

A Critical Edition of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī*: The Buddhist Refutation of Kumārila's Criticism of *Apoha*

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A survey of research


The Buddhist theory of *apoha* (exclusion)—‘cow’ denotes negation of non-cows and not a positive entity such as a universal <cowness>—is one of the topics that have attracted many scholars of Indian philosophy and Buddhist studies. Its description in general introductory books on Buddhist logic, such as Stcherbatsky [1930-32], has contributed to excite readers' interest in this paradoxical doctrine of negation as the meaning of a word and as the object of conceptual cognition. A detailed study by Mookerjee [1935] on *apoha* based on Sanskrit texts thitherto published has provided a foundational hypothesis of its historical development, distinguishing three main phases: 1. Dignāga (who is criticized by Uddyotakara and Kumārila), 2. Later Buddhists, notably Śāntarakṣita, 3. and Ratnakīrti (who criticizes Vācaspati).

As in the case of many other topics in Indian philosophy, the most important pioneering work for philological and historical research on *apoha* was carried out by Frauwallner [1932-37]. His series of articles “Beiträge zur Apohalehre” elucidated the *apoha* theory of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV) I and Dharmottara's *Apohaprakaraṇa* (AP). Frauwallner's careful study is based on their Tibetan translations of these works. Sāṅkṛtyāyana discovered the original Sanskrit texts of PV, Manorathanandin's *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā* (PVV) and Karṇakagomin's *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā* (PVSVṬ) in Tibet and published them in 1938, 1938-40 and 1943 respectively. He also reconstructed the Sanskrit text of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* (PVSV) based on its Tibetan translation and its commentary PVSVṬ. On the basis of Sanskrit manuscripts, Malvania and Gnoli published editions

of PVSV in 1959 and 1960 respectively.

Krishnamacharya published Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṃgraha* (TS) and its commentary *Tattvasaṃgrahaṭṭhikā* (TSP) by Kamalaśīla in 1926 and Mokṣākaragupta's *Tarkabhāṣā* (TBh) in 1942. Ihara [1951] (and later Ōta [1973]) expounded Śāntarakṣita's theory of *apoha*. Ratnakīrti's *Apohasiddhi* (and *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi*) were published by H. Shāstri in his *Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts in Sanskrit* back in 1910. Thakur's editions of *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī* (RNĀ) and *Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvalī* (JNĀ) appeared in 1957 and 1959. Based on this Sanskrit edition Kajiyama [1960] and Sharma [1969] expounded Ratnakīrti's theory of *apoha*.

Hattori's Japanese translation with detailed annotation of the *apoha* chapter of Kumāri's *Ślokavārttika* (ŚV) appeared in 1973-75. Since 1978 Akamatsu published a number of important articles clarifying the Buddhist theory of *apoha* both theoretically and historically. Ogawa [1981a][1981b] elucidates Jñānaśrīmitra's theory of *apoha*. Concerning the criticism of the Buddhist theory of *apoha* by Nyāya scholars, Hattori [1979b][1980] studied Uddyotakara's *Nyāyavārttika* (NV) and Akamatsu [1982] studied Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī* (NM), Bhāsarvajña's *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* (NBhū), Vācaspatimiśra's *Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā* (NVTṬ) and Śrīdhara's *Nyāyakandaḷī* (NK). Contrasting the *Vidhivādin* and *Pratiṣedhavādin*, Akamatsu [1986] concludes that the historical development of the Buddhist theory of *apoha* must have been as follows.



Katsura [1986][1988] reviews the 'remarkable advancement' of recent research on *apoha* and shows that it is time to reconsider Mookerjee's hypothesis. His careful study of Jñānaśrīmitra's theory of *apoha* demonstrates that the apparently new idea of Jñānaśrīmitra in fact stems from Dharmakīrti at least in germ, e.g. with regard to the simultaneous understanding of both affirmation and negation (cf. also Ogawa [1981a]).

The loss of the original Sanskrit texts of Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (PS) V and Dharmottara's AP is a major obstacle for us in attempting to proceed further in reconstructing the historical development of the *apoha* theory in detail.⁽¹⁾ However, the gap can be filled in by carefully studying non-Buddhist texts. Kumāriḷa criticizes Dignāga and Jayanta criticizes Dharmottara. Jayanta first depicts Kumāriḷa's criticism of *apoha* and thus provides us a summary in prose to understand Dignāga's theory from the viewpoint of a severe opponent. The relevant portion has been critically reedited by the present author in Kataoka [2008]. Jayanta then reproduces the Buddhist refutation of Kumāriḷa's criticism clearly based on Dharmottara's AP, as Cakradhara's commentary NMGBh (132.24: *jñānārthābhyām anya eveti dharmottarah*) and modern studies such as Frauwallner [1937] and Hattori [2006] demonstrate. This is the portion that is reedited in the present article.

It is noticeable that previous research has a tendency to see the whole history of *apoha* from the viewpoint of the latest theorists such as Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti. Needless to say, however, it has to be borne in mind that these scholars were engaged in refuting their own opponents such as Vācaspati and Sucarita (the latter is referred to as *kaumārila*). They have their own motivation that is quite different from their predecessors such as Dharmakīrti, who must have been targeting his own opponents in the seventh century. Dharmottara's old view that was once most influential is discarded by Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti by pointing out that his theory 'is supported neither by ordinary people, tradition nor philosophers' (JNĀ 229.16-17: *alaukikam anāgamam atārkiḷyam*) and labeling him simply as *pratiṣedhavādin* (RNĀ 54.4). Jayanta's perspective provides us with another look at the history and motives for various theories of *apoha*.

1 For studies on PSV V, see Hattori [2000:138].

Historical development of the theory of *apoha*

On the basis of the description by Jayanta (ca. 840-900 AD), we can reconstruct the historical development of the *apoha* theory as viewed by a scholar in late ninth-century Kashmir. Jayanta refers to three Buddhist views of *apoha* that can tentatively be called **abhāvavāda*, **jñānāṃśavāda* and **āropitavāda*, the last of which can be safely attributed to Dharmottara.

1. *apoha*: *abhāva*
2. *apoha*: *jñānāṃśa* (or *jñānākāra*, *buddhipratibhāsa*, *buddhyākāra*, *buddhipratibimba*)
3. *apoha*: *āropita* (or *samāropita*, *ālīka*, *nistattva*, *nīrūpa*, *bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇa*)

The distinction between the latter two views is also found in Sucarita's description of Buddhist views.⁽²⁾ Just as is the case for Jayanta, this distinction comprises the basic framework of Sucarita's understanding of the Buddhist theory of *apoha*. According to Sucarita, the second view regards *apoha* as 'a form of cognition itself' (*svākāra*) and the third, i.e. Dharmottara's view, as being 'postulated, unreal and false' (*kalpitam nistattvam alīkam*). Therefore, it seems that around 900 AD, i.e. in the post-Dharmottara period, it was not uncommon to describe the Buddhist theory of *apoha* under this kind of scheme.

The view of Śāntarakṣita, whom Dharmottara seems to criticize⁽³⁾ and whom Ratnakīrti labels as *vidhivādin* (RNĀ 54.3), cannot be precisely identified in Jayanta's explanation. It is conceivable that Jayanta may have understood Śāntarakṣita's view criticized by Dharmottara as being in the same line as the second view '*jñānāṃśavāda*'. And insofar as Śāntarakṣita accepts a reflective image (*pratibimba*) in a cognition,

2 ŚVK 2615.9-11: *kas tasyā viśayaḥ. svākāra evety eke. kalpitam nistattvam alīkam ity anye.*

"What is the object of that [cognition]? Some say that it is precisely the form of [cognition] itself. Others say that it is postulated, unreal and false."

3 Akamatsu [1979] points out the similarity of the view attributed to 'someone' criticized in AP 589(240).24-26 and 590(241).11-18 with the view of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla in TS(P) 1018.

his view could indeed be classified as the second, according to Jayanta's scheme. One should perhaps also take into consideration that Śāntarakṣita was rarely referred to in brahmanical texts. There is no hint in NM that Jayanta knows TS.⁴⁾

Dignāga, Kumāriḷa and Dharmakīrti

A noun such as 'cow' denotes a universal (*jāti*) or an entity qualified by a universal (*jātimat*). Dignāga criticizes these and other brahmanical views by replacing the universal with 'exclusion of other things' (*anyāpoha*) or 'being excluded from other things' (*arthāntaranivṛtti*). According to Dignāga, a word denotes an entity qualified by the exclusion from other things (*śabdo 'rthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭān eva bhāvān āha*).⁵⁾ Kumāriḷa captures the parallel structure between the two views. Namely, both views presuppose a qualified entity. Therefore Dharmakīrti correctly designates the theory of *apoha* as criticized by Kumāriḷa as *tadvatpakṣa* (PV I 64, see below).

<i>jāti</i>	≈	<i>anyāpoha</i>
<i>dravya</i>		<i>bhāva</i>

As Jayanta's description of the first view '*abhāvavāda*' suggests, Kumāriḷa first reinterprets Dignāga's *apoha* as being equivalent to an external nonexistent (*abhāva*)

4 Cf. also Hattori [2006:68]: "But Jayanta makes no mention of the responses to and counter-criticism of Kumāriḷa's criticism by Dharmakīrti, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. It is to be surmised that this was perhaps because in late ninth-century Kashmir, where he lived, the main current of Buddhist philosophy was represented by the thought of Dharmottara, who had also been active in Kashmir, but for the moment I wish to refrain from being any more explicit in this regard."

5 PSV ad V 36d (quoted in PVSV 62.27-63.1).

6 ŚV *apoha* 1: *agonivṛttiḷḷi sāmānyam vācyam yaiḷḷi parikalpītam/ gotvaḷḷi vastv eva tair uktam ago'pohagīrā sphuṭam/* "It is clear that the [Buddhists] who postulate a universal 'exclusion from non-cows' as being expressed [by the word "cow"] are referring precisely to the real entity 'cowness' with the word 'exclusion of non-cows'."

and severely criticizes it by making the point that the alleged <not non-cows> (exclusion from non-cows, *agonivṛtti*) is nothing but cowness (*gotva*). Double negation of a cow comes to be the same as affirmation of a cow, as is pointed out by Kumāriḷa in the opening verse of the *apoha* section of the *Ślokavārttika*.⁽⁶⁾ The ontological status of *apoha* and of *anya* are now questioned. As Hattori [1975:52][2006:68] points out⁽⁷⁾ and Akamatsu [1980][1986:70] explicitly claims,⁽⁸⁾ one can regard Dharmakīrti's *apoha-theory* as a reply to Kumāriḷa. See, for example, Dharmakīrti's reply to a criticism of just the kind which is made by Kumāriḷa.

PV I 64 (34.17-18):

*tenānyāpohaviṣaye tadvatpakṣopavarnanam/
pratyākhyātaṃ pṛthakte hi syād doṣo jātitadvatoḥ//*

Therefore, concerning the object (i.e. locus) of exclusion of other things, the [opponent's] explanation of the [Buddhist] view of *tadvat* (a locus qualified by *apoha*) is refuted, for if [*apoha* and its locus were] different, the problem that applies to [the non-Buddhist view of] universal and its locus would apply [similarly to the Buddhist view of *apoha*].

