

## Aesthetic Judgement and the Idea of Human Community —Problem of Universal Communicability in Kant's Aesthetics—

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### Introduction

In the last section of the *Critique of Aesthetic Judgement*, the first part of Kant's *Critique of Judgement*, we find a passage about the relationship between fine arts and humanity. It would initially appear that the perfection of fine art alone is the subject under discussion. But we can extend the same discussion to the matter of taste in general, for taste, or aesthetic judgement, is 'the indispensable condition (*conditio sine qua non*)'<sup>1)</sup> of fine art.

The propaedeutic to all fine art, so far as the highest degree of its perfection is what is in view, appears to lie, not in precepts, but in the culture of the mental powers produced by a sound preparatory education in what are called the *humaniora*—so called presumably, because *humanity* [Humanität] signifies, on the one hand, the universal *feeling of sympathy* [Teilnehmungsgefühl], and, on the other, the faculty of being able to *communicate* universally one's inmost self—properties constituting in conjunction the befitting social spirit [Geselligkeit] of mankind. [CJ, §60, 355]

What is being said here is that, as preparation for both creating and appreciating fine art, it is necessary to cultivate the mind with basic acquirements of *humaniora* rather than to obtain the special knowledge of practical directions or manuals of technique. *Humaniora* means the humanities or classical studies, which have been traditional sciences concerned with ancient Greek and Latin culture since Cicero's era. It was believed that these studies make human beings more human, or increase humanization<sup>2)</sup>. Now I wish to pay attention to Kant's definition of humanity. He holds that the meaning of humanity is not only our 'feeling of sympathy' or feeling of participation, but also our ability of universal communicating, i.e., getting across to every other people what we feel most inwardly and evoking their sympathy for it. And these qualities, which contribute to human sociability, should also be recognized as taking a decisive role in perfecting taste.

In this paper, I try to cast light upon certain aspects of Kant's aesthetics, relying on his notion *universal communicability* (allgemeine Mitteilbarkeit). In the *Critique of Judgement*, this notion is always applied to a Subject's mental state and his feeling of pleasure (with a few exceptions)<sup>3)</sup>. I understand the term *communicability* firstly as the possibility of gaining the sympathy of others or sharing one's feeling with

others, which does not always necessitate actual verbal communication *per se*. It may rather be taken as a *communio* of feeling. On the basis of this understanding of the term, this paper will attempt to bring out following points:

1. The factor of society, bearing directly on the universal communicability of the feeling of pleasure, could be a momentous issue in Kant's aesthetics. In fact the relationship between aesthetic judgement and society has long been an important part of the earlier Kantian theory of beauty, too. Nevertheless, the mode of this relationship has undergone a great transformation with his critical philosophy.

2. In the *Critique of Judgement*, the positive understanding of society could be found in the idea of *sensus communis*, with the mediate notion of 'reflection', which virtually means to aim at a universal standpoint. And this problem will take the whole aesthetic theory into the broader context of Kant's theory of Morality, Religion and History.

It is widely held by commentators that a phenomenological analysis of the structure of aesthetic judgement is the central task of *Critique of Aesthetic Judgement*. But that is true only of the first half of it. In the second half, including the 'Deduction of pure aesthetic judgement', it seems that Kant's ultimate intention is to elucidate the following question: if constituting a community is but characteristic of human nature, what role could aesthetic judgement take in the whole human activity?<sup>4)</sup> This problem, which should not be limited within a narrow aesthetic area, was not fully clarified even by Kant himself. But it would surely be one of the vital questions which his aesthetics still poses to us<sup>5)</sup>.

For the support of this argument, some other writings of Kant, including the fragments from his earlier classroom lectures, will furnish us with evidence.

