

UIA Booklet-2

East Asian Academy for New Liberal Arts
The Ushioda Initiative of Arts

何为东亚思想中的“传统”？

2024年日中韩朱子学学术研讨会论文集

田中有纪 [编]

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前言

田中有纪 TANAKA Yuki

2024 年 12 月 21、22 日，“2024 年日中韩朱子学学术研讨会‘何为东亚思想中的‘传统’？”在东京大学国际学术研究栋 3 号大教室举办。本次研讨会由东京大学东亚艺文书院潮田综合学艺知识计划、东洋文化研究所 Global Asian Studies、清华大学人文学院与韩国朱子学会共同主办。作为一个日本、中国、台湾与韩国从事朱子学相关研究的青年学者的国际研讨会，每年在日本、中国和韩国轮流举办（负责人是东京大学的田中有纪、清华大学的赵金刚、同德女子大学的朱光镐）。我们 2020 年在疫情期间举办了大约每两个月一次的“日中韩线上朱子学读书会”，讨论我们出版了的朱子学的相关博士论文。主要成员是编者在东京大学和北京大学学习时认识的同学们。

在本次研讨会上，来自东亚各个国家的 17 名研究者进行了论文发表，同时举办了博士生论坛和英语论坛，结合青年东亚思想研究者的视角和英语世界的思想研究，从多方面来重新审视东亚思想。本书是研讨会上发表的一些论文的汇编。

近年来，儒家思想作为一种有助于解决民主主义带来的矛盾的、未来国际社会所必需的哲学而受到关注。在现代，人们以各种形式尝试将传统思想的智慧运用到当今社会中。2024 年东京大学东亚艺文书院潮田综合学艺知识计划将“传统与现代的桥梁”作为研究主题之一，从各个角度进行了分析。但到底什么是“传统”？即使在前现代时期，“传统”也并没有以固定的形式存在，而是通过不断改变其形象，产生了各种各样的思考模式。本书广邀朱子学和东亚儒学的专家学者，探讨“传统”的概念在东亚思想史上是如何受到质疑的。

本书中的所有的论文都与朱熹思想和朱子学有关系。有的正面探讨了朱熹自身的哲学，有的从文学和历史的角度回顾宋代思想，有的从礼学、科学和经

学的角度重新分析朱子学研究。即使我们面对的都是朱子学，也有可能出现各种各样的观点。通过各种分析，“什么是朱子学”的问题将不可避免地浮现出来。被我们视为前现代东亚“传统”的朱子学，从最初的创造阶段开始就展现了各种各样的面貌，到了发展阶段，它已经变成了一个全新的“朱子学”。希望本书论文中讨论的朱子学研究能提供一个重新思考东亚思想“传统”的机会。

论二程对“才”“性”问题的 《易》学发明

刘健时 LIU Jianshi

1. 引言

“才”“性”之辩是贯穿中国古典思想发展的一个重要话题，其滥觞于先秦时期学者对人性的探索，汉唐学者在人性论、人才选举标准和文学审美等多个领域对这一对概念进行了发展。至于北宋，随着理学思潮的兴起，二程重新审视传统的“才”“性”问题，通过结合经学诠释和理学哲学建立起以“才”“性”为中心的人性理论，深刻地影响了朱子与之后理学家思考性论的方式。本文关注二程如何以《易》学对“才”“性”概念及其代表的人性、物性理论进行新的阐发，希望可以进一步厘清相关概念的内涵与关联，并说明其对朱子的影响。

2. 二程讨论“才”“性”的问题意识

二程与之后学者在理解性论问题时具有不同的思想基础，如对于朱子而言，他在分析“性”的问题时已经首先了解了二程和张载等理学家对“性”的不同论述，其中包括理学化的概念体系（如程颐之性即理，张载之天地之性和气质之性），也包括前人对该问题所涉及经典资源的指明。而二程在试图解决性

论问题时，直接面对之前学者留下的纷纭局面，并且需要寻找能够用以解释人性论问题的经典资源，以获得其在儒学内部的权威性。因为二程所处的这种特殊的思想处境，在讨论二程对“才”“性”的创见时，简要回顾之前学者留下的核心矛盾并且对二程讨论中选择的经典资源进行特别的留意有助于更清晰地理解二程的思想内涵。

就“才”“性”两个概念而言，在宋代之前，学者的理解相对模糊和多样，“性”被广泛地用来指称人性，其中包括人的生命活力、道德性质、才能和性格等多个方面。孟子与告子的争论表现出“性”在先秦已兼具因字义而有的生命活动义与本质属性义。“才”则根据其文字本义，一般被理解为人的才能，同时因为“才”与“材”相互训释，所以“才”也被理解为人有待培养或改造的潜能。“性”与“才”此时均指向人的某种性质，在中国古典思想观念中，德性与才能往往具有结合的趋势，因此学者有时将“才”“性”合为一词，泛指人表现出的德性才能。

而在人性的善恶本质方面，先秦儒者已经有不同的说法，如孔子言“性相近也，习相远也”“上知与下愚不移”（《论语·阳货》），暗示人性在本质上具有差异，孟子坚持性的本质为善，言“人性之善也，犹水之就下也。”（《孟子·告子上》）荀子则强调人性本质为恶，善是后天的人伪（《荀子·性恶》）。在后世儒家学者中，认为性善恶混杂的看法较多，二程就多次反对扬雄与韩愈对性的说法，扬雄言：“人之性也善恶混。修其善则为善人，修其恶则为恶人。”¹韩愈则支持将人性分为上中下三品，认为其中上品和下品是不可改易的²。从扬雄与韩愈的不同论述中也可见学者试图以不同的理论建构解释先秦儒家的论断。

因此，二程在使用“才”“性”概念论述人性问题时，实际上要处理两方面的问题：一方面需要对概念进行廓清，有根据地解释“才”“性”分别指人性的哪些内容；二是需要在坚持性善论的基础上，通过理论建构为孔子、孟子的不同说法给出圆融的解释。

1 扬雄撰，汪荣宝注疏，陈仲夫点校：《法言义疏》，中华书局1987年版，第85页。

2 韩愈著，刘真伦、岳珍校注：《韩愈文集汇校笺注》，中华书局2010年版，第47页。

3. 以《易》解《庸》：“继善成性”与“性”的结构

在北宋,《论语》和《孟子》的地位得到隆升,二程也认为《论》《孟》两书具有最重要的地位。程颐言“学者先须读论、孟。穷得论、孟,自有个要处,以此观他经,甚省力。论、孟如丈尺权衡相似,以此去量度事物,自然见得长短轻重。”³这意味着《论语》和《孟子》包涵那些最重要的哲学原则,并且两部经典的义理能够自洽。但是,如上所言,“性”的概念在《论》《孟》中可以解释出不同的含义和思想倾向,这种差异导致的矛盾在弟子门人对二程的提问中已经有所体现。同时,在建构哲学系统时,二程以唯一的、纯善的天理作为世界的本源,但现实世界中的人与物之间、人与人之间具有丰富的差异,人普遍地体现出恶的性质。因此,为了适应时代的思想需求、保证理学系统的自洽性,二程需要对经典进行重新诠释,以提出一种新的关于“性”的理论。在传统的研究中,学者更重视二程对《中庸》与《孟子》言“性”内容的诠释和融合,本文认为,二程较多地从对《周易》的诠释中获得解释人性论的思想资源,通过将《周易》中“天道生生”的思想容纳入《中庸》所论“天命之谓性”的天人结构,二程建立起一种更加丰富、清晰和自洽的人性理论,同时《易传》的权威性也保证了二程创立的新说不逾越儒家的正统。

在二程之前,汉唐经学对《中庸》“天命之谓性”的解释表现出天人直贯的结构,直接依据作为世界本源的“天”的性质论述“人”的本质和性质,郑玄言:“天命,谓天所命生人者也,是谓性命,木神则仁、金神则义、火神则礼、水神则信、土神则知,孝经说曰:性者,生之质,命,人所稟受度也。”天通过五行之气生人,因而人性就是五行之气属性的综合。孔颖达疏曰:“天命之谓性者,天本无体,亦无言语之命,但人感自然而生,有贤愚吉凶,若天之付命遣使之然,故云天命。老子云:道本无名,强名之曰‘道’,但人自然感生,有刚柔好恶、或仁、或义、或礼、或知、或信,是天性自然,故云谓之性。”⁴孔颖达受到道家哲学的影响,将天理解为老子所谓的“道”和“自然”,人自然而生,在生时自然具有刚柔善恶等具体的属性。汉唐经学的直贯结构说明了天是一切善的来源,也说明了人可能因为天作用的差异性体现出善或不善

3 程颢、程颐著,王孝鱼点校:《二程集》,中华书局1987年版,第205页。

4 郑玄注,孔颖达疏:《礼记正义》,见阮元校勘:《十三经注疏(清嘉庆刻本)》,中华书局2009年版,第3527页。

的性质，但是缺乏对人性本质善的讨论。

因此，二程在解释《中庸》的“天命之谓性”时，有意引入《系辞》“继善成性”的说法，在本源之天与具体人性之间开辟出一个兼具个别事物个体性和形上纯善性质的论“性”空间。程颢言：

“生之谓性”，性即气，气即性，生之谓也。人生气禀，理有善恶，然不是性中元有此两物相对而生也。有自幼而善，有自幼而恶，是气禀有然也。善固性也，然恶亦不可不谓之性也。盖“生之谓性”、“人生而静”以上不容说，才说性时，便已不是性也。凡人说性，只是说“继之者善”也，孟子言人性善是也。夫所谓“继之者善”也者，犹水流而就下也。……水之清，则性善之谓也。故不是善与恶在性中为两物相对，各自出来。此理，天命也。⁵

“生生之谓易”，是天之所以为道也。天只是以生为道，继此生理者，即是善也。善便有一个元底意思，“元者善之长”，万物皆有春意，便是“继之者善也”。“成之者性也”，成却待它万物自成其性须得。⁶

在程颢的分析中，“性”被拆分出两个层次，一是“生之谓性”所指的、包含气之影响的现实人性，此“性”因为人受生时获得的气的不同表现出或善或恶的性质；另一层次是孟子所言，“犹水之就下”的纯善的人性，程颢认为这种纯善人性对应着《系辞》“继之者善”的所指。这一论述之所以成立，在经典上的依据是对“继之者善，诚之者性”的哲学阐发，“继之”与“成之”被理解为具体事物生成的两个过程，“继之”是具体事物在生成的初始阶段直接继承天之“生理”，即直接获得生成的动力与善的本质，程颢称其为“万物皆有春意”，在他处程颢亦言“言天之付与万物者，谓之天命。”⁷可见万物均接受此生理作为它们的本质善性。之后，“成之”是具体事物的生生动力和善本质与现象世界的气结合，并且因为气的差异性表现出可能有恶的现实人性。由此，程颢认为当人言说“性善”时是指“继之”之性，而现实善恶混杂的人

5 程颢、程颐：《二程集》，第10-11页。

6 程颢、程颐：《二程集》，第29页。

7 程颢、程颐：《二程集》，第125页。

性与有异于人的物性则是“成之”阶段后性、气混杂的表现。

程颢的论述主要从事物生成的角度出发，因此其论述顺序是从天理下降至现实人性。程颢在部分论述更关注概念辨析，他直接分辨“生之谓性”和“天命之性”之间的区别，从“生之谓性”中分析出“天命之性”：

“生之谓性”，与“天命之谓性”，同乎？性字不可一概论。“生之谓性”，止训所稟受也。“天命之谓性”，此言性之理也。今人言天性柔缓，天性刚急，俗言天成，皆生来如此，此训所稟受也。若性之理也则无不善，曰天者，自然之理也。⁸

性无不善，而有不善者才也。性即是理，理则自尧、舜至于途人，一也。才稟于气，气有清浊。稟其清者为贤，稟其浊者为愚。⁹

程颢认为“生之谓性”只是说人在出生后表现出的性质，其包含着形而上的、纯善的“理”，也受到气的影响，从而产生缓急刚柔等不同的属性。第二句引文似乎表现出程颢的“性”只有完全同一的天理和善恶混杂的具体性质两层结构，与程颢“继之者善”表现出善本质分有在每一具体事物中不同，但是如果考察程颢在《周易程氏传》中以“四德论”对性的进一步分析，可以看出此处只是程颢说得较为简略，实际上程颢同样在人性中设定了一个天理分化在万物之中而无恶的层次：

故元专为善大，利主于正固，亨贞之体，各称其事。四德之义，广矣大矣。¹⁰

四德之元，犹五常之仁，偏言则一事，专言则包四者。万物资始乃统天，言元也。乾元统言天之道也。天道始万物，物资始于天也。云行雨施，品物流形，言亨也。天道运行，生育万物也。大明天道之终始，则见卦之六位，各以时成。卦之初终，乃天道终始。乘此六爻之时，乃天运也。以御天，谓以当天运。乾道变化，生育万物，洪纤高下，各以其类，各正性命

8 程颢、程颐：《二程集》，第313页。

9 程颢、程颐：《二程集》，第205页。

10 程颢、程颐：《二程集》，第695页。

也。天所赋为命，物所受为性。保合太和乃利贞，保谓常存，合谓常和，保合太和，是以利且贞也。¹¹

在程颐看来，乾卦的四德是对天地生物的结构化描述，“元”意味着天地生成万物的动力和纯善性质，其是就天道整体而言，这显然是指天理本体。“亨”作为“元”的后续，对应“云行雨施，品物流形”“生育万物”，意味万物合于天理之总体秩序的差异性展开，“品物流形”展示出万物个体性和差异性的出现，程颐通过对“元”与“亨”的分别进一步明确了天理命于具体事物但不与气相杂的纯善本质。部分学者认为此处已经言及由气的影响产生的事物的差异性，这种看法具有一定问题，会导致“利贞”失去对应的阶段。程颐在言乾卦的“利贞”时，强调“常保常和”是“利贞”实现的条件，这表明了在“利贞”所指的阶段才会存在后天的影响、涉及到“气”的作用。这说明程颐的“元”“亨”对应事物能动的、纯善的本质，而“利”“贞”对应事物在现实世界可能受到气质影响、并且可以通过人的努力保持和恢复其纯善本质的可能性。这与程颐所言的“成却待它万物自成其性须得”同意。通过对乾卦四德的解释，程颐同样设立了一种既具体到每一事物又保持纯善本性的人性或物性。

同时，在二程的论述中，《周易》的“继善成性”与“元亨利贞”均是事物生成的一种理想模型，《系辞》与乾卦中的描述均是纯善的情况，而二程在诠释时以“须物自成”和“保和才能利贞”的说法说明这种理想情况需要人的行为实现，由此，就为在性本善的基础上说明现实人性的恶以及人转恶为善的修养功夫留出了空间。

4. 程颐的“卦才”理论与“才”的可塑性

通过引入《周易》的思想资源分析“性”的结构，二程确立了人性的本质善，并且将可能出现的恶性归之于气的层次。但是，纯善的天理为何在现实层面表现出恶的可能、现实人性为何必然可以恢复其善本质，这些问题仍然需要进一步说明。程颐去世较早，对此论述较少，程颐因其漫长的学术经历以及晚年教授弟子的需要，对此做出了深入的研究。程颐在研究中继续援引《周易》的思想资源，对历史上议论纷纭的“才”概念进行了极具理学色彩的阐发。

11 程颐、程颐：《二程集》，第697-698页。

上文已经论及历史上“才”释义的复杂性，程颐坚定地将“才”理解为“材质”，并且突出了才的可塑性，以解决现实人性善恶的问题，在容纳《孟子》“非才之罪”论断的基础上，将人性的恶以及转恶为善的可能性建立在“才”概念上。程颐的思路主要体现在其对《周易》的诠释中。

在程颐看来，《周易》“其为书也，广大悉备，将以顺性命之理，通幽明之故，尽事物之情，而示开物成务之道也。”¹²圣人作《周易》的目的是说明万事万物的性质与发展规律，并指示后人在不同情境下如何进行应对。因此，程颐认为《周易》中的每一卦均具有卦德与卦才，每一卦的卦名指示出此卦所指的情景类型，“吉”“凶”“元亨利贞”等卦德是此卦情景的发展趋势或实现应然发展的要求，卦才是此卦之中诸爻的性质以及诸爻共同构成的系统的材质、性质，象征着一卦的情景性质或处于其中的人的性质。程颐指出诸卦下的“元亨利贞”与乾卦中不同，乾卦言天道运行的总体性质与理想状态，而诸卦中的“元亨利贞”则是言一卦可能的发展方向以及实现此种方向的需要的条件。

程颐在释卦时，常常通过分析卦才以说明一卦具有某一卦德的原因，如在需卦下，针对需卦《卦辞》与《彖传》中“需有孚，光亨，贞吉，位乎天位以正中也。”的说法，程颐认为《卦辞》取九五爻为义，“以卦才言之，五居君位，为需之主，有刚健中正之德，而诚信充实于中，中实有孚也。有孚则光明而能亨通，得贞正而吉也。”¹³五爻在上卦之中的位置同时可以得出处于君位和有中正之德的含义，九五的阳刚性质可以得出刚健和诚信充实两种德性，具有如此的德性，则可以在因凶险而等待的情势下获得好的结果。普遍而言，一卦表示的情境之所以可以发展出卦德表征的结果，是因为此卦的材质（“才”）具有某种性质，其中“材质”往往象征着处于此情境中的人的性质。由此，《周易程氏传》全书的逻辑就在于指示人应当塑造、改变自身的才，使之符合应然之理，以获得好的结果。

在这种理解中，程颐将传统的“才”概念理解为人天生具有、后天可改变的“材质”、资质。由此，一方面，“才”同时包括了古典学术中的“才能”“德性”“性格”等义，如上文需卦注释中九五爻同时象征着人刚健、诚信和充实的性质；另一方面，更重要的是，以可塑性规定“才”，可以在承认现实人资质差异和可能为恶的基础上，避免将一种本质层次的恶属性赋予人的

12 程颢、程颐：《二程集》，第689页。

13 程颢、程颐：《二程集》，第723页。

天生的资质，回避或减轻纯善天理与有恶的现实之间的矛盾。这在程颐十分常用的“木材之喻”中体现的较为明显：

问：如何是才？曰：如材植是也。譬如木，曲直者性也；可以为轮辕，可以为梁栋，可以为榱桷者才也。¹⁴

“乃若其情，则可以为善。若夫为不善，非才之罪。”此言人陷溺其心者，非关才事。才犹言材料，曲可以为轮，直可以为梁栋。若是毁凿坏了，岂关才事？下面不是说人皆有四者之心？或曰：人材有美恶，岂可言非才之罪？曰：才有美恶者，是举天下之言也。若说一人之才，如因富岁而赖，因凶岁而暴，岂才质之本然邪？¹⁵

在这种比喻中可以看出“才”与“性”构成一对密切关联的概念。程颐此处言“性”是木的曲直性质。这种“性”就其本质而言是善的，因为曲直之性意味着木可以、并且应当成为某种有用的结果。牟宗三先生解释此句时提出“曲直之性”“似又不当是材质之性，而应是指‘出于天’之义理之性”，这种思路极为正确，但是牟先生又认为既然为“曲直”，则必然又是言气的性质，程颐此处有错误使用概念的问题¹⁶。木的“曲直之性”确实具有物质性的意味，但程颐的比喻更多强调人的现实资质中包含着善的本质、成就善的条件和成就善的要求，正如二程所言：“天地生一人，自足了一世事”“天地生物，各无不足之理。常思天下，君臣、父子、兄弟、夫妇，有多少不尽分处。”¹⁷葛瑞汉先生将此解释为每一事物均在天地的秩序中具有自己的位置和应然规定¹⁸，这意味着一物的具体性质与其在天地秩序中的位置、责任是一体不分的，身处在特定秩序之中、禀受了与之相应气质的人需要塑造自身的气质以符合天理秩序的规定性。“才”是与这种规定性配合的现实的资质，因此，“才”上可能具

14 程颢、程颐：《二程集》，第292页。

15 程颢、程颐：《二程集》，第207页。

16 牟宗三：《心体与性体2》，见《牟宗三先生全集6》，联经出版公司2003年版，第335页。

17 程颢、程颐：《二程集》，第2页。

18 葛瑞汉（A. C. Graham）著，程德祥译：《中国的两位哲学家：二程兄弟的新儒学》，大象出版社2000年版，第54页。

有干扰、阻碍“性”实现自身的因素，亦即“才有美恶”，但是这种美恶不属于本质层次，不会影响曲直之性的善本质，其最终的善恶取决于人能否根据天理的要求对其进行雕琢。所以，程颐最后根据《孟子》的原文向弟子强调人皆有自然向善的四端之心，“才”的本然不是因偶然的现实之气而表现出的善或恶。因此，程颐在回答唐棣对“才”的疑问时，认为只要能遵循本性，就必然可以使作为资质的“才”改恶为善：“才乃人之资质，循性修之，虽至恶可胜而为善。”¹⁹

自然地，这种才性关系凸显出意志主体的决定性意义，天命之性意味着人本质地具有善以及实现善的责任，为了完成“性”的本然要求，人须对自身的“才”进行改变塑造，因此程颐说人的恶是“毁凿坏了”，即没有将自身的材质塑造为符合性理的结果，道德意义上的恶取决于人自身的意志和行为。由此，程颐可以自洽地解释孟子的“非才之罪”句的内涵以及人天赋差异的现实。

综上，在程颐的这种理解中，天命之性表现为人的纯善本性，而“才”指人的具体资质，这种资质既匹配性的要求，又可能具有影响天命之性实现的因素，这些因素是否最终表现在现实人性中，依赖于人自身的抉择和努力。因此，天命之性是纯善的，“才”是非道德性的，只是其提供了实现道德的条件，也包含着阻碍道德实现的因素，其中坏的成分会导致现实人性中恶的现象。在这种理解中，“生之谓性”作为一个描述现实人性的概念，在二程的论述中需要根据语境进行理解，如程颐解“生之谓性”为“善固性也，然恶亦不可不谓之性”²⁰，这只是说普通人资质中有容易导致恶的成分，因此在未进行修养功夫时，性会体现出恶的性质。而程颐不希望将“恶”加之于“性”的概念上，因此他在言人的性急性缓是“生之谓性”后，不同意弟子将“上智下愚不移”理解为“性”，而是称其为“才”，这是因为在程颐看来“才”虽然最终会导致恶的表现，但是虽“上智下愚亦有可移之理”²¹，“不移”而至于恶是因为人主动放弃了对天命之性的回归，但是天命之性的要求是内在于人性之中的。所以不能说“生之谓性”有某种不可改移的善恶性质。正如唐纪宇所言：“在程颐的人性论思想中只有生而自然的善，而绝没有生而自然的恶。”²²虽然二程在一

19 程颐、程颐：《二程集》，第292页。

20 程颐、程颐：《二程集》，第10-11页。

21 程颐、程颐：《二程集》，第204-205页。

22 唐纪宇：《“才”“性”之辨——程颐人性思想新论》，载《衡水学院学报》2013年第2期。

些说法中提到“性”或“才”的“恶”，但是这些“恶”都不具有本质的意义，只是说人性在未经修养矫正时存在表现为恶的可能性。以此，二程就通过《周易》解决了孔子与孟子之间对于人性善恶问题的可能矛盾，程颐总结说：“性相近对习相远而言，相近犹相似也。上智下愚才也，性则皆善。自暴自弃然后不可移，不然则可移。”人的本性均是善的，而人的资质就其具备成就善的条件、不具有本质恶而言也是相似的，是否能够实现性的本质规定的善，完全取决于人是否完成天理通过命性赋予人的、实现自身的责任。

5. 朱子对二程“才”“性”论的转化

二程通过援引易学资源对“才”“性”问题进行了新的阐发，建立了一种新的、理学化的人性论。但是二程作为理学的先行者，他们更多关注如何在容纳传统经典的基础上提供一种合理说明，因此在哲学的丰富性和完备性未免有所欠缺，这尤其体现在他们对理气和“才”“性”的关系缺乏细致的论述，只是较为含混地说“性出于天，才出于气”。因此，对于二程的人性是否禀受一种本体的甚至实体化的“理”作为性，当代学界仍然存在争议²³。对于人性与物性之间的差异及其原因，程颐的说法更是具有一些模糊甚至矛盾之处，如果将上文所述程颐对乾卦“元亨利贞”的解释在《周易》宇宙生成论的模式中推理，可能会得出不同人、物差异性的根本原因主要出于天理自身殊的结论，这就会与二程在他处所言“犬、牛、人，知所去就，其性本同，但限以形，故不可更”²⁴，“人与物，但气有偏正耳……得阴阳之偏者为鸟兽草木夷狄，受正气者人也”²⁵，认为人、物所具的本体之性完全相同，只是因形气差异而展现出现实差异的结论矛盾。

至于南宋，朱子在继承二程思路与基本概念的基础上，以更加详实彻底的气论完善和转化了二程的人性理论。

就“才”“性”的概念而言，朱子抛弃了二程对“才”的重视，将“才”

23 陈来教授在《朱子哲学研究》中认为二程还没有如朱子般禀受天理为性的实体的说法，而唐纪宇则认为“程颐的人性学说已经孕育着禀受天理为性的观点”，只是论述还不甚清晰。见于唐纪宇，《“才”“性”之辨——程颐人性思想新论》。

24 程颢、程颐：《二程集》，第312页。

25 程颢、程颐：《二程集》，第4页。

的内涵还原为日常语言中的“才能”、“能力”义，其在回答林夔孙“才出于气，德出于性？”的问题时言：“不可。才也是性中出，德也是有是气而后有是德。人之有才者出来做得事业，也是它性中有了，便出来做得。但温厚笃实便是德，刚明果敢便是才。只为他气之所禀者生到那里多，故为才。”²⁶朱子并没有直接否认程颐“才出于气”的说法，但是此处的“才”已经只是指人的才能。

朱子对“才”的抛弃一方面出于与程颐在《周易》诠释学上的不同看法，朱子认为“《易》本是卜筮之书”，以此将《经》《传》分别解释，如此，则程颐“卦才”理论被朱子全盘抛弃，“才”也就失去了在儒家经典中的地位，不能作为建构理论系统的核心概念。

更重要的是，朱子以“气”概念代替了程颐的“才”概念。程颐以“才”概念表示人性的物质性因素，在哲学上是不彻底的，材质只能通过其构成的具体事物得到定义，难以表达一般物质质料的意义，因此二程言“才”“性”“理”“气”的关系时很难进行彻底的分辨，这是导致上文所述矛盾的原因。朱子参考张载思想确立“气”为一般质料，直接使用“气”说明构成人性、物性的全部物质因素，将“才”“性”问题转化为了纯粹的理气问题，这使得朱子可以以“气以成形，而理亦赋焉”这种“气在理先”的模式为基础，将作为本体的性、理与作为物质质料的气清晰地分开，分别讨论二者的性质与关系，从气的差异对个体禀受天理的影响和对个体性理呈现的影响两个方面解释人与物、人与人之间现实性质的差异，一定程度上避免二程理论中的模糊与矛盾。

同时，对气论的发展也使朱子可以自由地使用气的不同性质解释现实世界的丰富现象。二程只论及了人性中善恶与缓急的差异性，前者主要根据气的清浊，后者则无对应，对于更多在性格、才能乃至道德上的特殊性，因为二程缺乏对气的系统性论述，所以很难在“才”或“性”上做出完备的解释。因为朱子的“气”是一般的物质质料，所以可以具有多层次、多样化的性质，如朱子论物性的差异言：“健是禀得那阳之气，顺是禀得那阴之气，五常是禀得五行之理。人物皆禀得健顺五常之性。且如狗子，会咬人底，便是禀得那健底性；不咬人底，是禀得那顺底性。又如草木，直底硬底，是禀得刚底；软底弱底，是禀得那顺底。”²⁷解释人性格的差异言：“禀得木气多，则少刚强；禀得金气

26 黎靖德编，王星贤点校：《朱子语类》，中华书局1986年版，第97页。

27 黎靖德：《朱子语类》，第375页。

多，则少慈祥。推之皆然。”²⁸ 如此，则万物的性质差异均可被解释为其所具有的气的性质差异，气的差异又可以与天理自身阴阳、五行等形式的分殊对应，虽然朱子在处理“理气同异”问题时仍不免遇到困难，但是正如陈来教授所言：“二程学说里虽然大谈其‘性与天道’，使性与理之间建立起了某种联系，但性与理的统一只是一种自然的天人合一，还没有后来那种禀受天理为性的实体说法。在朱熹则把理更加以实体化，用本体论进一步论证性即是理。”²⁹ 朱子的理气系统进一步打开了从物质质料和形上本体两方面分析人性和物性问题的可能性，“性”论作为一种哲学理论，终于具有了对现象的普遍的解释能力与较完备的自洽性。

