

論文

The Ebb and Flow of Cold War Tensions: The U.S. Government and Anti-Castro Exiles from 1980 to 1992

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要 約

本論は、なぜ1980年から1992年の間に、米国のキューバ政策における在米キューバ人亡命者の政治的影響力が増大したのかについて明らかにする。冷戦後における米国のキューバ政策に関する先行研究においては、安全保障や経済利益よりはむしろ、カストロ政権に反抗する在米キューバ人亡命者のロビー活動や選挙政治といった、国内政治の要因がしばしば重要視されてきた。しかしながら、一般的にエスニック集団が米国外交に及ぼす影響については議論が分かれるところであり、それはしばしば極端な誇張をも伴ってきた。そこで、本論は冷戦的緊張の推移に着目し、米国政府とこの非国家主体との相関を中南米における冷戦というより大きな文脈において分析した。なお、その分析にあたっては、米国政府の資料だけでなく、亡命者社会の資料も頻繁に参照した。

その結果、本論は第一に、反カストロ亡命者によるキューバ政策の決定過程への参画が、あくまで1980年代以降に起こったものであるという点を明らかにした。それは、新冷戦下のレーガン共和党政権が自らの中米カリブ政策を追求する際に、それまで政治的に無力な存在であった亡命者の潜在的な重要性に着目したところ由来するものであった。そして同政権は、彼ら亡命者に対し、米国への忠誠と民族への忠誠の両立を誇示する形で米国政治に参画することを促したことによって、その政治活動の姿容とその後の政治的台頭とを準備することになったのである。ところが、新冷戦の緊張がいったん緩和されると、米国政府のキューバ政策への関心も徐々に低下し、政治的影響力を強める亡命者集団からの圧力を相対的に強めることになった。そしてこの傾向は、とりわけ対キューバ経済制裁の強化を図る1992年キューバ民主化法の成立において顕著に表れることになる。すなわち、米国・キューバの冷戦的対立は、このような米国政府と亡命者集団との交錯を通じて、冷戦後の時代へと持ち越されたのである。

Introduction¹⁾

The United States lost an opportunity to improve relations with Cuba at just the moment that the Cold War ended. At this critical juncture, anti-Castro exiles reinforced

¹⁾ The paper uses the following source abbreviations in the notes; APP for American Presidency Project website, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/index.php> (accessed August 22, 2010); FOIA for Freedom of Information Act; NSDD for National Security Decision Directive; NSPG for National Security Planning Group; RRL for Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California; WHORM for White House Office of Records Management.

tensions between the United States and Cuba by supporting a more antagonistic U.S. Cuban policy than the administration would have pursued otherwise. With enthusiastic efforts in lobbying and electoral politics, members of the exile community successfully convinced Congressmen and President George H. W. Bush to pass the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, a bill to strengthen the Cuban embargo for hastening the downfall of the Castro regime. The act signaled a further continuation of Cold-War hostilities between the United States and Cuba.

Today, 20 years since the end of the Cold War, the United States and Cuba have not yet normalized their relations. Whereas Cuba has symbolized a defiance of U.S. power and "arrogance," the United States has maintained its embargo against Cuba, even though the latter has posed no security threat and has become a lucrative market for U.S. exports. National security and economic interests seem unable to explain why the United States has preserved its Cuban embargo while expanding economic relations with the other communist countries including China and Vietnam.

Thus, in explaining U.S.-Cuban relations, previous studies across disciplinary boundaries paid as much attention to domestic politics as to international relations. Lars Schoultz argues that Cuban-American lobbyists "basically seized control" of Cuban policy during the Bush Sr. and Clinton administrations. Susan Eva Eckstein posits that U.S. administrations have often manipulated their Cuban policies for catering to Cuban-American voters in Florida between 1992 and 2004. Although its influence was limited only to policies related to Cuba, David M. Paul and Rachel Anderson Paul rank the Cuban-American lobby as the second most influential ethnic lobby only after the Jewish lobby.²⁾ Although consisting of less than 1% of the U.S. national population, anti-Castro exiles and their descendants have formed powerful ethnic lobby as well as a solid voting bloc in South Florida, hindering a possible thaw in relations with Castro's Cuba.³⁾

Then how did this small minority start to exert a disproportionate amount of influence? Were there any changes in the approach of U.S. foreign policy around the end of the Cold War? While this paper explores domestic sources of U.S. Cuban policy, it places more attention to the changing importance of anti-Castro exiles in U.S.-Cuban relations than the above-mentioned studies. More specifically, by investigating U.S. Cuban policy as well as Cuban exiles' political activities, the paper scrutinizes how these exiles increased their influence on U.S. Cuban policy in the period from 1980 to 1992. For this purpose, the

²⁾ Lars Schoultz, *That Infernal Little Cuban Republic: the United States and the Cuban Revolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009); Susan E. Eckstein, *The Immigrant Divide: How Cuban Americans Changed the US and Their Homeland* (New York: Routledge, 2009), esp. 112-9; David M. Paul and Rachel A. Paul, *Ethnic Lobbies and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009).

³⁾ In 2007, the population of Cuban Americans is estimated to be almost 1.6 million. Pew Hispanic Center, "Hispanics of Cuban Origin in the United States, 2007," 2009, <http://pewhispanic.org/files/factsheets/50.pdf> (accessed November 15, 2009).

paper utilizes newly declassified documents at both the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and personal archives of Cuban exiles. By using these documents, this paper unearths the previously neglected aspects of the interaction of the U.S. government with anti-Castro exiles and presents a fresh explanation about why U.S. Cuban policy remained hostile even after the Cold War ended.

Interpretations of ethnic politics and its implications for U.S. foreign policy have been controversial. Some ethnic groups have certainly exerted influence on U.S. foreign policy, as shown in the familiar case of the Jewish lobby on U.S. Middle-Eastern policy.⁴⁾ This is because the United States has guaranteed a certain degree of separation of powers in the making of foreign policy, in particular since the Watergate scandal, and thus allowed citizens within ethnic groups to gain a variety of different accesses to the decision-making process.⁵⁾ Moreover, multiculturalism in U.S. society has encouraged the public's tolerance toward ethnic groups actively working for their substantive and symbolic needs. In the 1990s, these trends generated a heated controversy between those who appreciated the value of this diversification of the making of foreign policy and those who dismissed it as an obstacle for U.S.'s pursuing the "national interests" of the country as a whole.⁶⁾

These studies, however, tended to overemphasize political influence by ethnic groups on U.S. foreign policy. By narrowing their focus on a particular period in which an ethnic group seemingly influenced U.S. foreign policy, they ignored a variety of different contexts in which each policy was made. Then, without situating their analysis into the broader context of international history, they overlooked that the importance of ethnic politics in U.S. foreign policy has varied corresponding to changing circumstances. Ethnic politics cannot explain all the stories of U.S. foreign policy. With regard to Cuban policy, this is most clearly demonstrated in the era between 1959 and 1980, in which the U.S. government repeatedly betrayed the expectation of anti-Castro exiles and deepened their sense of powerlessness. In 1980, it seemed unlikely that the exiles would exert certain influence on U.S. Cuban policy as they did in the last three decades.⁷⁾

This paper analyzes Cuban exiles' political activities and their implications for U.S. Cuban policy in relation to the broader context of the Cold War in the Western Hemisphere.

