Is Visual Metaphor Possible?

Kiyokazu NISHIMURA

1. Trope and model

In his film *Strike*, Eisenstein abruptly cuts from a shot of workers being slaughtered to one of a steer being slaughtered. In Chaplin's *Modern Times*, next to the abrupt shot of a flock of sheep, he puts the shot of a crowd of workers (fig. 1). Such cutting is understood as a typical example of film metaphor, while it has been not incontrovertible among theorists whether it is a real metaphor. Do film metaphors or, more generally, visual metaphors exist in the world?



fig.1 Charles Chaplin, *Modern Times*, 1936

In order to answer the question, it must be clear to us what metaphor is. But there are two confusions in the traditional theories of metaphor. One confusion lies in the conception that metaphor is a relation between things referred to by two words, just as metonymy and synecdoche are. The other is the confusion of using the word 'metaphor' extensively for phenomena of different kinds. First of all, we need to clear away these confusions and make sure for which phenomenon 'metaphor' is the proper term.

We can enumerate three types of traditional theories of metaphor, i.e. the substitution, the comparison, and the interaction view. The substitution view of metaphor is found in Aristotle's definition that metaphor in general is the transfer (epiphora) of a name to a different thing[1]. Not only metaphor in the strict sense, but 'trope (figurative transfer)' — in general including metonymy and synecdoche — consist in substituting one word for another. Based on this Aristotelian concept, traditional rhetoric has mostly insisted that metaphor is used to show an analogy or similarity between two things, which is the comparison view of metaphor. It can also be said to be a special case of the substitution view because it considers, in effect, metaphor as the transfer of a word.

In opposition to these traditional views, I. A. Richards named the subject word 'tenor', the

[1] Aristoteles, *Ars Poetica*, 1457b6-7.

figurative word 'vehicle', and conceived that metaphor is "a resultant of the interaction"[2] when connecting a tenor with a vehicle. Max Black took over this view and tried to analyze more concretely the interaction itself between these two words. The effect of calling a man a 'wolf' is to evoke "the system of associated commonplaces"[3]. If the man is a wolf, "he preys upon other animals, is fierce, hungry, engaged in constant struggle, a scavenger, and so on". The man is seen through the filter of "the wolf-system of implications", and then any human traits that can correspond to those of wolf are selected and emphasized, and any that can not are suppressed. When the human traits of victimizing and bullying others are "made to fit" the pattern of implications associated with literal uses of the word 'wolf', the human system of implications and the wolf-system of implications turn out to be "isomorphic" and "a mixed lot"[4]. Our view of man is now organized and transformed freshly. The "metaphorical thought" which is "to see A as metaphorically B" brings about the discovery of new analogies which have not been noticed and makes it possible to create a new configuration of a conceptual system and a new view of the world. The notion of metaphor is, for Black, connected closely with that of the cognitive "analog-model", and then "every metaphor is the tip of a submerged model"[5].

2. Analogy and symbol

It is by noticing the cognitive function of metaphor on the initiative of Black that philosophers have been enthusiastic about metaphor research since the 1970s. Among them, George Lakoff is one of the champions of this cognitive view of metaphor. "In classical theories of language", he thinks, "metaphor was seen as a matter of language, not thought". However, in the statement 'Love is a journey' the metaphor is a thought which structures the concept of love by mapping well-known and clearly articulated knowledge about journeys onto more complex knowledge about love. The love relationship corresponds to a vehicle on the journey, the lovers' common goals to their common destination, and difficulties in the relationship to impediments to travel. In this sense, metaphor is "a major and indispensable part of our ordinary, conventional way of conceptualizing the world"[6].

Lakoff's 'mapping' is almost the same as Black's 'projection' through a filter. "The semantic field theory of metaphor" of Eric Steinhart and Eva Kittay claims that "the cognitive force of metaphor results from the re-ordering of relations that hold among concepts in the field of the topic by projecting onto them the relations that hold among the concepts in the field of the source terms"[7], and therefore is no other than the mapping theory. If a metaphor makes two different things of their respective categories isomorphic or classifies them freshly under the same category, we would have to try to "imagine a world in which the metaphor, however incongruous it may seem, is true"[8], as George Miller says. Or, we would have to project ourselves into a metaphoric world as "a version of reality"[9], as Samuel Levin says.

