

## Instrumentality in the Garden: Aesthetic Reflexions on the Tea-Ceremony Waiting Arbour with the Toilet, Katsura Imperial Villa, Kyoto

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The garden was one of those old-fashioned paradises . . . no finical separation between flower and kitchen garden there; . . . but a charming paradisiacal mingling of all that was pleasant to the eyes and good for food.

----- George Eliot, *Scenes of Clerical Life* (1858)  
Janet's Repentance, Ch. 8

Rikyû set stepping-stones in tea-ceremony gardens giving six-tenths of his consideration to use, four-tenths to beauty; while Oribe did so giving four-tenths of his consideration to use, six-tenths to beauty.

----- Anon., *Aphorisms on Tea-Ceremony Gardens*  
(Edo period [1603-1863], Japan)<sup>1</sup>

Throughout the course of the modern Western aesthetic tradition, the garden has been more or less marginalised as not belonging to the fine arts. In accordance with the current tendency to criticise modern aesthetics, however, philosophical studies dealing with the garden as a proper aesthetic and artistic object are increasing<sup>2</sup>. In one of the most important of these studies, David Cooper has pointed out the peculiar transformation everyday activities undergo when they are performed in a garden:

<sup>1</sup> My translation. The original text is in Keiji Uehara (ed.), *Nanpôroku Bassui, Roji Kikigaki* [Extracts from Southern Record; Aphorisms on Tea-Ceremony Gardens] (Tokyo: Kazima Shoten, 1983), p. 88. The tea master, Furuta Oribe (1544-1615) is a disciple of Sen no Rikyû (1522-91), the founder of the Wabi-cha tradition still prevalent in Japan today.

<sup>2</sup> To name important examples rather randomly: Thomas Leddy, 'Gardens in an Expanded Field', *The British Journal of Aesthetics*, 28: 4 (1988): 327-40; Mara Miller, *The Garden as an Art* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993); Stephanie Ross, *What Gardens Mean* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998); Philippe Nys, *Le jardin exploré* (Besançon: Les Éditions de l'Imprimeur, 1999); Noël Kingsbury and Tim Richardson, *Vista: The Culture and Politics of Gardens* (London: Frances Lincoln, 2005); David E. Cooper, *A Philosophy of Gardens* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Michel Conan (ed.), *Contemporary Garden Aesthetics, Creations and Interpretations* (Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 2007).

Further examples are: Charles W. Moore, William J. Mitchell, and Milliam Turnbull, Jr., *The Poetics of Gardens* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1988); Mark Francis and Randolph T. Hester, Jr. (eds.), *The Meaning of Gardens: Idea, Place, and Action* (Cambridge Mass.: The MIT Press, 1990); Monique Mosser and Georges Teyssot (eds.), *The History of Garden Design: The Western Tradition from the Renaissance to the Present Day* ([1990;] London: Thames & Hudson, 1991); Allen S. Weiss, *Unnatural Horizons: Paradox and Contradiction in Landscape Architecture* (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1998); Michael Crozier (ed.), *After the Garden? = The South Atlantic Quarterly*, 98: 4 (Fall 1999) (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000); John Dixon Hunt, *Greater Perfections: The Practice of Garden Theory* (London: Thames & Hudson, 2000); Tom Turner, *Garden History: Philosophy and Design 2000 BC-2000AD* (London: Spon, 2005); Scott J. Tilden, *The Glory of Gardens: 2,000 Years of Writings on Garden Design* (New York: Abrams, 2006).

It may sound paradoxical to say that swimming or breakfasting in the garden is a different activity from doing so indoors: in either case, after all, it is swimming or breakfasting that someone is doing. But the allegedly paradoxical way of putting it serves to emphasize that a swim or a breakfast in the particular context furnished by a garden may have a 'tone' that makes it a very different event from a swim or a breakfast elsewhere.<sup>3</sup>

The question is: what is this peculiar (probably aesthetic) 'tone' allegedly added to those everyday activities inside the garden which are normally done outside it? Cooper himself does not describe this 'tone' fully or explicate the mechanism by which it is produced. One can guess from his words that it is the 'intimacy' of a human being with himself, others, and the world that produces this special 'tone', (aesthetically) transforming activities in the garden. But the problem is that such 'intimacy' is not necessarily peculiar to the garden: other forms of art and nature can make people realise such 'intimacy'---sometimes in more profound ways. This is all the more problematic because Cooper claims throughout his study that he aims at finding the peculiarity of the garden which cannot be 'assimilated' to art or nature. My ultimate goal in the following is, then, to try to detect the *peculiar* kind of transformation everyday activities undergo if and only if they are done in the garden.

Of course it is possible, for one thing, that everyday activities in the garden are perfectly identical to those done outside it. The garden can be regarded as a portion or decoupage of the everyday world, cut out from it without any change in the ontological status of its components<sup>4</sup>. Hence there must be many cases where the swim or the breakfast in the garden is not in any point different from their counterpart outside the garden, with no peculiar 'tone' or transformation accruing to them. And it would grossly distort the standard garden practice/appreciation to exclude from it activities identical to those outside it, as impure or not proper for the garden.

For another thing, even when activities in the garden do possess some 'tone' not to be found in those outside it, it is still possible that this is only occasioned by causes *not* peculiar to the garden. Generally speaking gardens are places specially designed to be more beautiful and aesthetically more satisfying than the ordinary everyday world; it is accordingly probable that the garden should contain *quantitatively* more artistic and/or natural beauty, resulting in some striking aesthetic intensity, or a kind of 'tone'. But such intensity does not guarantee a *qualitative* difference between the garden and the outside world, so that the swim or breakfast in the garden can be qualitatively identical to, though perhaps quantitatively more aesthetically pleasing than, those done in a beautiful landscape or cityscape outside. Again, if the garden is a decoupage of the everyday world, it is essential that it should contain without any qualitative change those artistic/natural beauties to be found outside the garden as well. In addition, these elements that are not necessarily peculiar to the garden, must not be excluded from the analysis of garden practice/experience as impure or not genuine.

Then, it follows that my aim here is to elucidate that transformation of everyday activities in the garden which is *qualitatively* peculiar to the garden and which cannot be reduced to the artistic/natural beauties outside. One caveat is, however, against prematurely assuming in the manner of

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<sup>3</sup> Cooper, *op.cit.*, pp. 67f. (cf. pp. 79f.).