## I. Aesthetic Judgement and Society

### 1. Universal Communicability and *sensus communis*

The starting-point of Kant's aesthetics is that an aesthetic judgement as such involves a claim of universal validity. To call a thing beautiful is to demand the same delight from others. This universal validity is not founded upon any objective concept, because in aesthetic judgement, unlike theoretical judgement, 'we refer the representation to the Subject and its feeling of pleasure or displeasure'<sup>6)</sup>. Feeling itself is always merely subjective and cannot provide a ground for universal validity. But at the base of the feeling of pleasure occasioned by a beautiful thing, Kant points to the presence of a certain mental operation, which should be common to everyone and provides a foundation for the universal validity of an aesthetic judgement. This mental operation is nothing other than the free play of imagination and understanding on a given representation.

In §9 and §21 of the 'Analytic of aesthetic judgement' Kant's reasoning is mainly epistemological: the harmonious interaction between two cognitive faculties, '*imagination* for bringing together the manifold of intuition and *understanding* for the unity of the concept uniting the representations'<sup>7)</sup>, with a relative proportion, is

necessary for every objective and universal judgement, i.e. cognition in general, as its subjective inner condition. So every harmonious interaction must be as universally valid as is any determinate cognition. There is a special type of interaction called 'free play', in which the 'internal ratio suitable for enlivening [Belebung] (one faculty by the other) is *best adapted* [zuträglichste] for both mental powers in respect of cognition (of given objects) generally'<sup>8)</sup>. Since this fortunate disposition can not be determined by concepts and does not bring forth any objective cognition as an effect, the mind can be conscious of it only through a feeling of the Subject, which is the 'feeling of life'<sup>9)</sup> occasioned by a given representation. Its universality for all Subjects capable of cognition is expressed by Kant as the *universal communicability of this feeling* (or of *this mental state*), which can assure the characteristic universality or inter-subjective validity of our aesthetic judgement. This universal communicability is also explained as depending on the idea of common sense (Gemeinsinn, *sensus communis*).

Since, now, this disposition itself must admit of being *universally communicated*, and hence also the feeling of it (in the case of a given representation), while again, the *universal communicability* of a feeling presupposes a *common sense*: it follows that our assumption of it is well founded. [*CJ*, §21, 239 (Italics mine)]

We can say that the ultimate ground for the claim of universal validity of aesthetic judgement is the idea of common sense, which is first presented in §20 (as an exposition of the fourth moment of aesthetic judgement, i.e. Necessity), but is fully discussed in §§39–40, as a part of the Deduction. So our argument about universal communicability will be distilled into the problem of *sensus communis*.

Before examining this problem, we must enquire into certain connections between universal communicability and society, because, by the notion of universal communicability, we might expect communication of some sort with others as well as the existence of a society. Kant really had a keen sense of the social meaning of aesthetic judgement. In the *Critique of Judgement*, he observes that although aesthetic judgement tends to keep us away from society (because it makes us absorbed in the contemplation of the beautiful, apart from any interest), it can be linked to an empirical interest with respect to society. The delight in the beautiful is distinguished from other kinds of delight—the agreeable and the good—by its *universal communicability*, 'but also from this same property it acquires an interest in reference to society [Gesellschaft] (in which it admits of such communication)<sup>10)</sup>. We can find that the problem of society was always important to Kant in his earlier theory of taste.

## 2. The Meaning of Society in Kant's Earlier Theory of Taste

In the so-called pre-critical period, Kant had taken 'society' as a principal factor in aesthetic judgement. The issue of universal validity and of universal communicability then signified for him the problem of actual participation in one's society, and the factor of society was regarded throughout in a positive light. Kant often refers to this in his lectures on logic and his notes on anthropology, dating from about 1770<sup>11)</sup>.