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[2] I. A. Richards, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric,* Oxford U.P., 1936(renewed 1964), p.93.
[3] Max Black, *Models and Metaphors,* Cornell University Press, 1962, p.41.
[4] Max Black, More about Metaphor, in: *Metaphor and Thought*, ed. by Andrew Ortony, 2nd Edition, Cambridge U.P., 1993, p.29.
[5] ibid., p.30.
[6] George Lakoff, The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor, in: *Metaphor and Thought*, p.204.
[7] Eric Steinhart & Eva Kittay, Generating Metaphors from Networks: A Formal Interpretation of the Semantic Field Theory of Metaphors, in: *Aspects of Metaphor,* ed. by Jaakko Hintikka, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994, p.41.
[8] George A. Miller, Images and Models, Similes and Metaphors, in: *Metaphor and Thought,* p.397.
[9] Samuel R. Levin, Language, Concepts and Worlds: Three Domains of Metaphor, in: *Metaphor and Thought,*

But it is impossible, at least for me, to imagine such a world in which man and a wolf would belong to the same category and make 'a mixed lot'. Black's 'seeing A as a model B' is after all no more than paraphrasing A into B. Black himself confesses that if to think metaphorically is to do something more than compare, "what that "something more" is remains tantalizingly elusive: we lack an adequate account of metaphorical thought". And he accepts that "the chief weakness of the "interaction" theory . . . is lack of clarification of what it means to say that in a metaphor one thing is thought of (or viewed) *as* another thing"[10].

Thomas Kuhn as a historian of science considers some metaphors, for example one which describes atoms as 'miniature solar systems', as indispensable for constructing scientific theories, and says that "the same interactive, similarity-creating process which Black has isolated in the functioning of metaphor is vital also to the function of models in science". But we should take notice that Kuhn himself thinks of such metaphors as "more properly analogies"[11].

In fact, what the analog-model theory and the cognitive theory of metaphor have in mind is not metaphor in the strict sense, but the classical way of understanding the world through analogy or similarity, which Foucault regards as the principle which constructed the system of knowledge in Western culture until the end of the sixteenth century. According to the classical syntax for reading "the prose of the world" on the basis of analogy, which finds a correspondence between human existence and the earth, its flesh is the soil, its bones are the rocks, and its vessels are the large rivers. Yet here is no metaphor, but the discovery of the "analogical cosmography"[12] and the recognition that there is a privileged point of view supporting the analogical relationship in the universe, which is human existence. Even if to anthropologists primitive cultures "appear abundant in metaphor"[13], as Barbara Leondar says, it is a modern bias. For primitives, these mythological cosmographies are sciences based on analogy.

Today, as Gérard Genette criticizes, "the term metaphor tends more and more to cover the whole field of analogy"[14], and the tendency to label as 'metaphor' every transfer from one word to another, based on analogy or similarity between them, is widespread. To regard the relation of similarity in general as metaphorical, as Roman Jakobson does, and to call Freud's symbolism of dreams and the unconscious 'metaphor' reflects the same tendency.

Nelson Goodman says about "a picture of trees and cliffs by the sea, painted in dull grays, and expressing great sadness" that "this picture is literally gray but only metaphorically sad"[15]. 'Expressing', which is, in Goodman's meaning, not a literal, and so a metaphorical exemplification, points to the relationship implied in the fact that an object possesses a property (gray) which refers to another property (sadness) in a non-literal way. Then, what Goodman calls "the expressive symbol" is very close to what we have traditionally understood as 'symbol'. While Goodman accepts the statement that some of Hitler's architecture expresses 'nationalism', we call it not metaphor but symbol. For Goodman

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p.121f.

[10] Max Black, How Metaphors Work: A Reply to Donald Davidson, in: *On Metaphor*, ed. by Sheldon Sacks, The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1978, p.192.

