

論文

Faith-Based Relief and Postwar U.S. Foreign Policy: *Quäkerspeisung* as a Case Study

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要 約

本稿は、宗教と米国外交の関係史の文脈において、第一次世界大戦後のドイツで行われた「クエイカーの給食活動」という人道的救済の事例を分析し、以下の二点を指摘するものである。

第一に、この事業は、米国の宗教者と米国政府の外交当局者の連携のもと、米国に敗れた敵国の市民を対象に行われた戦後救済の最初の事例のひとつである。第一次大戦への参戦を機に国際政治の主役に躍り出た米国にとって、戦後ヨーロッパの復興に対する大規模な支援は前例のない試みであった。連邦政府においてこれを指揮したH・フーヴァーは、1919年2月、アメリカ支援局(ARA)を設立し、ヨーロッパ14カ国の児童を対象に給食活動を展開した。だがドイツに関しては、ARAはこの活動をクエイカーのアメリカ・フレンズ奉仕委員会(AFSC)に委託した。「クエイカーの給食活動」は、1920年2月に開始され、1921年のピーク時には100万人以上に補助食が配られた。この活動は、ARAによる物資や資金の提供に始まり、1924年にその役割を終えるまで、連邦政府の関係者からの支援に支えられていた。

第二に、この給食活動は、政府関係者の後援とともにキリスト教徒の連帯意識にもとづいていた。AFSCは、根深い宗教的分裂を抱えたクエイカー社会を母体としており、その活動において、クエイカーまたキリスト教徒の隣人愛にもとづく社会奉仕以上の意図を具体的には示さなかった。そして、この給食活動についても社会奉仕と解釈することで、AFSCはクエイカーリズムの伝道のための救済事業との批判を受けることなく、政府関係者と連携し、また米国とドイツにおけるキリスト教徒のネットワークを活用できた。つまり、「クエイカーの給食活動」の進展は、それが大戦後の複雑な国民感情から離れ、キリスト教徒の連帯の徴として簡潔に理解されえたことに助けられていたのである。

Introduction¹⁾

Peace did not immediately bring normalcy to warring nations after WWI. The twentieth century's new type of industrial warfare created battle lines and home fronts, and the end of formal hostilities was followed by contentious negotiations over the terms of peace. As a result, it took a long time to complete disarmament and reconstruction. After the Armistice,

¹⁾ This paper uses the following abbreviations in the notes: AA for the American Friends Service Committee Archives, Philadelphia; AF for *The American Friend*; FHL for the Friends Historical Library, Swarthmore College, Pennsylvania; FI for *Friends Intelligencer*; NYT for *New York Times*.

Germany, which had suffered “slow starvation” during WWI, had to endure “man-made famine” caused by the extended blockade.²⁾ The living conditions in Germany improved only slowly even after the country signed the Peace Treaty of Versailles in June 1919. In a January 7, 1921 report to the U.S. State Department, Ellis Loring Dresel, an American Commissioner to Germany, noted that “a large portion of the children in all the large cities in Germany are seriously underfed.” He also declared “the American relief” to be “essential to save the life and preserve the health of an entire generation.” The relief effort he referred to was the postwar child-feeding organized by Quakers, which Germans called *Quäkerspeisung*. Dresel commended it because he thought that “no other charity...in Germany has [inspired] such a deep feeling of gratitude to America.”³⁾

This paper addresses two critical features of *Quäkerspeisung*. First, it was one of the earliest postwar relief efforts directed at a former American enemy, and it was administered by an American faith-based agency which coordinated its humanitarian actions with U.S. foreign policy. The American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), formed by Quakers, worked with public officials like Herbert Hoover to render humanitarian assistance to post-WWI Germany. Second, *Quäkerspeisung* relied not just on the material resource of state power but also on the cultural resource of Christian fellowship. The interaction between religion and U.S. foreign policy produced *Quäkerspeisung* as a social service based on a transnational Christian identity marked by altruistic deeds. Meanwhile, it helped the American Quakers to overcome their internal religious conflicts, by appealing to a core Quaker identity, which was also defined by service to others.

I. Faith-Based Relief and U.S. Foreign Policy

To set the stage for my analysis of *Quäkerspeisung*, I would like to survey the recent scholarship on religion and U.S. foreign policy. For more than a decade, the shock of September 11 has motivated scholars to explore the religious voice in U.S. foreign policy, because the terrorist attack seriously challenged the secularist assumptions on which they had theorized international relations. However, some of the links between religion and U.S. foreign policy had already been outlined by scholars of U.S. history and other disciplines.⁴⁾

²⁾ Berinda Davis, *Home Fires Burning: Food, Politics and Everyday Life in World War I Berlin* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 246. Historians do not agree to what extent the continuation of blockade after the Armistice harmed civilian life in post-WWI Germany, and whether it was a necessary weapon for the Allies to secure German acquiescence to the peace agreement as they favored. See for example, Avner Offer, *The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 398-400; Paul C. Vincent, *The Politics of Hunger: The Allied Blockade of Germany, 1915-1919* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1985), 160-65.

³⁾ Sidney Brooks, *America and Germany, 1918-1925* (New York: Macmillan, 1925), 159-60.

⁴⁾ Some scholars tried to incorporate religion as a factor in international relations since the 1990s. The most notable achievement was Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson, *Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). Andrew Preston outlined the reasons why

The political growth of conservative Christians had aroused scholarly curiosity and anxiety by the 1990s. A crucial achievement came in 1990 when Mark A. Noll argued that religion had been “a highly visible factor in many of the most controversial political events” since the 1960s, such as the civil rights movement, the growth of new Christian right, and the moral conflicts in multicultural America.⁵⁾

Combined study of religion and U.S. foreign policy, relatively new to the scholarship of U.S. history, has mostly relied on the analytical framework conceived by Noll in 1990 to seize the essence of complex interaction between religion and American politics. Noll first split this interaction into three domains: institutional, behavioral, and philosophical.⁶⁾ In each domain, according to him, Americans have challenged the politics of accommodating the separation of church and state with a public role of faith. His approach, though requiring further elaboration, has persuaded many observers to replace *influence* with *interaction*: religion might influence politics, and vice versa. Though Noll defined neither religion nor politics accurately for the book, scholars, inspired by his framework, usually understood religion, relevant to politics, as an identifiably empirical phenomenon in which people interpreted the various dimensions of their life on the assumption of a transcendent entity and its normative guidance.⁷⁾ Meanwhile, what they meant by politics encompassed systems, actions, and thoughts for secular order, including those about foreign affairs.⁸⁾ Americans blended religious and political language to make their life more understandable, in other words, more congenial to their current situation and specific interests.