For example, in a fragment for anthropology from 1769 or 1770, Kant describes the judgement about the *universality* of delight in the beautiful object as being able to bring some enjoyment or pleasure. Hence the following assertion: 'since this universal validity is useless in the absence of society, in that case all charm of beauty must also be lost'<sup>12)</sup>. Here the actual existence of society is indispensable to the universal validity of delight, because this universality signifies the general agreement in a society. We can understand 'universality' here as 'generality'. In a transcription of Kant's lecture known as *Logik Blomberg* dating from about 1771, Kant states that 'in everything pertaining to taste, sociability is its foundation'. He goes on to assert:

*Sociability* gives life a certain taste, which it otherwise lacks, and this taste itself is sociable. . . . Solitary eccentrics never have taste. There is a certain principle in the human soul, which much deserves to be studied, namely that our disposition is *communicable and sympathetic*, so that man as gladly *communicates* as he allows himself to be *communicated to*. [*Logik Blomberg*, AA XXIV/1, 45–46 (Italics mine)]

In another transcription known as *Logik Philippi*, Kant claims that 'beautiful form seems to be only for society'<sup>13)</sup>. In these cases, Kant is connecting our pleasure in beauty 'to the satisfaction of a desire for communication possible only in a social situation'<sup>14)</sup>.

We can see a similar thought even in his critical stage. Kant published the *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* in 1797, almost a decade after the *Critique of Judgement*. In this book, he edited a lot of older materials from his lectures given 'for some thirty years'. So, though there are surely many points coincident with his later critical theory, we can still find some of his earlier thought in it:

We can therefore define taste as follows: taste is the power of aesthetic judgement to choose with universal validity. So it is a power of *social* estimation [*gesellschaftliche* Beurteilung] about external objects with imagination—Here the mind feels its freedom in the play of imagination (hence of sensibility); for social relations [Sozialität] with other people presuppose freedom—and this feeling is pleasure. [*APPV*, §67, 241]

It is suggestive for later discussion that social estimation is attended with the free play of imagination and social relations are taken to be founded on freedom. But the character of freedom is still obscure. What attracts our attention here is that Kant takes the universal validity of aesthetic judgement to be almost synonymous with its social validity. From such a point of view, universal communicability bears the substance of human sociability in aesthetic judgement. To share one's feeling of pleasure with others will provoke another feeling of pleasure. This feeling of pleasure in sharing or communication itself is held to be a part of taste.

Taste aims at *communicating* [*Mitteilung*] one's feeling of pleasure or displeasure to others and includes a susceptibility, which this very communication affects pleasurably, to feel delight (*complacentia*) about it in common [*gemeinschaftlich*] with others (socially [*gesellschaftlich*]). [*APPV*, §69, 244]

We can see that here pleasure is duplicated: the pleasure of seeing beautiful things and of communicating or sharing this pleasure with other people. These thoughts are characteristic of his earlier aesthetic theory. And we will find the similar thought that man in solitude is quite indifferent to the beautiful, even in the *Critique of Judgement*, though the treatment of society is not so simple as in his earlier thought<sup>15</sup>.

Now we must look into the relationship between aesthetic judgement and society in Kant's aesthetics of critical period.

### 3. The Empirical Interest in the Beautiful Thing

The main task of critical philosophy is to set three kinds of judgement (theoretical, practical and aesthetic one) apart from all empirical factors and to find an *a priori* foundation for the universal validity of each judgement. Society is one of the empirical factors from this critical point of view. Still the social meaning of universality in aesthetic judgement remains significant for Kant. But this time he treats the matter from an entirely new angle, i.e. partly attending to its negative side in §41 of the third *Critique*, but also partly making a positive transformation. Being no more than 'something else [etwas anderes]', that is an external and incongruous element of *pure* aesthetic judgement, society can be still an intermediate agent which arouses the empirical interest in the object of aesthetic judgement.