[11] Thomas Kuhn, Metaphor in Science, in: *Metaphor and Thought,* p.85.

[12] Michel Foucault, *Les mots et les choses,* Éditions Gallimard, 1966, p.38.

[13] B. Leondor, Metaphor and Infant Cognition, in: *Poetics,* 14/15, vol.4, 1975, p.284.

[14] Gérard Genette, *Figures III,* Éditions du Seuil, 1972, p.28.

[15] Nelson Goodman, *Languages of Art,* Hackett Publishing Company, 1976, p.68.

himself, in fact, there is no difference between expression and allusion or intimation; and allegory, personification, and symbol are modes of intimation.

For Danto too, who highly estimates Goodman's theory of 'metaphorical exemplification', when a literal representation expresses a particular property, it is a metaphor. Moreover he says that "the artwork becomes a metaphor for life"[16] when readers or spectators identify themselves with the attributes of the represented character and see their lives in terms of the life depicted. As for Ricoeur, he is more eager to expand the epistemology of metaphor into its ontology. A scientific model is "metaphorical redescription" to explain an unknown field of experiences hypothetically. So, a mythos as a fable corresponds to a hypothetical model. Then fiction is "metaphorical reference" to see and describe an unknown field of human reality as fictitious plots. "Tragedy teaches to 'see' the life of human beings 'as' that which mythos exhibits"[17]. And here, metaphors work the same way as fables, allegories, and symbols.

Yet if we call expressions and symbols suggested in them metaphors, if we call artworks metaphors for the real world, and the identification with a represented character the metaphor of life, then the situation must be called "an inflation of metaphor"[18]. When we use the term 'metaphor' in the broader sense of 'transfer (epihora)' of words according to Aristotelian etymology, that is one option. Then metonymy and synecdoche, analogy and symbols, fables, allegories, and personification, as well as suggestion and implication, can all be called 'metaphor=transfer'. But then, we are compelled to call by another term such a specific figure as 'man is a wolf'. I would like to choose to call exactly such a figure as 'man is a wolf' metaphor, and to probe its properties.

3. The predicate-modification theory of metaphor

Considering afresh the phenomenon of metaphor, the first question is what changes in a metaphor in comparison to the normal use of language. The cognitive theories of metaphor we have criticized so far are those which regard metaphor as the discovery or invention of a special 'metaphorical meaning' and which claim that the meanings of words and the world corresponding to them change in metaphors. But we, who can not imagine such a world, should say with Donald Davidson that "metaphors mean what the words, in their most literal interpretation, mean, and nothing more". He says further that "what distinguishes metaphor is not meaning but use"[19]. In fact, deviations from the normal usage of words often recur in ordinary communication as, for exemple, slips of the tongue, malapropisms, idiolects, as well as metaphor, and yet "in all these cases the hearer has no trouble understanding the speaker in the way the speaker intends". According to Davidson, in order to understand such a deviate utterance, the hearer needs to adjust the standard rules of language with which he has already been competent to the particular situation, and to produce new rules to interpret what the speaker intends the hearer to understand[20]. And metaphor is a common example of such a deviation.

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[16] Arthur C. Danto, *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace*, Harvard U. P., 1981, p.172.
[17] Paul Ricoeur, *La métaphore vive*, Éditions du Seuil, 1975, p.308.
[18] Genette, op. cit., p.33.
[19] Donald Davidson, What Metaphors Mean, in: *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation,* Clarender Press, 1984, p.259.
[20] Donald Davidson, A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs, in: *Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson,* ed. by. Ernest LePore, Basil Blackwell, 1986, p.442.

In spite of this keen analysis, when he brings up Wittgenstein's 'seeing as' as the particular usage of a word in a metaphor[21] we are put back again to Black's 'projection'. What Wittgenstein calls "noticing an aspect (das Bemerken eines Aspekts)" is the experience that someone who has so far seen a picture as a duck comes all at once to see it as a rabbit; not that of seeing a picture of a rabbit as a duck, as is often misunderstood. And with this fact he claims that our perception is not pure perception but always an interpretation with thought. We do not see one and the same picture simultaneously as a duck and a rabbit, and therefore these two pictures, a duck and a rabbit, have not "the slightest similarity" to each other "although they are congruent"[22]. Then, the 'duck- rabbit picture' is the same sort of phenomenon as homonyms or puns and has nothing to do with metaphor.