While scholars have generated their cross-interests in religion and U.S. foreign policy, the transnational reorientation of U.S. history has portrayed Christianity more as a long-standing path that connected Americans with other parts of the world. In the early twentieth century, globalization, having synchronized with the ecumenical movement since the nineteenth century, has thickened the international networks of American Christianity.⁹⁾

American diplomatic history had neglected religion until recently. See “Reviving Religion in the History of American Foreign Relations,” in *God and Global Order: The Power of Religion in American Foreign Policy*, ed. Jonathan Chaplin and Robert Joustra (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2010), 28-31.

⁵⁾ Mark A. Noll, introduction to *Religion and American Politics: From the Colonial Period to the 1980s* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 4.

⁶⁾ Noll, introduction to *Religion and American Politics*, 3-4. Political scientist Hugh Hecló rearticulated Noll's approach most clearly. Hugh Hecló, “An Introduction to Religion and Public Policy,” in *Religion Returns to the Public Square: Faith and Policy in America*, ed. Hugh Hecló and Wilfred M. McClay (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 11-13.

⁷⁾ Most scholars who studied the intersection between religion and American politics preferred to understand religion substantively rather than functionally, in order to escape from the entanglement with civil religion.

⁸⁾ On the theoretical level, historians, following Noll's approach, did not succeed in differentiating U.S. foreign policy accurately from domestic politics.

⁹⁾ See for example, William R. Hutchison, *Errand to the World: American Protestant Thought and Foreign Missions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), esp. chap. 4 and 5; Robert Wuthnow,

American religious history found the institutional apex of ecumenism in the formation of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America (FCC) in 1908 and the worldwide Edinburgh Missionary Conference in 1910.

However, in American society, it was the mobilization during WWI that, more than any other pre-war events, implemented ecumenical fellowship.¹⁰⁾ With U.S. foreign policy for almost the first time shaping the daily life of Americans, American Christianity confirmed the drastic and permanent changes regarding organization launched by the Social Gospel: Americans translated Christian faith, transnational in nature, into wartime social service through local and national schemes. The FCC and other religious groups eagerly coordinated their war efforts nationwide. In general, ecumenical Christianity framed belief systems in less specified wordings, for the sake of togetherness and adaptability. Thus, the movement centered less controversially in social service to others, rather than in theological interpretation and religious rituals, and often coincided with the disorganization of traditional forms of faith.¹¹⁾ Though Americans from the pulpits to the pews, from the President to ordinary soldiers, adopted common religious language to configure their wartime experience, WWI changed the way they organized their religious life more than religion influenced wartime politics.¹²⁾

American religious life during WWI also confirms Robert Wuthnow's recent suggestion that the role of faith has been more tangible and less insignificant in foreign assistance than in other realms of foreign policy.¹³⁾ The U.S. government started to incorporate private philanthropy, both ecclesiastical and secular, into its foreign assistance during the period from the Spanish-American War to the end of the 1930s.¹⁴⁾ Since the late nineteenth century, the Social Gospel had implanted the conviction that Christianity had a mission to combat social evil and transform human society into the Kingdom of God, and as a result, it had

Boundless Faith: The Global Outreach of American Churches (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), esp. chap. 6.

¹⁰⁾ Martin E. Marty, *The Irony of It All, 1893-1919*, vol.1 of *Modern American Religion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 217.

¹¹⁾ It is very difficult to specify the meaning of ecumenism as the word has obtained various implications through its history since ancient Christianity. Meanwhile, modern Christianity was distinctive in its acute sense of Christian social work. Ernst Troeltsch, *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches*, trans. Olive Wyon (1931; repr., New York: Harper and Row, 1960), 2: 1010-11.

¹²⁾ Richard M. Gamble, *The War for Righteousness: Progressive Christianity, the Great War, and the Rise of the Messianic Nation* (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2003), chap. 6 and 7. For the most detailed description of the ordinary soldiers' and war workers' religious perception, see Jonathan H. Ebel, *Faith in the Fight: Religion and the American Soldier in the Great War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010).

¹³⁾ Wuthnow, *Boundless Faith*, 191.

¹⁴⁾ Merle Curti, *American Philanthropy Abroad: A History* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1963), 619-21.

aroused American interests in international humanitarian aid. WWI compelled Americans to organize their foreign relief more effectively, though the empathy for specific groups of people rather than universal humanitarianism acted as their incentive.¹⁵⁾ As the Belgian plight evoked American sympathy, Herbert Hoover launched an unparalleled private relief scheme, the Commission for Relief in Belgium, and managed it from 1914 to 1919. The federal government could exploit this type of voluntarism, by stimulating wartime patriotic enthusiasm.¹⁶⁾

At the War's end, foreign relief was still a crucial policy arena for some Americans who naïvely anticipated that American Protestantism or progressivism would be a guiding force in the reconstruction of Europe.¹⁷⁾ To their surprise, Quakers—on the periphery of mainline Protestantism—were the ones who most deeply involved themselves with the American relief in post-WWI Europe, especially in Germany. Prior to the Armistice, American Quakers had administered one of several practical relief agencies based in the U.S., the AFSC. In April 1917, however, American Quakers formed that agency primarily for conscientious objection, the purpose that most Americans despised as unpatriotic. The wartime organization of American Christianity did not leave room for those who felt uncertain about the American abandonment of neutrality.

2. The Wartime Formation and Development of the American Friends Service Committee

On April 30, 1917, twelve American Quakers gathered in Philadelphia and anonymously formed the AFSC to assist their fellows threatened by unacceptable military demands, particularly conscientious objectors (COs). In May 1917, the federal government, which had not proposed any legislation about COs at the time of the war proclamation, offered the option of noncombatant service under the Selective Service Act. The COs affiliated with historic peace churches like the Society of Friends (Quakers) were more favorably treated than those who claimed the exemption exclusively based on political ideology or individual belief.¹⁸⁾ However, without the details about noncombatant service, its legitimization did not entirely ease the AFSC's concern. Aware of the diminishing discrepancy between combatant

¹⁵⁾ Ibid., 258.