As Jayanta correctly paraphrases in section 1 of the present edition, Dharmakīrti points out his opponent's misunderstanding of *apoha* as being an external entity <nonexistent> (*abhāva*) separate from its locus. Indeed, Dignāga's way of presenting *apoha* is vulnerable to Kumāriḷa's criticism.⁽⁹⁾

The problem of double negation pointed out in ŚV *apoha* v. 1 and v. 97 is one of the most serious objections to which the Buddhists must respond.⁽¹⁰⁾ As Kumāriḷa points out in v. 97 and Jayanta clarifies in section 5 in Kataoka [2008:185], because other things such as horses to be excluded, are also essentially an *apoha* and therefore a kind of nonexistent (*abhāva*₂), the *apoha*, i.e. *abhāva*₁, that is different from *abhāva*₂

7 See, for example, Hattori [2006:68]: "Dharmakīrti provides answers to several of the points raised in Kumāriḷa's criticism."

8 See his translation of PVSV 34.19 *yad āhuḥ* as "Ce que [Kumāriḷa] dit". (Akamatsu [1986:70])

would be a positive entity. In other words, *apoha* that is different from *abhāva*₂ would be nothing but existent (*bhāva*).

$$\begin{array}{c} abhāva_1 = apoha \neq \textit{anya} (=apoha = abhāva_2) \\ | \\ gauḥ \end{array}$$

On the other hand, if the *apoha* is not different from other things to be excluded, a cow would be equal to non-cows. These and other problems that Kumārila has pointed out in ŚV come out from his wrong assumption that *apoha* is a separate entity <nonexistent>. In other words, Kumārila presupposes the *tadvat* view and thereon

9 In this regard, remarks by Mookerjee [1935] and Katsura [1986] are both to be reconsidered. Mookerjee [1935(1997): 131]: “There are indications which warrant us to suppose that Dignāga put forward the theory of *apoha* as a pure negation without any positive reference and so his theory came in for ruthless animadversion first in the hands of Uddyotakara and then of Kumārila.” Katsura [1986:171]: “Further, if we look into the works of Diñnāga and Dharmakīrti, it is rather difficult to regard them as pure Negativists. A fragment of Diñnāga quoted by Dharmakīrti, “A portion of the real object is known through the exclusion of the other objects; a linguistic item (*śabda*) expresses the object qualified by the negation of the other objects,” even shows a close affinity to the Synthetist theory.” (underlined by Kataoka) Katsura’s objection to Mookerjee, especially concerning the misleading passage ‘without any positive reference’, can be partly justified, because Dignāga accepts a positive entity qualified by *apoha*. But Katsura misses the point of ‘pure negation’. As Jayanta describes, Kumārila assumes that Dignāga’s *apoha* is nothing but *abhāva* distinct from its locus. This is the ‘pure negation’. Whatever Mookerjee really intends with the word ‘pure negation’ here, it seems to me that Kumārila correctly captures Dignāga and that therefore Dharmakīrti gives up holding Dignāga’s view that he designates *tadvatpakṣa*. It is true, as Katsura assumes, that the basic structure remains the same for Dignāga, Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti (RNĀ 54.2: *anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ śabdānām arthaḥ*). But it does not mean that Dignāga’s view “shows a close affinity to the Synthetist theory.” ‘Pure negation’, i.e. *apoha* as an external *abhāva* distinct from its locus, and ‘pure Negativists’, i.e. *pratiśedhavādin*, are to be distinguished as they belong to completely different contexts. One would fall into anachronism if one claimed that Dignāga already anticipated Jñānaśrīmitra’s synthetic theory that intends to overcome the defect of a *vidhivādin*, such as Śantarakṣita, and a *pratiśedhavādin*, such as Dharmottara.

applies the logic of double negation. But his presupposition is false according to Dharmakīrti.

PVSV 32.15-17:

tatrāpy anyāpohe na vyāvṛttir anyānya eva vyāvṛttaḥ, tadvyāvṛtter nivartamānasya tadbhāvaprasaṅgāt. tathā ca vyāvṛtter apy abhāvaḥ. tasmād yaiva vyāvṛtṭiḥ sa eva vyāvṛttaḥ.

Furthermore, with regard to ‘exclusion of the other’ (*anyāpoḥa*), it is not the case that exclusion (*vyāvṛtti*) and the excluded (*vyāvṛtta*) are absolutely different. For, [if they were different], the thing [such as a cow] that is [different and therefore] excluded from ‘exclusion of the other’ (*tadvyāvṛtti*) would be equal to the affirmation of the other. [To explain, a cow would be equal to a horse, because a cow is the double negation of a horse., i.e. a cow is not a non-horse.] And then even the exclusion [e.g. of a cow from a horse] would not occur [because a cow is equal to a horse]. Therefore exclusion is not different from the excluded.⁽¹¹⁾

Dharmakīrti explains a problem caused by this separation, probably modeling it on Kumāriḷa’s criticism in v. 1 and partly in v. 97, in which Kumāriḷa uses the logic of double negation. If *vyāvṛtti* (in *tadvyāvṛtti*) is different from *vyāvṛtta*, *vyāvṛtta* would be equal to *tad*, because *vyāvṛtta* is different from the negation of *tad*. Double negation of *tad* results in the affirmation of *tad*.

$$\begin{array}{c} \text{vyāvṛtti} \neq \text{tad} (= \text{agauḥ}) \\ \text{+} \\ \text{vyāvṛtta} \end{array}$$

10 ŚV *apōha* 97: *abhāvasya ca yo 'bhāvaḥ sa cet tasmād vilakṣaṇaḥ/ bhāva eva bhaven, no ced gaur agaus te prasajyate//* “And if the negation₁ of a nonexistent₂ were different from the latter₂, it₁ would be equal to an existent. If [it₁ were] not [different], a cow would be equal to a non-cow for you.”

11 Cf. a translation by Ōta [1979:80].

Against this criticism, Dharmakīrti makes it clear that exclusion (*apoha*, *nivṛtti*, *vyāvṛtti*) is ontologically not different from the excluded (*nivṛta*, *vyāvṛta*)⁽¹²⁾.

$$\begin{array}{c} \textit{nivṛtti} \leftrightarrow \textit{anya} \\ \parallel \\ \textit{nivṛta} \end{array}$$

As Jayanta makes clear in the opening section 1 of the present edition when describing a Buddhist view that is most probably attributed to Dharmakīrti,⁽¹³⁾ *apoha* is not an external nonexistent (*abhāva*) but only an internal cognition itself (*āntaro jñānātmā*). Conceptual cognition grasps its own part (*svāṃśa*) and does not operate towards something external. Sucarita specifies it as *jñānākāra* and Ratnakīrti more correctly *bahiradyasto vikalpabuddhyākāraḥ* (RNĀ 55.1).

The Buddhist view of *apoha* as *jñānāṃśa*

It is perhaps necessary to examine whether the view of *jñānāṃśa* referred to by Jayanta can be attributed to Dharmakīrti. In ŚV *apoha* 38ab Kumāriḷa proposes a view that a form that appears in a cognition plays the role of universal as a real entity (*sāmānyam vasturūpaṃ hi buddhyākāro bhaviṣyati*).⁽¹⁴⁾ Dharmakīrti explicitly rejects this view of *buddhyākāra*.

PVSV 40.3-5: *evaṃ tarhi buddher eva pratibhāso jñānarūpatvāt sann eva sāmānyam. tan na. yasmāt—jñānād avyatiriktaṃ ca katham arthāntaraṃ vrajet//* (PV I 71cd)

[Q:] Then the reflective image that precisely belongs to a cognition is a universal as it exists being essentially a cognition.

12 Cf. also section 2.3 in the present edition.

13 Hattori [2006:66] also attributes to Dharmakīrti this view that Jayanta describes as *atmakhyātigarbhā saraṇiḥ* (section 3.2 in the present edition).

14 See also Karṇakagomin's clarification in PVSVT 175 (ad PV I 71cd).

[A:] No. The reason is as follows. —And how can [a form] that is not distinct from a cognition operate towards another object?

As Ogawa [1999] demonstrates, the view of *buddhyākāra*, conceptual representation, can be traced back to Bhartṛhari. Dharmakīrti's rejection makes it seem as if he does not accept the view of internal cognition as *apoha*. But this is probably not the case. Dharmakīrti's intention here is to reject Bhartṛhari's view (as suggested by Kumāriḷa) that postulates an internal image that appears in a cognition belonging to different objects and thus functioning as a 'real' (*vasturūpa*, *sann eva*) universal. Dharmakīrti's own view is quite different.

PVSV 34.26-35.1: *śabdāśrayā buddhir anādivāsanāsāmarthyād asaṃsṛṣṭān api dharmān saṃsṛjantī jāyate. tasyāḥ pratibhāsavaśena sāmānyam sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ ca vyavasthāpyate.*

A cognition arises depending on a word, as it connects even unrelated properties by means of residual impressions that has no beginning. [Our daily activity related to] <universal> [such as cowness] and <having the same locus> [such as 'mīlam utpalam'] are established by means of an image that appears in that [cognition].

Dharmakīrti's view which refers to the role of *vāsanā* is clearly echoed by Jayanta in section 3.2 in which he describes the second view '*jñānāṃśavāda*'. Here Dharmakīrti clearly accepts *buddhipratibhāsa* which plays the role of universal not as a real entity (*vasturūpa*, *sann eva*) but merely by appearance. It is not the case that *buddhipratibhāsa* actually belongs to external objects. Externality is merely superimposed on it, as is clarified by Kaṇṇakagomin as follows.

PVSVṬ 175.16-21: *satyam. na jñānarūpasya vyaktiṣv anvayaḥ, kiṃ tu tasmin buddhipratibhāse tadbhāvādhyavasāyāt, bāhyabhāvādhyavasāyāt. tathā bhrāntiyā samānavyavahāra itī cet. etac ceṣṭam eva siddhāntavādīnaḥ. kevalam prakṛtyaikakāryā vyaktayo 'tatkāryād vyāvṛttās tathābhūtāyā vikalpabuddher*

nimittam ity anyāpohāśrayā sā buddhir ity abhimataṃ sāstrakārasya.

[Q:] It is true that a form in a cognition does not belong to [different] individuals. But [it operates as a universal] by superimposing the nature of those [individuals], i.e. by superimposing externality, to that appearance in a cognition. In this way, the daily activity of 'generic' [is possible] by error.

[A:] This is exactly [the view] that the [Buddhist] proponent accepts. Merely [there is a difference] that individuals which by nature have the same effect and which are excluded from [other things] not having the same effect are the cause of this kind of conceptual cognition. In this way, Dharmakīrti accepts that this cognition [of a universal image] is based on exclusion of other things.

Karṇakagomin admits that an internal image that essentially is part of cognition functions as a kind of universal. Śāntarakṣita also accepts a reflective image that appears in a cognition (TS 1005ab: *jñāne bhāty arthapratibimbakam*; 1011ab: *tadrūpapratibimbasya dhiyah*). Kamalaśīla (TSP 352.5-24) discusses in detail the difference of the Buddhist view from that of the *buddhyākāravādin*, i.e. Bhartṛhari, a proponent who has the same view proposed by Kumāriḷa in ŚV *apoha* 38ab, who accepts it as an absolute truth that an image in a cognition is the referent of a word.