<sup>4</sup> One possible criticism to this argument is Stephanie Ross' (Ross, *op.cit.*, Ch. 6).

Western modern aesthetics that such peculiarity exists a priori, or that, even if there exists one at all, it is unconditionally important to the garden or garden aesthetics; because, to repeat, the garden being continuous and (basically) homogeneous to the outside world it is essential for the garden to contain elements *not* peculiar to itself.

Since garden experience is filled with these ‘impure’, not genuine elements of various kinds, it seems extremely difficult to specify, demarcate, and explain such a vague and highly subjective phenomenon as the ‘tone’ which human activities produce when done inside the garden. Hence I propose first to focus on the *instruments* (utensils, tools, devices, etc.) to be used in such garden activities. It can be said that when swimming or breakfasting in the garden, for example, one is using the garden or its facilities in an *instrumental* way. Now if such activities in the garden have some ‘tone’ qualitatively peculiar to the garden only, then it must be based on certain peculiar objective structures of the garden; and I suppose that it should be easier, philosophically more productive, at least in the first phase of the analysis, to clarify such objective structures by focusing on instruments as objects rather than on sheer subjective phenomena of experience.

To focus on garden instruments is also advantageous from the historical point of view. Generally speaking an instrument is something intended for attaining some useful end purpose: ‘utility’ is the most essential characteristics of the instrument. Both in the Western and the Eastern traditions of garden thought, the utility of the garden has been a most favoured topic: see for example the issues of the utilitarian farm turned into a garden, often called *ferme ornée*, in Europe<sup>5</sup>, and of balancing between ‘yō’ (用: utility) and ‘kei’ (景: beauty) in Japanese tea-ceremony gardens<sup>6</sup> (see the mottoes above). Added to this the relationship of the instrument’s utility to beauty in general has been frequently discussed throughout the history of Western philosophical aesthetics so that we can refer to such discussions on the way. That is why I focus on the instrument in the garden.

### **Instrumentality, Aesthetic/Artistic, Functional Beauty**

#### **Instrumentality: Serving Ends and Replaceable:**

In the following, I shall take a Japanese tea-ceremony waiting arbour or roofed bench as an example of the instrument in the garden: ‘Soto-koshikake’ (literally, ‘an outer bench’: fig. 1) built presumably in the early Edo period (in the early 17th century) in the garden of Katsura Imperial Villa, Kyoto<sup>7</sup>, and examine its mode of existence. There are four tea-houses in the garden as a whole; the arbour in question was built as the waiting place for the tea-ceremonies to be held in one of the tea-houses, ‘Shōkin-tei’. To serve the purpose of the tea-ceremonies there and to provide a waiting place for them, the arbour is equipped with several parts such as the roof, the pillars supporting the roof,

<sup>5</sup> Cf. William A. Brogden, ‘The Ferme Ornée and Changing Attitudes to Agricultural Improvement’, *Eighteenth-Century Life*, 8 (1983): 39-43; Tim Richardson, *The Arcadian Friend: Inventing the English Landscape Garden* (London: Bantam, 2007), Chs. 13, 14, pp. 204-36; Michael Symes and Sandy Haynes, *Enville, Hagley, The Leasowes: Three Great Eighteenth-Century Gardens* (Bristol: Redcliffe, 2010), Ch. 2.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Seidai Tanaka, *Nihon-no Teien* [The Japanese Garden] (Tokyo: Kajima Institute Publishing, 1967).

<sup>7</sup> There are numerous books on Katsura in English. To name just an important one: Akira Naito (text), and Takeshi Nishikawa (photos), trans. Charles S. Terry, *Katsura: A Princely Retreat* (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1977).



Fig. 1: Soto-koshikake (the arbour with a bench), the Katsura Imperial Villa, Kyoto (presumably built in the early Edo period).

the toilet, the wash-basin, the lantern, the stepping-stones, the narrow paved platform for walking ('Nobe-dan'), etc., as well as the bench in the narrower sense.

One can generalise that the end/purpose of an instrument exists outside of it, and that in essence an instrument has no other *raison d'être* than serving this outside end. Hence the instrument's tendency to annihilate or make forgotten its own particular being. As Heidegger points out<sup>8</sup>, this tendency takes the form of backgrounding the instrument's materiality or material substance which makes up its individual subsistence; in other words, the instrument is most instrument-like when its existence is backgrounded or forgotten<sup>9</sup>. On the contrary, the instrument's existence tends to foreground itself when it is broken or malfunctioning, or when it is being repaired or maintained instead of being used for its proper end. Ideally, when an instrument is serving its end most efficiently, it makes its existence transparent to its user(s). In the case of the waiting arbour, when the guests invited to a tea-ceremony regard the arbour in question as a pure instrument, they tend to completely forget or background its particular existence, concentrating only on its end purpose, the tea-ceremony.

As a result the instrument is in essence *replaceable*: an instrument can be replaced by another as long as the latter serves the same end as the former at least in the same degree of efficiency. For example, if the waiting arbour were burnt down and lost, then one could improvise by replacing it with the similar arbour in the garden originally intended for the intermissions during the tea ceremonies ('Manji-tei') or another tea-house (e.g., 'Shōka-tei'), or maybe the main residential building ('Shoin') of the Villa, as a substitute waiting arbour.

In contrast, if the user loves and attaches himself too strongly to one particular pure instrument as an end itself, at least not in artistic but in everyday contexts, he or she may well be accused of fetishism.

<sup>8</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes* (1935-36; 1960), in *Holzwege*, in *Gesamtausgabe* [henceforth, GA], 5 (Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann, 1977): 32.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Heidegger, *Ursprung*, GA, 5: 18, 53; idem, *Sein und Zeit* (1927), GA, 2: 93, 101.



Fig. 2: The wash-basin and the stepping stone in front of the arbour, the Katsura Imperial Villa, Kyoto.

#### **Aesthetic/Artistic: Form, Meaning, Mind:**

But the arbour in Katsura garden has another character not reducible to such instrumentality per se; it is obviously designed as an aesthetic/artistic product, too.