¹⁶⁾ See Christopher Capozzola, *Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of the Modern American Citizen* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

¹⁷⁾ William R. Hutchison, "Protestantism as Establishment," in *Between the Times: The Travail of the Protestant Establishment in America, 1900-1960*, ed. William R. Hutchison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 5; John A. Thompson, *Reformers and War: American Progressive Publicists and the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 248. Historians did not have a common understanding about the American general public's interest in post-WWI reconstruction of Europe. See also, Curti, *American Philanthropy Abroad*, 259.

¹⁸⁾ H.C. Peterson and Gilbert C. Fite, *Opponents of War, 1917-1918* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1957), 130-35. Capozzola summarized that "the World War I home front witnessed some of American history's most brutal repressions of labor, of pacifism, and of ethnic difference." *Uncle Sam Wants You*, 10.

and noncombatant services in modern industrial war, American Quakers came to associate conscientious objection with relief work for civilian victims.¹⁹⁾

In July 1915, the Winona Lake Peace Conference ushered in the most important turning point of Quaker pacifism in twentieth century American society. A group of Quakers, who espoused liberal theology and had an ecumenical orientation, determined to update their practice of the Peace Testimony, by integrating the American Quakers' response to the European War.²⁰⁾ In their religious life, they belonged to one of the three major groups of American Quakerdom: the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of Orthodox Quakers, the Friends General Conference of Hicksite Quakers, and the Friends United Meeting of Gurneyite Quakers. The Winona Lake conference captured a notable moment of American Quaker history in two points. First, for almost the first time, American Quakers, who had preferred decentralized organization and suffered internal schisms for generations, unified their peace advocacy on a national level.²¹⁾ Second, liberal Quakers made clear their intention to transform the traditional Peace Testimony into a collective, practical, and secularized response to the ongoing hostilities.²²⁾ Still justifying their position as seekers of Christian truth and enunciating their ideas with Christian language, they expressed support for American neutrality. In addition, by this time, many had started to contribute on an individual and local basis to the British Quakers' relief. The London Yearly Meeting (LYM) had been assisting wounded soldiers, civilian victims, and war refugees since 1914.²³⁾

The AFSC, as a descendant of the Winona Lake Conference, resolved to "co-ordinate the service of all groups of Friends," beyond the liberal Quakers' circle. The first audience it

¹⁹⁾ Vincent D. Nicholson, "Where Shall a Conscientious Objector to Military Service Draw the Line?," *The Friend (Philadelphia)*, September 20, 1917, 153-54.

²⁰⁾ The word Testimony refers to the organized collection of beliefs and public witness that Quakers think they must observe in order to follow the God's will. According to J. William Frost, Testimonies, in twentieth century liberal Quakers' understanding, have decreased its religious and spiritual implications, and they often spoke secular issues rather than theological themes in worship meeting. See J. William Frost, "A Century of Liberalism," *Friends Journal* 46, no. 10 (October 2000): 8-11.

²¹⁾ In 1827, Quakers in Philadelphia divided into the Orthodox and the Hicksites in Philadelphia. This "Great Separation" affected almost all the Quaker communities across the U.S. In the mid-nineteenth century, the Orthodox Quakers, other than those who were in Philadelphia, splintered again into the Gurneyites and the Wilburites. Those inner rifts, originated from theological conflicts, seriously overshadowed American Quakers' religious life in the early twentieth century, though their minority status was often misattributed to a monolithic unity. For example, they held different manners of worship: Hicksite Quakers kept the traditional style of unprogrammed worship, but most Philadelphian Orthodox and Gurneyite Quakers preferred pastoral meeting. Each branch had its channel of communication, and none of the major Quaker periodicals saved much space for the subject of peace before 1914.

²²⁾ H.F., "The Peace Conference," *FI*, July 31, 1915, 491-92; August 7, 1915, 505-09; August 14, 1915, 521-23.

²³⁾ John Ormerod Greenwood, *Friends and Relief*, vol.1 of *Quaker Encounters* (York, England: William Sessions Limited, 1975), 185-209.

wanted to persuade was other Quakers.²⁴⁾ Even though all the Quaker Meetings reaffirmed the Peace Testimony during WWI, there were many evangelical and holiness Quakers in the U.S. who emphasized it only theoretically and separated it from their response to the current hostilities. Those Quakers tended to contribute to seemingly more *patriotic* organizations like the American Red Cross (ARC) than to the AFSC. In fact, the AFSC adopted a very cautious approach because many Quakers did not fully support its activities, and its members also had vivid memories or real experiences of the internal antagonism within American Quakerdom. For that reason, the AFSC encapsulated its mission in terms of two central motives: “a clear sympathetic vision of our [Quakers’] obligation,” and “a deep consecration to our tasks.”²⁵⁾ It did not venture any further specific details about the meaning of its work for Quakerism.

Even for its members, the AFSC became realistic, because, as a social agency, it kept an ambiguous position in terms of faith and practice. It assumed no authority over Quaker worship, theology, and membership, and at the same time no Meeting wielded any power to oversee what it was doing. Quakers of various theological interpretations and religious practices could join it, based on the fact that it was not fully subsumed under the hierarchical system of Quaker Meetings.²⁶⁾ The AFSC Quakers generally avoided a religious debate among themselves. It simply expected that social service would justify its existence in the Quaker community and American society. The AFSC also welcomed non-Quaker contributions, though during WWI, it accepted only COs and their equivalents with special skills as its relief workers. One of the six AFSC women sent to Russia in 1917, for instance, was a Catholic fluent in Russian who had “the views of Friends with regard to war,” and she taught the language to her Quaker colleagues.²⁷⁾ However, those who became interested in Quakerism through their commitment in the AFSC could not easily join Quaker Meetings, which were diverse in terms of religious practice and position. In short, the AFSC could be inclusive on the premise that it was not an official window to Quaker membership.

The AFSC had to begin its “life on defensive,” not only inwardly for the sake of its inclusiveness, but also outwardly amidst the jingoistic intolerance of the home front.²⁸⁾ J. William Frost, a Quaker historian, considered that, from 1917 to 1919, it had to remain “apolitical, atheological, and silent on every subject except its good deeds.”²⁹⁾ The wartime

²⁴⁾ AFSC, *Bulletin*, 1: 1.