The empirical interest in the beautiful exists only in *society*. And if we admit that the impulse to society is natural to mankind, and that the suitability for and the propensity towards it, i.e. *sociability*, is a property essential to the requirements of man as a creature intended for society, and one, therefore, that belongs to *humanity*, it is inevitable that we should also look upon taste in the light of a faculty for estimating whatever enables us to communicate even our *feeling* to every one else, and hence as a means of promoting that upon which the natural inclination of every one is set. [*CJ*, §41, 296-7]

At first glance these words may seem to correspond to the definition of humanity in the previous passage from §60. But we must not overlook the fact that here sociability [*Geselligkeit*], as mere suitability [*Tauglichkeit*] for and propensity [*Hang*] towards society, is not always identical with the 'befitting social spirit of mankind'. The impulse to make a society is no doubt a blind instinct, but it is also true that the propensity or disposition for being in society constitutes a natural tendency or inclination in man as a social being. This propensity is just a necessary condition of a social man, but, as such, cannot satisfy that sociability which is *well worth* the name of humanity. If in aesthetic judgement the aspect of universal communicability of the

feeling of pleasure is associated with this inclination of the human being, that aspect may become exaggerated and turn out to be a matter of chief concern for man. In this case, any object will do, so long as it can bring real communication or sharing with others in respect to the feeling of pleasure. In fact in a highly civilized society, 'this work of communication is almost the main business of refined inclination, and the entire value of sensations is placed in the degree to which they permit of universal communication'. And even if the pleasure occasioned by an object is not considerable, that is trifling, 'still the idea of its universal communicability almost indefinitely augments its value'<sup>16)</sup>. As a result, taste would be deprived of its purity and be turned into nothing but a means of pushing forward each individual's empirical inclination.

There are still other problems. Sociability in this context is no more than what Kant calls 'unsocial sociability of men' in his other works, including *Anthropology* and the *Metaphysic of Morals*<sup>17)</sup>. We can find its clearest definition in one of his articles on historical philosophy, titled *Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View*, published six years before the *Critique of Judgement*. Here it denotes the human propensity to live in society, 'coupled, however, with a continual resistance which constantly threatens to break this society up'<sup>18)</sup>. For, along with his inclination to come together in society, man also encounters in himself the unsocial characteristic of wanting to direct everything in accordance with his own ideas. He therefore expects resistance all around, just as he knows of himself that he is in turn inclined to offer resistance to others. Through this very 'antagonism' within society or social incompatibility, all man's innate capacities and talents are gradually developed and every human culture will reach its height. But, originating in the selfishness of the desire for honour, power, or property (it drives him to seek status among his fellows), *heteronomy*, which is the dependence on others' opinions in *all value estimation*, comes to dominate. This is not sociability worthy of mankind.

This is not an exception to aesthetic judgement. If the universal communicability of the feeling of pleasure is sought exclusively, taste cannot lay claim to *autonomy*, and would be simply turned into an instrument of communication with others and even a means of conflict with others, no matter how refined and polished taste it might be.

This much may certainly be said of the empirical interest in objects of taste, and in taste itself, that as taste thus pays homage to inclination, however refined, such interest will nevertheless readily fuse also with all inclinations and passions which in society attain to their greatest variety and highest degree, . . . [*CJ*, §41, 298 (Italics mine)]

A youthful poet with a desire for recognition, a favorite instance of Kant's, may come to adjust his opinions and his behaviour to please the public, even against his own judgement<sup>19)</sup>. In this case, aesthetic judgement would have nothing to do with the cultivation of the human mind in its true sense.

Having showed the meaning of society on its negative side, we must enquire further into its positive implication.

## II. Universal Communicability and the Operation of Reflection

### 1. Aesthetic Egoism and Pluralism

Every aesthetic judgement is a singular judgement. An individual person must observe an individual object with his own eyes. He exposes the object immediately to his feeling of pleasure or displeasure. And yet it cannot be his own private feeling, if aesthetic judgement is to claim universal validity. But there can be an aesthetic egoist too. In *Anthropologie*, Kant touches upon this problem. Here, there are three kinds of egoism, i.e. logical, aesthetic and practical (moral). The *aesthetic* egoist is an artist who is 'content with his own *taste*, even if others find his verses, painting, music, etc. bad and censure or even laugh at them. By isolating himself with his own judgement, applauding himself and seeking the touchstone of artistic beauty only within himself, he prevents himself from progressing to something better'<sup>20</sup>. Needless to say, such is also the case with making aesthetic judgements in general. And the opposite of egoism in general can only be pluralism. It is 'the attitude of not being occupied with oneself as the whole world, but regarding and conducting oneself as nothing but a citizen of the world [ein bloßer Weltbürger]'<sup>21</sup>.