To be more specific, the arbour possesses, firstly, a number of formal beauties: for instance, the subtleties of the walls' colour, the rough texture of the supporting pillars and the thatched roof, the geometric patterning of the stone platform (which must have been perceived as highly innovative at the time of its construction, contrasted to the traditional Japanese irregular, naturalist garden prevalent until then), the bold arrangement of the stepping-stones, the striking shape of the wash-basin, the balance of the whole structure, and so on. Secondly, the arbour conveys aesthetic/artistic ideas or significances in addition to, and compounded with, its formal beauties. For example, it symbolises the idyllic ideal of a simple farm cottage (like ornamented cottages fashionable in late-18th- and early-19th-century European landscape gardens), with a mock-vulgar taste favoured in aristocratic, fashionable circles of the period. Also it represents the theme of harvest-time at autumn (in contrast to the theme of winter symbolised by the main tea-house, *Shôkin-tei*): the wash-basin imitates the shape of a square cup for measurement of the harvest rice, while the stepping-stone in front of it is figured like a sickle used for harvesting (fig. 2). Thirdly, the arbour expresses the artistic sagacity, intention, and taste ('*Suki*') of its (unknown) maker who probably belonged to the *Enshû* school of tea-ceremony<sup>10</sup>.

According to the usual understanding of modern Western aesthetics, such an aesthetic/artistic product is regarded as embodying a closed autonomous inner world to be appreciated and valued as an end itself, i.e., aesthetically. Contrary to the instrument, such an aesthetic/artistic product foregrounds its own materiality (colour, shape, texture, material, subsistence, etc.)<sup>11</sup>. As an *irreplaceable*

<sup>10</sup> Kobori Enshû (1579-1647) was a disciple of Furuta Oribe (see note 1 above). Some scholars assume Enshû himself originally designed Katsura Imperial Villa.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Heidegger, *Ursprung*, GA, 5: 32.

individual thing, then, such a work will become an object of long-term refinement, adjustment, aesthetic appreciation, and attachment (without any accusation of fetishism).

### **Instrumental vs. Aesthetic/Artistic:**

Of course, the above description of the instrumental and the aesthetic/artistic is just intended to provide ideal types, (over-)emphasising the distinctions between them<sup>12</sup>. Put in this way, however, it is clear that both of these two aspects, instrumental and aesthetic/artistic, are equally recognisable in the self-same arbour in question. Then, our next problem is what are the relationships between the two. As was stated above, the relation between the instrumental (or functional) and the aesthetic/artistic has been often discussed in traditional Western philosophy. Briefly looking back to these discussions I shall examine the arbour's mode of existence in more detail.

#### **(1): Externality, Interruption:**

According to typical modern Western aesthetics the instrumental and the aesthetic/artistic are external to each other, belonging to totally different regions, with an unbridgeable gap or interruption separating them<sup>13</sup>. Accordingly, the consciousness of the user/spectator/maker of such things as the Katsura arbour comes and goes from one to the other: if the thing is handled as an instrument, one actually or virtually uses it with 'interest' towards its substance, whereas if it is regarded as an aesthetic/artistic object, one contemplates it with distance and 'disinterestedness' (to use the Kantian terminology).

#### **(2): Agreeableness of the End:**

But of course, in the West there is an older tradition heterogeneous to this modern notion: according to the older tradition the instrumentality or the utensil's utility itself is productive of some kind of beauty. The origin of this tradition can be traced to Plato's *Hippias Major* (295d-e), for example, but it is still detectable in such a later text as David Hume's *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739-40). Hume thinks 'convenience', 'utility', or 'fitness for [the] purpose' to be (the causes of)

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<sup>12</sup> For general characterisation of the instrumental and the aesthetic/artistic, see for example: R. G. Collingwood, *The Principles of Art* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1938), Vol. 1, Ch. 2; Malcolm Budd, *Values of Art: Pictures, Poetry and Music* (London: Penguin, 1995), pp. 4-8; Robert Stecker, *Artworks: Definition, Meaning, Value* (University Park, Pa.: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), Ch. 12, esp. pp. 251-58.

It can be said that the aesthetic/artistic is utilised as an instrument: one for the purposes of producing aesthetically satisfying experience, communicating artistic ideas, for the artist's earning money, etc., and that its inner world is instrumentally used in order to achieve these ends. Strictly speaking, therefore, the aesthetic/artistic is not an absolute end in itself, but its (outer) end seems to reside in itself. To designate this peculiarity of the aesthetic/artistic, some philosophers have proposed to say that it has an 'inherent' rather than 'intrinsic' value, the latter term being restricted only to the absolute end in itself.

<sup>13</sup> See for example: Edward Bullough, "Psychical Distance" as a Factor in Art and an Aesthetic Principle', *The British Journal of Psychology*, V, 2 (1912): 87-118; rpt. idem, *Aesthetics: Lectures and Essays* (1957; rpt. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1977), pp. 94f.; Jerome Stolnitz, *Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art Criticism* (Cambridge Mass.: Riverside, 1960), pp. 33f.

beauty<sup>14</sup>; he says that it ‘pleases us by nothing but its tendency to produce an end that is agreeable’<sup>15</sup>.

What is interesting is that Hume mentions as an example of such beauty a subject frequently discussed in garden theories of his time: ‘nothing renders a field more agreeable than its fertility’, he says, ‘[f]ertility and value have a plain reference to use; and that to riches, joy, and plenty’<sup>16</sup>. Although Hume is not directly discussing agricultural utility of the *garden*, the contemporary British gentry constructed so-called ‘*fermes ornées*’ or ornamented farms<sup>17</sup> in order to incorporate such instrumental beauty of agriculture into their landscape gardens.

Three points should be noted here:

First, Hume is using the word ‘beauty’ in its broadest sense. Needless to say, this derives from the fact that his terminology is based on the older, pre-modern senses of the word ‘beauty’. Accordingly, what he means by ‘beauty’ is quite defuse, almost equivalent to generally ‘good’ or ‘wonderful’, only indicating indistinct affirmation of the object’s value.

Second, taking a closer look, Hume’s beauty belongs not to the instrument itself, but rather to the outside end it serves; then, this agreeableness of the end is somehow inverted and superimposed onto the instrument, and regarded as the latter’s beauty. Such a situation can be observed in gardens, not necessarily restricted to their agricultural aspects. To take the arbour in Katsura garden as an example, just because it serves efficiently the agreeable outer ends of comfortable sitting, formally refined ritualistic behaviours and conversations to be conducted there, tea ceremonies, etc., it acquires the impression of affirmative value or good, which appears to be beautiful in the wider sense.