⁴⁾ Alexander DeConde, *Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy: A History* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1992); Tony Smith, *Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).

⁵⁾ Eugene R. Wittkopf and James M. McCormick, eds., *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence*, 5th ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008); Melvin Small, *Democracy and Diplomacy: The Impact of Domestic Politics on U.S. Foreign Policy, 1789-1994* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

⁶⁾ Yossi Shain, "Multicultural Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy* 95, no. 100 (1995): 69-87; Samuel Huntington, "The Erosion of American National Interests," *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 5 (1997): 28-49.

⁷⁾ See, for example, Judson M. DeCew, Jr., "Hispanics," in *Florida's Politics and Government*, ed. Manning J. Dauer (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1980).

In an article describing Cold War historiography, Odd Arne Westad mentioned Cold War “conceptualism,” a recently popularized approach exploring how the key concept of the Cold War affected participants’ worldview and political behavior.⁸⁾ Here, with this new academic trend in mind, I aim to show how anti-Castro exiles have strongly interacted with the ebb and flow of Cold War tensions in the region. For this purpose, the paper places more attention to anti-Castro exiles, people of Cuban origins who considered the Castro regime as illegitimate and opposed rapprochement with the regime, than non-anti-Castro exiles, often called “dialogueros,” in the community. Still, the paper does not support the view that the community has been monolithic since 1959.⁹⁾ In the following, the paper first examines the origins and failures of these exiles’ political activities between 1959 and 1980. Then, it shifts focus to the early 1980s, a turning point in Cuban-exiles’ political history.

1. The Origins and Failures of Exile Politics

A struggle between Castro’s Cuba and anti-Castro exiles originated from a civil war over a small island in the Caribbean Sea. In the first four years since the 1959 Cuban revolution, more than 200,000 Cubans left the island for its neighboring country, the United States. These exiles included people from various political backgrounds. Some had supported the Batista regime, which had been toppled by Fidel Castro. Others had joined the war against Batista and then called for another war against the new regime. Regardless of these political orientations, these exiles in the United States soon resorted to violence and propaganda to topple the Castro regime, going back and forth across the Florida Strait.¹⁰⁾ The revolution became a prelude to what can be characterized as “the civil war across the border.”

This transnational conflict soon connected with the larger context of the Cold War. The Cuban revolution symbolized an opposition to Americanization that had deeply penetrated into the pre-Castro Cuba. What the revolution aimed for was a break from the past and a construction of a new society by *el hombre nuevo* (new man). The revolutionary government demanded that people join and contribute to this project, despised those who left the island as *gusanos* (worms), and evaluated the split of the nation as “a natural purification.”¹¹⁾ The government considered almost all the exiles as traitors against the nation,

⁸⁾ Odd Arne Westad, “The Cold War and the International History of the Twentieth Century,” in *Origins*, vol. 1 of *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

⁹⁾ On “dialogueros,” see Maria Cristina Garcia, “Hardliners v. ‘Dialogueros’: Cuban Exile Political Groups and United States-Cuba Policy,” *Journal of American Ethnic History* 17, no. 4 (Summer 1998): 3-28.

¹⁰⁾ Thomas G. Paterson, *Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). For the following description on Cuban exiles, I rely on Maria Cristina Garcia, *Havana USA: Cuban Exiles and Cuban Americans in South Florida, 1959-1994* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).

¹¹⁾ UPI, “Raul Castro Rallies People,” *New York Times*, July 23, 1961.

confiscated their property, and discarded their citizenship. In this way, it utilized exodus as an outlet for social frustration and a tool of propaganda for elevating a feeling of patriotism among its supporters.¹²⁾

By contrast, the U.S. government has welcomed Cuban exiles as “freedom fighters” and granted political asylum to *all* of them, at first for humanitarian reasons and later for political reasons. Massive exodus became a tool for attacking the legitimacy of the revolutionary government and a valuable source of recruitment by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for its plot to topple the Castro regime. The U.S. government set up an interim regime as the replacement of the revolutionary regime, and conducted the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion. The U.S. involvement in the Cuban war soon encouraged the Soviet government to send nuclear weapons to the island 90 miles away from the U.S. territory. This led to the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the peak of Cold War tensions.¹³⁾

Ultimately, the U.S. government failed to topple the Castro regime and meet the exiles' expectation. John F. Kennedy presided over a fiasco in the Bay of Pigs invasion, which resulted in the death or capture of almost 1,500 exiles. Despite having declared that he would continue the effort to attack the regime, the president did not fulfill this promise during the missile crisis by pledging to the Soviet Union that the United States would not invade Cuba again. Since making this commitment, the U.S. government has largely kept to promise and left little room for the exiles to interfere. The U.S. government started to maintain its position of neutrality while encouraging the exiles to spread across the country and assimilate into U.S. society. For this purpose, U.S. Congress enacted the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, which required a refugee to stay only one year and one day in the United States before applying for permanent resident status.¹⁴⁾

In the 1970s, this U.S. co-existence policy was accompanied by intermittent efforts to seek reconciliation with Castro's Cuba. With the internal situation stabilized, Castro's Cuba grew economically and politically more powerful with the substantial aid of the Soviet Union. Also, partly because of reducing its efforts to export revolution, Cuba reestablished diplomatic relations with many other Latin American countries in this decade. Thus, the United States, having improved relations with the Soviet Union and China, became inclined to normalize relations with Cuba. In 1974, the Ford administration started secret talks with Cuban officials but stopped these negotiations after learning about Cuban interventions in

¹²⁾ Maria de los Angeles Torres, *In the Land of Mirrors: Cuban Exile Politics in the United States* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 50-54.

¹³⁾ Alexander Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *“One Hell of a Gamble”: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964* (New York: Norton, 1997). See also, John Lewis Gaddis, *We May Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1997), chap. 9.

¹⁴⁾ The second wave of exiles continued from 1965 to 1973, with 265,000 people flowing into the United States. The U.S. government resettled 290,000 Cubans into other areas, although many of them eventually came back to South Florida, looking for jobs, friends, neighbors, and warm climates.

Angola. Yet, three years later, the Carter administration restarted the talks, which resulted in the opening of interest sections in each other's capitals. Although this second détente was disrupted again by further Cuban involvements in Africa, the opening of interest sections was considered by many as a step just before the normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations.¹⁵⁾

Anti-Castro Cuban exiles had little political power to stop this spillover of the U.S.-Soviet détente into the Western Hemisphere. As their period of residence in the United States grew longer, the community faced internal polarization, lack of powerful leadership, and divergence into varying classes, generations, and nationalities. By the 1970s over a hundred young students and scholars of Cuban origins started to reevaluate their relations with homeland, initiated dialogue with the Castro regime, and thus pluralized the voice of the community. Infuriated by these developments, intransigent militants harassed these dialoguers and eventually resorted to indiscriminate terrorism while justifying their moves as "punishment of the deviators."¹⁶⁾ Most of the exiles opposed both rapprochement with the Castro regime and indiscriminate terrorism. Yet they had no viable alternative at that time.