The pluralistic way of thinking is not always concerned with the surrounding people. One's main concern is not necessarily the present society. The point is but to take the whole world or all human beings to form, as it were, one community and to think of oneself as a member of this universal community. Is such a way of thinking realistic? Is it not a rather fantastic idea? And how could we have such a perspective?

On the other hand, from the viewpoint of critical philosophy, Kant stresses *autonomy* of taste in each individual. Every pure aesthetic judgement is to be an independent judgement of the individual. He must not count on the other's judgements. 'There must be no need of groping about among other people's judgements and getting previous instruction from their delight in or aversion to the same object'<sup>22</sup>. And yet aesthetic judgement claims the concurrence of everyone. But, without relying on any other people, how is it possible to prevent a fall into egoism? How can one attain pluralism within one's own self?

Hence if the import of the judgement of taste, . . . cannot be *egoistic*, but must necessarily, from its inner nature, be allowed a *pluralistic* validity, i.e. on account of what taste itself is, and not on account of the examples which others give of their taste, then it must be founded upon some *a priori* principle. [CJ, General Remark, 278]

The question of an *a priori* principle in aesthetic judgement is, as we have seen, nothing but a question of *sensus communis*. We shall now move on to the very core of our subject: what is *sensus communis*?

## 2. Taste as *sensus communis*

In §40, titled 'Taste as a kind of *sensus communis*', Kant gives the following definition:

By the name *sensus communis* is to be understood the idea of a *communal* sense [ein *gemeinschaftlicher* Sinn], i.e. a critical faculty [Beurteilungskraft] which in its reflective act takes account (*a priori*) of the mode of representation of every one else, in order, *as it were*, to weigh its judgement with the collective reason of mankind, . . . This is accomplished by weighing the judgement, not so much with actual, as rather with the merely possible, judgements of others, and by putting ourselves in the position of every one else, as the result of a mere abstraction from the limitations which contingently affect our own estimate. [*CJ*, §40, 293–4]

We can bring out many important things from here. The name of sense, which does not belong to the sensations proper, is applied to the faculty of estimation. The reflective act of this faculty is to test one's judgement in comparison with the judgements of everyone else. But for comparing to judgements of everyone else, it does not always depend on the presence of others. Neither does it require an actual society, to which one is obliged to belong. Instead this reflective act presupposes the idea that all human beings are capable of reason, which is possible only in our minds. That could mean the idea of a universal community or a kind of society made up of the entire species of man. *Sensus communis* is therefore the idea of the sense or faculty of estimation, which is supposed to be shared by all members of such a universal community. Other people, the general public surrounding the individual, may constitute potential members, who participate in that universal community but cannot all be members of it. The society itself is by no means able to take the place of the universal community. The society, which we can create and grasp within our empirical scope, is always subject to breaking up on various levels, even if it is gradually extended to a global dimension. In this situation, it is almost impossible to attain universal communicability in the true sense. Nevertheless, in aesthetic judgement, it is possible to represent through an act of reflection the universal community shared by every other person, granted that such a community can only be an idea. This is to seek universal communicability not in *actual* society, but in the *possible* society of a universal community. It is also to think of oneself not merely as one who cannot help having manifold interests in ordinary matters and is actually involved in all sorts of inevitable activity, but as a possible member of that community in the mind, who can 'communicate universally one's inmost self'. It is the meaning of 'putting ourselves in the position of every one else'. From this point of view, universal communicability and the reflective act are different sides of the same thing.