TSP ad 890 (352.5-24): *apohavādināpi buddhyākāro bāhyarūpatayā gṛhītaḥ śabdārtha itī bhāṣyata eva. ... buddhyākāravādinā tu buddhyākāraḥ paramārthato vācya iṣyata itī mahān viśeṣaḥ.*

[Opponent:] The [Buddhist] proponent of *apoha*, too, definitely states that an image in a cognition that is grasped as an external object is the meaning of a word. ... [Buddhist:] The [non-Buddhist] proponent of *buddhyākāra* claims that an image in a cognition is the referent [of a word] from the viewpoint of the absolute truth. Therefore there is a big difference [from the Buddhist view].

Opponents tend to simplify the Buddhist view and reduce *apoha* to *buddhyākāra*, an image that appears in cognition. But Buddhists emphasize that *apoha* is not accepted from the viewpoint of the absolute truth (*paramārthataḥ*).⁽¹⁵⁾ Dharmakīrti

and his followers do accept *buddhyākāra*, but only in the mundane level. *Buddhyākāra* plays the role of universal only practically. Thus, we can probably say that the second Buddhist view that Jayanta refers to is attributed to Dharmakīrti and his followers before Dharmottara, at least by Buddhist logicians up until Śāntarakṣita. At least one can say that Jayanta understands Dharmakīrtian view before Dharmottara as *jñānāṃśavāda* in contrast to Dharmottara's *āropitavāda*.

Dharmottara's view

Dharmakīrti clarifies that the demarcation between 'that' (*tad*) and 'other things' (*anya*) to be excluded is determined from the viewpoint of their utility. That is to say, <other things> are those which do not have the same effect (*atatkārya*). Thus, according to Dharmakīrti as is described by Jayanta's representation, <exclusion of other things> (*anyāpoha*) is reinterpreted as <being excluded from those which do not have the same effect> (*atatkāryaparāvṛtti*).

$$\begin{array}{c} vikalpa \rightarrow svāṃśa \\ | \\ nivṛtta = nivṛtti \leftrightarrow anya \text{ (atatkārya)} \end{array}$$

This solution by Dharmakīrti is not the final one. As Jayanta describes in section 2.4, then our conceptual cognition (*vikalpa*) evoked by a noun 'cow', which has only a vague image of cow, would become equal to direct perception (*grahaṇa*). In other words, when we grasp exclusion (*vyāvṛtti*), we grasp the entity being excluded (*nivṛtta*), too, because the two are not different from each other according to Dharmakīrti's reinterpretation. Furthermore, as a certain opponent whom Jayanta refers to as *kecana*

15 A parallel discussion is found in Mookerjee [1935(1997): 112-113] and Ogawa [1999]. See, e.g. Ogawa [1999:283]: "Thus, for the Vaiyākaraṇas, the word does have its object, directly a conceptual representation and indirectly Brahman. While for the Buddhist epistemologists the word never touches the reality, for the Vaiyākaraṇas it does in one way or another."

16 See section 2.3 in the present edition.

and whom Dharmottara refers to in his *Apohaprakaraṇa*⁽¹⁶⁾ rightly points out, if we followed this view that one grasps the entity being excluded (*vyāvṛttagrahaṇapakṣe*), it would be necessary to simultaneously grasp the three items (*tritayagrahaṇa*): 1. the entity that is excluded from other things (*yad vyāvṛttam*); 2. the cause by which it is excluded (*yena nimittena vyāvṛttam*), namely, <not having the same effect> (*atatkāryatva*); 3. and the other things from which it is excluded (*yato vyāvṛttam*).

Contrary to Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara separates the two, i.e. *nivṛtti* and *nivṛtta* so that conceptual cognition and perception are distinct. Ontologically speaking, *apoha* is neither external nor internal (*nāntar na bahir*), but a certain image that is superimposed (*āropitaṃ kiñcid ākāramātram*) on an entity, as he proclaims in the opening verse of the *Apohaprakaraṇa*.⁽¹⁷⁾ It is unreal (*nistattva*) and false (*alīka*). In other words, the object of conceptual cognition is a shadow of an entity. Conceptual cognition (*vikalpa*) is colored only by the shadow of an entity (*dṛśyacchāyā*) and not by the entity itself (*dṛśyo 'rthaḥ*), and different from perception (*darśana*) with respect to their objects.

$$\begin{array}{ccc}
 \text{vikalpa} & \rightarrow & \text{āropitākāra}=\text{chāyā}=\text{vyāvṛtti} \leftrightarrow \text{anya (atatkārya)} \\
 & & | \\
 \text{darśana} & \rightarrow & \text{dṛśya}
 \end{array}$$

One can regards Dharmottara's unique view of *apoha* as being partly inspired by his teacher Arcaṭa (ca. 710-770 AD). Arcaṭa states that a form which functions as a kind of universal (*sāmānyākāra*) is untrue (*nūrūpa*) and that it cannot be a reflective image of a conceptual cognition (*vikalpapratibimbaka*).

17 See Ishida [2008]. *buddhyā kalpikayā viviktam aparair yad rūpam ullikhyate buddhir no na bahir yad eva ca vadan nistattvam āropitam/ yas tattvaṃ jagato jagāda vijayī niḥśe-ṣadoṣadvīṣaṃ vaktāraṃ tam iha praṇamya śirasāpohaḥ sa vistāryate*! "The nature which is distinct from others is drawn by the conceptual cognition, as neither the cognition nor the external (object). Paying reverence here with my head to the faultless teacher who is the conqueror and who, stating that unreal and superimposed (nature), taught people the truth, I shall explain in detail that (doctrine of) exclusion (*apoha*).” (Ishida's translation)

HBṬ 221.10-11: *vikalpāvabhāsi ca sāmānyākāro naiva vikalpasyātmabhūtaḥ, tasya nīrūpasya vasturūpavirodhāt, tadrūpasya ca vikalpapratibimbakasya (-bimbakasya) em.; -bimbacrasya ed.) sāmānyātmatāvīrahāt. yasmād abāhyasyāpi bāhyatayā vyavasitasyānanuyāyino 'py anuyāyitayā sāmānyātmakatvam.*

It is not the case that a generic form that appears in a conceptual cognition is the conceptual cognition itself, because it [i.e. a generic form] cannot be a real entity insofar as it is unreal, and because an image in a conceptual cognition that is essentially [a conceptual cognition itself] cannot be a generic property. For it is essentially a generic property that is determined as being external though it is not external insofar as it belongs to [the objects of the same kind] though [in fact] it does not belong to [them].

Durvekamiśra clarifies Arcaṭa's intention and states that Arcaṭa assumes *apoha* that is essentially false (*abhāka*).

HBṬĀ 407.8: *sāmānyākārasya nīrūpasyeti (nīrūpasyeti) corr.; nīrūpasyeti ed.) ca vyācakṣāṇo 'lkarūpatām apohasyābhipraiti.*


And when [Arcaṭa] states 'of a generic form that is untrue', he intends that *apoha* is essentially false.

As Arcaṭa's passage indicates, the main motive for him to refute the view of *vikalpapatibimba*, i.e. an internal image that appears in a cognition (i.e. *buddhyākāra*), is that it cannot function as universal belonging to different external entities because it is real (*vasturūpa*) insofar as it is essentially part of conceptual cognition. In the immediately following line he quotes PV I 71 (by which Dharmakīrti probably intends to criticize ŚV *apoha* 38ab). Comparing Arcaṭa's immature expression 'nīrūpa' with Dharmottara's description of *apoha* as 'buddhir no na bahir' and 'nistattvam āropitam', it is likely that Dharmottara is indeed the originator of this unique view. But it is also clear that Arcaṭa already feels dissatisfied with the traditional interpretation of *apoha* as *vikalpapatibimba*, an interpretation that can be traced back to Dharmakīrti. One

can propose that Dharmottara's main motive to introduce a new view inspired by his teacher is the concern that the old view of *vikalṣapratibimba* in fact cannot overcome the defect that Dharmakīrti intends to avoid in PV I 71cd. Insofar as an internal image is essentially part of cognition, it is real (*vasturūpa*) and remains to be an existent (*sann eva*) and therefore cannot take the role of universal.

Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara

From the preceding investigation we can probably draw a historical development of the theory of *apoha* up to Jayanta as follows.



Recapitulating the three Buddhist views that Jayanta describes, *apoha* is ontologically defined as follows:

1. Dignāga: *apoha* = *abhāva* (as interpreted by Kumāriḷa)
2. Dharmakīrti: *apoha* = *buddhyākāra*, *atākāryaparāvṛtta* (because *vyāvṛtti* = *vyāvṛtta*)
3. Dharmottara: *apoha* = *kaścid āropita ākāraḥ* (neither external nor internal)

Epistemologically, their theories of *apoha* as viewed by Jayanta can be described as follows:

1. Dignāga: a word denotes an entity qualified by exclusion and thus operates externally.
2. Dharmakīrti: conceptual cognition grasps its own part (*svāmśa*) and thus

operates internally.

3. Dharmottara: conceptual cognition is colored by a shadow of an entity (*dr̥śyacchāyā*) that is neither internal nor external.

It is evident that Jayanta makes clear the difference of the three views by distinguishing the three phases: external → internal → neither external nor internal. He also contrasts the latter two views which we can attribute to Dharmakīrti (and his subsequent followers) and Dharmottara respectively as ‘a path based on the appearance of itself’ (*ātmakhyātigarbhā saraṇiḥ*) and ‘a path based on the appearance of nonexistent’ (*asatkhyātigarbhā saraṇiḥ*), by using Maṇḍana’s scheme of classifying cognitive error (*vibhrama*).

Dharmakīrti: *ātmakhyātigarbhā saraṇiḥ*

Dharmottara: *asatkhyātigarbhā saraṇiḥ*

18 Not only Jayanta but also Dharmottara is conscious of the difference of his view from Dharmakīrti’s. An opponent in AP 587(238).22 criticizes Dharmottara’s final view by pointing out that his view of *apoha* as being untrue and false (*dīos po med pa*) contradicts Dharmakīrti’s statement in PVin II that assumes *apoha* as being *svapratibhāsa*, i.e. an internal image. PVin II 46.7: *svapratibhāse ’narthe ’rthādhyavasāyena pravartanāt*. Of course Dharmottara justifies his view by reinterpreting Dharmakīrti’s statement. But this shows that Dharmottara implicitly criticizes Dharmakīrti. As Jayanta correctly captures, there is a clear and substantial difference between Dharmakīrti’s and Dharmottara’s views. But Frauwallner [1937] finds no substantial difference between the two. Frauwallner [1937:280, n.1]: “Den Unterschied zwischen dieser Auffassung und der Lehre Dharmakīrtis hat Jayantabhaṭṭa gut hervorgehoben. ... Auch Dharmakīrti hatte nicht das Vorstellungsbild an sich als Gegenstand der Vorstellungen bezeichnet, sondern nur insofern es nach außen verlegt erscheint. Aber Dharmottara hat die Verschiedenheit von der Erkenntnis als solcher schärfer hervorgehoben, wenn er auch, wie seine Darstellung zeigt, den Zusammenhang zwischen Erkenntnisbild und Gegenstand der Vorstellung nie aus dem Auge verloren hat. Über die tatsächlichen Verhältnisse bestand also keine Meinungsverschiedenheit. Nur in der Art, wie sie aufgefaßt und ausgedrückt wurden, liegt der Unterschied.” Frauwallner’s observation that dismisses the sharp contrast between the two views is in contrast with Jayanta’s understanding of the historical development of *apoha*.