²⁵⁾ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁾ A system of monthly, quarterly, and yearly meetings organized Quaker religious life. For instance, monthly meetings serve for weekly worship, and yearly meetings had an ultimate responsibility for theological interpretation and religious practice.

²⁷⁾ AFSC, Minutes, June 4, 1917, AA. The AFSC was also socially inclusive. Women were functional everywhere from central administration to fieldwork, although the early AFSC divided the tasks rigidly according to gender.

²⁸⁾ J. William Frost, “‘Our Deeds Carry Our Message’: The Early History of the American Friends Service Committee,” *Quaker History* 81, no.1 (Spring 1992): 6.

²⁹⁾ Frost, “‘Our Deeds Carry Our Message,’” 47.

AFSC said nothing publicly about federal policy, the anti-German uproar in American society, or the civilian tribulation behind the German lines. It tried to stay close to the mainstream, by wrapping pacifism in clever silence and altruistic behavior. Its prospectus epitomized its wartime behavioral pattern: "We [Quakers] are united in expressing our love for our country and our desire to serve her loyally. We offer our services to the Government of the United States in any constructive work in which we can conscientiously serve humanity."³⁰⁾ In this way, it associated its actions with Quakerism, Christianity, and patriotism simultaneously in succinct and simple but highly selected words.³¹⁾ The wartime AFSC sought, reticently in deeds, a delicate balance between the Peace Testimony and patriotism; distinctiveness and insiderhood in wartime America; and secularized pacifism and harmony among Quakers.

In 1917, the AFSC's willingness to negotiate with the federal government enabled the relief work in wartime France. The AFSC jointly ran the Friends Reconstruction Unit headquartered in Paris with British Quakers, and mainly worked in the war-devastated regions of Northern France from 1917 to 1920. As of June 1918, there were 227 AFSC workers, including many men of conscription age, in France, and they basically cooperated with the ARC's civilian section.³²⁾ The federal government indirectly subsidized the AFSC's relief work via the ARC, which had been nationalized since 1917.³³⁾ In American society, the relief work in France might have lessened the wartime criticism against Quakers, as the media sometimes praised it as the Quakers' unique and patriotic contribution to the American battle against the Kaiser.³⁴⁾

When the hostilities were suspended in November 1918, the AFSC was ready to dedicate itself to the larger relief in Europe. The experience in wartime France was replete with dissatisfaction, fears, and troubles.³⁵⁾ Yet, this did not fundamentally damage post-WWI Quakers' dedication to relief. During WWI, the AFSC had situated relief work in close alignment with patriotism, as a complement to or a social compensation for CO status. After the War, it framed the work exclusively in pacifist discourse, and clearly recognized it as one of the most pragmatic methods of peace-making. The AFSC's executive secretary, Wilbur K. Thomas articulated its German relief as a specific form of American involvement in Europe,

³⁰⁾ AFSC, Minutes, April 30, 1917.

³¹⁾ Frost, "Our Deeds Carry Our Message," 3-6, 31-34.

³²⁾ AFSC, *Bulletin*, 16: 8.

³³⁾ Wuthnow argued that the wartime relation between the ARC and public officials suggested that Americans kept the fundamental conviction about the separation between the voluntary associations and government. However, the relation between the ARC and the wartime government was not fully examined. See Wuthnow, *Boundless Faith*, 120.

³⁴⁾ Frost, "Our Deeds Carry Our Message," 11. See for example, AFSC, "Service Notes," *FI*, July 12, 1919, 445.

³⁵⁾ Frost, "Our Deeds Carry Our Message," 23-27.

an alternative to the League of Nations and the World Court.³⁶⁾ Meanwhile, the AFSC also justified the relief work as an essential step of “Christianizing international relations.”³⁷⁾

3. Religious and Political Resources for *Quäkerspeisung*

The massive relief in Europe, of which *Quäkerspeisung* was an integral part, was a completely new experience for post-WWI Americans. Woodrow Wilson’s well-known struggle for post-WWI peace-making did not focus solely on political architectures like the League of Nations or the installation of independent nation states based on the principle of self-determination. Rather, he had a more ambitious vision for America’s multifaceted leadership in the restoration of European life. Herbert Hoover remembered that Wilson often mentioned to it as the “Second American Expeditionary Force to Save Europe.”³⁸⁾ Hoover himself thought that the fact that “there was no previous experience of large scale international relief to Europe” made difficult the American task, which was indeed his task as he assumed.³⁹⁾

Hoover, the leading figure of the American delegation in Paris after only Wilson and Colonel Edward House, devoted himself to the economic and industrial reconstruction of Europe. He presided over the American relief to European countries and was rumored to be the “food dictator in Europe.”⁴⁰⁾ From February 1919, he directed the American Relief Administration (ARA), the temporary governmental organization that handled the congressional appropriation of \$100,000,000 for the European relief. Within the Wilson administration, Hoover was the person most informed about the physical devastation caused by WWI, and perhaps for his knowledge, he staunchly opposed the retention of the food blockade against Germany which, in his opinion, no longer had any military value. During the Armistice, he assiduously asked the Allied leaders to relax it, as he feared that without food, Germany would slip into anarchy and communism, and without an outlet, the American agricultural market would fall into debacle. The relaxation would serve the two purposes

³⁶⁾ Wilbur K. Thomas, “America’s Supreme Service to Europe,” *Locomotive Engineer’s Journal* 58, no.1 (January 1924): 20.

³⁷⁾ AFSC, Executive Board Minutes, January 10, 1919, AA; On the Quaker pacifism in the interwar period, see Farah Mendlesohn, “Denominational Difference in Quaker Relief Work during the Spanish Civil War: The Operation of Corporate Concern and Liberal Theologies,” *Journal of Religious History* 24, no.2 (June 2000): 180-95; William Darwin Swanson Witte, “Quaker Pacifism in the United States, 1919-1942: With Special Reference to Its Relation to Isolationism and Internationalism” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1954).

³⁸⁾ Herbert Hoover, *The Ordeal of Woodrow Wilson* (New York: McGraw-Hill Books, 1958), 87.