6. 结语

上文简要说明了二程借助《周易》思想资源对传统“才”“性”理论的改造，并且略论了朱子对二程理论的进一步发展。虽然“才”“性”问题在朱子之后成为儒学中的边缘性问题，但是其在二程与朱子思想中的发展展现出独特的思想史的意义。虽然理学的产生具有极强的创新性，以致部分学者称之为“新儒学”，但是二程对《周易》中“继善成性”的关注、程颐对《周易》“才”概念的重点诠释，以及“才”在朱子思想中的边缘化均展示出理学学者对儒家经学传统的重视，新的哲学创造仍要以经典为根据和范围，并且被用来解决经典中可能存在的矛盾。同时，朱子对二程“才”“性”理论的发展也显示出其追求哲学彻底性以及解释普遍性的运思特点，这也是朱子学能够在南宋收束洛学分化，并成为之后中国古典思想基本范式的一个重要原因。

28 黎靖德：《朱子语类》，第1388页。

29 陈来：《朱子哲学研究》，生活·读书·新知三联书店2010年版，第226页。

從蜀學到理學

以李杞《用易詳解》為例

陈佑真 CHIN Yuma

1. 蜀人李杞及其《用易詳解》

李杞，字子才，號謙齋，眉山人。除了他是《用易詳解》作者的這一點以外，其生平大抵不明，關於他的籍貫眉山，也只能透過《四庫提要》的記載確認。四庫館臣在從《永樂大典》輯佚《用易詳解》時，有可能在某處標著其籍貫，但此書目下只有《四庫全書》本留存，無法考證其具體情況。

宋代的眉山丹棱李氏家族，在學術方面的成就名震巴蜀，胡昭曦先生等有著如下的概括：

李濤學識精博，著述繁富，與二子壁、埴「皆以文學知名，蜀人必之三蘇」，也研治經學，長于《易》和《春秋》，並有多種著述。¹

李杞名字帶木字旁，有可能屬於李壁、李埴兄弟的祖輩，但目下缺乏明證，沒有進一步討論的條件。

1 胡昭曦、劉復生、粟品孝《宋代蜀學研究》，巴蜀書社，1997年，第280-281頁。

按照李杞的自序，《用易詳解》成于南宋嘉泰三年，即朱熹逝世後三年。此書書名經常被誤作《周易詳解》，其叫「用易」的理由，李杞如此說明：

文中子曰：「易，聖人之動也。于是乎用之，以乘時矣」。夫時變之來无窮，而易之理亦與之无窮。善用之則吉，不善用之則悔吝，古之聖人所以周流變化，而前民之用者，皆用易之妙也。……故吾于易多證之史，非以隘易也，所以見易為有用之學也。因取文中子之言，而以用易名編。²

我們從此書名可知，《用易詳解》的最大的特色在於其以史解《易》的基本方針，此方針正與三蘇蜀學的經學思想符合。下一節我們繼續來看看李杞的《周易》學和三蘇蜀學之間的關係。

2.《用易詳解》中可見的模仿蘇軾之傾向

（1）以史解《易》

《用易詳解》受到三蘇蜀學治學理論影響之處屢見不鮮。尤其，李杞對經學和史學之間的關係的觀點與蘇洵的思想有著共同之處。李杞在《用易詳解》的自序中說：

經學不可以史證。經學必以史證，此吾為書之病也。亦吾為書之意也。夫聖人之經，所以示萬世有用之學。夫豈徒為是空言也哉。故經辯其理，史紀其事。有是理，必有是事。二者常相關，而不可一缺焉。

他開頭就交代，儒家經典中表現的道理是不能用相似的歷史事實來證明的。李杞自己認為他有非要用歷史上的事情來證明之必要，他自認為他的問題就在這裡，但與此同時，他之所以著書的目的也在這裡。

其中「有是理，必有是事」的說法可能是因道學家反復提及的《詩經·大雅·烝民》「有物有則」之觀念而發的，然而，經學和史學的這種混合方式，

2 《用易詳解》自序。

正是蘇洵文集中出現的三蘇蜀學基本觀點：

使後人不知史而觀經，則所褒莫見其善狀，所貶弗聞其惡實。吾故曰：經不得史，無以證其褒貶。使後人不通經而專史，則稱謂不知所法，懲勸不知所祖。吾故曰：史不得經，無以酌其輕重。……史待 而正，不得史則經晦。³

蘇洵認為，經和史各自代表實物的理念和實體兩種側面，他們有互相補充的關係。蘇洵這個觀念給他二子的經學思想留下了深刻的影響，尤以《東坡書傳》最為明顯⁴。李杞繼承了蘇洵的這個觀點，並在《周易》解釋上予以應用，藉而完成了一部繼承三蘇蜀學經學思想的《周易》解釋書。

（2）卦合爻別

蘇軾《東坡易傳》中有不少具備特色的解經方法，其中以卦合爻別最為特別⁵。蘇軾對於《繫辭上傳》「是故列貴賤者存乎位，齊小大者存乎卦」有著如下解釋：

陰陽各有所統御，謂之齊。夫卦豈可以爻別而觀之？彼小大有所齊矣，得其所齊，則六爻之義，未有不貫者。吾論六十四卦，皆先求其所齊之端。得其端，則其餘脈分理，解无不順者。蓋未嘗鑿而通也。

討論一卦整體的內容時，蘇軾意識到其「卦合」的面向，而在討論個別的爻的內容時則使用「爻別」的觀點。此事在《周易》解釋史上不能說是蘇軾獨特的發明，但明確地用「卦合」、「爻別」等詞語，將之視為自己解經的特色則是蘇軾所開通的思路。

3 《嘉祐集》卷九·史論上。

4 請參見拙著《三蘇蜀學的研究——北宋士大夫による儒家經典解釋の展開》，京都大學學術出版會，2024年，第二章。

5 關於蘇軾的卦合爻別說，詳見於金生楊《〈蘇氏易傳〉研究》，巴蜀書社，2002年，第二章。

重點回到李杞，他的《周易》解釋中有模仿蘇軾卦合爻別說來解經的痕跡。例如，《蒙·九二》「包蒙吉，納婦吉，子克家」注：「爻而論之，爻各有蒙之義；合卦之全體論之，則四陰蒙也，二陽發蒙者也」。

又，《小畜·九二》「牽復吉」注：「以全體論之，則為畜者異也，受畜者乾也；以六爻論之，則爻皆有畜之義」，《遯·六二》「執之用黃牛之革，莫之勝說」注：「以全體論之，均謂之遯；分六爻而論之，則乾之三爻，以健而遯者也。艮之三爻，以止而不能遯者也」。《用易詳解》一書中，同樣的例子很多，可知是李杞在確切的意圖下繼承了《東坡易傳》中的卦合爻別說而形成自己的解經風格。

（3）修辭方面的影響

在《用易詳解》中，也有模仿《東坡易傳》修辭的地方。

《需·卦辭》「需有孚，光亨，貞吉」的注釋稱：「謂九五也。夫乾之進，坎之所忌者也。五居中得正位乎天位，不以乾之進為可忌，而信以待之，故需以酒食而與之，為廣大樂易之舉」。

李杞這個注釋的主張就是繼承《東坡易傳》「謂九五也。乾之欲進，凡為坎者，皆不樂也。……至於九五則不然」而成的。但不僅如此，李杞同時襲用蘇軾對此卦《象傳》注釋中的「廣大樂易之君子」之詞。由此可見，李杞注釋《周易》時，《東坡易傳》作為其參照對象而具有很大的重要性。

3. 三蘇蜀學的人性論

三蘇蜀學思想中有一個重要特色在於其人性論。如何理解人之本性，不僅是宋代人，對於幾乎所有朝代的中國思想家來說長期以來都是一個很重要的問題，可是到了宋代，人性論成為了一個尤其熱鬧的話題。

下一節將詳細討論，道學思想家為了印證他們的「聖人可學」思想，而需要繼承孟子以來的道統，主張「人之性，善也」之性善說⁶。性善說經過唐代李翱的理論彌補，與修養思想結合起來後，到了北宋時期，成為了道學思想中

6 吾妻重二先生認為承認「聖人可學」說與否可視為道學派思想家的定義，其說見《朱子學の新研究》，創文社，2004年，第151-152頁。

走向聖人的功夫的理論基礎。

道學派，尤其是程頤提出的普通人通過修養成為聖人的道路，對宋代士大夫來說有著強烈的吸引力。然而，蘇軾卻對道學的這種理論方向提出了疑問。土田健次郎先生整理蘇軾的觀點如下：

子思、孟子同樣主張人人都有實行聖人之道的可能性，但孟子的過失在於把它換成為對所有人進行要求的 ideology。作為 ideology 向人提出的時候，孟子假設出一種針對他而提出的反駁意見，致使將原來並不太適合作為議論對象的人性論勉強地帶到了討論桌上，導致滋生無用的混亂。⁷

與此同時，蘇軾重視個人的體驗中自然湧現出來的「情」，因此，他對韓愈以後的將「情」和「性」分別的觀點也提出了疑問：

儒者之患，患在於論性，以為喜怒哀樂皆出於情，而非性之所有。夫有喜有怒，而後有仁義；有哀有樂，而後有禮樂。以為仁義禮樂皆出於情而非性，則是相率而叛聖人之教也。⁸

蘇軾的人性論正屬於「性無善無惡」，但他並沒有很積極提出這種人性論，而是主張不應該輕易地討論人性。其《揚雄論》說：

夫太古之初，本非有善惡之論，唯天下之所同安者，聖人指以為善，而一人之所獨樂者，則名以為惡。⁹

三蘇蜀學對人性的這種看法，與道學修養學至聖人的思想顯得格格不入，也因而導致了南宋人余允文的強烈批判¹⁰，因此，南宋以後蘇軾就被評為「非孟思想」的代表性人物之一。

7 《道學の形成》，創文社，2002年，第366頁。

8 《經進東坡文集事略》卷八、《應詔集》卷十·韓愈論。

9 《經進東坡文集事略》卷八、《應詔集》卷十·揚雄論。

10 見余允文《尊孟續辨》卷下。

4.《用易詳解》人性論的道學化

宋代蜀人的思想中，比較具有特色的有南宋初期的員興宗。員興宗，仁壽人，紹興二十七年的進士。根據粟品孝先生的分析，員興宗「反對蘇學、洛學和王安石「新學」的對立鬥爭，認為它們各有所長，可以會通」。¹¹

我們來看他以下針對蘇轍《孟子解》的一條議論。蘇轍對《孟子·盡心下》「不仁而得國者，有之矣。不仁而得天下者，未之有也」曾云：

孟子之為是言也，則未見司馬懿、楊堅也。不仁而得天下也，何損於仁。仁而不得天下也，何益於不仁。得國之與得天下也，何以為異。君子之所恃以勝不仁者，上不愧乎天，下不愧乎人，而得失，非吾之所知也。¹²

蘇轍認為，某人有仁德與否和此人成不成功並沒有任何關係，並說即使不仁的人得天下，仁人也不會受到影響。這一章引發了後世的議論，明代張自烈給蘇轍寫了一封信說「況不仁而得天下，損天下必至于損仁，而足下以為何損于仁。仁而不得天下，雖無益天下，未嘗無益于不仁，而足下以為何益于不仁」¹³，此說也有其道理。只是蘇轍這條議論是為了支持歐陽修和蘇軾的正統論而發的¹⁴。所以從這條脈絡上來看的話，蘇轍的這個說法並不是不自然的。

員興宗則為了回護蘇轍，主張蘇轍的本意並不是如此，說：

蘇子之為是言也，亦充孟子之意云耳。是能充其類者也，惜也其言之未悉歟。蓋仁人之於天下也，計其道，不計其功。今日：仁而不得天下也，何益於不仁，則是猶與不仁較夫損益者，非仁之至也。然則，蘇子如之何其無訾也。當曰：仁而不得天下也，何愧於不仁，斯可矣。¹⁵

員興宗認為，仁者企圖得天下並不是為了獲得利益，仁者樂在其中，並不

11 胡昭曦、劉復生、粟品孝《宋代蜀學研究》，第95頁。

12 《孟子解》第二十三章。

13 《芑山文集》書牘卷二、《與古人書》卷上，與蘇子由論解語孟書。

14 關於蘇軾和北宋正統論的關係，可參見土田健次郎《朱熹の思想體系》，汲古書院，2019年，第453-454頁。

15 員興宗《辯言》。

需要把自己與不仁之人相比。

員興宗的這個議論的目的在於減少對於蘇轍學術的批評。然而，其對蘇轍著作的理解並未考慮到蘇轍身處的時代背景，也就是蘇轍當時支持蘇軾所主張的正統論的思想情況。

李杞對人性論的觀點也和上述員興宗與三蘇蜀學的關係有點接近。他們均欽佩其鄉賢蘇氏，極力推重三蘇蜀學，但其思想內容的核心則不是全面地繼承。對於《乾·文言傳》「乾元者，始而亨者也。利貞者，性情也」，李杞注解如下：

自元而至于利，情勝而性隱。自利而至于貞，性復而情滅。故曰：利貞者，性情也。謂性其情也。此聖人教天下万世以復性之學也。夫子論性之說，至于《易》之乾，其理亦曲盡矣。¹⁶

我們從李杞這一段說法，很容易可以看到其對李翱以來的道學復性說的支持。

《繫辭上傳》「一陰一陽之謂道，繼之者善也，成之者性也」的注解也是受到了道學影響而形成的：

一陰一陽，天地之道也。自有天地，即有陰陽。陰陽者，萬物之所資以生，故強名之曰道。其實則天命之本然者也。自道而降，則繼之以善。善即元也。所謂「元者，善之長」是也。自善而充之，則成之者性。性本善也。而性之所以成者，善有以為之繼也。故自道而繼之以善，馴致之理也。自善而成之以性，復性之學也。馴致之理，自天而之人者也。復性之學，自人而之天者也。¹⁷

另外也有一個小根據，我們可以藉以判斷李杞學習時乃是以道學為依據。對於《坤·六二》「直方大」，李杞如此注解：

六二之臣，直而不枉，方而不屈，大而不隘，其所養亦可知矣。孟子曰：

16 《用易詳解》卷一。

17 《用易詳解》卷十三。

「其為氣也，至大至剛以直，養而无害，則塞乎天地之間」。孟子之所謂「至大至剛以直」者，則六二之所謂「直方大」也。¹⁸

此處，李杞將《周易》和《孟子·公孫丑上》中有關「浩然之氣」的議論連接起來，這已經是受到程頤《易傳》的經說而成的。不僅如此，李杞所引用的《孟子》原文，乃是按照趙岐《孟子章句》，在「至大至剛」下句讀，而將「以直」二字下屬。

由此可見，在李杞存世的南宋初期，道學學派的經學著作雖未被國家承認為正式課本，但已經對士大夫階級有著很大的影響力，其影響力也延續到愛戴三蘇蜀學的眉山讀書人。

在李杞的學術思想中，其鄉賢三蘇所提出的經史關係等的議論保有重大的影響力。我們又可以從修辭等比較表面的方向看見出其對三蘇的尊敬。然而，在構成宋代道學思想核心的人性論方面，李杞已經接受了其性善說和復性說，沒有留下三蘇蜀學性無善無惡說的痕跡。這篇論文的目的雖然僅在於分析李杞《用易詳解》中三蘇蜀學和道學的影響，但或許能更進一步地指出一點：在我們以後深入研究南宋道學在讀書人階級中的普及時，李杞也許能成為一個很好的範例。

* 本研究接受 JSPS 科研費 JP24K00009 的資助。

18 《用易詳解》卷一。

抑揚頓挫，曲折甚多

朱子對陳師道詩文之評價

早川太基 HAYAKAWA Taiki

陳師道（1053-1101），字無己、履常，號後山，作為蘇門六君子之一，文名甚高，故而天社任淵特意傾平生學力而對宋子京與黃、陳詩歌作品作註，又後世推為江西詩派三尊之一。因為道學之徒固以經術為主、程伊川與蘇東坡有隙等各種原因，南宋朱子（1130-1200）尋常對蘇、黃吐以微詞，甚至評蘇文云「害正道，甚於老佛」¹，然卻在蘇門君子中，獨對陳師道深有所許，讚揚無已，《朱子語類》有關後山及其著作《後山談叢》者多達十二條，此事足以引人注意。本文專門分析朱子對後山文風的評價如此之高的原因，先觀散文，後論詩歌，以考究南宋理學家者流對文學之觀念。

1. 朱子對陳文之評價

如今文學史上，後山文名夙為詩名所掩，而觀宋人評語，便可以發現其實兩者成就難分高下，蓋雙才而已矣。朱子對陳後山散文加以評語云：

1 《朱子語類》卷一百三十九，中華書局，1986年，第3306頁。

今人文字都無他抑揚頓挫。²

又上文有言韓愈「《獲麟解》也是其間多曲折」，而後論陳氏文風云：

某舊最愛陳無已文，他文字也多曲折。³

此處出現「抑揚頓挫」「多曲折」兩個關鍵詞，乃朱子所理解的陳文特色。關於「曲折」，其他地方也有言及：

柳（宗元）《伐原議》極局促，不好，東萊不知如何喜之。陳後山文如《仁宗飛白書記》大段好，曲折亦好，墓誌亦好。有典有則，方是文章。其他文亦有大局促不好者。（後山《仁宗飛白書記》，其文曲折甚多，過得自在，不如柳之局促。）⁴

朱子所說「有典有則，方是文章」，可謂對文學家的最高褒詞。此處朱子所謂《仁宗飛白書記》應為《後山居士文集》所載《御書記》⁵，其文云：

①仁宗皇帝御書，兩紙三字，其文曰：善法刑政。其璽文曰：帝錄。
②皇祐嘉祐之間，以賜其臣江休復。於是休復為集賢校理，御試詳定官，
休復以文義誦說、明習世務，奉使有績，列于名臣，遂蒙顯揚，寵以翰墨
歸藏于家，而世守之。其為平生之觀，學者之榮至矣。③休復後為刑部郎
中修起居注以卒，其孫端禮以示臣師道，使記載皇帝所以照臨江氏，假寵
子孫，明示來今，臣蓋不得辭也。④臣愚敬惟皇帝之於書極矣。在位四十
餘年，外被四夷，下逮百世，口耳所傳，紙墨所載，德政道化，有不勝
言。其不習而能者，豈聖人優為哉。臣亦不敢贊也。⑤臣生于皇祐四年，
被蒙恩澤，上下田里，不畏不夭，至於成人，而曾不得望前驅之塵，蹈後
車之躅，臣不勝至恨。⑥乃今幸得伏覽聖制，見至人之用心，附于不忘，

2 《朱子語類》卷一百三十九，第 3315 頁。

3 《朱子語類》卷一百三十九，第 3321 頁。

4 《朱子語類》卷一百三十九，第 3306 頁。

5 陳師道《後山居士文集》卷第十五，上海古籍出版社，1984 年。

臣亦與有榮焉。⑦端禮學而不息，文而不露，能世其家，將復受賜矣。

文中①說起仁宗御筆，簡而得要；②說皇帝賜給江氏之由來，盛述家門之譽；③說江端禮與自己之間的交友，故不能拒絕作文；④大讚仁宗聖德；⑤說其仁宗聖德亦為自己所體驗；⑥再回主題「仁宗御筆」：因為如此，故觀御筆，自感「有榮」；⑦再回江氏榮耀，期待江端禮亦不墜家聲，將來又有所賜。此文雖短，段落清楚，①述全篇主題，②與③互相密接，間不容髮，而從④開始議論，但因為這種美頌之文的議論部分動輒空虛，故在⑤作為自己體驗述之，頗有親切感；最後⑥⑦返歸①②主題，以吉言收筆。一段一事，篤實不虛，而且每段接續之處，疏密得宜，一以貫之。朱子所謂「抑揚頓挫」「曲折」應為如此結構之美。朱子又云：

陳後山之文有法度，如《黃樓銘》，當時諸公都斂衽。⁶

不知究竟何種法度？觀其《黃樓銘》并序⁷云：

熙寧十年，京東路安撫使臣某、轉運使臣某、判官臣某稽首言：①河決澶州，南傾淮泗，彭城當其衝，夾以連山，扼以呂梁，流泄不時，盈溢千里，平地水深丈餘，下顧城中，井出脉發，東薄兩隅，西入通洫，南壤水垣，土惡不支。百有餘日而後，已守。②臣蘇某深惟流亡為天子憂夙夜不怠，以勞其人，興發庶兵，固弊應卒，外為長楫，乘高如虹，以殺其怒。內為大堤，附城如環，以待其潰。築二防於南門之外，以通南山，以安危疑。發倉庾，明勸禁，以惠困窮，以督盜賊，宣布恩澤，巡行內外，吏民嚮化，興於事功，法施四邑，誠格百神，可謂有功矣。宜有褒嘉，以勸郡縣。十月二日甲子，奏京師。③明年元豐正甲子制誥諭意，臣某惟念祇承謨訓，人神同力，敢自為功，以速大戾，而明揚褒大，無以報稱，乃作黃樓於東門，具刻明詔，以承天休，而明德意，使其客陳師道又為之銘。④臣師道大惟呂尚南仲，內撫百姓，外平諸侯，詩美文武，尹甫召虎，南伐淮夷，北伐玁狁，功歌宣王，君能使人以盡其才，臣能有功以報

6 《朱子語類》卷一百三十九，第3315頁。

7 陳師道《後山居士文集》卷第十七。

其上古之義也。臣師道又惟感而通之者道也，行而化之者德也，制法明教者政也，治人成功者事也。昔之詩人歌其政事，則并其道德而傳之，後王有作，可舉而行，顧臣之愚，何與於此？誠樂君臣之盡，忘其不佞，冒死上《黃樓銘》，其詞曰：⑤皇治惟成，修明法度，協和陰陽。十有一年，天災時行，河失其防。齊魯梁楚，千里四遠，潰亂散亡。皇仁隱憂，臨遣信臣，以惠東方。羸老不窮，安慰撫養，發散積倉。流人如歸，居人忘危，完聚靡傷。天敘地平，明聖成能，人神效祥。靈平吉成，百穀豐盈，萬邦樂康。郡縣祇畏，允迪聖謨，終事無荒。皇功不居，歸休臣民，邇昭遠揚。守臣拜手，夸大休嘉，使民不忘。改作黃樓，以臨泗上，述修故常。庶臣無佞，原始念終，銘之石章。以告成功，以揚德聲，永永無疆。

熙寧十年（1077），洪水已發，東坡作為太守保衛彭城，水退之後為了紀念此事，「作黃樓於東門，具刻明詔」。此時蘇轍、秦觀並作《黃樓賦》，又在後山文集有《黃樓絕句》（卷十一）、《黃樓》（卷十一）等。此文序文部分具述黃樓來由，①用上奏文體，客觀描述大水危機之狀，筆法精彩，最後敢說「土惡不支」，表示凶多吉少，於事甚危，殆難抵抗，正好如觀電視連續劇每一集的最後幾分鐘，故意使人看了便吊胃口，然而續說「百有餘日而後，已守」，一語顛覆情景。②出現了太守蘇軾，具體描述「百有餘日」之間的各種困難。③建樓及作銘來由，④陳述陳師道個人意見，以為聖王賢臣今日之事，足以垂示後世。⑤銘文部分如同始皇石刻之文一般，三句為韻，古意橫溢。此文「法度」亦於結構見其精妙，修辭方式取範於先秦文體，氣象恢弘。又見《朱子語類》，有言：

- （學生）問「後山文如何？」（朱子）曰：「後山煞有好文字，如《黃樓銘》《館職策》皆好。」又舉數句說人不怨暗君怨明君處，以為說得好。⁸
- 《館職策》，陳無己底好。⁹

《館職策》應為《擬學士院試館職策》¹⁰。此文甚長，雖為模擬「策文」，而不

8 《朱子語類》卷一百三十九，第3309頁。

9 《朱子語類》卷一百三十九，第3315頁。

10 陳師道《後山居士文集》卷九。

異議論之文，專述國家強弱及經世濟民之理，引用故事，說明德治主義的重要性，一篇大意便在最後一句：「德者治之本也。可不務乎。」令人注意的是後來秦檜（1090-1155）好讀陳文，因為《館職策》並不主張強國強兵，卻說「和戎好」。¹¹

關於後山這種文法淵源，《朱子語類》所記載的幾種逸聞在宋人筆記中最為翔實。

（學生）問：「後山是宗南豐文否？」（朱子）曰：「他自說曾見南豐於襄漢間。後見一文字，說南豐過荆襄，後山攜所作以謁之。南豐一見愛之，因留款語。適欲作一文字，事多，因托後山為之，且授以意。後山文思亦澀，窮日之力方成，僅數百言。明日以呈南豐，南豐云：‘大略也好，只是冗字多，不知可為略刪動否？’後山因請改竄。但見南豐就坐，取筆抹數處，每抹處連一兩行，便以授後山。凡削去一二百字。後山讀之，則其意尤完，因歎服，遂以為法。所以後山文字簡潔如此。」¹²

後山學文於曾鞏（1019-1083），其所得之筆法，便在「簡潔」。此事令人想到歐陽修著《醉翁亭記》時，開頭數十字最後成為「環滁皆山也」五字。朱子平生深推曾南豐文，在《語類·論文·上》中也多次提到具體作品。

關於後山學習文法的具體方式，有云：

（學生）問：「嘗聞南豐令後山一年看《伯夷傳》，後悟文法如何」。
（朱子）曰：「只是令他看一年則自然有自得處。」¹³

王應麟《困學紀聞》所云「東坡得文法於《檀弓》，後山得文法於《伯夷》」¹⁴，便為此事。關於後山學習《史記》的經歷，朱子又說：

11 《朱子語類》卷一百三十九（第3309-10頁）云：「秦丞相教其子孫作《文說》，中說後山處。」《朱子語類》卷一百三十（第3122頁）云「陳無己亦是以策言不用兵，孝文和戎好，檜亦喜之。」

12 《朱子語類》卷一百三十九，第3309頁。

13 《朱子語類》卷一百三十九，第3315頁。

14 王應麟《困學紀聞》卷十七，四部叢刊本。

問《史記》如何？曰：《史記》不可學，學不成，卻顛了，不如且理會法度文字。」問後山學《史記》¹⁵。曰：「後山文字極法度，幾於太法度了。然做許多碎句子，是學《史記》。」

《史記》本屬天才之文，太史公的筆法難以模仿，而因為後山文法本就頗具「法度」，因此學習《史記》，卻可偶爾出入如此範圍之內，別有滋味。

總之，朱子對後山文法的評價是有「法度」，而其具體表現乃「抑揚頓挫」與「曲折」。因為由此特色，「若散文，則山谷大不及後山」。¹⁶

2. 朱子對陳詩之評價

陳後山詩法受到蘇黃熏陶，自成一派，能在遒勁修辭之內表達人心機微。朱子評論陳師道與黃山谷兩者詩體云：

擇之云：「後山詩恁地深，他資質儘高，不知如何肯去學山谷？」（朱子）曰：後山**雅健**，強似山谷，然**氣力**不似山谷較大，但卻無山谷許多輕浮底意思。然若論敘事，又卻不及山谷，山谷善敘事情，敘得盡，後山敘得較有疏處。（淳錄云：後山詩雅健勝山谷，無山谷**瀟灑輕揚**之態。然山谷氣力又較大，敘事詠物，頗盡事情。）¹⁷

兩者共同之處便在「雅健」，而區別便在「氣力」，例如陳詩並無「瀟灑輕揚」之趣。朱子所提具體作品，有二：

如《題太白像》《高軒過》古詩，是晚年做到平易處，《高軒過》恐是絕筆。¹⁸

確實，兩首作品都被視作建中靖國元年（1101）即後山過世之年所作。先觀

15 後山受南豐之訓而學《史記》事，又見宋人王正德《餘師錄》卷一。

16 《朱子語類》卷一百三十，第 3334 頁。

17 《朱子語類》卷一百三十，第 3334 頁。

18 《朱子語類》卷一百三十九，第 3306 頁。

《和饒節詠周昉畫李白真》¹⁹云：

君不見浣花老翁醉騎驢，熊兒捉轡驢子扶。金華仙伯哦七字，好事不復千金模。青蓮居士亦其亞，斗酒百篇天所借。英姿秀骨尚可似，逸氣高懷那得畫。周郎韵勝筆有神，解衣磅礴未必真。一朝寫此英妙質，似悔只識如花人。醉色欲盡玉色起，分明尚帶金井水。烏紗白紵真天人，不用更著山巖裏。平生潦倒飽丘園，禁省不識將軍尊。袖手猶懷脫靴氣，豈是從來骨相屯。仰視雲空鴻鵠舉，眼前紛紛那得顧。是非榮辱不到處，只恐朝來有新句。勿言身後不要名，尚得吳侯費百金。江西勝士與長吟，後來不憂身陸沉。