Then what is the special usage of a word in a metaphor? Answering this question, it is necessary for us to make sure what the meaning of a word is. Let us share Putnam's proposal to "define 'meaning' not by picking out an object which will be identified with the meaning . . ., but by specifying a normal form (or, rather, a *type* of normal form) for the description of meaning"[23]. The meaning of a word 'dog' is a bundle of features which an object X referred to by the word is supposed to possess in the particular linguistic community, so a set of 'quadruped, tail, bark, obedient, etc', and a word 'dog' is, so to say, a label for the 'stereotype' as "a conventional . . . idea . . . of what an X looks like or acts like or is". We could add impressions of cuteness and trickiness, reactions to likes and dislikes which one may have spontaneously on hearing this word, and unique feelings which Edmund Burke would call the same 'effects' or 'affections of the soul' "on the word's being mentioned, that its original has when it is seen"[24]. This kind of consideration of the meaning of a word is common with Greimas' concept of a bundle of 'sèmes' constituting a 'sémème' or Black's 'system of associated commonplaces', and also with Michel Denis' concept of 'traits' of a word.

Important for semantics is, as the cognitive psychologist Michel Denis says, the fact that in ordinary communication only those few suited to the context, among numerous features or 'traits' of an object, are made conscious and 'actualized'. A schoolboy trying to answer the geometrical question 'divide the apple-pie into five equal parts' might be actually conscious of an abstract circle without any details like its hues and the gloss of melted sugar[25]. Yet this process of actualization does not mean the 'suppression' of some traits(sèmes) from the whole set of all underlying sèmes nor the 'adjonction' of some to the set, as Groupe μ conceives on the basis of Greimas' semantics. According to them, the metaphor 'Richard is a lion' "results from the conjunction of two basic operations: addition and suppression of sèmes"[26]. For while some sèmes (brave, king) remain after the suppression of the rest of the set 'Richard', the adjunction of the other sèmes (carnivore, fierce, king of beasts, etc.) to them results in the word 'lion'. But if a metaphor is a 'métasémème' replacing the one sémème with the other

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[21] Donald Davidson, What Metaphors Mean, p.263.

[22] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophische Untersuchungen, Philosophical Investigations*, transl. by G. E. M. Anscombe, Oxford, 1953, p.195.

[23] Hilary Putnam, *Mind, Language and Reality, Philosophical Papers*, Volume 2, Cambridge U. P., 1975, p.269.

[24] Edmund Burke, *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful*, ed. by J. T. Boulton, Basil Blackwell, 1987, p.166f.

[25] Michel Denis, *Les images mentales*, Presses Universitaires de France, 1979, p.164f.

[26] le groupe μ (J. Dubois, F. Edeline, J.-M. Klinkenberg, P. Minguet, F. Pire, H. Trinon), *Rhétorique générale* (1970), Éditions du Seuil, 1982, p.106.

through suppression and adjunction, the word whose meaning is changed becomes the synonym of what it is replaced with. Then metaphor is reduced to producing a new synonym and to substituting it for the other word.

We should speak of the actualization of some traits, neither of their suppression nor adjunction. The actualization of traits is just a linguistic phenomenon in ordinary communication. Facing deviations from normal usage (like metaphor and slips of the tongue), we adjust our rules and produce new rules in order to understand the deviate utterances. Not that by these new rules the literal meaning of a word changes or a new word is produced; only the usage of the word changes. The special usage of a word in a metaphor is centered in the rule that every word, not only a verb or an adjective, but also a noun, even a proper noun, put in the position of the predicate must be used as a modifier for the subject. The predicate 'a wolf' in the metaphor 'man is a wolf' is used as a modifier ('fierce and cruel in the manner of wolves'), and in this context such traits of the word 'wolf' as 'carnivore, fang, howl, etc.' remain latent whereas the traits named 'fierce and cruel' are actualized.