³⁹⁾ Herbert Hoover, “Résumé of American Relief Operations in Europe 1918-1922,” in *Organization of American Relief in Europe, 1918-1919: Including Negotiations Leading up to the Establishment of the Office of Director General of Relief at Paris by the Allied and Associated Powers*, ed. Suda Lorena Bane and Ralph Haswell Lutz (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1943), 1.

⁴⁰⁾ Margaret Macmillan, *Peacemakers: Six Months That Changed the World* (London: John Murray, 2001), 69.

and ensure greater stability to Europe. In March 1919, he finally succeeded at persuading the Allies to ease the food blockade in exchange for German gold reserves and merchant vessels, but this measure did not improve ordinary German life to a satisfactory level.⁴¹⁾

In June 1919, shortly before the close of the Paris Peace Conference and the expiration of the ARA's legal life, Hoover decided to create a new American organization for child-feeding in Central and Eastern Europe, which he would personally direct. Wilson immediately approved the plan and permitted the organization to inherit the ARA's title and its monetary surplus. In July 1919, the privatized ARA initiated the European Children's Fund (ARA-ECF). The ARA-ECF supervised the child-feeding in fourteen countries, where it depended on indigenous organizations for the actual delivery of food. From 1919 to 1924, the ARA-ECF, whose director joined the Harding Cabinet as the U.S. Secretary of Commerce in 1921, spent more than \$84,000,000 individually and saved millions from malnutrition. However, the ARA-ECF excluded Germany from its relief scheme, and decided to assign the task to the AFSC.⁴²⁾

Other than *Quäkerspeisung*, the ARA-ECF never entrusted its child-feeding program to any other organization at an administrative level. The ARA-ECF permitted this exception because it could not cover German relief through its allocation from the U.S. Congress, which prohibited funds from being spent for enemy nations. Since the U.S. failed to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, it was officially at war with Germany until the peace treaty was concluded between the two countries in August 1921.⁴³⁾ Other plausible reasons for Germany's exclusion from the benefit were the personnel shortage of the ARA and Hoover's political acumen. He understood that the public assistance toward Germany would provoke antipathy from most Americans. The anti-German sentiment remained strong in American society for years after WWI.⁴⁴⁾ Although some people found it to be a "humorous" decision when Hoover chose Quakers, the AFSC was one of the several organizations with experiences of relief work in war-weary Europe.⁴⁵⁾

⁴¹⁾ Kendrick A. Clements, *The Life of Herbert Hoover: Imperfect Visionary, 1918-1928* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), chap.1.

⁴²⁾ Frank M. Surface and Raymond L. Bland, *American Food in the World War and Reconstruction Period: Operations of the Organizations under the Direction of Herbert Hoover, 1914-1924* (Stanford University: Stanford University Press, 1931), 80-81. In 1919, the ARA-ECF even assisted Austrian children with the President's national security and defense fund. *Ibid.*, 88-89.

⁴³⁾ Herbert Hoover, *Famine in Forty-Five Nations, Organization behind the Front, 1914-1923*, vol. 2 of *An American Epic* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1960), 379; Richard L. Cary, "Child-Feeding Work in Germany under the American Friends' Service Committee Coöperating with the American Relief Administration and the European Children's Fund, Herbert C. Hoover, Chairman," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 92 (November, 1920): 157-58.

⁴⁴⁾ Herbert Hoover, *Famine in Forty-Five Nations, the Battles on the Front Line, 1914-1923*, vol. 3 of *An American Epic* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1961), 334; Charles E. Strickland, "American Aid to Germany, 1919-1921," *Wisconsin Magazine of History* 45, no.4 (Summer, 1962): 256-70.

⁴⁵⁾ "Topics of the Times: Germans Will Feel the Point," *NYT*, November 28, 1919.

In addition, Hoover knew Quakers' interest in Germany. As WWI neared to its end, some Quakers started to disclose their concern about German conditions to the AFSC administration. Carolena M. Wood, a Quaker woman from Mount Kisco, New York, revealed to the AFSC her hope for assisting the impoverished population of postwar Germany.⁴⁶⁾ In January 1919, when several American and British Quakers discussed in Paris, they mentioned to German relief.⁴⁷⁾ In the spring of 1919, Hoover conferred with the AFSC workers in Paris, and sold relief supplies to British Quakers who were planning to send them to German mothers and children in crisis.⁴⁸⁾ Those Quakers regarded the relief toward Germany as "a wonderful opportunity for Friends and the Friendly Spirit," and in July 1919, with Hoover's help, the AFSC sent three representatives to investigate the conditions in Germany.⁴⁹⁾ Travelling with Carolena M. Wood were two non-Quaker delegates, Jane Addams and Alice Hamilton. The group toured Germany for weeks, and upon returning to the U.S., Addams and Hamilton, among the most famous women in early twentieth century American society, coauthored a journal article on the abject conditions they had witnessed. They alerted readers to the widespread undernourishment and tuberculosis epidemic faced by Germans, especially children in urban areas.⁵⁰⁾ Addams, who had found many Germans in "a state of bewilderment," told the AFSC members that the "spiritual blockade" Germans endured was "far worse than any food blockade that could be imposed" on them.⁵¹⁾ Addams' remarks paralleled to liberal Quakers' reflections, which became less theological and sectarian, while admitting and even encouraging a religious drive in the wider sense as a means to understand and address social issues.

In July 1919, the AFSC started the relief work in Germany with 60.9 tons of food that it purchased from the ARA and put in Wood's hands. Wood could bring that food to Germany, thanks to "the strength of Miss Addams' name," and delivered it through the British Quakers' transnational network.⁵²⁾ In August 1914, the LYM formed a special committee to support enemy citizens who were stranded in Britain, and soon started to collaborate with the Germans interested in the similar task: Elizabeth Rotten, a social activist, Friedrich Siegmund-Schultze, an ecumenical social thinker, and others. From April 1919, those

⁴⁶⁾ AFSC, Executive Board Minutes, October 31, 1918.

⁴⁷⁾ Conference Held in Paris, France, memorandum, January 22 and 23, 1919, in AFSC, Executive Board Minutes, February 12, 1919.

⁴⁸⁾ Lucy Biddle Lewis to Wilbur K. Thomas, April 30, 1919, Biddle Family papers, ser. 5, box 8, FHL; Friends Foreign Fund Committee, Minutes, May 13, 1919. Library of the Society of Friends, Friends House London.