又觀《題明發高軒過圖》²⁰云：

滕王蛟螭江都馬，一紙千金不當價。異才天縱非力能，畫工不是甘爲下。今代風流數大年，含毫落筆開山川。忽忘朽老壓塵底，却怪鳬鴻墮目前。爾來八二復秀出，萬里河山才咫尺。眼邊安得有突兀，復似天地初開闢。明窗寫出高軒過，便逐愈湜聞吟哦。晚知書畫真有益，却悔歲月來無多。官禁修嚴斷過訪，時於僻寺逢稅鞅。秀潤如行琮璧間，清明似引星辰上。憂悲愉佚百不平，河擘太華東南傾。平生秀句寰區滿，拾掇餘棄成丹青。平湖遠嶺開精神，斗覺文字生清新。未許二豪今角立，要知旁有衛夫人。

兩首詩中，每句一意，連貫起來之後，一篇一意。僅觀單句，不甚突出新奇，而近乎朱子所評「平易」，但通篇讀來之後，卻有出人意表之感。後山這種寫法與山谷晚年之作《武昌松風閣》《次韻文潛》《花光仲仁出秦蘇詩卷思二國士不可復見開卷絕歎因花光爲我作梅數枝及畫煙外遠山追少游韵記卷末》等頗為神似，句法或「平易」，而其詩意所以為高遠者，在於章法卓然。章法乃一篇之結構，更具體地來說，第一是某一句與其前後句之間接續的互相關係，第二是每段內容的層次，第三還可以包括起筆與收筆。字法、句法、對法等都是修

19 《後山詩注補箋》，中華書局，第429-432頁。

20 《後山詩注補箋》，第454-457頁。

辭局部之美，而章法則可以從整體角度分析一首詩歌作品。這種章法為黃山谷所擅長，在黃氏《論作詩文》自云：

但始學詩，要須每作一篇，輒須立一大意，長篇須曲折三致焉，乃為成章耳。²¹

又在《答洪駒父書三首》其三云：

文章最為儒者末事，然既學之，又不可不知其曲折，幸熟思之。至于推之使高如泰山之崇崛，如垂天之雲。作之使雄壯，如滄江八月之濤，海運吞舟之魚，又不可守繩墨令儉陋也。

此言使用了詩歌作品一般的雄渾浩大的比喻，江河汪洋千里，滔滔不絕，發源注海，我們由此可知黃氏長篇創作的理想之所在——其關鍵詞就是「曲折」。可見朱子評論後山散文尋常使用「曲折」此語，本為山谷說明自己詩法時屢次使用之術語。因為有此曲折，縱使「平易」亦不流淺俗，風格「雅健」，可以表現深意。

3. 小結

朱子之所以評價陳師道文學作品，因其散文「抑揚頓挫」「曲折」可比韓文，「局促」可比柳文；作詩亦「雅健」「平易」而有章法。劉克莊（1187-1269）云「文師南豐，詩師豫章，二師皆極天下之本色，故后山詩文高妙一世」²³，謂後山為繼承二人成就而集其大成者。值得注意的是朱子評價文學的基準便在這種一篇之中的結構，蓋志於道學者尋常通過理氣體用之學把握一切，因此不太關注瑣細修辭，卻對於一篇文章中的「理」與「體」這種核心觀

21 《黃庭堅全集》，江西人民出版社，第1627頁。此言互見《王直方詩話》云：「山谷論詩文不可鑿空強作，待境而生，便自工耳。每作一篇，先立大意，長篇須曲折三致意乃成章耳。」

22 《黃庭堅全集》，第733頁。

23 劉克莊《後村集》卷九十五，四部叢刊本。

念比較敏感，因此善於發現在全體結構方面展現之文心。今觀曾南豐、陳後山之文，「法度」謹嚴，有條有理，措辭比較質樸，不似東坡那種驅使才華一氣呵成之體，故為道學之士所好亦不足為奇。

此外，朱子對陳後山如此之高的評價應當來自其人一生節義之行。《語類》卷一百三十有云：

先生看《東都事略》。文蔚問曰：「此文字如何？」曰：「只是說得箇影子。適間偶看《陳無已傳》。他好處都不載。」問曰：「他好處是甚事？」曰：「他最好是不見章子厚，不著趙挺之綿襖。傅欽之聞其貧甚，懷銀子見他，欲以賙之。坐間聽他議論，遂不敢出銀子。如此等事，他都不載。」²⁴

關於後山冬日不被裘衣，下二條亦均言及之。後山仕途不甚順利，而在元祐諸公含冤之際，卻拒身穿趙挺之家的裘衣，得寒疾而亡，守節之行，最為顯著，亦所以為朱子所慕。

24 《朱子語類》卷一百三十，第3121頁。

本体与日常

兼论陈来《仁学本体论》¹

朱光镐 ZHU Guanghao

1. 认识与信仰或客观与主观

我认为最能体现朱子学特质的关键词是“本体”和“日常”。当代大部分道学家执着追求内心的本体时，朱子主张应该转向于日常的对象（事·物）。然而，在我们时代的许多研究人员中，似乎认为仅靠内在本體就能解决一切的态度仍然存在。

中国清华大学的陈来教授最近将自己对儒学本质的观点整理为一本书，称为《仁学本体论》²。陈来在这本书中提到，儒家的历史中客观地把“仁”理解为存在于宇宙中并不断发挥作用的实体。古代儒者单纯地将“仁”理解为对别人的怜悯和共鸣，但后代的儒者逐渐认识到，“仁”实际上是宇宙存在和运行的本质。

我不否认陈来教授所说的儒者对仁本体的信仰历史。尤其是宋明道学家们似乎真的拥有这样的信仰体系。这对于朱子来说也是如此，我们无法确认仁本体是否真的存在，但是可以确认朱子对“仁本体”的信仰。

但是陈来并没有单纯地记述这个“信仰的历史”，而是继承这一传统，将

1 此文乃是笔者 2024 年初出版的《朱子学，从本体到日常》的结语部分。

2 陳來，《仁學本體論》，三聯書店，2014。

宇宙的仁本体作为自己的“信仰”。因此，陈来的主张中认识和信仰或客观和主观混杂在一起。陈来主张对宇宙仁本体的信仰是“广义的形而上学”，并评价在儒家历史中未能明确确认宇宙仁本体的想法是“不成熟”的思想。我不打算反对或批评陈来教授的信仰或他的形而上学。他所说的本体是无法确认的，因此属于信仰范畴，但因为无法证实，所以同样也不能反对。陈来教授举出了仁的现代意义为仁爱、自由、平等、公正、和谐等，对于仁可以这样翻译的可能性或这些品德所具有的价值，我亦然没有反对或批判。

我只是想通过分析和批评陈来在展开自己仁学本体论的过程中所表现出的思维方式，来探讨许多研究者所坚持的所谓“本体论”的意义和效用。陈来在完成仁学本体论的过程中，把朱子作为主要人物，因此这个问题与对朱子哲学的解释问题紧密相连。另外，陈来的这本书关注着 21 世纪儒学的可能性及其作用，因此这个问题与当今的儒学能做什么以及如何做的问题有关。

2. 个人道德和社会价值

在陈来的思维方式中，我特别关注的是他把“个人道德”和“社会价值”区分开来。当然，从他的观点来看，这两者并不是相互排斥的。他是这么说的。“……五常中的智就不是社会价值，虽然智也有超出个人道德的意义。近代以来的社会，礼义廉耻是个人道德，忠孝仁爱信义和平则就是个人道德，也是社会价值。……仁义礼智的意义都不是单一的。所以仁义礼智四德不仅具有作为个人道德德目的意义，还具有更广的社会意义。……这里还需要把“道德”和“价值”作一区分，如自由是一种价值，但不是个人道德，平等是社会价值，也不是个人道德。可见基本道德与核心价值是有所不同的。民主、自由、平等都是社会价值，但不是个人道德。”³ 这个观点可以整理成如下表格。

个人道德	社会价值
礼义，廉耻	民主，自由，平等
忠孝，仁爱，信义，和平，仁义礼智	

《表 1》

3 陈来，《仁学本体论》，三联书店，2014，各 458，460 和 464 页。

陈来没有明确说明区分个人道德和社会价值的标准是什么。只是从以下描述中得到一些启发。“改革开放以来，我们的生活中有这样的一种观点，认为只讲公民道德就可以了，其实亚里士多德早就指出过，城邦公民的品德和善人的品德是不一致的，一个好公民不必具有善人所应有的品德。可见公民品德的要求较狭，善人品格要求的更为全面，政治的国家只要求公共有序和公民品格，而社会与文化则更要求善良风俗、要求善人品格，善人品格就是我们所说的讲道德、守道德的个人基本道德。”⁴他认为的“好公民”是不违反公共秩序的，即不侵犯公共协议和他人利益的公民。因此，从《表1》中可以看出，他所说的“社会价值”是指像民主、自由、平等一样，是一个社会协议的公共价值。从这个角度来看，忠孝、仁爱、信义、和平等也是为了圆满维持社会时所需要的品德。但是这个“公民品德”好像脱离了公共场合的独自一人时，并不怎么约束个人，因为“公民品德”是只有在公共范围才需要的品德。因此，这个“公民”可能不是我们通常所认为的“善人”。

但问题是，陈来教授并没有具体说明这个“善人”指的是什么样的人。“社会价值”或“好公民”局限在公共领域，也许这个“善人”可以解释为是在私人范围中遵守一定品德的人。《表1》列出了礼义和廉耻作为“私人品德”。

但我完全不能理解这个“私人领域”。在私人领域遵守礼义和廉耻意味着什么呢？这是否意味着即使无人注视，依然能够坚持自己应当履行的责任，并且关怀别人？那么《表1》中提到的社会价值都是与自己内心无关，只有在考虑别人的监视或评判时才能遵守的品德吗？陈来教授似乎认为民主、自由、平等等等都是在与他人关系中所发生和需要的品德。

但是，什么样的伦理道德不是在与他人的关系中产生的呢？与民主、自由、平等一样，我们不能想象不考虑别人的礼义和廉耻。他表示需要“善人品德”的“社会和文化”也只有在与他人的关系中才能实现。同样，民主、自由、平等社会价值也彻底以对他人关怀为前提的，这个前提是即使独自在房间里也要坚持的内心认同。总之，不能以是否与他人产生联系来区分社会价值和个人道德。

当然，“现实”的维度内法律和社会意义上的“好公民”和伦理意义上的“善人”可以区分。即使是对他人毫无关怀的人，也会害怕社会谴责或法律制

4 陈来，《仁学本體論》，三聯書店，2014. 466 页。

裁，尊重他人的自由，遵守民主程序。也许这就是陈来教授担心的“改革开放以来的现代中国人”。只遵守最起码的社会纪律，最大限度地追求自己的利益，却丝毫找不到对他人的怜悯和关心，这种“滑头”可能是超越国境的现代人普遍自画像。因此，陈来教授认为，“社会价值”固然重要，但一直未被关注的“个人道德”也很重要。按照这样的脉络，“个人道德”和“社会价值”也没什么不能区分的。

但问题并不是那么简单。虽然从“现实”维度上或许可以区分这两者，但这样就会丧失“价值”或“道德”的根本理由。因此，“社会价值”变质为“社会契约”，“个人道德”沦落为“个人问题”。

“社会价值”和“社会约定”不同之处何在？并非所有的社会契约都符合终极价值。纳粹党倡导并由大多数德国人同意的种族清洗也是一项社会契约。但是该契约没有认可犹太人为应该照顾的对象。我们将外卖食品装在一次容器里，从而可以方便食用，也是因为我们的社会允许可以使用一次性容器。但我们并没有得到所有动植物和地球的同意。不是所有的社会契约都能保证它的价值。

许多现代人似乎认为只要在社会上达成的契约，就都可以被接受。相反，他们认为达成协议的契约在任何情况下都不能废除。按照这种观点的话，无论是黑人奴隶，还是纳粹统治下的犹太人，还是传统时期的女性，都永远不能得到解放。丧失最终价值的约定只是社会暴力。人类文明的历史是不断否定、克服着上一代的契约而发展的。只遵守最起码的纪律，因而认为自己已经尽了自己该做的事，却丝毫没有关心或怜悯他人的“滑头”，是因为不考虑最终价值，只看社会契约的眼色行事而诞生的。

要想使社会契约被评价为“价值”，其基础必须符合终极价值。每个人和社会的终极价值不可能永远相同。我们讨论的是儒家，就限定为儒家的价值吧。我认为的和大多研究者同意的儒家终极价值是通过对他人的关怀（爱人利物）获得的共存，以及在此过程中美丽愉快地度过自己人生（各得其所）。这就是儒家所说的“生”和“仁”。

那么“个人道德”沦落为“个人问题”是什么意思呢？与社会价值一样，道德可称为道德的根据，因为它符合于终极价值。即使是“个人”道德，从儒家观点来看，要想成为道德，最终必须以“对他人的关怀和共存”为前提。在《表1》中的礼义和廉耻之所以可称为道德，是因为其前提是对他人的关怀。

这样看来，《表1》中“个人”和“社会”的区分实际上是没有意义的。

陈来教授可能将个人内心与与他人关联来区分两者，即伦理状况的潜在态和现实态。其中对他人的关怀（爱人利物）这一前提是相同的。但是，当它停留在主体的内心时，是“个人道德”，如果在与他人的关系中展开，就会成为“社会价值”。

这种区分具有实际意义。即使是一个人，也要努力不失对别人的关怀和尊重的心态，实际见到别人时，就会尽到这种关怀和尊重。这就是《周易》所说的“寂然不动，感而遂通”另外，这也是朱子等道学家所说的以敬贯通动静思想。这样的主体已经不仅是“善人”而且是“优秀公民”，不再是“滑头”，而是任何人都能同意的优秀人格。关键依然是道德与社会性。

3. 终极价值的根源

那么，儒家主张的终极价值，即对他人的关怀和尊重之心，到底是从何而来、由何而生的呢？我们内心中真的存在道德本性，它是来自宇宙的本性吗？有人可能会说，这只是一种自私基因（selfish genes）的把戏，它甚至可以选择道德性。或者也可以称之为在长期的社会化过程中融入内心的压迫。尽管解释方式不同，但这些想法一致认为终极的价值来自“内心”。

但我认为，即使不是“内在根源”，也能充分解决价值问题。这并不是说对“内在根源”的关注和探索毫无意义或不可能。只是我觉得内面本性存在与否很难确认，即使它存在也没有有效性。通常关注“内在根源”的探索主张这是人类的普遍性。因此，无论是基因还是超我（super ego），都说“每个人”都有。

但是，如果这种“普遍性”对人类具有强制性，伦理主体就不能成立。在伦理主体的可能性方面，普遍的本质既不能、也不应当保障伦理主体。如果内心的道德本性使所有人永远是善良的存在，那么由于没有主体的选择，就不能称其为伦理主体。从这一点看，这种行为也不能称为善行。而且这种普遍性不能强制要求人类，这是不变的事实。因为在现实中，我们多少都会目睹恶人。更何况，就像男女的先天差异一样，所有的普遍性都无法保障价值。

关键不是普遍的本质，而是主体的“选择”和“同意”。价值永远只是想象、选择和同意的问题。关怀和尊重别人真的是正确的选择吗？只有那样的时候，我才能找到真正的幸福吗？为了做出正确的选择，我们必须学习，但学习方法中还有两个方向。一个是面向内心，即面向普遍本性的道路，牟宗三教授

称其为“逆覺体證”。另一个是对外部对象和其中发生的具体事态的关注和探索，朱子称其为“格物致知”。在这两条路径的分岔口，朱子选择了面向外部的对象与事件，而非内心。

但是，即使承认对内心普遍道德本性的关心和探索，其终极意义仍然在于与他人的关系中。因为所有的伦理性都发生在与他人之间的关系中。朱子在《仁说》中批判程门（二程以及其弟子们）的内心化、神秘化、绝对化倾向，是指与对他人的关怀或尊重这一终极价值无关，将内在道德性绝对化、观念化地追求的态度。“终极价值”，即与对他人的关怀和尊重无关的“内在道德”，因此再也不能成为道德。那只是“内面的事情”。这就是朱子批判的佛教的“作用是性”。排除与他人之间发生的伦理状况，探索内在道德本质，因此我说这是“个人问题”。“个人问题”不再是个人的“道德”。

作为陈来教授所说的“个人道德”，礼义和廉耻不可能是对他人的关怀无关的“作用是性”。但是，如果忽视他所相信的“仁本体”或“生本体”总是以对他人的关怀和尊重为终极前提，那么学习的目的就不是与他人共存和由此带来的美好、快乐的生活经营，而是对内心道德本体的体验。他是这么说的。“……人生的目标就是要体认从天地接受的生意生理，因为这是人的生命的根源。”⁵ 因此，他才能像《表1》一样设定与社会关系无关的“个人道德”。

陈来教授所说的“本体认识”，即“对从天地赋予的生育意志的体验性认识”，是否和牟宗三所说的“逆覺体證”一样是“面向内心”尚不得而知。陈来教授对此没有具体提及。在《仁学本体论》中，他只谈了仁本体的存在和对它的认识的必要性，没有提及认识的方法。但是，只能确认他所说的“仁本体”并不是王阳明、熊十力、李澤厚以及牟宗三等所说的“情感本体”或“心本体”。总之，宇宙本体与个人的认识或同意与否无关，是真实存在的。

但是，比起是否同意陈来的这种“学派”观点的问题，我更不同意他在仁本体的实在、对实在的认识、认识方法等方面的问题。

首先，我们无法确认宇宙的意志问题，因为这是“信仰”的范畴。因此，对仁本体的认识也不是能够客观验证的“认识”。尽管如此，所谓的“本体主义者”们仍然不放弃对本体的说教，是因为他们认为将“生育之意”和“生育之理”作为人类的本性，可以使人类和社会变得更好。也就是说，他们认为那

5 陳來，《仁學本體論》，三聯書店，2014，348 頁。

是既必要又美好的东西。而且我也同意这种想法。

我认为，只有在对他人的尊重（利物）下，所有存在者才能美好地享受自己的生活（各得其所）。但我认为，这种想法并不是通过对宇宙和人类本质的“发现”和“体验”才能得到的，而是在程度和内容上可能存在差异的每个人的“同意”和“选择”而已。我们可以把承认各自差异的各自的同意和选择称为“境界”。

4. 本体与境界

《论语》中许多句子描述孔子及其弟子的境界。在《先进》篇中，孔子向弟子们询问各自的抱负时，曾点说“莫春者，春服既成，冠者五六人，童子六七人，浴乎沂，风乎舞雩，咏而归。”孔子曰：“吾与点也！”这就是代表性的例子。朱子解释为孔子之所以赞同曾点的想法，是因为他不勉强做什么，而是融入到自然的秩序中，愉快地创造自己的人生（天理流行）⁶。这里重要的是，在维持现有生活的同时（即其所之位），也能从中感受到快乐（乐日用之常）。而且使在这种生活中遇到的一切都能实现自己的本质（与天地万物上下同流，各得其所之妙）。曾点正如日常生活中自己所看到、所感受到和同意的程度，与宇宙秩序同化，能够美好、愉快地创造自己的生活和完成他人的存在。这就是朱子眼里的曾点境界。

本体与意境何异？虽然对本体的信仰是主观范围，但在这种信仰中（信仰者的眼里）本体因其实在性而存在，因此与他人同意与否无关，本体本身对信仰者来说是客观的。但是境界由于各自的程度和内容都不同，所以是极端主观的。如果说本体是普遍的，那么境界就是个人的。如果说因为本体是一切存在的本质，所以本体是存在论范畴，那么因为境界是同意和选择的问题，所以境界是实在的和实践的范畴。因为本体是客观、普遍的，所以本体认识中可能存在对或错，但在主观和个人的境界中不会存在对或错。只是各有各样的方向和深度而已。

各自的境界并不一定要以对本体（仁本体或生本体）的认识为前提。即使

6 《论语集注·先进》：“曾点之学，盖有以见夫人欲盡處，天理流行，隨處充滿，無少欠闕。故其動靜之際，從容如。而其言志，則又不過即其所居之位，樂其日用之常，初無舍己爲人之意。而其胸次悠然，直與天地万物上下同流，各得其所之妙，隱然自見於言之外”。

没有（或无法）意识到宇宙的普遍和绝对的本质，也可以存在各自的认同和选择。虽然不知道宇宙的本质是否仁本体，但对电视上遇到的地球另一边的某个孩子感到怜悯，这就是人类。看着因为塑料袋而面临死亡的海洋生物，决心减少使用一次性用品，这里不需要深刻的学习。虽然不知道后面来的人是谁，但我们只能用一点关心和轻微的决断来暂时抓住门把手。这种关心和关怀决定着那个人的生活方向和水平。因此，境界一点也不神秘，反而平平常常。

这里再次提醒的是，所有这些问题都彻底是“关系性的”。也就是说，一切都发生在主体和对象之间的“关系”中。那么，是什么样的“关系”呢？所有的高等伦理都指向“共存的关系”。无论时间上或空间上的距离如何，所有的关系都会产生责任的问题，如果指向共存，就不能回避责任。对他人的关怀和尊重意味着同意共存，承担责任。正如反复所说的，即使没有对仁本体或生本体的信仰，只要向自己生活的世界给予关心和理解，我们就可以选择各自认为的好生活，即“境界”。朱子反对程门弟子们的“仁者何也？”那样的执着，并强调更重要的是日常的孝悌。这说明朱子更关注的是日常生活上的关怀和理解，而不是内面的本体。

但是，这里所说的“境界”并不等于不可逆的“资格”。在我们的日常语言中，“境界”是经过长期努力才能达到的，所以达到一定的高度后就不会再往下来了。从这个意义上讲的“境界”反而相当于朱子批判的程门弟子的“体仁”或“知仁”。牟宗三所说的“逆覺體證”也一样。但是我所说的境界不是这种神秘体验，那只是我们日常语言中的“为人”即“人格”的意思。朱子解《论语》的“克己復礼”章，说任何人都可以行“克己復礼”，但即使有人行“克己復礼”，也可以随时后退。对朱子来说，圣人并不是到达之后就会结束的状态。那是在视听言动的日常中需要不断实现的过程。

因此，“认识方法”的问题也就不言而喻了。无论是在感情发动之前还是之后，任何向主体内面本体的学习都没有起到实质性的帮助，这就是朱子中新说时期所达到的结论。像“逆覺體證”一样，向内心的探索摆脱了仁本体的“关系性”，将“个人道德”变成“个人的问题”。因此，即使是为了自觉地同意仁本体，主体反而应该朝着对象和关系前进。不仅关注即将到来的对象和事态而适当地应对（應事接物），还要积极走向世界。这就是朱子所说的格物。

因为仅靠普遍和客观的本体并不能解决任何问题，所以其关注和指向应向于对象和关系。所有的存在意志都可以得到认可。可是，认可之后呢？是否应该认可每个人的生意，由此接受无限的竞争？那不是共存，而是各自图生。如

果追求共存，那么各自的生意就应该得到协调。为了在两人以上的所有关系和社会中协调彼此的生意，需要细致周密的程序和方式。为了构建它们，需要合理的详议和真正的认同过程。这就是文明。

“对他人的尊重和关怀（爱人利物）”，但凭这一句话，并不能解决所有的事情。“对别人的尊重和关怀”是共存的大前提而已。因为是大前提，故那只是出发，而不是终点。“天命之谓性”，朱子的哲学体系也是从本体开始的。但这只是故事的开始而已。天命和本性要求率性和修道的过程，对朱子来说，修道（教）意味着“礼乐刑政”。即具体的、日常的文明体系。天命和本性是天赋性的，但是“礼乐刑政”已经与天赋性无关。“礼乐刑政”是确切关注了人间的关系性，因此是社会性的。朱子终极关怀的不是天赋的本性，而是关系的现实。因此，朱子学永远不会以本体论为目的，也不会就此停止。朱子学是在礼乐刑政的具体和日常生活中得以圆满。

5. 朱子学的提议

朱子固然同孔子一样是儒学的代表人物。但如果将朱子学的特色放在形而上学的完成上，那么在儒学的现代重新诠释可能性的探索中，朱子独有的意义是无法确保的。即使同意内圣外王的统一或共同体主义等儒学普遍的志向，也无法找到朱子的特点。这就是为什么尽管对“儒学的现代重新解释”或“儒学的现代意义”进行了那么多研究，但朱子学的固有意义一直没有得到关注的原因。那么，如果今天想重新激活朱子学，我们应该关注什么呢？

我认为朱子学独有的特征是（礼乐刑政的）系统性、具体性、日常性。从本体（太极）→ 天理 → 本性 → 道德心理 → 工夫 → 政治、文本、社会机制、制度等的一系列流程，构成了在日常生活中体现儒学终极价值的朱子学的巨大体系。系统性、具体性、日常性，我认为这三个关键词，在说明朱子学特征的同时，也是当今社会建设“可被认同的价值体系”时有用的原则。

“系统性”除了朱子学本身表现出极致的系统性外，本质上还意味着朱子学的世界观及价值观是“系统性”或“关系性”的。朱子的“先天易学”所说的“秩序和体系的世界”就是此意。朱子认为包括人类在内的所有存在者都处于紧密的联系之中。因此，接近主体的一切对象和事态都很重要。为了处理这些事物，在家庭、社会、国家等的阶段中设置了多种制度和机构。

朱子学的这种“系统性世界观”可以成为应对孤立化、工具化、生存性物

化的当今社会面临的各种问题的对策。对于向别人漠不关心、不再为追求初级欲望而害羞的现代人来说，朱子学的系统世界观敦促对共同体和环境负责，并要求全面价值和社会参与。不是把美食之旅当作唯一的幸福，用公寓面积来衡量人生成功与否的社会，而是在责任、连带和共鸣中追求丰富嗜好和价值的社会，这样的社会才是更好的社会吧？

“具体性”是朱子解释和处理世界的认识论与实践原则。在禅宗的影响下，朱子当代的儒学发展成为内心哲学。朱子批评这种倾向，而将儒学变成可以用语言和理性来说明的以及一定要说明的日常学问。最代表性的是格物，朱子的格物拒绝一切神秘化，而强调对具体对象的关心和了解。他所说的功夫，乃不是一瞬间的顿悟，而是要求阶段性、反复性、累积性的学习和实践。不能仅靠内心，而是提供经典、礼书、学校和教育作为学习的依据。

在认识和实践，朱子学的这种“具体性态度”对纠正一系列关于儒学的成见很有用，且对解决当今社会自身问题也有重要的指导作用。具体性的对立面就是神化化和神秘化。神化化是指认为特定的个人、集团或特定的观点或想法像万能药一样，一下子就能解决一切问题的态度。像彗星一样登场的政治家、不败财阀、房地产神话等现象就属于这种情况。神秘化是不努力用简单明确的语言解释想法和主张，而是希望各自能够领悟的态度。不负责任的煽动、毫无根据的主张以及由此引发的政治、社会矛盾皆是其弊端。

我认为，当今社会应该从每一个单词和概念开始仔细思考和协商，抓住认同的支点。只有通过这样的过程，才能树立理性和常识。其中，通过长期对话积累认同的过程是必须的。单方面的主张是暴力，只是矛盾的开端。孔子主张政治应该从“正名”开始。弟子们怀疑这种态度是否过于观念化而缺乏现实性，而孔子解释说，如果名不正，那么连基本的行动都无法进行。不正当的政权说“正义社会”的瞬间，“正义”这个词就被污染了。正名是首要任务，而且正名，即名字和规定，要经过深思熟虑和认同逐步建立。

“日常”是朱子关注的现实，日常化是体现朱子学理念的方法论。朱子并没有让儒家的价值和理念停留在观念的世界里。朱子提倡的书院、乡约、社仓、礼学、经典文本等具体政策、机构和机制，则在日常生活中落实了儒家价值及理念的方法。这些机制实际上统治了东北亚 800 年。朱子学的这种日常化方法论在实际体现当今社会的各种理念和价值时也是必需的。韩国的宪法规定大韩民国是“民主共和国”，但这毕竟只是理念，在我们的日常生活中，民主和共和的价值还没有得到充分体现。那不是到了某个层次就能完成的。因为是通

过想象无限追求的，所以不可能有终点，但就像在流动的江水中划桨一样，在停止的瞬间被推到后面，所以不能停止奋斗的“志向”。这一价值志向不能像宪法条文那样停留在纸面和理念上，应该在日常的具体现场中数量上和质量上落实。民主和共和、公正和正义等人类文明艰难建构的所有价值，不仅要在国家 and 政治上，还要在家庭、学校、职务等日常生活中得到实际落实。

作为朱子学的研究者，我希望这个“日常化”的原则同样适用于朱子学研究。不要停留在知识考古学的立场上，应该探索朱子学的理念如何在我们的现实中日常化。要从“观念的实验室”中走出来，走到日常的现场。应该找出更有说服力的价值，用更有效的方法征求认同。

在西学东渐的混乱时期，试图主张“我们也有哲学”，这就是 20 世纪东方哲学的现实。他们认为的“作为哲学的朱子学”是关于存在的“本体”，即道德本性。儒家通过主张这样永恒普遍的东西来试图表达东方独有的价值。包括科学和民主在内，19-20 世纪东方不得不引进了一切“外部的”。在这样的脉络之下，作为绝对不能被否认的“内部的”本体必然是迫切的。

