the continuum between full masculinity and full femininity, any number of times. In particular, the vast majority of transgender people are genderfluid in the sense that they experience at least one "realization of a change in gender identity" around the time they reach a certain age. Cisgender is minimal genderfluid; that is, it happens to remain at degree zero.

We can also explain the credibility of B1 in the opposite direction. The main reason transgenderism has enjoyed political and media success is that it has appealed to the identity-dependent psychology of young people. The promotion of vague, incomplete, low threshold "minority self-identifications" such as "nonbinary," "X-gender," "genderqueer," or "genderfluid" has encouraged trans entry, especially among young women with mental health difficulties (Shrier, 2020), and has broadened the base of transgenderism. The "general form" of transgenderism has been shaped by the empathy of these "general forms." Without the support of empathy building through these "general forms," support activities for fully transitioning transgenders would not have gained momentum.<sup>13</sup>

B2 is the definition of gender by the "counterfactual situation" on which the idea of "trans" essentially depends, whether in full or incomplete form. The "man" and "woman" appearing on the left side of B2 are the "true gender attributed to the individual" that is assumed to have survived the functional argument A in the previous section, the "metaphysical gender." Specifically, when it is said that "trans women are women," the "woman" in the predicate corresponds to that.

The right side of the M-version of B2 is synonymous with the following statement: If the situation had arisen such that *x*'s physical sex and mental gender (gender identity) were congruent, *x* would

<sup>11</sup> When we note that the boundary at which gender nonconformity occurs is not just in one place, body and gender identity, but in numerous other positions (e.g., between body dysphoria and gender dysphoria, between gender dysphoria and gender transition desire), we can see that even stable transgender people themselves include people in myriad stages; see Miura, 2022b.

<sup>12</sup> Strictly speaking, to avoid question-begging of discourse on gender, it would be better to either have B3 "a version other than M- and W- versions" or unify it with the general form B0 as follows: B0 "a necessary and sufficient condition for an individual *x* to be cis *y* is that [If *x* were cisgender, then *x* would be cis *y*." This generalization is unnecessary insofar as this paper is intended to validate "trans women are women," but we will touch on the fact that this generalization is unnecessary for even more principled reasons later (see note 16).

<sup>13</sup> Other factors that contributed to transgenderism's social penetration were the successful packaging of LGB and T and the appropriation of the image of medical support for gender identity disorder.



have been a cis-man. This composite attribute is hypothetical, and, therefore, not an attribute possessed only by cis-men. However, it is at least one attribute that cis-men must possess. A cis-man, who is both physically and mentally male, has no reason to be assigned a metaphysical gender other than man. Therefore, the metaphysical gender that  $x$  on the left-hand side would have to be “man” without question. In other words, B2 is considered an accurate formulation.

The same is true for the W-version.

The metaphysical “true gender” appearing on the left-hand side may or may not coincide with either physical sex or gender identity. In any case, B2 has both M- and W-versions, so you can apply and test the version you are more likely to think of yourself. You will see that B2 offers a view of gender that no one of any sex or gender identity can disagree with.

Now let’s see what we can conclude from B1 and B2.

Let me suggest the following to Ms. Q, who is MtF: “Imagine a situation in which you are cisgender. Retaining other matters as real as possible.”

The idea is to imagine “a possible world in which only the minimum of things associated with the relevant counterfactual situation differ from the real world,” that is, “a minimal departure world” (Ryan, 1991, Stalnaker, 1968, Lewis, 1972).<sup>14</sup> What kind of person would Q imagine being?

Q has two options. One is to think of the MtM state, in which one’s gender identity is M, and the other is to think of the FtF state, in which one is born without a Y chromosome and with the female primary sexual characteristics. Which is easier? Which is easier to imagine “what kind of person I am?” What preserves the essential identity of Q?

This is a test to determine whether one imagines the match by aligning the mind with M or the body with F. Q’s answer is one of the following:

Answer 1: “I was born with a male body, but being cisgender means that I do not feel gender dysphoria. In other words, I grew up with a ‘male mind’. So, my body has a penis as it is now, and my gender identity is in line with this.”