From the perspective of Jayanta at least, Dharmakīrti regards *āpoḥa* as an extension of internal cognition itself that appears as if external being influenced by various residual impressions (§3.2), whereas Dharmottara denies any kind of existential possibility of *āpoḥa* (§3.1). It exists neither internally nor externally. It is a certain image merely superimposed. It is an appearance of nothing (*asatkhyāti*).⁽¹⁸⁾

The appropriateness of the name ‘exclusion’

Whereas the negative term “*āpoḥa*” (exclusion) is suitable in Dignāga’s view, it is not necessarily so in the latter two views. Therefore, it is necessary for them to show how the negative name fits in its referent. Dharmakīrti presupposes *āpoḥa* as an extension of internal cognition. This is not a negative entity but positive. It would be proper for him to say that the cognition produced by hearing “cow” has cognition itself as its object. Dharmottara presupposes *āpoḥa* as a certain superimposed image that is neither external nor internal and that is neither existent nor nonexistent. His view would imply that the object of conceptual cognition is a superimposed image and not exclusion. How could the expression ‘exclusion as the object of a noun’ or ‘exclusion as the object of conceptual cognition’ fit in? According to Jayanta’s description of Dharmottara’s view (§2.4, 2.6, 2.8), the negative term ‘exclusion’ is used not on the basis of our actual feeling (*pratīpattitaḥ*), but it is a figurative usage (*upacāra*) applied only theoretically (*yuktitaḥ*). This is a usage by analytic scholars (*nītividaḥ*, *vyākhyātāraḥ*) and not ordinary people in everyday activity (*vyavahartāraḥ*). Jayanta’s explanation of the other view is simpler. The usage is based on ‘the connection with the shadow of exclusion’ (§3.2: *vyāvṛtticchāyāyogāt*).

The problem of activity (*pravṛtti*)

The *āpoḥa* theory denies a non-Buddhist view that conceptual cognition has an external entity as its object (*vastuviśayatva*). But our activity deals with an external entity and not exclusion. Therefore it is necessary to explain how people who have undertaken action (*pravṛtta*) will obtain an external entity (*vastuprāpti*). Buddhists have to explain the gap between the object of conceptual cognition and that of activity.



Jayanta's manner of description reveals that there are two different views inside Buddhism, probably one attributed to Dharmakīrti and the other to Dharmottara.

Dharmakīrti: *dṛśyavikalpyayor ekikaraṇam (abhedādhyavasāyaḥ) → pravṛtti*
Dharmottara: *dṛśyavikalpyayor bhedānadhyavasāyaḥ → pravṛtti*

Dharmakīrti holds that combining the seen and the conceptualized (*dṛśyavikalpyayor ekikaraṇam*) is the cause of activity. In other words, the cause is the determination of oneness (*abhedādhyavasāya*). Dharmottara reinterprets this 'making one' (*ekikaraṇa*), 'ascertainment of oneness' (*abhedādhyavasāya*) or 'determination of non-object as an object' (*anarthe 'rthādhyavasāyaḥ*) as being equivalent to 'non-determination of distinction' (*bhedānadhyavasāya*) (§4.1, 4.4). The cause of activity, according to Dharmottara, is not positive ascertainment of oneness but only the lack of distinction between the seen and the conceptualized. As Jayanta correctly sniffs out, one can perhaps suggest that Maṇḍana's description of the Prābhākara view of cognitive error (*bhrānti*) that error is in fact not an error but a mere lack of distinction (*bhedāgrahaṇa, vivekāgrahaṇa, akhyāti*)¹⁹ has influenced Dharmottara's view of *bhedānadhyavasāya*.

An additional manuscript consulted in the present edition

In addition to a Devanāgarī manuscript A₁ and a Malayālam manuscript K₁, I consult yet another manuscript Z₁, written in Śāradā script, for the present edition.

19 See, for example, BSi 137.2-3: *bhrāntis tarhi katham? pratyakṣasmaryamāṇayor vivekāgrahaṇāt.*

Z₁ A manuscript preserved in the Oriental Research Library, University Campus, Hazaratbal, Srinagar, No. 10232 (Acc. No. 1933). Śāradā. Paper. Incomplete. 98 folios. The text edited in this article is contained on ff. 200r9-202r5.

Abbreviations and conventions

For the abbreviations and conventions used in the present edition, see my previous editions of selected portions of the *Nyāyamañjarī*, Kataoka [2003b] [2004] [2005] [2007a] and [2008].

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Correction to Kataoka [2008]

	Printed text	Correct text
p. 1, l. 5	only upto v. 38	only up to v. 39ab
p. 9, ll. 16-17	<i>śābaleya 'śābaleya</i>	<i>śābaleyo 'śābaleya#</i>
p. 9, l. 23	<i>bāhuleyādiṣv</i>	<i>bāhuleyādiṣu#</i>
p. 28, l. 2	अपोह्यात्मनश्च	अपोहात्मनश्च*

#I thank Yasutaka Muroya for the correction of these two errors.

*I adopt a variant reading. Accordingly change the order of variant readings in the apparatus.

Abbreviations and Bibliography (see Kataoka [2008] for those unmentioned here)

AP: Dharmottara's *Apoḥaprakaraṇa*. See the Tibetan text edited in Frauwallner [1937].

- JNĀ: *Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali*. Ed. Anantalal Thakur. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1987.
- NMGBh: *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga*. Ed. Nagin J. Shah. Ahmedabad: L.D. Institute of Indology, 1972.
- PS(V): Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya, Chapter 1*. Ed. E. Steinkellner. http://ikga.oeaw.ac.at/Mat/dignaga_PS_1.pdf.
- PV: See PVSV. (I follow the verse numbers thereof.)
- PVSV: *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti: the First Chapter with the Autocommentary*. Ed. Raniero Gnoli. Roma: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1960.
- PVSVṬ: *Ācārya-Dharmakīrteḥ Pramāṇavārttikam (Svārthānumānaṇapricchedaḥ) Svopajñāvṛtṭyā Karṇakagomi-viracitayā Taṭṭikayā ca sahitam*. Ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Allahabad, 1943.
- PVV: *Pramāṇanavārttika of Acharya Dharmakīrti with the Commentary 'Vṛitti' of Acharya Manorathanandin*. Ed. Dvārikadāsa Śāstrī. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1984.
- BSi: *Brahmasiddhi of Maṇḍanamisra with Śāṅkhaṇḍinī's Commentary*. Ed. S. Kuppaswami Sastri. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, ²1984.
- RNĀ: *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī*. Ed. Anantalal Thakur. Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, ¹1957.
- TBh: *Tarkabhāṣā of Mokṣākara Gupta*. Ed. Embar Krishnamacharya. Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1942.
- TS(P): *Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the Commentary Pañjikā of Shri Kamalashīla*. Ed. Dvārikadāsa Śāstrī. 2 vols. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati,

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- ŚVK: Sucaritamīśra's *Ślokaṅkāśikā*. A manuscript preserved in the Adyar Library, Chennai, No. 38.G.5-5, 63359, TR 66-5.
- HBṬ(Ā): *Hetubinduṭīkā of Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa with the Sub-commentary Entitled Āloka of Durveka Miśra*. Ed. Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghavi and Muni Shri Jinavijayaji. Baroda: Oriental Institutel, 1949.
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Synopsis

- 1 apoha āntaro jñānātmeti pakṣaḥ
- 2 apoho nāntaro na bāhya iti pakṣāntaram
 - 2.1 āropitatvam
 - 2.2 jñānoparañjakatvam
 - 2.3 vyāvṛttitadvator bhedābhedacarcā
 - 2.4 vyāvṛttiviśayatvasamarthanam

- 2.5 sa-jā-tī-ya-ji-jā-tī-ya-pa-rā-vṛ-tī
- 2.6 a-po-hat-vo-pa-cā-raḥ
- 2.7 rū-pa-tra-yam
 - 2.7.1 bhā-vā-bhā-vasā-dhā-raṇa-tvam
 - 2.7.2 ni-yata-rū-pa-tvam
 - 2.7.3 bā-hyā-ro-pi-ta-ya-ḥ sā-dṛ-ś-ya-m
- 2.8 anyā-po-ha-ṣa-yat-vam
- 3 ba-ud-dha-ma-ta-d-va-yo-pa-sa-mhā-raḥ
 - 3.1 a-sa-tkhyā-ti-gar-bhā sa-ra-ṇiḥ
 - 3.2 ā-tma-khyā-ti-gar-bhā sa-ra-ṇiḥ
- 4 pra-vṛ-ttyu-pa-pā-dana-m
 - 4.1 ar-thi-tvam
 - 4.2 bhe-dā-na-dhy-a-vasā-yāt pra-vṛ-ttiḥ
 - 4.3 prā-pṭy-u-pa-pā-dana-m
 - 4.4 lau-kikā-nām abhi-mā-naḥ
 - 4.5 u-pa-sa-mhā-raḥ
- 5 a-po-ha-sa-mar-tha-na-m

न्यायमञ्जरी । बौद्धैरपोहदूषणोद्धरणम् ।

[1 अपोह आन्तरो ज्ञानात्मेति पक्षः]
उच्यते — तदेतदविदितबौद्धसिद्धान्तानामभिधानम् ।

अपोहो यद्यभावात्मा बहिरभ्युपगम्यते ।

ततो भवति भावत्कं वाग्जालं न त्वसौ तथा ॥

किन्तु खल्वयमान्तरो ज्ञानात्मा सौगतानामपोहः संमतः ।

तथाभ्युपगमे केयमपोहवाचोयुक्तिः । स्वांशविषयं पदार्थज्ञान-
मित्येतावदेव वक्तुमुचितम् ।

5

[2 अपोहो नान्तरो न बाह्य इति पक्षान्तरम्]
एतदपि नास्ति । नायमान्तरो न बाह्यो ऽपोहः, किन्तु ज्ञानार्था-

6 केयमपोहवाचोयुक्तिः] This passage will be referred to in section 2.4: व्या-
वृत्तिविषयत्ववाचोयुक्तिरनन्वितेत्युक्तम् ।

9 नायमान्तरो ... ०मन्य एव] Cf. Dharmottara's *Apoḥaprakaraṇa*
588(239).14-16: gaṅ žig rnam par rtog pa rnam kyis nes pa'i don de yaṅ
gaṅ yin/ ci śes pa'i bdag ñid yin nam/ 'on te gžan yin že na/ cuṅ zad kyaṅ
ma yin no žes smra'o//