⁴⁹⁾ AFSC, *Bulletin*, 24: 19.

⁵⁰⁾ Jane Addams and Alice Hamilton, "After the Lean Years: Impressions of Food Conditions in Germany When Peace Was Signed," *Survey* 42 (September 6, 1919), in Jane Addams, *Writings on Peace*, ed. Mary Fischer and Judy D. Whipps (London: Continuum, 2003), 203-11.

⁵¹⁾ AFSC, Minutes, September 24 and 25, 1919.

⁵²⁾ Charles J. Rhoads to Rufus M. Jones, June 19, 1919, box 18, Rufus M. Jones papers, Haverford College Quaker Collection, Pennsylvania.

people delivered relief supplies from British Quakers in German cities, and also welcomed American contribution, assisting Wood in distribution.⁵³⁾ The AFSC explained its gifts as a “message of a goodwill,” and an embodiment of the Quaker belief that “those who were called enemies are really friends separated by a great misunderstanding.”⁵⁴⁾ This phrase clarified how the AFSC would delineate its postwar relief work: it would condemn war but not a specific group of people in order to set up the immediate framework for reconciliation, and it would use semi-religious language to distance itself at most from political controversies.

In November 1919, Hoover officially requested the AFSC to operate the child-feeding program in Germany. In his letter to Rufus M. Jones, the AFSC’s chairman, he promised the ARA’s comprehensive support: financial and material resources, including most relief supplies, and as well, transportation and communication expenses. The AFSC, for its part, would cover the personnel expenses of organization in the U.S. and distribution in Germany, and take full responsibility for the administration of the program. Hoover wrote to Jones that he believed that “the undoubted probity, ability, and American character of Quakers” would prevent the political use of this child-feeding, despite the postwar political tensions.⁵⁵⁾ Hoover’s reasoning was naïve, and even the AFSC apparently understood the political importance of its relief work.⁵⁶⁾ However, both Hoover and the AFSC must have appreciated the apolitical articulation of child-feeding, which would mitigate the political tensions inherent to the victor’s feeding of the defeated. On another occasion, he spoke about his expectation that the Quaker pacifism would “do some people in Germany good.”⁵⁷⁾ At the same time, Hoover did not want himself to look pro-German in public. He cleverly asked the AFSC to state clearly its single-handed responsibility for German child-feeding and to limit advertisement among Quakers, Germans, and German Americans.⁵⁸⁾

“With some realization of the great responsibility and wonderful opportunity involved [in the German child-feeding],” the AFSC immediately decided to accept Hoover’s proposal, and it quickly put the plan into action.⁵⁹⁾ In December, the first group of fifteen, including four women, was on their way to Germany via London, and arrived in Berlin on January

⁵³⁾ Friends Foreign Fund Committee, Minutes, April 1 and 23, 1919; Addams and Hamilton, “After the Lean Years,” 211.

⁵⁴⁾ AFSC, “From a Quaker Ambassador,” *FI*, October 4, 1919, 634.

⁵⁵⁾ Herbert Hoover to Rufus M. Jones, November 17, 1919, in Jones, *Service of Love in Wartime*, 261-62.

⁵⁶⁾ Cary, “Child-Feeding Work in Germany under the American Friends’ Service Committee Coöperating with the American Relief Administration and the European Children’s Fund, Herbert C. Hoover, Chairman,” 162.

⁵⁷⁾ “Quakers to Aid Germans: Hoover Asks Quakers in America to Receive Contributions,” *NYT*, November 27, 1919.

⁵⁸⁾ Wilbur K. Thomas to Jane Addams, November 18, 1919, reel 12: 911, Jane Addams papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Pennsylvania.

⁵⁹⁾ AFSC, Minutes, November 6, 1919.

2, 1920. The AFSC workers visited many cities to investigate the local conditions and to formulate the indigenous plans for child-feeding. They also met American and German public officials, the ARA-ECF officers, British Quakers, and various social workers.⁶⁰⁾ However, it was not long until the ARA disappointed them. The delayed arrival of relief supplies from the ARA forced them to postpone the opening of *Quäkerspeisung*.⁶¹⁾ On February 26, 1920, the AFSC finally launched it, providing cocoa to a hundred children at the child clinic in Berlin, and it gradually expanded the operation to other German cities. As of July 1920, 632,000 persons were fed in eighty-eight cities. *Quäkerspeisung* reached its zenith in June 1921, when it provided meals to 1,010,658 persons.⁶²⁾ Quakers divided Germany into eight districts. The AFSC was active in seven, leaving the area under British occupation to the LYM's Friends Emergency and War Victims' Relief Committee (FEWVRC). Due to Hoover's request, the AFSC separated its operation from the FEWVRC, but the two committees continued to work closely in Germany, through the Field Committee formed in Berlin on February 19, 1920 and other schemes.⁶³⁾

Quäkerspeisung might have been a beneficial analgesic, but it was far from a panacea, and had complex side effects. Following the ARA's regular arrangement of child-feeding, the AFSC was very selective about who could eat the supplementary meal of 667 calories. It first classified German children aged six to fourteen into four categories based on a medical check-up. The AFSC accepted to the program only those who were diseased because of malnutrition or dangerously underfed. Infants aged two to six and expectant and nursing mothers were also qualified, grounded on their nutritional state. German volunteers daily cooked in public kitchens, and brought the meals to schools and other public facilities to feed the eligible persons. The AFSC strictly forbade the recipients from bringing their portions out of the feeding spot, despite their desire to share the food with their starving family.⁶⁴⁾

It is almost impossible for historians to evaluate precisely the practical contribution of *Quäkerspeisung* to post-WWI German society due to the shortage of statistical data.

⁶⁰⁾ Alfred G. Scattergood, Diary, January 1- February 26, 1920, folder, Individuals, Alfred G. Scattergood Diary, Foreign Service Country Germany, AFSC General Administration 1920, AA. See for example, AFSC, "German Unit Surveys Berlin Child-Saving Institutions," *AF*, March 11, 1920, 250.

⁶¹⁾ Wilbur K. Thomas to Alfred G. Scattergood, February 13, 1920, folder, Letters from Philadelphia to Berlin, Foreign Service Country Germany, AFSC General Administration 1920; Alfred G. Scattergood, Diary, February 5, 1920, folder, Individuals, Alfred G. Scattergood Diary, Foreign Service Country Germany, AFSC General Administration 1920.

