

The Evolution of *Bhāvanā* and *Niyoga*: How to Analyze the Vedic Injunction *Yajeta*?*

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Abstract

The present article investigates two parallel oppositions, one between Bādari and Jaimini, and another between Prabhākara and Kumārila, and their interrelationship, as originally suggested by K.S. Rāmasvāmi Śāstrī. My focus will be on the different interpretations of the Vedic injunction *svargakāmo yajeta*. As Śabara observes in his comments to JS 3.1.3, Bādari construes the Vedic injunction *yajeta* literally as *yāgaṃ kuryāt*. His understanding presupposes that the sacrifice expressed with the accusative ending—which usually denotes the most desired thing—is the end to be accomplished (*kartavya*). According to Jaimini, by contrast, *svargakāmo yajeta* can be paraphrased as *yāgena svargaṃ kuryāt*, with the instrumental ending denoting the most efficacious means toward the end. He regards heaven, expressed in the word *svargakāmaḥ*, as the most important motivation for people to undertake an action and therefore as the most desired end to be accomplished. Sacrifice is conducive to heaven and thus regarded as a means to attain it. This opposition between Bādari and Jaimini lays the foundation for the later bipartite development of Mīmāṃsā. Essentially following Bādari's view, the adherents of the theory of dharma-manifestation (*dharmābhivyakti*) construe the injunction as *yāgaṃ* (= *yāgābhivyaṅgyam apūrvam*) *kuryāt*. This interpretation,

which presupposes an eternal dharma that needs to be made manifest through the performance of sacrifice, enables them to explain the causal relationship between a past sacrifice and its future result. Later upholders of dharma-manifestation, trying to avoid the undesirable consequence that the eternal dharma might in this way become commonly accessible (*sādhāraṇa*) to everyone, explain that a difference between manifested objects can only arise through a difference of their manifestors (*abhivyañjakabheda*) in order to explain that only the respective manifestor attains the result. Jaimini's followers, by contrast, postulate an imperceptible effect of sacrifice (*adr̥ṣṭa*) in order to reconcile the conflict between the transiency of sacrifice and its causal relationship with future heaven. Further developing the view of Jaimini, Śābara regards *yajeta* as essentially causative and interprets it as *yāgena svargaṃ bhāvayet*. Whereas Śābara still uses *bhāva* (*svargo bhavati*) and *kriyā* (*svargaṃ kuryāt*), the old notions of activity, together with his new concept, *bhāvanā* (*svargaṃ bhāvayet*), Kumārila distinguishes the three from each other, clarifies their presupposed structures, and consistently makes the theory causative-oriented. He regards the causative structure as inherent in all actions and applies it to the analysis of Vedic injunction (*vidhi*) too, thus introducing the notion of *śabdātmikā bhāvanā*. Prabhākara, whom we can regard essentially as a descendant of Bādari's tradition and not Jaimini's in regard to his core doctrine of *niyoga*, construes *yajeta* as *yāgaviśayam niyogaṃ kuryāt*. One should realize the imperative (*niyoga*) which commands one to carry out the sacrifice. Jaimini's view, by contrast, culminates in Maṇḍana's view that the exhortative (*līn*) conveys that the action is a means for the desired end (*iṣṭābhyupāyatva*). Therefore, Maṇḍana goes further than Jaimini in the utilitarian interpretation of the Veda, diminishing the deontology emphasized by Prabhākara. The genealogy of *bhāvanā* and *niyoga* scrutinized on the basis of different paraphrases of

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yajeta demonstrates that Kumāṛila's view is a natural extension of Śabara's theory of *bhāvanā* and that Prabhākara's *niyoga* theory, which is essentially incompatible with Śabara's view, should be regarded as a development of a modified version of the *dharma-abhivṛyakti-vāda* and is thus ultimately rooted in Bādari's view.

Introduction

The main task for Mīmāṃsakas is to analyze the entire Vedic ritual into elements such as action (*karman*), material entity (*dravya*), and quality (*guṇa*) in a consistent way, and to confirm the structure of the ritual so analyzed—for example the relationship between the principal (*pradhāna*) and the subordinate (*guṇa*, *śeṣa*)—on the basis of Vedic injunctions. Mīmāṃsakas justify their views of ritual by extracting fitting ideas conformed to the Veda. Their ultimate goal, as they claim, is the correct understanding of dharma enjoined by the Veda, and this is carried out through a proper investigation of dharma (*dharmajijñāsā*), which requires an exegetically systematic understanding of the primary source of dharma, i.e., the Veda itself. As Jayanta puts it, Mīmāṃsā is essentially an investigation of the meanings of Vedic sentences (*vedavākyaṛthavicārātmikā*).¹ By referring to the Mīmāṃsā scheme of *kaṛaṇa* and *itīkartavyatā*, Kumāṛila describes the Veda as the main cause (*kaṛaṇa*) of understanding dharma, and Mīmāṃsā as the subsidiary cause or “how-to-do” (*itīkartavyatā*), which assists the Veda to convey the

* In Kataoka 2011a (in Japanese), I discussed many sources dealt with here in sections 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7. Sections 3 and 6 are also based on Kataoka 2000. Section 7 partially uses the material of Kataoka 2001. I express my gratitude to George Cardona, Patrick Cummins, Elisa Freschi, Akane Saito, Elliot Stern, John Taber, and Somdev Vasudeva for their comments. This research was partly supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 20K00056. Parts of this manuscript, i.e. sections 1 and 2, were read out at a colloquium organized by Shishir Saxena, then a PhD candidate at the University of Cambridge, on 11 November 2016.

¹ NM I 6.13-14=Kataoka 2007:180(147).2-3.

meanings.² Just as a jewel is made radiant by a light, so the understanding of Vedic meanings is made to shine forth by the science of Mīmāṃsā.³ The Veda requires Mīmāṃsā as an indispensable assistant.

The Mīmāṃsā tradition regards the Veda and its corresponding meaning, i.e., dharma, as eternal and fixed. This does not mean, however, that all Mīmāṃsakas have understood the meaning of the Veda in the same way. The same jewel appears differently in different hues of light. The history of Mīmāṃsā shows us that the understanding of Vedic sentences differs considerably among different exegetes. Mīmāṃsakas have different interpretations of the same Vedic injunction because they have different views of Vedic ritual. For Mīmāṃsakas, interpreting the Veda begins from the stock example, “one who desires heaven should sacrifice” (*svargakāmo yajeta*). The differences among Mīmāṃsakas in the interpretation of this sentence reflect differences in their philosophical approaches to the enterprise of interpretation.

In the following I focus on the different interpretations of this injunction, shed light on their presupposed views of Vedic ritual and injunction, investigate their historical and theoretical relationships, and clarify their genealogy. The main framework of the investigation elaborates the parallel opposition between Bādari and Jaimini⁴ and Prabhākara and Kumārila, first demonstrated by K.S. Rāmasvāmi Śāstrī.⁵ There is evidence that Prabhākara’s views follow in the tradition of Bādari’s

² *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* (quoted at NM I 7.1–2=Kataoka 2007:180(147).5–6) : *dharme pramīyamāṇe tu vedena karaṇātmanā/ itikartavyatābhāgaṃ mīmāṃsā pūrayiṣyati//*. See a note by Kataoka 2007 for other references.

³ *ŚV pratijñā 9: mīmāṃsāsāstratejobhir viśeṣeṇojvalikṛte/ vedārthajñānaratne me tṛṣṇāṭīva vijrmbhate//*.

⁴ Throughout this paper, when I refer to the views of Bādari and Jaimini, I intend those views as articulated in the Mīmāṃsā tradition, primarily as it is represented in Śabara’s commentary.

interpretation that coexisted with Jaimini's and persisted through Śabara's time and beyond. This study also provides more insight into the long disputed issue of Prabhākara's position in the history of Mīmāṃsā, in particular in relation to Śabara.⁶

1. Bādari's action-centered view

1.1. *Yajeta* paraphrased as *yāgaṃ kuryāt*

The most straightforward interpretation of the Vedic injunction *yajeta* is *yāgaṃ kuryāt*.⁷ Its equivalent paraphrase *yāgaḥ kartavyaḥ* is referred to by Śabara as follows:

ŚBh ad 3.1.3 (660.12) : *yāgas tāvat kartavyaḥ puruṣasya*.

First, a sacrifice is what must be done by man.⁸

According to this interpretation, which we can attribute to Bādari as ŚBh ad 3.1.3 records, *yāga* is considered the most desired end to be attained. As Śabara states, "It (sacrifice) is the aim of man." (ŚBh ad 3.1.3 (661.1) : *sa hi puruṣārthaḥ*.)⁹ There is no higher goal than the accomplishment of a sacrifice. A result (*phala*) such as heaven (*svarga*) expressed in the word *svargakāmaḥ* is not regarded

⁵ Rāmasvāmi Śāstrī 1956 Introduction XXV. Yozhimizu 2021 criticizes his view.

⁶ For a survey of previous studies of Mīmāṃsā, see Kataoka 2011a.

⁷ See Cardona 1975 for Indian views of paraphrase and sentence analysis. He calls *devadattaḥ pākāṃ karoti*, which is a paraphrase of *devadattaḥ pacati*, P₂ paraphrase, distinguishing it from other types of paraphrase, P₁ (*devadattaḥ kumbhaṃ karoti=devadattena kumbhaḥ kriyate*) and P₃ (*devadattaniṣṭhā pākānukūlā bhāvanā*).

⁸ I construe *puruṣasya* as a subjective genitive. For the meaning of *kartavya*, see also Pāṇini 3.3.171: *krtyās ca (āvaśyakādharmaṃyayoḥ 170)*.

⁹ In another context dealing with *pradhānakarman* and *guṇakarman*, Śabara refers to Grammarians' notion *kartur īpsitatamam karma* (Pāṇini 1.4.49). There he discusses the

as the principal element (*pradhāna*) for the sake of which a subservient element (*śeṣa*) is enjoined.¹⁰

ŚBh ad 3.1.3 (660.12–661.3) : *na hi tasmin [=yāge] nirvartite kiṃcid aṅparam asti kartavyam. ...*

*sa tu na kiṃcid abhinirvatayitum kriyate. phalam aṅpi na **tena** [=yāgena] kriyate.*

For once the [sacrifice] is accomplished, there is nothing more to be achieved. ... But the [sacrifice] is not performed in order to achieve something. Even the result is not achieved by that [sacrifice].

In other words, a sacrifice is not a means for achieving a result. Therefore, a different paraphrase such as *yāgena svargam kuryāt*, which contains *yāgena* in the instrumental case and *svargam* in the accusative, is not admissible for Bādari. Śabara explains as follows:

ŚBh ad 3.1.3 (661.4) : *nāsti “**yāgena** kriyate **phalam**” iti.*

There is no [testimony] which says: a result is produced by means of a sacrifice.

guṇa-pradhāna-relationship between a material entity and an action (*karman*→*dravya* or *dravya*→*karman*). ŚBh ad 2.1.10: *dviṭyā vibhaktiḥ kartur īpsitatame smaryate*. “The accusative ending is taught as denoting what is most desired to be attained for the agent.” (Also relevant here is A 2.3.2: *karmani dviṭyā*.) The principal element is described as *īpsitatama*. ŚBh ad 2.1.7: *dravyaṃ hi guṇabhūtam, karmanirvṛtter īpsitatamatvāt*. “For a material entity has the status of being subsidiary, because the accomplishment of an action is the most desired thing to be attained.”

¹⁰ Bold emphasis in the quotations below indicates that the expression emphasized is of key significance.

1.2. The arising of a result

It is, however, not the case that Bādari denies the arising of a result for a sacrificer. It will arise, but only spontaneously.

ŚBh ad 3.1.3 (661.3-4) : *tasmims [=yāge] tu kṛte svayam eva tad bhavati. tasmīn kṛte phalam asya bhavati etāvad gamyate.*

But once the [sacrifice] has been carried out, the [result] arises just spontaneously. People only understand this much, that a result arises for him after he has done the [sacrifice].

Bādari intends to deny the view that the Veda warrants the subservience (*śeṣatva*) of *yāga* to *svarga* (*yāga*→*svarga*), the interpretation which can be expressed by the instrumental case *yāgena* and the accusative case *svargam*. It is not heaven but a sacrifice itself that is the goal. Heaven is just an object of desire (*kāma*, *icchā*) which functions as what may be called a *nimitta* or motive and which bestows an eligibility (*adhikāra*) upon the sacrificer (*yajamāna*).

ŚBh ad 3.1.3 (661.7) : *svargaṃ pratīcchāmātreṇa svargakāma iti bhavati.*

He is called *svargakāma* merely by his desire for heaven.

The desire for heaven is a motive for the agent who desires heaven (*svargakāma*) in the case of the *kāmya* type of ritual just as other *nimittas* such as living (*jīvana*) expressed with *yāvajjīvam* are in the case of the *nitya* type of ritual. The Vedic statement *svargakāmo yajeta* enjoins human beings to accomplish the sacrifice if they desire heaven. One is called *svargakāma* solely because of a desire aimed towards *svarga*, and nothing more,¹¹ that is, not also because *svarga* is

promised to be a result produced by the performance of a rite.

1.3. *Yāga* as a principal element

I tentatively name this view of Bādari the action-centered view,¹² according to which an action such as *yāga* is regarded as the principal element (*pradhāna*). Bādari's view is a deontology and not utilitarian inasmuch as it does not consider that the Veda states a result as principal, although it admits that a result will arise for a sacrificer in the future as Śabara's above-quoted explanations *phalam asya bhavati* and *svayam eva tad bhavati* indicate (cf. section 1.2). We can also find a similar passage in the closely related section, ŚBh ad 6.1.3, where an opponent clearly echoes Bādari's view.¹³

1.4. Efficacy of a sacrifice

In this connection, it is interesting that an effort to justify the efficacy of a sacrifice is found on Bādari's side as described at ŚBh ad 6.1.1,¹⁴ where Śabara explains the view of an opponent that desire (*kāma, icchā*), as a kind of preexisting enti-

¹¹ Prabhākara clarifies that the word *svarga* mentioned in *svargakāmaḥ* is not the object to be accomplished but a mere qualifier of the agent. See *Bṛhatī* ad 3.1.3 (638.5-6) quoted in section 8.2.1.

¹² Adding the notion of *niyoga* which is totally absent in Bādari's original view as described by Śabara, Prabhākara summarizes Bādari's view at *Bṛhatī* ad 3.1.3 as follows (637.1-4) : *na niyogaṃ phale puruṣe ca manyate, yāga eva niyogaḥ, tannirvṛtṭyā ca niyoganirvṛtṭiḥ. dravyaḡuṇasaṃskāraiś ca yāgo nirvartyate. atas teṣāṃ eva pārārthyam—evaṃ manyate bādariś ācāryaḥ.* "It is not the case that he (Bādari) regards that the command is there with respect to a fruit or a human being. The command is there with respect to a sacrifice alone; and by accomplishing it the command is accomplished. And a sacrifice is accomplished by means of material entities, qualities and preparatory actions. Therefore, they alone are for the sake of other [elements]. This is what the teacher Bādari thinks."

¹³ ŚBh ad 6.1.3 (1353.11) : *atha matam—tataḥ svargo bhavatīti saṃbandhād idaṃ gamyata iti.* "Objection: we understand from the connection that heaven arises from the [action]." (See section 2.1.)

ty (*dravya*), is connected with the main action as a subordinate element (*guṇatvena*).

ŚBh ad 6.1.1 (1349.1–7) : (1) *katham punar avagamyate “yāgaḥ kartavyatayā codyate” iti, yadā kāmasyāpi kartavyatāsmād vākṛyād avagamyate.* (2) *ucyate. kāmasya kartavyatā vākṛyāt, yajyarthasya kartavyatā śruteḥ. śrutiś ca vākṛyād balīyasī. tasmād ayam arthaḥ—“svargakāmo yāgaḥ kuryāt” iti, “svargakāmasya yāgaḥ kartavyaḥ” iti.*

(3a) *kartavyaś ca sukhavān, akartavyo duḥkhavān.* (3b) *kartavya iti cainam brūte.* (3c) *tasmāt sukhaḥphalo yāgo bhaviṣyati,* (4) *sa tu “yasyecchā tasya sidhyati nānyasya” iti gamyate. tena svargecchā yāgasya guṇabhūtā.*

(1) [Jaimini:] But how is it understood that a sacrifice is ordained as something to be done, when a desired object, too, is understood from this sentence as something to be accomplished? (2) [Bādari:] Reply: That a desired object is something to be accomplished [is understood] from the [hermeneutic source called] ‘sentence’ (*vākya*), whereas the meaning of *yaj* as something to be done [is understood] from the ‘hearing’ (*śruti*), [i.e., direct mention in the sacred texts]. And, [generally speaking,] *śruti* is stronger than *vākya*. Therefore, this is the meaning: one who desires heaven should do a sacrifice, i.e., a sacrifice must be done for a person who desires heaven. (3a) And, [generally speaking,] something to be done is pleasurable, and something not to be done is painful. (3b) And [the Veda] refers to the [sacrifice] as something to be done. (3c) Therefore, a sacrifice will have

¹⁴ JS 6.1.1: *dravyāṇām karmasaṃyoge guṇatvenābhisambandhaḥ*/. For a translation, see Clooney 1990:183: “When materials are connected with actions, they are related to them as subordinate.”

pleasure as its fruit. (4) But we understand that the [sacrifice] is accomplished only for a person who has a desire, not somebody else. Therefore, the desire for heaven is an element subordinate to a sacrifice.

The first speaker, who can be assigned to Jaimini's side, presupposes the paraphrase of *svargakāmo yajeta* as *yāgena svargaṃ kuryāt*, whereas the second, who can be assigned to Bādari's side, presupposes the paraphrase of *svargakāmo yajeta* as *svargakāmo yāgaṃ kuryāt*. The first speaker derives his interpretation on the basis of 'sentence' (*vākya*), whereas the second does on the basis of 'hearing' (*śruti*). The second speaker claims that his interpretation is superior because 'hearing' of a single word *yajeta* is stronger than the 'sentence' consisting of multiple words *svargakāmo yajeta*.¹⁵ Then, anticipating a criticism from a utilitarian view of Jaimini that human effort is for the sake of pleasure (ŚBh ad 6.1.2: *prītyartham hi puruṣo yatate*), the view which is indicated by the word *tādathyāt* in JS 6.1.2, the second speaker pleads the efficacy of a sacrifice. But he does so not on the grounds of a Vedic statement but on the grounds of an independent inference on the human side, as the triple-tiered syllogism thereof (3abc) and as the future form *bhaviṣyati* indicate.

The defense of efficacy on Bādari's side is further depicted in ŚBh ad 6.1.3 (*siddhānta*). There, the second speaker explicitly makes mention of *arthāpatī* and claims that the sacrifice must have pleasure as its fruit (*yāgasya prītiḥ phalam*), that is, it must have a capacity (*sāmarthya*) for bringing about heaven, because otherwise the Vedic teaching would be pointless (*upadeśānarthakya*).

¹⁵ For the six *vinīyojakas* beginning with *śruti*, see Cardona 2017: 31–54.

ŚBh ad 6.1.3 (1353.15–1354.1) : (1) *atha manyate—upadeśānarthakyaṃ mā bhūd ity arthāpattir bhaviṣyatīti*. (2) *ucyate. nopadeśānarthakasyaitat sāmartyaṃ yad antareṇa phalavacanaṃ yāgasya prītiḥ phalam avagamyeta. kāmam asyānarthakyaṃ bhavet. na jātucit sāmartyam asya jāyate*. (3) *na hi dagdhukāmasyodakopādānam asati dāhe 'narthakam iti dahanaśaktim asya janayet*.

(1) One may think as follows: let us resort to *arthāpatti* out of fear that the Vedic teaching would be pointless. (2) We reply: the pointlessness of a Vedic teaching does not have the capacity to assume, without a statement of a result, that a sacrifice must have pleasure as its result. Let it (a Vedic teaching) be pointless. The capability [for such a postulation] never arises in it (a Vedic teaching). (3) For one cannot produce burning-capability in water even though the use of water is pointless unless it burns for a person who desires to burn.

The claim that a sacrificial action must be effective is rejected by Śabara by referring to a counter-example: even though water is useless for a person who desires to burn (*dagdhukāmasya*), nonetheless this does not generate in water the capacity to burn.

Thus, we can confirm that there must have been an effort on Bādari's side to justify the efficacy of a sacrifice without relying on a Vedic statement of a result. Bādari, who claims that the efficacy of a sacrifice is not attested in the Vedic scripture, has to resort to a logical inference on the human side that a sacrifice must be effective because there is a rule that something to be done is necessarily pleasurable (*kartavyaś ca sukhavān*), or to an *arthāpatti* that otherwise the Vedic teaching would be pointless. In both cases, as Bādari has to accept, the efficacy is not evidenced in the Veda.

1.5. Literal interpretation of *yajeta*: *śruti* vs *vākya*

Primarily, the Veda authoritatively enjoins human beings to do what must be done (*kartavya*). Here Bādari, or Śabara's prima facie interlocutor whose position appears harmonious with Śabara's rational reconstruction of Bādari's position ad JS 3.1.3, sticks to the literal interpretation of *yajeta*. Technically speaking, Bādari regards *śruti* as the *pramāṇa* for ascertaining the subservience in question.

As Śabara observes, the main defect of Bādari's view, exegetically speaking, is that it does not systematically take into consideration the result (*phala*, literally 'fruit'). Bādari's intention is described by Śabara as follows:

SBh ad 3.1.3 (661.4-7) : *nāsti śabdaḥ "yāgena kriyate phalam" iti. tasmād yāgo na śeṣabhūtaḥ kasyacid arthasya. ... "yaḥ svargaṃ kāmāyate sa yāgaṃ kuryāt" ity etāvac chabdenopadiśyate, na "ātmanah" "parasya" veti.*

There is no [Vedic] utterance which says that a sacrifice produces a fruit. Therefore, a sacrifice is not an element subservient to any other aim. ... What is taught by a [Vedic] utterance is merely "one who desires heaven must perform a sacrifice," not "[one who desires heaven] for oneself" or "for someone else."