但是本体只说明了一半的朱子学。因为只有一半，所以是不完整的。朱子不是 20 世纪的哲学家。现在我们也不再生活在 20 世纪了。在 21 世纪背景下，20 世纪的解释已不再成为“正确答案”。21 世纪又面临着文明史的转变。孤立的个人、共同体的解体、对别人和未来的不负责任等，不可避免的现象在喊着，以至今使用的方式是绝对不可能持续的。我认为关系、责任、共存的儒学声音，以及具体、系统地在日常生活中所实现的朱子的主张，是这个时代更加迫切的哲学。

朱子学，从本体到日常

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結 词	本体与日常

禮教思想傳統的演進及其特點

從朱子禮學到陽明禮學

殷慧 YIN Hui

1. 引言

禮教，也即「禮義教化」或「以禮為教」，在整個儒家思想中居於核心地位。禮教的內涵既包括規範社會人倫秩序的禮制，也包括禮儀背後的倫理道德與終極關懷。殷周時期已經奠定了「親親尊尊」的禮教內涵，西周行政教化傳統和國子教育體系是儒家思想的重要來源¹。諸子時代中國的軸心突破與禮樂傳統有著密切的關係²。漢代《白虎通義》確立了儒家禮教的典範，帝王和儒家思想家達成共識，以經學的傳承為主幹，三綱六紀和忠敬文化成為「教」的主要內容。魏晉時期，「名教」「禮教」互稱，玄學家表現出反名教的傾向，追求「越名教而任自然」³。社會層面而言，魏晉南北朝時期，世家大族形成了自己獨特的家法和門風，儒家經典被內化為士大夫風操，士族之家各有家法。到了唐代，士族衰落，禮法下移並同時受到佛教中國化的影響⁴。宋代復興儒學，

1 陳來：《古代宗教與倫理：儒家思想的根源》，北京：三聯書店，1996年，第226頁。

2 參見余英時：《論天人之際：中國古代思想的起源試探》，北京：中華書局，2014年。

3 （三國魏）嵇康，戴明揚校注：《嵇康集校注》，北京：中華書局，2014年，第402頁。

4 張國剛：《從禮容到禮教：中國中古士族家法的社會變遷》，《河北學刊》，2021（3）：36-40頁。

禮教思想從雙向著力，思想義理上有巨大突破，制度實踐上深入宗族社會。從宋明學者的討論和後世家禮家訓、鄉規民約對「禮教」的使用來看，多將其視作風俗建設與道德追求的極高標準⁵。後世批評的「封建禮教」也往往是針對宋明理學的儒家新禮教而言，就這一角度而言，禮教的成熟是在宋明實現的⁶。近代以來，禮教卻成為了眾矢之的，被視為中國文化之糟粕的集中體現，例如陳獨秀認為「三綱之根本義，階級制度是也。所謂名教，所謂禮教，皆以擁護此別尊卑明貴賤之制度者也」⁷。魯迅、吳虞則進一步提出「禮教吃人」說，對當時社會上禮教的負面因素進行了深刻揭示。此後，侯外廬、張豈之等學者又以「封建禮教」來與「禮教」相區分，在指出前者之消極性的基礎上對中國傳統禮教進行回護⁸。溝口雄三對禮教的分判，也有相似之處。值得注意的是，溝口雄三有以禮教指稱宋明儒學的傾向，他認為「理學」側重於強調宋明理學的哲學面向，禮教則更有益於發現其社會現實向度⁹。那麼，禮教作為一種思想傳統，在宋明如何展開，又有著怎樣的特性？本文試以朱子禮學、陽明禮學為中心，就這一問題進行討論，以求正於方家。

2. 「禮者理也」：禮教的義理化

北宋初年開始了禮教的復興與重建，而這一趨勢正與新儒學的興起相伴。此時儒者們面臨著漢末以來名教衰微的問題，名教即禮教¹⁰，所謂衰微，一方

5 耿天臺云：「里社之意，蓋緣先賢禮教未泯滅也。就中行令鄉長舉行鄉約，宣教聖論，令民知相親相恤之誼。蓋教化行而民心得，而後法制可舉也。」（《耿定向集》，傅秋濤點校，上海，華東師範大學出版社，2015年，第665頁。）劉宗周贊其姑：「姑操家政黽勉力奮，無可為者，猶思以禮教延家聲。」（《劉宗周全集》第4冊，吳光主編，杭州，浙江古籍出版社，2007年，第279頁。）

6 〔日〕溝口雄三：《中國的衝擊》，王瑞根譯，孫歌校，北京，三聯書店，2011年，第132頁。蔡尚思指出：「到了朱熹，禮教已經發展到無以復高的地步。就此而論，也可以說它實集禮教思想之大成。」（蔡尚思：《中國禮教思想史》，上海，上海古籍出版社，2006年，第82頁。）

7 陳獨秀：《吾人最後之覺悟》，《獨秀文存》，北京，外文出版社，2013年，第55頁。

8 張豈之：《關於傳統道德與封建禮教－紀念外廬師九十歲誕辰》，《史學史研究》1993年第3期，第4-8頁。

9 〔日〕伊東貴之：《從「氣質變化論」到「禮教」——中國近世儒教社會「秩序」形成的視點》，溝口雄三、小島毅主編：《中國的思維》，南京，江蘇人民出版社，2003年，第531頁。

10 陳寅恪指出：「故名教者，依魏晉人解釋，以名為教，即以官長君臣之義為教，亦即入

面是由於漢末動亂導致名教的規範作用被削弱；一方面魏晉名士又對名教極盡批評，導致了名教地位的下降。在魏晉名士看來，名教虛有其表，只能規範人的外在言行，卻並不真正弘揚禮義，在追求本末之辨的魏晉玄學影響下，進而產生了以名教為末、摒棄名教的傾向¹¹。國家機器與名教的規範作用在唐代得以復蘇，因而禮義與禮儀割裂的問題為盛唐的光輝所遮掩，但隨著唐末國家的衰微、世族的崩潰以及佛老的盛行，此一問題在宋初空前嚴重起來。宋初儒者化的名僧對於儒學復興與理學產生具有重要意義，這些僧侶亦為禮教的擁護者¹²。但深入觀察會發現，其對禮教的認可僅限於禮之文，對禮之本則欲以佛家心性之學取代之，故智圓云：「儒者飾身之教，故謂之外典。釋者修心之教，故謂之內典。」¹³契嵩謂：「彼孔氏者以跡其教化而目之也，吾本其道真而言之也。教化跡也。道本體也。」¹⁴智圓以外儒、以內言佛，契嵩則以跡言儒，以本體言佛，其對儒佛的分判不言而明。

因此受佛教的影響和刺激，禮教的義理化成為儒學復興過程中的重要趨向。玄學家雖有「名教出於自然」「越名教而任自然」的不同主張，但是均強調自然高於名教。宋代理學家復興儒學，吸收了玄學將名教之禮與自然之理相結合的思想。與玄學家將名教訴之自然相反，他們堅持從人文的名教之禮中引伸出天理，並強調人文之禮即為天理之自然。理學雖在哲學形式上仍主張天理高於名教之禮，但其實質則是名教之禮即理之自然。理學家提出「禮即理」，努力從本末體用角度化解「名教之禮」與「自然之理」的緊張和衝突¹⁵。北宋

世求仕者所宜奉行者也。其主張與崇尚自然即避世不仕者適相違反，此兩者之不同，明白已甚。」（陳寅恪：《金明館叢稿初編》，北京，三聯書店，2001年，第203-204頁。）就此而言，名教與禮教的含義大體無差，「所謂名教，簡單來說，就是儒家的綱常名教，是儒學有關社會制度的規範和社會價值理想，也就是儒家的禮教。」（劉丰：《北宋禮學研究》，北京，中國社會科學出版社，2016年，第442頁。）

11 嵇康等雖鄙夷名教，但從本末之辨來看，其所反對的是名教的外在形式，或者說是有名無實的名教，而作為仁義道德的名教之內核，仍是其期許的，故《家誡》云：「若夫申胥之長吟，夷叔之全潔，展季之執信，蘇武之守節，可謂固矣。」（〔三國魏〕嵇康，戴明揚校注，《嵇康集校注》，北京：中華書局，2015年，第544頁。）

12 蔡尚思：《中國禮教思想史》，第73-74頁。

13 （宋）智圓：《閒居編》，《玉續藏經》第101冊，臺北，新文豐出版公司，1983年，第110頁。

14 （宋）契嵩：《鐔津文集校注》，邱小毛、林仲湘校注，成都，巴蜀書社，2014年，第104頁。

15 殷慧：《從「自然」到「天理」——玄學與理學關於名教之禮的思考》，《哲學與文化》，2017年第3期，第23-40頁。

的儒者致力於禮教的復興與禮學地位的提升，但大多仍局限於儀注、制度的考訂。李覲認為禮囊括了所有政治文化制度與道德倫理原則，「樂刑政」一於禮；「仁義智信」皆禮之別名¹⁶。李覲可視作禮教義理化之前導，他已抬高了「禮」在儒學概念體系中的地位，但尚未上升到本體高度。司馬光亦致力於恢復禮教，他認為：「天子之職莫大於禮……何謂禮？紀綱是也。」¹⁷他把禮與大易陰陽聯繫起來：「《易》者，陰陽之變也，五行之化也，出於天，施於人，被於物，莫不有陰陽五行之道焉。故陽者，君也，父也，樂也，德也；陰者，臣也，子也，禮也，刑也；五行者，五事也，五常也，五官也。」¹⁸王安石強調禮的實用意義：「禮始於天而成於人，知天而不知人則野，知人而不知天則偽。聖人惡其野而疾其偽，以是禮興焉。」¹⁹其禮學思想雖結合天人性命言禮，但撰作《周官新義》根本指向是為變法服務。

周敦頤一方面注重禮學的社會面向，另一方面著力挖掘禮樂的形上內涵，但其禮學理學化的程度不如張載和二程²⁰。為了重塑禮教的神聖地位，張載以天之自然論禮：「禮亦有不須變者，如天敘天秩，如何可變！禮不必皆出於人，至如無人，天地之禮自然而有，何假於人？天之生物便有尊卑大小之象，人順之而已，此所以為禮也。」²¹禮有變化者與不變者，前者就禮之文而言，隨時間和空間的不斷變化，禮儀亦當有所損益；後者則就禮之本而言，因為無論環境如何變化，作為根本價值取向的仁義道德依然是永恆的，這可以謂之天敘、天秩。禮儀是出於人的，禮義則是出於天且合於自然之道的，天生萬物皆有規律，人本其規律而參悟禮義，進而創制節文度數之禮儀。禮，或者說作為禮之根本的禮義，上升到了本體層面。故張載認為：「大虛（太虛）即禮之大一（太一）也。大者，大之一也，極之謂也。禮非出於人，雖無人，禮固自然而有，何假於人？今天之生萬物，其尊卑小大自有禮之象，人順之而已，此所以為禮。或者專以禮出於人，而不知禮本天之自然。」²²太虛是生化萬物的宇宙

16（宋）李覲：《李覲集》，王國軒點校，北京，中華書局，1981年，第7頁。

17（宋）司馬光：《資治通鑑》，北京，中華書局，1956年，第2頁。

18（宋）司馬光：《溫公易說》，上海，上海古籍出版社，1989年，第3頁。）

19（宋）王安石：《王安石全集》，秦克、鞏軍標點，上海，上海古籍出版社，1999年，第252頁。

20 殷慧：《周敦頤禮學思想探析》，《天津社會科學》2017年第6期，第150-153頁。

21（宋）張載：《張載集》，章錫琛點校，北京，中華書局，1978年，第264頁。

22（宋）衛湜：《禮記集說》第58卷，《文淵閣四庫全書》第118冊，臺北：臺灣商務印書館，第216頁。

本體，「禮之太一」則指禮之本。

二程所做的工作與張載有相通之處，程顥云：「『禮』亦理也，有諸己則無不中於理。」²³ 程頤則通過理來看待禮：「視聽言動，非理不為，即是禮，禮即是理也。」²⁴ 禮儀對視聽言動的規範在本質上以理為依據。其實早如《禮記》已有：「禮也者，理也。」（《禮記·仲尼燕居》）張載也講：「禮者理也。」²⁵ 但天理二字乃二程自家體貼出來，其對「理」的發明與論述使理作為本體的含義空前完善起來，因而其「以理言禮」之論與此前學者有著本質上的差別，後來朱熹「禮理雙彰」的思想，實以程頤為肇端。

義理化在朱熹這裏達到了極致，「禮理雙彰」的禮教思想體系得以系統、完備地建構起來。「朱熹繼承二程之學說而擴大之，並補其不足。理之哲學，於是完成。」²⁶ 朱熹的天理學說在繼承二程的基礎上更加完備，並用理來統攝諸般概念與問題。朱熹以自然為天理，提出「禮者，天理之節文，人事之儀則。」²⁷ 徹底將禮之本概括為天理，使禮教重新獲得神聖性，這可以視作對程頤禮教思想的總結，對魏晉以來禮教之思的根本回應。

對於禮教之踐履，我們無法從表面判斷一個人內心是否具有禮義。外在的禮儀並非禮義的充分條件，二者容易在道德情感的意義上產生割裂。那麼，當朱熹將其宏大且至善的天理概念貫徹到禮義中去，也就使禮義獲得了可把握性，天理作為本體雖比道德情感更加視之不見、搏之不得，但由於朱熹的天理不是一個空空如也的概念，而是以分殊之萬物作為掛搭，有著整個致廣大而盡精微的思想體系作為支撐，就可以用來判定一個人行禮的同時是否有著「敬」的情感，也即：以天理作為判別一個人禮教行為的標準。需強調的是，「禮者，天理之節文」的說法並非把「禮」局限於「禮之文」的層面，並非在引入天理的意義上主張「理體禮用」，而是從體用一源的角度強調禮、理之間並無高低本末之分別²⁸。永嘉學派的禮教思想則體現出義理化不足的傾向，這從朱熹與

23 （宋）程顥、程頤：《二程集》，王孝魚點校，北京：中華書局，1981年，第367頁。

24 （宋）程顥、程頤：《二程集》，第144頁。

25 《張載集》，第326頁。

26 陳榮捷：《宋明理學之概念與歷史》，臺北，中央研究院中國文哲研究所，1996年，第134頁。

27 （宋）朱熹：《朱子全書》第14冊，朱傑人、嚴佐之、劉永翔主編，上海，上海古籍出版社；合肥，安徽教育出版社，2002年，第239頁。

28 陳淳對此指出：「蓋天理只是人事中之理，而具於心者也。天理在中而著見於人事，人

陳傅良的祧廟之爭便可看出²⁹。陳傅良推崇《周禮》，認為「周制可得而考，則天下亦幾於禮矣」³⁰，通過禮制的考察與討論，便可以達到禮教之真諦。這樣的思考主要著眼於制度建設與現實功利層面，這固然是禮教的重要內容，但缺乏哲學作為依據，會導禮之本的缺失與道德仁義的失衡，故朱熹譏之為「鄙陋」³¹。

朱熹的禮教思想完成了天理化的理論提升，被後世視為中國古代禮教思想的代表³²。不同個體體貼的「天理」，因為角色、地位不同，也會呈現不同。因此，顛撲不破的天理，也容易遭致質疑；而隨著朱學的定於一尊，後學末流中的天理尋求歸結到制度、經典、權威上時，在現實中不免走向重文輕質，嵇康、阮籍所目睹、反對的情景很快就在朱學末流的時代重現了³³。陽明禮教思想的展開則可視作對朱熹的發展與反思。在表面上看，陽明和朱熹一樣以理論禮：「『禮』字即是『理』字」³⁴，但其「理」的內涵已盡歸於「心」，主張「心即理也。此心無私欲之蔽，即是天理」³⁵，故陽明禮教思想以「心」論「禮」，「這心之本體，原只是個天理，原無非禮」³⁶，心之本體即為天理，同時也是禮，心、理、禮三者在陽明哲學體系中實現了統一。故陽明云：「禮根於心而一本者也」³⁷，禮之本便是心，禮可以視作本體之心在經驗世界的彰顯，禮之

事在外而根於中。天理其體而人事其用也。」（宋）陳淳：《北溪字義》，熊國禎、高流水點校，北京，中華書局，1983年，第20頁。）但其所說的「人事」主要針對於禮之文，並非包含著禮之本的作為整體的禮教。

29 殷慧：《禮理雙彰：朱熹禮學思想探微》，北京，中華書局，2019年，第366-372頁。

30 （宋）陳傅良：《止齋集》第40卷，《文淵閣四庫全書》第1150冊，第814頁。

31 （宋）朱熹：《朱子全書》第17冊，第3040頁。

32 例如在魯迅批判禮教的短篇小說《祝福》中，“四叔”作為禮教的象徵出現，其書房內擺放著《近思錄集注》，牆上對聯也出自《論語集注》。（《魯迅全集》第2卷，北京，人民文學出版社，1972年，第140頁。）

33 學者們在探究陽明思想形成背景時，往往會將前陽明時代的朱熹學看做僵化、消極的象徵。如楊國榮曾指出：“天理實際上是作為外在的絕對命令而宰製主體的行為。深刻的社會危機與程朱理學在避免與挽救危機上的無力，迫使當時的思想家在天理的外在強制之外另闢蹊徑。王陽明即是對此作自覺探討的思想家。”（楊國榮：《王學通論——從王陽明到熊十力》，上海，華東師範大學出版社，2003年，第8頁。）

34 （明）王守仁：《王陽明全集》，吳光、錢明、董平、姚延福編校，上海：上海古籍出版社，2014年，第7頁。

35 （明）王守仁：《王陽明全集》，第3頁。

36 （明）王守仁：《王陽明全集》，第41頁。

37 （明）王守仁：《王陽明全集》，第297頁。

文便是心之條理。陽明以心或良知論禮的做法，一方面延續了宋代理學對禮之依據的追問，因為心或良知是可以通過內在的感應來認知的，這使得禮獲得了真正具有實操性的規範依據。另一方面，這也是對魏晉玄學以來名教之間的進一步回應，嵇康等人所追尋的名教的內核，與其說是本體，更毋庸說是人情；玄學當然已經接觸並討論到了儒學之形上世界建構的問題，但身處禮崩樂壞之世的魏晉名士們更直接的疑惑是：一個動容周旋合禮的人為什麼會違背道德？魏晉名士們選擇揚棄禮之文而追求禮之本，陽明學對於人情的強調，無疑更能接續他們關於禮之本的思考。

宋明禮教思想的義理化緣起於玄學、佛學的衝擊，經北宋諸儒的努力，至朱熹已臻於完滿，且表現出有別於佛老的儒家自身之特點，但「數窮則盡，盛滿則衰」，遂激發了陸王「以心言禮」的禮教思想，這與其說是義理化進一步的發展，毋寧說是一次新的轉向，而這一轉向又推進了禮教思想的主體化、民眾化。

3. 禮源人心：禮教的主體化

宋明禮教思想在義理化道路上不斷發展的同時，也表現出主體化的傾向。這一方面指主體在禮教行為中不再是一個被動的接受者，主體對於「是否」與「如何」踐行禮具有了主動性；另一方面指在禮學經典、儀注詮釋過程中主體作為詮釋者的在場，學者的詮釋工作不再嚴格依據於經典或師法，而是可以根據自身的思想去解讀、質疑乃至增補經典。義理化與主體化之間是相隨相伴的，學者們在建構禮教形上世界的過程中無疑會受到佛教心性論的影響，而主體化的內在動因便於禮教與心性之聯繫上有所體現。費孝通曾說：「禮並不是靠一個外在的權力來推行的，而是從教化中養成了個人的敬畏之感，使人服膺；人服禮是主動的。」³⁸而這種讓人主動服膺的教化之禮是宋代儒者理論建設的重點。誠然，此前的禮教也有著使人克己以復之的魅力與價值，但人在服膺禮教的過程中受禮教制度化影響非常深，外在的束縛在所難免；此時儒家思想者的禮教觀則表現出對「為何」以及「如何」服膺禮教的主體思考。

對此，程顥指出：「今之禮書，皆掇拾於煨燼之餘，而多出於漢儒一時之

38 費孝通：《鄉土中國》，北京，北京出版社，2005年，第74頁。

傳會，奈何欲盡信而為之句解乎？」³⁹ 儒家經典原本有著不容質疑的絕對權威，一如佛家「聖言量」，北宋的疑經風潮則意味著學者不再只是代替經典言語的喉舌，而是一個真實存在的個體，其主體性從整個客觀世界中彰顯出來。後世學者在家禮、鄉約，乃至國家禮制的制定過程中敢於損益古禮，便是以這種主體化傾向為前提。張載論禮之本原云：「禮非止著見於外，亦有無體之禮。蓋禮之原在心。」⁴⁰ 所謂「著見於外」者是指禮之文而言，而與此相對的禮之本源則要歸結於心。又云：「禮所以持性。蓋本出於性，持性，反本也。凡未成性，須禮以持之。能守禮，已不畔道矣。」⁴¹ 張載將禮與主體之性相聯系，同時指出守禮對於持性的重要意義，這其中凸顯了知禮成性、變化氣質等工夫論思想的禮學淵源。程頤則強調因時損益：「『禮，孰為大？時為大』，亦須隨時。當隨則隨，當治則治。當其時作其事，便是能隨時。『隨時之義大矣哉！』」⁴² 雖云「時為大」，但能夠認識「時」並因時損益禮教者皆為主體，故對「時」的強調在禮教世界中為主體保留了空間。

朱熹把禮教與人的本性聯繫起來，認為：「性是實理，仁義禮智皆具。」⁴³ 在天為理，在人為性，性在具有至善性的同時又帶有個體的氣質，故程頤云：「才說性時，便已不是性也。」⁴⁴ 因此朱熹在以性論禮的同時體現出主體化傾向，他對前代學者的注疏乃至禮學經典本身都有所質疑：

或曰：「經文不可輕改。」曰：「改經文，固啟學者不敬之心。然舊有一人，專攻鄭康成解《禮記》不合改其文。如『蛾子時術之』，亦不改，只作蠶蛾子，云：如蠶種之生，迴圈不息。是何義也！且如《大學》云『舉而不能先，命也』，若不改，成甚義理！」⁴⁵

這說明朱熹在詮釋禮學經典時有著義理優先的原則，並不執著於訓詁，不迷信經典或古人。與此相應，在制禮時也並不過分堅持古禮，他強調：「禮，

39 (宋)程顥、程頤：《二程集》，第70頁。

40 《張載集》，第264頁。

41 《張載集》，第264頁。

42 《二程集》，第171頁。

43 (宋)朱熹：《朱子全書》第14冊，第216頁。

44 《二程集》，第10頁。

45 (宋)朱熹：《朱子全書》第17冊，第2942頁。

時為大。有聖人作，必將因今之禮而裁酌其中，取其簡易，易曉而可行，必不至複取古人繁縟之禮而施行於今也。古禮如此零碎繁冗，今豈可行！人亦且得隨時裁損爾。」⁴⁶ 在損益古禮的過程中，雖說是以時為大，但認識「時」的主體仍是制禮者。因此朱熹在制定《家禮》時遵循的理念是：「三代之際，禮經備矣，然其存於今者，宮廬器服之制，出入起居之節，皆已不宜於世。」⁴⁷ 天理作為禮的根源是永恆不變的，但具體的禮教、儀注需要主體來因時損益。

與朱熹相比，陸九淵的禮教思想有著更突出的主體化傾向。朱熹治學中多訴諸語言文字，在詮釋禮學經典時雖不泥經傳，但仍能在義理與訓詁中追求平衡，至少其主觀意圖仍是忠實地解讀經文⁴⁸；陸九淵則主張「學苟知本，六經皆我注腳」⁴⁹，經典的神聖性消解在自我主體的彰顯中。其論先王禮制時亦云：「義之所在，非由外鑠，根諸人心，達之天下」⁵⁰，認為禮義本諸人心，但這樣也表現出忽視節文的弊端，正如顧炎武所說：「南渡以後，二陸起於金溪，其說以德性為宗，學者便其易，群然趨之，而於制度文為一切鄙為末事。」⁵¹ 楊簡對禮教的論述相比陸九淵更加完備，他將禮視作心的發用：「吾心發於恭敬、品節、應酬、文為者，人名之曰禮」⁵²，在此基礎上強調不應外心而求禮，應在自心上克己復禮：「復者復所自有之禮，非外取也。禮廢樂壞逾二千載，學者求禮於外，先聖特曰復，所以針二千載之育，發人心之所自有。」⁵³ 復禮之學發自人心，針砭二千年來之弊病。

陽明對朱熹的發展主要體現在以「心」論「禮」的轉向上，而心與主體的關係更加密切，這一轉向推動了禮教思想主體化的發展。陽明認為：「君子之於《六經》也……求之吾心之條理節文而時著焉，所以尊《禮》也」⁵⁴，將《禮》中所載的節文度數視作心之條理。陽明視心為人情之發端，情雖有善惡

46（宋）朱熹：《朱子全書》第17冊，第2877-2878頁。

47（宋）朱熹：《朱子全書》第24冊，第3626頁。

48〔日〕小島毅、林松濤、藍弘嶽：《宋學諸派中之朱學地位》，漆俠主編《國際宋史研討會暨中國宋史研究會第九屆年會編刊》，保定，河北大學出版社，2002年，第525頁。

49（宋）陸九淵：《陸九淵集》，鐘哲點校，北京，中華書局，1980年，第395頁。

50《陸九淵集》，第279頁。

51（明）顧炎武：《顧炎武全集》第21冊，黃坤、嚴佐之、劉永翔主編，上海：上海古籍出版社，2011年，第82頁。

52（宋）楊簡：《楊簡全集》，董平點校，杭州，浙江大學出版社，2016年，第2056頁。

53《楊簡全集》，第1876頁。

54（明）王守仁：《王陽明全集》，第284頁。

之分，但實為心或良知之發用：「七情順其自然之流行，皆是良知之用，不可分別善惡，但不可有所著；七情有著，俱謂之欲，俱為良知之蔽。」⁵⁵ 情之善者也就是良知的自然發用，自然合禮；情之惡者則是良知受到了遮蔽。由此出發，陽明在禮教問題上不過多注重禮儀，而是注重禮義的發揮與人情的表達。陽明在居喪期間，有客前來弔喪時不哭，無客時反而痛哭，其對此的解釋是：「凶事無詔，哀哭貴於由衷，不以客至不至為加減也。昔人奔喪，見城郭而哭，見室廬而哭，自是哀心不容已。今人不論哀與不哀，見城郭室廬而哭，是乃循守格套，非由衷也。客至而哭，客不至而不哭，尤為作偽。世人作偽得慣，連父母之喪亦用此術，以為守禮，可歎也已。」⁵⁶ 客至而不哭，違背了以往一般意義上的禮制，但陽明眼中禮教的重點不在儀節，而在有無情感；不在哭與不哭，而在哀與不哀。

受陽明的影響，人情論在明代中晚期禮教思想中頗為盛行⁵⁷。如呂坤認為：「聖人制禮，本以體人情，非以拂之也。」⁵⁸ 這與「大禮議」之間也有著密切的聯繫，「大禮議」與北宋「濮議」之間有著類似的背景，但結果卻是秉持人情的「議禮派」大獲全勝，使嘉靖突破了身份原則和傳統意義上的國家禮法⁵⁹，但同時也為公共領域「人情」的存在取得了空間。陽明雖未直接參與「大禮議」，但卻對此表達過看法，《年譜》載：「是時大禮議起，先生夜坐碧霞池，有詩曰：『一雨秋涼入夜新，池邊孤月倍精神。潛魚水底傳心訣，棲鳥枝頭說道真。莫謂天機非嗜欲，須知萬物是吾身。無端禮樂紛紛議，誰與青天掃舊塵？』」⁶⁰ 所謂「掃舊塵」，所指無非破除舊臣之舊說，贊成新帝之新論。其餘

55 (明)王守仁：《王陽明全集》，第126頁。

56 (明)王畿：《王畿集》，吳震編校，南京，鳳凰出版社，2007年，第120頁。

57 陳寶良認為：「自陽明之後，明代的禮論大多本著『禮本人情』之說」（陳寶良：《禮教秩序與明代社會生活變遷——兼論禮制、觀念與生活之關係》，《安徽史學》2019年第3期，第5-19頁），趙克生則對陽明學與人情論之間的聯繫提出質疑：「有的學者過分強調『王學』與『人情論』之間的關係，而沒有注意到禮學自身的傳統。這種『泛化王學論』在明史研究中常常見到，它不利於歷史豐富性的探索。」（趙克生：《明代地方社會禮教史論叢——以私修禮教書為中心》，北京，中國社會科學出版社，2011年，第46頁。）誠然，「人情論」自《禮記》開始便是禮學自身的重要內容之一，但考慮到陽明之後明代思想界對人情的探討確有特別深化，故取前說。