The internal confusion increased during the 1980 Mariel boatlift, in which 125,000 new Cubans flooded into the U.S. shore and seriously damaged the image of Cubans in the U.S. media. As a protest to the boatlift, non-Cuban residents in Miami supported the English-only movement and passed an anti-bilingual resolution. As Alejandro Portes and Alex Stepick persuasively claimed, this "backlash" probably heightened exiles' sense of ethnic awareness and prepared for their subsequent political empowerment.¹⁷⁾ Overall, though, the prospect for political success in exerting influence on U.S. foreign policy seemed very dim unless Cold War tensions increased again in the Western Hemisphere.

2. The Early 1980s: Assimilating Anti-Castro Politics into the U.S. Polity

(1) The New Cold War in the Western Hemisphere

The start of what became known later as the new Cold War prompted a revival of strong U.S.'s antipathy toward Castro's Cuba. As the result of the social revolutions in Grenada and Nicaragua in 1979, Central America and the Caribbean region became a central battleground between East and West. These two countries formed a close connection with Castro's Cuba, which helped pro-Soviet influence to grow in this region. In response, U.S.

¹⁵⁾ On the dialogue, Robert M. Levine, *Secret Missions to Cuba: Fidel Castro, Bernardo Benes, and Cuban Miami* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). On Cuban interventions in Africa, Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002).

¹⁶⁾ In 1976 alone, these militants conducted 41 terrorist attacks killing 86 people. Carlos A. Forment, "Political Practice and the Rise of an Ethnic Enclave: The Cuban American Case, 1959-1979," *Theory and Society* 18 (1989): 69.

¹⁷⁾ See their book, *City on the Edge: The Transformation of Miami* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), chap. 2.

conservatives viewed this communist infiltration as a sign of another conspiracy plotted by Castro's Cuba and a failure by the Carter administration to prevent this occurrence. Among them was Ronald Reagan, who advocated for taking "steps to change the Carter administration's sorry record of vacillation, alienation, and neglect in the region."¹⁸⁾ Indeed, during the 1980 presidential campaign, U.S.-Cuban relations further deteriorated because of the Mariel boatlift.

Once elected as president in 1980, Ronald Reagan made policy toward Cuba one of the top-priority issues for his administration. Cuba became the first major subject at the National Security Council (NSC) meeting, in which the administration identified it as a source of turbulence in Central America.¹⁹⁾ In the next NSC meeting, the president repeatedly asked his cabinet members how the administration could put pressure on Cuba. In response, "clandestine operations could be considered," stated his Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger. Alexander Haig, the Secretary of State, went even further. Linking Central America with Eastern Europe, Haig remarked, "if the Soviets move into Poland, we must get them somewhere else first, that means Cuba."²⁰⁾

The administration started to take a variety of harsh measures against Castro's Cuba. These included military exercises in the Caribbean Sea, pressuring Latin American countries to cut their relations with Cuba, prohibiting travel by U.S. citizens, and strengthening the economic embargo. All of these measures were intended to exacerbate "Castro's paranoia over the likelihood of a U.S. invasion" and force Cuba to divert its limited resources away from the intervention in Central America.²¹⁾ Furthermore, the administration soon began planning new radio broadcasting to Cuba, Radio Marti, working in close collaboration with Cuban exiles.

Indeed, the start of the new Cold War and the corresponding change in U.S. Cuban policies reinvigorated anti-Castro exiles. Many exile organizations declared support for Reagan, including the National Association of Cuban American Women of the United States, a nonprofit and nonpartisan group aiming for protecting the right of minorities and women. The organization's pamphlet stated: "Support President Reagan's foreign policy, which... has imparted dignity to the fact that we face up to communism everyday with patience but relentlessly."²²⁾ Among the Cuban-exile community, there appeared numerous

¹⁸⁾ Televised Address by Governor Ronald Reagan, October 19, 1980, APP.

¹⁹⁾ "Summary of Conclusions of 6 Feb. NSC Meeting," in folder "NSC 00001 2/6/81," box 91282, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Meeting File, RRL.

²⁰⁾ "Summary of Conclusions of 11 Feb. NSC Meeting," in folder "NSC 00002 2/11/81," box 91282, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Meeting File, RRL.

²¹⁾ "Allen Briefing Book for 6 Feb NSC Meeting," in folder "NSC 00001 2/6/81," box 91282, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Meeting File, RRL.

²²⁾ Letter, Ana Maria Perera to the President with Brochure of National Association of Cuban American Women of the U.S.A., July 29, 1981, # 034899, Federal Government Organizations 006-01, WHORM: Subject File, RRL.

stories in tabloids, newspapers, and magazines that depicted Ronald Reagan as an exile's powerful and trustworthy friend, ally, and superhero.²³⁾ Years after suffering from a sense of powerlessness, these anti-Castro exiles might have sensed that the tide of the war finally began to turn in their favor. Reagan's Cuban policy rekindled their hopes for Castro's overthrow and put those who called for dialogue on the defensive.

Still, it is noteworthy that the administration's ideological motives coexisted with its essentially pragmatic attitudes. In 1980, the CIA emphasized the willingness of the Soviet Union to intervene in the region and reported: "Any US military challenge to the Castro regime almost certainly would bring a major crisis in US-Soviet relations."²⁴⁾ Determined not to risk replaying the missile crisis, the administration carefully avoided provoking direct military confrontation with Cuba, although its Cuban policies highly alarmed Castro's Cuba and attracted enthusiastic support from anti-Castro exiles. Interestingly, the administration also feared that a certain element of overexcited exiles might conduct random paramilitary operations to draw the United States into an unexpected military confrontation or exchanges of terrors with Cuba. The NSC predicted, "Unleashing Cuban exile organizations against Cuba would almost certainly cause Castro to respond in kind." In this scenario, "Castro is far better prepared for this game than is the US," the "US is much more vulnerable to terrorist activity than is Cuba."²⁵⁾ The administration continued to monitor and control the exile community. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, for example, arrested Eduardo Arocena, a leader of a militant exile terrorist organization, for planning to infiltrate Cuba and assassinate Fidel Castro.²⁶⁾

(2) The Alliance between Reagan Republicans and Anti-Castro Exiles

Then what did the Reagan administration expect of anti-Castro exiles? One answer is lobbying. The administration's concern about security threats from the region was not widely shared among the Democrats, the majority of the House. Thus, in order to facilitate its foreign policy in Latin America, it was necessary to look for a method to put pressure on these Congressmen. For this purpose, Richard V. Allen, who would soon become the administration's first National Security Adviser, paid close attention to the potential importance of anti-communist Cuban exiles. Allen encouraged Jorge Mas Canosa and the other two Cuban leaders to form a lobby, emulating Jewish examples. In 1981, these three

²³⁾ Many of them are available at the Cuban Heritage Collection, University of Miami Libraries, and the Special Collections, Florida International University Libraries.

²⁴⁾ CIA, National Intelligence Estimate, "Cuban Policy toward Latin America," June 23, 1981, FOIA.

²⁵⁾ "Allen Briefing Book for 6 Feb NSC Meeting," in folder "NSC 00001 2/6/81," box 91282, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Meeting File, RRL.