As the paraphrase of *yajeta* as *yāgaṃ kuryāt* indicates, there is no single word in the Veda that shows the causal relationship between *yāga* and *svarga* (R_{ys}). Rather the 'hearing' of *yajeta* indicates that *yāga* is the principal aim to be accomplished. The paraphrase *yāgena svargaṃ kuryāt* is not acceptable for Bādari, because *yāga* is not prescribed as being for the sake of *svarga*. The Veda is explicit merely about the eligibility (E) that a person who desires heaven (*svargakāma*) is the agent

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of a sacrifice (*karṭr*); but it is not explicit about the relationship between *svarga* and *ṣpuruṣa* (R_{sp}), i.e., the agent who desires heaven.¹⁶ The Veda does not promise a reward for him. A person who desires heaven is merely directed to do a sacrifice regardless of whether he desires heaven *for* himself or someone else. A result arises just spontaneously, i.e., not by means of the sacrifice he performs, according to the Veda. At the best, it can be only postulated on the listener's side on the basis of inference or *arthāpatti* that the sacrifice must have heaven as its result.

Technically speaking, Bādari claims that there is no proof (*pramāṇa*), such as *śruti*, *līṅga* and *vākyā*, in the Veda to know the subservience (*śeṣatva*) of *yāga* to *phala* and that of *phala* to *ṣpuruṣa*. Rather, the words *yajeta* (= *yāgaṃ kuryāt*) and *svargakāmaḥ* (= *svargaṃ kāmāyate*) demonstrates the absence (✖) of the two instances of subservience. (R: relation; E: equal)

$$\begin{array}{ccc}
 & R_{ys} & \\
 \mathbf{yāga} & \text{--- ✖ ---} & \mathbf{svarga} \\
 | & & \mathbf{✖}_{R_{sp}} \\
 \mathbf{karṭr} & = & \mathbf{ṣpuruṣa} \text{ (=svargakāma)} \\
 & E &
 \end{array}$$

2. Jaimini's result-oriented view

2.1. Human effort for the sake of pleasure

Jaimini's view depicted by Śābara is exactly the opposite of that of Bādari. Jaimini claims that both subserviences, R_{ys} and R_{sp} , are warranted by the Veda, in particular by *vākyā*, though not *śruti*. A good result is evidently the principal motivation for people to undertake an action. Vedic rituals are no exception. People make efforts for the sake of pleasure (*prītyartham*). Having determined the denotation

¹⁶ ŚBh ad 3.1.3 (661.5) : *phalam api na ṣpuruṣaṃ praty upadiśyate*. "A result also is not taught [as intended] for a person."

of *svarga* as pleasure (*prīti*) and not a pleasurable material entity (*prītimad dravyam*), Śabara reveals Jaimini's utilitarian attitude when commenting on JS 6.1.2 (*asādhakam tu tādarthiyāt*)¹⁷ as follows:

ŚBh ad 6.1.2 (1351.1–4) : *prītivacanaś cet, yāgo guṇabhūtaḥ prītiḥ pradhānam. kutaḥ. tādarthiyāt puruṣaprayatnasya. prītyartham hi puruṣo yatate. tena na prītir yāgasāadhanam iti vijñāyate.*

If [the word “heaven”] denotes pleasure, a sacrifice is subordinate and pleasure is principal. Why? Because a human effort has it (pleasure) as its purpose. For a human being makes efforts for the sake of pleasure. Therefore, we understand that pleasure is not a means [to accomplish] a sacrifice.

People would not undertake an action without knowing that it leads to the intended result. What is lacking in Bādari's system is the Vedic warrant of the causal relationship between *yāga* and *svarga*.¹⁸ An agent would make efforts to do something while he desires something else. This is nonsense.

ŚBh ad 6.1.3 (1353.9–12): (1) *api ca yasya svarga iṣṭaḥ syāt sa yāgaṃ nirvartayed ity asambaddham iva, anyad icchaty anyat karoti.* (2) *atha matam—tataḥ svargo bhavatīti sambandhād idaṃ gamyata iti.* (3) *na śabdapramāṇakānām antareṇa śabdām avagatir nyāyyā.*

¹⁷ “However, [a material entity is sometimes] not a means [of pleasure and therefore is not something denoted by the word ‘heaven’], because [a human effort] has [pleasure] as its aim.” This translation follows Śabara's interpretation. For the original intention of JS, see Clooney 1990:183: “However, [actions] will not accomplish [their results without materials, since materials] are introduced for the purpose of that [accomplishment].”

¹⁸ Cf. also Clooney 1990:147.

(1) Furthermore, it appears to be incoherent to say that a person who desires heaven should accomplish a sacrifice. He desires one thing and he produces another. (2) Objection: we understand from the connection that heaven arises from it (a sacrifice). (3) [Reply:] It is inappropriate for those who accept utterance as the source of knowledge to understand [something] without an utterance.

As Śābara points out and as Bādari himself has to accept, it is not appropriate to postulate the efficacy of a sacrifice without a Vedic source in the project of Vedic exegesis. Bādari's position scrutinized closely can be summarized as follows: it is understood from the Veda that the result will arise for a sacrificer, but it is not accepted that the Veda prescribes the result as being produced by the sacrifice.

Veda	<i>svargakāmo yajeta = svargakāmo yāgaṃ kuryāt</i> = <i>yah svargaṃ ātmanah kāmāyate sa yāgaṃ kuryāt</i> <i>tasmīn kṛte svayam eva tad bhavati (=yāgena-kriyate phalam)</i> = <i>tasmīn kṛte phalam asya bhavatīty etāvad gamyate</i>
Man	Inference: <i>sukhaphalo yāgo bhaviṣyati</i> <i>Arthāpatti: yāgasya prītiḥ phalam avagamya</i> <i>Sambandha: tataḥ svargo bhavatīti gamyate</i>

2.2. Subservience of *yāga* to *svarga*

Opposing Bādari, Jaimini claims that an action is an element subservient (*śeṣa*) to a result. The conclusion at JS 6.1.1–3 that a sacrifice is for the sake of a result (*phalārthatva*) forms the basis of its subservience (*śeṣabhāva*).¹⁹

¹⁹ Cf. also ŚBh ad 3.1.4 (661.16–17): *enam evārtham ṣaṣṭhe 'dhyāye sūtrair eva sādhaiṣyati. iha tu tatsiddhenaiva phalārthatvena śeṣabhāvam yāgasypādāyati sma.* “[Jaimini] will establish the same thing precisely with sūtras in the sixth lesson. Here, however, he con-

JS 3.1.4: *karmāṇy api jaiminiḥ phalārthatvāt.*

Actions, too, according to Jaimini, [are subservient elements (*śeṣa*)], because they are for the sake of their results.

Heaven, too, is the principal element,²⁰ i.e., the goal to which other elements contribute. He interprets *svargakāmo yajeta* as *yāgena svargaṃ kuryāt*. Heaven, i.e., the object being desired, is the thing to be accomplished (*kartavya*) and a sacrifice is its means (*karāṇa*).²¹

ŚBh ad 3.1.4 (661.14–16) : *sa [=Jaiminir] hi dadarśa—na yāgaḥ kartavyatayā codyate, phalakāmasya tu tatsādhanopāyatveneti. evaṃ śruto ’rthaḥ parigrhīto bhaviṣyati, arthavāṃś copadeśaḥ.*

For he has shown: a sacrifice is not enjoined as something to be done. Rather it is [enjoined] as a means of its accomplishment for a person who desires a result. [Only] in this way the meaning directly heard [from the Veda] will come to be received (followed/observed) and the [Vedic] teaching will become fruitful.

Here a sacrifice is downgraded from the aim (*sādhyā*) to its means (*sādhana*)²²

cludes the subservience of a sacrifice on the ground of its being for the sake of its result which is precisely established there.”

²⁰ ŚBh ad 6.1.3 (1353.3–4): *ato na svargakāmapadena svārtho vidhīyate, kiṃ tarhy uddīṣyate.* “Therefore, the word *svargakāmaḥ* does not prescribe its own meaning [as something to be done], but rather presents it [as an aim].” The main reason is *upadeśavaiyarthya*. See ŚBh ad 6.1.3 (1353.2) quoted in section 2.3.

²¹ ŚBh ad 6.1.3 (1353.4–5): *tatra vākyād avagatasya kāmasya kartavyatāvagamyate yāgasya ca karāṇatā.* “There it is understood that the desire[d object] understood from the sentence is to be brought into being and the sacrifice is the means [thereto].”

²² ŚBh ad 6.1.3 (1354.4–5): *naitad evam. tasmīn khalu pakṣe svargaṃ prārtha-*

and instead heaven is appointed to the position of the aim, i.e., the most desired element to be accomplished.²³ Thus, Jaimini succeeds in warranting the causal relationship (*yāga*→*svarga*) based on a Vedic statement.

ŚBh ad 6.1.3 (1353.6-7) : *tasmāt karmopadeśaḥ syāt. karma svargaṃ praty upadiśyate na svargaḥ karma prati.*

Therefore, it must be a teaching [that prescribes] an action. An action is taught for the sake of heaven; it is not the case that heaven [is taught] for the sake of an action.

2.3. *Vākya* as the criterion for subservience

In this view the *kāmya* type of ritual is the basic model; and other types, *nitya* and *naimittika*, which have no fruit, are construed according to the *kāmya* model. The main defect of this view, however, is the non-literal, forced, interpretation of the Vedic statement *svargakāmo yajeta as yāgena svargaṃ kuryāt*. Jaimini's opponent, probably echoing Bādari's view that a sacrifice and not heaven is the object to be accomplished (*kartavya*), protests as follows:

ŚBh ad 6.1.2 (1351.8) : *nanu kartavyatayā yāgaḥ śrūyate.*

[Objection:] Surely one directly hears that a sacrifice is to be done.

yamānasyānuṣṭhānam anūdyā yāgas tasyopāyatvena vidhīyate ity adoṣaḥ. "This is not the case. According to this view, as is well known, a sacrifice is enjoined as a means for it (heaven) after referring to the performance of a person who desires heaven. Therefore, there is no fault."

²³ Cf. also ŚBh ad 6.1.1 (1345.9-10): *kiṃ yāgaḥ sādhanatvena sambadhyata uta sādhyatveneti bhavati vicāraṇā.* "An uncertainty arises: whether a sacrifice is connected as a means or as [an aim] to be accomplished."

For Mīmāṃsakas it is important to preserve a literal interpretation as far as possible.²⁴ Moreover, among six criteria (*pramāṇa*) for ascertaining subservience, i.e., *śruti*, *liṅga*, *vākya*, *prakaraṇa*, *sthāna* and *samākhyā*, ‘hearing’ (*śruti*) or direct mention is the strongest.²⁵ In Jaimini’s view, however, the utilitarian perspective of everyday reality supersedes the hearing of the Vedic word. As Śābara observes, a sacrifice, inasmuch as it is visibly a pain-giver (*duḥkhada*) in itself, is not intrinsically something to be done (*kartavya*), because there is a rule or common sense that only what is conducive to pleasure (*sukhada*) is enjoined as something to be done.

ŚBh ad 6.1.2 (1351.11–13) : *yady aṅi yāgaḥ kartavyaḥ śrūyate, tathāṅi na kartavyaḥ. sukhadaḥ kartavyo bhavati. na sukhado yāgaḥ.*²⁶ *tasmāt pratyakṣeṇākartavyaḥ. pratyakṣeṇa ca duḥkhadaḥ.*

Although we hear that a sacrifice is something to be done, it is not to be done. Only what is conducive to pleasure is to be done. But a sacrifice is not conducive to pleasure. Therefore, it is not to be done according to perception. But it is conducive to pain according to perception.

Here pointlessness (*ānarthakya*, *vaiyarthya*) of the Vedic teaching, i.e., the fact that unless interpreted in this way the Vedic statement would be pointless,²⁷ justi-

²⁴ Cf. Śābara’s comment at the very beginning of his commentary ad JS 1.1.1: *tāni [=padāni] sati saṁbhave tadarthānyeva*. “Those [words] have the same meanings [as established] as far as possible.”

²⁵ JS 3.3.14: *śruti-liṅga-vākya-prakaraṇa-sthāna-samākhyānām samavāye pāradaurbalyam arthaviṅkararṣāt*. “When [six criteria, i.e.,] *śruti*, *liṅga*, *vākya*, *prakaraṇa*, *sthāna* and *samākhyā*, meet together, [i.e., conflict], the latter is weaker, because of the distance from the object in question.”

²⁶ *na sukhado yāgaḥ*] corrected by Kataoka 2011a:160, n. 52; *duḥkhado yāgaḥ* ed.

fies the secondary interpretation.

ŚBh ad 6.1.2 (1352.3-4) : *tasmād anarthako mā bhūd iti svargasya kartavyatā gamyate.*

Therefore, we understand that heaven is to be accomplished for fear that [a Vedic teaching] would be pointless.

Exegetically speaking, here not *śruti* but *vākya* is resorted to as the criterion (*pramāṇa*) for determining the *śeṣaśeṣibhāva*, the relationship between the subordinate and the principal, subsisting between *yāga* and *svarga*.²⁸ It is true that a sacrifice is enjoined by *śruti* as something to be accomplished, but it is also understood, by the *vākya*, that the desired fruit is something to be accomplished.²⁹ Śabara illustrates the point with an example: *kāṣṭhāny āhartukāmo 'raṇyaṃ gacchet*. When someone says that a person who wants to collect firewood should go to

²⁷ ŚBh ad 6.1.3 (1352.8-1353.2) : *na kevalam ānarthakya bhayād yāgasya guṇabhāvaṃ brūmah, kiṃ tarhi svargasamjñakam arthaṃ prati karaṇatvena yāgo vidhīyate. manu yāgaḥ kartavyatayā śrutyā vidhīyate. satyam evam. ānarthakyaṃ tu tathā bhavati. svargaṃ pratya vihitē yāge svargakāmas tasmīn niṣphale vidhīyamāno 'pi niṣprajānaḥ syāt. tatrāsyopa-deśavaiyarthyaṃ.* “We do not claim that a sacrifice is subservient merely because we fear that [the injunction] would be pointless, but because a sacrifice is enjoined as a means for the purpose designated as heaven. Objection: A sacrifice is enjoined by a *śruti* (direct hearing) as something to be done. Reply: It is true. But then [the injunction] would be pointless. If a sacrifice is not enjoined for the sake of heaven, a person desiring heaven, even though he is enjoined to [do] that fruitless [sacrifice], would lose a purpose. Then the teaching would be pointless for him.”

²⁸ ŚBh ad 6.1.2 (1351.9-10) : *śrutyā yāgasya, vākyaena kāmasya. na cobhayoḥ.* “By *śruti* a sacrifice [is understood as something to be accomplished], whereas by *vākya* the desired [aim is understood as something to be accomplished]; and it is not the case that both [are understood as something to be accomplished].”

²⁹ ŚBh ad 6.1.2 (1351.9) : *satyaṃ kartavyatayā śrūyate, kāmo 'pi kartavyatayāvagamyaṃ.* “It is true that [a sacrifice is] directly heard [by means of *śruti*] as something to be accomplished; but we understand [by means of *vākya*] the desired [object], too, as something to be accomplished.”

the forest, he intends that going to the forest enables the collecting of firewood.³⁰ Similarly on the basis of *vākya* people can understand the relationship (*saṃbandha*) between *yāga* and *svarga*, in other words, the capacity (*sāmarthya*) of a sacrificial action to bring about heaven.

2.4. The relationship between *svarga* and *ṣuruṣa*

With regard to another relationship, on the other hand, i.e., the subservience of *svarga* to *ṣuruṣa*, the *ātmanepada* in *yajeta* becomes the criterion.

ŚBh ad 3.1.5 (662.2-5) : *ātmanepadaprayogāt. kartrabhiprāya etad bhavati. kriyāphalam anubhavet katham ṣuruṣa iti yāgaḥ prayujyate. tasmāt phalam ṣuruṣārtham yāgāc chrīyate, nātmanirvṛttyartham.*

Because *ātmanepada* is used. It is used when [the fruit of an action] aims at the agent. ‘A person should enjoy the fruit of an action, but how?’ In response, a sacrifice is employed. Therefore, a fruit is heard of as something for the sake of man and also as something brought about by a sacrifice; it is not heard of as something for the sake of its own accomplishment.³¹

Ātmanepada is used if the result of an action aims at the agent. Therefore, *yajeta* shows that the fruit arising from the sacrificial action is for the sake of a human being (*ṣuruṣārtham*), i.e., the eligible agent. Here Śabara intends to reject Bādari’s

³⁰ ŚBh ad 6.1.3 (1353.12-15) : *vākyaḍ evāsmād imam saṃbandham avagacchāmaḥ. yathā “kāṣṭhāny āhartukāmo ’raṇyam gacchet” iti yadi brūyāt, brūyād etat “dṛṣṭam tatra pramāṇāntarenāraṇyagamanasya kāṣṭhāharaṇasāmarthyam vidyate” iti.* “We understand the relationship only from this sentence. For example, if someone says: a person who wants to collect firewood should go to the forest, he means: it is experienced in that case by another means of knowledge, that going to the forest enables the collecting of firewood.”

³¹ Cf. Pāṇini 1.3.72: *svaritañītaḥ kartrabhiprāye kriyāphale.*

view that a result arises spontaneously (ŚBh ad 3.1.3: *svayam eva tad bhavati*). With the phrase *ātmanirvṛttyartham* he presupposes a paraphrase as follows: *yaḥ svargaḥ sa ātmānaṃ labheta*, “heaven should come into being.” (ŚBh ad 3.1.5, quoted in section 8.2.3). Jaimini, on the contrary, presupposes a paraphrase: *yāgena kriyate phalam* (ŚBh ad 3.1.3). The *ātmanepada* in *yajeta* indicates that the result is for the sake of an agent. Therefore, the result is for the sake of man (*puruṣārtham*) and not for the sake of bringing itself into existence (*nātmanirvṛttyartham*).

Tellingly, Prabhākara introduces his opponent’s view as follows: *nanu “svargaṃ yāgena kuryād ātmārtham” iti niyogaḥ, ātmanepada prayogāt*, “Surely ‘one should achieve heaven by a sacrifice for the sake of oneself’ is the command, because *ātmanepada* is used [in *yajeta*].” (*Brhatī* 637.4, quoted in section 8.2.1). This paraphrase in fact accords with Śābara’s own intention. In other words, we can assign this paraphrase of Prabhākara’s opponent to the final view of Jaimini and Śābara.

	Analysis of structure	Paraphrase
Bādari:	<i>[phalam] ātmanirvṛttyartham [śrīyate]</i>	<i>yaḥ svargaḥ sa ātmānaṃ labheta</i>
Jaimini:	<i>phalam puruṣārtham yāgac chrīyate</i>	<i>svargaṃ yāgena kuryād ātmārtham</i>

3. *Dharma-abhivṛtya-vāda*: manifestation of the eternal dharma

3.1. A transient action and a future result

Jaimini emphasizes the causal relationship between a sacrifice and heaven and insists that it is based on the Vedic testimony. This view, however, clearly contradicts perception, because it is experienced that a sacrificial action perishes immediately after its performance. An action is transient (*anitya*).

NAA 141.7: *tasminn arthe pratyakṣata evānityāyāḥ kriyāyā anantaram phala-sambandhādarśanāt kriyāvaiḥalyadoṣaprasaṅgā ca.*

For, given that is the meaning [of the word dharma], then [its] connection with a fruit is not perceived immediately after the obviously transient action; and there would be an undesirable consequence that the action would be fruitless.

Then how can we explain the causal relationship between the past sacrifice and the future result? A stable connection is needed to mediate between the two. Some Mīmāṃsakas, following Bādari's straightforward interpretation of the sentence (*yajeta=yāgaṃ kuryāt*), and at the same time paying attention to the causal relationship, introduce an idea which I tentatively call **dharma-abhivṛyakti-vāda*, the view of dharma-manifestation.³² The eternal dharma, the ideal form of action or action-eidos so to speak, is made manifest through the performance of the transient sacrificial action. The eternal dharma, once made manifest, will bring about heaven for the sacrificer.

MBhD IV 25.25–26:³³ *avasthita eva dharmah. sa tv agnihotrādibhir abhivṛya-*

³² Kataoka 2000:168 refers to VPV ad I 136 (224.5–6) : *śāstrānuṣṭhānāt tu kevalād dharmābhivṛyaktiḥ*. "But dharma is made manifest merely by executing the teaching." The context of the passage, however, indicates that this is dharma made manifest from the use of correct speech, an issue that is taken up in the *Paspaśā*. Therefore, this reference should not be regarded as directly relevant to the present issue under discussion, although this passage surely sheds light to the general idea of dharma-manifestation in Bhartṛhari's time. See Aklujkar 2004 for Bhartṛhari's notion of dharma that is made manifest through the use of correct speech. Aklujkar 2004:695 quotes the present passage differently as '*śāstrānuṣṭhānād eva, na tu kevalād, dharmābhivṛyaktiḥ*', and translates it as "Only from doing what the *śāstra* (scriptural teaching) is, not from doing alone, results *dharma* manifestation."

³³ This portion comments on *dharmaprayojano vā* in MBh I 8.5.

iyate. *tatpreritas tu phalado bhavati. yathā svāmī bhṛtyaiḥ sevāyām preriyate phalam prati.*

Dharma is already in place. But it is made manifest by the Agnihotra, etc. Being urged by them (Agnihotra, etc.), it becomes a fruit-giver, just like a master who is urged toward a fruit by his servants in the action of serving [rewards them].³⁴

Although dharma is always principal, it engages itself in bestowing a fruit to a human being just as a master does for his servant. A master looks as if he acts for his servant, but in fact he does so for his own sake.

<i>svāmin</i>	→	<i>phala</i>		<i>dharmā</i>	→	<i>phala</i>
		<i>bhṛtya</i>				<i>puruṣa</i>

3.2. The eternal dharma and its manifestation

This view ensures the stability of the connection³⁵ and at the same time retains the straightforward natural interpretation of the sentence. The injunction *yajeta* is interpreted as *yāgaṃ* (= *yāgābhivyaṅyam apūrvam*) *kuryāt*. Similarly *agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ* is interpreted as *agnihotrābhivyaṅyam dharmam bhāvayet svargakāmaḥ*.³⁶

³⁴ Also quoted and translated by Aklujkar 2004:703. Cf. also Kaiyata’s interesting comment at *Pradīpa* I 65b.7–8. He comments that what Patañjali means when he says *dharmaprayojanaḥ* (MBh I 8.5) is “compelled by *dharmā* that is called *niyoga* and is the object signified by *liṅ* and so on (*liṅādīviśayena niyogākhyena dharmeṇa prayuktāḥ*).”

³⁵ The eternal dharma or *apūrvā* is described as *sthira* in this view. (See NM I 664.6–16 quoted in section 8.1.2.) This aspect of being a stable intermediate is inherited by its descendant notion *niyoga* (= *kārya*). See also PP 440.22–23 quoted in section 8.1.3.