Answer 2: “I was born with a female mind, so being cisgender means that I was born with a female body. So, my gender identity is female in its current state, and my body has a hymen that matches it.”<sup>15</sup>

These two answers correspond to the results of Q, applying the M- and W-versions of B2. That is, if Q really believes herself to be a woman, she would apply the W-version of B2 to herself and choose “answer 2” above; if Q, contrary to her self-identification, really believes herself to be a man, he would choose “answer 1.” Neither of these violates B2. Let us examine which of answer 1 and answer 2 is more appropriate.

Q, who is MtF, is nonbinary and genderfluid, according to B1. Therefore, even if one happens to

<sup>14</sup> If the “relevant counterfactual situation” is actually not counterfactual but factual, then the minimal departure world becomes the real world itself.

<sup>15</sup> Answer 2 does not mean that “Q is currently seeking sex reassignment surgery to acquire a feminine body.” It merely means that Q believes that being a woman in body and mind is the ontological state of her “cisgender self,” and “cisgender” is not supposed to have evaluative connotations.

be fully trans and an extreme being with no in-betweenness or vacillation in gender identity, one must choose answer 1 or 2 as the answer that would work if one were to become a typical nonbinary and genderfluid person. Since we are not being asked about personal convenience, but rather the legitimacy of transgenderism is being tested, it stands to reason that we must respond with an answer that is generally valid.

With this in mind, answer 2 proves to be unreasonable. It should be possible that “I must have had a woman’s mind since birth” and “my gender identity is currently female” are only superficial facts of the present, and that potentially, her gender identity swings between the arbitrary intermediate states of male and female. In fact, it could start swinging the next day. If we are to imagine, in accordance with answer 2, including such a situation, we must imagine that “gender identity is nonbinary and genderfluid, and the body is in the right state that matches it.” Such a body is impossible, even in the world of science fiction.<sup>16</sup> However, answer 1 is easy to imagine since it only means that one’s gender identity is stable as nonbinary and genderfluid in its extreme form, but the extreme form is opposite to reality, and one’s body matches it.

Thus, for Q’s answer to be reasonable, it must be answer 1. In other words,

<If Q were cisgender, then Q would be a cis-man>.

According to B2, this was a necessary and sufficient condition for Q to be a man. Thus, Q is a man.

Since the metaphysical gender that applies to Q must apply to any MtF, we conclude that, in general, “all MtF are men.” The statement “trans women are women” is false. End of proof.

The validity of answer 1 applies not only to people who are MtF in reality but also to FtM, cisgender people, and typical nonbinary, genderfluid people who are not extreme. In other words, answer 1 was easy for everyone. Answer 2 is not. To confirm this, let us examine answers 1 and 2 for real-life nonbinary, genderfluid, and cisgender people.

Suppose a nonbinary or genderfluid person is asked, “If you were cisgender ....”

Answer 1: “That’s a scenario where I would remain in this body and have a gender identity consistent with it.”

Answer 2: “That’s a scenario where I would remain in this gender identity and have a body consistent with it.”

As we have already seen in the counterfactual self-answering in Q, the content of answer 1 is clear; however, in answer 2, it is unclear what kind of body one would have to fit this scenario.

It would be appropriate to ask the cisgender the dual form of B2 so that the question becomes counterfactual and hypothetical. Suppose a cis-woman were asked, “If you were transgender...”

Answer 1: “That would be a scenario in which I would have a male gender identity while still in

<sup>16</sup> Some may envision disorders of sex development as a physical condition that corresponds to nonbinary. However, it is rarely the case in reality that a person with a disorder of sex development, whether of the chromosomal or hormonal variety, is nonbinary in his or her gender identity. And in any case, there is no physical condition that corresponds to gender fluidity. Furthermore, even if a state of mind-body congruence could be secured by both mind and body oscillating in tandem, this would raise the unnecessary question of whether such a secured state deserves to be called “cisgender” or not. These are the reasons why it is not necessary to generalize B1 and B2 by B3 addition or B0 integration (Note 12).

my current female body.”

Answer 2: “It would be a scenario in which I would have a male body while maintaining my current female gender identity.”