²⁶⁾ In 1984, U.S. judges pronounced a life sentence on Arocena. See FBI, "Omega 7," October 29, 1993, obtained from Cuban Information Archives, http://www.cuban-exile.com/doc_001-025/doc0011.html (accessed November 25, 2009).

responded to this offer by founding the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF).²⁷⁾

CANF consisted of a dozen influential anti-Castro leaders who failed politically as exiles but achieved success economically as immigrants. Its first chairman and charismatic leader, Mas Canosa, was president of a firm of engineering contractors, Church and Tower. As a young man, he had fought against Batista, joined the Bay of Pigs invasion, and continued the struggle for a return through engaging himself in anti-Castro propaganda. Meanwhile, in order to sustain his family, he started to work as milkman and finally became millionaire. Benefited by ethnic solidarity, language abilities, and a variety of different forms of federal assistance, he and the other members of the foundation achieved the "American Dream" in just one generation.

Because of this background, the members of CANF found it relatively easy to "Americanize" anti-Castro politics. These exiles believed that they could not accomplish their aim without the help of the U.S. government. Besides, in contrast to diehard militants, they shared a certain degree of pragmatism with the administration, as indicated in a paper submitted to the administration by Mas Canosa. In this paper, he analyzed the situation as follows:

While Castro's Cuba continues in [*sic*] a relentless offensive...the Soviet Union continues to utilize it's [*sic*] Third World proxy, Cuba, to attain further victories against the West....In the implementation of a policy which could put an end to such revolutionary adventurism, however, *caution must be observed in order to avoid an open confrontation* which could lead to a situation of high tension, where the use of armed force may become inevitable (Italics mine).

Instead, he proposed that the U.S. government initiate new radio broadcasting to Cuba, which will be described below.²⁸⁾ With the aim of supporting such U.S. anti-Castro policies, these exiles started to take part in U.S. politics.

The other political activity encouraged by the administration was electoral politics. Already by the 1980s, political analysts had predicted the increasing importance of new Hispanic voters, mainly because of their growing population, across the pivotal states in the presidential elections.²⁹⁾ Among these Hispanic voters, Cuban Americans constituted a promising electoral bloc for the Republican Party in South Florida, a traditionally strong base for Southern Democrats. Thus, it is no wonder that the administration not only welcomed

²⁷⁾ Alvaro Vargas Llosa, *El exilio indomable: historia de la disidencia cubana en el destierro* (Madrid: Espasa, 1998), 118-19; Torres, *In the Land of Mirrors*, 115.

²⁸⁾ Jorge Mas Canosa, Back-Up Paper, November 10, 1980, folder "Radio Free Cuba (5)," box OA 90051, Carnes Lord Files, RRL.

²⁹⁾ de la Garza, Rodolfo O. et al., *Latino Voices: Mexican, Puerto Rican, & Cuban Perspectives on American Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992), 2-4.

anti-Castro exiles as supporters for its foreign policy but also made efforts to maximize their votes for the Republican Party in local, state, and national elections. Indeed, the administration proved willing to appoint quite a few anti-Castro exiles to key positions within the government.³⁰⁾ For example, Jose Sorzano, a Cuban-American professor at Georgetown University, served first as U.S. ambassador to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, then as Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations, and finally as Senior Director of Latin American Affairs for the NSC. Moreover, as a part of such effort for reaching out to the exile community, the party in Florida recruited Jeb Bush, a son of vice president George H. W. Bush, because he could speak Spanish and use his name recognition on local radio programs.³¹⁾ Jeb soon became a local chair of the party at Dade County (Miami Metropolitan area) and took credit for registering hundreds of Cuban-Americans as Republicans.

The 1983 visit of Ronald Reagan is the most vivid example of these Republican efforts for reaching out to Miami Cubans. On May 20, the president visited Miami, with financial support by CANF, to celebrate Cuban "independence" day.³²⁾ In a highly emotional speech, the president told the Cuban-American audience what they wanted to hear from U.S. president for a long time. "Now is the time to act reasonably and decisively to avert a crisis and prevent other people from suffering the same fate as your brothers and sisters in Cuba." Referring to Congressional opposition against his foreign policy in Latin America, the president emphasized the urgency to defend the region from the aggression by "the Soviet-Cuban-Nicaraguan axis."³³⁾

The exile community, now harboring a half million people of Cuban origin, enthusiastically responded to this outreach. Anti-Castro exiles equated support for Reagan with voting against Castro; thus, their pattern of party registration dramatically changed thereafter. In June 1979, 49% of Hispanic voters in Dade County were registered as Democrats and 39% as Republicans. However, in March 1988, only 24% of them identified themselves as Democrats and 68% as Republicans.³⁴⁾ Also, young prospective politicians of Cuban origins followed their supporters and left the Democratic Party. "He [Ronald Reagan] made me a Republican," recalled Lincoln Diaz-Balart, a future Cuban-American congressman.³⁵⁾ This is how the Republican Party earned loyalty from voters and politicians

³⁰⁾ Torres, *In the Land of Mirrors*, 121.

³¹⁾ Helga Silva, "A Bush by Any Name is Just Good," *Miami Herald*, May 21, 1982.

³²⁾ While Castro's Cuba celebrates national independence on January 1, anti-Castro exiles celebrate national independence on May 20.

³³⁾ Ronald Reagan, Speech, May 20, 1983, APP.

³⁴⁾ Dario Moreno and Christopher Warren, "The Conservative Enclave: Cubans in Florida," in *From Rhetoric to Reality: Latino Politics in the 1988 Elections*, ed. Rodolfo O. de la Garza and Louis DeSipio (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992), 132.

³⁵⁾ Jay Nordlinger, "Meet the Diaz-Balarts: A Couple of Castro's 'Nephews' - in Congress," *National Review*, March 10, 2003.

of Cuban origin. The party drew more than 80% of their votes in 1980, 1984, and 1988 with growing numbers at an increasingly competitive swing state, Florida, in the presidential elections.

(3) The New Radio Broadcasting to Cuba: Radio Marti

The ideological resonance between the Reagan administration and anti-Castro exiles, for the first, bore fruit in establishing Radio Marti, a new device for fighting ideological war against Castro's Cuba. The administration viewed propaganda as a central component of its Cuban policy, partly because President Reagan saw the Cold War as a conflict of ideals and worldviews as much as it was a clash of arms and interests.³⁶⁾ The president and his policy staffs believed that by breaking the Castro regime's control of information and reaching Cubans directly on the island, Americans could convince them to stand up against Castro for their rights and freedom as well as a "better" American way of life. Indeed, observing the 1980 Mariel exodus, the CIA overemphasized internal instability in the island and predicted that "a coup against Castro is, for the first time in 20 years, no longer unthinkable."³⁷⁾ The estimate would not have discouraged the administration to prepare for the new radio broadcasting, which would further destabilize the regime's institution and encourage the ultimate transition to U.S.-type democracy in this sphere of the Soviet Union.

In planning and establishing the radio broadcasting, the administration and anti-Castro exiles worked in close collaboration. These exiles shared the administration's optimistic view and became the most passionate supporters for a propaganda war against Castro's Cuba. In his proposal to the administration, Mas Canosa stressed the existence of "a marked desire within the Cuban population to increase anti-government activities of a disruptive nature." The radio broadcasting, he argued, is the way to "respond encouragingly to the highly motivated opposition to Castro's regime." Then, he urged the administration to recruit Cuban exiles for the programming and administrating of the project.³⁸⁾

Richard Allen forwarded this proposal to his NSC member staffs in charge of the planning. Reviewing this and other proposals, the staffs concluded that Radio Free Cuba (RFC), a radio broadcasting sponsored by the U.S. government, was "vital to U.S. interests." Modeled on Radio Free Europe, RFC aimed "to foster a pre-revolutionary climate in Cuba." It would break the monopoly on communications in Cuba, and in the long run, it would

³⁶⁾ On President Reagan, see Ronald Reagan, *An American Life* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990). See also John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History* (New York: Penguin, 2005), chap. 6; James M. Scott, *Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996).