³⁶ Sīṃhasūri Gaṇi probably refers to the *apūrvajanman* theory, i.e., the later phase of the *dharmā-abhivyaṅgi-vāda*, which I discuss at section 6.

NAA (141.7–141.9): *agnihotram iti dharmah kriyābhivyāngya ucyate. kārye kāraṇopacārād agnihotrābhivyāngyo 'gnihotram iti. tataḥ "agnihotraṃ dharmam juhuyād bhāvayet svargakāmah" ity eṣa vākyārtho nirdoṣa iti.*

[The word] *agnihotra* [in the Vedic injunction *agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāmah*] expresses a dharma which is made manifest by an action. By figuratively calling the effect the cause, [the dharma] that is made manifest by the Agnihotra is called *agnihotra*. Therefore, there is no fault in the sentence-meaning [construed as follows]: A person who desires heaven should offer, i.e., accomplish, Agnihotra, i.e., dharma.

In this system the eternal dharma is often called *apūrva*, unprecedented, because the sacrifice-form is newly revealed by a Vedic injunction.³⁷ Bhāviveka refers to this view in his *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* as follows:

MHK IX 10 (Lindtner 1997:96): *apūrvo 'pi kriyāvyaṅgyaḥ.*

Furthermore, something new is made manifest by an action.

The sacrifice-form freshly conveyed by the Veda is able to bring about heaven for the sacrificer, although the Vedic statement *yajeta* interpreted as *yāgam kuryāt* does not directly speak of the causal relationship.

4. Pre-Śabara view of *adrṣṭa*

4.1. The *Nyāyasūtra* and the *Nyāyabhāṣya*

³⁷ The usage of *apūrva* in JS (cf. section 5.5.2) suggests that the original meaning of *apūrva* is epistemologically “new”, and not ontologically “new” as observed in the case of *apūrvajanman* (cf. section 6).

The defect of Jaimini's view regarding the causal nexus linking a transient sacrificial act with the future heaven (cf. section 3.1) can easily be corrected by postulating something unknown, i.e., something neither directly seen (*adr̥ṣṭa*) by perception nor heard (*aśruta*) from the Veda, because otherwise the Vedic statement would be pointless. The earlier and the later phases of this view can be traced in NS and NBh respectively. NS 4.1.44–47 discusses the fruit after death. The problem at stake is the time-gap between the transient cause and the future effect, as stated by an opponent as follows:

NS 4.1.46: *kālāntareṇāniṣpattir hetuvināśāt.*

[The fruit] does not arise in the future, because the cause has perished.

The *siddhāntin* at NS 4.1.47 (*prāṇ niṣpatter vṛkṣaphalavat tat syāt*, “It (a fruit) is similar to a fruit of a tree before it arises.”) resorts to the metaphor of a fruit of a tree (*vṛkṣaphala*) and refers to some precursor form of the effect. The *Nyāy-abhāṣya* clarifies it as *saṃskāro dharmādharma-lakṣaṇaḥ*, a residual force, either good or bad, left in a soul.³⁸ Śābara's discussion at 2.1.5 (cf. section 5.5) reflects preceding ideas of this line of thought.

4.2. The Vṛttikāra

Furthermore, the Vṛttikāra discusses the issue of the Citrā sacrifice, which is en-

³⁸ NBh ad 4.1.47 (242.2–4): *evaṃ pariṣekādīkarma cārthavat. na ca vinaṣṭāt kāraṇāt phal-anīṣpattiḥ. tathā pravṛtṭyā saṃskāro dharmādharma-lakṣaṇo janyate, sa jāto nimittāntarānugrhitāḥ kālāntareṇa phalam niṣpādayati.* “And in this way an action such as sprinkling water is fruitful. And a fruit is not accomplished by a cause that has already perished. A residual force, which has a characteristic feature of *dharmā* or *adharma*, is produced by undertaking an action in this way. This [residual force], being helped by other causes, accomplishes a fruit in the future.”

joined by a Vedic injunction, namely *citrayā yajeta paśūkāmaḥ*. An opponent claims that there is no connection between the sacrifice and its fruit.

Ṛttikāragrantha ad JS 1.1.4b (Frauwallner 1968:32.16–21) : (1a) *na ca paśūkāmeṣṭyanantaram paśava uḥalabhyante*. (1b) *ato neṣṭiḥ paśuḥphalā*. (1c) *karmakāle ca karmaphalena bhavitavyam. yatkālaḥ hi mardanam, tatkālaḥ mardanasukham*. (2) *kālāntare phalaḥ dāsyatīti cet*. (3) *na. na kālāntare phalam iṣṭer ity avagacchāmaḥ. kutaḥ*. (3a) *yadā tāvad asau vidy-amānāsīt, tadā phalaḥ na dattavatī*. (3b) *yadā phalam utpadyate, tadāsau nāsti. asaī ca katham dāsyati*.

“(1a) And domestic animals are not perceived immediately after a sacrifice [prescribed] for a person who desires domestic animals. (1b) Therefore, the sacrifice does not have domestic animals as its fruit. (1c) And a fruit of an action must exist at the time of the action. For the pleasure of massage lasts [only] during the time of massage. (2) Objection: [The sacrifice] will give a fruit in the future. (3) Reply: No. We do not understand the fruit in the future as that of the sacrifice. Why? (3a) When at first it was previously present, it had not given a fruit yet. (3b) When a fruit arises, it (sacrifice) is no longer present. And how can [a sacrifice], being absent, give a fruit?”

The issue at stake is the same as that dealt with in NS 4.1.46. The opponent here anticipates a theory in which *adrṣṭa* is postulated as an intermediate. We gauge this from the *Ṛttikāra*'s reference to an opponent who rejects the possibility of postulating an *adrṣṭa*.³⁹

4.3. Postulation of something unknown (*adr̥ṣṭakalpanā*)

The understanding of *adr̥ṣṭa* in this stage can be summarized as follows. The Veda properly interpreted as *yāgena svargaṃ kuryāt* promises a causal relationship between the transient sacrifice and the future heavenly pleasure.⁴⁰ Therefore, there must be something stable in between which connects the two. If one needs a locus for the *adr̥ṣṭa*, then let the soul be the candidate.⁴¹ The sacrifice makes fit the soul for heaven through the *adr̥ṣṭa* or *sam̐skāra* (effect of the preparations, residual force),⁴² a kind of *puṇya* or a merit (*dharma*) of the soul.⁴³

4.4. *Apūrva* commonly accessible to everyone

This view also reveals a defect of the *dharma-abhivṛyakti-vāda*. In the process of dharma-manifestation, *yāga* is the cause (*kāraṇa*) and dharma (= *apūrva*) is the

³⁹ *Ṛttikāragrantha* ad 1.1.4b (34.2-4) : *pratyakṣaṃ ca phalākāraṇam anyad upalabhāmahe. na ca dr̥ṣṭe saty adr̥ṣṭam kalpayitum śakyate, pramāṇābhāvāt*. “And we directly perceive another cause of the fruit. And it is impossible to postulate something unseen when something seen is present because of the absence of means of knowledge.”

⁴⁰ Exegetically speaking, the causal relationship is understood from *vākya-pramāṇa* and not *śruti-pramāṇa*, as an opponent says in *Ṛttikāragrantha* ad 1.1.4b (ŚBh 32.21-34.1) : *api ca karmakāla eva phalaṃ śrūyate “yāgaḥ karaṇam” iti, vākyaḥ avagamyate “karaṇam ced utpannam, kāryeṇa bhavitavyam” iti*. “Furthermore, it is directly heard [from the single word *yajeta*] that a fruit [exists] only at the time of an action, as it is stated that a sacrifice is a means. It is understood from the sentence [i.e., on the basis of the connection between *yajeta* and *svargakāmaḥ*] that the effect must exist once its means has arisen.”

(Frauwallner misses the point when he makes a footnote to *vākyaḥ*, saying “Quelle nicht nachgewiesen.”) For *śruti* and *vākya*, see Cardona 2017.

⁴¹ A merit (*dharma*) is *puruṣaguna* as explicitly stated by Praśastapāda. It is also imperceptible. PDhS section 308 (63.8-10) : *dharmāḥ puruṣagunaḥ. kartuḥ priyahitamokṣahe-tur atīndriyo ’ntyasukhasamvijñānavirodhī puruṣāntahkaranasamyogaviśuddhābhisandhijo varnāśramiṇāṃ pratiniyatasāadhananimittāḥ*.

⁴² See also Jayanta’s discussion on the medium, where Jayanta presupposes Kumāriḷa’s statement in ŚV *codanā* 195-196ab. NM I 663.12: *karmajanyo hi sam̐skārah puṁso buddhyādivad guṇaḥ*. “For a residual force produced by an action is a property of a soul just like cognition, etc.”

⁴³ Kumāriḷa briefly refers to an opponent who designates *nguna* as dharma. ŚV *codanā* 195d: *ngune*.

effect (*kārya*) inasmuch as dharma is made manifest by the *yāga*.⁴⁴ So the causal relationship can be similarly depicted as follows:

$$yāga \rightarrow apūrva (dharma) \rightarrow svarga$$

The eternal dharma, however, once made manifest by means of the action of the sacrificer, does not necessarily belong to the sacrificer. Take, for example, a pot which is revealed by a light. It can be seen by everyone in the room. Similarly, the eternal dharma, which by definition does not belong to a particular person (*nirādhāra*), once made manifest, may bring about heaven for other people, too. Who will enjoy the fruit? The theory of dharma-manifestation cannot account for the privatization of a general dharma. An eternal dharma, when it is made manifest, is common for everyone and cannot belong to a particular person who performs the sacrifice.

5. Śabara's view of *bhāvanā*

5.1. Śabara's introducing *bhāvanā*

Jaimini's interpretation of *yajeta* as *yāgena svargaṃ kuryāt* suggests that there is a general *kriyā* separate from *yāga*. By performing a sacrifice, one produces heaven. Grammarians, of course, do not accept such *kriyā* as separate from the *dhātvartha*. Utilitarian Mīmāṃsakas, however, had begun to go beyond the Grammarian's view. Śabara, for example, explicitly distinguishes between the two aspects of a verb-meaning when interpreting JS 2.1.1.

ŚBh ad 2.1.1 (Kataoka 2004:49.1-2) : *yāgādiśabdās caite bhāvaśabdās ca. ya-*

⁴⁴ See the description in NAA (*kārye kāraṇaḥ pacārāt*) quoted in section 3.2, where *agnihotra* is regarded as *kāraṇa* and dharma as *kārya*.

iyādyarthaś cāto 'vagamyate bhāvayed iti ca.

These (*yajati*, etc.) are the words [denoting] sacrifice, etc., and [at the same time] the words [denoting] *bhāva*. From these [verbs] we understand the meaning of the verb-root *yaj*, etc., and also [*bhāvanā*, i.e.,] “one should bring *x* into being”.

In one of the three views regarding which part of a verb denotes *bhāvanā*, Kumārila identifies the two types of *bhāvanā* as the two aspects of the same action denoted by a verb-root: a particular form (*viśeṣarūpa*) and a general form (*sāmānyarūpa*).⁴⁵ In the *Śābarabhāṣya* this separate *kriyā* is also called *anuṣṭhāna* (performance),⁴⁶ which I assume may echo a precursor form of *bhāvanā*.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ See TV ad 2.1.1 (Kataoka 2004:79.7–9) : *tathā hi dvyarthasya dhātor bhedanārthe kathyamāne “yāgena” iti viśeṣarūpaṃ karanātmanā niṣkṛṣtam. itarat tu bhāvanātmakam sāmānyarūpaṃ śabdāntareṇa “bhāvayet” ity anena kathyate.* “To explain, when the meaning of a verb-root which has two meanings is described distinctly, its particular form is extracted as a means [by the word] ‘by means of a sacrifice’. The other, i.e., the general form, on the other hand, which has *bhāvanā* as its nature, is described by another word ‘should bring into being’.” To obtain a critical analysis by Maṇḍana regarding Kumārila’s perspectives on *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*, kindly refer to Saito 2022 and Saito forthcoming.

⁴⁶ ŚBh ad 6.1.3 (1354.4–5) : *naitad evam. tasmīn khalu pakṣe svargaṃ prārthayamānasyānuṣṭhānam anūdyā yāgas tasyopāyatvena vidhīyata ity adoṣaḥ.* (Quoted and translated in section 2.2.)

⁴⁷ In other words, I assume that *anuṣṭhāna* can be a candidate for the precursor of Śābara’s notion of *bhāvanā*. The importance of the result-orientation of *anuṣṭhāna* is emphasized at ŚBh ad 6.1.3 (1354.5–8) : *tadanuṣṭhānam svargaṃ pratīti nāsti vacanam iti cet. iṣṭam artham praty anuṣṭhānam bhavati. svargakāmaśya ca svarga iṣṭaḥ. *tadanuṣṭhānaviśeṣanārtham eva *svargakāmagrahaṇam iti niravadyam. (*tadanuṣṭhānaviśeṣanārtham] corrected by Kataoka 2011a:167, n. 69; tadanuṣṭhānaviśeṣagrahaṇārtham ed.; *svargakāmagrahaṇam] corrected by Kataoka 2011a:167, n. 69; svargakāmaviśeṣanagrahaṇam ed.)* “Objection: There is no explicit statement that the performance of it (sacrifice) is for the sake of heaven. Reply: A performance is for the sake of a desired aim. And heaven is desired for a person who desires heaven. It is unobjectionable [to assume] that the use of [the word] *svargakāma* is purely for the sake of qualifying the performance of it (sacrifice).”

5.2. *Bhāva, kriyā and bhāvanā*

In order to understand Śabara's notion of *bhāvanā* we need to clarify its structure together with those of *bhāva* and *kriyā*. According to Kumārila, there are three types of verbs: intransitive, transitive and causative. The representative of the intransitive verbs is *bhavati*, whose agent merely comes into being.⁴⁸

karṭṛ—[*bhāva*]→

The representative of the transitive verbs, *karoti*,⁴⁹ has a structure in which the agent produces the object.⁵⁰

karṭṛ—[*kriyā*]→*karman*

The representative of the causative verbs, *bhāvayati*, shows that the causative agent (*prayojaka, hetu*) causes the object (*prayojya*) to come into being.⁵¹

prayojaka—[*bhāvanā*]→*prayojya*—[*bhāva*]→

⁴⁸ TV ad 2.1.1 (Kataoka 2004:70.18-19) : *iha kebhyaścīd dhātubhyaḥ parā tīnvibhaktir uc-cāryamāṇā kartrātmalābhamātram eva vyāpāram pratipādayati. yathāstibhavatividyati-bhyaḥ*. "Here [among all verb-endings], a verb-ending pronounced after some verb-roots makes one understand only the activity which merely is the agent's acquisition of its own existence. For example, after *as*, *bhū*, and *vid*."


⁴⁹ More correctly speaking, the structure of *karoti* is universal (*sāmānya*) in all instances of transitive verbs. TV ad 2.1.1 (Kataoka 2004:71.7-9) : *yadā tu labdhātmake 'nyatra vyāpriyate, tadā "karoti" ity evam apadiśyate. tathā ca "kiṃ karoti" "paṭhati" "gacchati" iti sāmānyaviśeṣarūpeṇa sāmānādhikaraṇyaprayogo drśyate*. "On the other hand, when [the agent] who has acquired its own existence operates towards something else, one expresses it as 'does'. To explain, we see the language use of co-reference in a general form and a particular form: 'What does he do?' 'He recites' 'He goes'." See also Saito 2022 and Saito forthcoming.

⁵⁰ TV ad 2.1.1 (Kataoka 2004:70.19-71.2) : *aṅparebhyas tu siddhe kartary anyāt-malābhaviṣayavyāpārapratītiḥ. yathā yajati dadāti paṭhati gacchatīti*. "After other [verb-roots], on the other hand, since the agent (*x*) already exists, we understand an activity [of *x*] in which another thing (*y*) comes into being. For example, 'sacrifices', 'gives', 'recites', 'goes'."

5.3. *Bhāva* of JS 2.1.1 for Śābara and Kumārila

5.3.1. Śābara's view of *bhāva*, *kriyā* and *bhāvanā*

Śābara regards *yajeta* as *fundamentally* possessing a causative nature, even though not from the perspective of lexical derivation, and interprets it as *yāgena svargaṃ bhāvayet*: one should cause heaven to come into being by means of a sacrifice. Here the core action is *bhāvanā*, with respect to which *svarga* and *yāga* are assigned to take the role of *sādhya* and *sādhana* respectively (ŚBh ad 6.1.3). *Yāga* is for the sake of *svarga* (ŚBh ad 3.1.4), and *svarga* is for the sake of *puruṣa* (ŚBh ad 3.1.5). On the ground of JS 6.1.3, *yāga* is considered subservient (*śeṣa*) to *svarga* (ŚBh ad 3.1.4). An unseen and unheard *adr̥ṣṭa* is postulated by the reference to an *aṇṇvam* between the transient sacrifice and the future heaven (ŚBh ad 2.1.5).⁵²



Śābara still uses *bhāva* (*svargo bhavati*)⁵³ and *kriyā* (*svargaṃ kuryāt*),⁵⁴ the old

⁵¹ TV ad 2.1.1 (Kataoka 2004:73.13–14) : *prayojyakartṛkaikāntavyāpārapratipādakāh/nyantā eva prayujyante tatprayojakakarmasu*// “Only causatives (that end with *Ṇi*), which make one understand another activity in which the *prayojya* is the agent, are used with reference to the *prayojaka*'s action towards the [*prayojya*].”

⁵² It seems that Śābara consciously avoids any expression that identifies the locus of *aṇṇvam* as a soul. See section 5.5.3. For my intentional use of the noun form *aṇṇvam* instead of *aṇṇva*, see section 5.5.2.

⁵³ ŚBh ad 2.1.1 (Kataoka 2004:49.2) : *tathā yateta yathā yat kiñcid bhavati*. *tenaite bhāvōśabdāḥ*. “[These verbs such as *yajati*] express: one should make efforts so that something or other arises. Therefore, they are words [denoting] *bhāva*.”; ad 6.1.3: *tataḥ svargo bhavati*; ad 11.1.1: *yāgāt svargo bhavati*. The significance of this “*yateta*” was deliberated by Akane Saito during her discourse titled “*Bhāva, Kriyā, and Prayatna* in the Mīmāṃsā Theory of Action” at the panel session hosted by the World Sanskrit Conference on 12th January 2023.

notions of activity,⁵⁵ together with his new concept, *bhāvanā* (*svargaṃ bhāvayet*).⁵⁶ The relationship of a result with an action (I. *bhāva*, II. *kriyā*, III. *bhāvanā*) and its corresponding paraphrases are described by Śabara as follow:⁵⁷

I	<i>phalasya ... niṣpattiḥ</i> (2.1.1)	
II	<i>phalasya kriyā</i> (2.1.1)	
III	<i>bhāvanā ca phalasya</i> (11.1.24)	<i>svargaṃ bhāvayet</i> (2.1.1)

Furthermore, the relationship of a sacrifice with a result and its corresponding paraphrases are presented by Śabara as follows:

I	<i>yāgadānahomasambaddhāḥ svargasyotpattim</i> (2.1.1)	<i>yāgāt svargo bhavati</i> (11.1.1) <i>tataḥ svargo bhavati</i> (6.1.3)
II	<i>yāgeneha svargasya kriyā</i> (11.1.10)	<i>yāgena svargaṃ kuryāt</i> (11.1.10) <i>svargaṃ yāgena kuryāt</i> (11.1.3)
III	<i>bhāvanāyām trayo yajatyādayaḥ</i> (2.2.1)	<i>yāgena svargaṃ bhāvayet</i> (11.1.24)

For Śabara the *bhāva* mentioned in JS 2.1.1 (*bhāvārthāḥ karmaśabdās tebhyaḥ kriyā pratīyeta, eṣa hy artho vidhīyate*⁵⁸) is not *bhāvanā*, as he explains *karmaśabdāḥ* and *bhāvārthāḥ* as follows:

⁵⁴ ŚBh ad 2.1.1 (Kataoka 2004:50.2) : *tasmāt tebhyaḥ kriyā pratīyeta phalasya kriyā karanam niṣpattir iti*; ad 11.1.3: *svargaṃ yāgena kuryāt*; ad 11.1.10: *yāgeneha svargasya kriyā*; ad 11.1.10: *yāgena svargaṃ kuryāt*.

⁵⁵ Śabara's use of *bhāva* and *kriyā* is based on JS 2.1.1 (*bhāvārthāḥ karmaśabdās tebhyaḥ kriyā pratīyeta, eṣa hy artho vidhīyate*), which mentions both *bhāva* and *kriyā*. See also Clooney 1990:116, n. 37: "It is possible that Jaimini borrowed from Yaska, or that both subscribed to a theory older than either the Sūtras or the Nirukta."

⁵⁶ ŚBh ad 2.1.4 (Kataoka 2004:55.4-5) : *puruṣasambaddhā bhāvanocyate. puruṣaṃ hi vadati bhāvayed iti*. "A causative activity connected with man is denoted. For it speaks to man: one should bring into being."; ad 11.1.24: *yāgena svargaṃ bhāvayet*.

⁵⁷ See Kataoka 2011a:211-212.

ŚBh ad 2.1.1 (Kataoka 2004:51.4–6):

*bhavanti kecit karmaśabdā na bhāvārthāḥ. yathā śyenaikatrikādayaḥ. kecid
bhāvārthā na karmaśabdāḥ. yathā bhāvo bhavanam bhūtiḥ iti.*

Some words [denote] action but not *bhāva*. For example, *śyena*, *ekatrika*.

Some words [denote] *bhāva* but not action. For example, *bhāvaḥ*, *bhavanam*, *bhūtiḥ*.

Śabara construes Jaimini's terms "*bhāvārthāḥ*" and "*karmaśabdāḥ*" as referring to the two different classes of words. The two classes overlap only partially. That is to say, only finite verbs such as *yajati*, etc., are classified as fulfilling the two conditions. Action words, i.e., proper names of rites such as *śyena* (and action nouns such as *yāga*), are *karmaśabdāḥ* (K) but not *bhāvārthāḥ* (B). On the other hand, *bhāvaḥ*, *bhavanam* and *bhūtiḥ* are *bhāvārthāḥ*, i.e., denoting *bhāva*, but not *karmaśabdāḥ*.⁵⁹

$K \cap \neg B$	<i>śyena, ekatrika, (yāga, dāna, homa)</i> ⁶⁰
$K \cap B$	<i>yajati, dadāti, juhōti</i>
$\neg K \cap B$	<i>bhāvaḥ, bhavanam, bhūtiḥ</i>

⁵⁸ "From the [finite verbs like *yajeta*] which are [both] *bhāvārtha* (the words which have *bhāva* as their meaning, i.e., which denote *bhāva*) and *karmaśabda* (action-words) one understands *kriyā*, [i.e., making of a result], because this meaning [such as *yāga*] is enjoined [as a means for a result]." Cf. Clooney 1990:47: "The purpose of action words is making. From these action is construed. For this purpose [making] is what is enjoined."