58 (明)呂坤：《呂坤全集》，王國軒、王秀梅整理，北京，中華書局，2008年，第873頁。

59 尤淑君：《名分禮秩與皇權重塑：大禮議與嘉靖政治文化》，臺北，國立政治大學歷史學系，2006年，第301頁。

60 (明)王守仁：《王陽明全集》，第1426頁。

方獻夫、席書、霍韜、黃綰、黃宗明等陽明學者，也都在議禮中不遺餘力地支持嘉靖。從朱熹對「濮議」的看法，到陽明學者的議禮立場，無疑意味著從天理到良知、人情的轉變，同時也體現著禮教思想主體化傾向的發展。而「大禮議」的結果與相關禮典的頒佈，以及嘉靖之後陽明學的漸趨興盛，無疑也都對整個社會的禮教產生著重大影響。

由於義理化與本體論相聯系，主體化則與心、性、情等心性概念相聯系，而心學學者又有著本體與心性合一的傾向，故義理化與主體化之間有著相似之處。然而義理化側重於形上學理論的建構，使先秦以來較為樸素的禮教思想發展為精緻思辨的哲學體系。主體化的內因是禮教思想的內向化、心性化，與此前注重外在儀則、名物制度相區別，表現詮釋禮學經典時更能跳脫樊籠，面對禮儀活動、禮學問題時更彰顯主體思考而非嚴守古禮規範等特點。兩者之間也有很大關聯，如主體化表現為用心、性、情等概念言禮，而心、性亦是義理化的重要表現，這是由於心性論乃宋明儒學義理體系建構中的重要一環，但心、性相比於「理」，有著更多的主體色彩，這也是為什麼陸王在主體化道路上走得比程朱更遠。

4. 禮下庶人：禮教的民眾化

在宋明禮教思想的發展進程中，民眾化也是其重要特點。主體化傾向與民眾化相聯系，因為主體化意味著經典的權威地位的下降，而這又以唐代以來世家大族的沒落作為前提⁶¹。從宋代開始，由於庶民地位的提升，禮下庶人的速度極大地加快了⁶²。李覲提出「庶人喪祭皆有其禮」⁶³，《政和五禮新儀》中對庶人禮進行規定，更是其集中體現。

司馬光、張載、程頤都通過編訂禮書、躬行禮教等形式致力於禮教的復興與民間禮教的展開。張栻對此指出：「司馬氏蓋已著書，若張載、程頤二先生

61 士族社會終結後，原本僅流傳於士族之間的經典開始滲入尋常百姓家，這使經典的神聖性降低了，更多的學者得以飽讀經典，同時又敢於在詮釋經典時勇於平視而非仰望之。這與禪宗崛起的背景十分相似。

62 楊志剛：《「禮下庶人」的歷史考察》，載《社會科學戰線》1994年第6期，第118-125頁。

63 《李覲集》，第20頁。

64（宋）張栻：《南軒先生文集》，鄧洪波點校，長沙，湖南大學出版社，2015年，第1091頁。

雖嘗草定，而未具然，所與門人講論反復，其所發明深矣。」⁶⁴ 司馬光曾著《溫公書儀》，以《儀禮》為基礎，結合當時的社會生活環境，對冠儀、婚儀、喪儀進行了規範。張載和程頤亦有相關文章與言論考訂古禮，並因時損益而制定新禮。程頤謂：「《禮》之名數，陝西諸公刪定，已送呂與叔，與叔今已死矣，不知其書安在也？然所定只禮之名數，若禮之文，亦非親作不可也。」⁶⁵ 關中之學自張載開始便「以禮為教」，素以禮學聞名，《藍田呂氏鄉約》作為鄉村禮教的典範，亦出自呂家兄弟之手，故程頤將刪定禮書的任務交給呂大臨。後來朱熹也有《增損呂氏鄉約》，對明代的鄉約和基層治理產生了很大影響。

張載之學素以禮教為重，注重風俗教化，他主張「禮教備，養道足，而後刑可行，政可明，明而不疑。」⁶⁶ 故黃宗羲讚譽：「關學世有淵源，皆以躬行禮教為本」⁶⁷，章太炎亦云：「張載頗重禮教，在鄉擬興井田」⁶⁸。張載將禮抬高至形上維度的同時，又尤其注重現實中的禮教之實行，其任官之處大多得以移風易俗，如：「其在云岩，政事大抵以敦本善俗為先，每以月吉具酒食，召鄉人高年會於縣庭，親為勸酬，使人知養老事長之義，因問民疾苦及告所以訓戒子弟之意。」⁶⁹ 程頤亦主張對民眾進行教化：「不可使知之者，非民不足與知也，不能使之知耳。」⁷⁰ 並非民眾沒有「知」的能力，而是教化不足。程頤作為修身以禮的典範，持禮頗嚴：「有人勞正叔先生曰：『先生謹於禮四五十年，應甚勞苦。』先生曰：『吾日履安地，何勞何苦？他人日踐危地，此乃勞苦也。』」程頤四五十年間對禮教的堅持，體現了禮教思想與踐履的統一。

溝口雄三認為：「陽明學在社會史方面所起到的作用，是使朱熹學從以官僚為本位的道德治世之學轉向以民間為本位的道德秩序之學；換言之，可以說這是把儒教道德從士大夫的修己治人之學擴大為民間的日常性生活規範。」⁷¹ 余英時曾以「得君行道」「覺民行道」判別朱熹與陽明的政治取向⁷²。似乎朱

65 (宋)程頤、程頤：《二程集》，第240頁。

66 《張載集》，第214頁。

67 (明)黃宗羲：《明儒學案》，沈芝盈點校，北京，中華書局，1985年，第11頁。

68 (清)章太炎：《章太炎全集》，上海，上海人民出版社，2018年，第987頁。

69 《張載集》，第382頁。

70 (宋)程頤、程頤：《二程集》，第297頁。

71 (日)溝口雄三：《中國的衝擊》，第133頁。

72 余英時：《朱熹的歷史世界》，北京：三聯書店，2011年，第426頁；余英時：《宋明理學與政治文化》，《余英時文集》第10卷，桂林：廣西師範大學出版社，2006年，第195頁。

熹之學的話語體系是圍繞著君主與官方展開的，其實從《大學章句》《中庸章句》的詮釋來看，朱熹主要的著力點仍是推動所有士庶的「致中和」。宋儒對古禮最大的損益之一，便是制定與關注庶人之禮，這正是禮教民眾化的表現⁷³。在朱熹等人的努力下，禮教的民眾化得到了進一步加強與落實⁷⁴。當時福建地區多有男女之間不行婚禮的習俗，朱熹於是作《申嚴婚禮狀》，主張：「禮律之文，婚姻為重，所以別男女，經夫婦，正風俗而防禍亂之原也……欲乞檢坐，見行條法，曉諭禁止，仍乞備申，使州檢會《政和五禮》士庶婚娶儀式行下，以憑遵守，約束施行。」⁷⁵朱熹整理禮教範本、制定家禮儀注的目的也在於：「使覽之者得提其要以及其詳，而不憚其難行之者。雖貧且賤，亦得以具其大節、略其繁文而不失其本意也。」⁷⁶雖貧賤者亦能行之。在此基礎上，《家禮》的編訂更彰顯了朱熹為庶民修禮的主張，以及通過禮儀幫助國家教化民眾的意圖。《朱子家禮》後來傳播廣泛，對整個東亞都有著深遠的影響，使廣大庶民的社會生活有禮可依。在此意義上，應該說朱熹的禮教思想也體現著其覺民行道、教化庶民的民眾化面向。

陽明以心為本，但並不意味著他只關注自身而對萬民有所忽視，因為陽明的「心」並不是簡單的個體之心，而是收納了整個天理的宇宙萬物之心。陽明在這個意義上強調萬物一體：「夫聖人之心，以天地萬物為一體」⁷⁷。在《大學問》中，陽明亦指出：「大人者，以天地萬物為一體者也，其視天下猶一家，中國猶一人焉。若夫間形骸而分爾我者，小人矣。」⁷⁸在其看來，道德修養的目的在於歸復此心的光明，其境界即是「大人」，大人亦是所有人的原初狀態。而大人的特徵便是以萬物為一體、以萬民為一人。以此來看禮教思想，則貴冑與農夫並無不同，「四民異業而同道」⁷⁹，禮教當然不應只行於士大夫。因此，陽明及其後學尤為注意禮教之民眾化。陽明頒行《南贛鄉約》，對南贛的昏喪

73 殷慧、尋夢依：《宋代禮制變化與理學興起》，《中國哲學史》，2021年第2期，第27-37頁。

74 王美華：《禮制下移與唐宋社會變遷》，北京：中國社會科學出版社，2015年版，第77-78頁。

75（宋）朱熹：《朱子全書》第21冊，第896頁。

76（宋）朱熹：《朱子全書》第24冊，第3920頁。

77（明）王守仁：《王陽明全集》，第61頁。

78（明）王守仁：《王陽明全集》，第1066頁。

79（明）王守仁：《王陽明全集》，第1036頁。

諸禮進行了規範，強調「約長等其各省論約內之人，一遵禮制」⁸⁰，以求化民成俗。其著眼之處在於「民俗之善惡，豈不由積習使然哉！」⁸¹通過潛移默化的禮義教化來使人心向善。陽明禮教思想的這種民眾化傾向正如余英時所說：「王陽明在明代理學史上的劃時代貢獻，便在於他用「覺民」取代了「得君」，示學者另條「行道」的途徑，因而使「三代之治」再度成為一種令人嚮往的理想。」⁸²所謂「覺民行道」，正是要通過禮義教化民眾，實現三代之治的理想。

值得注意的是，明末以來批評陽明者眾多，大多以空疏、玄虛言之，以其有超脫名教之弊；後世回護陽明者，則將此空疏歸於泰州等陽明後學⁸³。但其實，陽明主張事上磨煉，尤重事功；陽明後學雖有良知現成等思想，但亦十分注重民間的禮教實踐。例如王艮關注現實問題，認為「刑因惡而用，惡因無教養而生。苟養之有道，教之有方，則衣食足而禮養興，民自無惡矣。刑將安施乎？」⁸⁴又曾積極推行鄉約：「於是覺山請訂鄉約，令有司行之，鄉俗為之一變」⁸⁵，使淮南的禮教情形大為改善。何心隱亦言：「《大學》先齊家，乃構萃和堂以合族，身理一族之政，冠昏喪祭賦役，一切通其有無。」⁸⁶在家族中制定禮教規範，合族而治。黃佐則制定了著名的《泰泉鄉禮》，甚為清人所看重。朱廷立整理《家禮節要》，認為「君子之政，所以善其俗者，禮而已矣。」⁸⁷為官期間尤為重視化民成俗。正如有學者論述的：「程朱學鄉里經世的實踐，在宋代曾經達到高峰，至明初沉潛下來，明中期經世之風的再起，等於是把這個曾經沉潛不彰的傳統重新復活。王學的流行，則為此一經世之風注入新的精神動力，而這股動力的理論基礎則是其『一體說』的經世論。」⁸⁸陽明的萬物

80（明）王守仁：《王陽明全集》，第667頁。

81（明）王守仁：《王陽明全集》，第664頁。

82 余英時：《宋明理學與政治文化》，第200頁。

83 高攀龍認為「姚江之弊，始也掃聞見以明心耳，究而任心而廢學，於是乎《詩》《書》《禮》《樂》輕，而士鮮實悟；始也掃善惡以空念耳，究且任空而廢行，於是乎名、節、忠、義輕，而士鮮實修。」（（明）黃宗義：《明儒學案》（修訂本），沈芝盈點校，2008年，第1424頁。）黃宗義認為：「泰州之後，其人多能以赤手縛龍蛇，傳至顏鈞、何心隱一派，遂非名教之所能羈絡矣。」（（明）黃宗義：《明儒學案》，第703頁。）

84（明）王艮：《王心齋全集》，陳祝生等點校，南京，江蘇教育出版社，2001年，第64頁。

85（明）王艮：《王心齋全集》，第74頁。

86（明）黃宗義：《明儒學案》，第704頁。

87（明）朱廷立：《兩崖集》，合肥，黃山出版社，2006年，第208頁。

88 張藝曦：《陽明學的鄉里實踐》，北京，北京師範大學出版社，2013年，第210頁。

一體與禮教思想一體兩面，對後世產生了深遠影響。

陽明的禮教思想在義理化的方面對朱熹進行了反思，實現了從天理到心或良知的轉向，這使得人對禮的踐履更富於主體性，也更具有現實性和可操作性。在主體化和民眾化方面，陽明討論得比朱熹更為深入，一方面「滿街皆是聖人」，廣泛的民間禮教實踐以及民眾化的發展，證明了陽明禮教思想的現實指向；另一方面我行我素，墮入異端、背離禮教的弊端已經顯現，陽明後學出現了非名教所能羈絡的危險，如何繩之以禮，如何以《儀禮》作為準繩來挽救墮入異化的禮教，這似乎可成為乾嘉考據學禮儀考證的思想和社會動因。

5. 結語

宋明時期的禮教傳統順應復興儒學的要求，在諸多層面推動了禮教思想的義理化、主體化和民眾化。義理化是為了應對漢末以來玄學的質疑和佛老的挑戰，此將禮義上升到本體高度，以理、心、良知解禮，建構了相應的形而上學體系。主體化以禮教思想的內向化、心性化為內因，表現為詮釋者在詮釋禮教規範、禮學經典時的在場，這意味着人們可以借助思考、情感、環境等重新審視禮教，同時也意味著在踐行禮教的過程中，人不再完全是被動的接受者，人在逐漸獲得主體性地位。民眾化則是庶民社會的產物，隨著科舉制的完善和唐末五代對世家大族的打擊，從宋代開始，庶民的地位得以空前提高，因而「禮下庶人」的趨勢在此時大大加強，而覺民行道亦愈發為理學家所重視。

宋明禮教思想與宋明理學的發展相伴展開，兩者之間是一種雙向互動、非一非異的關係。一方面，理學哲學體系的建構直接服務於儒家禮教，本體論、心性論與修養論相結合，解決人何以需要且能夠服膺禮教的問題。天道、天理全面詮釋和闡發了六經、四書中的禮義，理學作為一種富有生命力的儒學新形態，為禮學與禮教注入了新的養分。另一方面，禮之教化，又是宋明理學的內聖工夫和外王事功，理學家們對於道德修養的看重與民間教化之努力，均可見其「同道德、一風俗」、振興禮教之旨歸。

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前后超越与向外超越

中国古典学的时代生命

胡海忠 HU Haizhong

1.

对生存实践中反复出现的问题进行思考、对历史中的典范性进行记载，并将其经典化，为未来提供参照，应该是大多数文明的策略，所以世界上各大文明都有对其影响深远的经典。西方文明将这种历史文化的生成机制塑造成古典学学科，在对古希腊罗马经典的继承、解释、重构之中，西方文明不断自我特殊化而确立起了自身的主体性，试图借助古典学蕴含的政治文化理想构建起独特的文化形态。中国也有一个发达的经典体系，悠久广大的时空条件，足以让古人不断去探索、总结生存经验，不断丰富对生存的可能性的想象，由此形成了自己的古典传统。

从近二三十年来古典学概念在中国的不断传播，尤其是首届世界古典学大会的召开，我们可以看到古典学已经不是在狭义上指称希腊罗马的思想，古典学这个大帽子可以权宜性地指称世界各地与古代经典研究有关的学问。所以“中国古典学”不仅要包括狭义的古希腊罗马古典学，还要包括中国自本自根的经典传统，更为重要的是，“中国古典学”指向的是一种当代性，要涵盖当下中国思想场域中完整的经典版图。

在与西方文明对比中，我们可以大概归纳出中国古典学有两方面特质。首

先，中国的古典传统与政治传统在紧密互动中保持着连续不断的发展态势，赓续政统与道统的意志，将心术与治道统合为一的自觉，驱动着文明传统不断更生、不断壮大。其次，中国古典对于整体性原理十分看重，倾向于在至大无外的生存处境中探索建立起一种关系理性，在保证多元的合理性的基础上追求内在的统一，体现出重视整体的伦理学特征。如果说西方古典传统是在柏拉图主义的影响下展开的，具有重视超感的、绝对的、外在的超越者的倾向，那么中国古典学则强调从此世的内在性出发，从时间、空间的一体性思考生存的意义。中国古典学从时间性、空间性刻画的这两种自我实现路径，可以用“前后超越”“向外超越”进行概括。

2. 前后超越

现代新儒家认为，西方文明的超越者是神学语境中的上帝或哲学语境中的绝对者，超越者存在于变动不居的世界之外，体现出对于感性世界的规范性，作为有限个体的人，以永恒的、外在的绝对者为追求，体现出“外在超越”的取向。现代新儒家注意到中国哲学中有一种与外在超越不同的意识，如果以西方的人、神关系为参照，中国哲学中天、人关系构成了一种“内在超越”的路径，“天”被视为超越者，但“天”又是内在于人的，“天”不仅是宗教的超越性的来源，又是人的道德的规范性的根据，个人以践行道德的方式体验超越性、实现与天道的贯通。这种理解的问题至少有二。

第一，人虽可将外在的不得已、外在的被动性归结为“天”，人与生俱来的道德、价值本性虽源于客观所赋，但被动的不得已并不一定要推极为一种超越于此世的、外在的绝对性。“天”的客观性也可以说是一种他者性，“天”是他者之最大者，但在天人一体视野中，他者也是内在于此世的他者，人的道德应是在他者的语境中被规定的，人因受此客观性制约而发展出一种关系理性、共生智慧、价值本能。在这一意义上，道德与其说是由超越性的天所赋予，不如说是一种天生的、与生俱来的能力，道德是在历史中逐渐探索出来的集体理性、关系理性，作为一种在客观性的制约中探索出来的以共在为目的的观念，道德未必只能根源于作为神秘的、绝对的超越者的“天”。

第二，执着于天道、性命贯通的角度所提示的纵向超越方向，必然带来对横向上时间的关联性的忽视，亦即对中华文化中突出的历史意识的忽视。中华文化重视以“通古今之变”的方式来“究天人之际”，强调尽心知性知天。也

就是说“天”是具有此在的时间性的，“天”并不超越于时间之上。是作为整体性的天命的运行造就了历史的变化。所以“史之义出于天”（章学诚语），“究天人之际”要求历史主体的价值要在“天”这一最整全的语境中进行把握，这种把握是通过时间——在“通古今之变”中实现的。在天地背景中“事”的世界形成的时间秩序构成了人自我超越的背景，这个背景为历史主体提供了坐标，启发历史主体把接续历史视为责任，将继往开来视为主动性实现的方向。所以中华文化中的超越意识应该有一个重要的向度，那就是在历史中的超越，张志强将这种超越方向概括为“前后超越”。

中国的经学典籍原本是“先王之政典”，记录了先民维持政治共同体秩序、克服时代困难的探索历程，在这一意义上可以说“六经皆史”，经典首先是对先民的历史性努力的历史化理解。同时，经典系统因是对政治治理中反复出现的问题进行思考，对典范性进行记载，试图揭示恒常的智慧、启发不同的时代，所以经典又以批判性传统的面貌出现，体现出反思当下处境、突破历史局限的超越精神。第三，经典系统要以实践为校准，在历史实际中不断调整义理解释的方向，经学解释构建了一个古与今相互质询的古典学场域，在历史性与未来性交错的视野中，历史主体的意识被不断塑造。

3. 向外超越

赵汀阳认为，中国思想中不承认绝对在外的超越存在，不承认那种无论如何也“化”不进来的存在。因此中国的宗教精神并不发达，中国思想认为没有绝对不可化解的敌人。而承认超越存在的理论后果就是宗教以及与人为敌的政治理论，个人主义、异教徒、丛林假定、民族国家的国际政治理论等陷世界于冲突和混乱的观念，都与承认绝对超越者概念有关。

对于“化”的重视，确实是中国文化的一个特点，中国的古典学体系构建的就是一个教化的系统。《周易》贲卦彖传“刚柔交错，天文也。文明以止，人文也。观乎天文，以察时变；观乎人文，以化成天下。”孔颖达说：“圣人观察人文，则《诗》《书》《礼》《乐》之谓，当法此教而‘化成天下’也。”圣人是通过经典来实现教化的，中国这一政治共同体是以文化共同体为纽带而构建的一个吸引力系统，以向内凝聚的方式达成一种有机协调的关系，这与通过武力向外征服、控制、占有的帝国政治根本不同。因为保持不断向内凝聚的态势，所以就能够不断化入他者，因此也就需要不断超越于自身的特殊化、个体主义，

超越特定的利益集体，不断向外超越。

人文的天下应该包含所有存在者，所以天下是无外的，天下只有内。在这一意义上，也就不存在向绝对的外在者的超越。天下指向的是一个无边包容、无尽承载、相互协调、相互补充的有机“大群”。至大无外的整体感在中国哲学中被表达为万物一体、民胞物与、理一分殊。中国哲学中的虚心、大心、大我、格物、公私之辨、性情之辨、变化气质等工夫修养指向的都是克服自我中心主义而向外超越。王阳明说“大人者，以天地万物为一体者也，其视天下犹一家，中国犹一人焉。”人的最高存在状态是在关联感通之中，将天下所有的差异性、他者性理解为一个有机整体的内在性。古典传统的意义在于引导每个人尽其“一体同物之心”（王阳明语），让所有存在都能在廓然大公之中被照料。人的价值体现在能够维持人类整体像天地那样长久，个人如果“间形骸而分尔我”（王阳明语），也就难以生成一种维持大群一体永续持存的历史主动性，因此也就无法以德配天，无法在天长地久的无限之中让自己不朽。

从向外超越的角度来理解，中国古典学提供的文化理想就不会是划分文明边界的工具，相反，中国古典学应该成为刻画万物一体的应然原则的价值文本。中国的古典不会排斥其他文明的古典，因为中华文明真正关心的是整体性的生存境遇，关心的是如何维持大群一体的永续持存，关心的是如何借助古典中的智慧获得更好的生活，并不是借助古典中蕴含的抽象价值来划分彼此的界限、判摄文明的优劣、评价存在状态的高下。

The Perception of Humanity and the Nature of Shen Kuo 沈括

Insights from Joseph Needham's Perspective
on the Philosophy and Physics of Chinese Scientific History

TANAKA Yuki 田中有纪

This current research examines the perception of humanity and nature in traditional China through Shen Kuo's (沈括, 1031–1093) descriptions of physics and divination during the Song Dynasty, drawing on Joseph Needham's perspective on the role of philosophy and physics in the history of Chinese science.

Noel Joseph Terence Montgomery Needham (1900–1995) was born on December 9, 1900. He initially specialized in chemical embryology at Cambridge University. Through his interactions with young Chinese researchers working in Cambridge, he developed an interest in the history of Chinese science and began learning Chinese. When World War II broke out, he was commissioned to establish the Sino-British Science Co-operation Office in Chongqing. After the war, he worked with UNESCO in Paris before returning to Cambridge, where he devoted himself to studying of the history of Chinese science. In 1954, Cambridge University Press published seven volumes of *Science and Civilization in China*.¹

¹ Needham Research Institute, <https://www.nri.cam.ac.uk/joseph.html> (Last accessed: February 11, 2025)

1. Rethinking Needham's Question

“Why was it that, despite the immense achievements of traditional China, the scientific and industrial revolutions occurred in Europe rather than in China?”

This is Needham's famous question, but what kind of relationship did he envision between traditional science and modern science in the first place?

Until it had been universalized by its fusion with mathematics, natural science could not be the common property of all mankind. The sciences of the medieval world were tied closely to the ethnic environments in which they had arisen, and it was very difficult, if not impossible, for the people of those different cultures to find any common basis of discourse. ... But the mutual incomprehensibility of the ethnically-bound concept systems did severely restrict possible contacts and transmissions in the realm of scientific ideas. This is why technological elements spread widely through the length and breadth of the Old World, while scientific elements for the most part failed to do so. ²

In the traditional world, finding common ground was difficult because each culture had its own scientific framework, closely tied to its surrounding environment. Mathematics was essential for the natural sciences to become a shared heritage of humankind.

Because mathematics played a fundamental role in the development of modern science, Needham's query can be rephrased as follows:

Why did modern science, the mathematization of hypotheses about Nature, with all its implications for advanced technology, take its meteoric rise only in the West at the time of Galileo? ³

As Keizo Hashimoto explains in the translator's afterword to Needham's *The Grand Titration*, the emergence of modern science can be attributed to the mathematization of natural laws and the integration of the technology developed by the artisan class with the

² Needham, Joseph, *The Grand Titration: Science and Society in East and West*, first published in 1969 by London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, reprinted in 2005 by New York: Routledge. p. 15.

³ Needham, Joseph, *The Grand Titration: Science and Society in East and West*. p. 16.

knowledge of the scholarly class.

Needham also raises another critical query.

Why was it that between the second century B.C. and the sixteenth century A.D. East Asian culture was much more efficient than the European West in applying human knowledge of Nature to useful purposes? ⁴

When comparing this query with the first, Keizo Hashimoto argues that the core issue driving Needham's major work, *Science and Civilization in China*, is actually the second problem. I agree with this perspective because Needham believed that modern science could have developed in China as well.

I often like to sketch the Chinese evolution as represented by a relatively slowly rising curve, noticeably running at a higher level, sometimes a much higher level, than European parallels between, say, the second and the fifteenth centuries A.D. But then after the scientific renaissance had begun in the West with the Galilean revolution, with what one might almost call the discovery of the basic technique of scientific discovery itself, then the curve of science and technology in Europe begins to rise in a violent, almost exponential, manner, overtaking the levels of the Asian societies and bringing about the state of affairs which we have seen during the past two or three hundred years. This violent disturbance of the balance is now beginning to right itself. No doubt in true historical thinking the "ifs" so attractive to popular thought are out of place, but I would be prepared to say that if parallel social and economic changes had been possible in Chinese society then some form of modern science would have arisen there. If so, it would have been, I think organic rather than mechanical from the first, and it might well have gone a long way before receiving the great stimulus which a knowledge of Greek science and mathematics would no doubt have provided, and turning into something like the science which we know today. ⁵

4 Needham, Joseph, *The Grand Titration: Science and Society in East and West*. p. 16.

5 Needham, Joseph, *The Grand Titration: Science and Society in East and West*. pp. 40–41.

In other words, Needham believes that China may also reach “something like the science which we know today” just because the speed of scientific development is different. Moreover, since the “something like the science which we know today” is not a mechanistic science, but an organic science, it is like modern science but has a qualitative difference.

He argues that we should adopt a less biased perspective on constitutes “science” and “mathematics,” which formed its foundation. Needham also challenges the overemphasis on geometry in mathematics, asserting that traditional Chinese mathematics—algebraic in nature—had a significant influence on European mathematicians during the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Additionally, he questions the utility of applying Euclidean geometry astronomically to Ptolemy’s system. He also critiques narrow definitions of “science,” pointing out that geometric dynamics does not encompass the entirety of scientific knowledge. In modern science, developments such as field theory in physics and the organic concepts of biology have radically revised the early mechanistic worldview. In other words, mathematics that underpins the universalization of modern science has been substantially influenced by China. Furthermore, the emphasis on field theory and organic theory, which are now becoming more mainstream, can be traced back to traditional Chinese physics, which I will explore in this paper.

In this sense, traditional Chinese science is not merely a forgotten legacy of the past but an essential subject for analysis—whether in relation to modern science, the development of science, or the future direction of scientific inquiry.

In this paper, I will first analyze the descriptions of “physics” that Needham highlights as a remarkable phenomenon in the history of traditional Chinese science, drawing from *The Grand Titration* and the 7th volume (Physics) of *Science and Civilization in China*. I will introduce Needham’s perspective on the query: “Which aspects of traditional Chinese knowledge contributed to the development of science and technology that surpassed that of Western Europe during the same period?” Subsequently, I will analyze the thought of Shen Kuo, a polymath of the Neo-Confucianism era, whom Needham regarded as central to the history of Chinese science. Shen Kuo excelled in physics and was the first in the world to identify magnetic needle declination. Finally, I will return to Needham’s second query and present a perspective on humanity and nature—one that transcends tradition and reveals commonalities between East and West, both ancient and modern.

2. Physics and Neo-Confucianism

(1) Philosophy in Traditional Chinese Physics

Needham highlights “physics”—particularly magnetism—as a notable phenomenon in the history of traditional Chinese science.

Three branches of physics were particularly well developed in ancient and medieval China—optics, acoustics and magnetism. This was in striking contrast with the West where mechanics and dynamics were relatively advanced but magnetic phenomena almost unknown. Yet China and Europe differed most profoundly perhaps in the great debate between continuity and discontinuity, for just as Chinese mathematics was always algebraic rather than geometrical, so Chinese physics was faithful to a prototypic wave theory and perennially averse to atoms.⁶

Needham regarded the science of magnetism as a crucial component of modern science. In Chinese physics, magnetic phenomena were discovered early, and wave theory was highlighted due to the concept of “organic materialism.”