³⁷⁾ CIA, National Intelligence Council, "Castro Agonistes: The Mounting Dilemmas and Frustrations of Cuba's Caudillo," November 1981, FOIA.

³⁸⁾ Jorge Mas Canosa, Radio Free Cuba "Project," November 10, 1980, folder "Broadcasting to Cuba," box OA 90051, Carnes Lord Files, RRL.

create “the conditions necessary for an upheaval to occur—an upheaval that would fundamentally alter the character of the Cuban regime.”³⁹⁾ Allen approved this as well as the more detailed staffs’ proposal, which discussed the RFC’s organization and structures, budgets, programming ideas, and schedule of implementation.⁴⁰⁾

The next step was to set up the Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba (PCBC), a special advisory board to undertake further preparations for RFC. The NSC staffs emphasized the importance of making sure that all the members of PCBC shared “the Administration’s general philosophy on foreign policy.” They added, “The Cuban-American membership should not dominate nor should any member represent a particular faction of the exile community. Each member, particularly the [*sic*] Cuban-Americans should, however, be acceptable to that community.”⁴¹⁾ The administration’s choice was Mas Canosa, who was strongly endorsed by Florida Senator Paula Hawkins.⁴²⁾ Along with the other nine conservative U.S. citizens in the Commission, Mas Canosa, himself as a specialist on propaganda, played an important role in preparing for the radio broadcasting, now known as Radio Marti.⁴³⁾

The final step was to gain Congressional support for providing the radio broadcasting with budgets. For this purpose, CANF began its lobby but immediately faced opposition from U.S. broadcasters who were concerned about the Cuban government’s threat to retaliate by jamming U.S. airwaves. The opposition hardened its attitude when the Castro regime took action by increasing Cuban interference with U.S. domestic broadcasting. Regardless, with the help of sympathetic Congressmen and making compromises, the administration and the foundation finally succeeded to pass the bill in 1983.⁴⁴⁾

Radio Marti became the first major achievement for anti-Castro exiles in U.S. politics. In reward for the efforts, the president appointed Mas Canosa as chair of Presidential Advisory Board, which was newly established for the management of the broadcasting. CANF declared its victory: “The foundation did not lose its faith and falter in its efforts, and

³⁹⁾ Memo, Roger Fontaine and Carnes Lord to Richard Allen, March 24, 1981, folder “Cuba/ Broadcasting/ RFC (5),” box 90125, Roger Fontaine Files, RRL. There is no other proposals found in this and other related boxes than Mas Canosa’s proposal, yet Fontaine, one of the authors of Santa Fe report, must have referred to this report as well as Mas Canosa’s. See Committee of Santa Fe, *A New Inter-American Policy for the Eighties* (Washington, D.C.: Council for Inter-American Security, 1980).

⁴⁰⁾ Carnes Lord and Roger Fontaine, “Suggested Initiative: Radio Free Cuba,” in Memo, Richard Allen to Alexander Haig, June 2, 1981, folder “Cuba/Broadcasting/ RFC (4),” box 90125, Roger Fontaine Files, RRL.

⁴¹⁾ *Ibid.*

⁴²⁾ Letter, Paula Hawkins to Richard Allen, September 25, 1981, folder “Cuba-Radio Broadcasting/ Radio Marti (2);” Letter, Paula Hawkins to Richard Allen, October 23, 1981, folder “Cuba-Radio Broadcasting/ Radio Marti (1),” both in box 90125, Roger Fontaine Files, RRL.

⁴³⁾ See PCBC, *Final Report* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1982).

⁴⁴⁾ Howard H. Frederick, *Cuban-American Radio Wars: Ideology in International Telecommunications* (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1986), 31-37.

now Radio Marti is a beautiful reality and will be a substantive contribution for the cause of Free Cuba.”⁴⁵⁾ Although this early victory would not have been obtainable without support and direction by the administration, CANF increased its credibility among the community and further strengthened its anti-Castro movement.

3. Toward the End of the Cold War: Ethnic Politics and Superpower Mentality

(1) U.S.'s Shifting Priority in the Late 1980s

The new Cold War forged an ideological alliance between Reagan Republicans and anti-Castro exiles. Previous studies, describing this as “a unique and symbiotic relationship,” identified it as the principal reason for the exile community’s achievements in the later period.⁴⁶⁾ Too much emphasis on this alliance, however, should not obscure presence of conflicting interests. Once incorporated in the U.S. polity, anti-Castro exiles intensified political activities and started to call for a more antagonistic Cuban policy than the administration would pursue otherwise. In short, ethnic politics took on a life of its own, independent of Reagan Republicans and their intentions.

The Reagan administration, soon after successfully drawing an enthusiastic response from anti-Castro exiles, found itself troubled by the consequences. This was in large part because the administration decreased its interest in its Cuban policies. In the Western Hemisphere, the new Cold War tension reached its peak at the 1983 U.S. invasion in Grenada. The administration landed eight thousand U.S. troops on this small island in the Caribbean Sea for the restoration of order, the protection of U.S. citizens on the island, and the “elimination of current, and the prevention of further, Cuban intervention” in the region.⁴⁷⁾ Yet U.S. troops encountered little resistance from the Cuban army when seizing control of the island. The invasion revealed that the Cuban threat to the region had been vastly exaggerated.

After the invasion, the Reagan administration diverted its attention from Cuba to other regions and the other issues. The phrase “Cuba” had frequently appeared in the title and contents of National Security Decision Directives (NSDD), issued by the administration to set forth national security policy for the guidance of the whole U.S. government. After 1983, NSDD at times mentioned Cuba but not so persistently as before. The replacement of Alexander Haig by George Shultz also reinforced this shift in priority. The new Secretary of State “set the tone of a policy less ‘ideological’ than critics supposed,” recalled Kenneth Skoug, the coordinator of Cuban Affairs in the Department of State. As Skoug correctly grasped, “President Reagan laid great store by his popularity among anti-Castro Cuban-

⁴⁵⁾ CANF, *Radio Marti ya es una realidad...!* (Washington, D.C.: CANF, 1984).

⁴⁶⁾ Patrick J. Haney and Walt Vanderbush, *The Cuban Embargo: The Domestic Politics of an American Foreign Policy* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005), chap. 3-4.

⁴⁷⁾ NSDD 110A, October 23, 1983.