⁵⁹ See charts at Kataoka 1995:51, Kataoka 2004:110, n. 59, and Kataoka 2011a:202 for the extensions of *bhāvārthāḥ* (B) and *karmaśabdāḥ* (K).

⁶⁰ For inclusion of *yāga*, etc., see ŚBh ad 2.1.1 (Kataoka 2004:48.4–49.1): *kaḥ punar bhāvaḥ ke vā bhāvaśabdāḥ. yajati dadāti juhōtīti. nanu yāgadānahomaśabdā ete na bhāvaśabdāḥ. naitad evam. yāgādiśabdāś caite bhāvaśabdāś ca.* "[Objection:] What then is *bhāva*? Or what are the words denoting *bhāva*? [Reply:] [Finite verbs such as] *yajati, dadāti* and *juhōti* are [the words denoting *bhāva*]. [Objection:] Surely they are the words denoting *yāga, dāna*, and *homa* [respectively] and not the words denoting *bhāva*. [Reply:] This is not true. They are the words denoting *yāga*, etc., and [at the same time] the words denoting *bhāva* as well." Here Śabara uses *yāgadānahomaśabdāḥ* in the place of *karmaśabdāḥ*.

5.3.2. Kumārila's view of *bhāvanā*

It is Kumārila who distinguishes the three, *bhāva*, *kriyā* and *bhāvanā*, from each other as described above (in section 5.2) and clarifies their presupposed structures. For example, he clarifies the structure of *kriyā* as follows.

TV ad 2.1.1 (Kataoka 2004:71.12–13):

*karotiḥ kriyamāṇena na kaścit karmanā vinā/
bhavatyarthasya kartā ca karoteḥ karma jāyate//*

There is no verb-root *kṛ* without the object being made. And the agent of the meaning, [i.e., coming into being], of the verb-root *bhū* becomes the object of the verb-root *kṛ*.

An agent's action of producing (*kriyā*) requires something to be produced, i.e., an object (*karman*) being made (*kriyamāṇa*), which in its own right is an agent (*kartṛ₂*) of another action of coming into being (*bhāva*).

kartṛ₁—[kriyā]→karman=kartṛ₂—[bhāva]→

Kumārila then points out that in fact *kriyā* essentially has the *bhāvanā*-structure by introducing the causative-related notions *prayojaka* and *prayojya*, i.e., the promoter and the promoted.⁶¹

TV ad 2.1.1 (Kataoka 2004:72.14–15):

*karotyarthasya yaḥ kartā bhavituḥ sa prayojakah/
bhavitā tam apekṣyātha prayojyatvaṃ prapadyate//*

⁶¹ Cf. also Pāṇini 1.4.55: *tatprayojako hetuś ca*.

The agent of the meaning of the verb-root *kr* is the promoter of the agent of *bhū*. Then, in relation to the [promoter], the agent of *bhū* becomes the promoted.

He identifies the agent of *kriyā* as the *prayojaka*, i.e., the causative agent, and the object of *kriyā* (which at the same time is the agent of *bhāva*) as the *prayojya*, the object of the causative action.

prayojaka — [*vyāpāra*] → *prayojya* — [*vyāpāra*] →

As demonstrated in this example Kumāriḷa consistently makes the theory causative-oriented. This attitude culminates in his interpreting *bhāva* in *Jaiminisūtra* 2.1.1 as equivalent to *bhāvanā*.⁶² Kumāriḷa explicitly states that all transitive verbs in fact have a causative-structure.⁶³ He also includes intransitive verbs as such.⁶⁴ Kumāriḷa's basic attitude of *bhāvanā*-standardization even lets him criticize Śābara's inappropriate (but in fact straightforward and natural) interpretation of *bhāva* in JS 2.1.1.

TV ad 2.1.1 (Kataoka 2004.92.6–8): “*kecid bhāvārthā na karmaśabdāḥ*” *yathā*

⁶² For his interpretation of *bhāva* in *Jaiminisūtra* 2.1.1, see TV ad 2.1.1 (Kataoka 2004.68.8–9) : *siddhāntavādī tu bhavāter niḷantāt “er ac” ity acpratyaye kṛte bhāvanāvācinam bhāvaśabdam vyutpādya ...* . See also Yoshimizu 1997:68, n. 62, Kataoka 2004:146, n. 138, Diaconescu 2012:269, and Ollett 2013:228.

⁶³ TV ad 2.1.1 (Kataoka 2004:74.1) : *evaḷ karotyarthadvāreṇa sarvākhyāteṣu bhāvayatyarthāḥ siddhaḥ*. “In this way the causative meaning is established in all verbs through the meaning of *kr*.”

⁶⁴ TV ad 2.1.1 (Kataoka 2004:80.13–81.1) : *astyādāv api kartraḷśe bhāvye 'sty eva hi bhāvanā/ anyatrāśeṣabhāvāt tu na tathā sā prakāśate*// “For, in the case of the verb-root *as*, etc., too, a causative operation does exist with respect to the agent-part to be caused. But it (the causative operation) does not show itself like [in the case of transitive verbs], because it is subservient exclusively to [the agent to be caused].”

bhāvayet kuryād iti codāharaṇam. bhūtyādayas tu prayojyavyāpāravacanātvaṅ naiva yathāvarṇitabhāvārthā ity anudāharaṇam.

“There are some words that denote *bhāva* [nā] but nevertheless do not denote action.” For example, *bhāvayet* and *kuryāt*. These are proper examples. *Bhūti*, etc., [which Śabara gives as examples] are not proper examples, because they are not the denoter of *bhāva* [nā] as explained, inasmuch as they denote [only] the activity of the *prayojya*.

Proper examples are *bhāvayet*, etc., and not *bhūti*, etc., for Kumārila, who interprets the *bhāva* in Jaimini’s *bhāvārthāḥ* as equivalent to *bhāvanā* by etymologically construing it as containing the causative marker *ṆiC*.

5.4. Śabara’s paraphrase: *yāgena svargaṃ bhāvayet*

The merit of introducing the concept *bhāvanā* is that it enables Mīmāṃsakas to access the result in the domain of the verb. In other words, a result is expected, though in a general form, by the verb *yajeta*, because *yajeta* essentially has the causative formula: *yāgena kimapi bhāvayet*.⁶⁵ Śabara already has a developed idea of the three factors (*aṃśatraya*) of *bhāvanā*:⁶⁶ *sādhya*, *sādhana*,⁶⁷ and *itīkar-*

⁶⁵ ŚBh ad 2.1.1 (Kataoka 2004:49.5–50.2) : *ya āhuḥ kimapi bhāvayed iti, te svargakāmapadasaṃbandhāt svargaṃ bhāvayed iti brūyuh*. “Those [words] which say ‘One should cause something to come into being’ must mean ‘One should cause heaven to come into being’ because of the connection with the word *svargakāmaḥ*.”

⁶⁶ ŚBh ad 2.1.1 (Kataoka 2004:51.1–2) : *yajetety evamādayaḥ sākāṅkṣāḥ, yajeta kiṃ kena katham iti*. “[The words] such as ‘one should sacrifice’ has expectations. ‘One should sacrifice.’ ‘What?’ ‘by means of what?’ ‘how?’”; ŚBh ad 11.1.24 (3013.24–3014.2) : *bhāvapradhānam ākhyātam. bhāvanām kasyāpi brūte, bhāvaprayuktasya sādhanagrāmasyāpekṣitatvāt. yajeta kena kimarthaṃ katham iti*. “A finite verb has *bhāva* as its principal element. It expresses the operation of causing something, because the aggregate of means caused by *bhāva* is required: ‘One should sacrifice’ ‘By means of what?’ ‘For what?’ ‘How?’”

⁶⁷ ŚBh ad 2.1.1 (Kataoka 2004:50.3–4) : *eṣa hy artho vidhīyate. yathā yāgādīnā—“svarga-*

tavyatā.⁶⁸ One should cause the *sādhya* by means of *sādhana* through a particular process *itikartavyatā*. Thus, *svargakāmo yajeta* is interpreted by the formula: *yāgena na svargaṃ bhāvayed ittham*.⁶⁹ The entire process of a sacrifice is explained by the causative interpretation of *yajeta*.

Śabara's view can be regarded as a descendant of Jaimini's result-oriented view. The principal element is *svarga* and not *yāga*. His view also inherits the utilitarian *adr̥ṣṭa* view (described in section 4) and contradicts the deontology that is the *dharma-abhivyaṅgi-vāda* (section 3), because he does not hold the action-centered view which interprets *yajeta* as *yāgaṃ kuryāt*. As stated above, his formulation is *yāgena svargaṃ bhāvayet*.

5.5. Śabara's notion of *apūrva*

5.5.1. *Apūrva* as an object of postulation

Śabara probably repurposed old material describing the view of dharma-manifestation popular in his time, but consistently reinterpreted it according to his new idea of *bhāvanā*.⁷⁰ He replaces the *apūrva*, which is an element newly commu-

kāmaḥ kena sādhayet svargaṃ" "yāgādīnā" *iti*. "For this object (sacrifice, etc.) is enjoined. For example, by means of a sacrifice, etc. 'By what should a person who desires heaven accomplish heaven? 'By means of a sacrifice.'"

⁶⁸ ŚBh ad 11.1.8 (2106.2-3) : *tasmāt setikartavyatākasya karmaṇaḥ prayogaś codyate*. "Therefore, the execution of an action together with its *itikartavyatā* is enjoined." ŚBh ad 7.1.2 (1527.21-23) : *kartavyatāyām coditāyām itikartavyatākāṅkṣā bhavati "kathaṃ kuryāt" iti. prakaraṇena dharmāḥ sambadhyanṭe "ittham kuryāt" iti*. "When a *kartavyatā* (the principal action to be done) is enjoined, the expectation of an *itikartavyatā* arises: How should one do? [Subsidiary] elements are connected via the *prakaraṇa* (context) [and not the *vākya* (sentence)]: One should do in this manner."

⁶⁹ ŚBh ad 1.1.32 (103.11-13) : *jyotiṣṭoma ity abhidhāya kartavya ity *abhidhīyate (*abhidhīyate] T₁; ucyate ed.) . kenety ākāṅkṣite someneti. kimartham iti svargāyeti. katham iti. *ittham iti (*ittham] T₁; ittham anayetikartavyatayeti ed.)*. (See Kataoka 2004:28 for the description of Tanjore manuscript T₁.) "Jyotiṣṭoma having been presented, it is said that it must be carried out. To the expectation 'by means of what', [it is replied that] by means of the Soma sacrifice. For what? For heaven. How? In this way."

nicated by the Veda, with *adr̥ṣṭa*, something unseen and unheard and therefore to be postulated, as shown in his interpretation of JS 2.1.5.⁷¹ Śābara claims that the *apūrvā* must exist because a fruit is promised by the Veda, although *yāga* is transient.⁷² To put it another way, an intermediate *apūrvā* must exist because the sacrifice is transient.

ŚBh ad 2.1.5 (405.2-3): *tasmād bhaṅgī yajih. tasya bhaṅgitvād apūrvam astīti.*

Therefore, a sacrifice is transient. Because it is transient, *apūrvā* exists.

According to *dharmā-abhivṛtyakti-vādins*, on the other hand, the existence of *apūrvā* is warranted fully by the Vedic statement. It is not an object of postulation.⁷³

5.5.2. *Apūrvā*: adjective or noun

It is true that in many places Śābara uses *apūrvā* as an adjective which means “new”, i.e., “not yet known” (*avidita*),⁷⁴ in accordance with Jaimini’s usage of the adjective *apūrvā* which is closely related to the notion of *vidhi* as a conveyer of new information.⁷⁵ What I discuss here, however, is Śābara’s notion of *apūrvam* as

⁷⁰ Śābara’s reference to *bhāvanā* being qualified by *yāga*, *dāna* and *homa* (ŚBh ad 2.2.1: *yāgadānahomair viśiṣṭāpūrvasya bhāvanā*) reminds us of *apūrvā*’s description in NAA (quoted in section 6), where *apūrvā* is described as being qualified by *agniṣṭoma*, etc., and *iṣṭis*.

⁷¹ Śābara discusses *apūrvā* in a focused way when commenting on JS 2.1.5: *codanā punar ārambhaḥ*. There Śābara interprets the sūtra as stating that *apūrvā* does exist because undertaking of a sacrifice is enjoined by the Veda (*apūrvam punar asti, yata ārambhaḥ śiṣyate “svargakāmo yajeta” iti*).

⁷² ŚBh ad 2.1.5 (390.2-3) : *bhaṅgitvād yāgasya. yady anyad anutpādaya yāgo vinaśyēt, phalam asati nimitte na syāt. tasmād utpādayatīti.* (Translated below in this section.)

⁷³ For Śābara’s formulation of *arthāpatti* and its application to *apūrvā* and other cases, see Kataoka 1998.

⁷⁴ For example, ŚBh ad 2.2.27: *“revatīṣu ṛkṣu vāravantīyaṃ sāmā kṛtvā paśukāmo yajeta” ity apūrvō yāgaḥ sarvair viśeṣanair viśiṣṭo vidhīyate.*

expressed in a noun,⁷⁶ which functions as an intermediate between a sacrifice and heaven and which is not directly expressed by any Vedic word.

ŚBh ad 2.1.1 (Kataoka 2004:50.7): *na tu kaścic chabdaḥ sākṣād apūrvasya vācako 'sti.*

But there is no word that directly denotes the *apūrvam*.⁷⁷

In other words, Śabara's *apūrvam*, something postulated as an intermediate, is not the same *apūrva*, an adjective of the eternal dharma, as intended by *dharma-abhivyakti-vādins*. For Śabara the intermediate *apūrvam*,⁷⁸ something which, by its very nature, is neither seen nor heard (i.e., it is neither within the realm of our human experience, nor is it directly taught in the Vedas), but is postulated

⁷⁵ JS 10.3.4: *pradhānaṃ tv aṅgasaṃyuktam tathābhūtam apūrvam syāt tasya vidhyuḥpalakṣaṇāt sarvo hi pūrvavān vidhir aviśeṣāt pravartitaḥ//*; JS 3.4.3: *vidhis tv apūrvatvāt syāt//*. Śabara contrasts *apūrva* with its counterpart adjective *pūrvavān* related to *anuvāda*. ŚBh ad 3.4.3: *vidhir eva bhavet, tathā prayojanavān, itarathā vādamaātram anarthakam. pūrvavān anuvādo bhavati. ayaṃ tv apūrvah, yan niyamena nivṛtavyam iti.* See also Yoshimizu 1997:61, n. 38 for other examples of *apūrva*.

⁷⁶ In the following, the expression with the neuter ending *apūrvam* is used instead of *apūrva* to make it clear that *apūrva* as a noun is specifically intended.

⁷⁷ The entire paragraph is as follows. ŚBh ad 2.1.1 (Kataoka 2004:50.4–7) : *yasya ca śabdasyārthena phalaṃ sādhyate—tenāpūrvam kṛtvā nānyatheti—tato 'pūrvam gamyate. ato yas tasya vācakas tato 'pūrvam pratīyata iti. tena bhāvaśabdā apūrvasya codakā iti brūmaḥ. na tu kaścic chabdaḥ sākṣād apūrvasya vācako 'sti.* “And the meaning of the word *x* [e.g., *yajeta*] accomplishes a fruit after it produces an *apūrvam* and not otherwise. From this *x apūrvam* is understood. Therefore, *apūrvam* is understood from the word that denotes it. Therefore, we claim that the word [denoting] *bhāva* urges (indirectly indicates) *apūrvam*. But there is no word that directly denotes *apūrvam*.” Here Śabara seems to reinterpret an old statement *bhāvaśabdā apūrvasya codakāḥ*, which probably belongs originally to a *dharma-abhivyakti-vādin* who intends to say that verbs enjoin *apūrva*, something new.

⁷⁸ The role of *apūrva* as an intermediate is explicitly stated by Śabara when he recapitulate the content of 2.1.5 at ŚBh ad 7.4.1 (1569.8–10) : *idam api cōktam. yajir apūrvam sādhyati. tataś cāpūrvāt kālāntare phalaṃ bhavati “codanā punar ārambhah” ity atra.* “And this, too, is already taught there [in JS 2.1.5] as *codanā punar ārambhah*, which means: A sacrifice accomplishes an *apūrvam*. And from this *apūrvam* arises a fruit in the future.”

through *anyathānupaṭatti*, the condition where the sacrifice's efficacy would otherwise remain inexplicable. See, for example, ŚBh ad 7.1.5, where an opponent raises an objection as follows:

ŚBh ad 7.1.5 (1531.15–17): *yathā tailaṭpānaṃ ghr̥taṭpānaṃ vā bhaṅgitve 'pi sati kālāntare medhāsmṛtibalapaṣṭyādīni phalāni karoti, evaṃ yajir api kariṣyati. kiṃ no 'dr̥ṣṭāśrutenāpūrvveṇa kalpiteneti.*

Drinking sesame oil or drinking ghee, although it is transient, brings about results such as intelligence, memory, strength, and well-nourished condition in the future. Similarly a sacrifice will produce [a result]. What is the use for us to postulate an *apūrvam* neither seen nor heard?

The opponent here wants to retain the direct relationship between a sacrifice and a result, whereas Śabara allows *apūrvam* to intervene. We can confirm that Śabara's *apūrvam* is different from the *dharma-abhivyakti-vādin's* *apūrva*, something new, that is directly known from the Veda. In other words, *apūrva*, an eternal dharma, is directly known from the Veda for *dharma-abhivyakti-vādins*, whereas for Śabara

⁷⁹ Śabara postulates the existence of the intermediate *apūrvam* through *anyathānupaṭatti*: the Vedic statement that a sacrifice brings about heaven would be otherwise pointless. ŚBh 2.1.5: *codanety apūrvam brūmah. apūrvam punar asti, yata ārambhaḥ śiṣyate "svargakāmo yajeta" iti. itarathā hi vidhānam anarthakam syāt, bhaṅgitvād yāgasya. yady anyad anutpādya yāgo vinaśyeta, phalam asati nimite na syāt. tasmād utpādayatīti.* "The *codanā* [in the sūtra] means *apūrvam*, we say. [The sūtra then means:] *apūrvam*, however, exists, because undertaking is taught: a person who desires heaven should sacrifice. For, otherwise, the injunction would be pointless, because a sacrifice is transient. If a sacrifice perishes without producing something else, there would be no fruit inasmuch as there is no cause. Therefore, [a sacrifice] produces something else." Cf. also ŚBh ad 7.1.3 (1529.1–3: *satyaṃ śrūyate, na tu tad [=phalaṃ] yajinā kriyate. vinaṣṭe yajau tad [=phalaṃ] bhavati. apūrvam tu tena [=yajinā] kriyate. tasmāt tasya [=apūrvasya] kartavyatocyate*) and 7.1.5 (1531.12–13: *nanu yajir bhaṅgitvāt kālāntare phalaṃ dātum asamarthaḥ*).

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apūrvam, *adr̥ṣṭa* in nature, is postulated through *arthāpatti* due to *anyathānuṣāpatti*, because otherwise the Vedic statement that a sacrifice brings about heaven would be pointless.⁷⁹

5.5.3. Postulation of *apūrvam*

Commenting on JS 2.1.5, Śabara rejects an opposing view that a sacrificial action itself perdures without perishing, because a sacrifice, being an action, cannot take a different form (*rūpa*).⁸⁰ We can probably identify this opponent as a *dharma-abhivyaṅgi-vādin*. For Śabara, on the other hand, a sacrifice is transient and therefore is not a direct cause of heaven. Therefore, one needs to postulate something that mediates between a sacrifice and its result in order to rationalize the Vedic statement.⁸¹ Śabara describes the process of postulating *apūrvam* as follows at ŚBh ad 2.1.1 (Kataoka 2004:50.4–5, quoted above in this section):

yasya ca śabdasyārthena phalaṃ sādhyate—~~tenāpūrvam kṛtvā nānyatheti~~—tato 'pūrvam gamyate.

And the meaning of the word *x* [e.g., *yajeta*] accomplishes a fruit after it produces an *apūrvam* and not otherwise. From this *x apūrvam* is understood.

Śabara seems to be cautious in defining the exact nature of *apūrvam*, because *apūrvam*, inasmuch as it is an object of postulation, must not be specified more

⁷⁹ ŚBh ad 2.1.5 (400.1–2) : *yadi punaḥ phalavacanasāmarthyāt tad eva na vinaśyatīti kalpyate. naivaṃ śakyam. na hi karmaṇo 'nyad rūpam upalabhāmahe.* “It might be postulated, however, on the basis of the capacity of the statement of a fruit that the [action] itself does not perish. [But] it is impossible. For we do not perceive another form of an action.”

⁸¹ ŚBh ad 2.1.5 (405.2–3) : *tasmād bhaṅgī yajīḥ. tasya bhaṅgitvād apūrvam astīti.* (Translated above in this section.)

than necessary. Śābara's explanation at ŚBh ad 2.1.5 (400.2–404.6) regarding the postulation of *apūrvam* can be summarized as follows. An action (*karman*) is defined as something which shifts its locus to another place.⁸² It cannot inhere in the soul (*ātman*), which is omnipresent (*sarvagata*)⁸³ and therefore immovable. Nor does it inhere in material entities (*dravya*), because material entities such as sacrificial cakes have disappeared (*vinaṣṭa*)⁸⁴ and only ashes remain.⁸⁵ An opponent then suggests that the material entity in fact remains but is not perceptible due to one of the reasons for imperceptibility such as minuteness (*saukṣmya*).⁸⁶ The *siddhāntin* replies: then the opponent necessarily has postulated something,⁸⁷ i.e., minuteness or the like. Śābara further asks: which is it better to postulate, *apūrvam* or minuteness, etc.? In this context Śābara refers to a rule concerning the postulation of an *adr̥ṣṭa*.