In the first place it can be shown in great detail that the *philosophia perennis* of China was an organic materialism. ...and the organicist view in which every phenomenon was connected with every other according to hierarchical order was universal among Chinese thinkers. ...It was not so strange or surprising that the lodestone should point to the pole if one was already convinced that there was an organic pattern in the cosmos.⁷

Needham believed that organic materialism represented the *philosophia perennis* of China—a mode of thought shared by philosophers across all ages. As he affirms, Chinese

6 Needham, Joseph, *The Grand Titration: Science and Society in East and West*. p. 17.

7 Needham, Joseph, *The Grand Titration: Science and Society in East and West*. pp. 20–21.

thought, when viewed as a whole, typically seeks to identify organic patterns rather than isolating individual phenomena. However, as I will explain later, Chinese thinkers were keenly aware of both organic patterns and the potential negative consequences that could arise from attempting to connect everything. What is crucial, therefore, is the scope of the organic patterns each thinker sets.

(2) Neo-Confucian Worldview: A Fusion of Cyclical and Linear Concepts of Time with Theories of Biological and Social Evolution

Chinese thought is both organic and cyclical. Nonetheless, in “Time and Eastern Man,” Needham examines the traditional Chinese concept of time and notes that, despite their discovery and imagination of various cycles in heaven and earth, Chinese perceptions of time can also be linear, revolutionary, and (to some extent) progressive. He also asserts that time in China is not necessarily purely cyclical. This linear perspective was later incorporated into Neo-Confucianism as evolutionary naturalism.

Evolutionary naturalism came fully into focus in the thought of the great Neo-Confucian school, ...Just as the Europeans sought to harmonize Greek philosophy with the doctrines of Christian theology, so the Neo-Confucians drew upon all the older philosophies, Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism for their own synthesis. But their spirit of organic materialism was so different from that of the European scholastics that Chu Hsi (A.D. 1131 to 1200), their greatest figure, has been termed with at least equal enthusiasm the Herbert Spencer as well as the Thomas Aquinas of China.⁸

Neo-Confucianism, which emerged during the Song Dynasty through the synthesis of Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism, embraced evolutionary naturalism and developed a concept of time that was both cyclical and linear. What does this mean?

Needham explains this idea by referring to the dualism of li 理 and qi 氣 in the philosophy of Zhu Xi 朱熹:

8 Needham, Joseph, *The Grand Titration: Science and Society in East and West*. p. 250.

For the Neo-Confucians the universe was essentially moral, not because there existed beyond space and time a moral personal deity controlling his creation, but because the universe was one which had the property of bringing to birth moral values and ethical behaviour when that level of organization had been reached at which it was possible that they should manifest themselves. Organization in the animal kingdom begins to approach this, very incompletely and one-sidedly (hence the gleams of righteousness), but it is only with the fully developed nervous system of gregarious social man that the universe manifests ethical values. Thus long before the Darwinian age evolutionary naturalism was very clearly stated by Chinese philosophers.⁹

According to Needham, the evolutionary theory referred to here is not just a single evolutionary lineage but a whole continuation of their phylogenetic development. This is because animals can only exercise one virtue, such as “righteousness 義,” at most, whereas humans can cover a wide range of virtues and extend ethical values throughout the universe. From the animal world to the human world, moral values and ethical actions are based on the universe that has evolved and manifested in this way. Needham observes that this theory of evolution was first systematized by Shao Yong 邵雍 (1011–1077) of the Neo-Confucian school. Additionally, Shen Kuo states that his evolutionary naturalism gave him keen insight into mountain-building and erosion.

Needham highlights the contributions of various thinkers in ancient China, such as their use of the hexagrams in *the Book of Changes* to represent phases of the evolutionary cycle and their identification of specific time ranges within the calendar system. He states the following:

Biological and social evolution were thus conceived in a cyclical setting, and would for ever continue to recur, each cycle being separated by a kind of Ragnarök, a twilight of the gods, the reduction of everything to a disordered and chaotic state, after which all things slowly evolved anew.¹⁰

9 Needham, Joseph, *The Grand Titration: Science and Society in East and West*. p. 251.

10 Needham, Joseph, *The Grand Titration: Science and Society in East and West*. p. 252.

Just as dinosaurs, which once dominated the earth, became extinct all at once, giving way to the era of mammals, life evolved through repeated cycles of extinction and the emergence of new organisms. In other words, “the single action of the world’s drama was replaced by a whole series of repeated performances.”¹¹ According to Needham, social evolution “was implicit in the Neo-Confucian worldview.”

(3) Needham’s Views on Confucianism and Taoism

Needham evaluates Neo-Confucianism in this way because it emerged during the Song Dynasty as a synthesis of the three teachings: Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism. In particular, Needham underscored the role of Taoism in advancing Chinese science. While Confucianism contributed certain strengths to scientific development, it also had limitations. Needham likely believed that Neo-Confucianism compensated for this limitation from Taoism. Put differently, he saw Neo-Confucianism as becoming more “scientific” through its integration of Taoist perspectives.

First, what did Needham think about the characteristics of Confucianism and Taoism in the history of science? This will be discussed with reference to Chapters 9 and 10 of Volume 2 of *Science and Civilization in China*.

Needham believed that there was a robust interplay between science and democracy. He viewed that the Confucian approach of education as democratic because it broke down barriers between various classes.

The feeling of education from all barriers of privilege and social class was undoubtedly revolutionary doctrine, and if it paved the way for the mandarinism of feudal bureaucratism, it embodied also some of essential elements of modern democratic thought.¹²

11 Needham, Joseph, *The Grand Titration: Science and Society in East and West*. p. 252.

12 Needham, Joseph. *Science and Civilization in China*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959., vol. 2, chap. 9, p. 7. Regarding how democratic Confucius himself was, Needham highlights that opinions vary. Some argue that Confucius upheld feudal values, while others, such as Guo Moruo 郭沫若, emphasize the revolutionary aspects of his thought.

The robust interplay between science and democracy is further explained by Needham in his chapter on Taoism.

Historically, it is evident that modern science and modern democracy grew up together, as parts of that great movement in European development which included the Renaissance, the Reformation and the rise of Capitalism. First, Nature is no respecter of person. The status of an observer, if competent, as to age, sex, color, creed or race, is, as we know today, irrelevant. Secondly, the birth of science requires the bridging of the gap between the scholar and the artisan.¹³

Taoist thought, which seeks to transcend human societal norms and assimilate with the Tao, fosters a scientific attitude that nullifies the various attributes of human beings and confronts nature in a pure manner. “The Confucians were entirely on the side of the literate administrators and lacked all sympathy with artisans and manual workers. The Taoists, Conversely, were, as we have seen, in close contact with them (here is another parallel with the pre-Socratic Greek nature-philosophers).”¹⁴

Needham also argues that the Confucian attitude toward knowledge both contributed to and hindered the development of science.

The Master himself, moreover, often counselled suspended judgement, saying that one should leave on one side what is doubtful.¹⁵

Confucius’s teaching that true knowledge is acknowledging what you do not know is evident in the following quote:

The Master said: ‘(Chung) Yu, shall I tell you what knowledge is? When you know

13 Needham, Joseph. *Science and Civilisation in China*, vol. 2, chap. 10, The “Tao chia” and Taoism, p. 130.

14 Needham, Joseph. *Science and Civilisation in China*, vol. 2, chap. 10, p. 130.

15 Needham, Joseph. *Science and Civilisation in China*, vol. 2, chap. 9, p. 8.

a thing, to say that you know it; and when you do not know a thing, to admit that you do not know it—this is true knowledge.’¹⁶

Such an attitude is “as good a device as could be found, surely, for any modern scientific academy.”

“Confucius was far from having an *ex opera operato* theory of the efficacy of ritual,” hence, Needham says that Confucian ritual is only for human beings. He also observes that “even while emphasizing traditional rites and ceremonies, Confucianism remained unshakably skeptical and averse to any kind of supernaturalism.” This is also the element “which could have helped the growth of the scientific view of the world.”¹⁷ Nonetheless, the tendency to avoid the supernatural and what lies beyond human comprehension can also hinder the development of science. The following is a famous passage from *the Analects*:

The subjects on which the Master never talked were: extraordinary things (natural prodigies), unnatural strength, disorders (in Nature) and spiritual beings.¹⁸ (子不語怪力亂神)

Concerning this passage, Needham interprets that *li* (力) refers to “the superhuman force of nature, as shown in natural convulsions such as earthquakes, tidal waves, avalanches, hot springs, geysers, and the like.” He also says, “Interest in natural phenomena is first awakened by surprising or startling departures from the normal course of things—comets, seismic or volcanic phenomena, and teratological productions (monstrous births) ...”

Needham observed that the Confucians’ interest in the natural sciences could not be outweighed by their interest in human beings. He says, “Yet trace of interest among the early Confucians in natural science, as opposed to human affairs, are few,” and highlights some examples of Confucian engagement with natural science study of *the Book of Odes*

16 Needham, Joseph. *Science and Civilisation in China*, vol. 2, chap. 9, p. 8. *The Analects*, Weizheng 爲政.

17 Needham, Joseph. *Science and Civilisation in China*, vol. 2, chap. 9, pp. 12–14.

18 Needham, Joseph. *Science and Civilisation in China*, vol. 2, chap. 9, p. 14. *The Analects*, Shuer 述而.

for widening one's acquaintance with the names of birds, beasts, plants, and trees," Confucius' remark that "a man without constancy would not make even a good wizard or a good physician." And the fact that "his chief students, Tseng Shen (曾参), had scientific interests." However, Needham says, "that is all."

Therefore, the Confucian's "Tao" is extremely different from that of the Taoists.

While believing in a moral order of the universe (Thien; Heaven), the Confucians used the word Tao (the 'Way') primarily if not exclusively meaning the ideal way or order of human society. While not separating man from social man, nor social man from the whole of Nature, they always considered that the only proper study of mankind was man.¹⁹

Even though the Confucians did not separate nature from humanity and employed the term "Tao" to represent the moral order of the entire universe, their primary focus remained on human beings as the central subject of exploration. Thus, "throughout Chinese history, there was opposition to those elements that sought a scientific approach to nature and a scientific interpretation and extension of technology."

Confucius also has two contradictory attitudes toward artisans and their crafts.

Fan Hsu requested to be taught agriculture, but the Master said 'I am not so good for that as an old farmer'. He also requested to be taught horticulture, but the Master said 'I am not so good for that as an old gardener'.²⁰

In response to this quote, Needham says, "This might have been modesty with regard to traditional technicians," but, "unfortunately," when Fan Hsu had gone out, Confucius went on to say:

What a small-minded man is Fan Hsu!... If a ruler or an official loves good customs, righteousness and sincerity, people will flock to him from all quarters, bearing their

19 Needham, Joseph. *Science and Civilisation in China*, vol. 2, chap. 9, pp. 8–9.

20 Needham, Joseph. *Science and Civilisation in China*, vol. 2, chap. 9, p. 9, *The Analects*, Zilu 子路.

children on their backs. So what does he need to know about agriculture? ²¹

Regarding the knowledge of the sages, Confucius said:

As to the displacement of body and empty space, or the separation of whiteness and hardness, or the distinction of agreement and difference... Even the wisdom of the sages does not always comprehend them. Not knowing them does not make one less of chun-tzu (gentleman), knowing them does not raise one from being a small minded man. Without them, artisans can be just as good artisans. And the sages can very well govern a state without them. ²²

Thus, Needham says, “there was no room for science, therefore, only traditional technology.”

While showing respect for technology, the Confucians had a cold view that it was not something that they were concerned with. Needham describes this Confucian attitude as “the ambivalent attitude toward science.”

On one side Confucianism was basically rationalistic and opposed to any superstitious or even supernatural forms of religion. But on the other side its intense concentration of interest upon human social life to the exclusion of non-human phenomena negated all investigation of Things, as opposed to Affairs. Hence... Rationalism proved itself less favorable than mysticism to the progress of science. ²³

From Needham's point of view, Neo-Confucianism, in which the contradictory attitude of Confucianism is integrated with Taoism's attitude toward nature, can be a new idea that has a high affinity for the scientific spirit.

21 Needham, Joseph. *Science and Civilisation in China*, vol. 2, chap. 9, p. 9, *The Analects*, Zilu 子路.

22 Needham, Joseph. *Science and Civilisation in China*, vol. 2, chap. 9, p. 9, *Xunzi*, Ruxiao 儒效.

23 Needham, Joseph. *Science and Civilisation in China*, vol. 2, chap. 9, p. 12.

3. Shen Kuo in the Neo-Confucian Era

Needham argues that, similar to the Greeks, a distinction was made between theory and practicality in China, with the former deemed suitable for a gentleman and the latter not. However, he cites Shen Kuo as one of the greatest figures to break down that boundary. According to Needham, Shen Kuo was the first person in the Song Dynasty to renounce Confucian chauvinism and carefully document all the mysteries of nature, as exemplified by his work with the compass.²⁴

What kind of ideology did Shen Kuo hold? In response to Lai Xisan's analysis of Shen Kuo's thought through the lens of Western philosophy and the Zhuangzi and Ya Zuo's positioning of Shen Kuo's mathematical theory within his empiricist view in the context of Northern Song thought, Douglas Skonicki asserts that he cannot demonstrate that Shen Kuo proposed a position that transcends the human state by quoting the thought of Zhuangzi and that Shen Kuo's views on science and mathematics differ significantly from those of Daoxue 道学 scholars. Regarding the latter, he says that Shen Kuo not only refrained from using number 数 and li 理 as a basis for ethics but also employed them to elucidate events and phenomena that carried no moral significance.²⁵

For Shen Kuo, numbers are not innate. Skonicki affirms that Shen Kuo made it very clear that the universe originally had no degrees or numbers and that it was imposed on astronomy by humans to measure and record the fortunes of the heavens. Thus, unlike Liu Mu 劉牧 and Shao Yong, Shen Kuo did not assert that the number was an innate thing that was born in the process of creation. Instead, he argued that numbers were later applied by people to natural phenomena. Furthermore, according to Skonicki, there is only one extant text that gives li 理 a moral meaning.²⁶

24 Needham, Joseph, *The Grand Titration: Science and Society in East and West*. p. 142.

25 Skonicki, Douglas, “沈括數、理觀初探：以《夢溪筆談》為主軸的討論,” *Xinsongxue* 新宋學. 2019, pp. 104–114.

26 “所謂修身也，不能窮萬物之理，則不足擇天下之義。不能盡己之性，則不足入天下之道德。窮理盡性以此。” This quotation exhibits that Shen Kuo believes that “reason” also has moral implications. Nonetheless, in Shen Kuo's extant literature, he only highlights the interplay between reason, morality, and self-cultivation. Skonicki, Douglas, “沈括數、理觀初探：以《夢溪筆談》為主軸的討論,” p. 112.

In this way, the thought of the number and li of Shen Kuo is different from the current of thought in the Northern Song Dynasty. Conversely, it can also be evaluated like Kaoru Umehara.

Behind Shen Kuo stood the new Song society, which had shed the old shell of the Tang Dynasty and could be described as a Chinese Renaissance.... After the mid-Tang Dynasty, specifically in the Jiangnan region, against the background of the advanced economy and society, the undercurrent of rationalism and realism, which was different from the conservative traditional society of the north, took root. Wang Anshi 王安石 and other new forms of bureaucrats were active on the basis of this, and Shen Kuo was none other than one of those who was nurtured in this Jiangnan atmosphere.... I would like to draw my attention to the peculiarities of the mid-11th century, when individuals with specialized knowledge, such as Shen Kuo, were appointed and were able to fully exercise their skills in a society of scholars who placed great significance on a comprehensive liberal arts education, which is based on sutras, literature, and history.²⁷

I would like to summarize his evaluation thus far. Shen Kuo is one of the most significant figures in the history of Chinese science, representing the new Confucian era, in which Confucianism and Buddhism were integrated. Nonetheless, there was not much direct evidence of the inheritance of the Taoist view of nature. Unlike the Daoxue scholars of the same period, he did not regard numbers as the fundamental principle behind phenomena, nor did they associate them with ethics. Nevertheless, he remains a typical Song Dynasty scholar. In this paper, I will attempt to present Shen Kuo's way of thinking by exploring his descriptions of physics and magnetism from the *Mengxibitan* 夢溪筆談, which Needham identified as central to the history of Chinese science.

The first thing I will discuss is a description of magnetic needles:

If the fangjia 方家 polishes the tip of the needle with a magnet, then it can point south, but it is consistently slightly biased to the east and does not point completely

27 Umehara, Kaoru, *Mengxibitan* 夢溪筆談, Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1981. pp. 284–285.

south. When floating on water, it typically shakes. You can invariably do this on your fingernails or on the edge of a bowl. While the needle rotates very quickly, it is best to hang it on a thread because it is easy to fall off in a hard, slippery place. The approach is to employ a thread taken from a new cocoon, tie it to the waist of the needle with the jiezi 芥子 and wax of Xuzhou 許州, and hang it where there is no wind, and the needle will always point south. If polished, some of them point north. In my house, some point south, and some point north. The fact that the magnet points south and the oak points West, there may be the same reason, but I cannot figure out why. ²⁸

This is known as the first description of magnetic declination in history. This suggests a correlation between the magnetic declination angle and the westward extension of the oak tree, but the fact that he does not try to forcibly link them can be said to be a manifestation of the merits of Confucian rationalism.

Subsequently, I will prioritize the sound resonance phenomenon.

There is a pipa in my friend's house, and when I put it in an empty room and play a flute with Shuangdiao 雙調, the strings of the pipa immediately make a sound and respond to it, but if I play another key, it does not respond. People value it as a rarity, but they do not know that it is normal. ²⁹

Additionally, there is also a description that, after tuning the strings of the qin and se 琴瑟, a paper puppet is placed on the strings, and when the corresponding strings are

28 “方家以磁石磨針鋒，則能指南，然常微偏東，不全南也，水浮多蕩搖。指爪及碗唇上皆可爲之，運轉尤速，但堅滑易墜，不若縷懸爲最善。其法取新蠟中獨繭縷，以芥子許蠟，綴於針腰，無風處懸之，則針常指南。其中有磨而指北者。餘家指南，北者皆有之。磁石之指南，猶柏之指西，莫可原其理。” *Mengxibitan*, chap. 24, Zazhi 1 雜誌一。

About *Mengxibitan*, the original text referred to Hu, Daojing, 夢溪筆談校證, Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient Books Publishing House, 1987. The English translation was by the author with reference to the Japanese translation of Umehara, Kaoru, *Mengxibitan* 夢溪筆談, Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1981.

29 “余友人家有一琵琶，置之虛室，以管色奏雙調，琵琶弦輒有聲應之，奏他調則不應，竇之以爲異物，殊不知此乃常理。” *Mengxibitan*, chap. 6, Yuelü 2 樂律二。

pulled, the paper doll dances, but the other strings do not move ³⁰. Shen Kuo describes the resonance phenomenon and accurately describes the resonance of sounds at the same pitch or an octave apart.

Conversely, he holds a skeptical view of narratives that seem to describe the resonance phenomenon but attribute the sound of one instrument to directly influencing another ³¹. He asserts that an instrument can be exquisitely tuned to alter its pitch, rejecting simplistic explanations such as a swing of a bell and a qing 磬 (stone instrument) to respond.

He grasps the mutual influence of objects with a keen sense. He also argues that the phases of the moon are unrelated to seasonal changes and proposes a calendar closely aligned with the solar calendar. According to him, the moon influences only fetal development and the ebb and flow of tides. ³²

The correlation between musical temperament and qi sensitivity has also been discussed in various ways in ancient China. It is impossible for the ash packed in a pitch pipe to be blown away when the qi arrives (候氣之法). Nonetheless, Shen Kuo acknowledges that musical temperament and qi are interrelated, and he offers a special way of doing it. ³³

Subsequently, I will consider Shen Kuo's idea of divination. Shen Kuo asserts that he can infer the principle of fetal growth of heaven and earth (天地胎育之理) from the law of Najia (納甲之法). He claims, "Organisms are in the womb and are not born in the opposite direction. What arises from below is the order of the hexagram, which conforms to the principle of creation and embryonicism. This kind of supreme principle fits naturally." ³⁴

30 “琴瑟弦皆有應聲。宮弦則應少宮，商弦即應少商，其餘皆隔四相應。今曲中有聲者，須依此用之。欲知其應者，先調諸弦令聲和，乃剪紙人加弦上，鼓其應弦，則紙人躍，他弦即不動，聲律高下苟同，雖在他琴鼓之，應弦亦震，此之謂正聲。” *Mengxibitan*, Bubitan 補筆談, chap. 1, Yuelü 樂律.

31 “唐獨異志云：‘唐承隋亂，樂簾散亡，獨無徵音。李嗣真密求得之。聞弩營中砧聲，求得喪車一鐸，入振之於東南隅，果有應者。掘之，得石一段，裁為四具，以補樂簾之闕。’此妄也。聲在短長厚薄之間，故考工記：‘磬氏為磬，已上則磨其旁，已下則磨其端。’磨其毫末，則聲隨而變，豈有帛砧裁琢為磬，而尚存故聲哉。兼古樂宮，商無定聲，隨律命之，迭為宮、徵。嗣真必嘗為新磬，好事者遂附益為之說。既云：‘裁為四具’，則是不獨補徵聲也。” *Mengxibitan*, chap. 5, Yuelü 1 樂律一.

32 *Mengxibitan*, Bubitan, chap. 2, Xiangshu 象數.

33 *Mengxibitan*, chap. 7, Xiangshu 1 象數一.

34 *Mengxibitan*, chap. 7, Xiangshu 1.

In this way, the hexagram is secretly in line with nature. Shen Kuo talks about what kind of mechanism exists for humans to utilize divination as follows:

Today's divination is based on old books, and the skill of divination depends on the person who performs it. Nonetheless, if we are "silent and steadfast," then we can "communicate with the heavens." Because man cannot be in the state without a *mind heart*, he relies on the things that do not have a *mind heart* to tell the results of divination. The reason for burning the shell of a turtle or breaking a tile is to take advantage of the fact that there are no streaks (li) in these and, therefore, do not break according to the streaks. In this way, it is brought closer to a state without a mind heart.

Lü Cai 呂才 gave his own theories about house divination, fortune telling, and funeral divination and thought that all these techniques were ineffective. It is certain that the technique of divination cannot be relied upon. Nonetheless, he failed to understand that all of these are acts of entrustment (寓). "It's up to the person to reveal the mystery" (Author's Note: *The Book of Changes*, Xicishang). Thus, if the same technique is employed by two different people, then the results of divination will be different. The human mind is inherently mysterious, but it cannot help but be troubled by various things. Hence, we temporarily entrust it to the mindless thing and employ the mysterious work in me to tell the results of divination. The subtleties of such a technique are not something that the layman makes a fuss about.³⁵

Shen Kuo believed that not only divination but also all written words were entrusting in the first place and that there was nothing that was not entrusting within the scope of seeing, hearing, and contemplation. He affirmed that we can join the companions in discussing the mysterious work of foreseeing the future, in equal proportion to the en-

35 “今之卜筮，皆用古書，工拙繫乎用之者。唯其寂然不動，乃能通天下之故。人未能至乎無心也，則憑物之無心者而言之。如灼龜、豐瓦，皆取其無理 (Author's Note: Some printed edition write “心” instead of “理”)，則不隨彼理而震，此近乎無心也。呂才爲卜宅、祿命、卜葬之說，皆以術爲無驗。術之不可恃信然，而不知皆寓也。“神而明之，存乎其人”，故一術二人用之，則所占各異。人之心本神，以其不能無累，而寓之以無心之物，而以吾之所以神者言之，此術之微，難以俗人論也。” *Mengxibition*, chap 8, Xiangshu 2 象數二.

trusting and substantial.

Conclusion

Human beings gain the mysterious ability to foresee the future by entrusting them to mindless things. Because human beings cannot be in a state without a *mind heart*, it is a mistake for humans to try to copy their own *mind heart* into things that do not have it. In other words, human ethics and morality have nothing to do with the material world. Thus, Shen's thought does not link human ethics to the world of nature.

Shen Kuo suggested a correlation between the magnetic declination angle and the westward extension of the oak tree but did not attempt to forcibly connect them. By refraining from inferring things beyond human comprehension, Shen Kuo's description of natural phenomena reflects the development of Confucian rationalism, as identified by Needham. Conversely, the attitude of having an unprejudiced view of technology and accepting new and mysterious phenomena without denying them is Taoist. Additionally, it can be said that behind the discovery of magnetic needle declination and resonance is the philosophy of organic, cyclical, and mutually influential influence, which is the permanent philosophy of Chinese thought that Needham refers to. Nonetheless, when explaining each phenomenon, he only discusses the mutual influence within the scope of each field and does not easily apply the same influence in relation to diverse fields.

The world of human beings with a *mind heart* and the world of things without a *mind heart* exist separately. Shen Kuo thought that the two would not be easily linked; thus, he sought a way to connect them. He maintained that human beings always have a *mind heart*. Rather than adopting the policy that we should lose our *mind heart*, he argued that human beings should continue to have their *mind heart* and search for ways to live by entrusting them to mindless things.

Employing Needham's opinion as a clue, I examined the relationship between things and humans of scholars in the Song Dynasty. Shen Kuo had a traditional organic philosophy, but it is very cautious. He also presented a new philosophy on how human beings who could not lose their *mind heart* would relate to things.

As previous research has highlighted, he had little consciousness of attaching moral meaning to the concept of *li*, which is regarded as a principle that underlies everything. Is

he abandoning the possibility of applying human ethics to nature? Rather, he exhibited the way forward for human beings by appropriately engaging with all the human mind, encompassing ethics, and things without a *mind heart* while keeping a good distance. What can be read from the process of divination described in the Xiangshu 象数 chapter of *Mengxibitan* is that, after a human has entrusted to an object without a *mind heart*, the result of divination is again spoken by humans, and only then will there be a possibility of predicting all kinds of futures, such as human misfortune, life, and death. In the process of interacting with things, he may have found all the possibilities of human life, including ethics.

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On Master Zhu's Thinking of Will and the Thought

GAO Haibo 高海波

In pre-Qin Confucianism, there also exist discussions on the issue of “The Will”.¹ In arguing that there is also free will in Confucianism, “To practice humanity depends on

1 In Chinese philosophy, discussions on the issue of the will mainly manifest as issues such as “Setting one’s Mind” and “Holding up the Mind”, and are more related to “ambition”. Regarding the relationship between “ambition” (志向) in Chinese philosophy and the “will” in Western philosophy, if we consider from the perspective of an individual’s long-term psychological orientation and from the perspective of deep-seated personality or character, ambition can be said to be a more lasting and deep-seated will. Therefore, the issue of “Setting one’s Mind” discussed in Chinese and Western philosophies should also be related to the maintenance of “The Will”. However, “ambition” and “Setting one’s Mind” as an activity can be directed at external goals or at self-perfection. Even, if the existence of a priori moral will is admitted, it can also refer to psychological efforts that do not take the realization of external goals as the target but take the manifestation of one’s own a priori moral will as the target. He Lin said in “*On Freedom of the Will*”: “For moral freedom of the will originates from the depths of the heart and the development of character. It is an achievement strived for through conscious, rational, and autonomous efforts, not a blind and accidental favor bestowed by the external world” (*Brief Explanation of Modern Idealism*, He Lin. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2011. Page 187). This statement by He Lin on freedom of the will actually has similarities with the doctrines of “Setting one’s Mind” and “Holding up the Will” in Confucianism. The goal of Confucianism is to become a sage, that is, to realize a personality with free will. Therefore, the establishment and perseverance of ambition are actually to cultivate a deep, powerful,

oneself. Does it depend on others?” (*The Analects · Yen Yuan*) and “As soon as I desire it, there it is right by me” (*The Analects · Shu Er*) often cited by academics as an example in *the Analects* of Confucius, objectively speaking, although there are no words directly related to the will in this sentence, it is true that the connotation of free will can be analyzed from it. Master Zhu, in his commentary on this sentence, has said “Jen is the essence that man is born with, and if one wants to attain it, then the will in the Mind works toward it, and at the same time the material force follows.”²

It can be seen that Master Zhu believes that the word “desire” in this sentence of *the Analects* contains the element of will. In addition, there are many other discussions on “the will” in *The Analects*. For instance, “If you set your mind on humanity, you will be free from evil” (*The Analects · Li Jen*), “A resolute scholar sets his will on the Way” (Ibid), “The will of even a common man may not be taken away from him” (*The Analects · Zi Han*), “At fifteen I set my mind upon learning” (*The Analects · Wei Zheng*) and etc. “The ambition” in these contexts has the meaning of both “Orientation of the Mind” and “The Will”. If further analyzed, “Orientation of the Mind” also includes a kind of continuity and persistence of “The Will”, therefore, Confucius actually attaches great importance to the role of “The Will” in moral practice. Mencius also attached great importance to “The Will”, he said that “A resolute scholar will pursue The Will” (*The Book of Mencius · Jin Xin Shang*). Mencius proposed the cultivation method of “Holding the Will” in the chapter “Being skillful in nourishing my strong, moving power” (*The Book of Mencius · Kung-sun Ch’ou Shang*). The American sinologist Benjamin I Schwarz, in his understanding of the text, also translated “志 Zhi” as “Will” in English. It can be seen that it is roughly equiv-

and lasting free will. This kind of free will can be said to be an important content in the development of Confucianism moral personality and character. Its scope and time are even more extensive than the issue of will choice in “Moral Dilemma” emphasized in Western philosophy. From the perspective of virtue ethics, in the personality of a superior man with strong moral integrity that Confucianism aims to cultivate, firm moral will has become an important characteristic of his virtue. This can be seen from the sayings in *The Analects* such as “A superior man understands righteousness” and “Aspires to the Dao”, as well as the expression of the “Three Universal Virtues” of wisdom, humanity, and courage in *The Doctrine of the Mean*.