From the two points above it is clear that in the Humean explanation the instrument itself and the aesthetic/artistic character *per se* are in fact still external to each other.

Third, in the case of Hume’s agricultural ‘field’, it is ambiguous what exactly is the end it serves. The immediate end of the field can be surely said to be its ‘fertility’, but the ‘use’ and ‘riches, joy, and plenty’ to which the ‘fertility’ has a ‘reference’ also can be said to be its ends. Hume says this ‘reference’ is effected by ‘imagination’ and ‘sympathy’; be that as it may, the end of the field remains indeterminate in the final analysis. Generally speaking such ambiguity is always observable in ordinary instruments.

This applies to the waiting arbour in question: it certainly has as its immediate end the waiting or the tea ceremony; but since these acts are aiming at entertainment and recreation to be conducted there, its end can be said to be such entertainment and recreation. Again, in the historical context of its construction, to afford such refined entertainment and buildings would show off the aristocratic status of the garden’s proprietor(s), so as to serve the end of manifesting the cultural hegemony of the old aristocracy in Kyoto (the ancient capital of Japan), contra the military Tokugawa shogunate which was rapidly solidifying its power at the time in Edo (old Tokyo).

Thus, as Roger Scruton has said criticising architectural functionalism<sup>18</sup>, the end or the proper

<sup>14</sup> David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Bk II, Pt II, Sect V, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 235.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, Bk III, Pt III, Sect I, ed.cit., pp. 368f.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, Bk II, Pt II, Sect V, ed.cit., p. 235.

<sup>17</sup> See note 5 above.

<sup>18</sup> Roger Scruton, *The Aesthetics of Architecture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 38-43.

function of an instrument is often ambiguous (as well as changing through time). This point is so important for examining the nature of the instruments in the garden that I shall discuss it at length later.

### (3) Functional Beauty:

By bridging the externality and interruption between the instrumental and the aesthetic/artistic as stated above, advocates of ‘functional beauty’ assert that the instrument as such *internally* possesses some kind of beauty. There has been a huge amount of literature on this topic, but I shall only refer to the most important recent work by Glenn Parsons and Allen Carlson (I shall sometimes tacitly change their terminologies to fit my argument)<sup>19</sup>.

According to Parsons and Carlson the aesthetic appreciation of useful artefacts or instruments is ‘cognitively rich’: i.e., instruments have gained cognitive categories showing their proper function or end as a result of selection in the marketplace, and these categories *internally* determine the aesthetic appreciation of those artefacts. Relying on Kendall Walton’s theory of categories of art<sup>20</sup>, Parsons and Carlson classify into three rubrics the instrument’s relevant properties when considered with reference to these categories: ‘standard’, ‘variable’, and ‘contra-standard’. By certain combinations of these three kinds of properties there will emerge at least the following three types of internal functional aesthetic qualities.

The first type consists in an instrument’s ‘looking fit’ for its end. This aesthetic quality is produced when the artefact, with reference to the category of its function, seems to lack every contra-standard property and to possess a higher degree of variable properties showing its function. In the example of the Katsura arbour, its bench in the narrower sense need not be in its present particular shape to serve its end of providing seating; in other words, the bench’s shape is a variable property with reference to its function. But the shape of the bench seems to possess the height and width, the backrest and armrest fit to invite sitting and to serve the end very well. In addition, it has no contra-standard property that suggests bad seating. Hence, with reference to the category of its function, the internal functional aesthetic quality of ‘looking fit’ emerges.

The second type is produced when the instrument seems to possess (almost) no contra-standard or variable properties with reference to the category of its function, but to possess only standard properties. In this case the instrument will have such functional aesthetic qualities as ‘simple’, ‘graceful’, or ‘elegant’. For example, some of the stepping stones and paved platform set in front of the arbour seem to be entirely subservient to the end of walking (see fig. 1): they are set in a completely suitable manner to prevent shoes from getting dirty when it is raining, to protect the soft moss from being stepped on, and to be in perfect accord with the guest’s pace, so as to effect a peculiar aesthetic functional quality. This quality corresponds to the modernist and ‘functionalist’ aspect of Katsura that the German architect, Bruno Taut (1880-1938) is said to have discovered when he visited it in 1933.

Thirdly, when the instrument fulfilling its end seems to lack some standard properties, and to possess contra-standard properties with reference to its functional category, it will gain ‘a surprising,

<sup>19</sup> Glenn Parsons and Allen Carlson, *Functional Beauty* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

<sup>20</sup> Kendall Walton, ‘Categories of Art’, *Philosophical Review*, 79 (1970): 334-67.



vibrant look', or a 'pleasing dissonance'. In the example of the arbour, the extremely thin pillars look barely able to support the heavy roof; in other words they seem to lack standard properties and to possess contra-standard properties in reference to their function of supporting the roof, effecting a certain playful functional aesthetic quality. This quality corresponds to the postmodern Katsura that the contemporary Japanese architect, Arata Isozaki (1931-) has discovered there.

Thus the three types of internal functional aesthetic qualities Parsons and Carlson enumerate can be all detected in the arbour in Katsura garden.

### **From Quantitative to Qualitative Peculiarity:**

To summarise, the arbour's mode of existence can be described in terms of the three viewpoints cited above concerning the relationship between instrumental and aesthetic/artistic: (1) externality and interruption between instrumental and aesthetic/artistic, (2) the general affirmative impression which the agreeable end gives by imagination and sympathy, and (3) three types of internal functional aesthetic quality as stated by Parsons and Carlson.

Probably these viewpoints are not exclusive in principle, capable of existing concurrently, and which of them is prevalent or proper depends on the particular historical context at one particular time and place. For instance, in the context of modern society where the instrumental and the aesthetic/artistic stand in marked contrast to each other, their externality and interruption are emphasised, whereas in the context of pre-modern or post-modern society they tend to be internally related (whether in conscious or sub-conscious ways); or in the age of the tea-ceremony school directly influenced by the tea-master Rikyû, utility and beauty would be put in sharp contrast, and/or the functional aesthetic quality by standard properties would be foregrounded, whereas in the later age when the tastes of the tea-masters Oribe and Enshû were dominant, utility and beauty would be blended internally, and/or the functional aesthetic quality by variable and contra-standard properties would be prevalent. Furthermore, even within the very same society or age, which viewpoint will be prevalent can vary depending on the contexts of each garden, spectator, occasion, or other numerous factors. In contemporary society, for example, people tend to regard public parks whose foremost concerns are leisure activities (sports, picnics, etc.), only as reflecting the agreeableness of these ends, while even today in more traditional tea-ceremony gardens utility and beauty tend to merge internally if used in traditional ways. When these same tea-ceremony gardens are appreciated as objects of sightseeing, however, the aesthetic/artistic may well be more prevalent than the instrumental. And it is still possible that the user/spectator prioritises the agreeableness of the ends of his or her leisure activities such as socialising with company in the garden. (As stated before, one should not exclude such seemingly 'improper' or 'impure' garden experiences from the philosophical investigations of the garden simply as degraded or not genuine.)