2 उच्यते — तदेतद०] MVK₁Z₁; ----- तम० A₁ 3 यद्य०] M^{gha}K₁Z₁;
यदि MV; यद्यनु० A₁ 3 ०भ्युपगम्यते] MVK₁Z₁; ०प्युपगम्यते M^{ka}M^{gha}A₁
4 ततो] MVK₁Z₁; --- A₁ 4 वाग्जालं] MVK₁Z₁; वाग्जालं A₁ 5 ०पो-
हः] MVA₁Z₁; ०पोह० K₁ 6 केय०] VZ₁; चैय० M; वा केय० A₁; च
केय० K₁ 6 ०पोहवाचोयुक्तिः] MVK₁Z₁; ०पाहवाचायुक्ति A₁ 6 स्वांश०]
MVK₁Z₁; स्वां- - A₁ 7 ०ज्ञानमि०] VA₁K₁Z₁; ०ज्ञानानामि० M 7 ०त्ये-
तावदेव] MK₁Z₁; ०त्येतदेव M^{kha}V; ०च्छ- -तावदेव A₁ 7 वक्तुमुचितम्]
MVK₁Z₁; वक्तुमुचितं अपोहो यस्य भावात्मा बहिरभ्युपगम्यते A₁ 9 एतदपि
नास्ति] MVK₁Z₁; एतदपि -स्ति A₁ 9 ०मान्तरो] MVZ₁; ०मंतरो A₁;
०मामान्तरः K₁ 9 न] MVK₁; नापि A₁Z₁

भ्यामन्य एव ।

[2.1 आरोपितत्वम्]

ननु यद्विद्यते नान्तर्न बहिः परमार्थतः ।

तन्न विद्यत एवेति कथं शब्दार्थ उच्यते ॥

5 पारमार्थिकशब्दार्थसमर्थनपिपासिताः ।

नेहागताः स्मो येनैवमनुयुज्येमहि त्वया ॥

यत एव तन्नान्तर्बहिरस्ति, तत एव मिथ्येति काल्पनिकमिति गी-
यते । किं पुनस्तत् । आरोपितं किञ्चिदाकारमात्रं विकल्पोपरञ्जकम् ।

[2.2 ज्ञानोपरञ्जकत्वम्]

10 ननु बाह्यार्थव्यतिरेकेण किमीय आकार आन्तर आन्तरस्य ज्ञा-
नस्योपरञ्जकः । उच्यते—दृश्यच्छायैवानुरञ्जिका विकल्पानाम्, न

1 ज्ञानार्थाभ्यामन्य एव] *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga* 132.24: ज्ञानार्थाभ्याम-
न्य एवेति धर्मोत्तरः ।

10 ननु बाह्यार्थव्यतिरेकेण] *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga* 133.1: ननु बाह्या-
र्थव्यतिरेकेणेति ।

11 दृश्यच्छायैवानुरञ्जिका] *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga* 133.3: दृश्यच्छायै-
वानुरञ्जिकेति ।

3 नान्तर्न] MVA₁Z₁; नान्तर् K₁(unmetrical) 4 तन्न] MA₁K₁Z₁; न तु
M^{hha}V 4 उच्यते] MVA₁Z₁; उच्यते उच्यते K₁(unmetrical) 6 स्मो] MV
K₁Z₁; स्म A₁ 6 ०युज्येमहि] MVA₁K₁; ०युज्येमहे Z₁ 7 यत] MVZ₁; य
A₁K₁ 7 एव] MVK₁; एवं A₁Z₁ 7 ०र्बहिरस्ति] MVK₁Z₁; ०रवहिरस्ति
A₁ 7 तत] MVA₁Z₁; अत K₁ 7 काल्पनि०] MVA₁Z₁; कोल्पनि० K₁
7 ०कमिति] A₁K₁Z₁; ०कमिति च MV 8 किञ्चि०] MVK₁Z₁; कंचि० A₁
10 आन्तर आन्तरस्य] Z₁; आन्तरस्य M; आन्तरान्तरस्य M^{hha}V; आंतरा
आंतरस्य A₁; आन्तेर० K₁ 11 दृश्यच्छायैवा०] MA₁K₁Z₁; दृश्यतयैवा०
M^{hha}V

दृश्यो ऽर्थः । व्यावृत्तं हि वस्तु दर्शनानां विषयः, तच्च स्पष्टमक्षमा विकल्पा इत्युक्तम् । अथ तच्छायामवलम्बमाना विकल्पा व्यावृत्तस्याग्रहणाद् व्यावृत्तिविषया उच्यन्ते ।

[2.3 व्यावृत्तितद्वतोर्भेदाभेदचर्चा]

ननु व्यावृत्तितद्वतोरभेदाद् या च व्यावृत्तिर्यच्च व्यावृत्तं स्वलक्षणं तदेकमेवेति व्यावृत्तिग्राहिभिर्विकल्पैर्व्यावृत्तमपि गृहीतं स्यादिति दर्शनतुल्या एव ते भवेयुः ।

नैतदेवम् । न विकल्पैर्व्यावृत्तं वस्तु गृह्यते । न च पारमार्थिकी व्यावृत्तिः । अपि तु कश्चिदारोपित आकारः । वास्तवत्वे हि

1 तच्च स्पष्टमक्षमा] *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga* 133.5: तच्च स्पष्ट (ष्टु)मक्षमा । 2 इत्युक्तम्] See *Nyāyamañjarī* II 6.10–11: तत्पृष्ठभाविनस्तु विकल्पाः स्वभावत एव वस्तुसंस्पर्शकौशलशून्यात्मान इति ।

3 व्यावृत्तस्याग्रहणाद्] *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga* 133.6: व्यावृत्तस्याग्रहणादिति ।

5 ननु ... तदेकमेवेति] Cf. *Pramāṇavārttikasavṛtti* 32.15–17: तत्राप्यन्यापोहे न व्यावृत्तिरन्यान्य एव व्यावृत्तः, तद्व्यावृत्तेर्निवर्तमानस्य तद्भावप्रसङ्गात् । तथा च व्यावृत्तेरप्यभावः । तस्माद्यैव व्यावृत्तिः स एव व्यावृत्तः ।

9 अपि तु कश्चिदारोपित आकारः] *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga* 133.9: अपि तु कश्चिदारोपित आकार इति ।

1 °पानाम्, न दृश्यो ऽर्थः] MA_1K_1 ; °पनां नेदृशो ऽर्थः M^{kha} ; °पना नेदृशो ऽर्थः V ; °पाना न दृश्यो र्थः Z_1 1 व्यावृत्तं हि] MVA_1K_1 ; व्यावृत्तं Z_1 1 स्पष्टम्] MVK_1Z_1 ; स्तष्टु° A_1 2 अथ] MVA_1Z_1 ; तथा अथ च K_1 2 तच्छाया°] $MA_1K_1Z_1$; तच्छाय° V 2 विकल्पा] MVA_1Z_1 ; विकल्प° K_1 3 °ग्रहणाद्] MVA_1Z_1 ; °ग्रहणा K_1 3 उच्यन्ते] MA_1K_1 ; इत्युच्यन्ते $M^{kha}V$; इत्युच्यते Z_1 5 °भेदाद्] MVK_1Z_1 ; °भेदा A_1 5 या च] K_1Z_1 ; या M ; om. $M^{kha}V$; या स A_1 6 तदेकमेवेति] MVK_1Z_1 ; तदेकमेवेकमेवेति A_1 7 एव ते] $MA_1K_1Z_1$; om. $M^{kha}V$ 8 न विकल्पै°] MVK_1 ; विकल्पै° $M^{ka}A_1$; न हि विकल्पै° Z_1

व्यावृत्तेर्वस्तुसंस्पर्शिन एते दोषाः प्रादुष्युः । न त्वसौ तथेत्युक्तम् ।

अत एव यत्केचन पर्यचूचुदन् किल—व्यावृत्तग्रहणपक्षे त्रितयग्रहणं प्राप्नोति, यद्वावृत्तं येन च निमित्तेन व्यावृत्तं यतश्च व्यावृत्तमिति । न च त्रितयग्रहणमस्तीत्यतः कथं व्यावृत्तग्रहणमिति—तदप्यपास्तं भवति । यदि व्यावृत्तं गृह्णामीत्येवमुल्लेखो भवेद् व्यवहर्तृजनस्य, तदैवमसौ पर्यनुयुज्येत, न चैवमस्तीत्यचोद्यमेतत् ।

[2.4 व्यावृत्तिविषयत्वसमर्थनम्]

नन्वेवमारोपिताकारविषया एव विकल्पा उक्ता भवन्ति । व्यावृ-

1 तथेत्युक्तम्] See section 2.1.

2 व्यावृत्तग्रहणपक्षे ... व्यावृत्तग्रहणमिति] Cf. Dharmottara's *Apoḥaprakaraṇa* 595(246).4–9: gal te dños po gžan las ldog par sgro btags pa yin na/ ldog pa gañ yin pa de dañ/ ldog mtshams gañ yin pa de dañ/ rgyu mtshan gañ gis ldog pa de gsum ka yañ rnam par rtog pas rtogs par bya bar 'gyur te/ dper na lha sbyin mchod sbyin las ldog par 'dzin pa na gsum ka yañ 'dzin pa bzin no// dños po med pa'i phyir ji skad bśad pa gsum ni rnam par rtog pas 'dzin par mi 'thad ciñ ñams su myoñ bas yañ ma yin no//

1 व्यावृत्तेर्व°] MVA₁Z₁; व्यावृत्ते व° K₁ 1 °संस्पर्शिन] MVK₁Z₁; °स्प-
र्शिन M^{ka}A₁ 1 एते] MA₁K₁Z₁; एव VM^{ka} 1 दोषाः] MVK₁Z₁; दोषः
A₁ 1 प्रादुष्युः] MVK₁; प्रादुःस्युः A₁; प्रादुःषुः Z₁ 1 न त्वसौ तथेत्युक्तम्]
MVK₁Z₁; om. M^{ka}A₁ 2 पर्यचूचुदन्] MVK₁Z₁; पर्यस्तुद्वत् A₁ 3 त्रित-
यग्रहणं] MVA₁K₁; त्रितयं ग्रहणं Z₁ 3 यद्वावृत्तं येन च निमित्तेन व्यावृत्तं
यतश्च] MA₁Z₁; यद्वावृत्तं येन निमित्तेन व्यावृत्तं यतश्च VM^{ka}; यतो व्यावृत्तं
यच्च व्यावृत्तमद्येन निमित्तेन K₁ 4 व्यावृत्तमिति] MVA₁; व्यावृत्तं त्रितय-
ग्रहणे सति युज्यते K₁; व्यावृत्तम् इति एव Z₁ 4 त्रितयग्रहणम°] MA₁K₁;
त्रितयम° M^{ka}V; ग्रहणत्रितयम° Z₁ 5 यदि] K₁; यदि हि MVA₁Z₁ 5 गृ-
ह्णामीत्ये°] K₁; गृह्णीम इत्ये° MVZ₁; वृहणीम इति A₁ 6 तदैव°] MVK₁;
तदैव° A₁Z₁ 6 चैव°] K₁; त्वेव° MVA₁Z₁ 9 नन्वे°] MVA₁Z₁; नन्वेम°
K₁ 9 °विषया एव] MA₁K₁; °विषया M^{ka}V; °विषय एव Z₁ 9 विकल्पा
उक्ता] MA₁Z₁; विकल्पा युक्ता M^{ka}V; विकल्पा K₁