2 Wang Xingxian proofread, Li Jingde compiled. Chu Tzu yü-lei (Classified Conversations of Master Zhu) [M], Volume 34. Zhonghua Book Company. 1986. Page 900. Future citations of Chu Tzu yü-lei will only be marked with the volume number.

alent to what the Western calls “Will”³. The “Three Universal Virtues” in *The Doctrine of Mean* is “Wisdom, humanity, and courage”, and the word “courage” is also associated with strength of “The Will”. The discussion in the chapter “Being skillful in nourishing my strong, moving power” of the *Book of Mencius* is also relevant to the cultivation of moral courage, and one of the ways to cultivate moral courage is to “Holding the Will”, which also proves that “courage” in the “Three Universal Virtues” of the *The Doctrine of Mean* is related to “The Will”. Professor Qian Mu has said that “If the three virtues of wisdom, humanity, and courage, as the Chinese call them, are matched with the traditional psychological trichotomy of the West, then wisdom belongs to the reason, courage to the will, and humanity obviously belongs more to the emotion.”⁴ It can be seen that Professor Qian Mu also believes that the virtue of “courage” in *The Doctrine of Mean* is related to “The Will”. Hsün Tzu is also fully conscious of the mastery and autonomy of the Mind: “The Mind is the ruler of the body and dominates the cognitive. It just gives commands, it doesn’t take any. The six activities of prohibiting, using, seizing, acquiring, acting, and stopping are possible because of the existence of Mind. Thus if the mouth is silenced it causes silence, and if the body is silenced it renders itself incapable of free movement. However, the Mind cannot be made to change its will; what is right is accepted and what is wrong is rejected” (*Hsün Tzu-Removal of Prejudices*). Savoring this context, the meaning of the autonomy of “The Will” can also be analyzed.

These resources for discussions of “The Will” in pre-Qin Confucianism formed the basis for the discussion of the same questions in Neo-Confucianism. The Neo-Confucianism developed their moral philosophy and method of cultivation through the interpretation of the above resources in pre-Qin Confucianism. Among the Sung Neo-Confucianism, Master Zhu paid more attention to the problem of “The Will”. This thesis is an attempt to systematically sort out the ideas about “The Will” and to analyze the theoretical problems that may exist in Master Zhu’s idea of that.

3 Benjamin I. Schwartz translated “志，气之帅也” in Mencius as “The will command the Ch’i” (Benjamin I. Schwartz. *The World of Thought in Ancient China* [M], Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University. Page. 271).

4 Qian Mu. *Mind, Nature and emotion, Likes and Dislikes* [A]. *Collection of Essays on the History of Chinese Thought*, Volume 2 [C]. Hefei: Anhui Education Press. 2004. Page 79.

Master Zhu's Discussing on the Will and Thought

There is a good deal of the discussion of “The Will and the Thought” in Volume 5 of *Chu Tzu yü-lei* (*Classified Conversations of Master Zhu*), one of which states:

The disciple asked, “Is the thought the employment of the mind, or the arousing part of the mind?” Master Zhu replied, “employment is the arousing part of the mind.” “And is emotion the arousing?” The question was asked, “Since emotion is also the arousing, so why is there a difference?” Master Zhu replied, “Emotion is the arousing of the nature; and the thought is the psychological factor to insist on doing sth.; it is as if like that object is emotion, so the reason why we can do that is the thought. Emotion is like a boat, and the thought is a person steering a boat.”

According to Master Zhu, emotions and thoughts are all contents of the arousing part of the Mind. Only emotions, although there is also a natural direction that is not dominated by conscious awareness, do not contain artificial, conscious thinking, choice, tendency, and dominance. However, the thought contains human conscious thinking, choice, tendency, and dominant consciousness. “As for ‘The thought’, Master Zhu said that ‘The Thought’ is emitted by the Mind. He also said that ‘The Thought’ has a leading direction. The difference between it and emotion lies in that emotion is the arousing of nature in the Mind, that is, the direct or natural manifestation of nature in the Mind. While ‘The Thought’ is emitted by the Mind. The key lies in emphasizing that it is emitted through a conscious dominating exertion of the Mind.”⁵ Master Zhu's view on “The Thought” is relatively complex. It contains both the role of intellect and the consciousness of choice, tendency, and dominance (“Advocate that it should be in that way”). So Master Zhu said in another place: “All activities of planning, deliberating, coming and going are manifestations of ‘The Thought.’” (Volume 5, *Chu Tzu yü-lei*). Among them, “deliberating” belongs to the intellectual function of thinking, examining, and weighing. And “planning activities” indicates that “The Thought” contains a psychological activity of

5 Tang Junyi. *The Original Theory of Chinese Philosophy: The Chapter on the Original Nature* [M]. Beijing: Jiuzhou Press. 2016. Page 314.

conscious choice and tendency ⁶. “Coming and going” should refer to the existential state of psychological intentions, referring to its constantly arising and ceasing pattern. Sometimes Master Zhu said, “The Thought is what engages in all kinds of calculations.” The so-called “all kinds of calculations” should also include psychological factors such as intellectual weighing, choice, and tendency. Among them, it should contain both intellectual functions and the functions of “The Thought”. But generally speaking, Master Zhu believes that the Thought is mainly an active ability of choice and tendency. He said, “Knowledge and the Thought both emerge from the Mind. Knowledge is mainly for distinguishing and recognizing, while the Thought is mainly for planning and acting. Knowledge is close to nature and close to the essence; the Thought is close to emotion and close to function” (Volume 15, *Chu Tzu yü-lei*). In a narrow sense, Master Zhu’s “The Thought” refers to “ideas”. Compared with “The Will”, it mainly refers to some constantly arising and ceasing psychological and conscious activities. Master Zhu also talked about the issue of “The Will”. He believed: “‘The Will’ is where the Mind goes. It is even more important than emotion and thought.” “What the Mind goes to is called ‘The Will.’” “‘The Will’ is where the Mind goes, going straight ahead” (Volume 5, *Chu Tzu yü-lei*). Judging from these statements, “The Will” refers to a psychological intention that is stronger, more lasting and stable than “The Thought”. To be precise, it is described by “ambition”. But it contains the perseverance of the will and is closer to the category of “will” discussed in Western philosophy. However, Master Zhu’s “The Will” does not contain the ability to generate moral laws. We will not discuss this for the moment.

In the contrast of “will” and “thought”, the intensity of “will” is more intense than that of “thought” (e.g. Will is the tendency of the mind, which is more important compared to feelings and thoughts; the will is strong, while the thought is weak (Volume 5, *Chu Tzu yü-lei*). In addition to this, will is a more explicit psychological intention, which is easily perceived by others, while the thought is more subtle and implicit, which is not easily perceived by others. Therefore, Master Zhu appreciated Zhang Zai’s following statement: “A student asked Master Zhu about the thought and will. Master Zhu answered: Hengqu said: ‘In terms of the words thought and will, we could say that the will is explicit and

6 Master Zhu clearly said in another place that “‘The Will’ has a leading direction” (Chu Tzu yü-lei. Volume 5).

impartial, while the thought is implicit and probably private; the will is strong, while the thought is weak; the will is yang, while the thought is yin” (Ibid.). Master Zhu has an analogy which well explains the difference between the will and the thought: the will is expressed as an explicit assertion to do something, while the thought arouses implicitly and abruptly. The will is like the crusade, while thought is like the invasion (Ibid.). As regards the relationship between the will and the thought, Master Zhu holds that the former is more dominant in psychological activity, while the latter serves as a tool for the manifestation and activity of the will. The Thought is the tool of the will, like the feet of the will. Tang Junyi explains, “The meaning of this sentence is that the thought is in the process of the fulfillment of the will, where many kinds of thoughts are planning and arranging. So the will is an apparent forerunner, and the many thoughts arouse implicitly after the will.”⁷ “In the present context, the thought could be interpreted as “Thought is the process of fulfilling the will, but it is also a complex and manifold process of heart-mind’s arousing.”⁸ It is also somewhat similar to the relationship between will (*wille*) and thought (*willkür*) in Kant’s philosophy. Max Scheler, referring to Kant’s distinction between “will (*wille*)” and “thought (*willkür*)”, also stated: “Kant also emphasizes, with complete justification, that will (*Gesinnung*) is distinct from mere thought (*Absicht*) and from all planning (*Vorsatz*). Facts is composed as follows: in the same will, we are able to remain in the same (*Verharren*) before the same fact, whereas our thoughts may yield to changes (*Wechsel*) before the same fact, just as, on the other hand, in the case of the same thought, the planning could also be very different. Thus will (*Gesinnung*) is certainly a stage deeper than thought (*Absicht*).”⁹ This means that Kant also distinguishes between will and thought, arguing that in contrast to thought, which is easily influenced by objects and therefore always changes, the will possesses more stability and is a more profound psychological activity. However, according to Li Ruiquan, Kant’s will is just being without making effects, and its fulfillment depends mainly on thought. Scheler also ar-

7 Tang Junyi. *The Original Theory of Chinese Philosophy: The Chapter on the Original Nature* [M]. Beijing: Jiuzhou Press. 2016. Page 315.

8 Tang Junyi. *The Original Theory of Chinese Philosophy: The Chapter on the Original Nature* [M]. Beijing: Jiuzhou Press. 2016. Page 315.

9 Scherer, Max, translated by Ni Liangkang, *Formalism in ethics and material value ethics*, Beijing: Commercial Press, 2018. Page 182.

gues that in Kant “he takes what he calls will first as unempirical, and second as the form to set the thoughts.... What can be experienced is always those thoughts that have been set, while will are just the form to set the thoughts thus it can never really be experienced.”¹⁰ However, Master Zhu’s will, according to himself, belongs to the arousing feelings, as he said: “both will and thought belong to feelings” (Ibid.).¹¹

As for the relationship between the thought and feelings, Master Zhu had pointed out:

Li Mengxian asked the difference between feelings and thoughts. Master Zhu answered that: “Feelings are the things that make us do somethings, and thoughts are the things that make us go through all the ways of planning, so thoughts can only function after feelings are aroused.” Kuisun recorded that: “Only with feelings can the thought function in its own way.” (Ibid.)

One asked Master Zhu: “How do I know feelings and thoughts?” He said, “The nature and feelings are almost one. The nature is inactive, feelings are active, and the thought has a determined tendency. Such as loves and hates are feelings. When we love a beautiful color and hate a bad smell, it is the thought.” Shiyi recorded.

For example, your loving that thing is the feeling, and to love that thing is a thought. (Ibid.)

Thinking carefully about these three passages of Master Zhu, it seems that Master Zhu believes that feelings are the arousing from the nature, and therefore the two are closely related (We can't interpret the almost one as fully equivalent). The feelings are the function of the nature, but after the feelings have been aroused, what to intend to and to choose is dominated by the thought. The thought is the arousing part of the heart-mind but not the part of feelings. We could only claim that feelings provide the capacity and

10 Scherer, Max, translated by Ni Liangkang, *Formalism in ethics and material value ethics*, Beijing: Commercial Press, 2018. Page 183.

11 Master Zhu’s concept of “feelings” in the general sense is more complex, not exactly the same as the feelings in modern psychology and philosophy, but also includes thinking, thought, will and other contents. In a narrower sense, feelings refer to the content of consciousness naturally arising from the nature, which is different from the will, but is not exactly the same as “feelings”, and should also include some spontaneous perceptual activities.

motivation for the fulfillment of thought, i.e., “Thoughts can only function after feelings are aroused”; “Such as loves and hates are feelings. When we love a beautiful color and hate a bad smell, it is the thought.” Or, in other words, the thought chooses the object and feelings help it to fulfill its purpose, for without feelings to provide motivation forces, thought’s intentionality toward the object cannot be fulfilled. When Summarizing Kant’s statement about the role of feelings in motivating the fulfillment of the thought, Lee says: “The representation of an object must be the determining ground of thought. But the representation of a given object, if it is to be able to determine our thought to prompt the fulfillment (or non-fulfillment) of that object, has to be combined with pleasant (or unpleasant) feelings as a motive.”¹² For Master Zhu, loves and hates are the pleasant and unpleasant feelings that an object arouses in the mind of the subject, which promote the subject to fulfill (or negate) the desire for the object. On the contrary, if there are only feelings, without the control of conscious thought, the onset of feelings will be spontaneous but with no specific tendency or pattern. That is why Tang Junyi says, “From this it is clear that thought is what controls feelings and applies them, and it is also clear that the mind has the function of consciously controlling and applying.”¹³ However, Master Zhu also points out that thought also affects the mind, depriving the mind of its controlling function. “One asked: ‘Thought is the arousing part of the heart-mind, and it is said that there is the heart and then the thought. However, the mind should have control the arousing part, yet by indulging in desires, the mind can no longer control it.’ Master Zhu answered: ‘absolutely’” (Volume 5, *Chu Tzu yü-lei*). Master Zhu’s understanding of the relationship between “make the thoughts sincere” and “rectify the mind” in *the Great Learning* contains this insight that sincerity of thought is necessary because thought can affect the tendency of the mind.

One asks, “The mind controls the body; thought is the arousing part of the heart-mind. Thoughts arouse from the mind, so they should be commanded by the mind. But the Great Learning reads: ‘Those who wished to rectify their minds would first

12 Li Minghui. *Confucianism and Kant*, Taipei: Lianjing Publishing Company, 1980. Page 174–175.

13 Tang Junyi. *The Original Theory of Chinese Philosophy: The Chapter on the Original Nature* [M]. Beijing: Jiuzhou Press. 2016. Page 315.

make their thoughts sincere.’ It seems that thought seems to control the mind. What is the reason for this?” Master Zhu replied, “The natural state of the mind is never incorrect. The reason why the mind manifests itself as not-correct in reality is probably because evil thoughts arise and thus the mind is disturbed. An analogy with water is that the water was calm, but by the waves, the water develops into turbulence.” (Volume 15, *Chu Tzu yü-lei*)

However, this raises a question. What kind of psychological mechanism is it when the thought controls and disturbs the mind after it has aroused, at the same time even the mind is not able to control itself? “Reason is affected” does not explain the problem clearly, and therefore the problem of the will is also involved, that is to say, the will is weakened or shaken. Although normally the human will is relatively stable, when it is impacted by strong thoughts, the strength and tendency of the will also change, thus yielding to the thoughts. Regrettably, Master Zhu only described the relationship between mind and thought in appearance, without further clarifying the functioning of the psychological mechanisms involved.

“Will” and “The mind commands man’s nature and feelings.”

There remains a question concerning the real master in the state after the feelings are aroused. Before discussing this issue, it is imperative to analyze Master Zhu’s understanding of the functions of the mind. According to the summary presented in Chen Lai’s “A Study of Zhu Zi’s Philosophy”, the primary function of the mind is “consciousness”. Master Zhu frequently used terms such as “the pure intelligence and clear consciousness of the mind (虚灵知觉)”, “consciousness (知觉)”, “the spiritual intelligence (神明)” and “the clear intelligence (灵明)” to denote this cognitive capability of the mind. Of course, “in a narrow sense, the mind of consciousness is merely a thinking capability without any normative meaning. As for the mind of consciousness in a broad sense, it evidently encompasses various specific contents of thinking, among which some are reasonable while others are not”.¹⁴ On the other hand, Master Zhu also emphasizes the master role the

14 Chen Lai. *Studies on the Philosophy of Master Zhu*, Beijing: Life Raeding, Xinzhi Sanlian Book

mind plays:

The mind is the abode of the spiritual intelligence and the master of the body.
(Volume 98, *Chu Tzu yü-lei*)

The mind is that with which man rules his body. It is one and not a duality, is subject and not object, and controls the external world instead of being controlled by it.¹⁵

The physical body and the consciousness are all ruled by the mind. The mind is the master of the body whether in the state of activity or talking or in the state of tranquility or silence.¹⁶

Seeing, hearing and moving are all guided by the mind. If the body moves without the mind's awareness, it signifies the absence of the mind, and the actions are carried out without awareness. (Volume 5, *Chu Tzu yü-lei*)

Chen Lai points out Master Zhu's "thought of the mind as the master primarily examines the role of the mind playing in individual practice by regarding humans as the subjects of these activities"¹⁷, "This subject is endowed with great dynamism and a free will"¹⁸ and "The master discussed here refers to the freedom of choice, great autonomy and dynamism possessed by the mind as a will."¹⁹

Furthermore, Chen Lai also mentions another implication of the mind mastering the body, namely, "the mind commands the nature and the feelings, 'which refers to' the self-control of the rationality and the restraining effect of moral consciousness on desires

store, 2010. Page 249.

15 Chu Hsi. A Treatise on the Examination of the Mind [A]. Master Hui-an Chu Wen Kung wen-chi (Collected Works of Master Zhu) [C]. Volume 67.

16 Chu Hsi. Master Zhu's Letter to Zhang Qinfu [A]. Master Hui-an Chu Wen Kung wen-chi [C]. Volume 32.

17 Chen Lai. Studies on the Philosophy of Master Zhu, Beijing: Life Raeding, Xinzhi Sanlian Bookstore, 2010. Page 250.

18 Chen Lai. Studies on the Philosophy of Master Zhu, Beijing: Life Raeding, Xinzhi Sanlian Bookstore, 2010. Page 250.

19 Chen Lai. Studies on the Philosophy of Master Zhu, Beijing: Life Raeding, Xinzhi Sanlian Bookstore, 2010. Page 251.

and passions.”²⁰

After Master Zhu's enlightenment in Jichou, he basically determined the structure of “the heart-mind includes and commands the nature and the feelings.” In this structure, the heart-mind is in a state of activity in general, but it can be divided into two states: the relatively tranquil state of the not arousing part of the heart-mind and the obviously active state of the arousing part of the heart-mind. The not arousing part is the substance of the heart-mind; the arousing part is the function of the heart-mind; nature is in the heart-mind when in the not arousing part, and when in the arousing part, nature produces the feelings, and the heart-mind encompasses both nature and the feelings. Thus, Master Zhu denied his earlier view of the “nature-substance and heart-mind-function” model, which was the same as that of the Huxiang School. This is the first meaning of “the heart-mind includes and commands the nature and the feelings”, in other words, the heart-mind includes nature and the feelings and both substance and function. Of course, there is a second meaning of “heart-mind is the unifying agent between the nature and the feelings”, that is, heart-mind is the master of nature and the feelings. Master Zhu said:

The nature is the substance, the feelings are the function, nature and the feelings are out of heart-mind, so heart-mind can command them. Command is like the unity of an army, which means that there is a master. (Volume 98, *Chu Tzu yü-lei*)

Nature, the essence; its function is the feelings; heart-mind, the unity of nature and feelings, which is the master of the movement and static of nature and feelings.²¹

The nature is the heart-mind's Principle, the feelings are the heart-mind's function, the heart-mind is the master of nature and the feelings.²²

The heart-mind's mastery over the feelings is better understood as referring mainly to

20 Chen Lai. *Studies on the Philosophy of Master Zhu*, Beijing: Life Raeding, Xinzhì Sanlian Bookstore, 2010. Page 252.

21 Chu Hsi. *The Outline of Mencius* [A]. Master Hui-an Chu Wen Kung wen-chi [C]. Volume 67.

22 Chu Hsi. *The Doctrine of Origination, Flourish, Advantage and Firmness* [A]. Master Hui-an Chu Wen Kung wen-chi [C]. Volume 67.

the master of reason over feelings, and the “sanction of non-moral concepts.” “Master Zhu’s talk of the feelings is not limited to the psychological sense of emotion, but also includes the so-called ‘wisdom and knowledge of thoughts and considerations’, so the master of the heart-mind over the feelings, and should include the moral concepts formed by human beings in the social life of the various kinds of passions and non-moral concepts of the sanction, from the latter point of view, it is overlapping with the moral heart’s master of the human heart.”²³

Master Zhu was more concerned about the rational function of the heart-mind, so when he talked about the master role of the heart-mind over the nature and the feelings, he also mainly emphasized the rational function of the heart-mind, as Prof. Chen Lai said, Master Zhu also said in the Preface to the Doctrine of the Mean of Chapters and Sentences that “the pure intelligence and consciousness of the heart-mind are only one.” Master Zhu talks about the master role of the moral mind over the physical mind (Human mind), also mainly in terms of the dominance and control of reason over emotional passions and desires. However, is reason alone sufficient to ensure the transformation of moral activity from knowledge to practice? Does it also require the participation of other psychological elements? Chen Lai recognizes that when Master Zhu talks about the master role of the heart-mind over the body, he also mentions the issue of “freedom of will and thought”, which I think is a very important issue. The ancient Korean scholar, Lee Yulgok put forward the view that “the heart-mind covers the feelings and thought” and “the physical mind and the moral mind are changeable with each other”²⁴, that is to say, the master and directional nature of the thought is noted ²⁵, and Li Suping said, “Yulgok believes that ‘thought’ has the function of regulating nature and the feelings. He advocated the use of ‘human thought’ to regulate ‘human nature’ and ‘human feelings.’”²⁶ It may not be accurate to say that thought can regulate nature, but it is certain that thought has

23 Chen Lai. *Studies on the Philosophy of Master Zhu*, Beijing: Life Raeding, Xinzhì Sanlian Book-store, 2010. Page 297.

24 Li Er (Yi I). The letter to Cheng Yuanhao. [A] Ligu (Yulgok) ch’üan-shu (Complete Works of the Yi I) [C]. Volume 9. Shanghai: East China Normal University Press, 2007. Page 346.

25 See Gao Haibo. The Problem of the Motivation in Moral Practice: Taking East Asian Rationalistic School of Neo-Confucianism as an Example [J]. *Morality and Civilization*. 2019, Volume 5. Page 53–54.

26 Li Zuiping. *History of Korean Confucianism*, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2007. Page 346.

the function of regulating and orienting the feelings, which is also in line with Master Zhu's view. Volume 5, *Chu Tzu yü-lei*: "Asked: 'Thought is the arousing part of the heart-mind, and it is said that there is the heart-mind and then the thought.' Then it is still the heart-mind controls it. However the heart-mind goes with it when the private thought is in full bloom.' Master Zhu said: 'Certainly.'" In other words, Master Zhu admits that the activity of the thought will master the direction of the heart-mind in some circumstances, but this actually becomes "the thought masters the heart-mind." Fundamentally, if we want to realize the master of the heart-mind over the feelings and thoughts, we should not say that the heart-mind at this point in time is only the feelings and thoughts, but should also include the will. This is why Master Zhu emphasizes the master role of will over thought. Both Lee Yulgok and Master Zhu believe that the thought is not as lasting and stable as the will, so if the role of the will and the thought is not further discussed in the discussion of the heart-mind's dominating function over the feelings, then this mechanism of mental regulation is still not clear enough. According to Master Zhu, Will represents a long-term ideal and planning, and can be used as a dominant intention to dominate and implement into the specific activities of the thought. This is what Tang Junyi said, "'Thought' is implemented by 'Will' in the 'complex and manifold course of the heart-mind's development.'" Will belongs to the subject of the long-term planning of the heart-mind. When Confucian says "set up one's mind", the "ambition" is more related to this, and this will decides a person's long period of time and even a lifetime choices, directions of moral practices, however the thought is the idea aroused when someone is in face of a specific practical activities, in the specific personal choice, it has the role of orientation for the heart-mind of the moment, but does not have a decisive role in the mind. In contrast, the will is more fundamental. "Because one's will is always to realize an ideal in things, this is the meaning of going straight to an ideal, or towards the nature and Principle that the heart-mind desires to realize."²⁷

However, the above is only a manifestation of "the heart-mind includes and commands the nature and the feelings" in the arousing part, but how does the heart-mind realize its mastery over nature when it is in the not arousing part? How do we understand the mean-

27 Tang Junyi. *The Original Theory of Chinese Philosophy: The Chapter on the Original Nature* [M]. Beijing: Jiuzhou Press. 2016. Page 314.

ing of “the heart-mind is the master of nature”? Chen Lai said, “As for the heart-mind’s ‘mastery’ over nature, it must be viewed from the perspective of the gongfu of keeping the seriousness from the not arousing part, and must not be confined to words. Originally, nature as the overall essence of conscious activity, the law of conscious activity should play a master role, and in Master Zhu’s view, the spiritual cultivation of the heart-mind to a certain extent determines whether this master role of nature can be properly expressed and played.”²⁸ Its main gongfu is to hold the seriousness, “that is to say, thought has not yet sprung up, the heart-mind is not yet proceeded, but there should be some mastery, that is to say, taking up this mind, so that there is alertness but not thought, so that the mind is calm and clear and not confused, so that there is concentration but not relaxation of concentration, that is self-cultivation requires keeping the seriousness in the not arousing part, and it is a necessary condition for maintaining the state of the Mean.”²⁹ In general, Master Zhu’s gongfu of keeping the seriousness is to maintain the heart-mind’s self-consciousness, so that the heart-mind remains in a state of reason, thereby realizing self-consciousness of nature and Principle and achieving mastery over the body and actions. Therefore, even when the heart-mind is the master over nature in the not arousing part, Master Zhu stresses the role of “consciousness”: “The feelings are produced from the nature, so it is the counterpart of the nature, and the heart-mind is conscious of both of them and is able to control them. If it has not yet moved and is not able to control them, then it is empty and quiet; if it has moved and is not able to control them, then it is unrestrained.”³⁰

Master Zhu’s theory of “the heart-mind includes and commands the nature and the feelings” is mainly derived from the keeping the seriousness and self-cultivation of the Mean in the not arousing part of the Ch’eng Brothers and Li Tung, as well as the theory of the Hunan School of “examining and recognizing the clues (of activities of moral feelings)”, therefore, in the not arousing part of the heart-mind, the main emphasis is the

28 Chen Lai. *Studies on the Philosophy of Master Zhu*, Beijing: Life Raeding, Xinzhi Sanlian Bookstore, 2010. Page 297.

29 Chen Lai. *Studies on the Philosophy of Master Zhu*, Beijing: Life Raeding, Xinzhi Sanlian Bookstore, 2010. Page 297.

30 Chu Hsi. Master Zhu’s Letter to Feng Zuosu [A]. Master Hui-an Chu Wen Kung wen-chi [C]. Volume 41.

gongfu of keeping the seriousness and the self-cultivation of the heart-mind at ordinary times, with the aim of keeping the heart-mind in the state of “the pure intelligence and consciousness.” This is also the result of the influence of Buddhism and Taoism. However, in order to distinguish the difference between the state of heart-mind obtained by keeping the seriousness and that of the Buddhism and the Taoism, Master Zhu put more emphasis on what Ch’eng Yi said, “There must be something in the tranquility”, that is, the nature and the Principle in the heart-mind of the not arousing part. “Principle and righteousness (yi) cannot be attained when in the not arousing part, and when they are known to exist, it is already at the part of arousing part. At this point in time there is the origin of Principle and righteousness, and there are no concrete Principle and righteousness” (Volume 62, *Chu Tzu yü-lei*). “Man’s body, the use of consciousness is what the heart-mind does, the heart-mind is the master of the body but there will be no movement or speech. However, when it is in tranquility, things do not happen, thoughts do not spring up, and nature is in it, with the Tao and righteousness. The Mean is where the heart-mind takes it as the essence and remains tranquility and unmoving. As it is aroused from within, things come together, thoughts sprout up, then the seven feelings ensue, each have their own relevant master. The so-called harmony, is where the heart-mind takes it as the function and sense everything in the world and know the reason of things.”³¹ This is where Master Zhu consciously distinguishes himself from Buddhism and Taoism. However, is it possible that a kind of willful insistence is also inherent in the heart-mind of emptiness and clarity when it is in the not-arousing part? According to Master Zhu, “Will” can only be the heart-mind’s already aroused part, once there is the gongfu of “holding the will”, then it already belongs to the already aroused.