Americans," but now "Reagan came down pragmatically on the most issues."⁴⁸⁾

The administration finally started immigration talks with Cuba and announced the Migration Agreement after the president's reelection in 1984. The agreement was necessary for not only repatriating 2,746 unwanted Cuban immigrants who entered the United States in the 1980 Mariel boatlift, but also for preventing a future boatlift. The administration could have justified the move as a requirement for leading Cubans to stay on the island and stand up against tyranny themselves instead of running away to the United States. Yet many exiles saw little reason to favor the agreement since they considered negotiation with Castro morally wrong and gradually held ambiguous, if not angry, feelings toward the administration when it treated incoming Cubans as illegal immigrants, not freedom fighters. CANF's Mas Canosa complained to Skoug that Cuban-American community had not been consulted prior to the talks.⁴⁹⁾

Anti-Castro exiles, however, had already started to gain strength and influence through intensifying their political activities. With the guidance of Bernardo Barnett, a Jewish lobbyist, CANF formed a two-tier board of directors who paid \$10,000 annually and trustees who paid half dues but abandoned a vote in decision-making. In order to receive government funds and maintain a tax-exempt status, the foundation focused on conducting research while the Cuban American Foundation lobbied and Free Cuba PAC managed funding.⁵⁰⁾ From this strong organizational base, the foundation expanded its lobby, spent massive financial resources, and pursued a nonpartisan approach. According to one estimate, the total amount of all Cuban-American related political contributions between 1979 and 2000 was \$8,821,202, and 60% of the amount went to Democrats.⁵¹⁾

CANF also utilized its solid support base in South Florida and New Jersey, the state with the secondly largest population of Cuban Americans. After the initial success with Radio Marti, Cuban Americans deepened their sense of political efficacy and became more inclined to vote for politicians who paid attention to their substantive and symbolic needs in local, state, and national elections. All of these factors sustained the foundation's effort to broaden its anti-Castro network in Congress. The foundation earned the support of not only Jesse Helms, a conservative Republican, but also Claude Pepper and Dante Fascell, both influential liberal Democrats representing South Florida.

⁴⁸⁾ Kenneth Skoug, *The United States and Cuba under Reagan and Shultz: A Foreign Service Officer Reports* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), i.

⁴⁹⁾ *Ibid.*, 71. The agreement authorized immigration of 20,000 Cubans to the United States each year and allowed for the return of 2,746 Cubans.

⁵⁰⁾ John Nordheimer, "Cuban-American Leader Builds a Foundation of Power Beyond Miami," *New York Times*, July 12, 1986.

⁵¹⁾ The Center for Responsive Politics, "The Cuban Connection: Cuban-American Money in the U.S. Elections, 1979-2000," <http://www.opensecrets.org/pubs/cubareport/index.asp> (accessed May 20, 2007).

(2) Conflicting Interests within the Anti-Castro Alliance

The startup of Radio Marti became the first case in which Cuban Americans took the lead in the making of U.S. Cuban policy. At first, the Reagan administration hesitated to initiate its broadcasting since Fidel Castro threatened to jam U.S. commercial radio programs with its own broadcasting, Radio Lincoln, in retaliation. If that occurred, politically powerful domestic broadcasting groups would have criticized the administration's Cuban policy and called for shutting down the Radio Marti station. In order to avoid wasting political capital, the administration explored preventive methods and delayed the startup for almost two years.⁵²⁾

Meanwhile, tension arose between the administration and anti-Castro exiles. Calling for an immediate startup, Mas Canosa and his allies in Congress mounted pressure on the administration day by day.⁵³⁾ On the other hand, the Secretary of State, Shultz, insisted that the administration should continue to delay the startup until it would make sure that the Cuban government would not launch retaliation. National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane presented another option, called "preemptive negotiations." In order to deter retaliation, he argued that the U.S. government should "express willingness to talk to Castro about some routine issues" and "make him less likely to screw it up by starting his own broadcasting interference."⁵⁴⁾

Despite strong opposition within the administration, Radio Marti finally went on the air on the Cuban "independence" day, May 20, 1985. Mas Canosa enlisted the help of Charles Wick, the director of U.S. Information Agency and a close friend of the president. In the National Security Planning Group meeting, Wick stressed that "a failure to proceed now would be a political defeat" and added, without the immediate startup, "Castro would have successfully blackmailed us." This argument persuaded the president, who concluded the meeting with reiterated support for the startup.⁵⁵⁾ Even thereafter, the State Department requested further delay for gaining additional time for planning damage control measures, but this request was unheeded. McFarlane kept informing the president of his concern about retaliation, yet the president replied: "I feel very strongly we must go ahead even if we do have to shut down [Radio Marti] temporarily if he [Castro] jams our commercial channels."⁵⁶⁾

This decision, however, drew prompt but unexpected retaliation by the Cuban

⁵²⁾ Minutes, "NSPG Meeting," December 14, 1984, folder "NSPG 0107," box 91307, Executive Secretariat, NSC: NSPG Files, RRL.

⁵³⁾ Memo, Walter Raymond to Robert McFarlane, December 4, 1984, folder "NSPG 0103," box 91307, Executive Secretariat, NSC: NSPG Files, RRL.

⁵⁴⁾ E-mail, Robert McFarlane to John Poindexter, May 14, 1985, reproduced in John Elliston, *Psywar on Cuba: The Declassified History of U.S. Anti-Castro Propaganda* (Melbourne: Ocean, 1999), 226.

⁵⁵⁾ NSDD 170, May 20, 1985; Minutes, "NSPG Meeting," May 17, 1985, folder "NSPG 0107," box 91307, Executive Secretariat, NSC: NSPG Files, RRL. See also, Constantine C. Menges, *Inside the National Security Council* (New York: Touchstone/ Simon & Shuster, 1988), 219.

government. Instead of jamming, the Cuban government suspended implementation of the Migration Agreement of 1984. The suspension shocked the State Department officials who worked for reaching the agreement with their counterparts for a long time; Skoug lamented that the startup without diplomatic preparation was the "single unfortunate decision with respect to Cuba made by President Reagan."⁵⁷⁾ The Cuban retaliation might have disappointed the NSC staffs and the president as well. Taking credit for the startup, CANF requested a personal autograph from the president on a Radio Marti cartoon for presentation to its chairman, Mas Canosa. "I don't think this is a good idea and I don't consider he was such a big help," noted John Poindexter, Deputy National Security Advisor. McFarlane agreed, though he reluctantly requested the president's authorization. The president, however, did not bother to sign it.⁵⁸⁾

Even though Cuban Americans played such a significant role in launching Radio Marti, they still lacked sufficient political influence to control the immigration issue. When the Cuban government started to release political prisoners, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) refused to issue immigration visas for maintaining pressure on the Cuban government to implement the immigration agreement. Out of sympathy for the ex-prisoners' plight, CANF, its allies in Congress, and Jeb Bush lobbied the administration for issuing visas, but this appeal faced resistance by INS.⁵⁹⁾ INS did not change this refusal policy even when the Cuban government started to deport ex-prisoners and their relatives to third countries. The deadlock continued until the administration eventually negotiated with the Cuban government and reached an immigration agreement again in 1987.

It is still noteworthy that CANF maintained its leverage even on this issue. In return for CANF's endorsement for the immigration agreement, the administration approved of the foundation's refugee program, Cuban Exodus Relief Fund, which would help almost 10,000 Cubans in third countries enter and resettle in the United States.⁶⁰⁾ Years later, the foundation received a \$1.7 million grant from the Department of Health and Human Services for conducting this service.⁶¹⁾ In addition, the foundation gained endorsement for T.V. Marti by George H. W. Bush, vice president and the candidate for the 1988 presidential election.