Here, the real procedure of the reflective act is but 'a mere abstraction from the limitations which contingently affect our own estimate'. Furthermore, the effective



operation of reflection is more concrete. It is 'leaving aside as much as possible the element of matter, i.e. sensation, in our general state of representative activity, and simply having respect to the formal peculiarities of our representation or general state of representative activity'<sup>23)</sup>. The formal peculiarities are those of harmonious interaction between imagination and understanding, which is called free play, as a state of mind.

The point to be concentrated on here is the significance of the operation of abstraction or of leaving something aside, which might seem to have only a negative import. The ability to abstract is certainly of great importance for universal communicability. Each individual unavoidably has all kinds of empirical condition in his own particular temporal (historical) or social situation. He cannot remove all of these in actuality. If he keeps on yielding to every natural inclination, he will not even be aware of these conditions. But to be able to abstract himself from these factors, at least in his mind, means his emancipation from his own individual, personal limitations, and a setting himself free at the level of possibility. Such an ability to abstract is essential to any communication with others. It is undeniable, though, that the range of communicability corresponds to the degree of this possible emancipation or freedom. And most basic to this kind of abstraction can be that operation of leaving aside the element of sensation, a mere accidental element of our representation.

Furthermore, the ability to abstract from an empirical element of representation is more generally held by Kant himself, again in *Anthropology*, as demonstrating 'a freedom of the power of judgement and the autonomy of the mind, by which the state of its representation is under its control (*animus sui compos*)'<sup>24)</sup>. Being in good control over one's state of representation could also suggest an ability to release oneself from the manifold accidental desires or passions provoked by one's own natural inclination. In these respects, the power of abstraction is, compared with the power of simple attention, 'much more difficult to exercise, but also more important'<sup>25)</sup>.

### 3. Aesthetic Judgement and the Cultivation of Human Mind

Based only on those thoughts about the reflective act, it could be said that the universal communicability of the feeling of pleasure is more essential to aesthetic judgement than the feeling of pleasure itself. Kant insists that 'we might even define taste as the faculty of estimating what makes our feeling in a given representation *universally communicable* without the mediation of a concept'<sup>26)</sup>. And therefore he can give another definition of taste as 'the faculty of forming an a priori estimate of the communicability of the feelings that, without the mediation of a concept, are connected with a given representation'<sup>27)</sup>. Here the object of aesthetic judgement does not need to be a mere means to any actual communication in society at the cost of its quality, as is the case associated with the empirical interests in it. The object can stand apart from all the determinations, which are only extrinsic to itself and are compelled to bear on the object owing to the Subject's particular interest.

Aesthetic judgement on an individual object, through a reflective act in Subject's mind, could serve to cultivate his mental powers in order to become befitting to that universal community as an idea of society.

Fine art is a mode of representation which, . . . has the effect of advancing the culture of the mental powers in reference to social communication. The universal communicability of a pleasure involves in its very concept that the pleasure is not one of enjoyment arising out of mere sensation, but must be one of reflection. [CJ, §44, 306]

On the one hand, the cultivation of mind is necessary for the perfection of taste or fine art as we have seen in the above-quoted passage, and on the other hand, taste and fine art could serve to cultivate human mind.

Kant often mentions the three maxims for the enlightenment of human beings<sup>28)</sup>. He is also extracting these as a help in elucidating the problems of taste. They are '1) to think for oneself; 2) to think from the standpoint of every one else; 3) always to think consistently'<sup>29)</sup>. Their aim is to acquire perfect practical use of reason. Although they all appear to be too common and stale, it would be a task of extreme difficulty to observe these maxims in a strict sense within actual social life. The cultivation of the mental powers is necessary for attaining these even with very gradual progress. In the second part of the *Critique of Judgement*, where Teleology is the main theme, Kant holds the role of fine art and science in the cultivation of human being, who is supposed to be the ultimate end for the whole teleological system of nature, as follows:

Fine art and the sciences, if they do not make man morally better, yet, by conveying a pleasure that admits of *universal communication* and by introducing polish and refinement into society, make him civilized. Thus they do much to *overcome* the tyrannical propensities of sense, and so prepare man for a sovereignty in which reason alone shall have away. [CJ, §83, 433 (italics mine)]

The ultimate end can still not be the final end of the existence of a world, which is nothing but man considered as a moral agent. Self-cultivation with fine arts and sciences could prepare the moral state of man through the power of discarding the element of any private sense, which will be linked with the liberation of the will from the despotism of desires. Although, it is also undeniable that all kinds of culture could fall into being a mere instrument of this very tyrannicalness, if it seeks exclusively the development of all talents to the highest degree.

### Conclusion

The aim of self-cultivation of human beings can also be found in the last part of

the *Anthropology*. Kant here stresses men's endowment with a moral predisposition as well as all his rational resources.

As culture advances they feel ever more keenly the injuries their selfishness inflicts on one another; and since they see no other remedy for it than to subject the *private sense* (of the individual) to the *common sense* (of all united), . . . But in doing this they . . . feel themselves ennobled by their consciousness of it: namely, by their awareness of belonging to a *species that lives up to man's vocation*. [APPV, II E, 329–330 (Italics mine)]

To think of human beings as a species does not bear a physiological meaning, but rather suggests the idea of a possible universal community. And it can also be interpreted as indicating that the whole human species in itself has the character of organism, which is argued in the second part of third *Critique*, as its paradigm. Already in §59, a living body is given as a symbol of the state (although a kind of monarchical one) governed by inner constitutional law, for an instance of 'analogy'<sup>30</sup>. An organism is a final being, in which all its parts, both as to their existence and form, are only possible by their relation to the whole and they are reciprocally both cause and ends. In such a product, nothing is in vain or without an end<sup>31</sup>. Furthermore the decisive character of an organism is that it is an organized and self-organizing being, which 'possesses inherent *formative* power [*bildende Kraft*], and such, moreover, as it communicates to material devoid of it—material it organized'<sup>32</sup>

With these definitions of organism in mind, the meaning of our first quotation from §60 will become much clearer. Each individual human being should be each one part (Teil) belonging, together with (mit) every other part, to the whole of the possible community, which is befitting to humanity. 'The universal feeling of sympathy' could signify human consciousness of participation in this whole community of human species. The active aspect of each part to combine with other parts into the unity of a whole by being the cause of their form as well as (reciprocally) being the effect of it, may be signified with that 'faculty of being able to communicate universally one's inmost self'. But more essential should be the formative power of man to educate and cultivate himself. Human beings as a whole may have an inherent formative power, which, cultivating the mental powers, should make up that community of the species worthy of the name *humanity*.

What kind of community or society it is should be given to each individual as an idea. It can be said that Kant suggested that it was 'a kingdom of god' in his theory of religion<sup>33</sup>. But now it is to be remarked that he poses three questions about reason, which will be crystallized into the fourth question 'what is man?', as follows: 1. what can I *know*? 2. what should I *do*? 3. what may I *hope*?<sup>34</sup> And it could be supposed that to the third question we might find an answer in aesthetic judgement with its universal communicability.