But such ways of co-existence of instrumental and aesthetic/artistic are not qualitatively peculiar to the garden, but widely observable outside it. If there is something in them peculiar to the garden, it will be only the *quantitative* difference founded on the fact that in the garden it is easier and more probable for the aesthetic/artistic to be foregrounded; for, the garden is an 'emplacement' (Foucault)<sup>21</sup>

<sup>21</sup> Michel Foucault, 'Des espaces autres (1967), Hétérotopie', in *Dits et écrits* (1984)(Paris: Gallimard, 2001).

assigned by social institutions specially for facilitating aesthetic appreciation more efficiently and frequently than in the ordinary everyday world outside. Related to this, most of the ends of the instruments in the garden are leisure activities, relatively easy to do and playful (e.g., pleasurable swimming, eating, and tea drinking), whereas in the outside everyday world the burden of accomplishing serious ends (e.g., performing one's social duties) is usually so heavy that the room for aesthetic appreciation tends to be scanty. The garden is relatively free from such rigour of instrumentality of the outside world; accordingly it will be easier for instruments in the garden to be appreciated in aesthetic/artistic manners, allowing for greater flexibility concerning user/spectator's choice of the three viewpoints mentioned above.

To repeat, this characteristic of the garden is not *qualitatively* peculiar to it. Moreover, the observations in this section thus far have not necessarily taken into consideration the *activities* or experience per se of the user of the garden. As far as I know, however, in the discipline of aesthetics there have been few reflexions on such everyday activities of using instruments<sup>22</sup>. In the following, therefore, I shall still mainly focus on the instrument, picking up one example seemingly peculiar to the garden (at least historically) and advantageous to explicating the transformation of an everyday activity: the ornamental toilet ('Suna-secchin') attached to the arbour in Katsura garden (fig. 3).

### **Instrument's Being-Set-in-the-Right-Place: Aesthetic Toilet, Duchamp's *Fountain*, 'Thomason'**

#### **'Suna-Secchin': Japanese Poetics of the Toilet:**

As is well known, every act to be performed in the Japanese tea-ceremony is thoroughly aestheticised and ritualised according to established rules. One exception is evacuation itself to be done in the (Suna-)Secchin or toilet, probably because of the simple fact that it is too ugly. Indeed the sharp conflict between utility and beauty in the Secchin was sometimes discussed as a problem in traditional tea-ceremony theories<sup>23</sup>. In order to avoid this conflict a separate Simobara- or Sitabara-Secchin for actual use came to be built later apart from the ornamental Suna-Secchin. But originally



Fig. 3: Inside of the toilet (with the stone urinal) attached to the arbour, the Katsura Imperial Villa, Kyoto.

<sup>22</sup> We can refer to Yuriko Saito, *Everyday Aesthetics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 26f., 211f. Also Arnold Berleant's work on environmental aesthetics may provide some hints.

<sup>23</sup> For example see: *Chafu* [Records concerning the Tea Ceremony], ed. Akira Tani and Zentaro Yagasaki (Tokyo: Shibunkaku, 2010), p. 22.

the Suna-Secchin was also used for actual evacuation, and how to reconcile its ugly use and its beauty constituted its most interesting aspect.

What can be called ‘the poetics of the toilet’ embodied in the Suna-Secchin, deriving from the Zen Buddhist paradox of using trivial everyday things for religious askesis<sup>24</sup>, might be typically Japanese, as has been suggested in Junichiro Tanizaki’s *In-ei Raisan* (1933)<sup>25</sup>. But a long tradition of intertwining excrement and beauty can be found in the West, too, from Socratic dialogue<sup>26</sup> to Shock Arts such as Piero Manzoni’s *Artist’s Shit* (1961) and Andres Serano’s *Piss Christ* (1987)<sup>27</sup>. The poetics of the toilet may well have a kind of universality based on physical human condition. In any way, arguably its most outstanding example in the Western context is the much debated ready-made by Marcel Duchamp, *Fountain* (1917), a urinal turned into an artwork.

### **Comparison with Duchamp’s *Fountain*: Instrumental Totality of Being-set-in-the-right-place, Spati-ality, and Aroundness:**

Although Suna-secchin and Duchamp’s *Fountain* were produced in entirely different cultural milieux, they have it in common that they put in aesthetic/artistic contexts instruments serving most ugly ends. I shall compare them to each other focusing only on salient points relevant to our considerations, so as to find out the characteristics of the instrument in the garden through a kind of negative way.

The most conspicuous difference between Suna-secchin and the *Fountain* is that in principle the former is really used for evacuation, while to use the latter as an actual urinal is prohibited or suspended: in other words the *Fountain* is deprived of the original end as urinal, and forced to serve Duchamp’s artistic concept (in this sense it can be said to be an instrument for a concept).

What should be noted here is the difference of their respective contexts or surroundings. Suna-secchin is an instrument serving the end of evacuation; which in turn serves the end of the arbour as a whole, i.e., waiting; then again, this end of waiting serves the tea ceremony to be held at the adjacent Shokin-tei Tea-house; and further, this end of tea ceremony serves the end of pastime in the whole garden or of living in the main residential house of the Villa as a whole. Martin Heidegger has called such a chain of ends/means of the instruments (‘Zeuge’: tools, equipments) the ‘totality of being-set-in-the-right-place’ (Bewandtnisganzheit<sup>28</sup>: we shall also call it, for brevity’s sake, the

<sup>24</sup> Cf. *Nanpōroku* [Southern Record], ed. Isao Kumakura (Tokyo: Chuōkōron-shinsha, 2009), p. 701.

