

論文の内容の要旨

論文題目

Polarizing Diplomacy: How Partisanship Has Influenced Japanese and
U.S. Policy toward China

(分極化する外交政策：党派心が日米の対中国政策に与える影響について)

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Even as it becomes more apparent that domestic politics influences a state's international behavior, the role of political parties on state behavior still does not get the consideration it deserves. Understanding the relationship between political parties and state behavior means understanding the role that parties play in shaping the choices available to decision makers, in other words, partisanship can influence the political space available to decision makers as they navigate foreign policy choices. Partisanship, defined as the bias towards and identity with one's own party and dislike towards opposing parties, operationalizes domestic attitudes, interests, cleavages, and ideational preferences but most importantly structurally connects foreign policy decision makers with domestic voters and stakeholders. When parties and voters become polarized, or increasingly opposed to one another, the need for parties to create and exploit differences between themselves incentivizes them to emphasize difference rather than pursue interests. This drive to create, emphasize, and exploit differences makes it harder for foreign policy decision makers to build coalitions or at least count on opposition acquiescence and raises the political costs for making the "wrong" choice, the result of which limit the choices and political space available to decision makers. Understanding the behavior of competing states or the geopolitical context, as realism emphasizes, is only half of the equation for understanding state behavior – the other half is to understand the reasons why states respond to those contexts the ways that they do.

The aim of the current study is to demonstrate how domestic political partisanship can account for the advances in the literature and explain the decision making of foreign policy elites in ways that previous explanations could not. This study will explain how the literature has shown that domestic political culture explains the formation of state preferences more than only the international strategic context which is most often used to explain preference formation. The findings from this research requires that

considerations of domestic-foreign linkages move past simply identifying self-interested moves, as game theory and linkage studies would demand and focus more on domestic political contexts. Qualitative methodology is the only way to illuminate the narratives and ideas that permeate the ways in which perceptions are formed in foreign policy decision making. This study will begin by outlining the literature on the linkages between domestic politics and foreign policy making to understand the state of current work on these topics. While there has been important work completed on these subjects, they are often too focused on discrete negotiations and crises and rely too heavily on rationalist assumptions of the pursuit of material interests.

The study will then explore partisanship and polarization and will demonstrate how both are essential to understanding foreign policy choice despite being only thinly linked to policy and ideological preferences. What matters instead is the nature and degree in difference of opinions between people, including decision makers, identifying with a given party. This section will draw on literature emphasizing the oppositional aspects of political partisanship rather than its rationalist or instrumentalist aspects. In periods of intense polarization, partisanship even becomes essential to the self-concept and people rely on parties and party elites to understand their own position on a given issue, making divisions between parties essential for understanding the political landscape. In the United States at least, differences between the parties are exaggerated in the minds of the public and for highly salient issues where public opinion is more forcefully brought to bear, this can create a feedback mechanism whereby decision makers become more responsive to public opinion on issues that decision makers have sought to distinguish a difference. This section makes the important qualification that partisanship varies across time and place – while much literature has focused on the polarizing politics of the United States, it is not representative of the whole of liberal democracies and to that end Japan will be considered to understand the variations between partisan dynamics.

This study will investigate its argument by considering Japanese and U.S. perceptions of China since 1994. Japan and the United States are selected because they are liberal democracies whose politics are organized around parties but with differing partisan and voter dynamics, perceptions of China are selected both countries' relationships with China touch on aspects that are essential to almost every political actor in the United States and Japan – economic, security, normative, and more. Both countries have foreign policy networks that favor engagement and that favor confrontation, and all with deferent biases and preferences that will make a comparison between Japan and the United States especially fruitful. 1994 is a significant year for partisan politics for several reasons. For one, both countries were visibly beginning to move on from the Cold War political consensus that governed their foreign policies for the preceding forty years. In the United States, this meant the “Republican Revolution” with the election of Newt Gingrich as speaker of the house and a wave of conservative Republicans elected to Congress and institutionalizing the polarizing trends that had been setting in for the past twenty years. In Japan, the Liberal Democratic Party had found itself out of government for the first time since 1955 and electoral reform was passed to (among other things) create a system of ideologically defined parties alternating in power like that of the United States and United Kingdom. China was also transforming between the economic liberalization of Deng Xiaoping, the impact of the Tiananmen Square massacre, the internalization of lessons for military reform from what it saw as its humiliation in the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis, all forming the landscape for its ascension to great power status.