ŚBh ad 2.1.5 (404.5–6): *tatrāpūrvam vā kalpyeta tad [=saukṣmyādīnām anyatamad] veti. aviśeṣakalpanāyām asti hetuḥ, na viśiṣṭakalpanāyām.*

In that case, [there is a doubt] whether we should postulate *apūrvam* or one [of the reasons for the imperceptibility of a material entity (*dravya*)]. We have a good reason to postulate something non-specific but not something specific.

One is allowed to postulate something non-specific and not something specific

⁸² ŚBh ad 2.1.5 (400.2–3) : *yadāśrayam deśāntaram prāpāyati tat karmety ucyate.*

⁸³ ŚBh ad 2.1.5 (400.3–4) : *na tad ātmani samavetam, sarvagatatvād ātmanah.*

⁸⁴ ŚBh ad 2.1.5 (404.1) : *yatra samavetam āsīt tad vinaṣṭam dravyam.*

⁸⁵ ŚBh ad 2.1.5 (404.2) : *āśrayo 'py avinaṣṭa iti cet. na, bhasmopalambhanāt.*

⁸⁶ ŚBh ad 2.1.5 (404.4–5) : *saukṣmyādīnām anyatamad bhaviṣyatīti yadi cintyate.*

⁸⁷ ŚBh ad 2.1.5 (404.5) : *kalpitam evam sati kiñcid bhavatīti.*

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(*viśiṣṭa*). As Śābara quotes at ŚBh ad 2.2.1, there is a Mīmāṃsā version of Occam's rule that less postulation is better.

ŚBh ad 2.2.1 (462.6) : *viśeṣaś cen na gamyeta tato naiko 'pi kalpyate//*

If a difference is not understood, not even one more [object, either unseen or unheard,] is to be postulated.⁸⁸

Postulation of minuteness is more specific than that of the *apūrvam*, because the *apūrvam* lacks any other characteristics than to be a simple intermediate between a sacrifice and heaven. Therefore, I hesitate to identify Śābara's *apūrvam* as a *saṃskāra*, either good or bad, as NBh ad 4.1.47 claims (cf. section 4). If people postulate *apūrvam* as identical with *saṃskāra*, it amounts to postulating something more specific than necessary.

As the present explanation of Śābara, in particular the expression *aviśeṣakalpanāyām*, indicates, that what Śābara discusses in ŚBh ad 2.1.5 is *apūrvam* as an object of *arthāpatti*, i.e., a kind of *adṛṣṭa*, and not the *apūrva* which is alleged to be an object of injunction (*vidhyartha*) in the theory of dharma-manifestation as it is also in the view of the Prābhākaras.

5.6. Prabhākara's bewilderment about Śābara's description of *apūrva*

Śābara's statement here contradicts Prabhākara's view of *apūrva*. Therefore, Prabhākara has difficulties in justifying Śābara's statement.

Bṛhatī 320.6–8: *tasmād yāgasya vā nityatvaṃ kalpayitavyam, ātmano vā*

⁸⁸ See Kataoka 1996, 1998 and 1999a for details of Śābara's *arthāpatti*.

*saṃskāraḥ kaścit, devatāprasādo vā, na punaḥ “tenāpūrvaṃ kṛtvā” ity etat sūktam iva pratibhāti.*⁸⁹

Therefore, we must postulate that the sacrifice itself is eternal; or some residual impression in a soul; or the favor of the deity. But this [statement by Śabara] “after it produces *apūrva*” does not seem to be a proper statement.

His difficulty is essentially derived from the difference of the epistemological status of his *apūrva* from that of Śabara as suggested at *Bṛhātī* 319.7.⁹⁰

nanu cāyaṃ praśno noḥapadyate, apūrvaṃ hi vidhyarthaḥ.

“Initial objection: The question is unnecessary, because *apūrva* is evidently the *vidhyartha*.” (Clooney’s translation)

The *apūrva* is undoubtedly *vidhyartha* for Prabhākara, i.e., directly known from a Vedic injunction, whereas for Śabara it is the object of *arthāpatti*, as he states: *tenāpūrvaṃ kṛtvā nānyatheti*. Prabhākara tries to legitimate Śabara’s statement, *tenāpūrvaṃ kṛtvā*, which looks inappropriate in Prabhākara’s system.⁹¹ At the end he reveals his honest feeling: “This does not seem to be a proper statement” (*na ... etat sūktam iva pratibhāti*). Prabhākara’s attitude here does not make sense if

⁸⁹ Translated by Clooney 1990:246 and quoted by Yoshimizu 1997:59, n. 26. Clooney 1999:246 translates: “Hence, (in order to meet these difficulties) we must understand the sacrifice itself to be enduring; or (the effecting of) some change (*saṃskāra*) in the agent; or the (gaining of) the favor of the deity; but it does not appear as easy to assume the effecting of an *apūrva*.” Note that the last part of his translation regarding *sūkta* is not literal.

⁹⁰ Translated by Clooney 1990:247 and quoted by Yoshimizu 1997:59, n. 24.

⁹¹ Śabara repeats the phrase *apūrvaṃ kṛtvā* in ŚBh ad 7.4.1 (1569.11) together with a summary of his understanding of JS 2.1.5. See also *nākṛtvāpūrvaṃ* in ŚBh ad 7.1.7 (1532.12) quoted in section 7.5. The passage is a crucial one for Śabara and therefore not inappropriate.

we regard Śābara as an upholder of the same view as the *dharma-abhivyakti-vā-dins*; nor can he be regarded as conforming to the view of the Prābhākaras that *apūrva* is directly known from the Veda.

6. The view of *apūrva* *vajanman*: something newly produced

The defect of the view (4 and 5) in which an *adr̥ṣṭa* is postulated lies in the postulation itself, because something unknown, neither seen nor heard, should not be postulated if not absolutely necessary. In other words, the postulation of an unknown (*adr̥ṣṭakalpanā*) is allowed under the condition of it being otherwise inexplicable (*anyathānupapatti*), i.e., only when the known fact is not explicable without postulating something unknown.⁹² According to the followers of the *dharma-abhivyakti-vāda*, the postulation of an *adr̥ṣṭa* is not necessary, because the modified view of the eternal dharma can explain the causal relationship.

Some followers of the *dharma-abhivyakti-vāda*, I assume, introduced the notion of *apūrva* *vajanman*, something newly produced or occasioned, as recorded by Kumāṛila.⁹³ They regard this newly instantiated thing, i.e., the eternal dharma newly made manifest,⁹⁴ as occasioned at a particular time, confined only to the

⁹² See the Vṛttikāra's definition of *arthāpatti* as *dr̥ṣṭaḥ śruto vārtho 'nyathā nopapadyata ity arthakalpanā* (Frauwallner 1968:32.6-7). "It is a postulation of an object [carried out] on the ground that the object seen or heard is inexplicable otherwise." The Mīmāṃsā version of the principle of Occam's razor is expressed by Śābara as *alpīyasya adr̥ṣṭakalpanā nyāyyā* (ŚBh ad 2.1.6) and in a half-verse quoted by Śābara at ŚBh 2.2.1 (quoted in section 5.5.3).

⁹³ ŚV *codanā* 195d-196ab: ***apūrva* *vajanmani***// *prayogo dharmasabdasya na dr̥ṣṭo ...* / "We do not see the word *dharma* being used in reference to something newly born (*apūrva* *vajanman*)."

⁹⁴ Sīṃhasūri Gaṇi explains the particularity (*viśeṣa*) of the previously "unseen" (*adr̥ṣṭa*), "new" (*apūrva*) dharma as its being qualified (*viśiṣṭa*) by many elements. NAA (140.23-141.5): *na pūrvo 'pūrvo 'dr̥ṣṭo dharmaviśeṣaḥ. ... viśeṣasabdāt para-paraviśiṣṭābhir yajñasamsthābhir agniṣṭomādibhir iṣṭibhiś cābhivyaktavyā apūrvā* api viśeṣyante dravyamantradevatādīviśiṣṭābhiḥ.* (*-vyā apūrvā] *em.* by Kataoka 2011a:188;

sacrificer, and thus giving a fruit only to him, because the sacrificer is its manifestor (*abhivyañjaka*). Uddyotakara, who slightly predates Kumārila, informs about this view as follows:

NV ad 1.1.7 (55.15–17) : *nityam apy apūrvam yo 'bhivyanakti tasya phalam, abhivyaktyarthā ca kriyā. abhivyaktyarthatvāc ca na kriyālopa iti. yena yad abhivyaajyate tasyaiva tat phalapradātr bhavātīti dr̥ṣṭam.*

The fruit pertains to the person who makes manifest *apūrva*, even if it is eternal. And an action is for the sake of manifestation. And an action is not lost, [i.e., not abandoned,] because it is for the sake of manifestation. It is experienced that an *x* which is made manifest by *y* gives a fruit only to *y*.

Thus, they avoid the danger of undesirably admitting that the eternal *apūrva* might become common (*sādhāraṇa*) to everyone.⁹⁵ They explain, as Uddyotakara records, the difference among the manifested objects (**vyañgyabheda*) through a difference among the manifestors (*vyañjakabheda*).⁹⁶ Only the manifestor attains the fruit.

-*vyāpūrvā* ed.) “*Apūrva* is an unprecedented, unseen, particular dharma. ... With the word ‘particular’ the following is meant: *apūrvas*, too, which are made manifest by sacrifices and Agniṣṭoma, etc., which are qualified by each other and which take the form of sacrifice, are qualified by these [Agniṣṭoma, etc., and sacrifices], which [in return] are qualified by material entities, mantras, deities, etc.”

⁹⁵ NV ad 1.1.7 (55.11–12) : *nitye vāpūrve parikalpīte tasya sādhāraṇatāsādhāraṇatā vā vaktavyā. yadi sādhāraṇatā, sarvaprāṇīsādhāraṇo 'bhyudayaḥ syāt.* “Alternatively, if the *apūrva* is postulated as eternal, then it is to be clarified whether it is common or uncommon. If common, the elevation (worldly benefit) would be common to all living beings.”

⁹⁶ NV ad 1.1.7 (56.7–10) : *athāpīdam syāt. ekam apy apūrvam vyañjakabhedānuvidhānād bhinnam iva bhavati. ... nanu ca khadgādibhedān mukhabhedas tadanuvidhānād dr̥ṣṭaḥ.* “Furthermore, the following might be possible: Although *apūrva* is single, it becomes as if many according to the differences of its manifestors. And it is experienced that the differences of the faces due to the differences of [the reflective surface such as] a sword, etc., are due to the [differences of their manifestors].”

$$\begin{array}{ccccc}
 yāga & & \rightarrow & \text{apūrvajanman} & \rightarrow & svarga \\
 | & & & | & & | \\
 kartṛ & & = & vyañjaka & = & adhikārin
 \end{array}$$

7. Kumārila's view of *bhāvanās*: *arthātmikā* and *śabdātmikā*

7.1. *Bhāvanā* as *prayojakavyāpāra*

Kumārila clarifies the general structure of causative action and regards it as inherent in all actions. The *prayojaka* “brings into being” (*bhāvayati*) the *prayojya*, which in turn “comes into being” (*bhavati*). In the case of sacrifice, the sacrificer causes heaven to come into being (cf. section 5.2).

$$prayojaka \text{ — } [bhāvanā] \rightarrow \text{prayojya — } [bhāva] \rightarrow$$

7.2. Kumārila's analysis of *vidhi* as *abhidhābhāvanā*

He then applies Śābara's notion of *bhāvanā*, human effort to cause heaven to come into being, to the analysis of Vedic injunction (*vidhi*).⁹⁷ A Vedic injunction (*vidhi*) causes a human being to undertake an action.⁹⁸

$$vidhi \text{ — } [abhidhābhāvanā] \rightarrow \text{puruṣa — } [arthātmabhāvanā] \rightarrow$$

7.3. *Adhyayanavidhi* analyzed under the framework of *abhidhābhāvanā*

He further applies the notion of *vidhi* to the analysis of the *adhyayanavidhi*: one

⁹⁷ TV ad 2.1.1 (Kātaoka 2004:74.5–6) : *abhidhābhāvanām āhur anyām eva liṅādayaḥ/ arthātmabhāvanā tv anyā sarvākhyāteṣu gamyate//* “The exhortative ending *liṅ*, etc., express the *abhidhābhāvanā*, which is completely different from [another type of causative operation]; the other, *arthātmabhāvanā* is understood in all finite verbs.” For the *-ādi* which serves to include reference to *kṛtya* affixes (and *loṭ* as well), confer also a verse quoted at ŚBh ad 4.3.3 (1247.24–25) : *kuryāt kriyeta kartavyam bhavet syād iti pañcamam/ etat syāt sarvavedeṣu niyataṃ vidhilakṣaṇam//*.

⁹⁸ TV ad 1.2.7 (Harikai 1990:492.5–6) : *tatra liṅādīnām prayojakakartṛtvaṃ puruṣaḥ prayojyaḥ, tena “kim” ity apekṣāyām “puruṣapravartanam” iti sambadhyate.* “There, *liṅ*, etc., are the causer and a person is the caused. Therefore, when ‘what’ is expected, ‘prompting a man’ is connected.”

should learn one's own Veda (*svādhyāyo 'dhyetavyaḥ*). Here the *adhyayanavidhi*, a kind of *vidhi* that expresses *abhidhābhāvanā* described above, causes all Vedic injunctions (*vidhi*), including itself, to instigate human beings.⁹⁹

adhyayanavidhi — [*abhidhābhāvanā*] → *vidhi* — [*abhidhābhāvanā*] →

7.4. From the Veda to heaven

In this way Kumārila consistently analyzes the entire process of the Veda's instigation of human beings as consisting of three causative processes: 1. The *adhyayanavidhi* causes all Vedic injunctions to prompt human beings; 2. Vedic injunctions cause human beings to undertake an action,¹⁰⁰ 3. Human beings cause heaven to come into being. The second type of *bhāvanā* is called *śabdātmikā* (= *abhidhātmikā*) *bhāvanā* and the third is called *arthātmikā bhāvanā*. The first is a special case of the second type.

adhyayanavidhi — [1] → *vidhi* — [2] → *puṣa* — [3] → *svarga* →

7.5. Kumārila's modification of the ontological status of *apūrvam*

It is to be noted that Kumārila tries to degrade the independent status of *apūrvam*, because this intermediate thing, if it independently exists as something substantial

⁹⁹ TV ad 1.2.7 (Harikai 1990:492.4-5) : *svādhyāyādhyayanavidhinetaṛe sarve vidhāyakāḥ svādhyāyapadopāttās cātmaṁ niyujyate "bhāvayet" iti*. "By the injunction of the recitation of one's own Veda all other injunctions and [this injunction] itself which is inclusively referred to by the word 'svādhyāya' are enjoined: it should cause [another] to come into being." For Maṇḍana's critique of the *svādhyāya-adhyayana-vidhi*, see Saito 2021.

¹⁰⁰ TV ad 2.1.1 (Kataoka 2004:74.12-75.1) : *tatrārthātmikāyāṁ bhāvanāyāṁ līnādiśabdānāṁ yaḥ puṣaṁ prati prayojakavyāpārah, sā dvitīyā śabdadharmo 'bhidhātmikā bhāvanā vidhir ity ucyate*. "There, the linguistic units, such as *līn*, have the operation of the causer towards a man in respect to *arthātmikā bhāvanā*. This is the second [*bhāvanā*], i.e., *abhidhātmikā bhāvanā*, which is [a kind of] a property of *śabda*, [also] called *vidhi*." In the case of *abhidhābhāvanā*, *sādhya* is *arthātmikā bhāvanā*, *sādhana* is *vidhijñāna*, and *itikartavyatā* is *prāsastyajñāna*. See Kataoka 2011a:239.

“as if embodied” (*vigrahavad iva*), may well harm the direct causal relationship between *yāga* and *svarga* stated by the Veda. Śābara already noticed the problem of indirectness, i.e., intervention in the relationship by an intermediate *apūrvam*. He justifies indirectness, saying that even an indirect cause is considered a cause.

ŚBh ad 7.1.7 (1532.12–14): *yaś ca yajeh pratyakṣaḥ phale guṇabhāva iti, sa nākṛtvāpūrvam bhavati prāṇālikī vijñāyate. pranādyāpi ca yena kriyate tat kāraṇam bhavati.*

And that a sacrifice is evidently subordinate to a fruit, is considered indirect, because subordination is not [possible] without *apūrva* being effected [in between]. And, [generally speaking,] *x* is [considered] a cause even if *x* causes [a result] indirectly.

Kumārila, on the other hand, seeks a different solution. He looks upon *apūrvam* not as an independent element but only as a capacity (*śakti*) of a sacrifice, etc., or as a capacity of a fruit such as a domestic animal;¹⁰¹ or fitness (*yogyatā*) of the action (*karman*) or the person (*puruṣa*).¹⁰² Thus, he regards the *apūrvam* as dependent on another entity so that he can reduce the ‘weight’ (*gaurava*) of its ontological status. Here Kumārila’s motivation lies mainly in the ‘weight saving’ of the *apūrvam*, because it is better to postulate a capacity (*śakti*) than to postulate an independent entity (*vastu*) in order to explain the same fact, as expressed in

¹⁰¹ ŚV codanā 199: *tasmāt phale pravṛttasya yāgādeḥ śaktimātrakam/ utpattau vāpi paśvāder apūrvam na tataḥ prthak//* “Therefore, the mere capacity of a sacrifice, etc, which functions towards a fruit, or that of a domestic animal, etc., which functions towards arising, is the *apūrvam*. It is not separate from them.”

¹⁰² TV ad 2.1.5 (394.10–11) : *saiva ca puruṣagatā kratugatā vā yogyatā śāstre ’sminn apūrvam ity apadiśyate.* “And the same suitability of a soul or rite is called *apūrvam* in this system.”

a later maxim: *dharmikalpanāto dharmakalpanā laghīyasī*. Kumārila himself gives an expression to the idea in another context as follows:¹⁰³

ŚV *śūnya* 18:

anekakalpanāyās ca jyāyasī hy ekakalpanā/

śaktimātrasya bhedaś ca vastubhedād viśiṣyate//

For it is better to postulate one thing than to postulate many. And the separation [and postulation] of a mere capacity is superior to the separation [and postulation] of an entity.

In this way, by reducing the ontologically independent status of the *apūrvam*, he intends to return to the original, simple scheme of the causal relationship between *yāga* and *svarga*. At the same time he enriches it by developing Śabara's notion of *bhāvanā* (which Kumārila calls *arthātmabhāvanā*, *arthātmikā bhāvanā*) and introduces his new idea of *śabdātmikā bhāvanā*,¹⁰⁴ also called *abhidhābhāvanā*. Kumārila's systematic reflections on *vidhi*, totally missing in Śabara,¹⁰⁵ bring it to the attention of subsequent Mīmāṃsakas. Prabhākara's *niyoga* and Maṇḍana's *iṣṭasādhanatā* as the meaning of *liṅ* are its direct results.

¹⁰³ See Kataoka 1999b:13 for the original context of his statement and its relevance to the postulation of a capacity regarding the *pūrvavarṇajanītasamskāra*.

¹⁰⁴ As Kumārila states when commenting on ŚBh ad 2.1.1, *viśeṣataś ceyam arthavādādhi-karaṇe varṇitā* (TV ad 2.1.1, Kataoka 2004:75.1), he discusses *abhidhābhāvanā* in the *arthavādādhi-karaṇa*. TV ad 1.2.7 (Harikai 1990:492.1-2) : *iha hi liṅādīyukteṣu vākyeṣu dve bhāvane gamyete śabdātmikā cārthātmikā ca*. "For here in the sentences which have *liṅ*, etc., one understands two *bhāvanās*, *śabdātmikā* (which has *śabda* as its substratum) and *arthātmikā* (which has *artha* as its substratum)."

¹⁰⁵ Śabara very briefly refers to a mundane usage of *codanā*. ŚBh ad 1.1.2 (Frauwallner 1968:16.9-10) : *ācāryacoditah karomi*. "Ordered by my teacher, I act."

8. Prabhākara's view of *niyoga*¹⁰⁶

Theoretically speaking, Prabhākara's view of *niyoga* may be regarded as a variant of Bādari's tradition and not Jaimini's in spirit in that it follows the basic interpretation of *yajeta* as *yāgaṃ kuryāt* and not *yāgena svargaṃ kuryāt*, although it is a historical fact that Prabhākara comments on Śabara's commentary of Jaimini's *sūtra*.¹⁰⁷

8.1. Descriptions in later sources: Maṇḍana, Jayanta, Śālikanātha and Vācaspati

8.1.1. The status of a result in the Prābhākara system

In the system of the Prābhākaras a Vedic injunction (*vidhi*) first requires or "expects" a person to be commanded (*niyojya*) and an object of the com-

¹⁰⁶ An additional mention is required regarding the Prabhākara (and Prābhākara) study. Most recently, Patrick Cummins, whose first publication emerged as Cummins 2020, delivered an elaborate exposition titled "Prabhākara's Hermeneutics of Deontology" during a panel session titled "History of Mīmāṃsā" at the World Sanskrit Conference, which took place online on 12th January 2023. Detailed presentation materials were also disseminated during that period. This supplementary document constituted a segment of his doctoral dissertation, which he intends to submit to Cornell University. Conversely, my current paper had been prepared autonomously long before said presentation by Patrick Cummins. Put differently, the composition was not fundamentally crafted subsequent to the aforementioned presentation, with the exception of certain amendments, such as those pertaining to the English phrasing and the inclusion of additional information on the latest relevant articles, etc., implemented during the concluding phase. The reciprocal statement holds true as well. To clarify, his manuscript during that period was not formulated with regard to my unpublished manuscript. In other words, both manuscripts were essentially authored independently. Besides the Prabhākara study by Yoshimizu and Cummins, other recent Prābhākara studies include Freschi 2012 and her forthcoming edited volume on Maṇḍana's VV: *Maṇḍana on Commands. Including a Critical Edition and Translation of Maṇḍana's Discernment about Commands, chapter 11*.