Xiao asked whether the heart-mind can not be captured. Master Zhu said, “It’s true. The heart-mind can master itself, and how can the man catch it! Only can we cultivate it with the righteousness and Principle.” Again asked: “Why do we insist on ‘Holding the will?’” Said: “Will is the arousing part of the heart-mind., How can we let it go and not to hold it? But we mustn’t go on defending stability fastid-

31 Chu Hsi. Master Zhu’s Letter to Zhang Qinfu [A]. Master Hui-an Chu Wen Kung wen-chi [C]. Volume 32.

iously.” (Volume 120, *Chu Tzu yü-lei*)

Master Zhu was very much against the Huxiang and Lu schools’ method of “observing the heart-mind with the heart-mind” and concerning in turn pursues the heart-mind, so he was against grasping the heart-mind. However, the questioner believes that the gongfu of “holding the will” involves a kind of perseverance and practice of the will of the heart-mind, and it seems that “holding the will” can also be used to refer to the gongfu of the not arousing part.

Holding the Will, Setting up One’s Mind and Keeping the Seriousness

Master Zhu acknowledges the necessity of “holding the will”, but denies that it is to hold the not arousing part of the heart-mind; rather, it is gongfu exerted on the arousing part of the heart-mind. However, this seems to differ from the view of the Ch’eng brothers. “Question: ‘When one is affected by wrath, fear, worries and anxieties, his mind will not be correct. Does it mean one must eliminate these emotions to rectify his mind?’ Answer: ‘It does not mean to eliminate them; rather, it is not to let these feelings disturb his mind. For those who have not yet been tranquil, they must hold their wills.’”³² It seems that the Two Ch’engs also advocate that through the effort of “holding the will”, the mind can be preserved. The effort of “holding the will” that the Ch’engs mention is associated with rectifying the mind. However, when Master Zhu explains the concept of “rectifying the mind” in *The Great Learning*, he understands it from the perspective of the not arousing part of the heart-mind. In this way, isn’t Master Zhu’s interpretation of holding one’s will contradictory to the view of the Ch’engs? Furthermore, Master Zhu’s statements on “holding the will” seem inconsistent; sometimes he also considers the effort of “holding the will” to be similar to the effort of keeping the seriousness:

Although words may vary in depth depending on different contexts, the moral

32 Ch’eng Hao, Ch’eng I. Erh-Ch’eng I-shu (Surviving Works of The Ch’eng Brothers) [M]. Volume 19.

effort required remains consistent. For instance, there is not a significant difference between preserving one's mind and holding one's will. The phrase "preserving the mind" specifies a broad range; the phrase "holding the will" specifies a narrow range but is more closely related. Merely holding one's will can restrain the mind and make the body and mind be serious. He also said: one should hold the will as soon as the mind starts to arouse feelings. (Volume 12, *Chu Tzu yü-lei*)

Huang asked: to setting up the will is to lay the foundation; to dwell in seriousness is to hold the will. Answer: One must set up his will as the fundamental prerequisite for doing anything; without it, nothing can be accomplished. Even if the will is set up, if one can not dwell in seriousness to keep the will, the mind will wander and fail to be the master, leading to a life spent aimlessly and in vain. The will set up must transcend the superficial aspects of affairs, while dwelling in seriousness requires to penetrate into affairs, ensuring that both seriousness and affairs are in harmony. Seriousness is required in talking, in acting, and even in sitting, which must be present at every moment without exception. (Volume 18, *ibid*)

Someone asked: How about guarding against depravity and concentrating on one thing? Answer: Concentrating on one thing is similar to "holding the will firm", and guarding against depravity is similar to "never doing violence to the vital force." To guard against depravity merely means to prevent depraved forces from entering the mind, whereas in concentrating on one thing one protects it from the inside. Neither should be unbalanced in any way. This is the way the internal and the external mutually cultivate each other. (Volume 96, *ibid*)

When Mencius discussed nourishing the qi, he considered from the state after the feelings are aroused. While Cheng Zi discussing nourishing the will was from the state before the feelings are aroused. Both convey their own meanings, but there is no hindrance for the internal and the external mutually cultivating each other. (Volume 52, *ibid*)

Master Zhu's statements also seem to acknowledge that holding the will is associated with the moral effort of keeping the seriousness. And holding (nourishing) the will can also refer to preserving (nourishing) the not arousing part of the heart-mind. In this sense, gongfu of "keeping the seriousness" and "concentrating on one thing" should en-

compass the moral effort of “holding one’s will.” In Master Zhu’s *Methods of Reading* (editors of *Chu Tzu I-chi (Surviving Works of Master Zhu)* think the book was compiled in 1194, Shao Xi Fifth year³³), compiled by his disciple Fu Guang, “Keeping the Seriousness and Holding the will” is listed first, accompanied by Master Zhu’s further elaboration: “Cheng Zi said, ‘Self-cultivation requires seriousness; the pursuit of learning depends on the extension of knowledge.’ This is of utmost importance. When one is not engaged in any task, one should keep the seriousness, and the mind should not wander. When coping with tasks, one should act with seriousness; when reading, one should read with seriousness. This naturally penetrates activity and tranquility, and the mind is always present. ... This issue is not about reading but about the mind. Because if the mind is not concentrating and tranquil, it can not think clearly. One must nourish his mind to be tranquil, be clear and concentrate, and then principles can arise from the mind.”³⁴ Fu Guang’s assertion seems to have synthesized Master Zhu’s reading methods. According to this interpretation, Master Zhu appears to advocate that gongfu of keeping the seriousness and holding one’s will can penetrate the entire process of “self-cultivation” and “the extension of knowledge”, which means that “when one is not engaged in any task, one should keep the seriousness” and “when coping with tasks, one should act with seriousness.” Master Zhu also seems to suggest that during the state of “being not engaged in any task” and feelings are not aroused, one needs to keep the seriousness to hold one’s will, thereby he seems to acknowledge the existence of will in the not arousing part of the heart-mind. Fu Guang was significantly influenced by Master Zhu’s teaching on setting up one’s will and holding one’s will. In the *Si Shu Zuan Shu (An Compiled Interpretation of Zhuzi for the Four Books 四書纂疏)*, there is also a quotation from Fu Guang discussing the association between holding one’s will and keeping the seriousness:

33 According to Chen Rongjie’s *Students under Master Zhu*, Fuguang once studied with Master Zhu in 1194. It is documented that Fuguang stayed for three months and then returned. The reading method in *Chu Tzu yü-lei* is now partly recorded by Fuguang.

34 Chu Hsi. *The Reading Method of Master Zhu* [A]. *Chu Tzu I-chi (Surviving Works of Master Zhu)* [C]. Volume 4. *The Collection of Missing Text of Chu Tzu ch’üan-shu (Complete Works of the Master Zhu)* [C]. *Chu Tzu ch’üan-shu (Complete Works of the Master Zhu)*, Volume 62, Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient Books Publishing House, Hefei: Anhui Education Publishing House, 2010. Page 733.

Fu Guang said: Although there may be a difference in urgency between the will and the qi (the strong moving power), they are not to be neglected. Therefore, one must hold his will with seriousness and nourish the qi. To hold is to maintain, and to be serious is to concentrate on one thing and does not get away from it. If one wants to hold his will, he has to be serious. Hence, Cheng Zi said that it is the will that leads the qi, and nourishing the will needs to straighten the internal life. The most crucial principle for this is nothing other than “be serious in order to straighten the internal life.”³⁵

Fu Guang’s interpretation primarily stems from Cheng Zi’s statements and is also consistent with statements of Master Zhu. If this is indeed the case, Master Zhu’s discussion on keeping the seriousness and holding one’s will does not merely regard the will as a function of the arousing part of the heart-mind. Rather, it can also incorporate the traditional Confucian concept of “setting up one’s will”:

Cheng Zi’s statement quoted as an example: “Learners, influenced and controlled by their qi and habits, can only command their own will to overcome this situation.” Master Zhu further quoted: “‘setting up one’s will to lay one’s foundation, and dwelling in seriousness to hold one’s will’, this is a meritorious sentence from Wufeng.” He also cited, “‘Learners value their will.’ What does valuing one’s will mean?’ He said, ‘Nothing more than benevolence (jen) and righteousness (Yi).’” Additionally, he referenced, “Shun established norms for the world, which could be transmitted to later generations. Yet, I still cannot escape being a common man. This troubles me. What should one do in this situation? Just emulate Shun.” Master Zhu also quoted, “The commander of three armies may be taken away, but the will of even a common man may not be taken away from him”, “Even among Confucius’ students, there were those who could not set up their will, such as Ran Qiu, ‘who are pleased with Confucius teachings, however he can’t practice Confucius’ teachings and said that his abilities were insufficient.’ Therefore, it is not surprising that he

35 Zhao Shunsun. *The Compilation of Annotations of Mencius [M]*. Volume 3. *The Compilation of Annotations of the Four Books [M]*.

later set up his will to accumulate wealth.” (Volume 118, *Chu Tzu yü-lei*)

According to Qian Mu’s assertion, Master Zhu emphasized the importance of “setting up one’s will” in his later years. As recorded in volume 118 of the *Chu Tzu yü-lei*, “In the past, when friends came here, I would tell them what they should pursue considering they had traveled thousands of miles. And I would tell them a general outline of how to learn based on different circumstances. It seems that I hadn’t point the core issue, which was my fault. Upon the reflection today, learners must base their learning on setting up their will.... If one does not set up his will, one will ultimately fail to find the core point.” The passage quoted above follows this one. This sentence was recorded by Teng Lin in 1194, when Master Zhu was 62 years old. According to Wingsit Chan’s book, the *Zhu Zi Men Ren* (*Master Zhu’s Disciples* 朱子门人), “There are approximately twenty questions and answers in the *Chu Tzu yü-lei*, numbered from 4539 to 4546 in volume 118. From the ‘Lin’s Annotation’ at number 30, Lin recorded a total of thirteen sentences, focusing on the importance of setting up one’s will in learning and self-cultivation.”³⁶ Teng Lin studied from Master Zhu in the same year as Fu Guang, so it is likely that they both heard Master Zhu’s teachings on “setting up one’s will” at the same time, indicating that Master Zhu emphasized this concept at that time. In the passage mentioned above, according to Qian Mu’s research, Master Zhu’s stress on the necessity of setting up one’s will was influenced by Lu Jiuyuan’s emphasis on “setting up one’s will” in his teaching. Additionally, he also mentioned that one should hold his will through the practice of “keeping the seriousness”, ensuring that one’s ambition (including one’s will) remains firm and unwavering. Qian Mu pointed out, “Without the will, one would not know where to practice the moral effort of keeping the seriousness.”³⁷ Qian Mu also noted that Master Zhu intentionally combined the moral effort of seriousness which he inherited from the Ch’eng Brothers, with the effort of setting up one’s will. “The Ch’eng brothers emphasized seriousness, while Lu Xiangshan emphasized setting up one’s will. Master Zhu chose to em-

36 Chen Rongjie. *Students under Master Zhu*, Shanghai: East China Normal University Press, 2007. Page 226.

37 Qian Mu. *The New Study of Master Zhu*, Book II, Beijing: Jiuzhou Publishing House, 2011. Page 474.

phasize the latter in his later years as part of his teaching, which also means learning from others' strengths."³⁸

As Qian Mu stated, Master Zhu also recognized in his later years that keeping the seriousness requiring the effort of setting up one's will is regarded as its core, otherwise the effort of keeping the seriousness would lose its direction. Moreover, Master Zhu even believed that setting up one's will is the primary moral effort, preceding even the gongfu of preserving the mind and nourishing the nature and the self-examination:

Someone asked: Which gongfu should be the first to do in learning? Answer: As previously mentioned, the core moral effort is to set up one's mind. Once one understands the principles, by setting up the mind firmly and advancing consistently, there is no need for him to worry about not making progress! However, if one does not set up a firm mind, just listens to others' words and reads their books, no accomplishment will be gained. (Volume 116)

Your letter has elaborated on points that I had not fully discussed before, which is excellent! Excellent! However, learning proceeds in stages, and when setting up one's mind, it is crucial to have a general understanding of the principles involved. If one cultivates a cautious and apprehensive mind, following with efforts of discussion, thinking, preserving and nourishing, progress can be made. This aligns with Confucius' teachings on having the mind bent on learning and being engaged in vigorous pursuit of something. If one merely wanders and does not have a specific start to do gongfu, merely asserting that something can be done, then "the effort at seriousness and cultivation", "always be doing something", and "it seems to be sometimes present or sometimes easily lost, and may not be maintained even with great efforts" may lead to futile attempts and lack real achievements. Such assertions are indeed biased. My previous words were methods proposed in response to your questions, which you can use to make progress. Nowadays, it is not necessary to adhere strictly to such methods. Instead, one should intimately understand the teachings of the saints and sages within their hearts, holding fast to what they comprehend as they

38 Qian Mu. *The New Study of Master Zhu*, Book II, Beijing: Jiuzhou Publishing House, 2011. Page 475.

progress. Over time, one can get natural enlightenment.³⁹

Based on Master Zhu's aforementioned statements, only by first setting up one's will and then practicing the gongfu of teaching, learning, preserving the mind, nourishing the nature, self-examination, and keeping the seriousness, can show the latter gongfu a correct way to be practiced. In other words, the "will" set up provides the starting point for the aforementioned gongfu. During this process, by firming one's will and persevering consistently, progress will naturally be achieved. Master Zhu told Chen Chaozong that after setting up his will, the gongfu of keeping the seriousness and nourishing the nature can also have an internal guidance and direction, leading to a clear objective and essential efforts in learning, which will prevent a situation where "it seems to be sometimes present or sometimes easily lost, and may not be maintained even with great efforts." However, although Master Zhu was influenced by Lu Xiangshan at this time and began to emphasize the importance of setting up one's will, he differed from Lu's empty and exaggerated talk about setting up one's will. Master Zhu still emphasized the necessity of reading the books of sages and worthies, comprehending principles therein, internalizing them and adhering to them consistently, and advocated that rationality will eventually be enlightened by doing these efforts. According to the content of this letter, it is possible that Master Zhu had previously emphasized setting up one's will somewhat excessively in order to motivate Chen Chaozong to study hard, which led Chen to think that Master Zhu's statements were "not exhaustive".

Master Zhu reflected that his previous statements were to solve Chen Chaozong's individual issues. While Master Zhu acknowledged that Lu Jiuyuan and others had issues with their empty and exaggerated words about setting up one's will without paying attention to learning, Chen Chaozong's problem was lack of the moral effort of setting up his will. Therefore, Lu Jiuyuan's words could serve as a remedy for Chen Chaozong's problem. From the previous discussions, Master Zhu regarded setting up one's will as the foundation of keeping the seriousness, preserving the mind and nourishing the nature. If so, we must consider the association between the will and keeping the seriousness during

39 Chu Hsi. Master Zhu's Letter to Chen Chaozong [A]. Master Hui-an Chu Wen Kung wen-chi [C]. Volume 55.

the process of preserving the mind and nourishing the nature. From his repeated citations of the Ch'eng brothers' "commanding the will (责志)" and Wufeng's "keeping the seriousness is to hold one's will" at this time, it seems that he intentionally tried to integrate the will throughout the entire process of learning. For instance:

The issue with contemporary learners lies in their lack of aspiration (will).... Yichuan said: "Learners, influenced and controlled by their qi and habits, can only command their own will to overcome this situation." Yan Yuan said, "I looked up to Confucius' doctrines, and they seemed to become higher; I tried to penetrate them, and they seemed to become firmer; I looked at them before me, and suddenly they seemed to be behind. When I have exerted all my abilities, there seems something to stand right up before me." In the case of Yan Yuan, he clearly perceived a goal and then was determined to achieve it. This is akin to a soldier on the battlefield. Once the war drum sounds, one must either kill the enemy or be killed by them; how can one fail to advance? Similarly, scholars striving for official positions through imperial examinations think of nothing else but exams from dawn till dusk until they eventually succeed. If only they could apply such a mind to their studies, what achievements could they not make! Confucius stated, "At fifteen, I had my mind bent on learning", and "At thirty, I stood firm", which showed each stage derived logically from the previous. Wufeng said, "setting up one's will to lay one's foundation, and dwelling in seriousness to hold one's will." This saying is exceptionally profound.... Today's learners often say, "They were Yao and Shun, but I am a common man; how can I emulate Yao and Shun?" Those who utter such words pale in comparison to the Buddhist Sudhana, who declared, "I have awakened the mind of enlightenment, so there is nothing else I should do to become Buddha." He was willing to become a Buddha, yet these people are unwilling to emulate Yao and Shun.... It is said, "Only when one has established their aspiration can they seek the way to pursue their goals." However, even among Confucius's disciples, there were those who lacked aspiration, such as Zai Yu and Ran Qiu. Yan Yuan, of course, needs no mention. Considering the statement, "When Zilu heard something, if he had not yet succeeded on carrying it into practice, he was only afraid lest he should hear something", isn't this a sign of will? As for Qi Diaokai and Zeng Dian, they both

possessed a will. When Confucius was in Chen, he missed the radicals from Lu. Why were these radicals worthy of his missing? Because they had aspirations. Given the guidance of a sage as their teacher, they could all have become gentlemen. (Volume 118)

This quotation was recorded by Teng Lin in 1194, indicating that Master Zhu emphasized the importance of setting up one's will in his later years. However, even in his later years, Master Zhu did not provide a clear statement regarding whether there was the moral effort of holding the will in the whole process of doing the gongfu when the feelings are not aroused, nor did he clearly elucidate the relationship between keeping the seriousness and holding the will. We previously quoted a passage, which is "both will and thought belong to feelings. The character 'qíng' (feelings) is broader in scope, and both the characters 'xìng (nature)' and 'qíng (feelings)' are derived from 'xīn (mind)', hence the saying 'the mind commands man's nature and feelings'", was recorded by Shen Xian in the fourth year of Qingyuan (1198), three years before Master Zhu's death. Therefore it represents Master Zhu's views in his very late years. It is evident that even in his later years, he still attributed the will to the state when the feelings are aroused. From this expression, although he attempted to incorporate the will and thoughts into the structure of "the mind commands both nature and feelings", he primarily attributed the will to the broadly defined state after the feelings are aroused.

Reflections on Master Zhu's Thought on Will

As mentioned earlier, although Master Zhu also began to pay attention to the issue of setting up one's mind in his later years, and even made it the foundation (origin) and main direction of keeping the seriousness, preserving the mind and nourishing nature, in the end he did not affirm the position of the will in the not arousing part of the heart-mind, which also leads to the confusion in our understanding of Master Zhu's "the heart is the master of the nature and the emotions", the center of the mastery of the nature. Why does Master Zhu oppose the task of holding the will in the not arousing part of the heart-mind? This may relate to his understanding of 'keeping the seriousness.' He believed that the task in the state of not arousing part of the heart-mind mainly refers to the

self-cultivation, and this task primarily encompasses the constant vigilance in perception (keeping the mind ‘constantly alert’) and maintaining an orderly and serious demeanor externally but not the holding the original mind. In his view, holding on to the original mind is already a task that belongs to the arousing part of the heart-mind and may not only fail to keep the mind still but may first cause the self-mind to be disturbed. In addition, focusing on holding the mind inwardly can easily fall into the Buddhist mold. Master Zhu said in his Reply to Pan Shudu:

In your letter, you have shown your firm ambition to the fullest, which I deeply admire! However, regarding the word “respect” that you mentioned, I personally think that it is not appropriate to use it to name the reason of keeping the nature of the heart-mind. This is because the human heart-mind is the most intelligent of all, capable of mastering a thousand changes, rather than being mastered by external objects. Therefore, once there is the thought of persistently holding on to it, it means that this heart has already acted first. This is also why Cheng Yi said that “sitting in forgetfulness” is actually “sitting with mind going astray”, and he illustrated this point with the example of silently counting the pillars of a storehouse. When Cheng teaches scholars how to keep their mind in order, he will definitely say “to make the heart upright by means of reverence”, but he also says “to make the heart upright by means of reverence alone may not be upright.” Generally speaking, only by keeping one’s external serious and orderly one’s heart-mind can be mastered and one’s mind naturally nourished, and it is not the case that one has to find another method to maintain and nourish one’s mind and then call that method admire. This kind of problem seems to be a subtle misuse of terminology and is not worth debating in depth, but if left unchecked, I am afraid that it will be detrimental to the daily cultivation efforts. Therefore, I have made it a point to mention them again and again in my letter to you, and that is what I mean. I hope you will refer to it and comment on it to each other, so that our discernment will be clearer and the difference between Confucianism and Buddhism can be judged accordingly.⁴⁰

40 Chu Hsi. Master Hui-an Chu Wen Kung wen-chi [C]. Volume 46.

Although in terms of Master Zhu's thought itself, through the cultivation of the not arousing part of the heart-mind, the mind is made to conceive and perceive, and the nature and principles can be naturally manifested, however, without the will (Intention) implicitly present in it, how can it be ensured that the mind will always be oriented toward the nature of the reason and will not have any bias? This is perhaps one of the difficulties of the task of keeping the seriousness: on the one hand, keeping the seriousness involves a conscious mental effort to keep consciousness alert, cohesive, serene, and dedicated (Maintain Mindfulness). On the other hand, this mental effort can lead to deviation from the state of this pursuit due to the individual's conscious awareness, which then calls for avoiding artificial mental expectations (Avoid over-intervention) of the state mentioned above. If the mind and body are artificially and consciously manipulated, then not only will the mind not be tranquilized, but it may become even more disturbed, just as when a person suffers from insomnia, the more he tries to fall asleep as quickly as possible, the more he is unable to do so. However, in any case, keeping the seriousness in the initial stage must necessarily include a conscious spiritual self-training and self-control, which is why Cheng Yi would say: "concentrating on one thing is called seriousness. One is called sincerity. Concentration leads to intention."⁴¹ The so-called "intention" here can be understood as self-consciousness, but it should also include an effort of will. Perhaps, at the highest stage of the task of keeping the seriousness, the person does not need to make a conscious effort in order to achieve the concentration of consciousness and to be able to act like the sages, who "follow their heart and do not overstep the rules", but at the initial stage it is impossible not to include a conscious control of the will, even if the manifestation of this will is not very obvious.

Also, although Master Zhu emphasizes that the state of virtual stillness achieved by the subject through keeping the seriousness is different from that of the Buddha and Lao, i.e., the Buddhist's virtual stillness aims at the emptiness of consciousness, while the Confucian's virtual stillness intrinsically contains the nature and principles and is in a state of self-consciousness, how can the mind be made to maintain such a mental state stably and for a long period of time, if there is not an inner will (intention) pointing to the inner

41 Ch'eng Hao, Ch'eng I. Erh-Ch'eng I-shu (Surviving Works The Ch'eng Brothers) [M]. Volume 24.

nature and principles in this process without deviation? Although, in addition to keeping the seriousness, Master Zhu also emphasized the task of “advancing in study is in the pursuit of knowledge”, which ensures that the Confucian mind of not yet aroused is different from the Buddhist mind of tranquility. However, in his later years, Master Zhu also seemed to recognize that if there was no task of setting up one’s mind as a prerequisite, then it might lead to the lack of an “originating place” for the task of keeping serious and advancing in study, as well as the lack of a sense of direction and mastermind, which would result in aimlessness and weakness, and this is what he worried about in the Reply to Chen Zongchao: “If you think that you can go on doing things in such an ordinary way without having a clear beginning or a place to start, then I am afraid that the so-called solemn respect and cultivation of the body and mind, which are necessary things to be done, will become something that is not there, and that you are only grasping them in vain, but will not be able to achieve a precise, clear, true, and thorough effect.” Although Master Zhu realized this, he always objected to placing the will in the not arousing part of the heart-mind, which caused a lot of confusion about the domination of the heart over nature in its not yet arousing part of the heart-mind. As a matter of fact, Master Zhu was also very clear about the volitional character of “master” (主), and in the *Chu Tzu yü-lei*, Volume 98, he also said: “Shuai, i.e., ‘ambition, the marshal of qi’, has the meaning of master.” It can be seen that he also emphasizes the dominating role of the will. He repeatedly emphasized the dominance of the mind over the body and the need for the mind to be dominant in both the arousing and not arousing part of the heart-mind, but did not clearly affirm the dominant role played by the will in this. More often than not, he primarily emphasized the dominant role of reason (the mind of vacuity, spirit and perception). Although in his later years, especially after 1194, he had many discussions with his students on the issues of holding the will, setting up one’s mind, the intention, and the aspiration, and also highlighted the importance of the will (intention), he never clearly affirmed the existence of the will at the time of not arousing part of the heart-mind, nor did he explicitly affirm that there is the task of holding the will at the time of not arousing part of the heart-mind. This may be the reason why some late Ming and early Qing thinkers attached importance to the issue of will, especially Wang Chuan-shan, who put forward the idea of “holding the will”, revised and developed Master Zhu’s task of “rectifying the mind.”

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后记

田中有纪 TANAKA Yuki

书中的论文从各种角度分析了从宋代到明代的思想史。通过超越时代和专业的重新思考的过程，编者认为一种新的“朱子学”的研究形式已经出现。朱熹对什么样的文学作品做出了很高的评价，以及朱熹思想与南宋的道学和蜀学有什么样的影响关系，这个问题表明了朱子学是如何通过一个复杂的过程而形成的。此外，通过从礼学和科学的角度解读朱子学的时代，我们可以看到朱熹的哲学是如何以具体的方式与各种学术结合起来的。本书还收录了一些论文，有的仔细解读了朱熹的思想，有的通过与西方经典进行比较来重新思考中国经典的力量。我们应该更加关注朱熹本人试图更新传统，以及朱熹后学也积极参与传统的更新的事实。最重要的是，如果我们想在现代社会运用这些“传统”，应该更加了解我们选择的“传统”是什么，我们根据的以及我们想要改变的是什么。

最后介绍本次研讨会的报告者及报告题目。

2024 年日中韩朱子学学术研讨会“何为东亚思想中的‘传统’？”

开幕致辞：小島毅（东京大学）

第一场 宋代思想中的传统概念

主持人：许家星（北京师范大学）

福谷彬（京都大学） 道统论的政治功能

陈佑真（都留文科大学） 从蜀学到理学：以李杞《周易详解》为例

李春颖（中国政法大学） 宋代儒佛之辩的本体之维：空与有、空与实理

第二场 宋明理学和学术传统

主持人：朱光镐（同德女子大学）

史甄陶（台湾大学） 論顧夢麟《詩經說約》對朱公遷「興」論的繼承與展開

殷慧（湖南大学） 礼教传统的演进：从朱子礼学到阳明礼学

早川太基（神户大学） 抑揚頓挫，曲折甚多：朱子對陳師道詩文之評價

第三场 东亚经学与传统

主持人：福谷彬（京都大学）

高山大毅（东京大学）（翻译：廖嘉祈） 批判的手法：围绕获生徂徕的《论语徵》

姜智恩（台湾大学） 从东亚视角探讨近代初期知识分子对儒学传统的解读

许家星（北京师范大学） 朱子学现代性的质疑：百年来东亚的反理学研究

第四场 朱子学与传统

主持人：赵金刚（清华大学）

李天承（成均馆大学） 韩国朱子学的理学传统和栗谷性理说的意义

陈睿超（首都师范大学） 论朱子的太极训释

胡海忠（中国社会科学院） 前后超越与向外超越：经史传统的视域

第五场 理学与传统

主持人：早川太基（神户大学）

赵金刚（清华大学） 朱子思想中的魂魄与心

中岛谅（明海大学） 南宋后期陆学与汤汉的“融合”思想

朱光镐（同德女子大学） 本体与日常

第六场 日中韩博士生论坛

主持人：姜智恩（台湾大学）

新本果（东京大学） 真德秀对朱熹“齐家”思想的继承与发展

刘健时（清华大学） 论二程易学对“才”“性”概念的发明

佟欣妍（东京大学） 皇极之解与屋极之喻：以王安石《洪范传》为中心

王靖（台湾大学） 朝鮮儒者宋時烈「北伐」構想對朱子學的承繼與轉化

李昭姈（成均馆大学） 女性主义与主体性：以韩国儒者任允塾堂研究为例

第七场 “What is Tradition? From the Perspective of East Asian Philosophy”

Moderator: Tanaka Yuki (University of Tokyo)

Matsubara Emi (University of Tokyo)

The Encounter between Evolutionary Theory and Pre-modern Philosophy: Focusing on the Development of Oka Asajiro's Thought in the Republic of China

Tanaka Yuki (University of Tokyo)

Joseph Needham's View of the Characteristics of Physics in the History of Chinese Science and His Thoughts on Confucianism and Taoism

Gao Haibo (Qinghua University)

On Master Zhu's Thoughts of Will and Ideas

闭幕致辞：田中有纪、赵金刚、朱光镐

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UIA Booklet 02

何为东亚思想中的“传统”？

——2024 年日中韩朱子学学术研讨会论文集

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