Answer 1 describes a scenario that could occur the next day. In contrast, answer 2 is nothing more than an unrealistic fantasy.<sup>17</sup>

This suggests that B2 can be extended to include a version of “if I were cisgender” as well as “if I were transgender.” In other words, it can strengthen B2 as follows.

B2\* The necessary and sufficient condition for individual x to be a man is as follows: If x were cisgender, then x would be a cis-man; if x were transgender, x would be a trans woman.

The necessary and sufficient condition for individual x to be a woman is as follows: If x were cisgender, then x would be a cis-woman; if x were transgender, then x would be a trans man.

Thus, answer 1 was universally accepted.

Applying Q’s answer 1 to the diagram in B2\*, the following proposition S is confirmed.

S: If Q were cisgender, then (by the only valid answer, 1) Q would be a cis-man; if Q were transgender, then (as is the case in reality) Q would be a trans woman.

By checking S against B2\*, we find that Q is a man. B2\* is a stronger proposition with more sub-conditions required for determining a person’s metaphysical gender than B2; however, it still leads to the same conclusion as B2 about transgender people. Q is still a man, and “trans women are women” in general is once again confirmed to be false.

Counterfactual argument B, which is considered in this section, is merely a somewhat rigorous confirmation of common sense. Common sense is as follows: If gender is an identity, it must be a stable attribute, and even more so if it is a metaphysical identity. Therefore, gender identity, which is ambiguous or fluctuating, cannot be considered an individual’s identity. Physical sex, which remains unchanged throughout life, can be an individual’s identity or metaphysical gender.

It is important to note that argument B does not rely on the following auxiliary metaphysical premise. “All of you in the Minimal Departure Worlds are trans-world-identified by the identity of your bodies, not by the similarity or continuity of your mental properties or memories.” Rather, it relies on the following empiricist auxiliary premise: “Each of you in the Minimal Departure Worlds,

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<sup>17</sup> One might object that answer 2 also states a matter that could happen tomorrow. One could say, “Tomorrow, I could undergo sex reassignment surgery and get a male body, causing gender dysphoria and becoming transgender.” However, (1) surgery does not really make your body a male body, (2) the possibility that you would be willing to undergo surgery against your will is minuscule, and (3) even if surgery creates a gender incongruence between body and mind, that state cannot be called “transgender” in the usual sense. Another possible objection is that you may find out through chromosome testing that you were really a male. This assumes that you have a disorder of sex development and that your sex and gender identity were mismatched without you being aware of it. But since your gender identity is likely to be affected by the knowledge of the medical truth, the condition of the minimal departure worlds of “remaining a female gender identity” is broken. Once you know your true physical sex, your gender identity will get to be congruent to that sex.

as in the real world, can vary the contents of your mind in response to your environment, but the biological sex of your body does not vary in response to your environment.” This statement cannot be disagreed with.

#### Section 4 Challenges for transgenderism?

If Functional argument A is correct, the proposition that individuals have a gender different from their biological sex is a category mistake and cannot be substantiated, except in illusion. In other words, transgenderism is meaningless.

Even if we assume that argument A is incorrect and that individuals may have gender as a personal attribute in their true identity, according to argument B, trans women are men. In other words, transgenderism does not form a consistent cognitive system. Either way, the “gender identity” doctrine of transgenderism is shown to be invalid.

If argument B always holds when argument A cannot be used, i.e., if these two arguments cover all cases, then the constructive dilemma leads to the unconditional conclusion that “transgenderism cannot be true.”

The only way for transgenderism to refute this conclusion is to prove that arguments A and B are wrong. However, identifying the specificity of this error is extremely difficult. To refute argument A, it would be better if “gender” could be defined as a function in which the individual is one of the inputs and gender expression is the output, but it is unlikely that such a definition can be constructed consistently (at least without the anti-transgenderist implication of gender norm fixing).

By comparison, the policy of rejecting argument B is slightly more concrete. There are almost certainly only two ways to deny argument B. One is to deny B2, i.e., to question the validity of the method of determining the true attributes of actual sexual minorities by considering counterfactual situations. The other is the denial of B1, i.e., the refusal to recognize two kinds of gender identity, nonbinary and genderfluid, as a general form of gender identity.