¹⁰⁷ A mere fact that a commentator X comments on an original text of Y does not prove that X is a successor of Y on the doctrinal level. For example, there are cases in which *dvaita*-oriented texts are commented on by *advaita*-oriented commentators. In other words, there are cases in which X imposes X's own core doctrine on Y if Y is an established authority in X's time, although Y's core doctrine is the opposite of that of X in essence. Prabhākara's superimposition of *anvītābhīdhāna* theory, for example, is a crystal clear case that opposes Śabara's own view (as expressed in SBh ad 1.1.25), which we can safely judge as *abhihitānvaya* theory as Kumārila correctly understands.

mand (*viśaya*) to which a person is prompted, but not a result (*phala*). The postulation of a result comes only later through *anyathānupapatti* (being otherwise inexplicable), and thus is regarded as “coming out of human minds” (*puruṣabuddhiprabhava*) and “not based on the Veda” (*na śāstrīyam*). Contrasting the two types of ritual, i.e., *nitya* and *kāmya*, Jayanta clarifies the status of a result (*phala*) in this theory as follows:¹⁰⁸

NM II 111.14–112.1:(1) *kiṃ yāvajjīvam ityādicodanāḥ phalaśūnyā eva. om ity ucyate. na hi vidhiḥ phalam ākāṅkṣati, api tu niyojyaṃ viśayaṃ ca—kasya niyogaḥ, kutra niyoga iti. te ete ubhe apy ākāṅkṣe pariṣūrṇe tatra—jīvato niyogaḥ, yāge ca niyoga iti. ataḥ param phalakaḥpanam puruṣabuddhiprabhavam bhavati, na śāstrīyam.* (2) *kāmādhikāre tu niyojyataivānyathā svargakāmasya nopapadyata iti svargasya sādhyatvam abhyūpagatam, na punar vidheḥ phalārthatvāt.*

(1) Objection: Is it the case that the injunctions such as ‘as long as one lives’ have no fruit? Reply: We say yes. For an injunction does not expect a result. But it expects a person to be commanded and an object [to be accomplished]: A command¹⁰⁹ directed to whom? A command of what? Both of these two expectations are fulfilled in the case above: A command directed to a person who is alive; and a command of a sacrifice. Therefore, a further postulation of a result is something coming out of human minds and not based

¹⁰⁸ Cf. also Yoshimizu 2022:115–116. A critical edition of the NM vākya section is being prepared by Alessandro Graheli. The author had the opportunity to check the manuscript together with Graheli at a meeting organized by him in Vienna on 12–24 September 2017. The author also gave a presentation at a research meeting on *vākyārtha*, also organized by Graheli, in Vienna, 18–20 December 2017.

¹⁰⁹ Note that *niyoga*, which is translated here as “command,” is a command as an object of *liṅ* etc., i.e., *śabdārtha*, not a word (*śabda*), i.e. a phonetic form.

on the Veda. (2) In the case of *kāmya* rituals, however, heaven is admitted as the aim to be accomplished, because the very property of being commanded in the case of a person who desires heaven is otherwise inexplicable, and not because an injunction aims at a result.

A Vedic injunction (*vidhi*) does not require a result in the first place as is the case in the *nitya* type of ritual. Only in the case of *kāmya* rituals, a result is postulated, because being a person to be commanded (*niyojyatā*) is otherwise inexplicable (*anyathā nopapadyate*). It is not the case that a Vedic injunction has a result as its aim (*phalārtha*). A desire (*kāma*) is not the cause of undertaking an action (*pravṛtīhetu*), but rather the cause of eligibility (*adhikārahetu*). Maṇḍana states:

VV₁ 65.4–5, VV₂ 900.2–904.1, VV₃ 250.4–5: *na tu kāmaḥ pravṛtīhetuḥ, adhikārahetus tu. adhikārahetukā ca pravṛttir iṣyate na phalāhetukā, prāg adhikārāt tadajñānāt.*

But the object of desire is not the cause of undertaking an action, but rather it is the cause of eligibility. And it is accepted that undertaking an action is based on eligibility and not based on a result, because it (undertaking an action) is not understood before the eligibility.

A person undertakes a ritual action (*pravṛtti*) because he has an eligibility to do it (*adhikārahetukā*) and not because he aims at a certain result (*phalāhetukā*). Undertaking an action is not seen before the eligibility is given. Only after the word *svargakāmaḥ* gives the connection of eligibility, i.e., the information to whom the command is directed (*kasya niyogaḥ*), heaven is postulated as the re-

sult of the sacrifice.¹¹⁰ As Jayanta emphasizes, it is not the case, according to the theory of the Prābhākaras, that the Vedic scripture cannot prompt a man without a result (*phalaṃ vinā*).¹¹¹

According to Bādari, a result such as heaven, being just a *nimitta*, is not the main factor that necessarily motivates other elements. Rather the action is the principal element. The view of dharma-manifestation then replaces the transient action with the eternal dharma so that the connection with a fruit is justified by the stability of the eternal dharma. We can regard this as a concession to the opposing result-oriented view current in the period. As stated above, the view of dharma-manifestation is challenged to explain how to confine the common dharma to the sacrificer. The relationship between *vyañgya* and *vyañjaka* (cf. section 6) remains unconvincing.

8.1.2. *Niyoga as apūrva*

Prabhākara replaces the role of the eternal dharma, also called *apūrva*, with *niyoga*,¹¹² imperatives invoked in human minds by Vedic injunctions. The following description by Jayanta indicates that the *apūrva* of the *dharma-abhivyakti-vā-dins* (pre-Śabara old Mīmāṃsakas whom Jayanta calls *vṛddhamīmāṃsakāḥ* and *jarajjaiminīya*) is replaced with *niyoga* by Prābhākaras.

¹¹⁰ NM II 111.6: “*svargakāmaḥ*” *ity adhikārānubandhaḥ padāntareṇārpyate*. “The connection of eligibility is provided by another word *svargakāmaḥ*.” Cf. also Yoshimizu 2022:105.

¹¹¹ NM II 111.10–12: *na hīdṛśaṃ śāstrasya dainyam—yat phalaṃ vinā puṃsaḥ pravartayituṃ na śaknotīti. anyathā “yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta” ityādāv apravartakaṃ śāstraṃ syāt*. “For a Vedic teaching does not have this kind of weakness that it cannot prompt a man without a fruit. Otherwise, a Vedic teaching such as ‘one should sacrifice as long as one lives’, etc., could not prompt [a man].” Cf. also Yoshimizu 2022:106.

¹¹² E.g., *Brhātī* 651.1–2: *adr̥ṣtam apūrvaṃ niyoga ity ekam idam ity uktam “ato ‘pūrvaṃ kṛtvā” iti*. (I thank Patrick Cummins for this reference.)

NM I 664.6–16:

(1) *vr̥ddhamīmāṃsakā* yāgādikarmanirvartyam *apūrvam* nāma dharmam abhivadanti. (2) yāgādikarmaiva *śābarā* bruvate. (3) vākyārtha eva niyogātmāpūrvāśabdavācyaḥ, dharmāśabdena ca sa evocyata iti *prābhākaraḥ* kathayanti. ... (4) *svargayāgāntarālavartinaś* ca sthirasya nirādhārasyāpūrvasya niṣpramāṇakatvāj *jarajaiminīya* pravādo 'py apesalaḥ.

(1) Old Mīmāṃsakas designate the well-known *apūrva*, which is accomplished by an action such as sacrifice, as dharma. (2) Followers of Śābara call the action such as sacrifice alone [*dharmā*]. (3) Followers of Prabhākara say that *niyoga* in essence, which is precisely the sentence-meaning, is denoted by the word *apūrva*; and the same thing is denoted by the word dharma. ... (4) And what the old Mīmāṃsakas (Jaimini-followers) say is not clever, because a stable *apūrva* without a support which exists between a sacrifice and heaven lacks a means of knowledge.

8.1.3. *Niyoga* and *niyojya*

According to Jayanta's interpretation based on Maṇḍana's description, Prabhākara believes that from hearing a reliable Vedic command free of any defect, one has an impulse-like intuition (*pratibhā*) "I must do it" (*kartavyam iti*).¹¹³ Prabhākara

¹¹³ This derives from Maṇḍana's understanding, fusing together Bhartṛhari's notion of *pratibhā* with Prabhākara's deontological commitments. VV₁ 174.2–175.3, VV₃ 540.3–543.3: *nanu kartavyam iti pratipatteḥ pravṛttiḥ. ... kaḥ punar ayam arthaḥ kartavyam iti. na kaścit, pratibhā*. "Objection: [One] acts because of understanding that something has to be done. ... But what is this object which is spoken of as something that has to be done? It is nothing, [just] an intuition." NM II 105.2–3: *kaḥ punar asāv arthaḥ. yasmin sati "niyukto 'ham atra" iti pratipadyate puruṣaḥ, so 'sāv arthaḥ. sa eva vidhir ity ucyate*. "But what is that meaning? It is that upon whose presence a person understands, 'I am directed [to do] this.' This is the meaning in question. The same thing is called *vidhi*." See David 2021 for *pratibhā*.

interprets *yajeta* as **yāgaviṣayaṃ niyogaṃ kuryāt*.¹¹⁴ One should realize the sacrifice-imperative.¹¹⁵ A command (*niyoga*) is by nature something to be done. It does not require something else in order that it becomes something to be done (*kārya*), whereas a sacrifice (*yāga*), the object of a command (*niyogaviṣaya*), is dependent on a command to become something to be done.¹¹⁶ Vācaspati explains the process of understanding as follows:

NKa₁ 77.29–78.5, NKa₂ 990.9–11, NKa₃ 277.10–11: *sākṣān niyoga eva kartavyatayāvagamyate liṅādibhyaḥ. sa tu yāgaviṣayas tadanuṣṭhānam antareṇa kartavyatāyā aparyavasānāt tadanuṣṭhānam ākṣīpati.*

Only a command (*niyoga*) is directly understood from *liṅ*, etc., as something to be done. But the [command], which has a sacrifice as its object, entails the performance of it (sacrifice), because its status as something to be done is not completed without the performance of it (sacrifice).

Firstly, it is directly understood from hearing *yajeta* that one should realize the

¹¹⁴ In the case of *yajeta* a sacrifice is the object (*viṣaya*) of the command (*niyoga*). NM II 111.5: *yajyādīnāsya viṣayānubandho dhātunocyate*. “Its [i.e., *niyoga*’s] connection of an object [to be done] is expressed by a verb-root such as *yaj*.” (cf. also Yoshimizu 2022:105.) NKa₁ 62.24–25, NKa₂ 878.5–6, NKa₃ 243.3: *yajeteti liṅā kāryaṃ niyogaṃ abhidadhatyā yāgaviṣaya ājñādir arthaḥ kartavya ity uktam syāt*. “The *liṅ* in *yajeta* which denotes *niyoga* amounts to saying that the object such as a command which has a sacrifice as its object is to be done.”

¹¹⁵ Prabhākara’s *niyoga* is what is to be done (*kārya*, *kartavya*). VV₁ 62.1–2, VV₂ 872.4–874.1, VV₃ 241.1–2: *nanu niyoga eva kāryatvapratyayaḥ. evaṃ hi vyapadiśanti “ācāryaniyogaḥ kartavyaḥ” “rājaśāsanam anuṣṭheyam” iti*. “Objection: *Niyoga* alone is understood as something to be done, because people mention [it] as follows: A teacher’s command is to be done. A king’s order is to be carried out.”

¹¹⁶ VV₁ 62.5, VV₂ 876.2–3, VV₃ 242,7: *rūpeṇaiva niyogaḥ kāryaḥ, na tatrānyāpekṣā viṣayavat*. “Command is something to be done by itself; it does not expect something else unlike the object [to be done, which expects something else].”

command: “I must act.” Then, he expects an object of the command to what he is directed: “Do what?” The command has a sacrifice as its object (*viṣaya*). Therefore, the command of a sacrifice is realized by performing a sacrifice. In this way, the command entails (*ākṣīpati*) the performance of a sacrifice.

Prabhākara’s system solves the privatization problem (cf. section 4.4) by introducing the relationship between *niyoga* (command) and *niyojya* (the commanded).¹¹⁷ The Vedic command (*niyoga*) conveyed by *liñ*¹¹⁸ to an eligible person (*adhikārin*) is confined only to him, i.e., the commanded person (*niyojya*), and thus brings about the future fruit only to him,¹¹⁹ although the Vedic injunction

¹¹⁷ Jayanta calls the relationship *praiśaṅgaprāiśyaśaṅbandha*. NM II 105.5-7: *vidhiś ca nāma pre-ranātmaka eva. ata eva vartamānāpadeśikākhayātajānitapratītilakṣaṇeyam pratītiḥ “yajeta” iti. atra hi praiśaṅgaprāiśyayoḥ śaṅbandho ’vagamyate. anya evāyam kriyākartṛśaṅbandhāt praiśaṅgaprāiśyaśaṅbandhaḥ.* “And the well-known *vidhi* is precisely an urge in nature. This is precisely the reason why this understanding ‘One should sacrifice’ is different from the understanding produced by the finite verb designating the present. For here the relationship between the urge and the urged is understood. This relationship between the urge and the urged is completely different from the relationship between activity and agent.” Cf. also Yoshimizu 2022:96, n.15.

¹¹⁸ Prabhākara makes it clear that an imperative (*niyoga*), prompt (*pravartanā*) by nature, is a property belonging to *niyoktr* and not *niyojya*. NKa₁ 77.21-24, NKa₂ 988.13-990.3, NKa₃ 277.5-7: *atraiva jaratprābhākaronnītārthaṃ guror vacaḥ saṅgacchata ity āha—uktam ca “kartavyatāviśayo niyogaḥ” pravartanā niyoktur dharmah, tam abhidadhāti liñ, na niyojyasya dharmam kartavyatām pravartanāyā viśayam āha, viśayasya viśayiṇo ’nyatvāt.* “Considering that Prabhākara’s statement the meaning of which is construed by the old-Prabhākara fits here, [Maṇḍana] says. And it is stated [by Prabhākara] that *niyoga* has obligation as its object. [*Niyoga*] is a prompt, which is a property of a command giver. It is denoted by *liñ*. [*Liñ*] does not express an obligation, a property of a person to be commanded, which is the object of a prompt, because an object is different from the object-possessor.” *Brhātī* 38.8-9: *kartavyatāviśayo niyogaḥ, na puṇaḥ kartavyatām āha.* Here the old Prabhākara considers *niyoga* as equivalent to *pravartanā*, i.e., a property of *niyoktr*, which is denoted by *liñ*, and distinguishes it from the *kartavyatā*, i.e., the object of *niyoga*, which belongs to *niyojya*. As Vācaspati records, the new Prabhākaras (*navīnāḥ*) construe Prabhākara’s passage differently.

¹¹⁹ PP *vākyārthamātrkā* II 24 (440.22-23) : *tad dhi kālāntarasthānāc chaktam svargādisid-dhaye/ śaṅbandho ’py upapadyeta niyojyenāsya kāmīnā//* “For this (*kārya*) is capable of accomplishing heaven, etc., because it endures until a future time. The relationship of it with the commanded person who has a desire can also be explained.”

construed as *yāgaviṣayaṃ niyogaṃ kuryāt svargakāmaḥ* does not directly state the causal relationship between *niyoga* and *svarga*.

$$\begin{array}{ccccc}
 yāga & \rightarrow & \mathbf{niyoga} & (\rightarrow) & svarga \\
 | & & | & & | \\
 kartṛ & = & niyojya & = & adhikārin
 \end{array}$$

8.2. Prabhākara's *Bṛhatī*

8.2.1. Prabhākara's disapproval of the paraphrase *svargaṃ yāgena kuryāt*

Whereas for Śabara and Kumārila it is easy and straightforward to find evidence in the Vedic statement which warrants the causal relationship, it is not such an easy task for Prabhākara. Śabara and Kumārila resort to the 'sentence' (*vākya*), the third *pramāṇa* for ascertaining the subservience (*śeṣatva*), in order to ascertain the causal relationship between a sacrifice and heaven (*yāga*→*svarga*), because the two words *svargakāmo yajeta* which are paraphrased as *svargaṃ yāgena kuryāt* warrants it straightforwardly, as the use of the accusative ending in *svargam* shows. Prabhākara, on the other hand, has to take a circuitous approach. Unlike Śabara and Kumārila, he cannot simply resort to the 'sentence' (*vākya*), because his presupposed paraphrase is different. Prabhākara explicitly denies the paraphrase "*svargaṃ yāgena kuryāt*" in *Bṛhatī* ad 3.1.3.

Bṛhatī 637.4: *nanu "svargaṃ yāgena kuryād ātmārtham" iti niyogaḥ, ātmanepadaprayogāt. naivaṃ śabdāt pratipattuṃ śakyate.*

[Objection:] Surely "one should achieve heaven by a sacrifice for the sake of oneself" is the command, because *ātmanepada* is used [in *yajeta*]. [Reply:] It is impossible to understand it from the [Vedic] statement.

For Prabhākara it is neither obvious (*siddha*), i.e., already well established from

another source, that heaven is the object to be achieved by a sacrifice, nor is it the case that the causal relationship between a sacrifice and heaven is understood from the Vedic statement *svargakāmo yajeta*.¹²⁰ Furthermore, *svarga* primarily functions as a qualifier of an agent in the sentence “*svargakāmo yajeta*.”¹²¹ Generally speaking, a qualifier of an agent cannot be the object of a main action, just as a king, who functions as a qualifier of his man, is not the object of seeing in the example: “Look at the king’s man” (*rājapuruṣaṃ paśya*).¹²² Prabhākara states as follows:

Bṛhatī 639.1: *ato na “svargaṃ kuryāt” iti niyogaviṣayatā śakyate pratipattum.*

Therefore, it is impossible to understand that *svargaṃ kuryāt* is the content of the command.

8.2.2. Prabhākara’s interpretation of Śabara’s passage *svargaṃ bhāvayet*

Consequently, Prabhākara has to adopt a different method from that of Śabara. Prabhākara’s deviation from him, however, entails the following exegetical problem.

ŚBh ad 2.1.1 (Kataoka 2004:50.1-2): *svargakāmaṣadāsaṃbandhāt svargaṃ bhāvayed iti.*

It is understood due to the connection with the word *svargakāmaḥ* that one

¹²⁰ *Bṛhatī* 638.1-2: *na ca svargo yūgasya kārakam iti siddham, na ca vedāt kriyākārakasāmbandhāvagatiḥ.*

¹²¹ For the entailment of *svarga*, see section 8.2.4.

¹²² *Bṛhatī* 638.5-6: *kiṃ ca kartṛviśeṣaṇam cātra svargaśabdaḥ. na kartṛviśeṣaṇam īpsitamaṃ bhavati “rājapuruṣaṃ paśya” itivat.* “Furthermore, here the word *svarga* is a qualifier of the agent. A qualifier of an agent does not become an object most desired to be attained. This is similar to an example: Look at the man of the king.”

should bring about heaven.

This statement apparently contradicts Prabhākara's own view, because for him *svarga* is not the object (*karma-kāraka*) of an action, i.e., one of the *kāraṅkas* that is expressed in the accusative ending, but a mere motive (*nimitta*, *prayojana*) in the first place. Therefore, Śābara's comment is hostile to his view rather than supportive. Prabhākara is thus pushed into the situation that he needs to justify Śābara's inconvenient statement. He solves the problem in an acrobatic way as follows:

1. Śābara's statement is alright. It is not contradictory.¹²³
2. If it contradicted Prabhākara's view, Śābara would have stated as follows:
svargaṃ iti śravaṇāt svargaṃ bhāvayed iti. "Because *svargaṃ* is heard [in the accusative case], it is understood that one should accomplish heaven."¹²⁴
3. But Śābara does not say so. Instead he states: *svargakāmapadasaṃbandhāt "svargaṃ bhāvayet" iti*.
4. This means that Śābara's comment intends to say that the result arises spontaneously (*svayam eva tad bhavati*).¹²⁵
5. Because Śābara regards heaven, the object (*karman*), as a mere motive (*nimitta*) when he says *svargaṃ bhāvayet*.¹²⁶
6. Therefore, heaven is a motive (*prayojana*) and not the object to be achieved.¹²⁷

¹²³ *Bṛhatī* 639.2-3: *evam etad bhāṣyam*.

¹²⁴ *Bṛhatī* 639.3: *anyathā hi svargaṃ iti śravaṇāt "svargaṃ bhāvayet" iti syāt*.

¹²⁵ *Bṛhatī* 640.1: *ata eva svayam eva tad bhavātīty etadabhiprāyaṃ tat*.

¹²⁶ *Bṛhatī* 640.1-2: *nimittamātrakathanam hi tat karmaṇaḥ*.

¹²⁷ *Bṛhatī* 640.2-3: *ataḥ prayojanam svargo yāgasya na karma*.

We can confirm here a clear difference between Śabara and Prabhākara. Insofar as the interpretation of *svargakāmo yajeta* is concerned, Prabhākara does not consider the sentence to be warranting the causal relationship that would be primarily shown by the paraphrase *svargaṃ bhāvayet*. Instead, he prefers the idea that we can trace back to Bādari, i.e., the view that the result arises spontaneously. In other words, he understands Śabara's statement *svargaṃ bhāvayet* secondarily as equivalent to *svayam eva svargo bhavati*. As Śālikanātha explains, Śabara's use of the accusative ending in *svargam* should be considered secondary (*gauṇa*) for Prabhākara.¹²⁸

8.2.3. Prabhākara on the relationship between *yāga* and *svarga*

Of course it is not the case that Prabhākara, inasmuch as being a commentator of Śabara's commentary, follows Bādari in every respect with regard to JS 3.1.3–4, where Śabara considers Bādari mentioned in JS 3.1.3 to be a *pūrvapakṣin*. Prabhākara has to accept Jaimini's view that a sacrifice, too, is for the sake of heaven, as JS 3.1.4 claims: *karmāny api jaiminiḥ phalārthatvāt*, and not Bādari's view that the sacrifice is never for the sake of heaven. But, as shown above, Prabhākara's method is different from that of Śabara. For Prabhākara the causal relationship between *yāga* and *svarga* is understood indirectly from the Vedic statement paraphrased as follows: *yaḥ svargaṃ kāmayaṭe sa yāgaṃ kuryāt*. This paraphrase shows that only a person who desires heaven is eligible as the agent of the sacrifice. And this eligibility is impossible without the causal relationship.

Br̥hatī 641.7–8: *kathaṃ phalārthatā karmaṇaḥ. kāmīno hy adhikāro yāge. sa ca*

¹²⁸ R̥ju 640.15–16: *tena gauṇo 'yaṃ dvitīyāprayoga iti yāvat*.

phalasādhanatām yāgasyānāpādayan na sidhyatīti śaṣṭhe vakṣyāmaḥ.

[Question:] How can the [principal] action [such as *yāga*] be for the sake of a fruit [such as *svarga*]?

[Reply:] For a person who has a desire is eligible to a sacrifice. And it is impossible for the eligibility to be fulfilled if it did not bring about [the causal relationship, i.e.,] *yāga* being a means of a result. We will state this in the sixth lesson.