त्तिविषयत्ववाचोयुक्तिरनन्वितेत्युक्तम् । समाहितमेतत् । दर्शनपृष्ठभा-
विभिर्गौरित्यादिविकल्पैरतत्कार्यपरावृत्त आकार उल्लिख्यते । न हि
गोविकल्पैरतत्कार्याणामश्वादीनामुल्लेखः । स्वलक्षणं च न स्पृश्यते ।
सामान्यं च वास्तवं नास्ति । तस्मादतत्कार्यपरावृत्तिविषयत्वमेव
विकल्पानामवतिष्ठते — इत्येवं युक्त्या तेषामपोहविषयत्वमुच्यते, न
प्रतिपत्तितः । 5

[2.5 सजातीयविजातीयपरावृत्ती]

नन्वतत्कार्यपरावृत्तमिव सजातीयपरावृत्तमपि दृश्यस्य स्वरूपम् ।
तत्र विजातीयपरावृत्ताकारोल्लेखिनश्चेद् दर्शनपृष्ठभाविनो विकल्पाः,
सजातीयव्यावृत्तमप्याकारमुल्लिखेयुः । न हि सजातीयविजातीय- 10

1 °त्युक्तम्] See section 1: केयमपोहवाचोयुक्तिः ।

6 न प्रतिपत्तितः] *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga* 133.11: न प्रतिपत्तितः ।

1 व्यावृत्ति°] MVA_1K_1 ; व्यावृत्त° Z_1 1 °रनन्विते°] MVK_1Z_1 ; °रनन्विते°
 $M^{ka}A_1$ 1 °तमेतत्] MVK_1Z_1 ; °तमेत- - A_1 2 °परावृत्त] $M^{kha}VK_1Z_1$;
°परावृत्ता MA_1 2 आकार] $M^{kha}VK_1Z_1$; आकारा MA_1 2 उल्लिख्यते]
 $M^{kha}VA_1K_1Z_1$; उल्लिख्यन्ते M 3 गोविकल्पैरत°] MVA_1Z_1 ; गोविकल्पे
ऽत° K_1 3 च न] $M^{kha}VZ_1$; च MA_1 ; तु न K_1 4 तस्मादतत्कार्यप-
रावृत्ति° ... °परावृत्तमिव] MVK_1 ; तस्मादतत्कार्यपरावृत्तमिव A_1 (eyeskip);
तस्मादतत्कार्यपरावृत्त° ... °परावृत्तमिव Z_1 5 °वतिष्ठते] MVZ_1 ; °वतिष्ठे-
त K_1 8 °परावृत्तमपि] K_1 ; °व्यावृत्तमपि MVA_1Z_1 8 दृश्यस्य स्वरूपम्]
 Z_1 ; दृश्यस्वरूपम् MV ; दृश्यस्य रूपं A_1 ; दृश्यरूपम् K_1 9 तत्र ... विजाती-
यव्यावृत्ती] $MA_1K_1Z_1$; तत्र विजातीयव्यावृत्तिः VM^{kha} 9 विजातीयपरा°]
 K_1 ; सजातीयविजातीयव्या° M ; विजातीयव्या° A_1Z_1 10 °वृत्ताकारोल्लेखि-
नश्चेद् दर्शनपृष्ठभाविनो विकल्पाः, सजातीयव्यावृत्तमप्याकारमुल्लिखेयुः] *em.*;
°वृत्तमप्याकारमुल्लिखेयुः $MA_1K_1^{pc}$; °वृत्ताकारोल्लेखितनश्चेद्दर्शनपृष्ठभाविनो वि-
कल्पास्तर्हि तदभेदात् सजातीयव्यावृत्तोल्लेखी तुल्यविषयाश्च विकल्पैः शब्दा इ-
त्यन्यापोहविषयास्त उच्यन्ते सो ऽयमारोपित आकारो न बहिरारोपितत्वादेव
नान्तर K_1^{ac} ; °वृत्ताकारोल्लेखिनश्चेद्दर्शनपृष्ठभाविनो सजातीयव्यावृत्तमप्याका-
रमुल्लिखेयुः Z_1 10 सजातीय°] MA_1K_1 ; स्वजातीय° Z_1

व्यावृत्ती स्वलक्षणं चान्यत् । न चैकतराकारोल्लेखनियमहेतुमुत्पश्या-
मः ।

धीमन्, मैवं मंस्थाः । निश्चयात्मानो हि विकल्पाः । सजातीय-
विजातीयव्यावृत्ताकारोल्लेखे सर्वात्मना तन्निश्चयाद् विकल्पान्तराणां
5 शब्दान्तराणां चाप्रवृत्तिः स्यात् । तथा च गौरिति शब्दादुत्पद्यमानो
विजातीयव्यावृत्ताकारोल्लेख्येव विकल्पः संवेद्यते, न सजातीयव्या-
वृत्तोल्लेखी । तुल्यविषयाश्च विकल्पैः शब्दा इत्यन्यापोहविषयास्त उ-
च्यन्ते ।

[2.6 अपोहत्वोपचारः]

10 सो ऽयमारोपित आकारो न बहिः, आरोपितत्वादेव । नान्तः,
अबोधरूपत्वात् । अतश्चासौ न किञ्चिदेव । न किञ्चिदपि भवन् “अ-

1 °ल्लेखनियम°] A_1K_1 ; °ल्लेखननियमन° M; °ल्लेखननियम° VZ_1 3 मंस्थाः]
 MVK_1Z_1 ; संस्थ A_1 3 हि विकल्पाः] K_1 ; निर्विकल्पाः MVA_1 ; विकल्पाः
 Z_1 4 सजातीयविजातीय°] MVK_1Z_1 ; सजातीय° $M^{ka}M^{gha}A_1$ 4 °ल्ले-
खे] K_1 ; °ल्लेखे च MVZ_1 ; °ल्ले-च A_1 4 सर्वात्मना] MVK_1Z_1 ; सवोल्म-
नां A_1 5 चाप्रवृत्तिः] MA_1K_1 ; प्रवृत्तिः VZ_1 6 °कारोल्लेख्येव] MK_1Z_1 ;
°कारोल्लेखीव VM^{kha} ; °क-नन्व दर्शनपृष्ठभाविभिगोरित्यादिविकल्पैरतत्वा-
त्कार्यपरावृत्ता आकारानुल्लिख्यते न हि गोविकल्पैरतत्कार्याणामश्वादीनामुल्लेखः
स्वलक्षणं च स्पृश्यते सामान्यं च वास्तवं नास्ति तस्मादतत्कार्यपरावृत्तमिव स-
जातीयव्यावृत्तमपि दृश्यस्य रूपं तत्र विजातीयव्यावृत्तमप्याकारमुल्लिखेयुः न हि
सजातीयविजातीयव्यावृत्ती स्वलक्षणं चान्यत् न चैकतराकारोल्लेखनियमहेतुमुत्प-
श्यामो धीमन् मैवं संस्थः निश्चयात्मानो निर्विकल्पाः सजातीयव्यावृत्ताकारोल्लेख
च सर्वात्मना तन्निश्चया विकल्पांतराणां शब्दान्तराणां चाप्रवृत्तिः स्यात् तथा च
गौरिति शब्दादुत्पद्यमानो विजातीयव्यावृत्ताक-ल्लेखे न A_1 6 °ल्पः संवेद्यते]
 MVA_1Z_1 ; °ल्पो दृश्यते K_1 6 न] MVA_1Z_1 ; om. K_1 7 °वृत्तोल्लेखी] MV
 K_1Z_1 ; °वृत्तोख A_1 7 °न्यापोह°] MVK_1Z_1 ; °न्यापोह इति फलत उपचर्यते
अतश्च बाह्यमपोह° A_1 7 °विषयास्त] MA_1K_1 ; °विषया $VM^{kha}Z_1$ 8 उ-
च्यन्ते] MVA_1K_1 ; उच्यन्ते ते Z_1 10 °पित आकारो] A_1K_1 ; °पिताकारो
 MVZ_1

पोहः” इति फलत उपचर्यते । अतश्च बाह्यमभावात्मकमपोहमाश्रित्य दूषणोपन्यासेन कण्ठशोषमनुभवन्नस्थाने क्लिष्टो देवानांप्रियः ।

[2.7 रूपत्रयम्]

अपि च विकल्पभूमिरर्थो विकल्पान्तरसन्निधापितभावाभावापेक्षो नियतरूपो बाह्यार्थसदृशश्च प्रतीयते । न चेदं रूपत्रयमपि बाह्ये वस्तुनि युज्यते ।

5

[2.7.1 भावाभावसाधारणत्वम्]

बाह्यस्य हि वस्तुनः स्वरूपेणावगतस्य न विकल्पान्तरोपनीतभावसंबन्ध उपपद्यते, वैयर्थ्यात् । नाप्यभावसंबन्धः, विप्रतिषेधात् ।

[2.7.2 नियतरूपत्वम्]

10

नियतरूपता च विकल्पविषयस्य “गौरेव, नाश्वः” इत्येवमवग-

1 फलत उपचर्यते] *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga* 133.12: फलत उपचर्यते ।

4 विकल्पान्तरसन्निधापित°] *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga* 133.14: विकल्पान्तरसन्निधापितेति ।

8 बाह्यस्य ... विप्रतिषेधात्] Cf. Dharmottara's *Apoḥaprakaraṇa* 590(241).22-25: gañ gi phyir phyi rol gyi me ni dños po yod pa la mi ltos te/ mthoñ ba ñid kyi rañ bñin ni yod pa'i dños po'i bdag ñid du yod pa'i phyir ro// dños po med pa la yañ mi ltos te/ mthoñ ba de'i rañ bñin ni med pa dañ 'gal ba'i phyir ro//

11 नियतरूपता ... व्यवच्छेदविषयत्वम्] Cf. Dharmottara's *Apoḥaprakaraṇa*

1 न किञ्चिदपि भवन् “अपोहः”] MVA_1Z_1 ; किञ्चिदेव भवत्यस्यापोह K_1

1 °मभावात्मकम°] $M^{kha}VK_1Z_1$; °म° MA_1 2 दूषणो°] $MA_1K_1Z_1$; दू-

षणो° (?) M^{kha} ; स्वरूपे दूषणो° V 2 °पन्यासेन] K_1 ; °पन्यासे MVA_1Z_1

2 कण्ठशोष°] MVK_1Z_1 ; कार्यापोह° M^{ka} ; कार्यापोस° A_1 2 क्लिष्टो] MV

K_1Z_1 ; क्लिष्टे A_1 2 देवानांप्रियः] MVK_1Z_1 ; देवानांप्रिया A_1 4 °वापेक्षो]

A_1K_1 ; °वाक्षेपी MV ; °वापेक्षी M^{ka} ; °वाक्षेपो Z_1 5 बाह्यार्थ°] K_1 ; बाह्य°

MVA_1Z_1 5 बाह्ये] MVK_1Z_1 ; बाह्यं A_1 9 वैयर्थ्यात्] MVA_1Z_1 ; वैयर्थ्यात्

K_1

म्यमाना वस्त्वन्तरव्यवच्छेदमन्तरेण नावकल्पत इति बलाद् व्यव-
च्छेदविषयत्वम्, अन्यथा नियतपरिच्छेदाभावात् । संदिग्धं च वस्तु
न गृह्यत एव ।

[2.7.3 बाह्यारोपितयोः सादृश्यम्]

5 बाह्यवस्तुविषयत्वे च निरस्ते विकल्पानाम् “एकस्यार्थस्वभावस्य”
इति न्यायेन पौनरुक्त्यादबाह्यविषयत्वं न्याय्यम् । अबाह्यं चारोपितं

594(245).19–21: de'i phyir cig śos kyī rañ b'zin gyis stoñ pa ñid du rtogs
pa'i rnam par rtog pa ni ñes pa'i don rtogs par byed pa yin no//; *Nyāya-*
mañjarīgranthibhaṅga 133.16–17: गौरेवायमिति या नियतरूपतया गृहीतिः
सा अन्यव्यवच्छेदमन्तरेण नेति यद् उक्तं तन्न ।

2 अन्यथा नियतपरिच्छेदाभावात्] *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga* 133.15–16:
अन्यथा नियतपरिच्छेदाभावादिति । वस्त्वन्तरव्यवच्छेदनमन्तरेणेति शेषः ।

2 संदिग्धं च वस्तु न गृह्यत] *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga* 133.18: संदिग्धं च
वस्तु न गृह्यत इति ।

5 एकस्यार्थस्वभावस्य] *Pramāṇavārttika* I 43: एकस्यार्थस्वभावस्य प्रत्यक्षस्य
सतः स्वयम् । को ऽन्यो न दृष्टो भागः स्याद्यः प्रमाणैः परीक्ष्यते॥; this is also
quoted in NM II 13.14–15 and NM I 239.12–13.