⁵⁶⁾ Handwritten memo, Ronald Reagan to Robert McFarlane, May 18, 1985, folder "NSDD 170 (1)," box 91296, Executive Secretariat, NSC: NSDD Files, RRL.

⁵⁷⁾ Skoug, *United States and Cuba*, 209.

⁵⁸⁾ Handwritten Memo, in Memo, Robert McFarlane to the President, July 8, 1985, # 302963, Public Relations 005, WHORM: Subject File, RRL.

⁵⁹⁾ Letter, Claude Pepper et al. to Ronald Reagan, November 25, 1985; Letter, Jeb Bush to Edwin Meese, June 25, 1986; Letter, Frank Calzon to Patrick J. Buchanan, July 8, 1986; Letter, Frank Calzon to Elliot Abrams, July 9, 1986. All are included in #400828, Immigration/ Naturalization, WHORM: Subject File, RRL.

⁶⁰⁾ Skoug, *United States and Cuba*, 167.

⁶¹⁾ Garcia, *Havana USA*, 156.

After a necessary bill passed in Congress, this television version of Radio Marti started its broadcasting in 1990, although it rarely reached the Cuban audience because of jamming by the Cuban government.

(3) The Cuban Democracy Act in 1992

After the socialist bloc collapsed in 1989, the importance of ethnic politics for U.S. Cuban policy grew even greater. This is partly because of the increasing influence by anti-Castro exiles. CANF had been frequently criticized by many inside and outside the community of its authoritative approach to pursue its objective. Nevertheless, the foundation had already taken credit for many achievements, impressed its capability on U.S. politicians, and marginalized the voice of dissenters.⁶²⁾ By November 1992, the number of CANF's directors increased from 14 to 62, with 71 trustees and approximately 50,000 supporters who contributed small amounts of cash to the foundation.⁶³⁾ With these abundant financial resources as well as its solid reputation among politicians, the foundation broadened its network of supporters and made some distinguished liberal Democrats drop their opposition to anti-Castro policies, including chair of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Claiborne Pell.⁶⁴⁾ Compared to economic issues, Cuban policy was on the margin of the public's mind. It is no wonder that these Congressmen found it relatively easy to follow guidance by Cuban-American lobbyists and their allies in Congress.

Cuban-American voters in favor of toppling the Castro regime helped CANF's lobby gather further momentum. For example, Robert Torricelli, a Democrat representative from New Jersey who had previously opposed several anti-Castro measures, eventually became one of the CANF's powerful allies. Urged by Mas Canosa, the congressman changed his mind probably because he started to think of running for a state-wide elective office in New Jersey, where over 50 thousand Cuban Americans resided at that time.⁶⁵⁾ In addition, more anti-Castro exiles were winning and holding elective offices with the support of co-ethnic voters. In 1989, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen became the first Cuban-American elected to Congress and soon gained the initiative in dealing with Cuban policies at the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. In 1992, she was joined by Lincoln Diaz-Balart, another Florida Republican, and Robert Menendez, a New Jersey Democrat.

⁶²⁾ On the criticism of the foundation, Americas Watch, "Dangerous Dialogue: Attacks on Freedom of Expression in Miami's Cuban Exile Community," *Americas Watch* 4, no. 7 (1992).

⁶³⁾ CANF often listed the names of directors and trustees on its letters to Congressmen and President, so I simply counted the number of the names. For the number of contributors, I relied on newspaper articles, such as Charles Cotayo and Pablo Alfonso, "Un Año sin Jorge Mas Canosa," *El Nuevo Herald*, November 22, 1998.

⁶⁴⁾ Philip Brenner and Saul Landau, "Passive Aggressive," *NACLA Report on the Americas* 27, no. 3 (November 1990): 19-20.

⁶⁵⁾ Morris Morley and Chris McGillion, *Unfinished Business: America and Cuba after the Cold War, 1989-2001* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 15-16.

At first, the Bush administration seemed as eager as the exile community to hasten the downfall of the Castro regime. On December 1989, at the Malta Summit, President Bush ranked Central America and Cuba as his highest priority and demanded that the Soviet Union halt its massive economic and military assistance to Cuba, estimated \$5.5 billion per year.⁶⁶⁾ Mikhail Gorbachev refused and offered a help for the dialogue with Castro's Cuba instead. In a confidential conversation, Gorbachev conveyed a secret message to Bush from Fidel Castro on "Cuba's interest in normalizing relations with the United States." In response, Bush simply stated, "Democratic changes are alien to him [Castro]," and emphasized the antipathy among Cuban exiles toward Castro who was "considered to be the worst dictator."⁶⁷⁾

The administration, however, has never maintained intense interest in its Cuban policy over a long period. Left-wing revolutionaries lost the 1990 Nicaraguan elections. The Soviet Union, desperate for U.S. aid, announced the withdrawal of its brigades from Cuba in September 1991 without even informing the latter in advance. With its ties with allies broken and economically bankrupt, the Castro regime now appeared ready to fall down by itself and thus moved to the outer reaches of U.S. officials' consciousness. After all, a superpower country, such as the United States, has to deal with multiple policy agendas with limited resources. Thus, the administration possessed an incentive to use its political capital carefully rather than wasting time and effort in a low-priority issue.⁶⁸⁾ The administration lowered its interest; anti-Castro exiles increased its political power. With these two combined together, there appeared a significant change in the method of political calculation for the U.S. administration.

This change is clearly illustrated in the process of enacting the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, a bill to reinforce the Cuban embargo for promoting a peaceful transition to a democracy in the island. In order to survive in the capitalist world, Castro's Cuba had increased trade with foreign companies, including foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies in third countries. Thus, CANF and its allies in Congress sponsored this bill with the aim to (1) oblige foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies in third countries to follow U.S. sanctions against Cuba, and (2) prohibit a vessel which enters a port in Cuba for trade from entering U.S. port for 180 days.⁶⁹⁾ President Bush pledged to veto this bill since he found the bill unnecessary. He was also afraid that its extraterritorial clause would cause friction with U.S.

⁶⁶⁾ Selected Released Pages of Briefing Book for the President, "The President's Meetings with Soviet President Gorbachev, December 2-3, 1989, Malta," n. d., available at National Security Archive, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB298/Document%209.pdf> (accessed August 8, 2010).

⁶⁷⁾ Transcript of the Malta Meeting, December 2-3, 1989, available at National Security Archive, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB298/Document%2010.pdf> (accessed August 8, 2010).

⁶⁸⁾ This part is benefited by Lars Schoultz's argument on U.S.'s "moderate realism," see *Cuban Republic*, 3-6.

⁶⁹⁾ U.S. Department of Treasury, "Cuban Democracy Act (CDA),"

<http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/legal/statutes/cda.pdf> (accessed August 10, 2010).

allies and damage the international reputation of the U.S. government.⁷⁰⁾

Anti-Castro exiles, however, could handily force the president to change his mind by making an approach to Bill Clinton, the leading candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination. Urged by Mas Canosa and his allies in Congress, Clinton declared his support for the bill and received \$275,000 contributions from Mas Canosa's wealthy Cuban-American friends.⁷¹⁾ Clinton did so because of his own motives. Still, regardless of his intentions, Clinton's support for CDA took the president by surprise and immediately convinced him to announce his endorsement for the bill.⁷²⁾ It is obvious that the president preferred improving his electoral prospects to delivering what he thought his sound Cuban policy. In other words, anti-Castro exiles successfully influenced U.S. Cuban policy because the president chose to listen carefully to their demands on what was to him only a secondary matter.