Interestingly, Prabhākara presupposes a Bādari-like paraphrase here, *yaḥ svargaṃ kāmāyate sa yāgaṃ kuryāt* (ŚBh ad 3.1.3), rather than a Jaimini-like one: *yāgena kriyate phalam* (ŚBh ad 3.1.3). Bādari claims that the Vedic statement which should be paraphrased in the former way does not warrant the subordination that the result belongs to a human being, i.e., the result is for the sake of man (*phala*→*puruṣa*), as he states (according to Śābara):

ŚBh ad 3.1.3: (1) *phalam api na puruṣaṃ praty upadiśyate*. (2) “*yaḥ svargaṃ kāmāyate sa yāgaṃ kuryāt*” *ity etāvaca chabdenopadiśyate*, (3) ***na “ātmanah” “parasya” veti***. (Cf. section 1.5)

A result also is not taught [as intended] for a person. What is taught by a [Vedic] utterance is merely “one who desires heaven must perform a sacrifice,” not “ [one who desires heaven] for oneself” or “for someone else.”

Śābara opposes Bādari regarding this paraphrase when commenting on JS 3.1.5 (*phalaṃ ca puruṣārthatvāt*) by reversing his words.

ŚBh ad 3.1.5: (1) *phalam api puruṣaṃ praty upadiśyate*. (2) *yaḥ “svargo me*

bhavet” *ity evaṃ kāmāyate tasya yāgaḥ*, (3) **na “yaḥ svargaḥ sa ātmānaṃ labheta” iti**. (4) *kutaḥ. ātmanepadaḥ prayogāt*.

A result, too, is taught for a human being. A person who desires that, “May I enjoy heaven,” [is eligible as the agent of] a sacrifice, and not a person who desires that heaven will come into being [somewhere else]. Why? Because *ātmanepada* is used.

Here the point is that a person is eligible to perform a sacrifice only when he desires that *he*, not somebody else, will attain heaven. Prabhākara repeats Śābara’s view almost verbatim at 3.1.5.

Bṛhatī 643.2-4: (1) *phalam aṅgī puruṣaṃ praty upadiśyate*. (2) *yaḥ “svargo me syāt” ity evaṃ kāmāyate tasya niyogaḥ*. (3) **na “svarga ātmānaṃ labheta” iti**. (4) *kutaḥ. ātmanepadaḥ prayogāt*.

A result, too, is taught for the sake of a human being. [Only] a person who desires that, “May I enjoy heaven,” is commanded, not a person who desires that heaven will come into being [somewhere else]. Why? Because *ātmanepada* is used.

Thus, we can confirm that Prabhākara criticizes Bādari’s view and instead adopts Jaimini’s view by following Śābara’s method of resorting to the *ātmanepada* with regard to JS 3.1.5: *phalam ca puruṣārthatvāt*. In other words, Prabhākara accepts the paraphrase of *svargakāmaḥ* as *yaḥ svargaṃ ātmanāḥ kāmāyate* that Bādari criticizes.

Bādari:	<i>yaḥ svargaṃ ātmanaḥ kāmāyate sa yāgaṃ kuryāt</i> = “ <i>yaḥ svargaḥ sa ātmānaṃ labheta</i> ” <i>iti</i>
Jaimini:	<i>phalaṃ ca puruṣārthatvāt = phalam api puruṣaṃ praty up-</i> <i>adiśyate</i>
Śabara:	<i>yaḥ “svargo me bhavet” ity evaṃ kāmāyate tasya yāgaḥ</i>
Prabhākara:	<i>yaḥ “svargo me syāt” ity evaṃ kāmāyate tasya niyogaḥ.</i>

JS 3.1.4 establishes the subservience of *yāga* to *svarga* (R_{ys}). JS 3.1.5, on the other hand, establishes the subservience of *svarga* to *puruṣa* (R_{sp}), i.e., a *kāmin* who has a desire. (R: relation)

$$\begin{array}{ccc}
 & R_{ys} & \\
 yāga & \rightarrow & svarga \\
 | & & \downarrow R_{sp} \\
 karṭṛ & = & puruṣa (=kāmin=adhikārin)
 \end{array}$$

As the difference in paraphrasing *yajeta* shows, there is a serious gap between Śabara (*yāgena svargaṃ kuryāt*) and Prabhākara (**yāgaviśayam niyogaṃ kuryāt*) with regard to R_{ys} dealt in JS 3.1.4, whereas with regard to R_{sp} dealt in JS 3.1.5, there is little difference between them at least with respect to the paraphrase of *svargakāmaḥ* as **yaḥ svargaṃ ātmanaḥ kāmāyate*, i.e., *yaḥ “svargo me bhavet” ity evaṃ kāmāyate*. (But note that Prabhākara does not forget to insert *niyoga*.) To conclude, Prabhākara’s method is different from Śabara’s with respect to *yajeta* but not so with regard to *svargakāmaḥ* except that someone who is commanded (*niyojya*) is the eligible person (*adhikārin*) in his system.

8.2.4. *Anyathānuṣaṅgā* as the criterion for the relationship between *yāga* and *svarga* Prabhākara’s explanation at 3.1.4 quoted above can be interpreted as a claim that the subservience of *yāga* to *svarga* (R_{ys}) is necessary for the subservience of

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svarga to *kāmin* (R_{sp}), i.e., a properly eligible person (*adhikārin*). Remember that he inserts *hi* as the connective.

Bṛhatī ad 3.1.4 (641.7): (R_{ys}) *kathaṃ phalārthatā karmaṇaḥ*. (R_{sp}) *kāmino hy adhikāro yāge*. (Cf. section 8.2.3.)

[Question:] How can the [principal] action [such as *yāga*] be for the sake of a fruit [such as *svarga*]?

[Reply:] For a person who has a desire is eligible to a sacrifice.

To put his claim another way, the relationship R_{sp} is impossible without another relationship R_{ys} . This is expressed by Prabhākara as follows:

Bṛhatī ad 3.1.4 (641.7–8) : *sa [=adhikāraḥ] ca phalasādhanatām yā-gasyānāpādayan na sidhyati*. (Cf. section 8.2.3.)

And it is impossible for the eligibility to be fulfilled if it did not bring about [the causal relationship, i.e.,] *yāga* being a means of a result.

The expression “Not fulfilled without bringing about” (*anāpādayan na sidhyati*) indicates that the process is *anyathānuṣaṅgā* as Jayanta explains (cf. section 8.1.1). The relationship R_{sp} requires R_{ys} . Therefore, a sentence of eligibility (*svargakāmo yajeta*) entails the causal relationship between *yāga* and *svarga*. This is what Prabhākara intends. Here Prabhākara follows Śabara’s explanation with regard to the relationship R_{sp} as his almost verbatim comment shows; but not so with regard to another relationship R_{ys} . For Prabhākara the relationship between *yāga* and *svarga* is not based on the ‘sentence’ (*vākya*), the third *pramāṇa* for ascertaining the subservience; but rather it is an object of *arthāpatti* as Jayanta clarifies.

Śālikanātha, too, supports my observation when he states that the causal relationship between *yāga* and *svarga* is entailed (*sādhyasādhanabhāvākṣepaḥ*) because only a *kāmin* who has a desire is the *niyojya*, a person who is commanded.¹²⁹

8.2.5. Prabhākara on the relationship between *svarga* and *puruṣa*

That Prabhākara does not in fact consider important the causal relationship between *yāga* and *svarga* is indicated in his comment on 3.1.4.

Bṛhatī 642.1-2: *yadi punar ayam yāgaḥ phale sādhanabhāvam na pratīpadyate tatra ko doṣaḥ. na khalu kaścit. pratīyate tu tathā.*

[Question:] What then is wrong if this sacrifice does not come to be a means of a result?

[Reply:] Nothing at all. But it is actually understood in that way.

Here he clearly deviates from Śābara. For Śābara it is a serious problem if the sacrifice is not a means of a result, as his system of *bhāvanā* together with its three factors, *sādhya*, *sādhana* and *itikartavyatā*, indicates. But in Prabhākara's system of *nyoga*, this is not the case. As the commentator Śālikanātha explains, in the case of *nitya* type of ritual a fruit is not required and therefore the causal relationship is not absolutely necessary for Prabhākara.¹³⁰ For Śābara, on the contrary, a fruit is postulated even in the *nitya* type of ritual. As Kumārila puts it, either compensation of the past or avoiding a future demerit is regarded as a fruit in the case

¹²⁹ Rju 642.13: *kāmino niyojyāt sādhyasādhanabhāvākṣepaḥ*. "The [causal] relationship between *sādhya* and *sādhana* is implied, because only a person who desires is the *niyojya*, i.e., the [eligible] person who is commanded."

¹³⁰ Rju 642.11-12: *nityādhikāre vinā phalenādhikārānupaṭtīr nāsti*. "In the case of a *nitya* ritual there is no problem in eligibility without a fruit."

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of compulsory rituals.¹³¹

8.3. Modern scholars on Prabhākara

Opposing K.S. Rāmasvāmi Śāstrī, A. Subrahmaṇya Śāstrī insists that one cannot regard the Prābhākaras as followers of Bādari, because they do not adopt Bādari's view (JS 3.1.3: *dravyaguṇasamskāreṣu bādariḥ*) but rather accept Jaimini's view (JS 3.1.4: *karmāṇy api jaiminiḥ, phalārthatvāt*).¹³² Yoshimizu confirms Subrahmaṇya Śāstrī's view and says as follows in Yoshimizu 1994:403:

Although Prabhākara insists that the fulfilment of obligation (*niyogasiddhi*) is the real interest of the Vedic injunctions, he also admits like Jaimini and Śābara and unlike Bādari from the viewpoint of the human motivation that the act of sacrificing is a means to and therefore subordinated to the desired result.

It is, however, misleading for us to simply conclude that there is little difference between Bhāṭṭas and Prābhākaras and to regard Prābhākaras as the followers of Jaimini's utilitarian view. There are theoretical differences between the two schools. The most fundamental difference comes out of their interpretations of

¹³¹ TV ad 1.3.27–29: *pratyāśramavarṇanīyatāni nityanaimittikakarmāṇy api pūrvakṛtadurita-kṣayārtham akarṇanimitānāgatapratyavāyaparīhārārtham ca kartavyāni*. "Obligatory rituals and occasional rituals, too, which are prescribed according to the life-stage and the social class, must be performed for the sake of consuming the sin committed in the past and abandoning future 'descending' caused by an inaction." Cf. also his famous words at ŚV *sambandhākṣepaparihāra* 110c: *nityanaimittike kuryāt pratyavāyajihāsayā*//.

¹³² Subrahmaṇya Śāstrī 1961:8: "*yat tu tṛtīyādhyāyaprathamapāde "dravyasaṃskārakarmasu bādariḥ", "karmāṇy api jaiminiḥ phalārthatvāt" iti atra dravya-guṇa-samskāraṇām eva mukhyam āngatvam iti bādarīmatam. yac ca karmaṇo 'pi svargaśeṣatvam, tad idam ubhayaṃ api bhāṭṭa-prābhākarayor aviḥpratiḥpannam.*"

yajeta. The basic interpretation of *yajeta* by the Prābhākaras is reconstructed as *yāgaṃ* (*yāgaviṣayaṃ niyogaṃ*) *kuryāt* and not *yāgena svargaṃ kuryāt*.

Of course, as the two scholars emphasize, the Prābhākaras do not deny that a fruit is brought about by the sacrifice as Jaimini does. This attitude of justifying the efficacy of an action is also confirmed even in Bādari's view described by Śābara at 3.1.3–4 and its closely related view at 6.1.3 (cf. section 1.4). Bādari and his followers, including *dharmābhivṛtyāda* and the Prābhākaras, also feel it necessary to somehow justify the relationship between action and fruit (cf. sections 3 and 8.1.1). But it is impossible for them to demonstrate it directly from the Veda, because they construe the Veda literally as stating *yāgaṃ kuryāt* and not *yāgena svargaṃ kuryāt*.

We should be sensitive to the subtle nuance of Prabhākara's admittance of Jaimini's view. As Yoshimizu carefully chooses the verb "admit" and not "accept" or "claim", it is not the case that Prabhākara is eager to claim Jaimini's view of result-orientation. His basic view is *niyoga*-centered. Prabhākara maintains his basic tenet of *niyoga* and at the same time tries to justify the efficacy of an action.¹³³ Although it is not the case that Prabhākara has exactly the same view as Bādari, it is also inappropriate to say that Prabhākara has the same view as Jaimini or Śābara does. Considering Prabhākara's basic plan and its prehistory witnessed in the *dharmābhivṛtyāda*, we should conclude, as K.S. Rāmasvāmi Śāstrī does, that the opposition between Prabhākara and Kumārila corresponds to the one between Bādari and Jaimini.

¹³³ See also Śālikanātha's view on this issue (PP 443.22–24 quoted below in this section).

8.4. The relationship between *niyoga* and *phala*

The simile of a master (*svāmin*) and a servant (*bhṛtya*) once used by *dharma-abhivṛtya-vādins* (cf. section 3.1) also fits with Prabhākara's view. See, for example, the view of *dharma-abhivṛtya-vādin* referred to in MBhD IV 25.26:

yathā svāmī bhṛtyaiḥ sevāyām preryate phalaṃ prati.

Just like a master who is urged toward a reward by his servants in a service.

Śabara refers to the simile of a servant when discussing *śeṣa* which he defines as “absolutely for the sake of the other” (*atyantaṃ parārthaḥ*).¹³⁴ In some cases, however, a master acts for his servant. For example, he gives him a salary and food. Śabara justifies this case, saying that in this case, too, the master primarily acts for the sake of himself. The master also acts for his servant, because his labor for the sake of himself is inevitably accompanied by the service for his servant.¹³⁵

The Prābhākara school also uses this simile.¹³⁶ Śālikanātha denies the view

¹³⁴ ŚBh ad 3.1.2: *yas tu atyantam parārthas tam vayam śeṣa iti brūmah. yathā garbhadāsaḥ karmārtha eva svāminah, anaḍvāms ca krīyate “vakṣyati” ity eva.* “But we call it subservient if it is absolutely for the sake of something else. For example a slave by birth who is purely for the sake of a master's work; and one buys an ox, just because one thinks that it will carry.”

¹³⁵ ŚBh ad 3.1.2: *nanu garbhadāsasyāpi svāmī samvidadhāno guṇabhāvam āyāt. neti brūmah. ātmana evāsau samvidadhāno guṇabhāvam gacchati. nāntarīyakatvād garbhadāsasyopakaroti, anaḍhuo vā.* “Objection: A master works for the sake of a slave by birth, too; then he becomes subservient to the latter. Reply: We say No. Working purely for the sake of himself, he becomes subservient. He serves for a slave by birth or an ox because it is inevitable.”

¹³⁶ For example, see PP *vākyārthamātrkā* II (443.22–24) : *ātmasiddhyartham eva niyogaḥ kāmyamāna-phalasiddhihetutvam avalambate, svāmivat. yathātmana eva samvidadhānah svāmī garbhadāsasyopakaroti, tathā niyogo 'pi niyojyaseti, na prādhānyapracutyaiḥ.* “*Niyoga* becomes a cause of accomplishing a desired fruit purely for the sake of its own accomplishment, just like a master. A master serves for a slave by birth when he works just for the sake of himself. Similarly *niyoga*, too, serves for the urged. Its primacy is not lost.”

that a result is principal (*pradhāna*) and *niyoga* is its means (*phalasādhana*). *Niyoga* always remains principal and never loses its high status. But the master, *niyoga*, inevitably becomes a means for a result purely for the sake of its own accomplishment (*ātmasiddhyartham*), because otherwise *niyoga* would not be accomplished. It is not the case that *niyoga* is subsidiary to a result.

To restate the basic idea of the simile: a master prompted (*prerita*) by a servant's service will give him a reward,¹³⁷ similarly the master-like *niyoga* prompted by the sacrificer's performance will give him the result. Although the master is always primary and the servant is absolutely subservient to the master (*atyantaṃ parārthaḥ*), there are cases in which the master appears to be subservient to the servant.¹³⁸ In fact, however, his apparent subservience has inevitably (*nāntarīya-katoāt*) resulted in the course of his acting for his own sake.

¹³⁷ *Bṛhatī* 320.7 (quoted in section 5.6) mentions a deity's gratification (*devatāprasāda*) as a possible candidate for the direct cause of a fruit. According to this view, a sacrifice propitiates (*ārādhana*) a deity, who being gratified will graciously bestow a fruit to the sacrificer in the future. Śālikanātha explains it as follows in PP *vākyārthamātrkā* II (436.20–24): *nanu yāgādikriyā devatārādhanoḥpāyabhūtā satī kāryatayocyatām, sā tat-pratyāsattidvāreṇa kālāntare 'pi phalaṃ janayitum alam eva. devatā phaladānasamarthā karmabhir ārādhyate, sārādhitā prasīdati, prasannā ca kartṛṇ kālāntare 'pi phalena yojayaty eveti*. "Objection: Let the action such as sacrifice which is the means for propitiating a deity be called *kārya* (what is to be done). It is indeed capable of producing a fruit even in the future because of its presence at the [sacrifice, etc.]. A deity which is capable of giving a fruit is propitiated by actions; and having been propitiated it gets gratified; and having been gratified it does connect agents with a fruit even in the future." This is the most naive view probably current in ancient times. This line of thought, which is particularly referred to in JS 9.1.8 (*tataś [=devatāyās] ca tena [=phalena] saṃbandhaḥ*), is denied in the *devatādihikaraṇa* (JS 9.1.6–10).

¹³⁸ Śābara refers to a case in which the relationship between the principal and the subordinate is interchangeable and thereby the subservience is not "absolute". ŚBh ad 3.1.2: *nanu yo 'pi pradhānabhūtaḥ so 'pi kadācit parārthe vartate, yathopādhyāyaḥ pradhānabhūtaḥ śiṣyāṇāṃ vidyāvīnayaḥdhāne vartate*. "[Objection:] In some cases even a person who is principal works for the sake of someone else. For example, a teacher, although he is principal, works for bestowing knowledge and conduct on his disciple."

9. Maṇḍana's view of *iṣṭasādhanatā*

9.1. Maṇḍana's analysis of *pravartaka*

What prompts (*pravartayati*) a listener of the Veda to commence a ritual action? In other words, what is the direct cause of a listener's undertaking an action (*pravartaka*, *pravṛttihetu*)? Is it a sound itself (*śabda*) such as an exhortative ending (*liṅ*) or its denoted meaning (*artha*), i.e., injunction (*vidhi*), that a listener understands from hearing *liṅ*?¹³⁹

9.2. *Kāra*ka and *jñāpaka*

In his analysis of the injunction, Maṇḍana introduces the framework of *kāra*ka (maker: something that physically makes a listener act) and *jñāpaka* (communicator: something that epistemically makes a listener understand) in the first place.¹⁴⁰ If the sound "Ought" itself (and not its meaning) forced a listener to move just as strong wind (*balavadanila*) or a flood (*salilaugha*) drives away,¹⁴¹ it could be called *kāra*ka.¹⁴² This is, however, not the case, because the sound would give up its status of being a *pramāṇa* if it produced a human activity without

¹³⁹ For Maṇḍana's notion of *iṣṭasādhanatā*, see David 2013, 2015. Maṇḍana Miśra is an area of research that has made remarkable progress recently, partly because Elliot Stern is preparing a new edition of the *Vidhiviveka* (to be published in 2023) and partly because a study group is being organized around Elisa Freschi. A noteworthy instance of this can be found in Das's forthcoming contribution, which is featured in her edited volume (with gratitude extended to Elisa Freschi for providing information on an unpublished article).

¹⁴⁰ See Maṇḍana's explanation of VV₃ v. 1.2a: *pramāṇatvāt*. "[An utterance is] a means of knowledge." VV₁ 5.7-8, VV₂ 252-254, VV₃ 45.8-9: *na hi kāra*ko hetuḥ *pramāṇam*, *api tu jñāpakaḥ*. "For a means of knowledge is not a physical cause but an epistemic cause."

¹⁴¹ See Maṇḍana's explanation of VV₃ v. 1.2ab: *aniyamāt pravṛtteḥ*. "Because anybody, without any restriction, would commence an action."

¹⁴² Vācaspati, a commentator of Maṇḍana's *Vidhiviveka*, compares it with a magnet (*ayaskāntamaṇi*) that moves iron. NKa₁ 4.11-12, NKa₂ 236.5-240.2, NKa₃ 42.10: *tasya khalu liṅāder ayaskāntamaṇer iva vastusvabhāvajō 'tiśayo yena loham iva cetanaṃ pravartayati*. "As is well known, the exhortative ending, etc., have a natural superior quality by which they move a sentient being just as a magnet moves iron."

communicating a meaning.¹⁴³ Therefore, it is the meaning and not the sound that prompts a listener. The linguistic unit “Ought” requires a listener’s cognition¹⁴⁴ inasmuch as it is a *jñāpaka* that communicates its meaning.¹⁴⁵

9.3. Maṇḍana’s criticism of Kumāriḷa’s *abhidhābhāvanā*

Then, the question is: what exactly is the nature of the meaning of an exhortative ending that prompts man? Is it *abhidhābhāvanā* (causative operation of an utterance)¹⁴⁶ or *niyoga* (command/imperative as the meaning of “Ought”)? Kumāriḷa’s *abhidhābhāvanā* is subject to the same fault that *kāraḷa* is, because being a coercive operation (*vyāpāra*) in nature, it would theoretically follow that *abhidhābhāvanā*, even without being cognized, forcibly causes a listener to move just as wind does.¹⁴⁷ Then, the process of denoting a meaning by the exhortative ending, etc., would be useless (*abhidhānavaiarthya*).¹⁴⁸ An utterance being a cause of producing a listener’s activity, denotation of its operation is not required, because it brings about the same result anyway, regardless of whether its oper-

¹⁴³ VV₁ 4.6–7, VV₂ 250–252, VV₃ 45.8: *svayam eva tu pravṛtteḷ kārakas tām [=pramāṇatām] apajahyāt*. “But the *kāraḷa* which produces an activity independently would give up being a *pramāṇa*.”

¹⁴⁴ VV₃ 1.2b: *saṃvidāśrayāt*. “Because [an utterance] depends on cognition.”

¹⁴⁵ VV₁ 5.6–7, VV₂ 268–272, VV₃ 51.10: *jñāpakam ca jñānam apeḷḷate. linādisvarūpaṃ ca pravṛtteḷ kārakam ity anuḷayuktasaṃvido ’pi pravṛtṭiprasaṅgaḷ*. “And, [generally speaking,] a communicator requires cognition. But if the exhortative ending or the like itself was a *kāraḷa* that produces an activity, it would undesirably follow that even someone who does not use his mind takes an action.”