1 °त्येवमवगम्यमाना] MVK₁Z₁; °त्यवगम्यमाना A₁ 2 °विषयत्वम्] M
VA₁; °विषयम् K₁Z₁ 2 अन्यथा] MVK₁Z₁; अन्यथ A₁ 2 नियत°]
M^{gha}A₁Z₁; नियम° MV; नियतरूप° K₁ 2 °दाभावात्] em.; °दासंभवात्
MVA₁K₁Z₁ 2 संदिग्धं च] MVK₁Z₁; संदिग्धि हि A₁^{ac}; संदिग्ध हि A₁^{pc}
3 गृह्यत एव] K₁; गृह्यते । एवं MVZ₁; ह्यत एव A₁ 5 निरस्ते] MVA₁Z₁;
निरस्ते च K₁ 5 °नाम् “एक°] MVA₁K₁; °नामैक° Z₁ 6 °रुक्त्याद°]
MVA₁Z₁; °रुक्त्यात्तद° K₁ 6 न्याय्यम्] VA₁K₁; ख्याय्यम् M; न्यायम् Z₁
6 अबाह्यं चारोपितं] MA₁K₁Z₁; अबाह्यान्तरारोपितं M^{kha}V

रूपम् । तच्च बाह्यवदवभासते । न च व्यावृत्तिच्छायामपहाय बाह्या-
रोपितयोः सादृश्यमन्यदस्तीति व्यावृत्तिविषया विकल्पाः फलतो
भवन्ति ।

[2.8 अन्यापोहविषयत्वम्]

यद्यपि विधिरूपेण गौरश्च इति तेषां प्रवृत्तिः, तथापि नीतिविदो 5
ऽन्यापोहविषयानेव तान् व्यवस्थापयन्ति । यथोक्तम् “व्याख्यातारः
खल्वेवं विवेचयन्ति, न व्यवहर्तारः” इति ।

[3 बौद्धमतद्वयोपसंहारः]

[3.1 असत्ख्यातिगर्भा सरणिः]

सो ऽयं नान्तरो न बाह्यः, अन्य एव कश्चिदारोपित आकारो व्या- 10

1 तच्च बाह्यवदवभासते] Cf. Dharmottara's *Apohaprakaraṇa* 593(244).25–28:
gʒan yañ mi bden pa'i rañ b'zin ston pa'i rnam par rtog pa phyi rol 'dra ba
kun tu ston par ji ltar 'gyur te/ de gñis ni śin tu chos mi mthun pa'i phyir
ro// de'i phyir de'i rañ b'zin gʒan las ldog par ŷen pa na rnam par rtog pa
phyi rol 'dra bar kun tu ston par 'gyur ba ya yin no//

1 न च व्यावृत्ति° ... भवन्ति] Cf. Dharmottara's *Apohaprakaraṇa*
593(244).29–30: gañ ŷig śin tu mi 'dra ba de'i rañ b'zin du 'dzin pa de ni
gʒan las bzlog pas byas pa'i 'dra bar 'dzin pa lhur len pa yin te/

6 व्याख्यातारः खल्वे°] *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga* 134.4: व्याख्यातारः
खल्विति ।

6 व्याख्यातारः ... व्यवहर्तारः] *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* 39.5–6.

1 व्यावृत्तिच्छायाम°] K_1Z_1 ; व्यावृत्तिच्छायाम° MV; व्यावृत्तिच्छाया° A_1 1
°पहाय] MVK_1Z_1 ; °सपर्याय A_1 2 °विषया] K_1 ; °विषया एव MVA_1Z_1
7 विवेचयन्ति] MVK_1Z_1 ; विवेचयन्ति $M^{ka}M^{kha}A_1$ 10 न बाह्यः, अन्य]
 MVK_1Z_1 ; नावाह्योन्तरो नावाह्यौ त A_1

वृत्तिच्छायायोगादपोहशब्दार्थ उच्यते — इतीयमसत्ख्यातिगर्भा सर-
रणिः ।

[3.2 आत्मख्यातिगर्भा सरणिः]

अथ वा विकल्पप्रतिबिम्बकं ज्ञानाकारमात्रमेव तदबाह्यमपि विचि-
त्रवासनाभेदोपाहितरूपभेदं बाह्यवदवभासमानं लोकयात्रां बिभर्ति ।
5 व्यावृत्तिच्छायायोगाच्च तदपोह इति व्यवह्रियते । सेयमात्मख्याति-
गर्भा सरणिः ।

1 °मसत्ख्यातिगर्भा] *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga* 134.6: असत्ख्यातिगर्भा ।
एवं ह्युच्यमाने असत् एवाकारस्य विकल्पबुद्धौ प्रतिभास इत्युक्तं भवति ।
5 विचित्रवासना° ... बिभर्ति] Cf. *Pramāṇavārttika* I 205abc: अनादिवासनो-
द्धृतविकल्पपरिनिष्ठितः । शब्दार्थस्; *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* 105.24–25: यथा
नैते शब्दाः स्वलक्षणविषया, अनादिवासनाप्रभवविकल्पप्रतिभासिनमर्थं विषय-
त्वेनात्मसात्कुर्वन्ति ।; *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā* 182.9–10: तदपि विकल्प-
प्रतिबिम्बकं व्यवहर्तृपुरुषाध्यवसायवशादर्थक्रियाकारितया प्रतिभासते ।

1 °दपोह°] MVA₁Z₁; °दपोहः K₁ 1 उच्यते] MVA₁Z₁; इत्युच्यते K₁
1 °मसत्ख्याति°] K₁; °मसत्ख्यातिवाद° MVA₁Z₁ 4 अथ वा] MVK₁Z₁;
अथ भा A₁ 4 °मात्रमेव] K₁; °मात्रकमेव MVA₁Z₁ 4 तद°] MVA₁Z₁;
तदा° K₁ 5 °नाभेदोपाहित°] MVA₁K₁; °नोपाहित° Z₁ 5 °रूपभे-
दं] MVA₁Z₁; °भेदरूपं K₁ 5 °दवभासमानं] MVK₁Z₁; °दभासमानं A₁
5 लोकयात्रां] MVK₁Z₁; कोलोच्छत्रा A₁ 6 तदपोह] MVK₁Z₁; तपोह A₁

[4 प्रवृत्त्युपपादनम्]

[4.1 अर्थित्वम्]

ननूभयथापि वस्तुविषयत्वाभावे विकल्पानां कथं वस्तुनि व्यवहर्तारः प्रवर्तन्ते । नावश्यं वस्तुदर्शनात्ते प्रवर्तन्ते, दृष्टे ऽपि क्वचिद् वस्तुनि तृणादौ प्रवृत्त्यभावात् । अर्थित्वं तु प्रवृत्तेः कारणम् ।

5

[4.2 भेदानध्यवसायात्प्रवृत्तिः]

नन्वर्थितावद् दर्शनमपि कारणमेव, अर्थिनो ऽप्यपश्यतस्तत्र प्रवृत्त्यभावात् । अपोहपक्षे च प्रवृत्तस्य वस्तुप्राप्तिः कथमिति वक्तव्यम् ।

उच्यते । प्रवृत्तिस्तावद् दृश्यविकल्पयोरेकीकरणनिबन्धना । दृश्यदर्शनानन्तरमुत्पन्ने विकल्पे विकल्प्यं विकल्प्यतया न प्रतिपद्यते

10

3 ननूभयथापि] *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga* 134.8: ननूभयथापीति । यत् पूर्वमुक्तमारोपिताकारविषयत्वम्, यच्च 'अपि च' इत्यादिनोक्तं तेनापि । अथवा बुद्ध्याकारापोहपक्षे आरोपिताकारापोहपक्षे चेति ।

9 दृश्यविकल्पयोरेकीकरणनिबन्धना] Cf. *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* 39.6-7: ते तु स्वात्मनिमेवार्थक्रियायोग्यं मन्यमाना दृश्यविकल्प्यावर्थावेकीकृत्य प्रवर्तन्ते ।; see also *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga* 134.5-6: व्यवहर्तारः पुनर्दृश्यविकल्पयोर्भेदाग्रहणेन प्रवर्तन्ते ।

3 विकल्पानां कथं] MVZ₁; विकल्पाना कथं A₁; कथं विकल्पानां K₁ 4 व्यवहर्तारः] MK₁Z₁; व्यावहाराः M^{ka}; व्यवहाराः V; व्यवहर्तारः A₁ 4 नावश्यं वस्तुदर्शनात्ते प्रवर्तन्ते] Z₁; om. MVA₁; नासत्यं वस्तुदर्शनात्ते प्रवर्तन्ते K₁ 4 दृष्टे ऽपि] MVA₁K₁; दृष्टे Z₁ 5 क्वचिद् वस्तुनि] MVK₁Z₁; वस्तुनि क्वचित् A₁ 7 नन्व... कथमिति] MA₁K₁Z₁; कथमिति M^{ka}V 8 वस्तु] MA₁Z₁; वस्तुनः K₁ 8 वक्तव्यम्] MVA₁Z₁; वक्तव्याः K₁ 9 दृश्यविकल्प्यं] MA₁K₁Z₁; दृश्यविकल्प्यं V 9 रेकीकरणं] MVZ₁; रेककारणं M^{ga}; हरेककारणां A₁; रेकी K₁ 10 मुत्पन्ने] MVA₁Z₁; मुत्पन्ने K₁ 10 विकल्प्यं विकल्प्यतया न] em.; विकल्पतया न M; विकल्प्यं तेन M^{ka}V; विकल्प्यतया न A₁; विकल्प्यं विकल्पतया न K₁; विकल्प्यं विकल्प्यतया Z₁ 10 प्रतिपद्यते] MVA₁K₁; प्रतिपाद्यते Z₁