The first policy denies the assumption that each individual maintains identity in counterfactual situations, which is tantamount to the belief that humans do not have counterfactual fulfillment. Above all, this implies the denial of human free will. The fact that individual human beings have counterfactual multidimensionality, including free will, is usually held as an *a priori* premise, even if it appears to be denied by precise philosophical analysis. If one were to *a priori* reject the standard view of the human being only for a subject such as transgenderism and limit the discussion to a monolithic and fatalistic framework, one could be forgiven for suspecting that some kind of sexual bias is at work. The blind special treatment of transgender subjects is ethically undesirable.<sup>18</sup>

Three difficulties can be pointed out with the second policy, regarding nonbinary and genderfluid as special rather than general forms of gender identity. First, the assumption that cis- and transgender are general forms, which is only stable in terms of gender dualism, is contrary to the observed fact that gender identity is reported to fluctuate in reality.

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<sup>18</sup> The situation in which gender suffers unfounded specialization among trans culture has already occurred. The tendency for only transgender people to be officially recognized, while trans-racial and trans-age people are not, is already a gender specialization and can be a source of reinforcing sexism; see Brubaker, 2016.

Second, even if nonbinary and genderfluid are special rather than general forms, we must recall that it was not only nonbinary and genderfluid who had to choose answer 1, but cisgender as well. To insist that only transgender people should choose answer 2 in this context would be to unnecessarily single out transgender people. Ad hoc measures to make up “gender identity supremacism just for the sake of full transgenders” must be avoided.

Third, singling out nonbinary and genderfluid and excluding them from the normative gender perspective of transgenderism seems to contradict the basic stance of inclusive gender identity respect. Transgenderism’s worldview should have been that the assumption of a “social system relying on stable gender dualism” is an illusion, and the attitude of not considering nonbinary and genderfluid as the standard form is nothing but transgenderism’s self-denial. The denial of B1, which recognizes only fully trans people as “real trans” and pushes nonbinary and genderfluid people to the margins, will reduce the desire for solidarity among the quantitative core of trans people and lead to a decline of the trans rights movement.

Regarding argument B, I remind you of the precepts of all of the above combined. Let us reformulate this in the form of a question to cisgender people, who make up the majority of trans allies.

By “If you were not cisgender...”

- a. You imagine shifting your gender identity while maintaining your actual physical sex.
- b. You imagine shifting your physical sex while maintaining your gender identity.

In case b, you can imagine that you are transgender, but you can no longer imagine that you are nonbinary or genderfluid. Excluding certain types of sexual minorities, even in the imagination, would be undeniably discriminatory and an unacceptable position to take as an ally.

Therefore, we must choose a. Human beings have their physical sex as a default value but have ambiguous psychological tendencies, such as gender identity as a parameter. Reverse initialization is not possible. You cannot change your physical sex (even in your imagination) while retaining who you are and being yourself.

Gender is an attribute of the body (nothing more, nothing less), not of the mind. The mind has no gender framework and is free. It is only the body that is framed and crippled (thus constituting sexual identity).<sup>19</sup>

As stated above, the two arguments presented in this paper point out that applying the concept of gender to individuals in the form of “gender identity” is a category mistake (argument A), and that even after generously acknowledging the possibility of transgenderism, namely giving individuals some attribute that strengthens “gender identity” in a metaphysical way, the interpretation that makes the proposition “trans women are women” true cannot be obtained (argument B). Unless transgenderism can meet this dual challenge, it will be extremely difficult to provide transgender people with

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<sup>19</sup> The same can be said about sexual orientation. Sexual orientation in which the object of sexual love is determined by the object’s physical sex is stable and constitutes the identity of the subject. Sexual orientation, in which the object of sexual love is determined by gender identity and other “genders,” does not constitute the identity of the subject, because the gender judgment is not necessarily stable in the subject himself/herself and cannot be identified from the outside.

support methods other than conversion therapy (psychotherapy).<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Unlike conversion therapy for homosexuals, conversion therapy for transgender persons does not correct the person’s sexual behavior or gender expression. It is a therapy that discourages poor gender reassignment and restores a consistent worldview by correcting cognitive distortions surrounding gender concepts. See Miura, 2022a. The “diagnosis by exclusion” associated with the diagnosis of gender identity disorder is a form of conversion therapy.