¹⁴⁶ Maṇḍana considers two optional interpretations of *abhidhābhāvanā* in VV₃ vv. 1.3–4: “a causative operation of an utterance” (*abhidhāyā bhāvanā*) and “denotation cum causative operation” (*abhidhāiva bhāvanā*).

¹⁴⁷ See Maṇḍana’s explanation of VV₃ v. 1.3b: *vaiarthyaṭ pūrvadoḷḷataḷ*. “Because denotation would be useless and because of the same fault mentioned above.”

¹⁴⁸ VV₁ 14.1–3, VV₂ 428.1–2, VV₃ 90.5–6: *tad asaḷ, abhidhānavaiarthyaṭ, apratīḷavyāpārasyaḷpi vāyvāder iva svabhāvataḷ prerakatvāt*. “This is not correct, because denotation would be useless. For, even an exhortative ending of which operation is not cognized would urge [a person] by its own nature just as wind does.”

ation is denoted or not. A physical cause does not require cognition.¹⁴⁹ Furthermore, even if the Vedic “Ought” had a causative operation, people would not enact it without a clear motive such as attaining a merit or avoiding a demerit.¹⁵⁰

9.4. Maṇḍana’s criticism of Prabhākara’s *niyoga*

It is also necessary to remember that a coercive operation such as urging (*preṣaṇa*) is a property of a human being (*puruṣadharmā*) and not an utterance. The authorless Veda cannot have as a property a human operation.¹⁵¹ Prabhākara’s *niyoga*, too, has the same problem. A command, being an operation of a command giver (*niyoktrivyāpāra*), cannot exist without a command giver. Therefore, it is impossible for the Veda to provide a command, because it is authorless (*apauruṣeya*).¹⁵²

9.5. Maṇḍana’s own view

Maṇḍana’s own view is that it is *iṣṭasādhanatā* (being a means of a desired end),

¹⁴⁹ VV₁ 14.3–5, VV₂ 430.1–3, VV₃ 90.6–8: *na hi pravṛttikāraikatve śabdasya sad api tad-
vyāpārābhīdhanam* āngam, *anabhihitavyāpārasyāpi tasya kāryakaratvāt, kārakasyāna-
pekṣitajñānatvāt*. “For, an utterance, when it is a cause of an activity, does not require the
process of denoting its operation even in the case where [the denotation] takes place,
because an utterance brings about its own effect [anyway] even if its operation is not
denoted. For a *kāraka* does not require cognition.”

¹⁵⁰ VV₁ 14.5–8, VV₂ 430.3–434.2, VV₃ 91.14–16: *upetyāpi tu śabdasya prayogaṃ brūmah, na
pravarteta puruṣaḥ, pravartayato ’pi śabdasyānanurodhyatvāt. na hi sarvasmin pravart-
tayati pravṛtīḥ prekṣāvātām, api tv anuvidheye. na cārthānarthaprāptiparihārādyanu-
vidhānakāraṇaṃ svāmyādāv iva śabde samasti*. “Even admitting that the utterance has
an operation, we claim that people would not undertake an action, because the utterance,
even though urging, is not something to be followed. For it is not the case that peo-
ple of common sense undertake an action due to any instigator; but [they do so only]
when [the instigator] is to be followed. But there is no motive of obedience such as
attaining a merit or evading a demerit in the utterance unlike a [human] master, etc.”

¹⁵¹ See Maṇḍana’s explanation of VV₃ v. 1.3a: *na prayogānirūpyatvāt*. “No, because [this kind
of] operation cannot be ascertained [as that of an utterance].”

¹⁵² See Maṇḍana’s explanation of VV₃ v. 1.12c: *nākartykā kriyā*. “No action without an agent.”

e.g., the causal relationship between a sacrifice and heaven, that prompts a human being to undertake an action. A human being spontaneously commences an action after having understood from hearing the Veda that a sacrifice is a good means for attaining a desired end.

As described above, the *kāraka* theory that a linguistic unit itself forces a human being to perform an action is extremely deontological, because it would follow that anybody without exception commences an action even against his will (*icchā*).¹⁵³ Prabhākara's command theory can be placed next, because he claims that a Vedic command internalized in a listener's heart as "I must do it" is the primary cause that prompts a human being. Kumārila's theory of *abhidhābhāvanā* still retains a deontological tendency as Maṇḍana alleges, although Kumārila himself intends to be more utilitarian by showing that the framework of the two *bhāvanās*, i.e., *śabdātmikā* and *arthātmikā*, encompasses a result in its scope so that the Veda itself warrants the desired end.

9.6. Maṇḍana's place in the history

It is possible to regard that the utilitarian tradition beginning with Jaimini's result-oriented view reaches its highest peak with Maṇḍana.

9.6.1. Bādari

Remember that Bādari's view is deontological and that it complies with what the Veda states, interpreting *yajeta* literally as *yāgaṃ kuryāt*. Bādari's view is action-centered. According to his view, one should perform a sacrifice primarily because the

¹⁵³ VV₁ 5.4-5, VV₂ 266.3-268.1, VV₃ 50.1-2: *na hi tadānīm balavadanīlasalīlaugha-nudyamānasyeveccchāpi tantram puruṣasya*. "For then even one's will would not be the main cause just as that of a person being pushed away by strong wind or a flood."

Veda commands one to do it.

9.6.2. Prabhākara

Prabhākara further emphasizes the authoritativeness of the Veda and makes his view imperative-centered. It is the command (*niyoga*), i.e., the meaning of *liñ*, etc., that is to be realized. The command is what prompts human beings and at the same time it is what is to be done.¹⁵⁴ In order to realize a command, one needs to perform a sacrifice, which is the object of a command (*niyogaviṣaya*), because it is impossible to realize a command by itself.¹⁵⁵

According to Jayanta (NM II 70.3–8), there are two subordinate views among the Prābhākaras with regard to the two aspects of *niyoga*, i.e., *niyoga* as *kārya* (*anuṣṭheya*, something to be done) and *niyoga* as *pravartaka* (*preraka*, an instigator that causes one to act). One group regards the *pravartaka*-aspect as primary and *kārya*-aspect as secondary (NM II 70.5: *arthāt tasya kāryatvam*), whereas another regards *kārya*-aspect as primary and *pravartaka*-aspect as secondary (NM II 70.6: *arthāt tasya prerakatvam*). Śālikanātha admits that *arthātmikā bhāvanā*, i.e., *kṛti* (human effort), is integrated into *niyoga*, in particular into its *kārya*-aspect.¹⁵⁶ Of these two views the former view that *pravartaka*-aspect is

¹⁵⁴ NM II 110.4: *niyoga eva prerakaḥ, niyoga eva cānuṣṭheyaḥ*.

¹⁵⁵ NM II 110.9–11: *kimarthaṃ tarhi viṣayānuṣṭhānam iti cet. na hy ājñā ghaṭādivat svarūpeṇa kartuṃ śakyā, api tu viṣayadvārakaṃ tatsaṃpādanam. “kamaṇḍaluṃ bibhr̥hi” ity ācāryeṇājñaptaḥ kamaṇḍaluṃ bhṛtvācāryājñām kṛtām manyate.* “Objection: Then why is there a performance of the object? Reply: This is because a command itself cannot be accomplished, unlike a pot, etc. But it is accomplished via [its] object. A person who is ordered by his teacher to bring a vessel considers that his teacher’s order is performed if he brings [him] a vessel.” Cf. also Yoshimizu 2022:94, n. 12.

¹⁵⁶ PP *vākyārthamātrkā* II (426.10–11) : *kāryābhidhāyino liñādayaḥ kāryasyānyathānabhidhānāt kṛtyābhidhāyina iṣyante.* “The exhortative ending *liñ* and so on, which denote *kārya*, are accepted as denoting *kṛti* [too] because otherwise *kārya* would not be denoted.”

primary can be regarded as more rigorously deontological and conservative.

As the *pravartaka*-view shows well the feature of the deontological aspect of the Prābhākara theory, the Veda is here seen as primarily imperative rather than descriptive. For the Prābhākaras “Ought” statements cannot be reduced to “Is” statements. “Ought” denotes a command. It is not the case that a person undertakes an action after understanding the causal relationship of the action described by the Veda in the first place; but he does so primarily because he is ordered to do so. Whereas Kumārila regards *liṅārtha* as *śabdātmikā bhāvanā*, i.e., the causative operation of an injunction, Prabhākara regards it as *niyoga*, command.

9.6.3. Kumārila

In this connection it is noteworthy that Kumārila still regards Vedic injunction as a kind of force (*vidhisakti*)¹⁵⁷ or an operation of an utterance (*śabdavyāpāra*) as Maṇḍana and Śālikanātha critically describe,¹⁵⁸ although his predecessor Śabara has a tendency to look upon the Vedic injunction primarily as more descriptive rather than imperative.¹⁵⁹ This is also confirmed by Śabara’s attitude of dealing with the Śyena sacrifice, which, according to Śabara, is neutrally reported by the Veda as a means for killing one’s enemy without a moral commitment on the Veda’s side.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁷ See, for example, TV ad 1.4.3 (332.22–23) : *na tu nāmaṣadasya vidhisaktir asti*. “But a noun has no injunctive force.”

¹⁵⁸ See VV₁ 12.7–8, VV₂ 414.1–2, VV₃ 86.1–2, where Maṇḍana criticizes Kumārila’s notion of *abhidhābhāvanā* as a kind of operation (*vyāpṛti, vyāpāra*) of an utterance (*śruti, śabda*). Śālikanātha, too, criticizes Kumārila’s view that *śabdavyāpāra* is *vidhi* that prompts a human being to undertake an action (*pravṛttihetu*). PP *vākyaṛthamātrkā* II (419.11–17).

¹⁵⁹ Commenting on JS 1.1.2, Śabara refers to a predecessor’s view: *codaneti kriyāyāḥ pravartakam vacanam āhuḥ* (Frauwallner 1968:16.9). Commenting on JS 2.1.1, however, he paraphrases it as *codanā ca kriyāyā abhidhāyakam vākyam* (Kataoka 2004:47.6), replacing *pravartakam* with *abhidhāyakam*.

9.6.4. Maṇḍana

To sum up, the utilitarian tradition emphasizes the importance of the desired fruit, whereas the deontological tradition gives more weight to the Vedic injunction. As shown above, the former tends to interpret *yajeta* in a result-oriented way by emphasizing the goal, whereas the latter tends to interpret *yajeta* in a *vidhi*-oriented way by emphasizing the imperative source.¹⁶¹

Maṇḍana goes further in the “descriptive” interpretation of the Veda. He is a pure utilitarian. It is evidently not the case that the Veda forces human beings to perform sacrifices. Undertaking an action is necessarily preceded by the understanding of the causal relationship between the action and the intended goal. Maṇḍana denies Prabhākara’s view that *liñ*, etc., convey *niyoga*. Maṇḍana also does not like Kumārila’s idea that imperative words have some dynamic force or operation. Rather, imperative words, just like other types of words, statically denote something. Only by understanding the causal relationship thus described, a person spontaneously commences an action and thereby the words come to be considered *pravartaka*, instigator. The causal relationship is the meaning of *liñ*, etc. In other words, “Ought” denotes the causal relationship of an action with its result. What is denoted by the exhortative ending in *yajeta* is precisely the sacrifice’s property of being a direct means for the desired end (*iṣṭābhyupāyatva*).¹⁶²

¹⁶⁰ See Kataoka 2011b:462–463, n. 619 for the difference of attitudes between Śabara and Kumārila with regard to the Śyena sacrifice.

¹⁶¹ Jayanta regards the Prabhākara view as a theory which integrates Kumārila’s two *bhāvanās*, i.e., *arthātmikā* which is to be done (*anuṣṭheya*) and *śabdātmikā* which prompts human beings (*pravartaka*), into *niyoga*. NM II 70.1–2: *anye bruvate—dvyābhidhāne liñādeḥ pratīyasya bhāragauravād vidhir eva vākyārthaḥ, sa evānuṣṭheyaḥ pravartakaś ceti*. “Others claim: If the ending such as *liñ* denotes both, its burden is too heavy. Therefore, an injunction alone is the sentence-meaning. The same thing is what is to be done and [at the same time] what prompts [human beings].”

¹⁶² VV₁ 173.2–5, VV₃ 537.19–538.3: *pumso neṣṭābhyupāyatvāt kriyāsv anyañ pravartakāḥ/*

In other words, the causal relationship between the action and its end is the cause for a human being to commence an action (*pravṛtīhetu*). This is what people understand from hearing *liṅ* of the Vedic injunction *yajeta*. The Veda kindly reports to people the objective truth that a sacrifice is the means for accomplishing heaven.

Conclusion

The Vedic injunction *svargakāmo yajeta* is interpreted in various ways. We can reconstruct the presupposed paraphrases as follows (J: Jaimini, Ś: Śabara, K: Kumārila, M: Maṇḍana, D_{AV}: *dharmā-abhivyaṅgi-vāda*):

Bādari: *yaḥ svargaṃ ātmanaḥ kāmāyate sa yāgaṃ kuryāt*

J, Ś, K, M: **yaḥ svargam ātmanaḥ kāmāyate sa yāgena svargaṃ kuryāt*
(=*svargaṃ yāgena kuryād ātmārtham*, criticized in *Bṛhatī* 637.4)

D_{AV} **svargakāmo yāgābhivyaṅgyaṃ dharmāṃ kuryāt*

Prabhākara: **yaḥ svargam ātmanaḥ kāmāyate sa yāgaviśayaṃ niyogaṃ kuryāt*

All interpretations derive from either of the two basic ones: Bādari's literal interpretation *svargakāmo yāgaṃ kuryāt*; or Jaimini's utilitarian interpretation *yāgena svargaṃ kuryāt*. (The numbers correspond to the section numbers.)

svargakāmo yāgaṃ kuryāt: 1 (Bādari) → 3 → 6 → 8 (Prabhākara)

yāgena svargaṃ kuryāt: 2 (J) → 4 → 5 (Ś) → 7 (K) → 9 (M)

As shown above, 3, 6 and 8 belong to Bādari's tradition, whereas 4, 5, 7 and 9 be-

pravṛtīhetuṃ dharmāṃ ca pravādanti pravartanām//2.3// pravṛtīsamārtho hi kaścid bhāvātīśayo vyāpārābhīdhānaḥ pravartanā. sā ca kriyāṅām apēkṣitopāyataiva. "That [the action] is a means of the thing aimed at alone prompts man to actions. And people call the property which is the cause of taking action a prompt. For some additional quality of an entity, called activity, which is capable of [causing one's] taking action, is a prompt. And it is precisely an action's property of being a means for [attaining] the thing aimed at."

long to Jaimini's. It is inappropriate for us to regard Śābara's system as closer to Prabhākara's than Kumārila's. Kumārila's view is a natural extension of Śābara's theory of *bhāvanā*.

Prabhākara's *niyoga* theory, on the other hand, is incompatible with Śābara's theory of *bhāvanā*, because *niyoga*, not *bhāvanā*, is the core for Prabhākara. The difference is particularly clear in his interpretation of *yajeta*. His rejection of Śābara's paraphrase would be incomprehensible if we thought of Prabhākara as a faithful successor of Śābara's theory of *bhāvanā*. Śābara has introduced the notion of *bhāvanā* primarily in order to explain the result-oriented, utilitarian view of Jaimini, whereas for Prabhākara the notion of *niyoga* primarily functions as a device which explains the deontological view evolved from Bādari. Prabhākara replaces Bādari's action (*karman*) and D_{AV}'s *dharma* (= *apūrva*) with *niyoga*. Whereas for Śābara it is *yāga* that brings about *svarga*, for Prabhākara it is *niyoga* itself that, being urged, bestows *svarga* as a reward to the person commanded (*niyojya*). The causal relationship between *yāga* and *svarga* and that of *niyoga* and *svarga* look similar; but in the latter there is no subservience on the part of the cause. *Niyoga* remains principal. This is why Prabhākara does not admit the paraphrase *yāgena svargaṃ kuryāt*. It is *niyoga* and not *svarga* that should be expressed with the accusative ending as the most desired end to be achieved.

Śābara	Prabhākara
subordinate principal	principal subordinate
<i>yāga</i> → <i>svarga</i>	<i>niyoga</i> → <i>svarga</i>

Jayanta's distinction (NM I 664.7–9 quoted in section 8.1.2) between the view of Śābara-followers (*śābarāḥ*) and that of Prabhākara-followers (*prābhākarāḥ*) supports my view. He clearly regards Kumārila as included among Śābara-follow-

ers. If one regards Prabhākara as holding the same view as Śābara, one cannot explain Jayanta's distinction between Śābarāḥ and Prābhākarāḥ. One might forcedly claim that Śābarāḥ does not include Śābara, but refers only to his followers such as Kumārila. But this does not hold good, because Śābara's basic theory of ritual is the theory of *bhāvanā*.¹⁶³ If it is insisted that Śābara's original idea is more akin to Prabhākara's than to Kumārila's, it is necessary to show the essential continuity of Śābara's theory of *bhāvanā* and Prabhākara's theory of *niyoga*. The effort to discover the essential continuity, however, ends up in failure, because clearly both Śābara and Kumārila hold the same basic view, i.e., the theory of *bhāvanā*, whereas Śābara and Prabhākara do not. As Jayanta witnesses, Śābara neither holds the *dharma-abhivyakti-vāda* nor the *niyogavāda*. Prabhākara's view should be regarded as developed out of the modified version of the *dharma-abhivyakti-vāda* (6) by replacing the eternal dharma (also called *apūrva*) with *niyoga*, even though Prabhākara comments directly on Śābara. This is also implied by Jayanta (NM I 664.6–9 quoted in section 8.1.2) when he refers to the *apūrva* of *dharma-abhivyakti-vādins* (*vṛddhamīmāṃsakāḥ = jarajjaiminīya*) and the *apūrva* of Prābhākarāḥ. There is a continuity between the two theories in that both regard *apūrva* (*dharma*) as the principal element.¹⁶⁴ Prabhākara amends Śābara's result-oriented view of the Veda along the lines of deontology.

¹⁶³ For details of Śābara's theory of *bhāvanā*, see Kataoka 2004 (a critical edition of 2.1.1–4 with a Japanese translation) and Kataoka 2011a (a study in Japanese).

¹⁶⁴ Both regard *apūrva* as the sentence-meaning. For Prābhākaras *niyoga* is the sentence-meaning as Jayanta describes. NM I 664.8 quoted in section 8.1.2; NM II 119.10: *evaṃ niyoga eva pradhānatvād vākyaṛthaḥ*. With regard to the *apūrva* in the theory of dharma-manifestation Sīmaṣūri Gaṇi (NAA 140.23–141.5 quoted in section 6) describes it as being qualified by many elements. This suggests that the *apūrva* is the sentence-meaning in this theory.

Abbreviations and Bibliography

- Rju *Rjvimalā*. See *Bṛhatī*.
- JS *Jaiminisūtra*. See ŚBh.
- TV *Tantravārttika*. See ŚBh. For the *arthavādādhikaraṇa*, See Harikai 1990. For 2.1.1-4, See Kataoka 2011a.
- NAA *Nyāyāgamānusārīṇī* by Siṃhasūri Gaṇi. See NC.
- NKa₁ *Nyāyakaṇikā*. For NKa₁, NKa₂ and NKa₃, see VV₁, VV₂ and VV₃ respectively.
- NBh *Nyāyabhāṣya*. *Gautamīyanyāyadarśana with Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana*. Ed. Anantalal Thakur. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1997.
- NC *Nayacakra* by Mallavādin. *Dvādaśāraṇa Nayacakram of Ācārya Śrī Mallavādī Kṣamāśramaṇa, with the Commentary Nyāyāgamānusārīṇī of Śrī Siṃhasūri Gaṇi Vādi Kṣamāśramaṇa*. 2 parts. Ed. Muni Jambūvijayaḥ. Bhāvnagar, 1966, 1976.
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- NV *Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika of Bhāradvāja Uddyotakara*. Ed. Anantalal Thakur. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1997.
- NS *Nyāyasūtra*. See NBh.
- PDhS *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha. Word Index to the Praśastapādabhāṣya*. Johannes Bronkhorst and Yves Ramseier. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1994.
- Pāṇini *Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini*. Sumitra M. Katre. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1989.
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- VPV *Vākyapadīyavṛtti. Vākyapadīya of Bhartrhari with the Commentaries Vṛtti and Paddhati of Vṛṣabhadeva*. Kāṇḍa I. Ed. K.A. Subramania Iyer. Poona: Deccan College, 1966.
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- VV₂ See Stern 1988. [This contains only the first half of the *Vidhiviveka*.]
- VV₃ See Stern 2023. [Where the text readings differ, I follow the reading of VV₃.]
- ŚBh *Śābarabhāṣya. Mīmāṃsādāraṇam*. Ed. Subbhāśāstrī. Poona: Ānandāśra-

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mamudraṅālaya, 1929–34. For the *Tarkapāda*, see Frauwallner 1968.

ŚV *Ślokaṅvārttika. Ślokaṅvārttika of Śrī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa with the Commentary Nyāyaraṅnākara of Śrī Pārthasārathi Miśra*. Ed. Swāmī Dvārikadāssa Śāstrī. Varanasi: Tara Publications, 1978.

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This article reexamines conflicting views in Mīmāṃsā: Bādari vs. Jaimini, and Prabhākara vs. Kumārila, focusing on interpretations of the Vedic injunction *svargakāmo yajeta*. Bādari, according to Śabara's description, interprets *yajeta* as *yāgaṃ kuryāt*, thereby emphasizing the placement of a sacrificial act as the primary objective to be achieved, while Jaimini sees it as a means to attain heaven, by interpreting the sentence as *yāgena svargaṃ kuryāt*. The opposition between Bādari and Jaimini forms the basis for Mīmāṃsā's development. Dharma-manifestation proponents interpret the injunction as revealing eternal dharma through sacrifice, while Jaimini's followers posit an imperceptible effect (*adr̥ṣṭa*) to reconcile sacrifice's transiency with its future result. Kumārila further develops Jaimini's perspective, emphasizing the causative nature of action, while Prabhākara emphasizes imperative commands (*niyoga*). Ultimately, Kumārila's view extends Śabara's theory of *bhāvanā*, while Prabhākara's *niyoga* theory aligns with a modified *dharma-abhivyakti-vāda*, rooted in Bādari's stance.