<sup>25</sup> *In Praise of Shadows*, English trans. by Thomas J. Harper and Edward G. Seidensticker (1977; rpt. London: Vintage, 2001).

<sup>26</sup> Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, III. viii. 7.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Paul Ziff, “Anything Viewed,” in Esa Saarinen, Risto Hilpinen, Ilkka Niiniluoto, and Merrill Provence Hintikka (eds.), *Essays in Honour of Jaako Hintikka* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979), p. 285.

<sup>28</sup> ‘Bewandnis’ is one of the most difficult Heideggerian terms to translate. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson translated it as ‘involvement’ (Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* [New York: Harper & Row, 1962], p. 115). In a long note on the term they explain: ‘[its] root meaning has to do with the way something is already “turning” when one lets it “go its own way”, “run its course”, follow its “bent” or “tendency”, or finish “what it is about”, “what it is up to” or “what it is involved in”. . . . the kind of “involvement” with which we are here concerned is always an involvement of equipment [i.e., instrument] in “what it is up to” or what it is “doing”, not a person’s involvement in circumstances in which he is “caught” or “entangled”’ (ibid.). So my translation, ‘being-set-in-the-right-place’, though rather clumsy, can hopefully be tolerated in our context.

‘instrumental totality’)<sup>29</sup>. As pointed out earlier, the proper end (function) of an instrument can be ambiguous. In face of this fact Parsons and Carlson have asserted an instrument’s end is determined by the long process of selection in the marketplace. In addition, according to Heidegger, when the instrument is actually used, its end is ultimately determined and assigned by the context: i.e., by the specific chain of instrumentality, by the totality of being-set-in-the-right-place, whose final end is the human being.

In the case of *Suna-secchin* the totality of being-set-in-the-right-place is sufficiently evident for assigning its proper end without any ambiguity, whereas the *Fountain* is deprived of its original totality of being-set-in-the-right-place as a urinal. True, the *Fountain* has gained, or tried to gain, a new instrumental totality, i.e., that of an art exhibition or so-called ‘art world’, but its former end as urinal remains so strong that the *Fountain* looks, with reference to the category assigned by the new totality of the art world, too contra-standard, jarring, loud, and discordant to fit in there.

Furthermore, the *Fountain* gives the impression of being ‘out of place’ (which is exactly what Duchamp intended, of course). To use Heidegger’s phraseology again, in normal cases the totality of being-set-in-the-right-place of the instrument possesses its ‘spatiality’ (Räumlichkeit) and ‘aroundness’ (das Umhafte) rooted in a particular place<sup>30</sup>; but the *Fountain* appears to lack them.

On the contrary, the totality of *Suna-secchin* not only possesses the general spatiality and aroundness of the instrument, but is also embedded in a specific place, giving the impression of being unmovable and fit. Such spatiality and aroundness are based on the human being with a body capable of responding to the directions designated by the instrument, and on his/her actual bodily use of the instrument in the very space and surroundings (though Heidegger is not clear about this point). The *Fountain*, however, torn away from its original bodily use, lacks the spatiality and aroundness rooted in a specific place.

### Comparison with ‘Duchampian’ Garden: Rooted, Irreplaceable:

The situation above can be better understood if one transplants the *Fountain* back into a garden. Derek Toms writes about what might be called the ‘Duchampian’ garden resulting from such transplantation:

If art historians are in general agreement that a urinal signed by Marcel Duchamp constitutes a landmark in twentieth-century sculpture, who am I to disparage the gentleman in our neighbourhood whose front garden features a row of toilet bowls? (Planted up, I hasten to add, with pelargoniums.)<sup>31</sup>

As with the *Fountain*, the urinals in this ‘Duchampian’ garden are deprived of the original use and end, losing the totality of being-set-in-the-right-place, spatiality, and aroundness, forced to serve a new end of hosting pelargoniums. But this end of planting itself serves the end of the garden as a whole, and is assigned by the totality of the garden; and the urinals are in the process of becoming a

<sup>29</sup> Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, GA, 2: 112. Heidegger also uses the word, ‘Zeugganzheit’ (ibid., 69).

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 137f.

<sup>31</sup> Derek Toms, ‘An Essayist in the Garden, Godless’, *Hortus* (Farnham, Surrey: Wheeler), 36 (1995): 102.

part of the instrumental totality and spatiality, with an aroundness rooted in a specific place of the gentleman's garden---in a way becoming like a Suna-secchin. When in the course of time these urinals have fitted in with the surroundings, then they may well cease to jar and produce the discords aroused by the *Fountain*.

In fact such conversions or appropriations of instruments as in the 'Duchampian' garden are not uncommon in Japanese traditional tea-ceremony gardens: especially parts of small pagodas, columns, pedestals, or hand mills made of stone have been occasionally converted into wash basins and stepping-stones in gardens (fig. 4). These converted, appropriated instruments, while still trailing references (associations) to their original ends and instrumental totality, have the playfulness of the traditional Japanese method of witty 'seeing-as' ('Mitate'), and, fulfilling a new (artistic) end, seem to be rooted in the new instrumental totality, spatiality, and aroundness.

Of course, as was hinted by Toms' sarcasm above, the urinals in the 'Duchampian' garden still jar and are incongruous with their new surroundings. This is partly because the 'Duchampian' garden's urinals and their original end are too dirty to fit with the aesthetic end of the garden per se, i.e., growing beautiful plants, whereas small stone pagodas and columns, etc., can easily fit into the new situation of the garden. Also, it is partly because in the 'Duchampian' garden the act of conversion of the urinals has occurred so recently that their contra-standard properties have not been softened, too conspicuous with reference to their new end as a flowerpot. But it seems to be mainly because the urinals in the 'Duchampian' garden (as in the *Fountain*) are industrial products. Being standardised, the industrial product can have an infinite number of reproduced items of one and the same type; in other words, it is *replaceable* ad infinitum. This seems to be an important reason why in the garden an industrial product (or something looking like that) will almost always jar. To put it conversely, the instrument in the garden is, despite its instrumental character, often gives an impression of being *irreplaceable*.