प्रमाता । दर्शनानन्तर्यविप्रलब्धस्तु दृश्यमेव गृहीतं मन्यते । तद-
भिमानेन च प्रवर्तते । इदं तदेकीकरणमाहुर्दृश्यविकल्पयोः, भेदेन
वस्तुनो दृश्याद् विकल्प्यं यन्न गृह्यते । न पुनरनयोरभेदाध्यवसाय
एकीकरणमिष्यते, दृश्याद्विभिन्नस्य विकल्पस्य शुक्तेरिव रजतस्य
5 निर्देष्टुमशक्यत्वात्, अभेदाध्यवसाये चोपायाभावात् । नाभेदाध्यव-
साये दर्शनमुपायः, विकल्प्याविषयत्वात् । न विकल्पः, दृश्यावि-

2 इदं ... गृह्यते] Cf. *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā* 171.8–10: अर्थानुभवे सति
तत्संस्कारप्रबोधेन तदाकार उत्पद्यमानो विकल्पः स्वाकारं बाह्याभिन्नमध्यवस्य-
ति, न त्वभिन्नं करोति । तेन विकल्पविषयस्य दृश्यात्मतयाध्यवसायाद् दृश्य-
विकल्पयोर् (°विकल्पयोर्] em.; °विकल्पयोर् ed.) एकीकरणमुच्यते ।

3 न पुनरनयो° ... °मिष्यते] Cf. *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā* 171.4–5: ननु
दृश्यविकल्पयोर् (°विकल्पयोर्] em.; °विकल्पयोर् ed.) एकीकरणं कि-
मुच्यते । यदि दृश्यस्य विकल्प्यादभेदः, बाह्ये ऽर्थे प्रवृत्तिर्न स्यात् । विकल्पस्य
दृश्यादभेदः, स्वलक्षणं शब्दार्थः स्यात् ।

6 विकल्प्याविषयत्वात्] *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā* 171.5–6: न च दृश्यवि-
कल्पयोरेकीकरणं प्रत्यक्षेण, तस्य विकल्प्याविषयत्वात् ।

1 दर्शनानन्त°] MVA₁K₁; दर्शनान्त° Z₁ 1 °विप्रलब्धस्तु] MVK₁Z₁; °वि-
प्रलम्भस्तु M^{gā}A₁ 2 °विकल्पयोः, भेदेन ... गृह्यते] em.; °विकल्पयोर्भेदेन
... गृह्यते M; °विकल्पयोर्भेदो यन्न (दृश्यते) M^{kha}; °विकल्पयोर्भेदो यन्न
गृह्यते V; °विकल्पयोर्भेदेन वस्तुनो दृश्याद्विकल्पो यन्न दृश्यते A₁; °विकल्प-
योर्भेदेन ... गृह्यते K₁; °विकल्पयोर्भेदेन ... दृश्यते Z₁ 3 विकल्प्यं] em.;
विकल्पो MA₁K₁; विकल्प्यो Z₁ 3 °नरनयो°] K₁; °नः भिन्नयो° MVA₁;
°नर्भिन्नयोरनयो° Z₁ 4 °द्विभिन्नस्य] MVK₁Z₁; °द्विभिन्नश्च A₁ 4 विक-
ल्पस्य] MA₁Z₁; विकल्पस्य M^{kha}VK₁ 4 शुक्तेरिव] K₁Z₁; शुक्तेरेव] MV;
शुक्तेरिप A₁ 5 चोपाया°] MA₁K₁; चोभया° M^{kha}VZ₁ 5 नाभेदा°] MA₁
K₁; न भेदा° M^{kha}VZ₁ 6 विकल्प्या°] A₁K₁; विकल्पा° MV; विकल्प्या°
Z₁ 6 न विकल्पः] MVA₁Z₁; ललल्पा K₁

[4.4 लौकिकानामभिमानः]

एवं बाह्यवस्तुसंस्पर्शशून्येषु विकल्पेषु समुल्लसितेषु “बाह्यो ऽर्थो म-
या प्रतिपन्नः, तत्र चाहं प्रवृत्तः, स च मया प्राप्तः” इत्यभिमानो
भवति लौकिकानाम् । न त्वयमर्थाध्यवसायमूलः । तदुक्तम् “यथा-
5 ध्यवसायमतत्त्वात्, यथातत्त्वं चानध्यवसायात्” इति । “स्वप्रति-
भासे ऽनर्थे ऽर्थाध्यवसायेन प्रवृत्तेः” इत्यत्रापि ग्रन्थे ऽर्थाध्यवसायो

5 यथाध्यवसायम°] *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga* 134.10: यथाध्यवसायमि-
ति । अबहीरूपस्य बहीरूपतयाऽध्यवसायादबहीरूपस्याबहीरूपतयाऽनध्यवसा-
याच्च ।

5 यथाध्यवसाय° ... चानध्यवसायात्] Dharmottara's *Apoḥaprakaraṇa*
588(239).18–20: ji ltar ñes pa ni de kho na ñid ma yin pa'i phyir la/ de kho
na ñid kyañ ji lta ba bñin du ma ñes pa'i phyir ro źes gañ bśad pa dañ/; NM
I 63.15–16: तदुक्तं भवद्भिः—“यथाध्यवसायमतत्त्वात् (°तत्त्वात्] M^{ka}; °त-
त्त्वत्वात् M), यथातत्त्वं चानध्यवसायात्” इति ।; cf. *Pramāṇavārttikasavavṛtti*
107.2–3: यथाभिनिवेशमतत्त्वात्, यथातत्त्वं चासमीहितत्त्वात् ।

6 स्वप्रतिभासे] *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga* 134.11–12: स्वप्रतिभास इति ।
प्रतिभासत इति प्रतिभासो ग्राह्याकारस्तस्मिन् स्वस्मिन्नात्मीये विकल्पसम्बन्धि-
नि ।

6 स्वप्रतिभासे ... प्रवृत्तेः] *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 46.7–8: स्वप्रतिभासे ऽनर्थे ऽर्था-
ध्यवसायेन प्रवर्तनाद् भ्रान्तिरप्यर्थसम्बन्धेन तदव्यभिचारात्प्रमाणम् ।; quoted in
Dharmottara's *Apoḥaprakaraṇa* 587(238).22–23; cf. also *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* 71.5:
तथानुमानमपि स्वप्रतिभासे ऽनर्थे ऽर्थाध्यवसायेन प्रवृत्तेरनर्थग्राहि ।

2 एवं] K₁; एवं च MVA₁Z₁ 2 बाह्यव°] MVA₁Z₁; बा॥॥ K₁ 2 °शू-
न्येषु] K₁Z₁; °शून्येष्वपि MVA₁ 2 विकल्पेषु] MVA₁K₁; विकल्पेष्वपि Z₁
2 समुल्लसितेषु] M^{ka}VK₁; समुल्लसितेषु MA₁Z₁ 2 बाह्यो ऽर्थो] MVA₁Z₁;
बाह्यार्थो K₁ 3 मया प्राप्तः] MVK₁Z₁; प्राप्त A₁ 4 न त्वयमर्थाध्य°] M
VZ₁; न वसायेन यमर्थाध्य° A₁^{ac}; न वयमर्थाध्य° A₁^{pc}; न त्वयमर्थो ऽध्य°
K₁ 6 ऽर्थाध्यवसायेन] M^{ka}M^{gha}K₁Z₁; ऽर्थाध्यवसायात् MV; ----ध्यव-
सायेन A₁ 6 प्रवृत्तेः] A₁K₁; प्रवृत्तिः MVZ₁ 6 ऽर्थाध्यवसायो] MVK₁Z₁;
र्थाध्यवसाये A₁

प्रतीतिमार्गस्त्वविविच्यमानो जनस्य जातिभ्रममातनोति ॥
यावांश्च कश्चिन्नियमप्रकारः प्रदर्शितो जातिषु वृत्त्यवृत्त्योः ।
तावानपोहेष्वपि तुल्य एव भवत्यवस्तुत्वकृतस्तु भेदः ॥
तुल्ये ऽपि भेदे शमने ज्वरादेः काश्चिद्यथैवौषधयः समर्थाः ।
5 सामान्यशून्या अपि तद्वदेव स्युर्व्यक्तयः कार्यविशेषशक्ताः ॥
विशेषणादिव्यवहारकृत्स्तिस्तुच्छे ऽप्यपोहे न न युज्यते नः ।
अतश्च मा कारि भवद्भिरेषा जात्याकृतिव्यक्तिपदार्थचिन्ता ॥

2 यावांश्च कश्चिन्नि०] *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga* 134.14–15: यावांश्च कश्चि-
दिति । यथा निमित्तान्तरं विनैव कासुचिद् व्यक्तिषु सामान्यं समवैति कासुचिन्नेति
तव नियमः निमित्तान्तराभ्युपगमे अनवस्थापातादेवं ममाप्यपोहे भविष्यति त-
त्कारिष्वेव गौरिति प्रत्यय इति ।

4 तुल्ये ऽपि भेदे] *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga* 134.17: तुल्ये ऽपि भेद इति ।
4 तुल्ये ... कार्यविशेषशक्ताः] Cf. *Pramāṇavārttika* I 74: ज्वरादिशमने का-
श्चित्सह प्रत्येकमेव वा । दृष्टा यथा वौषधयो नानात्वे ऽपि न चापराः ॥ (This
verse is quoted in *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga* 134.19–20.)

6 विशेषणादिव्यवहारकृत्स्तिस्तु०] *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga* 134.20–25: वि-
शेषणादिव्यवहारकृत्स्तिरिति । बुद्धिरेव नीलावच्छिन्नमुत्पलमबाह्यं बाह्यमिव संदर्श-
यन्नुत्पद्यते न पुनर्बाह्यानां पदार्थानां निरंशत्वादेवंरूपता समस्ति । आदिग्रहणात्
सामानाधिकरण्यपरामर्शः, तत्राप्यनेकधर्मवन्तं धर्मिणं बाह्यमिव प्रदर्शयन्ती बु-
द्धिरेव तथाभूतोदेति । यदाह—संसृज्यन्ते न भिद्यन्ते स्वतो ऽर्थाः परमार्थतः ।
भिन्नं रूपमभिन्नं च तेषु बुधेरुपप्लवः ॥ इति ॥; *Pramāṇavārttika* I 87: संसृज्यन्ते
न भिद्यन्ते स्वतो ऽर्थाः पारमार्थिकाः । रूपमेकमनेकं च तेषु बुद्धेरुपप्लवः ॥

2 प्रदर्शितो] K_1 ; प्रवर्तते MVA_1Z_1 2 जातिषु वृत्त्यवृत्त्योः] MVK_1Z_1 ; जा-
तिप्रत्ययोः A_1^{ac} (unmetrical); जातिप्रवृत्त्योः A_1^{pc} (unmetrical) 3 ऽवस्तुत्व०]
 MVK_1Z_1 ; ऽवस्तत्वप्र० A_1 (unmetrical) 4 ऽद्यथैवौषधयः] $MA_1K_1Z_1$; ऽद्य-
था वौषधयः $M^{kha}V$ 5 ऽशक्ताः] MK_1 ; ऽयुक्ताः $M^{kha}VZ_1$; ऽसक्ताः A_1
6 न न] MVK_1Z_1 ; ननु A_1 7 भवद्भि०] MVK_1Z_1 ; भद्भि० A_1 7 ऽरेषा]
 MVK_1Z_1 ; ऽरेषु M^{ka} ; ऽरेषां A_1 7 जात्याकृति०] MVK_1Z_1 ; जात्य- -ति
 A_1