⁶²⁾ Lester M. Jones, *Quakers in Action: Recent Humanitarian and Reform Activities of the American Quakers* (New York: Macmillan, 1929), 55.

⁶³⁾ Germany Field Committee, Minutes, February 19, 1920, folder, Quaker International Relief Germany, Germany Field Comm., 1920, ser. 6, box 13, AFSC Reference Files, 1916-1944, FHL.

⁶⁴⁾ About the outline of the child feeding, see AFSC, *Bulletin*, 33: 4-6; Cary, "Child-Feeding Work in Germany under the American Friends' Service Committee Coöperating with the American Relief Administration and the European Children's Fund, Herbert C. Hoover, Chairman," 158-62.

People who were personally involved with this project were impressed, including German social workers, public officials, and President Friedrich Ebert.⁶⁵⁾ However, no historical source indicated that it had a formative influence on social welfare in Weimar Germany. Furthermore, contrary to Ellis Loring Dresel's naïve expectations, *Quäkerspeisung* would not secure the long-lasting gratitude of Germans to America, because it left only a marginal impact on the German understanding of Quakers and America. Indeed, at the scene of *Quäkerspeisung*, people most likely saw Germans helping other Germans, because the AFSC sent a very limited number of workers, two or three for each German metropolis, and it also stressed the spirit of self-help.⁶⁶⁾ Its members repeatedly insisted that they had to transfer the work to "Germans of goodwill" as soon as possible.⁶⁷⁾ Meanwhile, some German volunteers on an operation site were frustrated with Quakers' inflexible manner of handling the feeding schemes.⁶⁸⁾ Generally introduced as an embodiment of Quaker goodwill, *Quäkerspeisung* in fact entailed a complicated politics that was not easily condensed into an excellent model of humanitarian assistance.

The AFSC's readiness to negotiate with public officials, in other words to compromise with politics, lay behind its faith-based humanitarian relief in postwar Germany. The history of *Quäkerspeisung* can be divided chronologically into three parts, based on who was the chief subscriber. First, from February 1920 to July 1921, the AFSC was sponsored mainly by the ARA-ECF, which first funded the child-feeding in Germany with the governmental Grain Corporation's profits.⁶⁹⁾ However, in March 1921, Hoover ended his formal connection to the AFSC, and the ARA-ECF's role started to shrink.⁷⁰⁾ Beginning in August 1921, the AFSC covered expenses mainly with the help of the European Relief Council (ERC). Comprised of the AFSC, the ARA and seven other American private organizations, the ERC had managed the fund-raising campaign for the relief of Central and Eastern Europe since June 1920. The German government also supported the AFSC in terms of commodities and service.⁷¹⁾ The AFSC withdrew from Germany in July 1922, transferring the relief program to its German partner, *Deutscher Zentralausschuss für die Auslandshilfe (DZA*, German Central Committee for Foreign Aid). Later, from January to October 1924, the AFSC returned to Germany for

⁶⁵⁾ Caroline Nicholson, "The German Unit in Berlin," *FI*, February 28, 1920, 136; AFSC, Minutes, September 21, 1922.

⁶⁶⁾ Donald Gann, "Ansprache des Vorsitzenden des American Friends Service Committee zur Festveranstaltung im Deutschen Historischen Museum am 11. Januar 1996," *Der Quäker* 70, no.1 (January 1996): 67.

⁶⁷⁾ AFSC, *Bulletin*, 33: 5; Frederick J. Libby, "The Spiritual Relief of Europe," *AF*, February 3, 1921, 92.

⁶⁸⁾ Dr. Wendtenburg to the Children's Relief Committee of the Society of Friends (Quakers), November 30, 1920, file of Letters Exchanges within Germany, Foreign Service Country Germany, AFSC General Administration 1920.

⁶⁹⁾ Surface and Bland, *American Food in the World War and Reconstruction Period*, 118.

⁷⁰⁾ AFSC, Minutes, March 24, 1921.

⁷¹⁾ Surface and Bland, *American Food in the World War and Reconstruction Period*, 77-80, 117-19.

child-feeding at the request of the German government, which then faced the currency crisis and spiraling inflation.⁷²⁾ During this final phase, the child-feeding program was financed by the American Committee for Relief of German Children, known as the Allen Committee after General Henry T. Allen who had directed the American occupation force in Rhineland until 1923. The AFSC needed money and the Allen Committee desired relief workers. Throughout all the three phases, contrary to its name, *Quäkerspeisung*, though administered by Quakers, was mostly supported by non-Quakers in terms of financial, material, and human resources.

Moreover, religion and U.S. foreign policy interacted throughout *Quäkerspeisung*, as American public officials substantively and consistently, though non-governmentally on the surface, financed it. In this respect, the material and financial support via the quasi-governmental ARA was especially significant. From 1919 to 1924, the AFSC spent \$17,909,698.42 for Germans, and the ARA was the biggest sponsor with the direct contribution of \$5,031,582.14 and indirect support of various forms.⁷³⁾ Despite this close relationship, the AFSC, though often ridiculed for being pro-German, was rarely accused of breaching the wall separating church and state. Even after the church-state separation became a prominent issue in American society in the 1940s, Americans continued to allow governmental funding of faith-based social service, generally on the premise that the money was not used for proselytizing purposes. This was most clearly guaranteed by the absence of missionary intentions.⁷⁴⁾ The post-WWI AFSC understood that neither the German government nor American subscribers wanted it to use *Quäkerspeisung* as an opportunity to increase Quaker membership, and so it affirmed that its relief was not for evangelization.⁷⁵⁾

First of all, the AFSC could not casually advocate Quakerism because its members spoke and behaved very carefully to keep their inner harmony as well as their amity with non-liberal Quakers. American Quakers' internal religious and cultural divergence would have been disclosed with evangelization, which would have entailed distinctive and specific articulations of Quaker faith.⁷⁶⁾ The AFSC's autonomy from the Meetings also helped prevent the fusion of mission and social service. It was critical that the organization did not have any official power over Quaker membership. When its workers introduced to their beneficiaries Quaker faith as what motivated them, they had to condense their religious ideas into very simplified and therefore soft-spoken expressions like "the message of disinterested service of

⁷²⁾ AFSC, Minutes, August 14, 1923.