As we have seen, the instrument is replaceable because it ultimately obliterates its individual being by solely serving its end. In fact if the arbour with the Suna-secchin were burned down, its end as a pure instrument itself (i.e., evacuation for the tea ceremony) could be fulfilled by another facility in the garden. In Katsura garden's case, however, the instrumental totality of the arbour that the Suna-secchin is serving for, the tea-ceremonial complex in the nearby Syôkin-tei that the arbour is serving for, and the refined connecting passages between them seem all to be too closely intermingled to be separated; also the spatiality and aroundness of the whole seems to be rooted in the most irre-



Fig. 4: Stepping stones, Garyû-sansô, Ôzu City, Ehime Prefecture, Japan (built in 1903-07).




Fig. 5: An example of Thomason, 'Pure Stairs' found in Yotsuya, Tokyo.

placeable of all, *this* Earth, which Edmund Husserl has called the 'Ur-Arche' (the German word 'Arche' means the 'ark')<sup>32</sup>. As a result, in the garden the instrumental totality of the being-set-in-the-right-place itself gives the impression of being irreplaceable. This impression is in turn inverted and superimposed onto the instrument, the Suna-secchin; then the instrument acquires the impression of being irreplaceable. Thus the Suna-secchin, even if it is a mere (and apparently dirty) instrument, can foreground its materiality and individuality to be sophisticated in an aesthetic/artistic way. This is how a toilet in the garden can become an object of long-term refinement, adjustment, appreciation, and attachment (without the accusation of being a fetish).

#### **Comparison with 'Thomason': Repeatable, Sheltered, Enclosed:**

Such a mode of existence of the instrument in the garden will be brought in relief by comparing it with 'Thomason', a type of found objects (*objets trouvés*), named so by the contemporary Japanese artist, Genpei Akasegawa (1937-)<sup>33</sup>. Typical Thomasons are those everyday instruments (including buildings) in the streets which ceased to be used for some reason, and are deprived of their utility, while in the process having acquired a kind of abstract and artistic worth (fig. 5).

Suppose for example a Thomason of the toilet: a public or domestic toilet whose protecting roof and walls have been demolished somehow, leaving the urinal exposed on the ground. Such a Thomason of the toilet, being a species of a converted or appropriated instrument like the *Fountain* and the 'Duchampian' garden, has clearly lost its original end and utility as a urinal. Despite this fact, however, a Thomason of the toilet still gives a unique impression of being irreplaceable. The reason is obvious. While the urinals in the *Fountain* and the 'Duchampian' garden have never been actually

<sup>32</sup> Edmund Husserl, 'Grundlegende Untersuchungen zum phänomenologischen Ursprung der Räumlichkeit der Natur', in Marvin Farber (ed.), *Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl* (1940; rpt. New York: Greenwood, 1968), pp. 307, 318.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Genpei Akasegawa, *Chō-Geizyutsu Tomason* [The Super-Art, Thomason] (1985; Tokyo: Chikuma-shobō, 1978). 'Thomason' was named after Gary Thomason (1951-), the American baseball player who joined a Japanese professional baseball team in 1981. He got the biggest baseball contract ever in Japan, then played very poorly, going back to America without any outstanding 'use'.

used, and supposedly will never be used, as urinals, the Thomason of the toilet *was* actually used as one. In consequence the latter has become a token which vividly reminds the beholder of its real use and user(s), its past totality of being-set-in-the-right-place, spatiality, and aroundness, as well as its user's historical existence and real life as a whole. As a propagator of the Thomason, Akasegawa deplors, Thomasons in general tend to disappear quite easily due to urban development. In the transient moments before disappearance they poignantly indicate by referring to the lost end and use the unrepeatability of human existence of the past which used to be rooted in a specific place and embedded within a tightly knit context of the instrumental totality of being-set-in-the-right-place, spatiality, and aroundness. This is why Thomasons give the impression of being irreplaceable.

Then, the Thomason is, as it were, the instrument in the garden put the other way round, demonstrating the latter's mode of existence in a negative way. By comparing both, the following three points should be noted:

First, the Suna-secchin lacks the characteristic poignancy Thomasons possess. This is because while the latter are about to disappear, instruments in the garden are stable, giving the user/visitor a (tacit) feeling of confidence that they can be used repeatedly in the future. Sure, instruments in the garden and even the entire garden itself may be drastically changed, damaged, or even demolished in the long run. But in most cases gardens will continue to exist in relatively stable and consistent ways as 'emplacements' assigned by social institutions to specific sites. This institutionally granted stability makes it possible for instruments in the garden to be refined, adjusted, appreciated, and loved for a long time. Thus the instrument in the garden, embedded in a specific place, gives the impression of 'Wiederholbarkeit' (repeatability) to use Husserl's phraseology again: i.e., that it will be repeatedly used after our death<sup>34</sup>.

Second, the Thomason lacks this repeatability because it is situated in the midst of the ever changing everyday world, exposed to the vicissitudes there (e.g., urban developments, wars, etc.). In other words the instrument in the garden with its totality of being-set-in-the-right-place is protected from the shifts and changes in the outside world (though not completely immune to the outside mutability). To borrow the term Otto Friedrich Bollnow has used concerning the space in general, the garden instrument has 'Geborgenheit' (the character of being sheltered)<sup>35</sup>.

Third, the garden instrument being protected means that the instrumental totality of the garden is closed within its precincts (even if the garden itself is not completely closed in the literal and physical sense). On the contrary, the instrument before being converted into a Thomason used to form a part of everyday surroundings, which could be extended infinitely in principle without any boundary. For example the toilet before being converted into a Thomason used to serve the end of the evacuation of a certain family, which in turn used to serve higher ends of the family's life, which again used to serve even higher ends of society and the state. Thus in the ordinary everyday world the chain of ends/means, the instrumental totality can be extended as much as possible. An instrument like the toilet, positioned as the lowest link of this long chain, can therefore be easily changed, damaged, or demolished just according to the demands of various higher ends.

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<sup>34</sup> Husserl, *op.cit.*, p. 325.

<sup>35</sup> Otto Friedrich Bollnow, *Mensch und Raum* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1963).

In contrast, the Suna-secchin (seemingly) only serves the ends situated *within* the garden; for example it serves the ends of evacuation, tea ceremonies, and at the highest, the living in the Villa as a whole, all to be met within the garden. The garden is cut out and enclosed from the outer everyday world. Hence the (immediate) extent of the totality of the being-set-in-the-right-place, spatiality, and aroundness of its instruments does not exceed the boundaries of its grounds. In other words the instrumental totality of the garden has the character of 'enclosure'.