## Notes

- 1) *CJ*, §50, 320. According to Kant, although the requisites for fine art are imagination, understanding, soul and taste, the first three faculties are brought into union only by means of the fourth. And taste, or aesthetic judgement, is what one must look to as of principal importance in forming an estimation of art as *fine art*. See *op. cit.*, 319.  
References to the *Critique of Judgment*(*CJ*) are given by section, followed by Akademische Ausgabe(AA) V pagination. I owed all my quotations to the J. C. Meredith translation(1952), but *mutatis mutandis*.
- 2) In *Logik* we find another passage about *humaniora* and communicability. According to this, *humaniora*, as a part of philology or the knowledge of ancients which promotes the association of science and fine art and serves the formation of taste, advances the communicability and refinement of which humanity consists. See *Logik* AA IX, 62–3.
- 3) These exceptions are ‘universal communicability’ of cognition (knowledge) and representation. cf. *CJ*, §9, 217, §21, 238–9 etc.
- 4) I take the ‘Deduction’ to cover §30 to §40, a matter on which commentators do not reach a consensus, each given standards of their own. And the theory of fine art, the ‘Dialectic’ and the ‘Methodology’ should be interpreted in accordance with the preceding ‘Deduction’ to make a harmonious and consistent argument. Commentators are also puzzled and do not agree about the significance of the Deduction in the whole theory. (For example, D. W. Crawford, *Kant’s Aesthetic Theory* (1974), J. Kulenkampff, *Kants Logik des ästhetischen Urteils* (1978), P. Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*(1979), G. Kohler, *Geschmacksurteil und asthetische Erfahrung* (1980).)
- 5) There are some new illuminating interpretations, which attempt to treat the broader project of characterizing the whole aesthetic activity in our lives, rather than the question about the nature and structure of aesthetic judgement, as a principal part of Kant’s aesthetics. For example, G. Krahlming, *Die systembildende Rolle von Ästhetik und Kulturphilosophie bei Kant*(1985), S. Kemal, *Kant and Fine Art—An Essay on Kant and the Philosophy of Fine Art and Culture—*(1986). This paper is also an attempt belonging to this trend, but from a different angle.
  - 6) *CJ*, §1, 203.
  - 7) *CJ*, §9, 217.
  - 8) *CJ*, §21, 239 (Italic added).
  - 9) *CJ*, §1, 204.
- 10) *CJ*, General Remark on the Exposition of Aesthetic Reflective Judgement (General Remark), 275 (Italics mine).
- 11) This paper owes much to P. Guyer’s stimulating inquiry, especially in regard to Kant’s earlier theory. But the central aim here is to elucidate the complex modification of the meaning of society in Kant’s mature theory. cf. P. Guyer, ‘Pleasure and Society in Kant’s Theory of Taste’, in Ed. by T. Cohen & P. Guyer, *Essays in Kant’s Aesthetics*(1982).
- 12) *Reflexionen zur Anthropologie*, AA XV/1, 306(Nr. 686).
- 13) *Logik Blomberg*, AA XXIV/1, 354.
- 14) P. Guyer, *op. cit.*, p. 44. He calls Kant’s earlier thought implying that communicability is the source of our pleasure in the beautiful, ‘the communicability theory’. He points out that this theory insinuates itself into Kant’s mature aesthetic theory.
- 15) cf. *CJ*, §41, 297.
- 16) *CJ*, §41, 297.
- 17) cf. *APPV*, AA VII, 67, 240, II E, 322, *Metaphysik der Sitten*, AA VI, II §47, 471.
- 18) *Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht*, AA VIII, Vierter Satz, 20–21.
- 19) cf. *CJ*, §32, 282.
- 20) *APPV*, AA VII, §2, 129–130.
- 21) *op. cit.*, §2, 130.
- 22) *CJ*, §32, 282.
- 23) *CJ*, §40, 294.
- 24) *APPV*, AA VII, §3, 131.
- 25) *ibid.*

- 26) *CJ*, §40, 295.
- 27) *CJ*, §40, 296.
- 28) cf. *APPV*, AA VII, §43, 200, §59, 228. *Was heißt: Sich im Denken orientieren?* (1787), AA V, 146(Anm.).
- 29) *CJ*, §40, 294.
- 30) cf. *CJ*, §59, 352. Kant also uses the similar analogy in §65, 375 (Anm.).
- 31) cf. *CJ*, §65, 373, §66, 376.
- 32) *CJ*, §65, 374.
- 33) cf. *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft*(1793), AA VI, 93ff.
- 34) cf. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*(1781), A805/B833. Brief an K. F. Stäudlin vom 4. Mai. 1793. AA IV, 574. *Logik*, AA IX, 25.

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