If 'man is a wolf' means 'man is fierce like a wolf', it could be claimed a metaphor is an abbreviation of a simile, and its meaning can be paraphrased into the literal meaning of the corresponding simile. We must be able to answer this persistent aporie of metaphor theory.

We can definitely say that the difference between simile and metaphor is that of sorts of utterances explicitly expressed on the surface of sentences. A simile is a sentence stating a comparison which has a form 'X is like Y'. It indicates, according to the usual rule of language, i.e. literally, that there is a similarity between X and Y, and tells us to compare these two things or incidents. The point at issue here is to put two things referred to by two words X and Y side by side, to compare them, to find a similarity or an analogy between them, and to explain and understand X by comparison to Y. In one case, a sentence 'he is like a wolf' expresses just a literal comparison that his face is like that of a wolf. But in another case, it tells us to pay attention to a similarity or an analogy of character such as cunning and fierceness. In the latter case, it is plausible that the simile has a metaphorical implication, and therefore Groupe μ recognizes only such a 'metaphorical simile' as a figurative simile. But, let us follow the usual way of calling every statement comparing two things a simile or a comparison. Even if a simile sounds implicitly metaphorical, it is a secondary effect of the sentence stating a comparison, which is the reason why the implication of simile has been thought to be weaker than that of metaphor.

By contrast, a metaphor which has the form of a sentence identifying two things 'X is Y' is literally false, and it is necessary to change the usage of words temporarily according to its particular rule which demands using the predicate Y just as a modifier of the subject X. The point at issue here is not identity between two different things X and Y, nor subsumption of X under a category Y which is normally contradictory to X, but nuanced identification of X by modifying X with certain traits of the word Y. A so called 'absent metaphor', such as 'Oh, my sun', is a linguistic surface phenomenon which is rooted in a basic form of metaphorical statement such as 'Juliet is my sun'.

If, in the metaphorical sentence 'man is a wolf', the word 'wolf' seems to be simply a substitute for the word 'fierce', it is because of lack of knowledge about the economy of language by which it tends to name things resembling each other by one word. Language names by one word the traits which are in some respects common to the words like 'lion', 'shark' or 'wolf'. Yet what the predicate 'is a wolf' in the metaphorical sentence encapsulates implicitly is the fierceness in just the manner of hungry

wolves preying upon other animals and scavenging, which is different from fierceness in general, as well as from the fierceness of lions and sharks. And this is the linguistic and rhetorical implication which can be effected only by a metaphor, i.e. the predicate 'a wolf' used as a modifier. Metaphor is the linguistic behavior to dare to use a word 'wolf' as the predicate for the special feeling and effect which the word 'wolf' gives to a hearer and which the word 'fierce' can not express. And so metaphor is indispensable for compensating for the economy of language and for a commonplace linguistic behavior.

As we have already seen, the error of the traditional theories of metaphor, which regard metaphor not simply as a linguistic phenomenon but as a new recognition of the world, lies in the conception that metaphor is no other than analogy and similarity between things referred to by two words. Symbol, allegory, personification, allusion, intimation, all these have been called metaphor insofar as they are relationships between two things. But metaphor is, though resorting to analogy and similarity, an act of predicating under the rule that the metaphorical word must be used as a modifier for the subject. Let us call this tentatively 'the predicate-modification theory of metaphor'. Then we should assert against Lakoff that metaphor is from beginning to end a linguistic behavior and phenomenon, rather than a cognitive one.

4. Visual metaphor

Virgil Aldrich, who says that the main points about metaphor in language "can be shown, *mutatis mutandis*, to have a bearing on metaphorical seeing", takes Wittgenstein's 'seeing-as' as the common structure of verbal and visual metaphor. Yet an example which he gives by way of illustration is something different from that of Wittgenstein. What he assumes as 'metaphorical seeing' in the first place is the image which is realized by the "fusion"[27] of an actress with Ophelia effected by her enacting. But it is just a matter of aesthetic representation.