### **Aesthetic/Artistic vs. Instrumental in Garden Experience**

When seen from such a perspective, it will be possible to regard the instrumental totality in the garden itself as a quasi-artwork. Enclosed from the mutable outside everyday life and rooted in a specific place, this totality is irreplaceable, repeatable, and sheltered like an artwork (on the contrary the usual instrument lacks such stability<sup>36</sup>), embodying an autonomous unity purporting itself. As a result the instrumental totality of the garden and its component parts foreground their materiality, capable of refinement, adjustment, appreciation, and attachment for a long time, which in turn will further enhance its irreplaceable and repeatable character. If this instrumental totality in the garden were to be given a relevant, institutionally sanctioned aesthetic category, then it could be seen as an artwork on the whole.

The experience of using such aesthetic/artistic instrumental totality, though it may contain practical interests as its elements, will itself possess some aesthetic/artistic quality, and will become unforgettable and irreplaceable. Such experience may well be like what John Dewey called 'an experience', the outstanding, aesthetically unified, achieved, and fulfilled experience about to be crystallised into an artwork<sup>37</sup>. In the example of Katsura garden the total experience of using arbours and tea-ceremony houses and living in the Villa will have an aesthetic/artistic quality as a whole. (This quality in turn will be inverted and superimposed onto each relevant component of the garden, conferring upon it a similar aesthetic/artistic quality.)

What should be noted is that such aesthetic/artistic experience of the instrumental totality of the garden is ultimately made possible by its being enclosed. To put it in another way, the aesthetic/artistic character of such experience ultimately emerges at its closure or after that, i.e., when one is leaving the garden or when one is looking back to one's garden experience, on or beyond its boundaries. Dewey also points out, in general terms, what might be called such post factum, retrospective character of the aesthetic experience<sup>38</sup>.

Of course, as is often noted, it is far from clear if an aesthetic experience is as unified as Dewey asserts; especially in the garden whose formal unity tends to be much more diffuse and ambiguous than those of the other traditional fine arts, one's experience can be accordingly more irregular and disorderly. Also, closures of the aesthetic experience can already occur during one's experience of the garden within its outermost boundaries: to take Katsura arbour as an example again, it and its immediate surroundings themselves make up a kind of tightly composed artistic enclosure, what

<sup>36</sup> Cf. Persons and Carlson, op.cit.

<sup>37</sup> John Dewey, *Art as Experience* (New York: Minton, 1934).

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 36, 55f.



might be called a small garden within the whole garden, where some closure of aesthetic experience can already happen (especially when the tea ceremony in the main tea house ends) before one leaves Katsura garden as a whole. Furthermore, since it is obvious from the moment one enters the garden that one will leave it after some time spent there, the closure of the experience of the garden as a whole can be foreseen or felt anticipatorily before one actually leaves the garden, giving its components some feel of closure.

Be that as it may, at the least when one leaves the garden as a whole, garden experience must end without any exception, coming to its final closure. Whenever one visits a garden, there will always be a small Paradise Lost (if one is not to suppose the utopian state of the entire universe having become one huge garden or Paradise Regained). This very fact, however, ultimately makes it possible that the instrument in the garden with its totality of being-set-in-the-right-place, though serving practical ends with existential interests, should in itself become aesthetic/artistic (occasionally *ex post facto* and retrospectively). And in the last instance, this fact causes a certain aesthetic 'tone' to accrue to the experience of using the garden (facilities) in instrumental ways.

Now we have come back to the question posed at the beginning of our investigation: is this 'tone' thus produced *qualitatively* peculiar to the garden? As Dewey claims, in the final analysis, the constituent parts of aesthetic garden experience with such a 'tone' may not be essentially different from those of everyday experience. But this 'tone' can be safely said to be qualitatively peculiar to the garden in the sense that it is based on the objective structures inherent to the garden. That is to say, this aesthetic 'tone' of garden experience as a whole is not only ultimately achieved by the 'enclosure' structurally essential to the garden, but also is bolstered by its instrumental/practical being-set-in-the-right-place, spatiality, and aroundness which are unreplaceable, sheltered, and repeatable, being rooted in a specific site of the Earth's surface (including the land and the sky). Add to this, the specificity of garden site has been historically and presently sanctioned by social institutions as an 'emplacement' for facilitating such experience. Hence the qualitative peculiarity of the 'tone' of garden experience based on its structure. (As was suggested earlier, in the actual garden experience this peculiarity merges with the *quantitative* one brought about by the increased natural/artificial/functional beauties.)

But if the garden is an 'emplacement' sanctioned by social institutions, this same character can jeopardise the very specificity of its instrumental totality and experience. For, the garden's being enclosed from the public sphere of social institutions means at the same time its aperture and exposure to that sphere, which threatens to subsume it within the levelling social system and become a mere replaceable part. As far as the instrument is concerned, the closure of the instrumental totality in the garden can also mean its becoming itself a link of a bigger chain of ends/means, i.e., the instrumental totality of the outside world. In the case of Katsura garden, the aesthetic life in the suburban Katsura Villa as a whole could itself become an instrument for the outer world: for example the leisure activity and recreation it provides could serve the end of work and more serious life in the proprietor's main residence located in the central part of Kyoto. Then, just as the essence of the instrument demands, the material and substantial specificity of the instrument that is Katsura garden can be backgrounded and forgotten, capable of being replaced by another pleasure garden or leisure facility.

As Edward Relph has pointed out<sup>39</sup>, especially in the contemporary world various agents such as mass media, popular culture, large corporations, centralised power, economic system, etc., accelerate such processes of instrumentalisation, and tend to make the specificity of sites including gardens disappear, and the ‘placelessness’ prevalent. Should we then follow Albert Borgmann’s lead, and protect within some enclosed areas ‘focal things’ (e.g., the Katsura arbour) with special focal practices (e.g., tea ceremonies) against the outside technological hegemony?<sup>40</sup> But enclosure and aperture, place and placelessness are in the ultimate analysis complementary. If we are to protect the instrument and its totality of being-set-in-the-right-place in the enclosed space of the garden, therefore, we can do nothing but put them---paradoxically---into the framework of the outside social institutions.

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<sup>39</sup> Edward Relph, *Place and Placelessness* (London: Pion, 1976).

<sup>40</sup> Albert Borgmann, *Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life: A Philosophical Inquiry* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 209f.