On October 23, 1992, only a few weeks before the election, President Bush signed the CDA in Miami, declaring, "I will be the first American President to set foot on the soil of a free and independent Cuba."⁷³⁾ This prediction proved untrue because Bush lost his reelection and the effects of the CDA turned out to be at best ambiguous. Yet at least for the meantime, this did not pose a major problem for increasingly confident anti-Castro exiles who strongly believed that they stood on the right side of history and that their enemy would be banished from the scene in the near future. Anticipating the end of the "war," Mas Canosa wrote to president-elect Bill Clinton that "you will be the first President to set foot in a free Havana."⁷⁴⁾

Conclusion

Responding to the ebb and flow of Cold War tensions, the U.S. government and Cuban exiles often interacted, and around the end of the Cold War, this interaction reinforced tensions between the United States and Cuba. Fidel Castro almost immediately repudiated the CDA as "a desperate attempt by imperialist Yankees against Cuban resistance" and criticized the act as an inhumane policy to prevent Cubans from importing food and medicines from the other countries, especially in times of need.⁷⁵⁾ With its slogan, "*Patria O*

⁷⁰⁾ Canada and Mexico complained of a possible infringement by the United States upon their national sovereignty.

⁷¹⁾ Gaeton Fonzi, "Who is Jorge Mas Canosa?" *Esquire*, January 23, 1993. On Clinton's motives, see Haney and Vanderbush, *Cuban Embargo*, 88-89.

⁷²⁾ George H. W. Bush, Statement, April 18, 1992, APP.

⁷³⁾ George H. W. Bush, Remarks on Signing the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 in Miami, October 23, 1992, APP.

⁷⁴⁾ Letter, Jorge Mas Canosa and Francisco J. Hernandez to Bill Clinton, November 4, 1992, folder "Letter 1992," box 7, Jorge Mas Canosa Collections, Special Collections, Florida International University Libraries.

⁷⁵⁾ Fidel Castro, Speech, October 29, 1992, <http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/1992/esp/f291092e.html> (accessed October 27, 2010).

Muerte (homeland or death)," Castro's Cuba grew more determined to survive and appealed to anti-imperial sentiments and strong feelings of Cuban nationalism among the public while tightening its grips on the island.

The participation of Cuban exiles in the making of U.S. Cuban policy, however, did not start until the early 1980s. Since the Cuban revolution took place in 1959, thousands of Cubans had left their island and fought for the overthrow of the Castro regime. Yet, as their efforts failed to bear fruit and their period of "temporary" stay in the United States became longer, these exiles lost their faith in the U.S. government and fell into internal confusion. Anti-Castro exiles could do next to nothing when the U.S. government wound up moving to a rapprochement with their adversary during the 1970s' *détente* in the Cold War.

The turning point was the early 1980s, when Cold War tensions reached another peak and Reagan Republicans reached out to anti-Castro exiles. Ronald Reagan considered the battle in Central America and the Caribbean region as a centerpiece in his war against "the evil empire," and he encouraged the exiles' support by claiming, "Cuban Americans play a unique role in the preservation of our freedom."⁷⁶⁾ As a result of ideology-driven political mobilization, the Reagan administration promoted anti-Castro exiles to deepen their loyalty to the United States while keeping their affections for their homeland. By such means, the administration laid the groundwork for the transformation of their political activities and the subsequent increase of their political power in U.S. politics.

Then, as the new Cold War drew to a close, these anti-Castro exiles found it relatively easy to influence U.S. Cuban policy. They took advantage of the U.S. government's neglect of Cuba and its tolerance toward their political activities. The exiles began to increase their political power in U.S. politics, while the U.S. government lowered its hurdle for their participation in the making of Cuban policy. Only then did domestic politics enter into the U.S. administration's calculation, as shown in the process of enacting the CDA of 1992.

In sum, the ebb and flow of Cold War tensions had profoundly shaped anti-Castro exiles' worldview and political behavior, and their political activities in turn had affected significantly U.S. Cuban policy, especially after the Cold War ended. As this conclusion suggests, scholars on ethnic politics and its implications for U.S. foreign policy need to situate their findings in the broader context of world politics. The importance of ethnic politics in U.S. foreign policy varies not only because of some particularities of ethnic groups, but also due to their changing position within U.S. society as well as global society.

Even after 1992, anti-Castro exiles have often contributed to further prolongation of Cold-War hostilities in subsequent U.S.-Cuban relations. In 1996, Cuban-American Congressmen and their allies successfully strengthened the U.S. embargo against Cuba by supporting the enactment of the Helm-Burton Act. Regardless of the early death of Mas Canosa in 1997 and the political setback of the Elián González affair in 2000, anti-Castro

⁷⁶⁾ Ronald Reagan, Speech, May 20, 1983, APP.

exiles in Florida again demonstrated their political importance by giving the Republican Party's nominee, George W. Bush, an invaluable edge in the 2000 presidential election. The new president in turn made his Cuban policies more antagonistic than they might otherwise have been at the threshold of the 21st century.⁷⁷⁾ In response, Fidel Castro repeatedly excoriated exiles as "Miami Mafias" and blamed the U.S. embargo for disregarding the lives of Cubans on the island.⁷⁸⁾

Today, 20 years after the Cold War ended, it remains to be seen whether Barack Obama will undo the consequence of his predecessors' neglect of Cuba policy and encouragement for anti-Castro exiles' political activities. Fidel Castro remains on the stage, and the dynamics of anti-Castro politics might not have changed. Despite the challenge of increasingly more assertive moderates in recent times, old hardliners have used their significant political investments to entrench themselves on the commanding heights in the community.⁷⁹⁾ Meanwhile, Florida is still one of the most competitive states in presidential and Congressional elections, and Cuba appears as one of the least important issues for the current U.S. administration. U.N. General Assembly has annually passed the resolution against the U.S. Cuban embargo since 1992, and it may pass the 20th such resolution in 2011.

⁷⁷⁾ Morley and McGillion, *Unfinished Business: Schoultz, Cuban Republic*, chap. 13-14. On the Helms-Burton Act, see also, Patrick J. Kiger, *Squeeze Play: The United States, Cuba, and the Helms-Burton Act* (Center for Public Integrity, 1997); Joaquin Roy, *Cuba, the United States, and the Helms-Burton Doctrine: International Reactions* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2000). On the Bush Jr. administration's era, see also, Pete Kasperowicz, *The Bush Administration, Cuba and the Cuban-American Lobby* (Washington, D.C.: Center for National Policy, April 2002); Daniel P. Erikson, *The Cuba Wars: Fidel Castro, the United States, and the Next Revolution* (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2008), esp. chap. 5-6.

⁷⁸⁾ See, for example, Fidel Castro, Speech, January 27, 2001, <http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/2001/esp/f270101e.html> (accessed October 27, 2010).

⁷⁹⁾ Eckstein, *Immigrant Divide*, chap. 3.