Another example he gives, Picasso's sculpture *La Chèvre (Goat)* (fig. 2), is a little more problematic. Picasso replaced the rib-cage of a goat with a basket, which he himself explained as "a plastic metaphor". As a similar example, we could refer to Arcimboldo's painting of a face composed of flowers, fruits or fish (fig. 3). Roland Barthes says, "everything is metaphor in Arcimboldo"[28]. Yet he calls these 'allegory', 'analogy', and 'symbol' as well, and so here the term 'metaphor' is extended to 'trope (figurative transference)' in general. In fact, if we replace ears with shells in the manner of Arcimboldo, then we find there a funny and grotesque joke having nothing in common with the metaphorical implication of Jean Cocteau's verse 'Mon oreille est un coquillage'. In the case of Picasso's statue *Vénus du Gaz*, which is simply a burner taken from an old-fashioned gas stove and erected on a block of wood, Aldrich

fig.2 Picasso, *La Chévre (Goat)*, 1950, Musée Picasso

[27] V. C. Aldrich, Visual Metaphor, in: *Journal of Esthetic Education,* 2 Jan., 1968, The University of Illinois Press, p.73.

[28] Roland Barthes, *L'obvie et l'obtus,* Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 1982, p.129.

himself sees in it "a visual joke"[29] while still regarding it as an example of "metaphorical seeing".

A typical visual joke is a caricature. According to Goodman, a cartoon of a despot as a dragon is a "pictorial metaphor"[30] because the despot "metaphorically exemplifies" the cruel dragoness by possessing the properties of a dragon literally not ascribed to him, for example the dragonlike shape. But in fact, as Monroe Beardsley says, this picture only shows the despot like a dragon, and does not make a metaphorical statement 'the despot is a dragon'. To read such a statement into the caricature is our own linguistic behavior, and the statement "is a statement *about* the picture, not *in* it"[31].

fig.3 Arcimboldo, *Rudolf II. as Vertumnus*, ca. 1591

Another example of a visual joke which should rather be called a visual pun is, for instance, the show bill for coffee with a trade name 'Chat noir (Black cat)' designed by Julian Key (fig. 4), which Groupe μ dealt with. They consider an object as "a set of parts" and call the 'suppression-adjonction' of partial traits of an object "an objective metaphor", in parallel with the 'suppression-adjonction' of traits of words. There is certainly some suppression and adjunction of partial traits in the picture by Key. As for the black cat, the whiskers and limbs are suppressed while the spout is added to the tip of its tail. As for the coffee pot, the handle and lid are suppressed while ears, eyes, and a mouse are added.



fig.4 Julian Key, 1966

As Groupe μ itself admits, there is a clear difference between linguistic metaphor and iconic metaphor. What results from the 'suppression-adjonction' of sèmes (traits) of words is a 'métasémème', while it is an iconic 'métaplasme', a 'mot-valise', that results from the 'suppression-adjonction' of formal traits of objects. Yet Groupe μ says that "an iconic metaphor combines certain particularities which a linguistic metaphor offers in the domain of métasèmémes and certain particularities offered by a mot-valise ('chafetière') in the domain of métaplasmes"[32].

In reality, a mot-valise as a métaplasme does not appropriate certain particularities offered by a linguistic metaphor to itself. 'Chafetière' is nothing other than a joke in the form of a pun, and the picture by Key is just a visual joke resulting from 'noticing an aspect' as in the case of the 'rabbit-duck picture'. We can not see this picture as a statement 'the coffee (in the coffee pot) is a black cat'. To 'read' this picture so is, just as in the case of a caricature, a linguistic behavior of ours when motivated by seeing it to infer and read a certain sentence into it. For Charles Forceville, who analyzed pictorial

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[29] Aldrich, op. cit., p.82.
[30] Goodman, op. cit., p.89.
[31] Monroe C. Beardsley, *Aesthetics,* Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1958, p.375.
[32] Jacques Dubois, Francis Edeline, Jean-Marie Klinkenberg, Philippe Minguet, 《LA CHAFETIERE EST SUR LA TABLE…》, in:*Communications et Langage*, 29, 1976, p.49.

metaphors in advertising, images in advertising are no more than "stimulus"[33] to read linguistic metaphorical meanings. And Groupe μ cannot be unaware of this. They admit that "one cannot precisely talk about metaphor in its proper sense in the iconic field", and that "to talk about iconic metaphor is therefore to talk by means of metaphor"[34].