⁷³⁾ Surface and Bland, *American Food in the World War and Reconstruction Period*, 118-119.

⁷⁴⁾ See for example, Robert Wuthnow, *Saving America?: Faith-Based Social Services and the Future of Civil Society* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 288-90.

⁷⁵⁾ Frost, "Our Deeds Carry Our Message," 40.

⁷⁶⁾ American Quakers held limited resources and manifested less passion for missionary work than other denominations. Only some groups like the Friends United Meeting had small-scale missionary posts in Asia and Africa. However, Quakers in general did not recognize Europe as a place for proselytization.

love, which is the very heart of God.”⁷⁷⁾ Expressions of this kind, which deemphasized the organized form of Christian faith and appealed to Christian truism, were not unique to Quakers but shared by Christians across a wide spectrum of denominations.

While working inside Christian Germany, the AFSC also benefitted from the emerging ecumenical network at home and abroad, and this also revealed its lack of missionary intentions. Prior to the official opening of *Quäkerspeisung*, the AFSC called for support for its German relief efforts at the FCC Conference in February 1920, and the FCC directly aided the AFSC in fundraising, especially during the last phase of *Quäkerspeisung* in 1924.⁷⁸⁾ DZA, the AFSC’s partner in Germany, was also an “interparty” and “interdenominational” organization, joined by governmental ministries, religious groups, and secular social service agencies.⁷⁹⁾ Therefore, the proselytizing of Quakerism, as opposed to the promotion of generic Christianity, would have done nothing to help the operation of *Quäkerspeisung*. It would instead have endangered the relief workers’ inner harmony and have weakened non-Quaker support. The AFSC clearly renounced any use of its relief work “as a means for the propagation of Quakerism in a sectarian way.”⁸⁰⁾ It regarded relief work rather as an attempt “to interpret and to practice in a broad and inclusive spirit of Christ’s way of life.”⁸¹⁾ The AFSC in this way highlighted the dedication to altruistic social service as a similarity between Quakerism and broader Christianity. Such an easy but ingenious reliance on Christian fellowship produced more effective rhetoric to maintain and forward *Quäkerspeisung* than the mere advocacy of Quaker faith in public could have done.

Such a loose discourse of ecumenical Christian faith has also helped Germans reinterpret the meaning of relief from the victorious enemy, though the historical records kept by Quakers do not fully clarify the grass-roots reactions to *Quäkerspeisung* in German society. When the AFSC entered post-WWI Germany, some workers discovered deeply ingrained hostilities: Not all Germans were willing to receive American food.⁸²⁾ However, when Germans appreciated American Quakers as “brothers and sisters” in a common faith, they could put an alternative interpretation to *Quäkerspeisung*. A German could speak, for example, as “a German Christian, thankful to God for your [Quakers’] existence in these grievous times,” and voice a desire “to be as a member of your commission, a Christian and thus a friend of God.”⁸³⁾ Both beneficiaries and benefactors could simplify *Quäkerspeisung* as

⁷⁷⁾ Libby, “The Spiritual Relief of Europe,” 92.

⁷⁸⁾ Jasper T. Moses, “Appeal to Churches to Save Childhood of War-Torn Nations,” *AF*, February 19, 1920, 166-67; AFSC German Committee, Minutes, February 1, 1924, AA.

⁷⁹⁾ John Forbes, *The Quaker Star under Seven Flags, 1917-1927* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1962), 80, 100-01.

⁸⁰⁾ Libby, “The Spiritual Relief of Europe,” 92.

⁸¹⁾ AFSC, Minutes, March 24, 1921.

⁸²⁾ Jones, *Quakers in Action*, 49.

⁸³⁾ AFSC, “A Friend by Convincement in Germany,” *AF*, March 17, 1921, 211.

a sign of Christian fellowship, which would be transnationally imagined and conceptualized whenever they wished to overlook their national hostilities.

Conclusion

Quäkerspeisung played a part in the first post-war relief that an American faith-based organization and U.S. statesmen co-organized for a former American enemy. Though it was not a deliberate attempt to expand the public role of faith in U.S. foreign policy, the AFSC could not have completed its daunting task without the support of state power. Religion and U.S. foreign policy interacted in *Quäkerspeisung*, without attracting criticism regarding the support from governmental bodies to a faith-based agency. The AFSC's careful use of language and its emphasis on deeds prevented *Quäkerspeisung* being designed as an evangelical endeavor, and moreover enabled it to apply uniquely the public role of faith to U.S. foreign policy: Quaker pacifism, Christian conscience, and American virtue were merged into its explication of *Quäkerspeisung*, which was specified only in terms of its practical goal of helping German children.

Freed from dogmatic entanglements, in *Quäkerspeisung*, the AFSC and liberal Quakers embodied the less organized form of Christianity shared by those who were familiar with the ecumenical movement. The religious diversity of Quakers and the AFSC's independence from the Quaker Meetings made it difficult for the AFSC workers to advocate Quakerism in any detail. The AFSC ingenuously expected that its physical relief would convey "a spiritual message without a word being spoken." It characterized Quaker faith exclusively in terms of tangible service to others, and said nothing more specific about theological interpretation or religious practice in order to distinguish Quakerism from Christianity.⁸⁴⁾

By giving prominence to altruistic deeds as the common core of Quakerism and broader Christianity, the AFSC tried to integrate American Quakers from diverse religious cultures and also gain support from non-Quakers. The simplified understanding of *Quäkerspeisung* as an expression of disinterested service motivated only by Christian love had transnational resonance and relevance for beneficiaries and benefactors, Quakers and non-Quakers, Americans and Germans alike. Though its influence was limited and its social legacy could not be detected widely in Weimar Germany after 1925, *Quäkerspeisung* indicated the growth of intellectual and practical spheres available to a transnational community based on the ecumenical Christian identity.⁸⁵⁾

⁸⁴⁾ Libby, "The Spiritual Relief of Europe," 92.

⁸⁵⁾ Unfortunately, Quaker sources do not clarify much about what the AFSC's religious position and its ecumenical orientation meant to American officials and the German public. Hopefully, the historical study of the ARA, which appears to have progressed only slowly since the 1940s, and of German sources will shed new light on *Quäkerspeisung*.