Across the entire period, decision makers' choices were guided by advocates of specific policy directions. These “foreign policy networks” may be thought of as a conceptual tool to understand how preferences become ascendent at a given moment, illuminating both processes of change and the influence of political parties on foreign policymaking. These networks are guided not only by preferences of “engage” or

“confront” or “hawks” or “doves” but also by different motivations for these preferences which almost as important for distinguishing them from one another as are their preferences themselves. These networks reflect not only economic or sectoral interests but also act as expressions of the national self-concept and articulate how each country perceives itself and its role in the world.

These networks are rooted in each country’s self-image rather than only material and parochial interests. They provide a framework for how decision makers see the world and a link to an ideational tradition that provides guidance and sometimes even legitimacy. Arguments in favor of economic engagement were not rooted only in personal enrichment, but also in a genuine belief that engagement could change the relationship for the better. As a result, they connect material interests with ideational traditions and philosophies in ways that current explanations of foreign-domestic linkages cannot account for.

This will help overcome the contradiction that while partisanship may be a strong identification with one’s party and antagonism toward opposing parties, but foreign policy choices are not neatly bifurcated into two opposing and dialectical camps. The challenge for foreign policy decision makers is to assert multilayered and complex preferences into political systems that are based around oppositional organizations. By organizing decision makers into loosely defined foreign policy camps it will be possible to better understand how foreign policy choices are made against the backdrop of the domestic political context and the geopolitical situation.

It will be seen that decision makers are compelled to act as mediators among the various foreign policy networks and their preferences with their freedom to choose dictated by a combination of the geopolitical situation, leadership ability, political space. Where the first two factors have been well accounted for in the literature, this study will address the final factor – political space – and argue that it is bound by the domestic political context and more specifically by partisan polarization. This influence goes deeper than simply audience costs or public opinion into the influence and popularity of certain key stakeholders, how decision makers themselves perceive and understand public opinion, the accumulated legacy of past administrations’ policies, and more. Partisan politics will be seen to have influenced decision maker choices in ways that are not explained by geopolitics or leadership. In both Japan and the United States, changes in Chinese behavior were essential to understanding the development of each country’s “China policy” but domestic politics is responsible for setting which policy choices are available to decision makers.

More clearly understanding the political space before them and how the preferences of their international partners can evolve means that decision makers can focus on the achievable rather than the aspirational. By delinking preferences from parties, it will be possible for decision makers to better understand and anticipate how a country’s foreign policies will shift instead of assuming that they will change depending on the party in power. Rather than focusing on political parties themselves, observers can look towards the level of polarization, proximate advisors, and leadership capacity and political space (as well as the geostrategic context) to better understand how an administration’s preferences may form. This is admittedly a convoluted formula but offers a more clear and more grounded perspective on the decision making nature of a given administration. It is also not as complicated as it may seem since it simply requires observers to focus on different mechanisms than those which they may already be focused on.

Most important of all is that partisanship does not shape preferences on its own but circumscribes the field in which choices are made, a concept that this study refers to as “political space.” Highly polarized environments see leaders enjoying limited space while environments with less polarization see more political space available to leaders. Partisanship is of course not the only variable that influences political space, but it is the one that has been so far underexplored in international relations literature and more

misapplied in political science literature that focuses on foreign policy decision making. This study's argument is not that partisanship usurps things like the geostrategic context or leadership but that it should take a rightful place alongside variables such as these when we try to understand the nexus of foreign policymaking and domestic politics.

The findings also make clear the importance of process to decision making. The most successful administrations (in the sense that they articulated and pursued a consistent, clear vision that guided their decision making) had minimal infighting and largely had a common vision with the executive. Those that faced the most difficult times suffered from almost the exact opposite – unclear and inconsistent visions, competition and infighting among key decision makers, and muddled decision making structures. While a nod to the “Team of Rivals” hypothesis can allow for the possibility that constructive rivalry among decision makers can make for better policymaking, the case studies discussed here often present evidence that competition created confusion rather than clarity.

This also points towards the importance of optimizing the political space that is available. While it is easy to surrender political space, usually irrevocably, it is much harder to gain it. The leaders who were most able to build political space for themselves either enjoyed public support for their approach, saw the most contentious political debates deflected onto another issue, or enjoyed an unusual period of relative calm in domestic politics. In all cases, the freedom they enjoyed was more the result of circumstance than leadership, but most all were able to optimize the space to achieve policy gains that may not have been possible otherwise.