Noel Carroll takes the juxtaposition of two things as parallel to "the "is" of identity or apposition"[35], and finds visual metaphors in "composite images" the elements of which are connected with each other by mapping. His examples are Magritte's painting *Le Viol (The Rape)* (fig. 5), Man Ray's photomontage *Violon d'Ingres* (fig. 6), the image of a priest whose face is that of a pig in *The Temptations of Saint Anthony* painted by Hieronymus Bosch, Oldenburg's sketch *Typewriter-Pie* (fig. 7) and so on. But *The Rape* is just a case of 'the recognition of an aspect', and Man Ray's photomontage a typical *mot-valise*. Even if it is a visualization of a well-known metaphor 'women are musical instruments', it must still be said to be a visual joke as concerns the experience of seeing the image. The priest with the face of a pig is of course the same caricature as the despot described as a dragon. As for Oldenburg's *Typewriter-Pie*, in which the typewriter carriage and paper blend with the raised crust at the back of a piece of pie, while the downward trapezoidal convergence of the keys of a typewriter are captured by the triangular shape of a typical slice of pie, Caroll says that a linguistic metaphor produced from this image, 'typewriters are slices of pies' or 'slices of pies are typewriters', is very obscure. But all the more, he adds, this 'composite figure' as a visual metaphor succeeds independently of language and precedes its title, and it "counts as a uniquely visual metaphor". In fact, the perceptual experience of this drawing has rather the features of such surrealistic unusual feeling and strangeness as Dali's melted watches produce. It has a manner in common with surrealists which Genette calls 'an arbitrary simile'[36]. In a simile explicitly stating similarities, any arbitrary comparisons are possible such as Lautréamont's famous phrase: "He is beautiful....as fortuitous encounter on a dissecting table of a sewing machine and an umbrella" (Il est beau.....comme la rencontre fortuite sur une table de dissetion d'une machine à coudre et d'un parapluie)[37]. For surrealists, "comparing two objects which are as much distant as possible from each other, or with a totally different method, making them meet with each other in an abrupt and impressing manner, they remain the highest work for which poetry could long"[38]. Yet "this



fig.5 René Magritte, Le Viol (The Rape), 1934, Collection George Melly, London



fig.6 Man Ray, *Violon d'Ingres*, 1924, Gruber collection, Cologne

[33] Charles Forceville, *Pictorial Metaphor in Advertising*, Routledge, 1996, p.86.
[34] Jacques Dubois, Francis Edeline, Jean-Marie Klinlenberg, Philippe Minguet, op. cit., p.49.
[35] Noel Carroll, Visual Metaphor, in: *Aspects of Metaphor*, p.190.
[36] Genette, op. cit., p.28.
[37] Lautréamont, *Oeuvres complètes*, text établis, présentés et annotés par Pierre-Olivier Walzer, Gallimard, 1970, p.224f.
[38] André Breton, Les Vases communicants, in: *Oeuvres complétes*, II, édition établie par M. Bonnet, Gallimard, 1992,

cult of surrealists"[39] is, as Richards criticized, not metaphor in its strict sense.



fig.7 Claes Oldenburg, *Typewriter-Pie*, in: *Notes in Hand,* London, Petersburg Press, 1972

Considering the meaning of a word as the mental pictorial image of a perceived object according to traditional semantics, the word or the idea would have a one-to-one correspondence with that image or perception. To the contrary, considering on the one hand the meaning of a word as a bundle of traits, an utterance actualizing only a few traits relevant to the context, and a perception filled with all the details of the object referred to by the word on the other hand are in substance different behaviors. The corporeal-perceptual experience of the world cannot totally be reduced to the linguistic recognition of the world, though linguistic articulation is indispensable in order to give it a clear structure and to recognize it in a convenient way for us. It is certain that understanding the meaning of a picture and naming it with a word 'apple' go together. Yet perceiving objective images depicted is different from naming them with words. While verbal juxtapositions often mean copulas of identity or apposition, visual juxtapositions lack such syntax. After all, reading a picture and seeing it are different, and this difference is exposed especially in the cases of so-called 'visual metaphors'.

5. Filmic metaphor

Then, how about cinema? Cinema has its own discourse dependent on the syntax of montage which joins shots syntagmatically. Then, is visual metaphor not possible on the level of cinematic narration?

It is Eisenstein who treated the problem of filmic metaphor systematically. What he calls "a metaphorical montage" is the abrupt insertion of the shots of slaughter in his film *Strike* or of the shots of harps and balalaikas being played in his film *October*. Jacobson also mentioned briefly "a novel, metaphoric 'montage' with its 'lap dissolves'—the filmic similes"[40].



fig.8 Luis Buñuel, *Un Chien Andalou*, 1928

Whether these are real metaphors is controvertible among theorists. As to the above- mentioned cases as well as Buñuel's *Un Chien Andalou* (in which the eye is cut by a razor after a cloud has passed over the sun cutting it in two)(fig. 8), Jean Mitry argues that it has to do with a comparative relationship, an association of ideas, one of the two terms having a symbolic

p.181.

[39] Richards, op. cit., p.124.

[40] Roman Jakobson, *Selected Writings*, vol.II, Mouton, The Hague, Paris, 1971, p.256.

effect on the other, and nothing whatsoever to do with metaphor. He says, moreover, that "the majority of film metaphors use synecdoche"[41]. Dr. Smirnov's pince-nez caught in a rope on deck in *The Battleship Potemkin* (fig. 9) is a synecdoche of his absence, and a symbol of the collapse of the social structure of which he is a qualified representative.



fig.9 Sergei M. Eisenstein, *Battleship Potemkin*, 1925

Christian Metz also says that strictly speaking filmic metaphor requires "a motif completely alien to the rest of the film" which invades the fabric of the text, without the pretext of any natural linking only because of its resemblance to another element. It is therefore "a more disruptive operation" for the diegetic world. Insofar as metonymy and synecdoche are relationships between two things which belong to the diegetic world, they are usual phenomena in films. But "pure metaphor, with no metonymic complications, occurs only with extra-diegetic images" such as a flock of sheep in *Modern Times*, which is "actually quite rare even in avant-garde productions". So, what Metz calls a filmic metaphor is not a pure metaphor, but one "based more or less directly on an underlying metonymy or synecdoche"[42]. Then he should have said, after Mitry, "*film metaphor* — or what we understand as such — *is no more than a particular form of metonymy*"[43].

It is certain that films have a dimension of discourse narrating a story apart from a narrated diegetic world. Yet, insofar as it is a picture, a film image does not have the binary relation 'signifiant-signifié' of language, and the cinematic discourse, which is the fundamentally linguistic dimension of narration, can not be treated as independent of the story which is the dimension of the narrated perceptible world. The flock of sheep in *Modern Times*, or the slaughter of a steer in *Strike* is properly not a thing belonging to the diegetic world, and if it were a metaphor it should be a predicative vehicle which can only be in the dimension of the discourse. When it dares to show up in the dimension of the diegetic world with its full details, it can not function simply as a predicative modifier. Facing the abrupt invasion of strange images into the diegetic world, we do not, of course, accept such unnatural juxtapositions of two things literally. Yet, what we really experience there is to compare these two things and to notice a suggestion, a symbol, an allegory, or a caricature, a satire, or a joke prompted by the clue of analogy and similarity and to feel their visual effects. Here again, it is not impossible for us to infer and inquire into the intention of the author, and to read a metaphor into the image. It is, however, just a linguistic behavior of our own motivated by the experience of seeing a film.

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[41] Jean Mitry, *Esthétique et psychologie du cinéma*, II, Édition Universitaires, Paris, 1965, p.447.
[42] Christian Metz, *Le signifiant imaginaire. Psychanalyse et cinéma,* Union générale d'Editions, 1977, p.239.
[43] Mitry, op. cit., p.447.